Online Appendix for

Do Local Party Chairs Think Women and Minority Candidates Can Win? Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment

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1. Representativeness of Respondents

The study was approved by the institutional review board at Barnard College, Columbia University. The email invitation offered two incentives. First, respondents were given the option to opt into a raffle for one of four $100 Amazon gift cards. Second, we offered to send summary findings from the survey to interested respondents.

The county serves as the primary organizational unit for both Democrats and Republicans in most states, but several New England states organize at the town level, and in some sparsely populated states like Alaska parties organize within larger districts. In addition, some state parties organize within both counties and legislative districts. We did not constrain our collection to county party chairs alone, and solicited responses from all available county, town, and district chairpersons listed in the party directories.

Given the availability of county-level census demographics, however, we are able to assess whether the *county* chairs who responded tended to be from a representative pool of counties based on county level measures derived from the U.S. Census' American Community Survey 2014 5-year averages for U.S. counties. Descriptive statistics for the sample of chairs who participated in the survey are reported in column (1) of Table A2.[1] As shown in that table, the samples for both parties are representative of known county-level characteristics with respect to both the sampling frame (counties from which valid emails were obtained) and U.S. counties as a whole.

Moreover, the sample aligns well with the sampling frame in terms of two key attributes about the chairs that can be discerned from their names—their gender and Latinx heritage. We made educated guesses about the traits of respondents serving as county chairs in the sampling frame. Using the chairs' first names, two independent coders coded for gender. In cases when the coders disagreed about the chair's gender, or when they agreed that gender was ambiguous, we confirmed the gender of the chair via Web searches of party sites and news. Of the 195 individuals in our sample whose name suggested that they were female, 182 (93%) reported being female; of the remaining 380 who were flagged as male, only 9 (2%) reported being female. Coding for Hispanic heritage is an inherently fuzzier task. We employed the 2010 U.S. Census surname directory, and assigned Hispanic status to all 98 persons for whom the Census probability of being Hispanic was .66 or higher. Of the 7 county chairs who completed the survey and were flagged as likely to be Hispanic, 4 (57%) identified as Hispanic; only 4 (1%) of the remaining 568 county chair respondents who were not flagged as likely to be Hispanic identified as Hispanic.

In summary, we are confident that our sample for both parties reflects the geographic, demographic, and political conditions in which chairs make decisions.

2. Question Wording

Conjoint Introduction:

On the next few pages we will present you ten (10) hypothetical pairs of candidates. The pair of candidates will be presented in a table, where the columns will list characteristics of each candidate. For each pair, please imagine the candidates are running against one another in a [Democratic/Republican]

[1] Descriptive statistics for the full sample of chairs who responded to our survey (i.e., not just county chairs) are reported in Table A3.

primary election for a seat in your state's legislature.

For each pair, please tell us which candidate you think would win the most votes in a [Democratic/Republican] primary in the area for which you are responsible as a party chairperson. To be clear, we are not asking which candidate you personally would prefer, but rather which candidate you think would fare best among voters in a [Democratic/Republican] primary in your area.

{Conjoint – 10 tasks}

Conjoint Post-treatment:

Which candidate do you think would fare best in a [Democratic/Republican] primary in the area for which you are responsible as a party chairperson?

- [Candidate name A]
- [Candidate name B]

On the scale below where 0 indicates "only a little better" and 100 indicates "a lot better," about how much better do you think [Selected Candidate] would do than [Candidate Not Selected] in a [Democratic/Republican] primary in your area?

Figure A1. Example Conjoint Task

Candidate Pair 1

	Candidate A	Candidate B
Name	**Tanner Smith**	**Jose Martinez**
Political Experience:	Mayor	Mayor
Current Occupation:	Family Law Attorney	Financial Advisor
Number of Years Living in the Area:	10	9
Thinks laws covering the sale of guns should be:	Kept as they are	Less strict

Which candidate do you think would fare best in a Democratic primary in the area for which you are responsible as a party chairperson?

○ Tanner Smith

○ Jose Martinez

Other Questions Reported in Text:

Thinking about your responsibilities as a party chairperson, how common are the following scenarios? *(Response options: Not at all common; A little common; Somewhat common; Very common)*

You actively recruit a prospective candidate in hopes he or she runs.

Candidates for state or local office request your assistance in some matter.

