International Sanctions Termination (IST) Dataset Codebook

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1 Introduction and universe of cases

This manual familiarizes users of the IST dataset with its data features and variables. Research on sanctions has hitherto focused on their implementation and effectiveness, whereas the suspension or (partial) termination of such measures has received little attention despite the issue's theoretical and practical significance.

The IST dataset is composed of the entire universe of sanctions imposed by the EU, UN, US and regional organizations in the period from 1990 to 2018, including those that were already in place by 1990 and those still ongoing.

2 Sources

The data was coded using (inter)governmental documents. Information was mostly retrieved from the following primary sources:

- **United Nations:** Security Council resolutions, sanctions committee and expert panel documents, Secretary-General statements and official press releases;
- **European Union:** Common positions, Council decisions, Commission implementing regulations, declarations by the EU presidency, European Parliament resolutions, official statements, meeting minutes and official press releases;
- **Organization of American States**[1]**:** Communiqués, resolutions and official press releases;
- **African Union:** Communiqués, Peace and Security Council resolutions, Commission statements, official press releases;
- **League of Arab States:** Communiqués, summit resolutions and official press releases;
- **Commonwealth of Nations:** Summit/Mini-summit communiqués, official statements and press releases;
- **Economic Community of West African States:** Summit communiqués, official statements and press releases;
- **Southern African Development Community:** Summit communiqués, speeches, official statements and press releases;
- **Union of South American Nations:** Council of Heads of State and Government communiqués, decision papers and official press releases;
- **United States of America:** Presidential executive orders, declarations by the president and executive departments, congressional bills, congressional hearings, resolutions, statements and official press releases.

[1]Sanctions by the OAS can be mandatory, such as diplomatic sanctions that revoke a member's voting rights, or voluntary, i.e. in the form of trade embargoes and asset freezes. In addition to capturing all mandatory sanctions, our dataset also captures voluntary sanctions if there is evidence that OAS member states implemented them.

Other regional organizations such as the Association of East Asian Nations and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States have a guiding principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of their members and thus do not include own sanctioning mechanisms in their charters.

The primary data collection for this dataset was complemented by a systematic integration of data on sanctions termination provided in the following datasets: 'Economic Sanctions Dataset' (HSE, Hufbauer et al., 2007), 'EUSANCT Dataset' (Weber and Schneider, 2020), 'GIGA Sanctions Dataset' (Portela and von Soest, 2012), 'Threat and Imposition of Sanctions Dataset' (TIES, Morgan et al.,2009, 2014), and the 'UN Targeted Sanctions Consortium Database' (TSC, Biersteker et al., 2018). Further bibliographic sources are Charron and Portela (2015), Hellquist (2012) and Portela (2010). We identify new cases that are not covered in existing datasets by way of keyword search using the online search engine Factiva. Factiva is a research tool that aggregates content from free and licensed sourced providing one of the world's most comprehensive collection of news.[2] We used the following keywords in our search: sanctions, aid suspension/cut/ban/freeze/resumption and restrictive measures.

3 Definition of sanctions

Sanctions are defined as government-led restrictions implemented to promote political objectives vis-à-vis another country, its leadership and entities directly associated with it. We also include sanctions against de facto governments that control the state after a coup d'état. Government-led, in this context, is understood in broad terms to not only include unilateral sanctions, but also measures that are imposed by multiple governments under the auspices of regional or international organizations. Sanctions directed towards rebel groups and terrorists are excluded from the dataset. Likewise, sanctions against individuals and other entities are only included if these are associated with the government, for example because the measures target parastatal companies or individuals that hold positions in the ruling party.

Restrictions are understood as including both economic measures and non-economic measures. Economic measures include comprehensive trade, commodity or oil embargoes, financial sanctions, aid sanctions and asset freezes. Non-economic measures include arms embargoes, the interruption of military cooperation, flight bans, travel bans and diplomatic sanctions. Measures of commercial defence imposed in the framework of trade disputes do not qualify as sanctions for the purpose of this dataset, as the imposition and termination of these measures follows a trade policy instead of a political rationale (Morgan et al., 2009; Weber and Schneider, 2020).

Finally, the dataset does not include threats that fail to materialize into sanctions as stand-alone cases. Threats often just 'fade away' (Morgan et al., 2009, 97), and even if they end due to target compliance at the threat stage, they are not officially revoked in many cases. This makes it hard to pin down an end date or to precisely gauge the causes and processes of ending them.

