**APPENDIX FOR:**

# Why Rebels Stop Fighting. Organizational Decline and Exit from Colombia's Insurgency

Enzo Nussio* and Juan E. Ugarriza**

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## 1. Extended description of the FARC case

For a more in-depth understanding of the FARC case, here we provide additional insights into the history of the FARC and the desertion policy, including additional references to specialized literature. Certain passages may be redundant with the main article to allow for a complete account.

### *Short history of the FARC*

The FARC emerged as a rebel group in the 1960s out of the remnants of earlier communist guerrillas who fought during the civil war known as *La Violencia* during the 1940 and 1950s.[1] In 1966, Southern communist guerrillas formed the FARC, based around the so-called Southern Bloc guerrilla created in 1964. This Southern Bloc gathered guerrilla structures sponsored since 1947 by the Colombian Communist Party.[2]

The communist guerrillas did not demobilize their forces after *La Violencia* but instead combined their guerrilla activities with self-defense groups after the civil war.[3] The government, in accordance with a broader strategy to eradicate the communist influence in areas with little state control, targeted, what they called, the "independent republic of Marquetalia" in 1964. According to its own foundational myth, the FARC thus formed that year in response to this military attack.[4] This led to a low-intensity conflict, which during its course involved a series of other rebel groups (including the ELN, EPL, M-19 and other smaller groups[5]). However, it was not until the 1980s, with the emergence of drug trade and

[1] for further reading about the FARC, consider CNMH, *Guerrilla y Población Civil. Trayectoria de Las FARC 1949-2013* (Bogotá: CNMH, 2014); Juan Guillermo Ferro and Graciela Uribe, *El orden de la guerra: las FARC-EP, entre la organización y la política* (Bogotá: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2002); Garry Leech, *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency* (London: Zed Books, 2011); Carlos Medina, *FARC-EP. Temas y Problemas Nacionales 1958-2008* (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional, 2008); Eduardo Pizarro, *Las Farc (1949-2011): de guerrilla campesina a máquina de guerra* (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 2011).

[2] Juan E. Ugarriza and Nathalie Pabón, *Militares y Guerrillas* (Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario, 2017).

[3] Robert A. Karl, *Forgotten Peace: Reform, Violence, and the Making of Contemporary Colombia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017).

[4] Eduardo Pizarro, "Marquetalia: El Mito Fundacional de Las Farc," UN Periódico (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2004).

[5] ELN: Ejército de Liberación Nacional – National Liberation Army (exists until today); EPL: Ejército Popular de Liberación – Popular Army of Liberation (demobilized in 1991); M-19: Movimiento 19 de Abril – 19th of April Movement (demobilized in 1990).

the appearance of paramilitary groups, some of them aligned with government forces, political elites and countryside businessmen[6], when this low-intensity conflict turned increasingly complex and violent.

In the second half of the 1990s, the FARC had accumulated so much power that they could hold scores of regular soldiers in captivity and dominate large areas of Colombia. During that time, the broader public feared that the FARC could even overrun the capital Bogotá, as they planned to do since the 1980s when they reached the estimated manpower, and financial and logistical support needed for the attack.[7] The FARC estimated that reaching 16,000 combatants, they could attempt to siege Bogotá in the late 1980s. Later revised versions of this plan led them to estimate the need for 32,000 combatants in the early 1990s, and 64,000 late in the decade in order to attack and sustain positions within the Colombian capital.[8] It was always the FARC's stated aim to take government power and the 1990s was the time when it was closest to achieving it. By 2000, the FARC had placed at least nine structures, with about 800 combatants, surrounding Bogotá, backed by thousand more in an outer ring, and short of five thousand more in mobility corridors leading towards the capital city.[9]

At the same time, peace negotiations between the FARC and the government between 1998 and 2002 did not lead to a peace agreement[10], but set the stage for a new phase of confrontation. Thanks to Plan Colombia, the Colombian Army's manpower dedicated to counter-guerrilla activities jumped from 82,000 to 132,000 in that period, while it received a significant boost in terms of aerial and logistical capacity.[11] The Plan Colombia enabled U.S. financial and military aid amounting to US$3.7 billion between 1999 and 2005, complemented by US$7 billion from the Colombian Government Budget.[12] A great deal of the financial, military and police effort of Plan Colombia was aimed at putting pressure on

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[6] Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, *Clientelistic Warfare: Paramilitaries and the State in Colombia* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2019); Mauricio Romero, *Paramilitares y Autodefensas, 1982-2003* (Bogotá: Planeta, 2003); María Teresa Ronderos, *Guerras Recicladas. Una Historia Periodística Del Paramilitarismo En Colombia* (Bogotá: Aguilar, 2014).
[7] Semana, "Bogotá sitiada," https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/bogota-sitiada/30364-3.
[8] See Farc-EP 1989. Pleno del Estado Mayor, La Uribe, 10-17 de mayo; Comando Cuarta División 1992. Análisis Plan Estratégico Farc; and Central de Inteligencia Militar 2000. Análisis de documentos incautados en agosto de 2000.
[9] Ugarriza and Pabón, *Militares y Guerrillas*.
[10] Marc W. Chernick, "The FARC at the Negotiating Table," in Virginia M. Bouvier, ed., *Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War* (Washington: USIP, 2009), pp. 65–94.
[11] Winifred Tate, *Drugs, Thugs, and Diplomats: U.S. Policymaking in Colombia* (San Francisco: Stanford University Press, 2015).
[12] See Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2006. Balance Plan Colombia. Dirección de Justicia y Seguridad. Septiembre, 11.

coca growers and traffickers, which also put additional strain to the FARC's finances. In turn, the FARC exploited the peace process years to increase their numbers from about 12,000 to 21,000 armed members from 1999 to 2002. However, by the time of the sudden end of the peace process in 2002 they had fallen short of collecting the needed manpower and financial strength to launch a military offensive against the Colombian capital.

***Desertion policy and FARC reorganization***

While 2500 members of different armed groups deserted between 1998 and 2002[13], this number increased dramatically after 2002. Over 30,000 individuals deserted between 2002 and 2019, more than 19,000 of them had belonged to the FARC.[14] The Colombian government invested since 2002 in a functioning institutional set-up to receive rebels willing to desert, offered amnesty as well as a reintegration program, and rewarded them with financial compensation for strategic information.[15] The desertion policy also included a sophisticated public relations campaign with leaflets, TV adverts, and most importantly, radio messaging reaching rebels even in remote areas.[16] Members of all non-state armed groups were invited to hand themselves over to any civilian or military authority of the Colombian state and register as "*desmovilizado*" (demobilized individual) to receive amnesty and the benefits of a reintegration program. Deserters from the FARC and other guerrilla groups received the same reintegration benefits, administered by the Colombian Reintegration Agency (called ACR for most of the time period that interests us), as the former members of their enemies, the paramilitary Colombian Self-Defense Forces (AUC), which demobilized collectively between 2003 and 2006.[17]

[13] María Eugenia Pinto, Andrés Vergara, and Yilberto Lahuerta, "Diagnóstico Del Programa de Reinserción En Colombia" (Bogotá: DNP, 2002).
[14] Commentators have noted that such large figures of FARC deserters would amount to almost 100 per cent of the active guerrilla force in 2002. Partial explanations can be found in the FARC's great capacity for rapid recruitment and replacement of lost combatants, as well as the underestimation of their non-guerrilla forces (e.g. *milicias*), which could possibly rival guerrilla forces in numbers (see also main article).
[15] CNMH, *Desmovilización y Reintegración Paramilitar* (Bogotá: CNMH, 2015).
[16] Alex Fattal, *Guerrilla Marketing: Counterinsurgency and Capitalism in Colombia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018); Juan P. Aparicio, Michael Jetter, and Christopher Parsons, "Truth and Absolution in Colombia: For FARC's Sake," Working Paper.
[17] Enzo Nussio, *La Vida Después de La Desmovilización. Percepciones, Emociones y Estrategias de Exparamilitares En Colombia* (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 2012).

The agency within the Ministry of Defense in charge of this policy has been called "Program of Humanitarian Attention for Demobilized Individuals" (PAHD), giving it a positive connotation. However, oversight institutions[18] and the FARC[19] also criticized the desertion policy as a counterinsurgency tool.[20] For the period from 2002 to 2006, the Colombian Government established a goal of 5,774 demobilizations, and arrest or killing of about 800 mid-to-high-ranking leaders.[21] In reality, more than 10,000 members of non-state armed groups deserted in this period, more than half of those belonging to the FARC. From a military standpoint, this policy was thus extremely successful. Many of the major operations against the FARC were partially based on information provided by deserters.[22] This includes the Operation "Jaque" (the liberation of Ingrid Betancourt and a series of other high-profile kidnapped persons in 2008), and the Operation Phoenix (the bombing of the camp of Raul Reyes, then number 2 of the FARC, also in 2008). During this time, emboldened military generals even talked about the "end of the end" of the FARC conflict.[23]

After a series of military defeats, the FARC reinvented itself with the "Plan Renacer" and later the "Plan de la Segunda Independencia"[24]. At the same time, the government's "Plan Colombia" started to lose effectiveness.[25] FARC's new war plans meant a return to classic guerrilla warfare, centered in small unit operations aimed to wear enemy forces out, such as ambush, sporadic firing, use of explosives, landmines and long-distance shooters, rather than massive attacks against police and military posts

[18] Procuraduría, "Proyecto Control Preventivo y de Seguimiento a Las Políticas Públicas Para El Otorgamiento de Beneficios a La Población Desmovilizada y Reincorporada a La Vida Civil Componente de Beneficios Administrativos" (Bogotá: Procuraduría General de la Nación, 2006).
[19] FARC-EP, "La Criminal Política de Reintegración" (Havanna, December 13, 2013).
[20] This is, in part, why the FARC later insisted that the reintegration agency in charge of their collectively demobilized members following the peace accord in 2017 should be called "reincorporation" agency.
[21] Ministerio de Defensa 2005. Directiva ministerial permanente No. 29. Bogotá, 17 de noviembre.
[22] Gerson Arias, Carlos Prieto, and Natalia Herrera, "Mandos Medios de Las FARC y Su Proceso de Desmovilización En El Conflicto Colombiano: ¿Una Apuesta Para La Paz o Para La Guerra?," Informes FIP No. 10 (Bogotá: Fundación Ideas para la Paz, 2010), p. 14.
[23] John R. Thomson and Dorotea Laserna, "El Fin Del Fin," *National Review* (blog).
[24] See Comando Ejército 2008. Plan Renacer los 14 puntos de Alfonso Cano (redireccionamiento de la defensa estratégica o complemento de la misma), Fuerza de Despliegue Rápido, mayo; and Ejército Nacional 2010. Análisis plan de trabajo por la independencia definitiva 2010-2014. ONT-Farc. Presentación.
[25] Soledad Granada, Jorge Restrepo, and Andrés R. Vargas, "El Agotamiento de La Política de Seguridad," in Jorge Restrepo and David Aponte, ed., *Guerra y Violencias En Colombia* (Bogotá: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2009), pp. 27–124.

aimed to obtain territorial gains.[26] In addition, these plans evidence the shift in focus and resources to social and political action rather than the now faltering military strategy to take over power. Despite the still clear military advantage for the government side, the new government of Juan Manuel Santos (starting in 2010) pushed for a negotiated settlement, which eventually led to a peace agreement in 2016 and the subsequent collective demobilization of the FARC troops. While most members of the FARC demobilized, dissident groups formed quickly thereafter.[27]

The collective demobilization revealed the profile of the FARC's fighting force.[28] Of the 10.015 demobilized members included in a census (in the main article, we report the numbers of certified demobilized individuals, which differ from the census), 55% were armed fighters, while the rest belonged to support networks (29%, in Colombia called "*milicias*"), and 16% were imprisoned. In the census, 23% were women, 81% came from a rural area, and 90% knew how to read and write, although most had only basic education. Also, the FARC was able to keep a subset of hardcore members loyal until the end. According to the census of collectively demobilized FARC members, over 60% had spent more than 10 years in the organization.

[26] Camilo Echandía, "Punto de Partida Del Debilitamiento de Las Farc," *Revista de La Universidad Externado*.
[27] FIP, "Disidencias de Las FARC ¿Cuáles Son, Dónde Están, Qué Hacen?" (Bogotá: Fundación Ideas para la Paz, 2017).
[28] Universidad Nacional, "Caracterización Comunidad FARC-EP" (Bogotá, 2017), http://pensamiento.unal.edu.co/cp-paz/acompanamiento-dialogos-de-paz/censo-farc/.

