Supplementary Appendix for Dahl & Gleditsch "Clouds with Silver Linings: How Mobilization Shapes the Impact of Coups on Democratization"

Table A-1: Distribution of coup and protests events

	Coup and protest (same or following year)	**Coup and protest (same year)**	**Protest year t, coup year t+1**	**Coup year t, protest year t+1**	**Coup only**	**Protest only**
N	93	52	19	21	354	478

Table A-2: Overview of coups and protest sequencing for years with both active protests and coups

	N
Protest starts prior to coup (within the same year)	15
Protest and coups active same year, but protests starts in earlier year	25
Protests and coups erupt on same day	4
Coup prior to protest (same year)	3
Unkown	5

Table A-3: List of coups and Polity changes occurring within same calendar year, and no coup previous year

Country	Year	Date: Polity-change	Date: Coup	Polity-change first
Afghanistan	1978	4/17/78	4/27/78	1
Brazil	1963	1/23/63	9/12/63	1
Equatorial Guinea	1969	3/1/69	3/5/69	1
Ghana	1982	1/1/82	11/23/82	1
Guatemala	1954	6/28/54	6/29/54	1
Guinea-Bissau	2000	2/17/00	11/23/00	1
Honduras	1999	1/27/99	7/30/99	1
Kenya	1982	6/10/82	8/1/82	1
Nigeria	1993	6/24/93	11/17/93	1
Pakistan	1958	10/8/58	10/27/58	1
Peru	1992	4/6/92	11/13/92	1
Philippines	1986	2/26/86	7/6/86	1
Sudan	1971	5/17/71	7/19/71	1
Uruguay	1973	2/9/73	2/10/73	1
Yemen North	1962	9/20/62	9/27/62	1
Togo	1991	8/28/91	12/15/91	1
Argentina	1955	9/23/55	11/13/55	0
Gambia	1994	7/24/94	11/11/94	0
Greece	1967	4/22/67	12/13/67	0
Mali	1991	3/27/91	7/14/91	0
Mali	2012	4/6/12	5/1/12	0
Nigeria	1966	1/16/66	7/29/66	0
Philippines	1987	2/3/87	8/27/87	0
Sierra Leone	1992	4/30/92	12/29/92	0
Syria	1963	3/9/63	7/18/63	0
Venezuela	1992	2/4/92	11/27/92	0