3. Racial Composition of the Primary Electorate Analysis

Analysis of a sample of 1 percent of cases from the national voter file found that in 2008 and 2010, in the average county, black voters constituted 12.6 and 12.1 percent of voters, respectively, in Democratic primaries. The corresponding numbers for Republican primaries were 1.6 and 1.3 percent. Similarly, Latinx voters constituted about 5 percent of Democratic primary voters in these years, compared to less than 2 percent of Republican primary voters. (This information is presented in the bottom row of Table A1.) The rest of that table shows that in Democratic primaries each additional percent of black households in the county translates into approximately 1.3 percentage points more of Democratic primary voters being black; the corresponding figure for Republican primaries is less than 0.2 percent. Each additional percent of Hispanic households translates to a roughly 1 percent increase in the share of Democratic primary voters who are Latinx; the corresponding figure for Republican primaries is roughly 0.3 percent. We are grateful to Eitan Hersh for sharing the data used for these calculations.

4. Intersectionality Analysis

The structure of the conjoint design offers a straightforward way to consider the possibility that the intersection of race and gender affected perceptions of candidate viability. We considered the consequences of intersectionality in a model including interactions between the Female Candidate indicator and the Black Candidate and Latinx Candidate indicators. Estimates from this model are reported in Figure A2 (reference group: white male) and yield little evidence that the effects of a candidate's race/ethnicity depended on gender (or vice versa). The coefficients on the interaction terms are each small (less than .02 [i.e., 2 percentage points]) and well short of conventional levels of statistical significance.

Figure A2. Intersection between Race and Gender



Note: Estimates are from a regression model including interactions between the female candidate indicator and the Latinx and black candidate indicators. Reference group is white male candidates. Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals.

5. Additional Masking Analysis

We further examined the possibility that candidates' names served as a proxy for other candidate-related considerations in three ways. First, we assessed whether the magnitude of the gender and race/ethnicity treatment effects depended on the presence or absence of each of the 54 non-name candidate characteristic treatments. We re-estimated the base model 54 times, restricting the sample to cases where each candidate characteristic was presented and capturing the estimated effects tied to the name treatments. We then repeated the same procedure, this time restricting the sample to cases where each specific treatment was not presented. As the histograms illustrating the variation in the treatment effects presented in Figure A3 show, we find little evidence that the effects we report here are systematically tied to the presence or absence of other cues.

Figure A3. Variability of* Black Candidate *and* Latinx Candidate *Treatment Effects

Only cases where specific treatment ***not*** *presented*



Only cases where specific treatment presented



Note: Histograms describe the distributions of the estimated effects of the *Black Candidate* and *Latinx Candidate* treatments (relative to white candidate). Estimates reported in the column on the left are from a series of regression models that each exclude cases where one of the 54 individual non-name conditions (including "class of traits not presented"—e.g., cases where no information about political experience was presented) were *not* used; estimates in the column on the right are from models sequentially restricting the sample to cases where a given non-name characteristic condition *was* presented. Overall, the estimates are clustered around the AMCEs we report in the main text and are roughly normally distributed. We note that the greater variability in the estimates presented in the right hand column is due to the fact that these estimates tend to be drawn from substantially smaller samples than those on the left. For example, the estimated positive 5.5 percentage point effect for *Black Candidate* in the histogram on the top right is from a model restricted to cases where the candidate in question was described as having lived in the area for 5 years—a model that relies on only 480 cases; similarly, the dramatic 27 percentage point penalty in that histogram is drawn from a model restricted to the 405 cases where the candidate was described as supporting keeping gun laws the same.

Second, we leveraged the fact that our design was fully randomized and included some cases where the two candidates' names signaled the same race/ethnicity. This feature of the design offers an additional way to assess whether the name treatments acted as proxies for other characteristics. In particular, we can assess whether the magnitude of the effects of the other candidate characteristics depended on whether

respondents were provided with a distinguishing race/ethnic cue. To do this, we created an indicator for cases where the candidate was pitted against an opponent of their same race/ethnicity (approximately 33 percent of cases) and estimate a model including interactions between this indicator and each of the non-name treatments. The inclusion of these interaction terms does not significantly improve the fit of the model ($p = .065$), offering further support for the claim that we are correctly attributing the effects of the candidates' names to the race/ethnicity they signal, rather than to chairs' inferences about other characteristics of the candidates.

Additionally, if the names signaled something more nuanced than race, we might expect the magnitude of the treatment effects to vary across particular names—e.g., respondents may have made particularly favorable inferences about candidates with some "black names," and less favorable inferences about those with other names selected to signal the same race. We considered this possibility by adding indicators for each specific name used in the experiment to our base model. A test of the joint significance of the coefficients on the pool of "black name" treatments fell short of conventional thresholds of statistical significance ($p = .116$), as did a similar test tied to the Latinx names ($p = .610$).

A final piece of evidence comes from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) where we asked respondents to complete analogous conjoint tasks to those reported here and were asked which candidate *they* would prefer in a primary. There we find that the effect of the *Black Candidate* treatment is 5.5 percentage points more negative among those scoring high (1 SD above the mean) on racial resentment, than among those scoring low. The effect of the *Latinx Candidate* treatment was 7 percentage points more negative among those supporting restrictive immigration policies than those scoring low on this measure ($p<.05$ for both tests).