## 2. Variables used for statistical analysis

**Table A2: List of sources**

| Variables | Source | Coverage | Level of aggregation | Further description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Desertion (of FARC and ELN) | PAHD | 2002-2019 | Department | For more information, see main text |
| Killed FARC leaders | Ugarriza and Pabón 2017 | 2002-2017 | National | Members of *Estado Mayor Central*: Negro Acacio (date of killing: 2 September 2007), Martín Caballero (24 October 2007), Raul Reyes (1 March 2008), Mono Jojoy (22 September 2010), and Alfonso Cano (4 November 2011). |
| Rescue operation | Ugarriza and Pabón 2017 | 2002-2017 | National | Operación Jaque (2 July 2008), Operación Camaleón (13/14 June 2010) |
| FARC area | CNMH – acciones bélicas | 2002-2017 | Department | Dummy variable based on Any Contact between FFAA and FARC before 2002. Departments coded as FARC area with higher than median number of contacts (=1): Antioquia, Arauca, Bolívar, Boyacá, Caquetá, Casanare, Cauca, Cundinamarca, Guaviare, Huila, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, Santander, Tolima, Valle del Cauca Departments coded as not FARC area with lower than median number of contacts (=0): Amazonas, Archipielago de San Andrés y Providencia, Atlántico, Bogotá, Caldas, Cesar, Chocó, Córdoba, Guainía, La Guajira, Magdalena, Quindío, Risaralda, Sucre, Vaupés, Vichada |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| USD – Colombian peso exchange rate | Investing.com | 2002-2018 | National | In 1000 Pesos |
| Cocaine price per gram in US | UNODC | 2002-2016 | National | In US Dollars |
| Any contact with FARC | CNMH – acciones bélicas | 2002-2018 | Municipality | Any military encounter involving FARC |
| Military operation against FARC | CNMH – acciones bélicas | 2002-2018 | Municipality | Government military operation involving FARC |
| Coca cultivation | ODC | 2002-2018 | Municipality | In hectares |
| Population | DANE | 2002-2018 | Municipality | |
| Total GDP per department | DANE | 2002-2018 | Department | GDP with base 2000 and base 2005 merged |
| Land suitability for coca | Mejía and Restrepo 2013[29] | 2002-2018 | Municipality | Aggregated to department level using median. Not available for department of San Andrés and Providencia |
| Gold price | Investing.com | 2002-2018 | National | In 100 Dollars per ounce |
| Euro – Colombian peso exchange rate | Investing.com | 2002-2018 | National | In 1000 Pesos |
| Combat with FARC | CNMH – acciones bélicas | 2002-2018 | Municipality | |
| Coffe price | Investing.com | 2002-2018 | National | In US Dollars |
| Christmas PR campaign | Fattal 2018[30] | 2002-2018 | National | Coded as 1 for three months (December – when Operation was |

[29] Daniel Mejía and Pascual Restrepo, "Bushes and Bullets: Illegal Cocaine Markets and Violence in Colombia" (Rochester: SSRN, 2013).
[30] Fattal, *Guerrilla Marketing: Counterinsurgency and Capitalism in Colombia*.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | implemented, January, February), when one of the following operations were active:<br>Operation Christmas 2010<br>Operation *Ríos de luz* 2011<br>Operation *Belén* 2012<br>Coded as 0 otherwise |
| TV publicity promoting desertion | Aparicio et al. 2020[31] | 2002-2017 | National | TV campaign, especially during football matches |
| Forced recruitment of minors (by FARC and other groups) | CNMH – casos RUNNA | 2002-2018 | Municipality | |

[31] Aparicio, Jetter, and Parsons, "Truth and Absolution in Colombia: For FARC's Sake."

**Table A3: Summary statistics**

| | count | mean | sd | min | max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FARC desertion | 6105 | 3.07 | 5.73 | 0 | 76 |
| ELN desertion | 6105 | 0.68 | 1.85 | 0 | 42 |
| Killed FARC leaders | 6129 | 0.08 | 0.26 | 0 | 1 |
| Rescue operation | 6129 | 0.03 | 0.18 | 0 | 1 |
| FARC presence | 6129 | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Dollar-Peso exchange rate | 6105 | 2.32 | 0.44 | 1.733103 | 3.357891 |
| Cocaine Price | 5709 | 83.14 | 6.40 | 76 | 98 |
| Any contact with FARC | 6105 | 1.87 | 4.49 | 0 | 82 |
| Military Operation against FARC | 6105 | 0.13 | 0.53 | 0 | 12 |
| Coca cultivation area | 6129 | 2622.02 | 5390.68 | 0 | 45734.62 |
| Population size | 6105 | 1.38e+06 | 1.63e+06 | 33261 | 8080734 |
| GDP | 6129 | 17082.25 | 30396.62 | 68.68 | 236597.2 |
| Land suitability for coca | 5920 | -0.03 | 0.56 | -1.436631 | .8966476 |
| Gold price per oz | 6105 | 1015.06 | 442.95 | 310.15 | 1762.186 |
| Euro-Peso exchange rate | 6105 | 2.89 | 0.35 | 2.193364 | 3.72931 |
| Milicia FARC desertion | 6105 | 0.96 | 2.63 | 0 | 68 |
| Armed FARC desertion | 6105 | 2.10 | 3.88 | 0 | 54 |
| Combat with FARC | 6105 | 0.97 | 2.91 | 0 | 51 |
| Coffee price | 6105 | 132.92 | 47.53 | 48.11136 | 282.3167 |
| Christmas PR campaigns | 6129 | 0.03 | 0.18 | 0 | 1 |
| TV campaigns | 6129 | 0.61 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Forced recruitment by FARC | 6105 | 0.25 | 0.73 | 0 | 8 |
| Forced recruitment by other group | 6105 | 0.19 | 0.73 | 0 | 12 |
| Observations | 6129 | | | | |

**Figure A1. Evolution of coca cultivated area (in hectares) and exchange rate (in 1000 COP for 1 USD)**




This figure shows a largely parallel development of exchange rate (in 1000 pesos per USD) and coca cultivation areas. All else equal, a weaker Peso against the Dollar make coca exports more lucrative.[32] This could explain the largely parallel trend and provides face validity to the use of exchange rates as indicator for income from the coca economy.

[32] Juan F. Vargas, "Más sabe el diablo por viejo que por Santos," *Foco Económico* (blog), http://focoeconomico.org/2019/10/02/mas-sabe-el-diablo-por-viejo-que-por-santos/.

**Figure A2. FARC Desertion (2002–2017) across Colombian Departments**




Figure 2 shows where deserters were active across departments, largely coinciding with FARC areas of influence.

## 3. Additional statistical analysis

The objective of additional analysis provided here is to guard against haphazard results that are due to specific modelling choices rather than an underlying relationship between the variables in question. We briefly describe the logic of each additional test and the main findings. Overall, these additional tests provide strong support for the findings reported in the main paper.

**Table A4: Military performance (as Table 1), displaying control variables**

This table is identical to the one reported in the main text, except that it reports the values of control variables. We abstain from discussing the coefficients of control variables as their substantive interpretation may be misleading.[33]

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Killed leaders X FARC area | 2.189** | 2.222*** | 1.024** | | | |
| | (0.608) | (0.580) | (0.329) | | | |
| Rescue operation X FARC area | | | | 3.870** | 3.816** | 2.634*** |
| | | | | (1.343) | (1.241) | (0.718) |
| Contact with FARC | | 0.0278 | 0.0345 | | 0.0280 | 0.0352 |
| | | (0.0522) | (0.0349) | | (0.0517) | (0.0348) |
| Military operations against FARC | | 0.706** | 0.248*** | | 0.694** | 0.242*** |
| | | (0.211) | (0.0639) | | (0.208) | (0.0642) |
| Coca cultivation area | | -0.0000792 | -0.0000447 | | -0.0000777 | -0.0000428 |
| | | (0.000119) | (0.0000637) | | (0.000118) | (0.0000630) |
| Population size | | -0.00000290 | -0.00000167 | | -0.00000293 | -0.00000171 |
| | | (0.00000391) | (0.00000230) | | (0.00000396) | (0.00000233) |
| GDP per department | | 0.00000882 | 0.00000500 | | 0.00000896 | 0.00000534 |
| | | (0.0000356) | (0.0000203) | | (0.0000360) | (0.0000203) |
| lagged DV | | | 0.455*** | | | 0.455*** |
| | | | (0.0543) | | | (0.0530) |
| Constant | 1.030* | 4.713 | 2.303 | 1.030* | 4.735 | 2.339 |
| | (0.441) | (4.546) | (2.734) | (0.443) | (4.607) | (2.760) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.162 | 0.177 | 0.345 | 0.164 | 0.178 | 0.347 |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level. Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

[33] Luke Keele, Randolph T. Stevenson, and Felix Elwert, "The Causal Interpretation of Estimated Associations in Regression Models," *Political Science Research and Methods*, pp. 1–13.

**Table A5: Financial resources (as Table 2), displaying control variables**

Again, this table is identical to the one reported in the main text, except that it reports the values of control variables.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USD COP exchange rate X FARC area | -2.569** | -2.352** | -1.273*** | | | |
| | (0.822) | (0.687) | (0.348) | | | |
| Cocaine price in US X FARC area | | | | -1.807*** | -1.314** | -0.903* |
| | | | | (0.427) | (0.418) | (0.341) |
| Contact with FARC | | 0.0116 | 0.0256 | | -0.0679 | -0.0390 |
| | | (0.0547) | (0.0358) | | (0.0913) | (0.0918) |
| Military operation against FARC | | 0.701** | 0.253*** | | 3.036*** | 1.227* |
| | | (0.216) | (0.0683) | | (0.297) | (0.591) |
| Coca cultivation area | | -0.0000389 | -0.0000230 | | -0.00143 | -0.000948 |
| | | (0.000116) | (0.000063) | | (0.00150) | (0.000990) |
| Population size | | -0.0000029 | -0.0000017 | | -0.0000342 | -0.0000328 |
| | | (0.000004) | (0.000002) | | (0.000032) | (0.000044) |
| GDP per department | | 0.0000084 | 0.0000049 | | 0.000198 | 0.000127 |
| | | (0.000034) | (0.000020) | | (0.000305) | (0.000396) |
| lagged DV | | | 0.449*** | | | 0.414*** |
| | | | (0.0541) | | | (0.0433) |
| Constant | 4.542*** | 7.873 | 4.114 | 83.19*** | 105.5* | 119.3 |
| | (0.895) | (4.748) | (2.918) | (16.24) | (40.83) | (59.55) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 | 495 | 495 | 462 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.176 | 0.186 | 0.348 | 0.299 | 0.362 | 0.465 |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month (or year) fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level. Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Table A6: Military performance (as Table 1), with ELN desertion as dependent variable (instead of FARC desertion)**

In this table, we show the relationship of killings of FARC leaders and rescue operations of FARC hostages with desertion from the ELN, the second largest insurgent group in Colombia. This can be seen as a falsification test. Given that the indicators of decline are specific to the FARC, they should not impact desertion of another armed organization (the ELN). For example, the killing of a FARC leader or the rescue of FARC hostages should not be followed by more ELN desertion. This is what we observe in the below table. Results reported in the main paper are thus specific to FARC rather than reflecting a more general conflict-related trend.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Killed leaders X FARC area | 0.190 | 0.199 | 0.158 | | | |
| | (0.214) | (0.203) | (0.212) | | | |
| Rescue operation X FARC area | | | | 0.343 | 0.356 | 0.315 |
| | | | | (0.259) | (0.239) | (0.247) |
| Constant | 0.121 | 1.640 | 1.631 | 0.121 | 1.643 | 1.634 |
| | (0.157) | (3.240) | (3.261) | (0.157) | (3.246) | (3.266) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.027 | 0.039 | 0.040 | 0.027 | 0.039 | 0.040 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level.
Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
$^{*}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.01$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.001$

**Table A7: Military performance (as Table 1, Model 3), with different time windows after killings of FARC leaders and rescue operations (1 month, 2 months, 3 months, 5 months)**