[2] https://professional.dowjones.com/factiva/

4 Unit of analysis

The dataset structure is dyadic, and the core unit of analysis is a sanctions case. A case starts with the first imposition of sanctions by one sender against one target to address a specific political context and ends when the respective sender removes all previously imposed measures over the same issue. If several senders impose restrictions on the same target, we create a separate case for each sender. This allows us to provide sender-specific information on key variables such as costs, goals or outcomes, which can vary across sanctioners. Likewise, if a sender imposes sanctions against multiple targets, a new case is created for each target. A case can contain multiple measures and goals. However, if a sender imposes parallel sanctions on a target that address entirely different political contexts, these are coded as different cases for clear discernibility. For example, US sanctions against Venezuela that were related to the country's signature of the International Criminal Court statute and parallel measures over the regime's increasingly authoritarian rule are coded as two distinct cases.

5 Variable list

1. **Case identification code (caseid):** Each case is assigned a unique identification code. This identification code combines the identity of the sender and the target, as well as the last two digits of the year of sanctions imposition. The identity of the sender and target are abbreviated using the Correlates of War (COW) state abbreviation code or COW's international governmental organization (IGO) abbreviation code. For example, the EU sanctions imposed on the Central African Republic in 2003 are assigned the following code: EU_CEN_03.

2. **Sender:** This field states the COW code for the country that imposes the sanctions against the respective target. If sanctions are initiated under the auspices of an international or regional organization, then the variable states COW's IGO code for the respective organization. We treat international or regional organizations as autonomous senders. Sanctions by the European Economic Community are assigned the IGO code of '1653', while its successor the EU is assigned the IGO code '1830'. If a case occurs before 1993 and continues to the years afterwards then both codes are assigned in this field. Seeing as COW's IGO codes only provide a code for the Organization for African Unity, the code '3760' will also be used for the organization's successor the AU. The Union of South American Nations is assigned the code '4375', as there is no official IGO code for it.

3. **Target:** This field states the COW country code for the country that is targeted by the sanctions.

4. **Start date (startdate):** This field identifies the day, month and year in which the sender first imposes sanctions against the target. If no (inter)governmental document stating the decision to impose sanctions is available, the information is coded on the basis of other primary sources, preferably official statements. If information on the exact imposition day is not found in the available sources, then the first day of the respective month is coded as the imposition date.

5. **End date:**

(a) **De jure end date (terdate):** This variable captures the day, month and year in which all sanctions were officially terminated.[3] If a sanctions case comprises multiple measures imposed by the sender against the target and the sender only removes some measures while keeping others in place, sanctions are coded as ongoing. The information is coded on the basis of (inter)governmental documents that stipulate the removal of sanctions. For a sanctions case with a specified expiry date, the last expiry date before the sanctions were no longer renewed counts as the end date. If no (inter)governmental document stating the decision to remove sanctions or an expiry date is available, the information is coded on the basis of other primary sources, preferably official statements, but also news reports. If information on the exact termination day is not found in the available sources, then the last day of the respective month is coded as the termination date.

(b) **De facto end date (defactoter):** This variable captures the day, month and year in which the sender ceases to apply sanctions before officially terminating the measures. Otherwise, the field is left blank. It reflects the empirical record that some sanctions are 'dormant' for a while, meaning that they are no longer applied, before the sender officially decides to lift them. Examples include UN sanctions against Rwanda or Libya. If no (inter)governmental document stating the decision to suspend sanctions is available, the information is coded on the basis of other primary sources, preferably official statements, but also based on news reports. If only information on the month of the de facto termination is found in all available sources, then the last day of the respective month is coded as the de facto end date.

6. **Ongoing sanctions (ongoing):** This dummy variables takes the value of 1 if the sanctions are ongoing by 31 December 2018. Otherwise, it is coded as 0.

7. **Gradual termination (gradual):** This dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the sanctions are not lifted all at once but are gradually scaled back – either because certain measures are lifted while others remain in place, sanctions seized to apply prior to their termination or because of a gradual removal of individuals or companies from so-called sanctions blacklists that specify the targets of travel bans or asset freezes. The variable is coded as 0 if all sanctions measures are lifted at once.