Table A-4: List of NV campaigns starting same calendar year as Polity changes

Country	Year	Campaign	Campaign startdate	Politychange date	Polity-change first
El Salvador	1977	El Salvador anti-junta	2/28/77	2/28/77	1
Bolivia	2003	Anti-Sanchez de Lozada Campaign	2/13/03	2/12/03	1
Nigeria	1993	Nigeria anti-military	6/24/93	6/24/93	1
Philippines	1983	People Power	9/8/83	8/22/83	1
Tanzania	1992	Tanzania pro-democracy	Response to Polity change	6/17/92	1
Venezuela	1992	Anti-Perez	2/4/92	2/4/92	1
Benin	1963	Benin anti-government protests	29. oktober - 27. november	10/29/63	1
Cambodia	2013	2013 Cambodian election protests	9/15/13	7/29/13	1
East Timor	2006	Anti-Alkatiri	6/6/06	3/17/06	1
Iran	2009	Green Revolution and Day of Rage	6/13/09	6/12/09	1
Ukraine	2000	Orange Revolution	1/1/01	11/28/00	1
Dominican Republic	1961	anti-Balaguer strikes	November	5/31/61	1
Madagascar	1972	Anti-Tsiranana	5/13/72	4/24/72	1
Togo	2005	Togo anti-Gnassingbe/Coup Crisis	2/7/05	2/6/05	1
Russia	2007	Dissenter's March	12/16/06	12/2/07	0
South Korea	1960	Student Revolution	4/19/60	7/16/60	0
Albania	1990	Albanian anti-communist	12/27/89	12/12/90	0
Egypt	2013	Pro-Morsi Protests	1/1/13	7/4/13	0
Colombia	1957	anti-Rojas	5/1/57	7/21/57	0
Poland	1980	Solidarity	8/14/80	8/31/80	0
Niger	1991	Niger anti-military	10/19/91	11/3/91	0
El Salvador	1960	Anti-Lemus campaign	July	10/27/60	0
Bolivia	1964	Bolivian anti-government protests	May	11/5/64	0
Bolivia	1985	Anti-Siles Zuazo	4/10/84	8/7/85	0
Haiti	1956	anti-Maglore movement	5/17/56	12/13/56	0
Pakistan	1977	Anti-Bhutto	3/8/77	7/6/77	0
Pakistan	2007	Anti-Musharraf Campaign (Lawyer's Movement)	3/9/07	11/28/07	0
Peru	2000	anti-Fujimori campaign	7/26/00	11/22/00	0
Senegal	2000	anti-Diouf campaign	1/1/00	3/20/00	0
Sudan	1964	October Revolution	10/22/64	10/30/64	0
Guatemala	2015	Guatemala Uprising	April	9/3/15	0
Sudan	1985	anti-Jaafar	3/26/85	4/7/85	0
Sudan	2011	Anti-al-Bashir Government	1/30/11	7/9/11	0
South Vietnam	1963	1963 Buddhist Protests	May	11/2/63	0
India	1975	Anti-Indira Campaign (Phase 1)	1/14/74	6/26/75	0
India	1977	Anti-Indira Campaign (Phase 3)	1/1/77	3/24/77	0
Thailand	1973	student protests	6/10/73	10/15/73	0
Thailand	1992	pro-dem movement	4/8/92	9/14/92	0
Venezuela	1958	anti-Jimenez campaign	8/4/54	12/8/58	0
Cambodia	1998	Anti-Hun Sen	8/24/98	12/1/98	0
Nepal	1990	The Stir	2/18/90	11/10/90	0
Nepal	2002	Nepalese anti-government	August	10/5/02	0
Zambia	2001	anti-Chiluba campaign	1/25/01	12/28/01	0
Ivory Coast	2000	anit-Guei Protests	10/25/00	10/26/00	0
Ivory Coast	2010	Pro-Ouattara Campaign	January	12/4/10	0
Burundi	2015	Anti-Nkurunziza Campaign	April 2015	7/15/15	0
Chile	1983	anti-Pinochet campaign	5/11/83	8/7/83	0
Ecuador	2000	2000 Anti-Mahuad Protests	1/14/00	1/21/00	0
Panama	1987	anti-Noriega campaign	6/7/87	6/12/87	0
Turkey	1960	Students Lead Protest for Regime Change	April	5/28/60	0
Armenia	2018	2018 Anti-government protests	3/31/18	12/9/18	0
China	1976	Democracy Movement	4/5/76	9/10/76	0
Georgia	2007	2007 Anti-Saakashvili Campaign	9/28/07	11/7/07	0
Kyrgyzstan	2005	Tulip Revolution	3/1/05	8/14/05	0
Kyrgyzstan	2010	Second Revolution	4/7/10	4/16/10	0
Kyrgyzstan	2010	Anti-Interim Government	4/15/10	4/16/10	0
Madagascar	1991	Active Voices	1/5/91	11/13/91	0
Madagascar	2009	anti-Ravalomanana movement	1/26/09	3/18/09	0
Sri Lanka	2001	Anti-Kumaratunga	7/19/01	12/7/01	0
Togo	1991	Anti-Eyadema	3/12/91	8/28/91	0
East Germany	1989	pro-dem movement	9/4/89	11/25/89	0
Bahrain	2011	Anti-King Hamad Campaign	2/14/11	3/15/11	0
Bulgaria	1989	Bulgarian anti-communist	11/4/89	11/11/89	0
Croatia	1999	Croatian pro-democracy	May	11/26/99	0
Czechoslovakia	1989	Velvet Revolution	11/17/89	12/10/89	0
Fiji	1987	Indo-Fijian Anti-Coup Campaign	5/14/87	12/5/87	0
Fiji	2000	Anti-Chaudhry Campaign	5/19/00	7/28/00	0
Paraguay	1999	Anti-Cubas Protests	3/23/99	3/29/99	0
Hungary	1956	Hungarian anti-communist	7/18/56	11/4/56	0
Hungary	1989	pro-dem movement	6/17/89	10/24/89	0

Table A-5: Fixed-effects regression analysis: Window and decay functions (non-democracies, 1950-2019)