As mentioned in the Research Design section, we use different time windows to capture the aftermath of killings and rescue operations (1, 2, 3, and 5 months). Results are, with one exception, positive and significantly different from 0. The results reported in the main paper are thus not due to a specific time lapse that we use for analysis.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month after killing X FARC area | 1.727** | | | | | | | |
| | (0.494) | | | | | | | |
| 2 months after killing X FARC area | | 1.544*** | | | | | | |
| | | (0.418) | | | | | | |
| 3 months after killing X FARC area | | | 1.493*** | | | | | |
| | | | (0.349) | | | | | |
| 5 months after killing X FARC area | | | | 1.617*** | | | | |
| | | | | (0.440) | | | | |
| Month after rescue operation X FARC area | | | | | -0.944 | | | |
| | | | | | (0.664) | | | |
| 2 months after rescue operation X FARC area | | | | | | 1.665*** | | |
| | | | | | | (0.429) | | |
| 3 months after rescue operation X FARC area | | | | | | | 1.595*** | |
| | | | | | | | (0.383) | |
| 5 months after rescue operation X FARC area | | | | | | | | 1.588*** |
| | | | | | | | | (0.313) |
| lagged DV | 0.455*** | 0.453*** | 0.453*** | 0.449*** | 0.457*** | 0.454*** | 0.453*** | 0.451*** |
| | (0.0536) | (0.0535) | (0.0536) | (0.0533) | (0.0537) | (0.0534) | (0.0534) | (0.0532) |
| Constant | 2.451 | 2.474 | 2.488 | 2.469 | 2.412 | 2.469 | 2.476 | 2.515 |
| | (2.728) | (2.716) | (2.719) | (2.708) | (2.752) | (2.761) | (2.762) | (2.758) |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *N* | 6081 | 6081 | 6081 | 6081 | 6081 | 6081 | 6081 | 6081 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.348 | 0.348 | 0.349 | 0.351 | 0.347 | 0.347 | 0.348 | 0.348 |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month fixed effects and standard errors clustered at department level. All models include control variables: Lagged DV, Contact with FARC, Military operation against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
$^{*}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.01$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.001$

**Table A8: Military performance (as Table 1, Model 3), disaggregated by instances of leader killings and rescue operations**

Here, we disaggregate the military performance variables by instances of leader killings and rescue operations. Most coefficients remain positive, but there are variations across instances. For example, the killing of the acting FARC leader Alfonso Cano in 2011 was followed by less rather than more desertion, although the coefficient is not significant. All other coefficients are positive.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Killing of Caballero X FARC Area | 3.330** | | | | | | |
| | (0.958) | | | | | | |
| Killing of Acacio X FARC area | | 1.424** | | | | | |
| | | (0.480) | | | | | |
| Killing of Reyes X FARC area | | | 0.792 | | | | |
| | | | (1.067) | | | | |
| Killing of Jojoy X FARC area | | | | 0.924 | | | |
| | | | | (0.504) | | | |
| Killing of Cano X FARC area | | | | | -0.400 | | |
| | | | | | (0.474) | | |
| Operation Jaque X FARC area | | | | | | 2.634** | |
| | | | | | | (0.759) | |
| Operation Camaleon X FARC area | | | | | | | 0.506 |
| | | | | | | | (0.324) |
| lagged DV | 0.452*** | 0.455*** | 0.456*** | 0.456*** | 0.456*** | 0.452*** | 0.456*** |
| | (0.0545) | (0.0536) | (0.0532) | (0.0536) | (0.0535) | (0.0527) | (0.0537) |
| Constant | 2.506 | 2.452 | 2.435 | 2.445 | 2.437 | 2.460 | 2.433 |
| | (2.712) | (2.733) | (2.743) | (2.760) | (2.745) | (2.746) | (2.756) |
| *N* | 6081 | 6081 | 6081 | 6081 | 6081 | 6081 | 6081 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.349 | 0.347 | 0.347 | 0.347 | 0.346 | 0.348 | 0.346 |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month fixed effects and standard errors clustered at department level. All models include control variables: Lagged DV, Contact with FARC, Military operation against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Table A9: Military performance without time fixed effects and not interacted with FARC area (otherwise as Table 1, Models 3 and 6), to capture only time variation of leader killings and rescue operations**

To address concerns of omitted variable bias, economists and political scientists have frequently used two-way fixed effects models, as we do in the main paper.[34] However, recent literature has called some of the assumptions of these models into question.[35] Therefore, we reproduce our analysis with a simpler specification. We drop the time fixed effects and only include department fixed effects to capture the within-department change, our main interest in the analysis. This has the added benefit that it allows us to drop one of the components of the interaction term, namely FARC presence. Hence, in the below models we can show the results for both the interaction term we use in the main paper and the component that captures military performance over time. All coefficients are positive and significantly different from 0.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Killed leaders | 0.732*** | | | |
| | (0.172) | | | |
| Killed leaders X FARC area | | 1.169*** | | |
| | | (0.240) | | |
| Rescue operation | | | 1.471*** | |
| | | | (0.390) | |
| Rescue operation X FARC area | | | | 2.688*** |
| | | | | (0.653) |
| Constant | 4.585* | 4.669* | 4.740* | 4.833* |
| | (2.215) | (2.178) | (2.241) | (2.220) |
| *N* | 6072 | 6072 | 6072 | 6072 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.289 | 0.290 | 0.291 | 0.294 |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level. Control variables: Lagged DV, Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

[34] Scott Cunningham, *Causal Inference: The Mixtape (V.1.7)*; Joshua D. Angrist and Jorn-Steffen Pischke, *Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
[35] Clément de Chaisemartin and Xavier D'Haultfœuille, "Two-Way Fixed Effects Estimators with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 110, No. 9 (2020), pp. 2964–2996; Jonathan Kropko and Robert Kubinec, "Interpretation and Identification of Within-Unit and Cross-Sectional Variation in Panel Data Models," *PLOS ONE*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (2020), p. e0231349.

**Table A10: Military performance (as Table 1), only with desertion of *armed* FARC members**

We disaggregate desertion by type of group member (armed members vs. support network) to see whether members with different roles were affected differently by worsening military performance. Worsening military performance is associated with both desertion of armed members (Table A10) and members of the support network (Table A11). Coefficients are generally smaller as we are looking at subsets of deserters.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Killed leaders X FARC area | 0.731* | 0.747* | 0.0909 | | | |
| | (0.284) | (0.275) | (0.270) | | | |
| Rescue operation X FARC area | | | | 2.481* | 2.423** | 1.780** |
| | | | | (0.953) | (0.884) | (0.574) |
| Constant | 1.030*** | 5.642 | 4.212 | 1.030*** | 5.677 | 4.264 |
| | (0.248) | (3.847) | (2.722) | (0.247) | (3.871) | (2.738) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.139 | 0.166 | 0.283 | 0.145 | 0.171 | 0.286 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level.
Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Table A11: Military performance (as Table 1), only with desertion of FARC *support network* members (*milicianos*)**

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Killed leaders X FARC area | 1.449** | 1.467** | 0.929** | | | |
| | (0.432) | (0.418) | (0.289) | | | |
| Rescue operation X FARC area | | | | 1.398** | 1.403** | 0.868*** |
| | | | | (0.457) | (0.426) | (0.227) |
| Constant | 4.02e-14 | -0.967 | -1.936 | 4.23e-14 | -0.979 | -1.952 |
| | (0.219) | (2.001) | (1.836) | (0.223) | (2.017) | (1.834) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.109 | 0.113 | 0.225 | 0.104 | 0.109 | 0.223 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level.
Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Table A12: Military performance (as Table 1), only with desertion of *rank-and-file* FARC members**

We disaggregate the desertion outcome variable by level of command, counting only desertion by rank-and-file members and members with some command. Indicators of worsening military performance (the same as used in the main analysis) are positively associated with both types of deserters (rank-and-file: Table A12), but mostly insignificant for the less frequent desertion of individuals with some level of command (Table A13).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Killed leaders X FARC area | 1.966* | 1.963** | 0.987* | | | |
| | (0.720) | (0.695) | (0.472) | | | |
| Rescue operation X FARC area | | | | 2.923* | 2.931** | 2.276** |
| | | | | (1.140) | (1.040) | (0.638) |
| Constant | 1.152 | -0.773 | -2.230 | 1.149 | -0.874 | -2.273 |
| | (0.934) | (3.648) | (2.046) | (0.935) | (3.675) | (2.052) |
| *N* | 3865 | 3865 | 3853 | 3865 | 3865 | 3853 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.182 | 0.199 | 0.333 | 0.183 | 0.199 | 0.335 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level.
Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Table A13: Military performance (as Table 1), only with desertion of FARC members with *some level of command***

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Killed leaders X FARC area | 0.157 | 0.158 | 0.00480 | | | |
| | (0.0805) | (0.0806) | (0.0920) | | | |
| Rescue operation X FARC area | | | | 0.515 | 0.504 | 0.354* |
| | | | | (0.280) | (0.264) | (0.172) |
| Constant | 0.0606 | 1.825 | 1.484 | 0.0606 | 1.832 | 1.495 |
| | (0.0833) | (1.203) | (0.953) | (0.0831) | (1.210) | (0.961) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.094 | 0.106 | 0.176 | 0.097 | 0.108 | 0.177 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level.
Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Table A14: Military performance (as Table 1), only deserters who were members of the FARC for *more than 1 year***

We disaggregate the desertion variable by length of tenure (deserters who were part of the FARC for less vs. more than one year). Results are similar for both (long-term members Table A14), but rescue operations are not significant for short-term members (Tables A15).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Killed leaders X FARC area | 1.529** | 1.541** | 0.558* | | | |
| | (0.476) | (0.451) | (0.268) | | | |
| Rescue operation X FARC area | | | | 3.633** | 3.567** | 2.603*** |
| | | | | (1.258) | (1.163) | (0.703) |
| Constant | 0.242 | 2.703 | 0.535 | 0.242 | 2.741 | 0.591 |
| | (0.469) | (3.366) | (1.771) | (0.469) | (3.404) | (1.783) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.164 | 0.176 | 0.338 | 0.169 | 0.181 | 0.342 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level.
Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Table A15: Military performance (as Table 1), only deserters who were members of the FARC for *less than 1 year***

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Killed leaders X FARC area | 0.660** | 0.681*** | 0.466** | | | |
| | (0.191) | (0.186) | (0.139) | | | |
| Rescue operation X FARC area | | | | 0.237 | 0.249 | 0.0305 |
| | | | | (0.151) | (0.146) | (0.131) |
| Constant | 0.788** | 2.010 | 1.768 | 0.788** | 1.995 | 1.748 |
| | (0.282) | (1.379) | (1.200) | (0.281) | (1.399) | (1.208) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.086 | 0.103 | 0.153 | 0.083 | 0.099 | 0.152 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level.
Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Table A16: Military performance (as Table 1), restricting analysis to 2002-2012 (without negotiation period)**

We run additional analyses restricting the period of observation to the years between 2002 and 2012, to exclude the negotiation period. Results remain similar but partially lose statistical significance.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Killed leaders X FARC area | 1.233* | 1.351* | 0.629 | | | |
| | (0.530) | (0.553) | (0.343) | | | |
| Rescue operation X FARC area | | | | 2.958* | 2.796** | 2.154** |
| | | | | (1.231) | (1.014) | (0.659) |
| Constant | 1.030 | 5.968 | 3.271 | 1.030 | 6.100 | 3.342 |
| | (0.559) | (5.161) | (3.777) | (0.559) | (5.154) | (3.784) |
| *N* | 4125 | 4125 | 4092 | 4125 | 4125 | 4092 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.145 | 0.172 | 0.305 | 0.148 | 0.175 | 0.308 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level.
Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Table A17: Military performance (as Table 1), lagging all independent variables**

We run the same analysis as in Table 1 of the main paper, but lagging all independent variables. Results remain similar. Coefficients for killed leaders tend to be larger, whereas coefficients for rescue operations tend to be smaller.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Killed leaders X FARC area | 2.438*** | 2.490*** | 1.493*** | | | |
| | (0.658) | (0.625) | (0.349) | | | |
| Rescue operation X FARC area | | | | 3.363** | 3.317** | 1.595*** |
| | | | | (1.067) | (0.966) | (0.383) |
| Constant | 0.786 | 4.578 | 2.488 | 0.786 | 4.581 | 2.476 |
| | (0.534) | (4.704) | (2.719) | (0.538) | (4.775) | (2.762) |
| *N* | 6081 | 6081 | 6081 | 6081 | 6081 | 6081 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.162 | 0.180 | 0.349 | 0.161 | 0.179 | 0.348 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level.
Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Table A18: Military performance (as Table 1), using *operations with government initiative* against the FARC as independent variable (instead of killings of leaders and rescue operations)**