8. **Expiry date (expiry):** This dummy variable is coded as 1 if the sanctions documents stipulate an expiry date, sometimes also referred to as a 'sunset clause'. The variable is coded as 0 if the sanctions documents contain no expiry date.

9. **Review provision (review):** This dummy variable is coded as 1 if the sanctions documents specify a date or a temporal interval within which a review is to take place. By contrast, a standard commitment to review, which is included in most of the sanction cases, does not qualify as a sufficiently specific review provision for this variable and is coded as 0. For example, EU sanctions against Burundi in 2015 were coded as 0 as they lacked a review regulation or temporal requirements for reviews. The EU only dictated that the sanctions decision 'shall be kept under constant review. It shall be renewed, or amended as appropriate, if the Council deems that its

[3] In this codebook, the terms 'termination', 'ending', and 'lifting' of sanctions are used interchangeably to describe the definite removal of sanctions as opposed to the temporary nature of suspensions.

objectives have not been met' (Council of the European Union, 2015). In contrast, EU sanctions against Guinea-Bissau in 2011 were coded as 1, as the EU dictated that the sanctions shall be reviewed 'regularly *at least once every six months*, preferably in the light of joint monitoring missions by the European External Action Service and the Commission' (Council of the European Union, 2011b, emphasis added).[4]

10. **Measures:** This categorical variable lists the sanctions measures imposed by the sender. The coders identify the measures based on the definitions provided below, which are based on the GIGA Sanctions Dataset (Portela and von Soest, 2012). Several measures can be used simultaneously.

    - **Comprehensive trade embargo (TE):** The sender stops all economic exchange with the targeted country.
    - **Commodity embargo (CE):** The sender restricts the import and/or export of commodities (such as timber, cocoa or diamonds) from and/or to the target. This category hence includes both import and export sanctions.
    - **Oil embargo (OE):** The sender restricts the import and/or export of oil/petrochemical products from and/or to the target. Due to its frequency and its specific strategic importance for the target, which may affect decisions to impose and remove such measures, oil embargoes are listed as a separate category.
    - **Arms embargo (AE):** The sender stops the flow of military good to and/or from the target while trade in other sectors is still allowed. This category also includes a ban on one or several specific type(s) of military good.
    - **Interruption of military cooperation (IM):** The sender ceases training of military staff or other military advisory services provided to the target.
    - **Financial sanctions (FS):** The sender bans financial transactions with and/or investment in the target. Decisions not to approve new financial support to the target from international financial institutions are also coded as financial sanctions.
    - **Flight ban (FB):** The sender stops the operation of flights to and from the target (commonly referred to as a 'no-fly zone') or bans the target from using the airspace of the sender.
    - **Aid sanctions (AS):** The sender partially or completely stops the allocation of project, budget or military aid to the target.
    - **Asset freeze (AF):** The sender freezes or seizes the assets of selected individuals and/or companies.
    - **Travel ban (TB):** The sender imposes restrictions on the issuing of visa, otherwise restricts the entry of selected individuals from the target country into its territory and/or prohibits its own citizens from traveling to the target country.

[4]Similarly, AU sanctions against Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 were coded as 0 as the AU only 'decide[d] to remain actively seized of the situation' (AU Peace and Security Council, 2009). In contrast, AU sanctions against Madagascar in 2009 were coded as 1 as the AU required from the Commission to 'present *at the next Ordinary Session of the Assembly* concrete recommendations to better prevent and punish unconstitutional changes of Government... [It also] request[ed] the Chairperson of the Commission to submit to it an interim report on this issue' (AU Peace and Security Council, 2010, emphasis added).

- **Diplomatic sanctions (DS):** The sender restricts diplomatic contacts through the recall of ambassadors, the reduction of diplomatic personnel in the target country and/or the expulsion of the target's diplomatic staff from its territory. This category also encompasses expulsion from or suspension of membership in international organizations or vetoing accession.

11. **Goals:** This categorical variable captures the sender's goals; it draws heavily on the GIGA Sanctions Dataset (Portela and von Soest, 2012). Whenever possible, the goals are identified on the basis of (inter)governmental documents to avoid inferring intentions on the senders' side. Several goals can be stated by the sender, and thus each case can comprise multiple goals.