6. Additional Analysis of the Moderating Effects of Context: County Demographics Robustness Checks, County Level Attitudinal Measures, and Competitiveness

We assess the robustness of the moderating effects of county demographics in Table A9. We report models like those reported in columns (1)-(4) of Appendix Table A8 (and discussed in the text) using: 1) untransformed measures of county demographics, 2) logged measures restricting the sample to counties with a non-zero share of the minority group in question, and 3) logged measures excluding counties in the bottom 10 percent in terms of concentration of the minority group (Hispanic only; 11.5 percent of counties have zero black households). These alternative approaches yield the same substantive conclusions: among Democratic chairs the expected penalty for black (Latinx) candidates dissipates as the concentration of black (Latinx) households in the county increases; we find no moderating effect among Republicans chairs.

We also estimated models to assess whether average levels of racial resentment and support for providing a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants moderate the penalty chairs believe black and Latinx candidates, respectively, face with their base.

Our county level attitudinal measures were calculated using multiple CCES surveys. We stacked data from the 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2014 CCES surveys. CCES respondents' racial resentment was calculated as a mean of agreement with two statements: 1) "The Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors."; 2) "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to

work their way out of the lower class." (reverse coded). Agreement with each was measured on a 5-point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. For respondents from the 2011 survey we rely only on responses to the first statement as the second item was not included.

Immigration attitudes were measured as an average of dichotomous indicators of support for three policies: 1) "Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes;" 2) "Increase the number of border patrols on the US-Mexican border" (reverse coded); 3) "Allow police to question anyone they think may be in the country illegally" (reverse coded).

In each case we calculated averages by county to use in our analysis, restricting the sample to white respondents.

The models assessing whether these measures moderate the effects of the race/ethnicity treatments are reported in columns (5)-(8) of Online Appendix Table A8. We find little support for the expectation that penalties for black candidates would be greater in counties with high levels of racial resentment or that penalties for Latinx candidates would be smaller in counties where a large share of residents support a path to citizenship. The coefficients on the relevant two-way interactions (columns [5] and [7]) fall well short of conventional levels of statistical significance. Further, we find no evidence that chairs from one party or the other were particularly sensitive to these attitudinal characteristics of people in their area: each of the relevant three-way interactions (columns [6] and [8]) is statistically insignificant. We test the robustness of these (non)findings in Online Appendix Table A10. For each attitudinal measure we estimate analogous models restricting the analysis to counties where we have at least 10 responses to the attitudinal questions. The coefficients on the interactions of interest remain statistically insignificant in these models.

In Online Appendix Table A11, we considered the additional possibility that chairs serving in less competitive areas would be less inclined to view minority and women candidates as less viable. We estimated models interacting these candidate characteristics with a logged measure of how far the two party presidential vote in 2012 deviated from a 50/50 split within the county. This feature of chairs' electoral context does not moderate these treatment effects either in the aggregate or in the context of a three-way interaction model where we allow any moderating effect to vary across parties.

7. Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A4. Variation in Race and Gender Effects by Chair Characteristics

Figure A5. Context and the Effects of Candidate Race and Ethnicity (Republican Chairs; LOWESS)

Table A1. Relationship between Concentration of Minority Households and Primary Turnout (County Level)

Table A2. Mean Characteristics of Counties and Chairs

Table A3. Descriptive Characteristics of Respondents

Table A4. Attributes and Descriptors for Conjoint Experimental Tasks

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Table A7. Treatment Effects by Chair Characteristics

Table A8. Moderating Effects of County Characteristics

Table A9. Moderating Effects of County Composition (Robustness)

Table A10. Moderating Effects of County Attitudes (Robustness)

Table A11. Moderating Effects of Electoral Competitiveness

Table A12. Moderating Effects of Electoral Experience with Female or Minority Legislators

Table B1. Model Used to Calculate AMCEs (Linear Outcome)

Table B2. Masking Effects (Linear Outcome)

Table B3. Treatment Effects by Chair Characteristics (Linear Outcome)

Table B4. Moderating Effects of County Characteristics (Linear Outcome)

Table B5. Moderating Effects of County Composition (Robustness; Linear Outcome)

Table B6. Moderating Effects of County Attitudes (Robustness; Linear Outcome)

Table B7. Moderating Effects of Electoral Competitiveness (Linear Outcome)

Table B8. Moderating Effects of Electoral Experience with Female or Minority Legislators (Linear Outcome)

Figure A4. Variation in Race and Gender Effects by Chair Characteristics



Note: Estimated treatment effects (AMCEs; see Online Appendix Table A7 for underlying models). Markers refer to chairs' gender (M = Male; F = Female), race/ethnicity (W = White; B = Black; H = Hispanic), and party (D = Democrat; R = Republican). Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. Reference categories: male; white.