While we do not use military operations with government initiative as indicator of increased military performance of the enemy side in the main analysis (it may be endogenous to desertion), we use this indicator from the CNMH event dataset here. We find that military operations initiated by government forces against the FARC are associated with higher levels of desertion, in line with our theorizing.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operations with government initiative | 0.799*** | 0.695** | 0.239*** |
| | (0.126) | (0.210) | (0.0641) |
| Constant | 1.006* | 4.643 | 2.256 |
| | (0.441) | (4.626) | (2.758) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.165 | 0.172 | 0.344 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level.
Control variables: Contact with FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Table A19: Financial resources (as Table 2), with ELN desertion as dependent variable (instead of FARC desertion)**

Similar to above, we examine whether financial resources from the coca economy are associated with desertions from the ELN. The ELN are much less dependent on income from coca during the period of study and, different from the FARC, should thus not be influenced by fluctuations of the coca economy. All coefficients are negative, but none is significantly different from 0. Fluctuations of the coca economy are thus a specific predictor of FARC desertion, and do not capture a more general trend to more desertion among different conflict actors.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USD COP exchange rate X FARC area | -0.224 | -0.194 | -0.154 | | | |
| | (0.294) | (0.275) | (0.288) | | | |
| Cocaine price in US X FARC area | | | | -0.382 | -0.372 | -0.366 |
| | | | | (0.235) | (0.226) | (0.226) |
| Constant | 0.427 | 1.901 | 1.849 | 17.11 | 32.17 | 63.49 |
| | (0.371) | (3.104) | (3.104) | (9.169) | (35.03) | (54.26) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 | 495 | 495 | 462 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.027 | 0.039 | 0.040 | 0.093 | 0.118 | 0.111 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month (or year) fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level. Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
$^{*}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.01$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.001$

**Table A20: Financial resources (as Table 2), using coca land suitability to create interaction term instead of FARC area**

Instead of using FARC area to construct the interaction term that allows us to evaluate our hypothesis, we can use a separate indicator for the coca economy-related analysis, namely land suitability for coca production[36]. Hence, here we interact exchange rates and cocaine prices with land suitability for coca. Results are very similar to those presented in the main paper. Coefficients for exchange are slightly larger and coefficients for cocaine prices slightly smaller.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USD COP exchange rate X coca suitable land | -2.640** (0.824) | -2.558** (0.802) | -1.425** (0.407) | | | |
| Cocaine price in US X coca suitable land | | | | -1.278** (0.442) | -1.047* (0.433) | -0.733* (0.320) |
| Constant | 0.875 (0.466) | 2.441 (4.847) | 1.080 (3.054) | 3.263 (7.592) | 40.99 (44.74) | 72.31 (54.80) |
| *N* | 5920 | 5920 | 5888 | 480 | 480 | 448 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.187 | 0.199 | 0.353 | 0.298 | 0.367 | 0.467 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month (or year) fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level. Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

[36] Mejía and Restrepo, "Bushes and Bullets."

**Table A21: Financial resources (as Table 2), with gold prices (in 100 US Dollars per ounce) as alternative income source**

We use international gold prices to capture revenues from a different income source, rather than coca. The FARC also receive income from illegal mining, though to a much smaller extent than from coca.[37] However, as with coca economy indicators, we see a consistently negative, but less pronounced relationship with desertion. Hence, reduced income from gold is associated with more desertion.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gold price X FARC area | -0.129* | -0.119* | -0.0770* |
| | (0.0569) | (0.0568) | (0.0356) |
| Constant | 1.237* | 5.527 | 2.852 |
| | (0.492) | (4.165) | (2.485) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.162 | 0.176 | 0.346 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level.
Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

[37] Frédéric Massé and Johanna Camargo, "Actores Armados Ilegales y Sector Extractivo En Colombia" (Madrid: CITpax, 2012).

**Table A22: Financial resources (as Table 2), with Euro-Peso exchange rate**

We use the Euro-Peso exchange rate, which should show the same relationship with desertion as the Dollar-Peso exchange rate, given that cocaine is also shipped to Europe. Results remain similar to using the Dollar-Peso rate, though coefficients are smaller.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Euro-Peso rate X FARC area | -1.528* | -1.207* | -0.660* |
| | (0.622) | (0.536) | (0.288) |
| Constant | 3.074*** | 6.174 | 3.127 |
| | (0.695) | (4.629) | (2.778) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.161 | 0.174 | 0.345 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level.
Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Table A23: Financial resources not interacted with FARC area and without time fixed effects, to capture only time variation of exchange rates and cocaine price**

Two-way fixed effects models have been long used to address concerns of omitted variable bias by economists and political scientists.[38] However, recent literature has called some of the assumptions of these models into question.[39] Therefore, we reproduce our analysis with a simpler specification. We drop the time fixed effects and only include department fixed effects to capture the within-department change, our main interest in the analysis. This has the added benefit that it allows us to drop one of the components of the interaction term, namely FARC presence, to only focus on the effect of the substantive indicator of financial decline. Coefficients are negative throughout, though they are not significant for cocaine prices.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| USD Peso rate | -0.764*** | | | |
| | (0.178) | | | |
| USD COP exchange rate X FARC area | | -1.414*** | | |
| | | (0.326) | | |
| US cocaine price | | | -0.0583 | |
| | | | (0.171) | |
| Cocaine price in US X FARC area | | | | -0.510 |
| | | | | (0.330) |
| Constant | 7.326* | 7.301* | 115.1* | 132.5* |
| | (2.681) | (2.697) | (51.24) | (51.44) |
| *N* | 6072 | 6072 | 462 | 462 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.293 | 0.297 | 0.337 | 0.341 |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level. Control variables: Lagged DV, Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

[38] Cunningham, *Causal Inference: The Mixtape (V.1.7)*; Angrist and Pischke, *Mostly Harmless Econometrics*.
[39] de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfœuille, "Two-Way Fixed Effects Estimators with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects"; Kropko and Kubinec, "Interpretation and Identification of Within-Unit and Cross-Sectional Variation in Panel Data Models."

**Table A24: Exchange rates (as Table 2), with department year aggregation instead of department month**

The main analysis for exchange rates is conducted on the department-month level. Here, we run the same analysis for exchange rates on the department-year level to allow for a comparison with the cocaine price analysis. Results remain similar, but coefficient sizes are, as expected, about 12 times larger.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| USD COP exchange rate X FARC area | -36.66** | -32.67** | -12.24* |
| | (11.08) | (9.870) | (5.891) |
| Constant | 58.00*** | 78.56 | 81.59 |
| | (11.51) | (49.35) | (52.88) |
| *N* | 528 | 528 | 495 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.318 | 0.380 | 0.475 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month (or year) fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level. Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Table A25: Financial resources (as Table 2), only with desertion of *armed* FARC members**

We disaggregate desertion by type of group member (armed members vs. support network). Coefficients are negative through the board for desertion of armed members (Table A25) and members of the support network (Table A26), but results for analysis using yearly cocaine prices are partially not significant for armed members.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USD COP exchange rate X FARC area | -1.451* | -1.096* | -0.502* | | | |
| | (0.553) | (0.416) | (0.232) | | | |
| Cocaine price in US X FARC area | | | | -0.853** | -0.491 | -0.210 |
| | | | | (0.248) | (0.265) | (0.240) |
| Constant | 3.014*** | 7.124 | 4.941 | 42.03*** | 76.59 | 91.92* |
| | (0.669) | (4.047) | (2.839) | (10.50) | (41.58) | (42.66) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 | 495 | 495 | 462 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.152 | 0.172 | 0.284 | 0.262 | 0.355 | 0.471 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month (or year) fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level. Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Table A26: Financial resources (as Table 2), only with desertion of FARC *support network* members (*milicianos*)**

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USD COP exchange rate X FARC area | -1.104** | -1.241*** | -0.760*** | | | |
| | (0.343) | (0.310) | (0.164) | | | |
| Cocaine price in US X FARC area | | | | -0.952*** | -0.819*** | -0.691*** |
| | | | | (0.225) | (0.212) | (0.184) |
| Constant | 1.509*** | 0.692 | -0.870 | 41.03*** | 28.28 | 26.92 |
| | (0.359) | (2.067) | (1.887) | (8.095) | (22.39) | (33.12) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 | 495 | 495 | 462 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.113 | 0.120 | 0.227 | 0.279 | 0.306 | 0.348 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month (or year) fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level. Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Table A27: Financial resources (as Table 2), only with desertion of *rank-and-file* FARC members**

We disaggregate deserters by level of command. This is important as rank-and-file FARC members did not receive a salary for participation in the group, unlike their leaders who could personally enrich themselves.[40] For rank-and-file deserters, a relationship between income from coca economy and desertion can thus not be explained by the opportunity for personal enrichment. Both exchange rates and cocaine prices are negatively and significantly associated with desertion of both rank-and-file members (Table A27) and members with some level of command (Table A28).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USD COP exchange rate X FARC area | -2.135** | -1.971** | -1.026** | | | |
| | (0.673) | (0.578) | (0.294) | | | |
| Cocaine price in US X FARC area | | | | -1.610*** | -1.197** | -0.881** |
| | | | | (0.393) | (0.382) | (0.311) |
| Constant | 3.888*** | 5.530 | 2.270 | 74.47*** | 79.83* | 96.11 |
| | (0.737) | (4.029) | (2.746) | (14.78) | (34.25) | (55.91) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 | 495 | 495 | 462 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.165 | 0.174 | 0.330 | 0.301 | 0.355 | 0.434 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month (or year) fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level. Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

[40] Daniel M. Rico, "Los Ahorritos Del Bloque Oriental de Las FARC," *La Silla Vacía*.

**Table A28: Financial resources (as Table 2), only with desertion of FARC members with some *level of command***

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USD COP exchange rate X FARC area | -0.434* | -0.381* | -0.247** | | | |
| | (0.187) | (0.140) | (0.0822) | | | |
| Cocaine price in US X FARC area | | | | -0.197*** | -0.117* | -0.0212 |
| | | | | (0.0394) | (0.0470) | (0.0519) |
| Constant | 0.654** | 2.344 | 1.844 | 8.714*** | 25.66 | 23.20* |
| | (0.194) | (1.308) | (1.015) | (1.722) | (14.80) | (10.06) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 | 495 | 495 | 462 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.108 | 0.115 | 0.180 | 0.209 | 0.301 | 0.487 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month (or year) fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level. Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Table A29: Financial resources (as Table 2), only deserters who were members of the FARC for *more than 1 year***

We disaggregate deserters by length of tenure in the group. Both exchange rates and cocaine prices are negatively related with desertion of members who stayed for less than one year in the group (Table A29) and members who stayed for longer (Table A30).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USD COP exchange rate X FARC area | -2.126** (0.697) | -2.021** (0.573) | -1.143*** (0.292) | | | |
| Cocaine price in US X FARC area | | | | -1.437*** (0.351) | -1.011** (0.352) | -0.593* (0.287) |
| Constant | 3.149*** (0.671) | 5.430 (3.556) | 2.177 (1.956) | 63.30*** (13.64) | 76.60* (33.93) | 66.77 (46.12) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 | 495 | 495 | 462 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.179 | 0.189 | 0.343 | 0.299 | 0.373 | 0.522 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month (or year) fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level. Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Table A30: Financial resources (as Table 2), only deserters who were members of the FARC for *less than 1 year***

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USD COP exchange rate X FARC area | -0.443** | -0.331* | -0.130 | | | |
| | (0.159) | (0.143) | (0.103) | | | |
| Cocaine price in US X FARC area | | | | -0.370** | -0.303* | -0.309* |
| | | | | (0.131) | (0.130) | (0.128) |
| Constant | 1.393*** | 2.443 | 1.937 | 19.89*** | 28.89* | 52.55** |
| | (0.340) | (1.403) | (1.194) | (5.123) | (13.38) | (18.78) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 | 495 | 495 | 462 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.087 | 0.102 | 0.152 | 0.202 | 0.230 | 0.221 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month (or year) fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level. Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Table A31: Financial resources (as Table 2), restricting analysis to 2002-2012 (negotiation period)**