	Decay=1	Decay=2	Decay=3	Decay=4	Decay=5	Window=1	Window=2	Window=3	Window=4	Window=5
Coup	-0.917***	-0.576***	-0.404**	-0.301*	-0.229	-0.597***	-0.264*	-0.0173	0.0260	0.0673
	(-6.23)	(-4.04)	(-2.85)	(-2.12)	(-1.60)	(-5.20)	(-2.55)	(-0.17)	(0.27)	(0.70)
Protest* coup	2.199***	1.628***	1.326***	1.155***	1.046***	1.514***	1.061***	0.467*	0.280	0.311
	(5.68)	(4.62)	(4.00)	(3.63)	(3.38)	(5.34)	(4.36)	(2.12)	(1.36)	(1.60)
Protest, decay	1.125***	1.080***	1.032***	0.990***	0.955***	0.902***	0.900***	0.892***	0.855***	0.648***
	(8.04)	(7.52)	(6.99)	(6.53)	(6.14)	(7.23)	(7.51)	(7.61)	(7.38)	(5.60)
Log GDP per capita, t–1	0.0779	0.0875	0.0976	0.105*	0.111*	0.0989*	0.110*	0.122*	0.129**	0.147**
	(1.57)	(1.75)	(1.95)	(2.10)	(2.20)	(1.99)	(2.20)	(2.45)	(2.58)	(2.93)
Economic growth, t–1	-0.241	-0.217	-0.209	-0.206	-0.207	-0.235	-0.207	-0.221	-0.232	-0.248
	(-1.24)	(-1.12)	(-1.07)	(-1.06)	(-1.06)	(-1.21)	(-1.06)	(-1.13)	(-1.18)	(-1.26)
Log incumbent's time in office	0.00606	0.00809	0.00975*	0.0109*	0.0118*	0.00723	0.00974*	0.0121**	0.0129**	0.0134**
	(1.33)	(1.75)	(2.09)	(2.33)	(2.50)	(1.58)	(2.11)	(2.60)	(2.74)	(2.83)
Ongoing armed conflict	-0.109	-0.114	-0.116	-0.115	-0.114	-0.0965	-0.108	-0.111	-0.114	-0.114
	(-1.07)	(-1.11)	(-1.13)	(-1.12)	(-1.10)	(-0.94)	(-1.05)	(-1.07)	(-1.10)	(-1.10)
Democratic neighborhood	0.00649	0.00573	0.00610	0.00663	0.00709	0.00752	0.00645	0.00760	0.00807	0.00963
	(0.75)	(0.66)	(0.70)	(0.76)	(0.82)	(0.87)	(0.74)	(0.87)	(0.93)	(1.10)
Cold War	0.0589	0.0899	0.115	0.134	0.149	0.0481	0.0642	0.0757	0.0859	0.0826
	(0.66)	(1.00)	(1.28)	(1.49)	(1.65)	(0.54)	(0.72)	(0.84)	(0.95)	(0.91)
Other non-violent campaign, t–1	0.200	0.153	0.127	0.114	0.108	0.148	0.121	0.0867	0.0859	0.0712
	(0.61)	(0.47)	(0.39)	(0.35)	(0.33)	(0.45)	(0.37)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.22)
More than one coup, t–1	-1.541***	-1.903***	-2.035***	-2.089***	-2.114***	-1.745***	-2.047***	-2.105***	-2.182***	-2.144***
	(-4.08)	(-5.08)	(-5.45)	(-5.62)	(-5.69)	(-4.68)	(-5.53)	(-5.69)	(-5.89)	(-5.78)
Constant	-0.401	-0.536	-0.661	-0.756*	-0.829*	-0.551	-0.699*	-0.846*	-0.914**	-1.027**
	(-1.15)	(-1.52)	(-1.86)	(-2.13)	(-2.32)	(-1.57)	(-1.99)	(-2.40)	(-2.58)	(-2.89)
N	4097	4097	4097	4097	4097	4097	4097	4097	4097	4097
Log lik.	-8419.6	-8432.4	-8440.0	-8444.8	-8448.3	-8434.9	-8439.9	-8454.0	-8459.6	-8473.5
bic	16939.0	16964.7	16979.8	16989.5	16996.4	16969.7	16979.6	17007.8	17019.1	17046.8

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A-6: Descriptive statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Coup, $\alpha = 2$	0.087	0.228	0	1
Protest*coup $\alpha = 2$	0.008	0.075	0	1
Successful coup $\alpha = 2$	0.051	0.175	0	1
Successful coup * protest $\alpha = 2$	0.008	0.071	0	1
Failed coup $\alpha = 2$	0.049	0.171	0	1
Failed coup * protest $\alpha = 2$	0.006	0.60	0	1
Log GDP per capita	7.425	1.688	3.549	11.685
Economic growth	0.543	0.145	-1.418	1.607
Incumbents time in office	7.345	7.628	1	49
Ongoing armed conflict	0.135	0.342	0	1
Cold War	0.571	0.495	0	1
Other non-violent campaign	0.011	0.106	0	1
More than one coup	0.163	0.369	0	1

Table A-7: Logit and fixed-effects regression analysis: Change in any direction (1950-2019)

	Non-Dem: Abs. change	Non-Dem: Change dummy	All reg: Abs. change	All reg: Change dummy
main				
Coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$	1.111***	1.329***	1.502***	1.558***
	(9.05)	(8.83)	(17.41)	(11.00)
Protest, decay: $\alpha = 2$	1.227***	1.267***	1.193***	1.448***
	(10.43)	(8.99)	(14.97)	(11.04)
Log GDP per capita, t–1	-0.0424	-0.111**	-0.0425**	-0.277***
	(-0.92)	(-2.85)	(-3.10)	(-8.66)
Economic growth, t–1	-0.333	-0.650*	-0.302*	-0.476
	(-1.84)	(-2.24)	(-2.30)	(-1.68)
Log incumbent's time in office	0.00567	-0.00646	0.00541*	0.00788
	(1.32)	(-1.03)	(2.02)	(1.38)
Ongoing armed conflict	0.0906	0.182	0.0780	0.251*
	(0.95)	(1.62)	(1.44)	(2.37)
Democratic neighborhood	0.0146	0.0260**	0.00159	-0.00282
	(1.81)	(2.74)	(0.49)	(-0.37)
Cold War	0.0330	-0.179	0.0327	-0.347***
	(0.39)	(-1.60)	(0.76)	(-3.46)
More than one coup, t–1	0.834*	0.454	0.678*	0.385
	(2.39)	(1.10)	(2.31)	(0.93)
Constant	0.509	-1.340***	0.396***	-0.588*
	(1.56)	(-4.78)	(3.45)	(-2.34)
N	4109	4109	6462	6462
Log lik.	-8171.8	-1558.1		-1949.9
bic	16426.9	3199.3	.	3987.6