Figure A5. Context and the Effects of Candidate Race and Ethnicity (Republican Chairs; LOWESS)



Note: Solid lines are smoothed LOWESS lines showing the relationship between concentration of minority households in the chair's county and the probability of the chair selecting a candidate with a name that signals membership in that minority group. Black dashed lines restrict the sample to cases where the minority candidate (left panel: black; right panel: Latinx) was pitted against a white candidate; gray dashed lines are comparable lines restricted to cases where the minority candidate faced an opponent from the other minority group considered here (e.g., in the left panel, cases where a black candidate faced a Latinx opponent). Histograms describe the distribution of U.S. counties in terms of concentration of minority households in the U.S.

Table A1. Relationship between Concentration of Minority Households and Primary Turnout (County Level)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Democratic Primary				Republican Primary			
	% Voters Black		% Voters Hispanic		% Voters Black		% Voters Hispanic	
	2008	2010	2008	2010	2008	2010	2008	2010
Perc. Black HH	1.334 [0.019]**	1.376 [0.029]**			0.142 [0.025]**	0.113 [0.023]**		
Perc. Hisp HH			0.929 [0.024]**	0.988 [0.030]**			0.328 [0.033]**	0.330 [0.037]**
Constant	0.959 [0.129]**	0.740 [0.174]**	-1.817 [0.128]**	-2.393 [0.145]**	0.467 [0.155]**	0.420 [0.132]**	-0.569 [0.161]**	-0.755 [0.189]**
Observations	2360	2184	2360	2184	2371	2322	2371	2322
R-squared	0.867	0.752	0.742	0.681	0.091	0.068	0.417	0.419
Mean of Outcome Variable	12.610	12.130	5.040	5.090	1.660	1.340	1.750	1.570

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets. Restricted to counties reporting non-zero turnout in primary. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.

Table A2. Mean Characteristics of Counties and Chairs

Republicans				
	All U.S. Counties	All Counties With Valid Chair Emails	Non-Respondents	Respondents
County Traits:				
Median Age	40.8	40.6	40.5	41.1
Median Household Income	$46,493	$46,519	$46,343	$47,661
Perc. High School Graduates, Age 25+	34.9	34.5	34.5	34.1
Perc. College Graduates, Age 25+	13.1	13.2	13.1	13.4
Perc. Black Pop.	8.8	8.6	8.7	7.9
Perc. Hispanic Pop.	8.7	9.8	9.7	10.1
Perc. Spanish-Speaking Pop.	6.3	7.2	7.1	7.5
Perc. Non-Citizen	2.8	3.1	3	3.5
Perc. Obama Vote	38.2	37.8	37.6	38.7
Perc. Urban	40.6	42.9	42.7	44.5
Chair Traits:				
Perc. Women	-	25.5	26.2	21.2
Perc. Hispanic	-	1	1.1	0
Number of counties	N=3103	N=1869	N=1619	N=250
Democrats				
	All U.S. Counties	All Counties With Valid Chair Emails	Non-Respondents	Respondents
County Traits:				
Median Age	40.8	40.5	40.5	40.3
Median Household Income	$46,493	$46,980	$46,625	$48,488
Perc. High School Graduates, Age 25+	34.9	34.9	35.2	33.9
Perc. College Graduates, Age 25+	13.1	13.1	12.9	14.1
Perc. Black Pop.	8.8	8.8	9.2	6.7
Perc. Hispanic Pop.	8.7	9.7	9.8	9.5
Perc. Spanish-Speaking	6.3	7.1	7.1	7.2
Perc. Non-Citizen	2.8	3	2.9	3.3
Perc. Obama Vote	38.2	39.7	39.7	39.4
Perc. Urban	40.6	44.7	43.9	48
Chair Traits:				
Perc. Women	-	40	39.3	42.6
Perc. Hispanic	-	4.2	4.7	2.1
Number of counties	N=3103	N=1763	N=1427	N=336

Note: Chair gender assessed by two independent coders on basis of first name. Ambiguous names were coded via Internet search. Hispanic heritage coded based on last name probability greater than .66, as determined by 2010 U.S. Census.