We run additional analyses focusing exclusively on the period between 2002 and 2012, to exclude the negotiation period. Results remain similar but lose statistical significance. For reader convenience, we highlight results significant at the 0.1 level here.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USD COP exchange rate X FARC area | -2.054$^{+}$ | -1.587$^{+}$ | -0.853$^{+}$ | | | |
| | (1.192) | (0.831) | (0.462) | | | |
| Cocaine price in US X FARC area | | | | -1.531$^{+}$ | -0.447 | 0.335 |
| | | | | (0.890) | (1.085) | (1.119) |
| Constant | 3.838$^{*}$ | 7.377 | 4.073 | 71.39$^{+}$ | 73.47 | 63.98 |
| | (1.454) | (5.756) | (4.094) | (36.59) | (66.05) | (113.9) |
| *N* | 4125 | 4125 | 4092 | 363 | 363 | 330 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.150 | 0.174 | 0.306 | 0.260 | 0.344 | 0.404 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month (or year) fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level. Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
$^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, $^{*}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.01$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.001$

**Table A32: Financial resources (as Table 2), lagging all independent variables**

We run the same analysis lagging all independent variables. Coefficients remain almost identical for exchange rates, and coefficients are larger for cocaine prices.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USD COP exchange rate X FARC area | -2.539** | -2.346** | -1.310** | | | |
| | (0.829) | (0.697) | (0.362) | | | |
| Cocaine price in US X FARC area | | | | -2.411*** | -2.093*** | -1.486** |
| | | | | (0.636) | (0.531) | (0.430) |
| Constant | 4.255*** | 7.694 | 4.250 | 142.2*** | 181.1* | 132.4* |
| | (0.866) | (4.933) | (2.937) | (25.45) | (70.96) | (56.71) |
| *N* | 6081 | 6081 | 6081 | 495 | 495 | 495 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.175 | 0.189 | 0.351 | 0.306 | 0.354 | 0.493 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month (or year) fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level. Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Table A33: Financial resources (as Table 2), with standardized independent variables on department year level to allow for comparison of substantive weight of coefficients**

As the units of the two indicators for financial resources and their levels of aggregation differ, we standardized independent variables and ran analysis for both rates and cocaine prices on the department-year level. One standard deviation negative change in exchange rates leads to 39 additional desertions (Model 2) and one standard deviation negative change in cocaine prices to 55 additional desertions (Model 5).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Standardized USD COP exchange rate X FARC area | -44.20** | -39.40** | -14.76* | | | |
| | (13.36) | (11.90) | (7.104) | | | |
| Standardized Cocaine price in US X FARC area | | | | -75.61*** | -54.96** | -37.76* |
| | | | | (17.85) | (17.48) | (14.26) |
| Constant | 13.97** | 39.31 | 66.89 | 5.785 | 49.22 | 80.66 |
| | (4.379) | (45.16) | (53.43) | (7.046) | (38.47) | (51.84) |
| *N* | 528 | 528 | 495 | 495 | 495 | 462 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.318 | 0.380 | 0.475 | 0.299 | 0.362 | 0.465 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level.
Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

## 4. Alternative explanations

In our analysis of alternative explanations, we use the same specifications as for the models reported in the main paper.

**Table A34: Activation through publicity**

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| All Christmas PR campaigns X FARC area | -0.606 | -0.684 | -0.496 | | | |
| | (0.397) | (0.485) | (0.377) | | | |
| Operation Christmas 2010 X FARC area | | | | -0.312 | | |
| | | | | (0.665) | | |
| Ríos de Luz Operation 2011 X FARC area | | | | | -0.587 | |
| | | | | | (0.706) | |
| Operation Belén 2012 X FARC area | | | | | | -0.554 |
| | | | | | | (0.534) |
| Constant | 1.030* | 4.678 | 2.283 | 2.262 | 2.266 | 2.265 |
| | (0.450) | (4.612) | (2.738) | (2.751) | (2.747) | (2.755) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 | 6072 | 6072 | 6072 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.157 | 0.172 | 0.344 | 0.344 | 0.344 | 0.344 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level.
Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Here, we focus on three large-scale desertion PR campaigns that were launched during Christmas season (2010: Operation Christmas[41], 2011: Operation Ríos de Luz, 2012; Operation Belén). The Christmas variables receive a value of 1 during the operation and the immediate aftermath (December, January and February) and 0 otherwise.

[41] Operation Christmas, executed in 2010, was the most widely celebrated PR operation. See 60 Minutes, "How Unconventional Thinking Transformed a War-Torn Colombia," https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-colombia-after-civil-war-lara-logan/.
A promotional video of the widely discussed Operation Christmas can be found here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FMLoYpy_HFw

**Table A35: Contact with the enemy**

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Combat between FFAA and FARC | 0.101 | 0.0481 | 0.0553 | | | |
| | (0.0497) | (0.0621) | (0.0433) | | | |
| Any contact between FFAA and FARC | | | | 0.0765* | 0.0256 | 0.0336 |
| | | | | (0.0366) | (0.0520) | (0.0346) |
| Constant | 0.743 | 4.497 | 2.117 | 0.711 | 4.643 | 2.256 |
| | (0.508) | (4.560) | (2.710) | (0.498) | (4.626) | (2.758) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.160 | 0.172 | 0.344 | 0.161 | 0.172 | 0.344 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level.
Control variables: Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
$^{*}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.01$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.001$

We use variables captured by the National Historical Memory Center (CNMH).[42] Given that they have both spatial and temporal variation, we can include them without interacting with FARC area (as in the main paper). It is important to note that these variables may be endogenously related to desertion, and thus provide a preliminary analysis of the contact with the enemy hypothesis.

[42] CNMH, "Diccionarios de Las Bases de Datos - Observatorio de Memoria y Conflicto" (Bogotá: Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2016).

**Table A36: Opportunity costs**

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coffee price X cultivated coffee area 1997 | -0.292 | -0.185 | -0.105 |
| | (0.209) | (0.195) | (0.105) |
| Constant | 1.938** | 3.144 | 1.451 |
| | (0.582) | (3.351) | (1.781) |
| *N* | 5920 | 5920 | 5888 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.163 | 0.185 | 0.349 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level. Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

We use logged international coffee prices, much like we use exchange rates and cocaine prices in the main analysis, and interact them with mean coffee cultivation areas per department in 1997[43], to examine whether attractiveness of the legal labor market leads to additional desertion. While coefficients are negative, as predicted by opportunity cost theory, they cannot be distinguished from 0.

[43] Oeindrila Dube and Juan F. Vargas, "Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict," *The Review of Economic Studies*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (2013), pp. 1384–1421.

## 5. Downstream consequences

Research on the consequences of desertion is rare, despite its potential importance. The PAHD reports point to two potential downstream consequences of desertion: forced recruitment and displacement of civilians. Several deserters report that one of the main strengths of the FARC, at least until 2012, was its capacity to recruit minors.[44] Also, some – especially the so called *milicianos* – described how they themselves engaged in recruitment of minors, in one case recruiting "12 youngsters of different ages".[45] Does desertion lead to increased recruitment? This is a key question for policy makers, given that the gains of a desertion program would be limited if armed groups are capable to quickly replace members, even moreso if the new members were underage recruits. While data on forced recruitment in Colombia has to be taken with a grain of salt[46], exploratory analysis suggests that FARC desertion is related to forced recruitment of minors by the FARC (Table A37).

Some FARC deserters also mention that fear of forced recruitment of minors has led peasants to leave their areas of influence. In fact, one deserter who was in charge of recruiting minors ultimately left the FARC because his 11 year old son was going to be recruited.[47] Quantitative analysis using numbers of displacement from the Unique Victim Registration system[48] suggests that desertion is related to forced displacement (Table A38).[49]

While these findings about forced recruitment and displacement are less robust than the results of the main analysis, they are suggestive. They point to the need to further investigate the consequences of desertion and take them into account when designing policy.

[44] PAHD, April 2 2012.
[45] PAHD, May 12 2010.
[46] We use data provided by the CNMH on cases of «recruitment and use of girls, boys and adolescents» (RUNNA in its Spanish abbreviation), see CNMH, "Diccionarios de Las Bases de Datos - Observatorio de Memoria y Conflicto."
[47] PAHD, May 12 2010.
[48] CEDE, "Documentación de Variables: Descripción y Observaciones. Panel Municipal Del CEDE" (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 2016).
[49] On forced displacement in Colombia, see Abbey Steele, *Democracy and Displacement in Colombia's Civil War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017).

**Table A37: Downstream consequences on forced recruitment**

While models 1-3 capture the effect of FARC desertion on recruitment of minors by the FARC, models 4-6 provide a falsification test. In these models, we use recruitment by other groups as outcome variable. FARC desertion is not related to forced recruitment by other armed groups. Hence, it is not a broader trend to more forced recruitment in Colombia as a whole that is driving the results in models 1-3, but a dynamic specific to FARC desertion and replacement.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | FARC recruitment | FARC recruitment | FARC recruitment | Recruitment by other group | Recruitment by other group | Recruitment by other group |
| FARC desertion | 0.0227* | 0.0215* | 0.0177* | 0.00180 | 0.000507 | 0.00176 |
| | (0.00930) | (0.00800) | (0.00652) | (0.00847) | (0.00566) | (0.00432) |
| Constant | 0.674** | 1.448 | 1.257 | 0.362* | 1.616 | 0.766 |
| | (0.188) | (1.512) | (1.137) | (0.165) | (1.987) | (1.162) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6081 | 6105 | 6105 | 6081 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.156 | 0.164 | 0.209 | 0.143 | 0.177 | 0.268 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lagged DV | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level.
Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

**Table A38: Downstream consequences on displacement**

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| FARC desertion | 179.4* | 147.5** | |
| | (78.67) | (51.87) | |
| Lagged FARC desertion | | | 145.9* |
| | | | (57.97) |
| Constant | 22982.5*** | 37756.8 | 37213.5 |
| | (3120.7) | (22476.1) | (22148.0) |
| *N* | 6105 | 6105 | 6072 |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.270 | 0.300 | 0.296 |
| Control variables | No | Yes | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
All models include department and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at department level. Control variables: Contact with FARC, Military operations against FARC, Coca cultivation area, Population size, GDP.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

## 6. Ethical considerations

The main quantitative and qualitative data on desertion used for this article was not produced by the authors, but by Colombian government entities. Given the nature of this data, especially the classified reports used for qualitative analysis, it is important to reflect on how they were produced and what ethical considerations allow for a responsible use.[50]

Before diving into potential risks, the main benefit from the use of this data is to contribute to scientific knowledge about the phenomenon of desertion, a key aspect of most wars. As noted in the main text, the used data provides unique insights thanks to its granularity, detail and comprehensiveness. Hence, from a point of view of scientific value, we cannot think of another practical way of collecting data that would offer a more comprehensive evidence base on desertion, without tapping into existing government-produced data. In fact, we are not aware of a similar database on desertion that is as comprehensive as the one we use in this article. There is thus a clear benefit from using this data.

These benefits have to be weighed against potential risks, however. We focus here on three key risks in particular and discuss what we did to mitigate concerns: first, does our use of the data put any of the involved persons at risk of harm? Second, was the process of data collection in any way harmful to any of the involved persons? Third, does the use of this government-produced data validate the perspective of one of the conflict actors to the detriment of other perspectives?

### *1. Risk of harm stemming from data use and presentation*

The raw data we use for our article contain identifying information about former members of the FARC and incriminating information about their actions which could potentially endanger themselves and their former comrades. We agreed with the agencies providing the data that we would not refer to any information that could lead to the identification of any of the involved persons. By involved persons, we mean both individuals who were interviewed and third persons that appear in their accounts, as well as the military personnel in charge. We not only blinded the names of involved persons, but also their noms de guerre, affiliations to subgroups of the FARC (*frentes*, *compañias* etc.) and locations that might be precise enough to allow for their identification. There is one exception to this rule. We do refer to the names of high-ranking FARC members who have been killed in military operations, as is publicly known.

In addition, publicly available replication data for this article is aggregated to the department level and hence does not contain any identifying information.

[50] See Jelena Subotić, "Ethics of Archival Research on Political Violence," *Journal of Peace Research*; Lee Ann Fujii, "Research Ethics 101: Dilemmas and Responsibilities," *PS: Political Science & Politics*, Vol. 45, No. 4 (2012), pp. 717–723.

***2. Risk of harm stemming from the data production process***

The data collection was carried out by the desertion program (PAHD). During data collection, there was a clear power asymmetry between the military officers in charge of the interviews and the deserters, who were alone and defenseless under control of their former conflict rivals. This may have led to situations of undue pressure exerted on the deserters to extract information they would have not otherwise revealed. Using information that was produced in a situation of undue pressure or even torture would be unethical. Can we be sure that this was not the case for the data we use?