    - **Democracy support (DM):** Sanctions are imposed in response to domestic developments in the target state. They are implemented to induce the target to respect democratic rules. Prominent examples include sanctions imposed to undo unconstitutional changes of government, such as coups d'état, and sanctions after electoral misconduct.
    - **Support human rights (HR):** Sanctions are imposed to induce the target to end ongoing repressive actions, laws and policies and to respect universal human rights. This category also includes sanctions that are imposed to pressure targets to investigate ongoing and/or past human rights abuses.
    - **Address armed conflict (AC):** Sanctions are imposed to mitigate and/or terminate intra- or interstate armed conflict. This category includes sanctions that aim to end territorial disputes or that aim to coerce the target to stop supporting fractions in a civil war.
    - **Nuclear non-proliferation (NP):** Sanctions are imposed to impede the proliferation of nuclear weapons and/or material required to acquire nuclear capacity.
    - **Stop proliferation or usage of weapons of mass destruction (WM):** Sanctions are imposed to deny the target access to weapons of mass destruction, including biological and/or chemical weapons, to stop it from using such weapons and/or to prevent it from supplying such weapons to third parties.
    - **Counterterrorism (CT):** Sanctions are imposed in an attempt to compel the target to end its support for (transnational) terrorist organizations and/or to induce it to comply with international anti-terror legislation.
    - **Stop drug trafficking (DT):** Sanctions are imposed to induce the target to change its drug policies and practices in accordance with the sender's demands.
    - **Address convention breach (CB):** Sanctions are imposed to induce the target to follow an international protocol or convention.

12. **Adaptation of goals (adaptgoal):** This dummy variable is coded as 1 if the sender adapts his goals over the duration of the sanctions case by adding, removing or altering one or several goals. If the sanctions goal does not change during the time period of the case, the variable is coded as 0.

13. **Target issue salience (targetsalience):** This dummy variable is coded as 1 if the sanctions issue is salient to the target. Otherwise, it is coded as 0. The coding is based on the preceding *goal* variable and distinguishes between sender state goals that pose an existential threat to the target because they undermine regime survival and national security and those that do not fundamentally threaten the target. For example, sanctions imposed by the US on Nicaragua in 1981 supported democracy but were also imposed for the purpose of destabilizing a regime in power. In contrast, EU sanctions imposed on Uzbekistan in 2005 – while also referring to 'respect for human rights, rule of law and fundamental freedoms' – aimed at establishing an international inquiry into the Andijan massacre and not to destabilize or replace the regime (Council of the European Union, 2005). If the *goal* variable states multiple goals, then the dummy takes the value of 1 if at least one of the goals relates to the issue of regime survival and/or national security.

14. **Sender issue salience (sendersalience):** This dummy variable is coded as 1 if the sanctions issue is salient to the sender as stated in the (inter)governmental sanctions document(s). Otherwise, it is coded as 0. The coding is based on the preceding *goal* variable. Examples for sender issue salience are when the target's policy is considered to threaten the sender's national security. If the sender does not explicitly state whether the issue at stake is perceived as salient, then the assessment is based on a fundamental distinction between goals which are directly related to a sender's national security and territorial integrity. The dummy takes the value of 1 if at least one of the goals relates to the issue of national and territorial security. In the case of sanctions by multilateral organizations, the variable takes the value of 1 if the target's behaviour that the sanctions address has cross-border security implications.

15. **Termination requirement specificity (requirementter):** This categorical variable captures how specific the sender spells out the conditions for lifting the sanctions in the (inter)governmental sanctions documents. Coders assign the case into one of the following categories:

    - **Clear:** A requirement for the termination of sanctions classifies as clear if the sender refers to a well-defined offending behaviour of the target that must be changed for sanctions to be lifted or makes a well-defined demand that serves to address past offending behaviours. An example of a clear termination requirement was the EU demand for an international inquiry into the Andijan massacre when it imposed sanctions on Uzbekistan.
    - **Ambiguous:** A requirement for the termination of sanctions is coded as ambiguous if the sender refers to a broad area of target policies that required revisions for sanctions to be lifted. An example of an ambiguous statement are the EU sanctions against Iran in 2011 to halt 'serious human rights violations in Iran' (Council of the European Union, 2011a).