Table A3. Descriptive Characteristics of Respondents

Variable	(1)
Age (in years)	59.008
	[13.5631]
Female (1=yes)	0.345
	[.4755]
White Chair (1=yes)	0.905
	[.2933]
Black Chair (1=yes)	0.019
	[.1357]
Hispanic Chair (1=yes)	0.012
	[.1077]
Other race / Skipped (1=yes)	0.065
	[.2457]
Education (1=No HS; 6=post-grad)	5.067
	[1.1512]
Income (1=<$10k; 14=$150k+; 15=refused)	10.989
	[3.1431]
Income Refused (1=yes)	0.129
	[.3353]
Democrat (1=yes)	0.626
	[.4841]
Observations	853

Note: Cell entries are means with standard deviations in brackets.

Table A4. Attributes and Descriptors for Conjoint Experimental Tasks

Attribute (row label)	*Possible Descriptors*
	Background Characteristics
Current Occupation (indicators for occupation classes [italicized]):	*Lawyer*: General Practice Attorney, Real Estate Attorney, Family Law Attorney, Corporate Attorney, Employment Law Attorney, Criminal Defense Attorney, Public Defender; *Education*: High School Science Teacher, High School Math Teacher, High School English Teacher, High School Social Studies Teacher, Middle School Science Teacher, Middle School Math Teacher, Middle School English Teacher, Middle School Social Studies Teacher, Grade School Teacher; *Medicine*: General Practitioner Physician, General Surgeon, Cardiologist, Radiologist, Urologist, Anesthesiologist, Dentist, Pediatrician; *Financial*: Tax Accountant, Corporate Accountant, Insurance Agent, Personal Banker, Loan Officer, Financial Advisor; *Small Business Owner*: Owner and Operator of Local Bakery, Owner and Operator of Local Clothing Store, Owner and Operator of Local Hardware Store, Owner and Operator of Local Furniture Store, Owner and Operator of Local Car Dealership, Owner and Operator of Local Restaurant, Owner and Operator of Local Coffee Shop; *Journalism/Media*: Television Reporter, Newspaper Reporter, Television News Anchor, Television Meteorologist, Newspaper Editor, Local Radio Personality; *Farmer*: Dairy Farmer, Farmer, Organic Farmer, Poultry Farmer, Pig Farmer; *Social Programs*: Social Worker, Community Organizer
Marital Status:	Married (50%); Single (20%); Remarried (20%); Currently Divorced (10%)
Military Service:	None (75%); U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Coast Guard (all 5% each)
Number of Children:	0 (5%); 1 (40%); 2 (35%); 3 (15%); 4 (5%)
Number of Years Living in the Area:	5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 20 (all 5% each); Entire life (35%)
Political Experience:	None (40%); Member of Town Council (14%); Member of County Board (14%); Mayor (14%); Member of School Board (14%); Sheriff (4%)
	Issues
Position on abortion:	Pro-choice; pro-life
Thinks food stamp benefits should be:	Increased; Decreased; Kept as they are
Thinks laws covering the sales of guns should be:	More strict; Less strict; Kept as they are
Position on requiring employers to offer paid leave to parents of new children:	Supports; Opposes
	Compromiser or Principled
Friends Describe As:	*willingness to compromise*: “a coalition-builder,” “one who seeks consensus,” “pragmatic,” “tolerant of other views,” “willing to compromise,” “willing to work with the other side”; *commitment to a fixed platform and principles*: “a good party soldier,” “committed to their positions,” “ideologically pure,” “uncompromising,” “unswerving in their values,” “willing to fight for principles”

Note: Three background characteristics were chosen with equal probability. The fourth attribute was then chosen based on the following: 1/3 another background characteristic; 1/3 an issue (1 of the 4 with equal probability); 1/3 a descriptor from the "willingness to compromise" or "commitment to a fixed platform and principles" bin. Descriptors were chosen with equal probability unless otherwise noted (with %).

Table A5. Model Used to Calculate AMCEs

	Chose Candidate (1=yes)
Female Candidate	0.013
	[0.008]
Black Candidate	-0.087
	[0.010]**
Latinx Candidate	-0.098
	[0.010]**
Party Congruent: Abortion	0.227
	[0.037]**
Party Congruent: Family Leave	0.260
	[0.044]**
Party Congruent: Guns	0.287
	[0.058]**
Gun Laws - Same	0.279
	[0.035]**
Party Congruent: Food Stamps	0.354
	[0.039]**
Food Stamps - Same	0.273
	[0.029]**
Has Political Experience	0.224
	[0.014]**
Constant	0.340
	[0.139]*
Observations	16842
R-squared	0.078