While it is known that the PAHD has offered financial incentives to deserters for strategic information about, for example, the location of kidnapped hostages, cocaine laboratories and mine fields[51], we have not found any evidence indicating any form of abuse during the interviews. This statement is consistent with several pieces of indicative evidence. First, the government had strict guidelines about the interview procedures.[52] These guidelines make clear that the authorities were aware of potential risks and, in principle, respected the rights of deserters. This was all the more important in the case of underage deserters (in Colombia called "desvinculados" and not "desmovilizados") who received a different legal treatment and special reintegration benefits, given that they are considered conflict victims. The existence of norms respectful of human rights does obviously not prove that abuse never happened. However, reporting by the Ombudsman's office did not find instances of abuse during interviews, even though they criticized other aspects of the desertion program.[53]

Second, within the FARC there was a constant rumor that the desertion program was set up to deceive FARC combatants and that deserters would be killed and tortured by government forces (see examples in section on Alternative Explanations in main article). However, many deserters left after receiving news from their former comrades who had deserted already. Often, they only decided to leave after they heard from their comrades that it was safe to leave and that the government did not use violence against them. Hence, many deserters were aware of the desertion procedures, which can be taken as a form of implicit consent with the desertion interview, which was an integral part of it. The large number of deserters (we have records of 19,504 deserters from the FARC) also indicates that there was some level of trust in the program. Otherwise, deserters would not have registered with the government in such large numbers but rather looked for anonymity.

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[51] CNMH, *Desmovilización y Reintegración Paramilitar*, 91.

[52] For example: Ministerio de Defensa, Directiva Permanente No 15/2007: «Implementación de la política de desmovilización del Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, procedimientos que deben adoptarse y trato que debe conferirse al desmovilizado y su grupo familiar.» This Directive stipulates for example that for each deserter, an «Acta de Buen Trato» (testimony of good treatment) has to be signed, where the deserter confirms that he/she voluntarily abandoned his/her activities as member of an illegal armed organization, and that he/she received a good physical and verbal tratement and the instant humanitarian aid.

[53] The Ombudsman's office criticized in 2008 that some deserters had accompanied military operations after their desertion, for example to help identify camps and mine fields, exposing them to renewed security risks. See Procuraduría, "Proyecto Control Preventivo y de Seguimiento a Las Políticas Públicas Para El Otorgamiento de Beneficios a La Población Desmovilizada y Reincorporada a La Vida Civil" (Bogotá: Procuraduría General de la Nación, 2008), pp. 28–31.

Third, the Colombian approach to desertion and reintegration was internationally hailed as exemplary.[54] This international reputation may have helped to protect deserters, as reports about abuse and torture during interviews would have certainly made it more difficult for the government to sell their policy success abroad. The Colombian reintegration agency for example convened the international community to a large conference on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) in Cartagena in 2009.[55] Also, the reintegration agency has invited foreign delegates from other conflict-affected countries and Western donor countries to their South-South Cooperation Tours since 2009, often including a visit to transitory accommodation homes for deserters ("hogares de paz").[56] With international reputation at stake, abuse of deserters during interviews would have undermined their own success.

***3. Risk of harm stemming from validating the government perspective over other perspectives***

The data we use was produced by government agencies during an armed conflict. While the government often portrayed its desertion program as a humanitarian policy, it can also be seen as a counterinsurgency policy.[57] In any case, the government was party to an armed conflict with the FARC and as any conflict party, was interested to promote its own perspective and narrative of the conflict. For example, while the government often called the FARC a "narco-terrorist" organization,[58] the FARC saw the desertion policy as a criminal undertaking.[59] Hence, by using government-produced data we may be validating the government perspective on the conflict to the detriment of the perspective of other populations including not only deserters, but also conflict victims, who have struggled to be heard.[60] In our analysis, we made sure that we did not fall for anybody's line, by following two strategies.

First, our analysis does not constitute an evaluation of desertion policy. Hence, our results do not directly relate to whether the policy was successful or not, and can thus not be used by the government as supportive evidence for their side. We rather analyze substantive theory on desertion to better

[54] Justin Rohrlich, "How Do You Turn 57,000 Former Militants Into Model Citizens?," *Vice News*; 60 Minutes, "How Unconventional Thinking Transformed a War-Torn Colombia."
[55] As part of this conference, the Colombian style DDR approach was presented as state of the art, see CCDDR, "The Cartagena Contribution to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration" (Cartagena: CIDDR, 2009).
[56] ARN, "VII SOUTH-SOUTH TECHNICAL COOPERATION TOUR," http://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/en/Pages/South%20South%20Tour/south_south_tour_2019.aspx.
[57] Procuraduría, "Proyecto Control Preventivo y de Seguimiento a Las Políticas Públicas Para El Otorgamiento de Beneficios a La Población Desmovilizada y Reincorporada a La Vida Civil"; CNMH, *Desmovilización y Reintegración Paramilitar*; Fattal, *Guerrilla Marketing: Counterinsurgency and Capitalism in Colombia*.
[58] Sophie Haspeslagh, "The 'Linguistic Ceasefire': Negotiating in an Age of Proscription," *Security Dialogue*; Enzo Nussio, "Violencia, Terrorismo y Guerra de Discursos. Dos Décadas de Amenazas a La Seguridad Vistas Por Los Presidentes Colombianos," *LaRevista. Bulletin de La Société Suisse Des Américanistes*, Vol. 75, No. 43–56 (2014 2013).
[59] FARC-EP, "La Criminal Política de Reintegración."
[60] CNMH, *¡Basta Ya! Colombia: Memoria de Guerra y Dignidad* (Bogotá: Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013); Angelika Rettberg, "Victims of the Colombian Armed Conflict," in Bruce Bagley and Jonathan Rosen, ed., *Colombia's Political Economy at the Outset of the 21st Century* (New York: Lexington Books, 2015), pp. 111–140.

understand how this phenomenon works. Like this, we take an academic perspective that produces a public good rather than putting our work to the service of any of the conflict parties.

Second, we critically engage with the data we use. As can be seen in the main article, we do not take the data provided by government agencies at face value but discuss potential concerns for validity (see section on Data on Desertion). Also, we clearly flag where we cannot be certain about the validity of the data.

## 7. Original quotes

We present the original Spanish language quotes from the PAHD transcripts within a longer text passage. This is to provide as much transparency as possible in line with data access and research transparency requirements (DA-RT).[61] However, the information we are allowed to publicly reveal is limited by the classified nature of the documents.

We removed all potentially identifying information, and provide an extended version of what is quoted in the main paper to give additional context to the quotes. No grammar or style mistakes were redacted. Note that there are many punctuation and grammar mistakes throughout. This is understandable given the length of the reports. Sometimes we include the questions contained in the report format to facilitate understanding. The full material cannot be made available due to its classified nature.

Quotes are listed in order of first appearance in the main paper. To identify quotes, we refer to the date of interview – locations are blinded due to the classified nature of the documents.

***Section "Quantitative analysis of decline and desertion"***

1. PAHD, 6 February 2012.

"Para el año 2006 el desmovilizado recibe la orden salir para el sector de la vereda […], sobre la finca […], a raspar coca y estar pendiente de la producción de pasta base de esa finca, teniendo en cuente que eran fincas de grandes producciones de PBC, por lo cual colocaban a 01 a un integrante de las redes de apoyo al terrorismo para que estuviera pendiente de la producción"

2. PAHD, May 26 2012.

La compañía […] al igual que el resto de compañías que componen el bloque noroccidental cobran vacuna a los moradores que producen base de coca, por cada kilogramo los subversivos cobran 400.000 mil pesos, cuando los terroristas compran la coca a los mismo productores, el kilo lo pagan a 2.100.000 pesos y estos lo revenden a 2.650.000 pesos para obtener esta ganancia utilizan a los integrantes de la red de apoyo al terrorismo quienes son los encargados de negociar directamente con los narcotraficantes quienes son los que exportan el alcaloide a otros países.

3. PAHD, January 3 2010.

[61] Colin Elman and Diana Kapiszewski, "Data Access and Research Transparency in the Qualitative Tradition," *PS: Political Science & Politics*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (2014), pp. 43–47.

El área de injerencia de esta comisión de finanzas de la columna móvil […] de las FARC, es en el corregimiento de […], desde donde centralizan todo el movimiento de las finanzas y la recolección de la base de coca, cobro de vacunas a compradores de base de coca de otros traquetos los cuales les exigen $200.000, por kilo base de coca que compren, maneja un presupuesto de $20 mil millones de pesos para la recolección de base de coca la cual es comprada a un valor de $2.500.000.00 o $2.600.000.00 dependiendo el precio del mercado, los mayores sectores de producción de base de coca son: […], […], […], sector de […]. […], […], […], […], […], (esta mercancía es sembrada por campesinos del área) Las fincas de alias […] se encuentran ubicadas en La Vereda […], donde recogen aproximadamente 5.000 @ de hoja de coca y en ese mismo sitio la procesan para extraer base de coca, otra finca ésta ubicada en la vereda […] de propiedad de un señor llamado […] donde recogen 4.800 @ de hoja.

4. PAHD, June 20 2012.

Manifiesta el entrevistado que ingreso a la estructura por que el sujeto […] le manifestó su confianza y le hacia ver las cosas muy fáciles, prometiéndole dinero y ganancias en el momento de la venta de pasta base de coca, pagándole el 20 % de estas ventas, esto me motivo a seguir trabajando en la organización viendo que el negocio se veía rentable, mi trabajo era recibir la plata de la organización y comprar la (PBC), en las veredas […], […], […], luego se la entregaba a alias[…] y a alias […].
2002:
En este año la producción de coca en el sector fue abundante, en las reuniones que realizaban en todas las veredas le sugerían a los campesinos que sembraran coca que era lo que mas plata daba, por lo general siempre era precedida por el camarada […], el encargado de comprar la pasta base de coca era alias […], […] que tenia la particularidad de en cuadrillarse , y después salía de civil a comprar la "mercancía" al corregimiento de […], también compraban en la vereda el cedro del Municipio de […], cada 8 días salían a esto lugares a realizar la compra, luego de realizar todas las compras se reunía toda la "mercancía" en la casa de Alias […] que queda de la vereda […] en dirección hacia […] a la orilla del Rio […].
2007
Para esta este año me pase a vivir en la vereda […] en una finca que le compre a mi hermano […] en la cual inicio también con el cultivo de coca pero falle por que iniciaron las fumigaciones, entonces en vista de que se le acabo el cultivo la guerrilla exacta mente el camarada Alias […], me ofreció plata-para comprar coca en beneficio de la organización, en la primera cuota me dio 60.000.000 de pesos para la compra. Yo Salí a comprar la coca a la vereda las […] pero no utilice la totalidad del dinero debido a que las fumigaciones acabaron con gran parte del negocio, lo que me sobro lo utilice en el mercado siguiente (a los 8 días).

***Chapter "QUALITATE ANALYSIS"***

5. PAHD, May 8 2012.

Porque una vez en la estructura le interesaba que tuviera la comida de manera permanente y los comentarios que hacían los cabecillas sobre el Estado, además que permanentemente los están amenazando y repitiendo que las tropas lo asesinan si lo cogen, ante lo cual decidió mantenerse en la organización.

***Section on "Selective incentives"***

6. PAHD, Neiva, May 9 2012.

Manifiesta que fue reclutado por […] en el sector de […], íbamos a raspar Coca, después de estar raspando coca nos convidaron para que ingresáramos a la guerrilla en ese mismo sector nos enseñaron a manejar las armas y nos dictaron el curso de combate el cual tubo una duración de 3 meses, terminado el curso fue asignado al FRENTE […] haciendo Patrullas alrededor del pueblo durante 2 años por los al redores de […].

7. PAHD, May 17 2011.

Trabajaba como jornalero al día, en el corregimiento […] del municipio de […]. […] El jornal era Raspar hoja de coca, o machete, o fumigar, se gana 15.000 uno mismo gana la comida.

8. PAHD, February 22 2010.

Que la mantuvo en la organización antes de pensar en desmovilizarse?
Por ideología y porque se sentía segura.

9. PAHD, March 10 2010.

Cual fue el factor que más incidió en Usted para tomar la decisión de fugarse?
POR LA PRESION DE LA FUERZA AEREA CON LOS BOMBARDEOS QUE NOS LES DA TIEMPO DE PROTEGERSE.
Que fue lo que más lo desmoralizo y desmotivo para no continuar en la organización?
HABER PRESENCIADO DOS BOMBARDEOS EN EL CAMPAMENTO DONDE ESTABA, CUANDO FUE MUERTO EN COMBATE ALIAS […] QUE ERA EL […] COMANDANTE DEL FRENTE […].