16. **Outcome:** This categorical variable captures the primary nature of termination. For ongoing sanctions cases, the field is left blank. The variable builds upon the categories of the 'final outcome' variable provided in the TIES dataset (Morgan et al., 2009). In contrast to other datasets, several outcomes can be assigned to one sanctions case. For example, sanctions may be lifted as a result of a codified negotiated settlement between the sender and target stipulating

that the target completely adjusts its objectionable behaviour that the target fulfills. In this case, both negotiated settlement and complete target acquiescence are coded.

- **Partial acquiescence by target:** The target continues to exercise some of the offensive behaviour over which sanctions were initially imposed, while at the same time agreeing to and altering its behaviour to some of the sender's demands.
- **Complete acquiescence by target:** The target complies with all of the sender's demands and correspondingly alters its behaviour.
- **Capitulation by sender:** The sender terminates sanctions despite the target's failure to acquiesce to the sender's demands.
- **Stalemate:** Sanctions are removed even though the target did not change their behaviour or policies while the sender did not alter their demands either.
- **Negotiated settlement:** An agreement between the sender and target is reached for the termination of the sanctions. The target adjusts their behaviour to the sender's demands, while the sender in exchange carries out a negotiated and/or agreed on action.

17. **Negotiations over termination (negotiations):** This dummy variable is coded as 1 if direct governmental talks over the termination of sanctions took place between the sender and the target – regardless of whether these talks resulted in a negotiated settlement. The coders rely on (inter)governmental sanctions documents and verified news reports to identify bilateral talks that took place. If an absence of negotiations is reported or no negotiations are documented then the variable takes the value of 0.

18. **Sender economic costs (costsender):** This categorical variable captures the economic costs to the sanctions sender related to the imposition of the respective measure(s). The field is left blank if the sender is the EU or a multilateral organization. Coders compare and contrast the sender economic cost assessments provided by the TIES (Morgan et al., 2014) and HSE datasets (Hufbauer et al., 2007). In the case of contradictions and for sanctions cases not covered by these datasets, coders examine macroeconomic data and reports about the costs of the sanctions to the sender and assign the case to one of the following categories:

    - **Minor:** A case is coded as minor if there is no empirical evidence that the sender's economy was adversely affected by the sanctions beyond limited sector-specific effects.
    - **Major:** A case is coded as major if available data or narrative evidence indicates that the sender's macroeconomic performance was significantly affected. Signs include a noteworthy raise in inflation and/or unemployment, decrease in GDP growth and/or trade that can be attributed to the sanctions.
    - **Severe:** A case is coded as severe if available data or narrative evidence indicates that the sanctions undermined the sender's economy, for example because it cannot obtain crucial supplies such as petrol, electricity and/or food.

19. **Institutional investment (instinvestment):** This dummy variable identifies investments in the institutional structure for sanctions oversight. It takes the value of 1 if a sanctions committee,

a panel of experts and/or a task force was created to accompany the sanctions upon their imposition or later. If there were no such institutional investments, then the variable is coded as 0.

20. **Target economic costs (costtarget):** This categorical variable captures the economic costs to the sanctions target related to the imposed sanctions measure(s). Coders compare and contrast the target economic cost assessments provided by the TIES (Morgan et al., 2014) and HSE datasets (Hufbauer et al., 2007). In the case of contradictions and for sanctions cases not covered by these datasets, coders examine macroeconomic data and reports about the costs of the sanctions to the target and assign the case to one of the following categories:

    (a) **Minor:** A case is coded as minor if there is no empirical evidence that the target's economy was adversely affected by the sanctions beyond limited sector-specific effects.

    (b) **Major:** A case is coded as major if available data or narrative evidence indicates that the target's macroeconomic performance was significantly affected. Signs include a noteworthy raise in inflation and/or unemployment, decrease in GDP growth and/or trade that can be attributed to the sanctions.

    (c) **Severe:** A case is coded as severe if available data or narrative evidence indicates that the sanctions undermined the target's economy, for example because it cannot obtain crucial supplies such as petrol, electricity and/or food.

21. **Multilateralism:** This character variable reports the combination of senders imposing sanctions against the target over the same issue during the same time period.

22. **Datasets:** This character variable lists other datasets that code the respective case. The following datasets are considered: HSE (Hufbauer et al., 2007), TIES (Morgan et al., 2009) and EUSANCT (Weber and Schneider, 2020).

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