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by respondent, in brackets. Indicators for the full set of candidate characteristics, as well as for respondents assigned to a condition where a given type of descriptor was not presented, are included in the models; coefficients suppressed to save space. Full model available upon request. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table A6. Masking Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Chose Candidate (1=yes)		
Female Candidate	0.002	0.013	0.012
	[0.013]	[0.011]	[0.010]
Black Candidate	-0.072	-0.066	-0.089
	[0.018]**	[0.013]**	[0.013]**
Latinx Candidate	-0.096	-0.083	-0.100
	[0.018]**	[0.013]**	[0.013]**
Compromise Presented (1=yes)	0.016		
	[0.019]		
Compromise Presented x Female Candidate	0.011		
	[0.019]		
Compromise Presented x Black Candidate	-0.036		
	[0.024]		
Compromise Presented x Latinx Candidate	-0.013		
	[0.024]		
Issue Position Presented (1=yes)	-0.130		
	[0.021]**		
Issue Position Presented x Female Candidate	0.022		
	[0.019]		
Issue Position Presented x Black Candidate	-0.006		
	[0.025]		
Issue Position Presented x Latinx Candidate	0.009		
	[0.024]		
Experience Not Presented x Female Candidate		0.000	
		[0.015]	
Experience Not Presented x Black Candidate		-0.045	
		[0.020]*	
Experience Not Presented x Latinx Candidate		-0.032	
		[0.020]	
Experience Not Presented		0.075	
		[0.028]**	
Occupation Not Presented x Female Candidate			0.003
			[0.015]
Occupation Not Presented x Black Candidate			0.004
			[0.020]
Occupation Not Presented x Latinx Candidate			0.005
			[0.020]
Occupation Not Presented			-0.139
			[0.029]**
Constant	0.179	0.351	0.362
	[0.039]**	[0.144]*	[0.144]*
Observations	16842	16842	16842
R-squared	0.078	0.078	0.078
Joint Significance of Race/Ethnicity Interactions (p-value)	0.544	0.065	0.964

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by respondent, in brackets. Indicators for the full set of candidate characteristics, as well as for respondents assigned to a condition where a given type of descriptor was not presented, are included in the models; coefficients suppressed to save space. Full models available upon request. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table A7. Treatment Effects by Chair Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Chose Candidate (1=yes)			
Female Candidate	0.026	0.019	0.014	0.037
	[0.009]**	[0.008]*	[0.010]	[0.012]**
Black Candidate	-0.086	-0.085	-0.095	-0.094
	[0.013]**	[0.010]**	[0.012]**	[0.016]**
Latinx Candidate	-0.095	-0.100	-0.114	-0.115
	[0.012]**	[0.010]**	[0.013]**	[0.016]**
Female (1=yes)	0.020			0.015
	[0.014]			[0.014]
Female Candidate x Female (1=yes)	-0.037			-0.038
	[0.016]*			[0.017]*
Black Candidate x Female (1=yes)	-0.006			-0.002
	[0.020]			[0.021]
Latinx Candidate x Female (1=yes)	-0.008			0.006
	[0.020]			[0.021]
Black Chair (1=yes)		0.024		0.020
		[0.053]		[0.054]
Female Candidate x Black Chair (1=yes)		0.008		0.013
		[0.039]		[0.039]
Black Candidate x Black Chair (1=yes)		0.002		0.000
		[0.075]		[0.074]
Latinx Candidate x Black Chair (1=yes)		-0.121		-0.111
		[0.077]		[0.078]
Hispanic Chair (1=yes)		-0.005		0.007
		[0.055]		[0.053]
Female Candidate x Hispanic Chair (1=yes)		-0.098		-0.111
		[0.087]		[0.085]
Black Candidate x Hispanic Chair (1=yes)		-0.023		-0.032
		[0.068]		[0.068]
Latinx Candidate x Hispanic Chair (1=yes)		0.182		0.175
		[0.086]*		[0.086]*
Other race / Skipped (1=yes)		0.034		0.038
		[0.026]		[0.026]
Female Candidate x Other race / Skipped (1=yes)		-0.071		-0.069
		[0.032]*		[0.033]*
Black Candidate x Other race / Skipped (1=yes)		-0.025		-0.031
		[0.036]		[0.036]
Latinx Candidate x Other race / Skipped (1=yes)		0.032		0.025
		[0.039]		[0.040]
Republican			0.066	0.069
			[0.040]	[0.041]
Female Candidate x Republican			-0.003	-0.014
			[0.016]	[0.017]
Black Candidate x Republican			0.020	0.027
			[0.021]	[0.021]
Latinx Candidate x Republican			0.042	0.036
			[0.020]*	[0.021]
Age (mean-centered)				0.001
				[0.001]
Female Candidate x Age (mean-centered)				-0.001
				[0.001]
Black Candidate x Age (mean-centered)				-0.001
				[0.001]
Latinx Candidate x Age (mean-centered)				-0.001
				[0.001]
Education (mean-centered)				-0.005
				[0.006]
Female Candidate x Education (mean-centered)				-0.002
				[0.007]
Black Candidate x Education (mean-centered)				0.015
				[0.009]
Latinx Candidate x Education (mean-centered)				0.002
				[0.009]
Income (mean-centered)				0.000
				[0.003]
Female Candidate x Income (mean-centered)				0.003
				[0.003]
Black Candidate x Income (mean-centered)				-0.006
				[0.004]
Latinx Candidate x Income (mean-centered)				0.002
				[0.004]
Constant	0.357	0.366	0.251	0.268
	[0.143]*	[0.141]**	[0.143]	[0.138]
Observations	16842	16842	16842	16842
R-squared	0.078	0.079	0.078	0.081