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A-8: Fixed-effect analysis: Excluding cases where protest precedes coups (1950-2019)

	Non-dem	Non-dem	Non-dem	All regimes	All regimes	All regimes
Coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$	-0.182	-0.485**		-0.437***	-0.642***	
	(-1.24)	(-3.21)		(-3.74)	(-5.25)	
Protest*coup: $\alpha = 2$		2.576***			1.114**	
		(5.48)			(3.20)	
Successful coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$			-0.984***			-1.114***
			(-5.33)			(-7.39)
Protest* successful coup: $\alpha = 2$			2.146***			0.311
			(3.34)			(0.68)
Failed coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$			0.0901			0.0827
			(0.48)			(0.54)
Protest* Failed coup: $\alpha = 2$			1.770**			1.566***
			(3.08)			(3.55)
Protest, decay: $\alpha = 2$		1.068***	1.092***		1.100***	1.097***
		(7.42)	(7.58)		(10.17)	(10.17)
Log GDP per capita, t–1	0.148**	0.0732	0.0648	0.0341	0.0158	0.0146
	(2.95)	(1.46)	(1.30)	(1.06)	(0.50)	(0.46)
Economic growth, t–1	-0.310	-0.171	-0.171	-0.165	-0.0892	-0.0853
	(-1.58)	(-0.89)	(-0.89)	(-1.15)	(-0.63)	(-0.60)
Log incumbent's time in office	0.00860	0.00896	0.00756	0.0127***	0.0111**	0.00970**
	(1.84)	(1.95)	(1.64)	(3.52)	(3.13)	(2.73)
Ongoing armed conflict	-0.0832	-0.0939	-0.102	-0.0503	-0.0909	-0.105
	(-0.78)	(-0.90)	(-0.97)	(-0.63)	(-1.16)	(-1.35)
Democratic neighborhood	0.0105	0.00682	0.00613	-0.00183	-0.00326	-0.00398
	(1.17)	(0.78)	(0.70)	(-0.28)	(-0.50)	(-0.62)
Cold War	-0.0506	0.0391	0.0557	0.0157	0.0571	0.0710
	(-0.55)	(0.43)	(0.62)	(0.24)	(0.88)	(1.10)
Other non-violent campaign, t–1	0.0523	0.196	0.179	0.284	0.352	0.326
	(0.16)	(0.61)	(0.56)	(1.10)	(1.39)	(1.29)
More than one coup, t–1	-2.616***	-2.248***	-2.200***	-2.439***	-2.140***	-2.139***
	(-5.35)	(-4.66)	(-4.55)	(-5.86)	(-5.20)	(-5.19)
Constant	-0.780*	-0.459	-0.387	-0.208	-0.171	-0.155
	(-2.16)	(-1.29)	(-1.09)	(-0.81)	(-0.68)	(-0.62)
N	3691	3691	3691	5792	5792	5792
Log lik.	-7484.3	-7415.3	-7408.1	-10850.2	-10767.9	-10745.8
bic	15050.8	14929.1	14931.1	21787.1	21639.7	21613.0

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A-9: Fixed effect analysis: Excluding cases where coup precedes protests (1950- 2019)