10. PAHD, July 22 2012.

La vida en la guerrilla no tiene futuro y cada vez esta mas dura la situación, mucha presión militar y constantes bombardeos lo motivaron a tomar la decisión, ya que en cualquier momento podría caer muerto.

11. PAHD, February 5 2011.

Señala el entrevistado que la principal causa para fugarse de mencionada organización fue, la idea de brindarle un mejor futuro a sus dos hijas se sentía cansado y tenía miedo de ser dado de baja por el ejercito.

12. PAHD, February 3 2011.

Cuál es la principal debilidad de su organización? (armada, política y de convivencia entre sus miembros).
La moral de los guerrilleros está muy baja, también el suministro de comida es muy escaso por la presencia del Ejército.

13. PAHD, May 30 2012.

Cuál es la principal debilidad de su organización? (armada, política y de convivencia entre sus miembros).
El principal debilidad por la cual se desmovilizo fue que cambiaron de área estratégica, al llegar a un nuevo sitio no conocían ni tenían apoyo de la población civil, se confiaron los mandos y fueron varios fracasos que tuvieron.
Se ha debilitado por que se tiene muy controlado algunos sitios para recibir material aislándolos y obligándolos a buscar nuevas o antiguas áreas de injerencia que son desconocidas para la mayoría de guerrilleros nuevos.

14. PAHD, June 1 2012.

Dicen que la moral esta baja algunas veces por falta alimentos, muchas necesidades y presión del Ejército. Días de una sola comida otros solo dos o no se como.

15. PAHD, July 5 2011.

Logística:
En la actualidad esta estructura, a raíz de la muerte de (a. Mono Jojoy), el terrorista […] dio la orden de que cada estructura debía abastecerse por sí sola.

16. PAHD, September 28 2011.

DESPUÉS DE LA MUERTE DEL "MONO JOJOY", TODO CAMBIO EN EL
SENTIDO DE QUE YA NO LLEGABA EL ALIMENTO Y LA DOTACIÓN COMO,
ANTES, SOBRETODO EL TRATO CON LOS JEFES YA QUE POR CUALQUIER FALTA
COMETIDA EL ENCARGADO DEL GRUPO LOS HUMILLA Y LOS INSULTA DE UNA

FORMA GROSERA Y NOS AMENAZABA CONSTANTEMENTE DE HACERNOS CONCEJO DE GUERRA

17. PAHD, July 12, 2011.

Cuál es la principal debilidad de su organización? (armada, política y de convivencia entre sus miembros).
EL ARMAMENTO ESTA EN MAL ESTADO Y A PARTIR DE LA MUERTE DEL MONO JOJOY LA MENTALIDAD HA CAMBIADO MUCHO Y EL PERSONAL QUIERE DESERTAR DE LA ORGANIZACIÓN.

18. PAHD, July 31 2012.

Motivo de la desmovilización: Yo me empece a sentir aburrida hacia días, no por el trato, mas por el trajin porque me tocaba muy pesado, no le miraba ni cabeza ni cola a nada de eso, y ya después de la muerte del mono Jojoy me aburrí mas porque ya cada uno quería jalar para su lado, se miraba eso muy feo, y ya estaba cansada de estar hay, pero no me venia porque estaba en la mata y no conocía el área, hasta que llegue al frente […] y hay empecé a tener contacto con la población y como era allegada a […] se me facilitaron mas las cosas para poder salir, porque lo me detenía era el temor de que me cogieran y me mataran.

19. PAHD, October 1 2010.

¿La muerte del Mono Jojoy, afecto la moral del personal que integran las tres compañías?
Manifiesta que la reacción del personal de guerrilleros y mandos fue llorar, una vez […] les confirmo la noticia. El personal continuó con sus actividades
diarias como transportar los abastecimientos y no sabe más sobre el tema, porque al otro día concretan la fuga que tenían programada desde hace varios meses.

20. PAHD, October 5 2008.

Con la muerte del camarada acasio empezó todo a desmoronarse, ya que se veía como los apoyos de ropa y alimento empezó a ser cada vez menos y cuando uno se enfermaba era un problema ya que uno se podía morir y nadie le importaba.
Año 2008, vimos como la gente empezó a desmovilizarse, al principio era poquitos pero después ya eso era harta gente y entonces la idea de varios en la compañía y en los milicianos era la de volarse cuando se pudiera.

21. PAHD, October 5 2010.

Después de la muerte del Comandante Martin Caballero, pensé que ya no tenía sentido estar en la organización, el era la cabeza, un buen comandante y al morir todo cambio para mi, esa fue la razón mas importante para pensar en fugarme, por las malas condiciones de vida alimentación, vestuario, aburrida de vivir en la montaña, no estaba de acuerdo con las nuevas políticas de mando de los cabecillas del Frente […] y ahora quería recuperar el tiempo que perdí estando en las montañas.

22. PAHD, May 28 2011.

desde el año 2009 han venido decreciendo sus ingresos;
agudizándose más la situación ante las continuas erradicaciones de cultivos de coca, el
no retorno de algunos campesinos a cultivarla ante el temor de fracasar y perder sus esfuerzos

23. PAHD, February 21 2011.

Para este año asegura que fue difícil, ya que empezó la erradicación de los cultivos de coca ubicados en la zona, empezando en el sector de […], donde la Policía hizo varios desembarcos, siendo recogido por la estructura y otros milicianos de la región. Aduce que para estos días llego una compañía móvil al mando del sujeto alias […], con 25 terroristas, el cual reunió a los milicianos entre los cuales se encontraba el entrevistado, en la vereda […], quien les dijo que lo habían asignado a mencionada área y que no conocía y que necesitaba la colaboración de los milicianos, ya que eran los que conocían el terreno, dividiendo por comandos la estructura, entre los cuales incluía de 1 y 2 milicianos, indicando que el plan del gobierno era acabar con la coca y que la misión de la estructura era neutralizar esta actividad, afirmando que les iba a minar el área donde se encontraban erradicando y que les iban a lanzar ramplas, cilindros, día y noche.

***Section on "Ideological appeal"***

24. PAHD, April 28 2011.

Cuál es la principal fortaleza de su organización?
La principal fortaleza es la formacion ideologica, pues es en la que mas los mandos superiores infunden al conbatiente, para que no se baje la moral y colocan como ejemplo a los combatientes que tienen elavada moral y temple revolucionario
[…] El estudio permanente de todos los manteriales y estatutos que son los que mantiene al combatiente convencido de la lucha armada en la que esta involucrado.

25. PAHD, February 24 2010.

Que lo mantuvo en la organización antes de pensar en desmovilizarse.

ESTABA CONCIENTIZADO IDEOLÓGICAMENTE DE LA ESTADÍA ALLÁ Y CON EL TIEMPO SE RESIGNA A PERMANECER EN LA ORGANIZACIÓN.

26. PAHD, February 18, 2011.

Que lo mantuvo en la organización antes de pensar en desmovilizarse?
Porque le gustaban las armas y estaba convencida de la lucha hasta que se aburrió.

27. PAHD, October 1, 2010.

Manifiesta la desmovilizada que nunca creyó que las FARC fueran capaces de tomarse el poder porque miraba que tenían el control de algunos pueblos y cuando llegaba el Ejército, salían corriendo, mucho menor tienen la capacidad de tomarse la capital.

28. PAHD, December 22 2003.

La guerrilla si puede lanzar una ofensiva pero no esta en condiciones de tomarse el poder. Cuando estaba la zona de distensión se notó el crecimiento del movimiento, una vez termino se ve la deserción en masa día a día, otro motivo para no tomarse el poder es que tienen a la población en contra.

29. PAHD, April 16 2012.

QUE LES PROVOCO LA MUERTE DE CANO?
Desentuciasmo y moral baja el golpe fue duro para la organización y […] les habia dicho que la muerte del el había sido porque tenían a un infiltrado del ejercito y este los delato.

30. PAHD, July 7 2011.

Dice que la muerte del alias el Mono Jojoy, afecto el cumplimiento de las políticas y planes del grupo armado ya que la nueva dirección del bloque cambio y reestructuro los frentes y las compañías móviles regresaron a su zona de origen y no se están efectuando curso de entrenamiento a ese nivel.

31. PAHD, January 11 2012.

“Estaba aburrido por qué no tenia comunicación constante con mis familiares, en especial con mis dos hijas Que viven en el municipio de […] y mi mama que reside en El municipio de […]. Y porque no tenía futuro en esta organización terrorista”.

32. PAHD, January 18 2012.

Se dio porque no cumplieron con lo que le prometieron; malos tratos; no veía ningún futuro en esta organización, lejos de familia; así mismo lo incentivó la propaganda de desmovilización por medio de la radio FM.

33. PAHD, May 24 2012.

Manifiesta que empezó a planear su fuga de la guerrilla porque, se aburrió de ver que no tenía ningún sentido estar en esta organización que no le aportaba nada para un futuro y que era mentira todo lo que decían y esperando que en cualquier momento fuera dada de baja en algún combate o bombardeo de las fuerzas militares.

34. PAHD, May 7 2012.

Situación que ha incrementado una desmoralización general al interior de las filas guerrilleras; debido a que cada dia sus integrantes se dan cuenta que están luchando por nada, solo por arriesgar sus vidas.

35. PAHD, 14 May 2012.

Manifiesta el entrevistado que una de las razones que lo llevo a tomar la decisión de fugarse de la estructura terrorista y acogerse al Grupo de Atención Humanitaria al Desmovilizado, otorgado por el Gobierno Nacional, fue por su hijo ya que lo quería conocer y estar con él ya que estando en la organización terrorista esto era muy difícil y también por quería organizar una relación estable con la mama de su hijo la desmovilizada […]. También manifiesta que se dio cuenta que las estructuras de la ONT FARC, nunca van a surgir, como lo dicen sus cabecillas, antes por el contrario cada día son más golpeadas por los integrantes de la Fuerza Pública, por eso miro que era mejor entregarse a las autoridades para que estas lo ayuden hacer una persona de bien y así poderse dedicar a su familia.

36. PAHD, June 15 2011.

Por qué tomo la decisión de fugarse de la organización?.
Po que tenía claro que las FARC, no tenía ningún camino bueno y no podía llegar al poder, además su intensión era formar un hogar con su compañera sentimental y allí no se lo permitían.

37. PAHD, November 9 2011.

Por qué tomo la decisión de fugarse de la organización?.
Manifiesta, que después de un año de estar en cuadrillado en la estructura armada, se dio cuenta que no le gustaba la organización terrorista, por la persecución del Ejercito Nacional y por las acciones que los cabecillas ordenaban contra la población civil, como cobrarle impuestos a los campesinos que no tenían nada, desplazaban personas inocentes y también por que no recibía pago por las actividades que realizaba.

38. PAHD, 24 July 2002.

El entrevistado manifiesta que se encontraba aburrido desde su ingreso a la organización delincuencial, ya que no estaba de acuerdo con las actividades delictivas que llevaban a cabo como

asesinatos, hurtos y malos tratos de los cabecillas hacia los bandidos, y mas aun cuando les expliqaban que luchaban por un pueblo.

39. PAHD, July 15 2010.

Estando en la organización, no estuve de acuerdo con los múltiples actos que se cometían contra la población indefensa, especialmente campesinos, quienes eran sometidos a torturas y posteriormente los asesinaban.

40. PAHD, February 18 2012

Cuál fue el factor que mas incidió?

No estaba de acuerdo con los últimos atentados que ha realizado las farc, donde han salido muchos civiles heridos en […], y por la persecución a la que estaba sometido, debido a que el entrevistado no estaba de acuerdo con las políticas que impartían los mandos.

41. PAHD, December 3 2010.

Causa o motivo de su presentación: Debido a que tomo conciencia del mal que le estaba haciendo a la sociedad además la ideología por la que luchaba ya estaba básicamente muerta

42. PAHD, February 24 2011.

actualmente en la guerrilla se perdieron los ideales ya se observa que son un grupo de delincuentes, narcotraficantes que no ayudan al pueblo si no que lo están explotando.

43. PAHD, July 7 2011.

Porque, hizo un estudio al fondo y se dio cuenta que las cosas no funcionaban como debía de ser, las farc esta en un retroceso, por el mal manejo que le está dando algunos cabecillas de los frentes 39, 40 y 43, se están preocupando por su bienestar y de sus familias y no se interesan por darle cumplimiento a las directrices, respecto al manejo de los recursos económicos de la organización.