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by respondent, in brackets. Indicators for the full set of candidate characteristics, as well as for respondents assigned to a condition where a given type of descriptor was not presented, are included in the models; coefficients suppressed to save space. Full models available upon request. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table A8. Moderating Effects of County Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Percent Black Households (ln)		Percent Hispanic Households (ln)		Mean Racial Resentment (1-5)		Percent Support Path to Citizenship	
Female Candidate	-0.003	-0.013	0.017	0.012	0.128	0.194	-0.044	-0.048
	[0.014]	[0.019]	[0.018]	[0.025]	[0.079]	[0.104]	[0.029]	[0.041]
Black Candidate	-0.122	-0.149	-0.093	-0.107	-0.049	-0.095	-0.102	-0.076
	[0.019]**	[0.025]**	[0.023]**	[0.030]**	[0.097]	[0.137]	[0.037]**	[0.053]
Latinx Candidate	-0.115	-0.109	-0.153	-0.199	-0.062	0.020	-0.140	-0.188
	[0.018]**	[0.025]**	[0.023]**	[0.031]**	[0.089]	[0.144]	[0.035]**	[0.057]**
Moderator x Female Candidate	0.002	0.008	-0.011	-0.009	-0.034	-0.051	0.101	0.107
	[0.009]	[0.012]	[0.011]	[0.016]	[0.020]	[0.027]	[0.065]	[0.093]
Moderator x Black Candidate	0.022	0.042	0.000	0.008	-0.012	0.001	0.017	-0.035
	[0.011]*	[0.015]**	[0.013]	[0.017]	[0.025]	[0.035]	[0.082]	[0.116]
Moderator x Latinx Candidate	0.007	-0.007	0.031	0.054	-0.012	-0.036	0.076	0.164
	[0.010]	[0.014]	[0.014]*	[0.017]**	[0.023]	[0.037]	[0.080]	[0.128]
Moderator	-0.011	-0.014	-0.004	-0.014	0.026	0.038	-0.084	-0.085
	[0.008]	[0.011]	[0.009]	[0.012]	[0.017]	[0.026]	[0.056]	[0.084]
Republican Chair (1=yes)		0.065		0.036		0.180		0.074
		[0.052]		[0.057]		[0.146]		[0.068]
Moderator x Republican Chair		0.008		0.024		-0.023		-0.007
		[0.015]		[0.018]		[0.035]		[0.112]
Republican Chair x Female Candidate		0.022		0.010		-0.121		0.003
		[0.028]		[0.037]		[0.157]		[0.058]
Republican Chair x Black Candidate		0.059		0.032		0.095		-0.051
		[0.038]		[0.048]		[0.197]		[0.073]
Republican Chair x Latinx Candidate		-0.010		0.110		-0.145		0.095
		[0.036]		[0.046]*		[0.181]		[0.071]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Female Candidate		-0.014		-0.004		0.032		0.003
		[0.018]		[0.021]		[0.040]		[0.130]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Black Candidate		-0.042		-0.018		-0.027		0.104
		[0.022]		[0.027]		[0.050]		[0.162]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Latinx Candidate		0.029		-0.055		0.044		-0.163
		[0.020]		[0.027]*		[0.046]		[0.160]
Constant	0.426	0.324	0.426	0.339	0.310	0.135	0.446	0.345
	[0.171]*	[0.171]	[0.170]*	[0.169]*	[0.193]	[0.208]	[0.179]*	[0.182]
Observations	11364	11364	11364	11364	10984	10984	11102	11102
R-squared	0.079	0.080	0.079	0.080	0.080	0.081	0.080	0.080
Joint Significance of Interactions (p-value; 2-way interactions in odd numbered columns, 3-way in even numbered columns)								
Female Candidate Interaction	0.850	0.439	0.283	0.839	0.096	0.426	0.117	0.982
Black Candidate Interaction	0.048	0.057	0.997	0.502	0.626	0.593	0.835	0.524
Latinx Candidate Interaction	0.515	0.146	0.025	0.043	0.605	0.339	0.338	0.311