	Non-Dem	Non-Dem	Non-Dem	All regimes	All regimes	All regimes
Coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$	-0.230	-0.522***		-0.560***	-0.694***	
	(-1.75)	(-3.77)		(-5.26)	(-6.09)	
Protest*coup: $\alpha = 2$		0.864*			-0.498	
		(2.13)			(-1.56)	
Successful coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$			-0.984***			-1.176***
			(-5.79)			(-8.27)
Protest* successful coup: $\alpha = 2$			0.404			-1.446***
			(0.81)			(-3.76)
Failed coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$			0.00150			-0.0142
			(0.01)			(-0.10)
Protest* Failed coup: $\alpha = 2$			1.047			0.989*
			(1.96)			(2.32)
Protest, decay: $\alpha = 2$		1.262***	1.312***		1.299***	1.265***
		(5.83)	(6.18)		(7.69)	(7.65)
Log GDP per capita, t–1	0.140**	0.103*	0.0996*	0.0267	0.0207	0.0268
	(2.75)	(2.05)	(1.98)	(0.81)	(0.63)	(0.82)
Economic growth, t–1	-0.128	-0.0887	-0.0857	-0.0707	-0.0376	-0.0212
	(-0.66)	(-0.46)	(-0.45)	(-0.48)	(-0.26)	(-0.15)
Log incumbent's time in office	0.00618	0.00541	0.00403	0.00989**	0.00956*	0.00826*
	(1.31)	(1.15)	(0.86)	(2.65)	(2.57)	(2.23)
Ongoing armed conflict	-0.0546	-0.0614	-0.0546	-0.0603	-0.0680	-0.0506
	(-0.51)	(-0.58)	(-0.52)	(-0.73)	(-0.83)	(-0.62)
Democratic neighborhood	0.00308	0.000767	0.00158	-0.00962	-0.0103	-0.0100
	(0.35)	(0.09)	(0.18)	(-1.42)	(-1.54)	(-1.50)
Cold War	-0.0471	0.000180	0.0220	0.00527	0.0287	0.0582
	(-0.52)	(0.00)	(0.24)	(0.08)	(0.43)	(0.88)
Other non-violent campaign, t–1	-0.0138	0.0248	-0.00255	0.298	0.313	0.284
	(-0.04)	(0.08)	(-0.01)	(1.12)	(1.18)	(1.08)
More than one coup, t–1	-1.530***	-1.686***	-1.550***	-1.271***	-1.297***	-1.128***
	(-4.22)	(-4.69)	(-4.29)	(-3.99)	(-4.09)	(-3.56)
Constant	-0.775*	-0.603	-0.564	-0.155	-0.165	-0.217
	(-2.16)	(-1.69)	(-1.59)	(-0.59)	(-0.63)	(-0.83)
N	3625	3625	3625	5638	5638	5638
Log lik.	-7247.5	-7209.8	-7196.8	-10614.2	-10578.9	-10537.8
bic	14577.0	14518.0	14508.4	21314.7	21261.4	21196.6

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A-10: Fixed-effect analysis: Different specifications of independent variable (1950-2019)

	Decay=1	Decay=2	Decay=3	Decay=4	Decay=5	Window=1	Window=2	Window=3	Window=4	Window=5
Failed coup	-0.208	-0.0306	0.0332	0.0608	0.0767	-0.184	-0.00184	-0.0585	0.124	0.106
	(-1.11)	(-0.18)	(0.20)	(0.37)	(0.48)	(-1.23)	(-0.01)	(-0.49)	(1.08)	(0.96)
Protest* Failed coup	1.820***	1.212*	0.971*	0.872*	0.817*	1.415***	0.406	0.298	-0.00728	-0.121
	(3.42)	(2.55)	(2.21)	(2.10)	(2.06)	(3.51)	(1.23)	(1.02)	(-0.03)	(-0.49)
Successful coup	-1.605***	-1.005***	-0.707***	-0.536**	-0.425*	-1.130***	-0.674***	-0.184	-0.0543	0.0537
	(-8.63)	(-5.71)	(-4.12)	(-3.15)	(-2.50)	(-7.75)	(-5.29)	(-1.54)	(-0.47)	(0.48)
Protest* Successful coup	2.258***	1.606***	1.259**	1.076**	0.967**	1.719***	1.557***	0.571*	0.269	0.250
	(4.51)	(3.67)	(3.14)	(2.85)	(2.67)	(4.98)	(5.35)	(2.20)	(1.13)	(1.12)
Protest	1.137***	1.089***	1.031***	0.974***	0.923***	0.887***	0.887***	0.889***	0.888***	0.712***
	(8.16)	(7.62)	(7.04)	(6.49)	(6.02)	(7.18)	(7.50)	(7.69)	(7.78)	(6.26)
Log GDP per capita, t–1	0.0730	0.0837	0.0958	0.105*	0.112*	0.0952	0.105*	0.116*	0.128*	0.144**
	(1.47)	(1.68)	(1.91)	(2.09)	(2.22)	(1.92)	(2.11)	(2.33)	(2.55)	(2.87)
Economic growth, t–1	-0.240	-0.210	-0.200	-0.200	-0.203	-0.244	-0.222	-0.229	-0.229	-0.243
	(-1.24)	(-1.08)	(-1.03)	(-1.02)	(-1.04)	(-1.26)	(-1.14)	(-1.17)	(-1.17)	(-1.23)
Log incumbent's time in office	0.00545	0.00690	0.00863	0.00999*	0.0110*	0.00658	0.00848	0.0109*	0.0126**	0.0136**
	(1.20)	(1.49)	(1.84)	(2.12)	(2.33)	(1.44)	(1.84)	(2.34)	(2.67)	(2.87)
Ongoing armed conflict	-0.103	-0.110	-0.115	-0.116	-0.115	-0.0886	-0.101	-0.108	-0.114	-0.117
	(-1.01)	(-1.08)	(-1.12)	(-1.13)	(-1.11)	(-0.87)	(-0.99)	(-1.05)	(-1.10)	(-1.13)
Democratic neighborhood	0.00714	0.00628	0.00664	0.00719	0.00768	0.00798	0.00635	0.00710	0.00810	0.00956
	(0.83)	(0.73)	(0.76)	(0.83)	(0.88)	(0.93)	(0.73)	(0.81)	(0.93)	(1.09)
Cold War	0.0748	0.106	0.129	0.148	0.161	0.0607	0.0706	0.0799	0.0876	0.0783
	(0.84)	(1.18)	(1.43)	(1.63)	(1.77)	(0.68)	(0.79)	(0.89)	(0.97)	(0.86)
Other non-violent campaign, t–1	0.163	0.124	0.105	0.0983	0.0970	0.126	0.0928	0.0857	0.0808	0.0751
	(0.50)	(0.38)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.39)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.23)
More than one coup, t–1	-1.403***	-1.832***	-1.998***	-2.075***	-2.113***	-1.625***	-1.966***	-2.053***	-2.179***	-2.136***
	(-3.71)	(-4.87)	(-5.34)	(-5.56)	(-5.67)	(-4.34)	(-5.29)	(-5.52)	(-5.85)	(-5.72)
Constant	-0.359	-0.499	-0.638	-0.747*	-0.829*	-0.514	-0.640	-0.777*	-0.905*	-1.015**
	(-1.03)	(-1.42)	(-1.80)	(-2.10)	(-2.33)	(-1.47)	(-1.83)	(-2.20)	(-2.55)	(-2.85)
N	4097	4097	4097	4097	4097	4097	4097	4097	4097	4097
Log lik.	-8401.1	-8423.9	-8434.9	-8440.8	-8444.6	-8416.0	-8427.6	-8452.8	-8459.6	-8474.1
bic	16918.6	16964.3	16986.2	16998.1	17005.7	16948.5	16971.7	17022.1	17035.7	17064.7