44. PAHD, February 6 2012.

Manifiesta el entrevistado que el […] del frente […] de la ONT-FARC, en el momento no se encuentra realizando ningún tipo de cobro de vacunas o extorciones ya que se ha centralizado en la comercialización de Pasta Base de Coca, ya que esta es su principal fuente de financiamiento para el sostenimiento de la estructura.

45. PAHD, November 1 2010.

Resalta la falta de convencimiento ideológico en que se encuentran actualmente los guerrilleros recién incorporados y que a futuro no tendrán la convicción y la capacidad para afrontar las situaciones de

guerra con las Fuerzas del Estado, por lo tanto no encuentra un respaldo ideal para seguir en la lucha revolucionaria.

46. PAHD, March 27 2012.

la ideología no es la misma, lo que les importa actualmente es la plata producto del narcotráfico y esta va solo para el bolsillode los principales cabecillas.

47. PAHD, January 14 2012.

me encontraba muy aburrido porque no me dejaban visitar a mi familia, la cual vive en la vereda […]. Porque los privilegios y vida buena siempre eran para los cabecillas, y para los mandos medios y rasos nunca había nada.

48. PAHD, December 22 2003.

Ideología, la enseñan pero no la aplican, en la guerrilla no hay igualdad, los comandantes siempre tiene lo mejor y gastan dinero en lo que ellos quieren, en cambio el guerrillero de base nunca obtiene dinero. Actualmente se encuentra muy desorganizada, hay muchas deserciones de los frentes, el interés de la guerrilla esta basado mas en el dinero y no en la ideología.

***Section on «Coercion»***

49. PAHD, May 24 2012.

Menciona la entrevistada que en los 07 Años que permaneció en las filas guerrilleras vio el asesinato que terroristas del frente 44 cometieron a sus propios compañeros, por los delitos que van en contra de la disciplina tales como tentativa de deserción, indicios de personal infiltrado, desmoralización, insubordinación, entre el personal que han resultado asesinados producto de consejos de guerra se encuentran algunos menores de edad en total la entrevistada menciono el caso de:

Alias […] Acusado de traición.

Alias […] 15 años de edad acusada de plan de deserción.

Alias […] por tener comunicación con un desmovilizado.

Alias […] por dispararle accidentalmente a otro guerrillero.

Alias […] mando Medio del frente 16 por tentativa de deserción.

Alias […] consejo de guerra por plan de deserción.

Alias […] consejo de guerra por plan de deserción.

Alias […] consejo de guerra por plan de deserción.

Alias […] consejo de guerra por plan de deserción.

Alias […] consejo de guerra por plan de deserción.

Alias […] de 15 Años de edad por insubordinación.
Alias […] desviación a la disciplina de las FARC.
Alias […] por hacer comentarios de estar aburrido en la guerrilla.

50. PAHD, February 3 2011.

Que lo mantuvo en la organización antes de pensar en desmovilizarse
Manifiesta el entrevistado que lo mantuvo el temor a que si volaba y lo descubrieran lo llevaran a un consejo de guerra y por temor a que le hicieran daño a su familia.

51. PAHD, June 15 2011.

Que la mantuvo en la organización durante (13) años, antes de pensar en desmovilizarse.
Se mantuvo allí, por el miedo que tenia de ser asesinado en caso de un intento de fuga y el terreno era muy difícil, además no se lograba ubicar en que zona se encontraba.

52. PAHD, February 18 2011.

infiere la entrevistada, que cuando la tropas esta cerca incrementa la disciplina y cuando la tropas se aleja se indisciplina.

53. PAHD, May 24 2012.

Tampoco los dejan compartir con los demás guerrilleros porque los sancionan y les toman desconfianza porque los acusan que se van a desertar, los ponen hacer trabajos forzados de campo y no les dan nada a cambio.

54. PAHD, June 1 2012.

Manifiesta que de 1400 hombres y tan solo quedan aproximadamente 800 hombres por deserción. No tienen estatutos políticos y están peleando por el tráfico. No hay convivencia entre ellos los ven hablando entre cinco y los separan y castigan, no los dejan escuchar música, celular, las jóvenes nuevas solo están para los comandantes y las embarazadas son obligadas a abortar.

55. PAHD, November 23 2010.

Acerca de esa situación el desmovilizado manifiesta que la disciplina al interior de la estructura se ha vuelto demasiado rígida, por que a medida que va aumentando la confrontación con las fuerzas del estado son menos las posibilidades de cometer errores en el aspecto táctico, puesto que eso podría ocasionar el descubrimiento de su lugar de refugio, de igual forma toda esta clase de errores casi no esta siendo pagados con castigos, la mayoría de casos están siendo juzgados por la organización y ordenado su fusilamiento; pero en contraste con esto las deserciones al interior de la columna son muy

frecuentes, inclusive entre las últimas cuatro (4) fugas, los guerrilleros se desertaron de las propias áreas campamentarias de mayor injerencia tienen.

56. PAHD, September 28 2011.

DESPUÉS DE LA MUERTE DEL "MONO JOJOY", TODO CAMBIO EN EL SENTIDO DE QUE YA NO LLEGABA EL ALIMENTO Y LA DOTACIÓN COMO, ANTES, SOBRETODO EL TRATO CON LOS JEFES YA QUE POR CUALQUIER FALTA COMETIDA EL ENCARGADO DEL GRUPO LOS HUMILLA Y LOS INSULTA DE UNA FORMA GROSERA Y NOS AMENAZABA CONSTANTEMENTE DE HACERNOS CONCEJO DE GUERRA

57. PAHD, November 23 2010.

Desde hace un tiempo ha venido observando un incumplimiento total de los estatutos y normas que rigen a las FARC, lo que ocasiona una desviación y mal interpretación de de las tesis ideológicas y causa la ejecución de acciones injustas para con los guerrilleros y civiles en el área de injerencia, como lo pudo observar con el ajusticiamiento de un guerrillero de 13 años de edad, una guerrillera con aproximadamente 16 años en la organización y otra mujer de 08 años de militancia.

58. PAHD, January 21 2011.

Que fue lo que más lo desmoralizo y desmotivo para no continuar en la organización?
Porque a veces matan a gente inocente o a algunos milicianos por chismes.
Cuál es la principal debilidad de su organización? (armada, política y de convivencia entre sus miembros).
Manifiesta el entrevistado que por causa de que fusilan mucha gente debido a las reglas de régimen interno es que se está desmovilizando mucha gente.

59. PAHD, Caribe, April 4 2005.

El Ejército siguió avanzando hacia donde estaba la guerrilla, con esta acción la guerrilla se desplazó en forma obligada a […], allí permanecieron ocho días y en ese lugar se le hizo consejo de guerra a un guerrillero llamado […] y […] por el delito de robo, […] se habia comido una panela y la guerrillera se habia comido una comida de un compañero. El veredicto final fue fusilamiento. Aduce el entrevistado que en ese consejo de guerra interno diciendo que no estaba de acuerdo con ese fusilamiento por que el robo era insignificante y que habían muchos […] demostraba que la justicia que se aplicaba en la organización no tenia consistencia o igualdad, en ese momento […] se levanto y cuestiono la opinión del entrevistado, aduciendo que no estaba de acuerdo y que les decisiones del secretariado no se podían criticar.

60. PAHD, January 21 2011.

Cual fue el factor que más incidió en Usted para tomar la decisión de fugarse?
Porque le iban a hacer concejo de guerra y muy seguramente lo iban a matar.

61. PAHD, February 3 2012.

el entrevistado gastó ese dinero para suplir las necesidades básicas de su hogar, ya que no tenía con que subsistir. y la organización no le había cancelado la suma acordada de $20.000 diarios por la administración de la finca desde el mes de noviembre, por lo cual se vio obligado a gastar el dinero recibido por el alcaloide. El mencionado cabecilla lo sancionó con la orden de pagar tres veces más el dinero que se había gastado y asar como terrorista encuadrillado durante un año sin ninguna retribución económica; ante esto manifiesta el entrevistado que él ya sabía que era solo un aartimaña de la organización, porque esa falta cometida no es perdonada y se sanciona con el concejo de guerra que siempre da como resultado el asesinato del terrorista. Al saber que encuadrillarse significaba ser asesinado por la falta cometida, tomó la decisión de desmovilizarse.

62. PAHD, Medellín, June 12 2012.

De acuerdo a lo manifestado por el entrevista lo que lo motiva a fugarse de la organización es la intención que tenían los mandos de ajusticiarlo por problemas que el venia presentando debido a que le gusta mucho el licor y esto ha ocasionado que tenga inconvenientes con la población del sector en la que cumplía las funciones como motorista o lanchero, integrante de la red de apoyo del frente Urbano […].

63. PAHD, January 18 2011.

Aduce el entrevistado que alias […] le confeso que había recibido la orden de matarlo. y que lo mejor era que se fuera, en vista de lo que se planeaba contra el, logra convencer a alias […] de que se deserten juntos, esperan que llegue la noche.

64. PAHD, Miranda, March 27 2012.

CAUSA O MOTIVO DE SU PRESENTACIÓN:
Aduce el entrevistado que se encontraba aburrido debido a la persecución que tenia, la injusticia que se veía en la estructura, debido a que ajusticiaban en muchas ocasiones a los mismos guerrilleros sin muchas pruebas

***Section on "Alternative explanations"***

65. PAHD, February 18 2012.

Recuerda algún mensaje de desmovilización que le hay llamado la atención?

Sí, el que compara la vida de los comandantes con los guerrilleros de base. otro que dice: no sufra más, guerrillero, que su familia lo está esperando.

66. PAHD, February 22 2010.

Ha escuchado por la radio testimonios de miembros de la organización que se hayan desmovilizado?
Si, donde invitan a los combatientes a desmovilizarse que el gobierno da buenas ayudas.
Al cuanto tiempo de desmovilizarse esta persona, usted escucho el mensaje?
Varias veces
Tuvo esto alguna influencia en su decisión de desmovilizarse?
No cree mucho en los mensajes.

67. PAHD, May 7 2012.

Actualmente dentro del frente se encuentran varios guerrilleros desmoralizados, los cuales quieren fugarse de la organización y no lo realizan producto del miedo infundido, donde les dicen que si se entregan las tropas, les sacan la información y luego los asesinan; asimismo que si se fugan y son capturados por los mismos guerrilleros o las milicias son sometidos a consejo de guerra.

68. PAHD, February 12 2010.

Que lo mantuvo en la organización antes de pensar en desmovilizarse.
LE DABA MIEDO DESMOVILIZARSE POR QUE DENTRO DE LA ORGANZACION LES DECIAN QUE EL EJERCITO LOS COGIA LE SACABAN LA INFORMACION Y DESPUES LOS DESAPARECIAN, EL TEMOR A QUE EN EL INTENTO DE VOLARSEN LOS COGIAN Y LOS ASESINABAN.

69. PAHD, April 25 2012.

El miedo a que las fuerzas militares me hicieran algo, es que en la guerrilla le dicen a uno que los del ejército lo torturan a uno y lo asesinan.

70. PAHD, April 15 2003.

Cual es el estado moral o anímico de los que están obligados o con problemas?
El resultado es la intención de desertar lo mas pronto posible, pero ellos lo llenan de temor diciendo que el que deserta el ejército lo mata.

***Appendix 6 on "Downstream consequences"***

71. PAHD, April 2 2012.

Cuál es la principal fortaleza de su organización? (armada, política y de convivencia entre sus miembros)
En estos momentos la facilidad para reclutar personal menor de edad.

72. PAHD, May 12 2010.

fue reclutado por alias […], alias […] cabecilla de las Milicias en la vereda […], donde le dieron un revolver, prestaba horas y media de guardia y le dijeron que después de 02 años en las milicias Bolivariana pasaban a conformar las filas del frente […], de ahí le dieron misiones de realizar Retenes Ilegales, reclutamiento Forzados de jóvenes en las veredas […], […], […], […], donde alcanzo a reclutar a 12 jóvenes de diferentes edades donde le daban una Boleta para que se presentara en el sector de […] donde eran recibidos por alias […], cabecilla de Milicias , este le daba charlas sobre la FARC, y las funciones que tenían que cumplir en las filas de frente […].

73. PAHD, May 12 2010.

Manifiesta que en el sector de […] hay un campamento para capacidad para 200 terroristas, también manifiesta que decidió dejar las organización terrorista porque le iba a reclutar a su su hijo de 11 años de edad e iba a hacer trasladado con el entrevistado al campamento de […] donde iban a recibir instrucción Militar.