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A-11: Fixed-effect analysis (V-dem): Coups, outcome, protest and changes in the liberal democracy index (1950-2019)

	Non-Dem	Non-Dem	Non-Dem	All regimes	All regimes	All regimes
Coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$	-0.0198***	-0.0221***		-0.0195***	-0.0218***	
	(-8.13)	(-8.20)		(-8.35)	(-8.47)	
Protest*coup: $\alpha = 2$		-0.00453			-0.00447	
		(-0.70)			(-0.72)	
Successful coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$			-0.0361***			-0.0361***
			(-10.76)			(-11.21)
Protest* successful coup: $\alpha = 2$			-0.0147			-0.0143
			(-1.86)			(-1.88)
Failed coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$			0.000967			0.00116
			(0.29)			(0.37)
Protest* Failed coup: $\alpha = 2$			0.0285**			0.0285***
			(3.23)			(3.36)
Protest, decay: $\alpha = 2$		0.0231***	0.0213***		0.0237***	0.0219***
		(8.91)	(8.32)		(9.56)	(8.92)
Log GDP per capita, t–1	0.000173	-0.000352	-0.000175	-0.000639	-0.00100	-0.000814
	(0.22)	(-0.45)	(-0.22)	(-0.89)	(-1.40)	(-1.14)
Economic growth, t–1	-0.00477	-0.00346	-0.00272	-0.00317	-0.00205	-0.00137
	(-1.39)	(-1.02)	(-0.80)	(-0.98)	(-0.64)	(-0.43)
Log incumbent's time in office	-0.000453***	-0.000472***	-0.000517***	-0.000388***	-0.000413***	-0.000458***
	(-5.19)	(-5.44)	(-5.99)	(-4.71)	(-5.05)	(-5.63)
Ongoing armed conflict	0.000468	-0.000235	0.0000318	0.000731	-0.0000103	0.000213
	(0.26)	(-0.13)	(0.02)	(0.42)	(-0.01)	(0.12)
Democratic neighborhood	-0.0000694	-0.000109	-0.000110	-0.000142	-0.000169	-0.000171
	(-0.47)	(-0.74)	(-0.75)	(-1.02)	(-1.23)	(-1.25)
Cold War	0.000834	0.00170	0.00254	0.000725	0.00151	0.00228
	(0.53)	(1.09)	(1.64)	(0.50)	(1.05)	(1.59)
Other non-violent campaign, t–1	0.00426	0.00556	0.00450	0.00511	0.00626	0.00517
	(0.69)	(0.90)	(0.74)	(0.86)	(1.06)	(0.88)
More than one coup, t–1	-0.0264***	-0.0267***	-0.0255***	-0.0266***	-0.0268***	-0.0255***
	(-4.23)	(-4.30)	(-4.12)	(-4.42)	(-4.49)	(-4.29)
Constant	0.00842	0.00990	0.00836	0.0131*	0.0138*	0.0122*
	(1.38)	(1.64)	(1.39)	(2.28)	(2.42)	(2.15)
N	5992	5992	5992	6553	6553	6553
Log lik.	10892.8	10941.5	10988.9	12154.2	12210.4	12262.0
bic	-21698.5	-21778.6	-21856.0	-24220.4	-24315.3	-24401.0

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A-12: Fixed-effect analysis during the Cold War: Coups, outcome, protest and changes on the Polity score (1950-1991)

	Non-Dem	Non-Dem	Non-Dem	All regimes	All regimes	All regimes
Coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$	-0.353	-0.661***		-0.552***	-0.775***	
	(-1.88)	(-3.42)		(-3.47)	(-4.67)	
Protest*coup: $\alpha = 2$		1.411**			0.398	
		(2.62)			(0.85)	
Successful coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$			-1.143***			-1.346***
			(-4.86)			(-6.66)
Protest* successful coup: $\alpha = 2$			1.157			0.0511
			(1.85)			(0.10)
Failed coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$			-0.147			-0.0867
			(-0.63)			(-0.43)
Protest* Failed coup: $\alpha = 2$			1.229			1.098
			(1.62)			(1.66)
Protest, decay: $\alpha = 2$		1.919***	1.960***		2.024***	2.019***
		(7.26)	(7.41)		(8.82)	(8.83)
Log GDP per capita, t–1	0.422***	0.263***	0.249**	0.184***	0.115*	0.103
	(5.32)	(3.34)	(3.15)	(3.43)	(2.16)	(1.95)
Economic growth, t–1	-0.0975	-0.00673	-0.0225	-0.0428	0.0338	0.0273
	(-0.32)	(-0.02)	(-0.08)	(-0.17)	(0.14)	(0.11)
Log incumbent's time in office	0.00460	0.00482	0.000780	0.0131	0.0111	0.00696
	(0.50)	(0.54)	(0.09)	(1.78)	(1.53)	(0.96)
Ongoing armed conflict	0.0281	-0.0734	-0.0257	-0.000250	-0.0483	-0.00688
	(0.16)	(-0.42)	(-0.15)	(-0.00)	(-0.34)	(-0.05)
Democratic neighborhood	0.0373*	0.0271	0.0287	-0.000224	-0.00261	-0.00390
	(2.26)	(1.69)	(1.78)	(-0.02)	(-0.21)	(-0.31)
Other non-violent campaign, t–1	-0.539	-0.350	-0.402	-0.123	0.0195	-0.0363
	(-0.97)	(-0.65)	(-0.74)	(-0.26)	(0.04)	(-0.08)
More than one coup, t–1	-2.189***	-2.440***	-2.235***	-1.883***	-2.021***	-1.796***
	(-4.89)	(-5.57)	(-5.06)	(-4.66)	(-5.08)	(-4.49)
Constant	-2.266***	-1.435**	-1.279**	-1.158**	-0.788*	-0.669
	(-4.69)	(-3.01)	(-2.68)	(-3.21)	(-2.22)	(-1.89)
N	2141	2141	2141	3039	3039	3039
Log lik.	-4627.4	-4568.0	-4561.5	-6301.4	-6236.3	-6219.7
bic	9323.9	9220.4	9222.8	12675.0	12560.8	12543.6

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A-13: Fixed-effect analysis after Cold War: Coups, outcome, protest and changes on the Polity score (1992-2019)

	Non-Dem	Non-Dem	Non-Dem	All regimes	All regimes	All regimes
Coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$	-0.195	-0.622*		-0.582***	-0.882***	
	(-0.89)	(-2.42)		(-3.61)	(-4.52)	
Protest*coup: $\alpha = 2$		1.335*			0.509	
		(2.53)			(1.39)	
Successful coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$			-0.825*			-1.003***
			(-2.42)			(-3.69)
Protest* successful coup: $\alpha = 2$			1.084			-0.372
			(1.53)			(-0.76)
Failed coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$			-0.0172			-0.145
			(-0.05)			(-0.60)
Protest* Failed coup: $\alpha = 2$			1.108			1.360**
			(1.65)			(2.87)
Protest, decay: $\alpha = 2$		0.543**	0.543**		0.676***	0.653***
		(3.16)	(3.17)		(5.52)	(5.36)
Log GDP per capita, t–1	-0.0358	-0.0757	-0.0727	-0.0752	-0.0952	-0.0823
	(-0.47)	(-0.99)	(-0.95)	(-1.52)	(-1.94)	(-1.68)
Economic growth, t–1	-0.360	-0.295	-0.274	-0.255	-0.205	-0.151
	(-1.41)	(-1.16)	(-1.07)	(-1.47)	(-1.19)	(-0.88)
Log incumbent's time in office	0.00742	0.00752	0.00744	0.00791	0.00713	0.00636
	(1.23)	(1.25)	(1.24)	(1.70)	(1.55)	(1.37)
Ongoing armed conflict	-0.502***	-0.469***	-0.495***	-0.320**	-0.314**	-0.337**
	(-3.59)	(-3.37)	(-3.55)	(-3.01)	(-2.97)	(-3.18)
Democratic neighborhood	-0.00675	-0.0109	-0.00850	-0.0259**	-0.0276**	-0.0237*
	(-0.52)	(-0.84)	(-0.65)	(-2.59)	(-2.79)	(-2.39)
Other non-violent campaign, t–1	0.0461	0.0786	0.0698	0.305	0.337	0.330
	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.85)	(0.94)	(0.92)
More than one coup, t–1	1.897	2.199*	1.746	2.095*	2.315**	1.769*
	(1.84)	(2.13)	(1.67)	(2.44)	(2.70)	(2.04)
Constant	0.551	0.743	0.715	0.792*	0.886*	0.766*
	(1.02)	(1.38)	(1.32)	(2.06)	(2.31)	(2.00)
N	1956	1956	1956	3407	3407	3407
Log lik.	-3750.0	-3735.9	-3735.1	-5940.6	-5916.9	-5910.6
bic	7568.2	7555.2	7568.6	11954.4	11923.3	11926.9

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A-14: Jackknife estimates (1950-2019)

	Non-Dem	Non-Dem	Non-Dem	All regimes	All regimes	All regimes
Coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$	-0.200	-0.576**		-0.385*	-0.759***	
	(-0.95)	(-2.75)		(-2.06)	(-3.54)	
Protest*coup: $\alpha = 2$		1.628*			0.579	
		(2.35)			(0.78)	
Successful coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$			-1.005**			-1.227***
			(-3.04)			(-3.60)
Protest* successful coup: $\alpha = 2$			1.606			0.263
			(1.78)			(0.25)
Failed coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$			-0.0306			-0.0353
			(-0.16)			(-0.18)
Protest* Failed coup: $\alpha = 2$			1.212			1.177
			(1.38)			(1.43)
Protest, decay: $\alpha = 2$		1.080***	1.089***		1.131***	1.102***
		(4.98)	(4.93)		(6.21)	(6.10)
Log GDP per capita, t–1	0.180***	0.0875	0.0837	-0.0173	0.0195	0.0229
	(3.59)	(1.78)	(1.69)	(-1.48)	(0.63)	(0.75)
Economic growth, t–1	-0.323	-0.217	-0.210	-0.156	-0.132	-0.111
	(-1.67)	(-1.15)	(-1.11)	(-1.02)	(-0.87)	(-0.74)
Log incumbent's time in office	0.00796	0.00809	0.00690	0.00656*	0.0111**	0.00963*
	(1.51)	(1.59)	(1.32)	(2.02)	(2.63)	(2.23)
Ongoing armed conflict	-0.0897	-0.114	-0.110	-0.0454	-0.0766	-0.0712
	(-0.93)	(-1.16)	(-1.12)	(-0.87)	(-0.83)	(-0.79)
Democratic neighborhood	0.0132	0.00573	0.00628	-0.00127	-0.0102	-0.0103
	(1.40)	(0.62)	(0.68)	(-0.35)	(-1.25)	(-1.30)
Cold War	0.0118	0.0899	0.106	-0.0264	0.0762	0.0984
	(0.13)	(0.97)	(1.14)	(-0.70)	(1.14)	(1.50)
Other non-violent campaign, t–1	0.0236	0.153	0.124	0.205	0.348*	0.311*
	(0.16)	(0.89)	(0.69)	(1.86)	(2.49)	(2.39)
More than one coup, t–1	-1.802*	-1.903*	-1.832*	-1.464	-1.496	-1.404
	(-2.18)	(-2.32)	(-2.21)	(-1.78)	(-1.78)	(-1.63)
Constant	-0.981**	-0.536	-0.499	0.240*	-0.181	-0.209
	(-2.79)	(-1.52)	(-1.39)	(2.18)	(-0.70)	(-0.83)
N	4097	4097	4097	6446	6446	6446
Log lik.	-8504.8	-8432.4	-8423.9		-12399.6	-12374.1
bic	17092.8	16964.7	16964.3	.	24904.5	24870.9

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A-15: Fixed effect analysis: The effect of coups on changes on the Polity score (1950-2019) – without control variables

	Non-Dem	Non-Dem	Non-Dem	All regimes	All regimes	All regimes
Coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$	-0.383***	-0.606***		-0.491***	-0.646***	
	(-3.95)	(-5.86)		(-6.37)	(-7.65)	
Protest*coup: $\alpha = 2$		1.311***			0.560*	
		(4.77)			(2.56)	
Successful coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$			-0.878***			-1.025***
			(-6.80)			(-9.51)
Protest* successful coup: $\alpha = 2$			1.500***			0.411
			(4.44)			(1.53)
Failed coup, decay: $\alpha = 2$			-0.140			-0.0571
			(-1.08)			(-0.53)
Protest* Failed coup: $\alpha = 2$			1.013**			1.188***
			(2.67)			(3.88)
Protest, decay: $\alpha = 2$		0.994***	0.968***		0.846***	0.798***
		(9.42)	(9.21)		(10.38)	(9.85)
Constant	0.197***	0.0960***	0.0963***	0.116***	0.0452*	0.0438*
	(7.24)	(3.31)	(3.34)	(6.31)	(2.30)	(2.25)
N	6195	6195	6195	9450	9450	9450
Log lik.	-12475.2	-12376.6	-12367.4	-17829.5	-17742.3	-17713.4
bic	24967.9	24788.2	24787.1	35677.4	35521.2	35481.7

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$