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by respondent, in brackets. Column headers are the moderating variable considered in each model. County level attitudinal measures are constructed using data from the 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES). Indicators for the full set of candidate characteristics, as well as for respondents assigned to a condition where a given type of descriptor was not presented, are included in the models; coefficients suppressed to save space. Full models available upon request. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table A9. Moderating Effects of County Composition (Robustness)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Percent Black Households (Raw)		Percent Black Households (ln); Counties w/0% Excluded		Percent Hispanic Households (Raw)		Percent Hispanic Households (ln); Counties w/<10% Excluded	
Female Candidate	0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.017	0.007	0.007	0.002	0.008
	[0.011]	[0.014]	[0.017]	[0.021]	[0.011]	[0.015]	[0.022]	[0.030]
Black Candidate	-0.106	-0.122	-0.131	-0.143	-0.091	-0.102	-0.118	-0.116
	[0.015]**	[0.019]**	[0.021]**	[0.027]**	[0.015]**	[0.019]**	[0.028]**	[0.035]**
Latinx Candidate	-0.113	-0.109	-0.121	-0.107	-0.121	-0.151	-0.157	-0.221
	[0.014]**	[0.019]**	[0.021]**	[0.028]**	[0.014]**	[0.018]**	[0.027]**	[0.035]**
Moderator x Female Candidate	-0.001	0.000	0.002	0.010	-0.001	-0.001	-0.005	-0.007
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.010]	[0.012]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.012]	[0.017]
Moderator x Black Candidate	0.002	0.004	0.026	0.040	0.000	0.001	0.011	0.012
	[0.001]	[0.002]*	[0.012]*	[0.016]*	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.015]	[0.019]
Moderator x Latinx Candidate	0.001	-0.001	0.009	-0.007	0.002	0.005	0.033	0.064
	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.011]	[0.015]	[0.001]	[0.001]**	[0.015]*	[0.018]**
Moderator	-0.001	-0.001	-0.013	-0.014	0.000	-0.001	-0.011	-0.020
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.008]	[0.012]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.010]	[0.012]
Republican Chair (1=yes)		0.072		0.102		0.053		0.046
		[0.051]		[0.056]		[0.051]		[0.061]
Moderator x Republican Chair		0.000		0.003		0.003		0.022
		[0.002]		[0.016]		[0.001]*		[0.020]
Republican Chair x Female Candidate		0.015		0.032		-0.003		-0.017
		[0.022]		[0.034]		[0.022]		[0.044]
Republican Chair x Black Candidate		0.032		0.025		0.025		-0.006
		[0.030]		[0.043]		[0.030]		[0.058]
Republican Chair x Latinx Candidate		-0.004		-0.031		0.074		0.155
		[0.029]		[0.043]		[0.028]**		[0.054]**
Moderator x Republican Chair x Female Candidate		-0.001		-0.018		0.001		0.007
		[0.002]		[0.020]		[0.002]		[0.024]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Black Candidate		-0.004		-0.028		-0.003		-0.002
		[0.002]		[0.024]		[0.002]		[0.031]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Latinx Candidate		0.005		0.037		-0.007		-0.074
		[0.002]*		[0.022]		[0.002]**		[0.029]*
Constant	0.417	0.307	0.494	0.342	0.420	0.323	0.479	0.390
	[0.172]*	[0.172]	[0.189]**	[0.192]	[0.170]*	[0.169]	[0.169]**	[0.169]*
Observations	11364	11364	10078	10078	11364	11364	10010	10010
R-squared	0.079	0.080	0.078	0.080	0.079	0.081	0.080	0.082
Joint Significance of Interactions (p-value; 2-way interactions in odd numbered columns, 3-way in even numbered columns)								
Female Candidate Interaction	0.544	0.457	0.820	0.367	0.275	0.692	0.673	0.776
Black Candidate Interaction	0.120	0.074	0.028	0.232	0.782	0.183	0.469	0.959
Latinx Candidate Interaction	0.334	0.024	0.411	0.091	0.076	0.001	0.029	0.012

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by respondent, in brackets. Column headers are the moderating variable considered in each model. County level attitudinal measures are constructed using data from the 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES). Indicators for the full set of candidate characteristics, as well as for respondents assigned to a condition where a given type of descriptor was not presented, are included in the models; coefficients suppressed to save space. Full models available upon request. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table A10. Moderating Effects of County Attitudes (Robustness)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Mean County Racial Resentment (1-5); At Least 10 Responses		Support Path to Citizenship (%); At Least 10 Responses	
Female Candidate	0.196	0.214	-0.054	-0.063
	[0.106]	[0.143]	[0.045]	[0.062]
Black Candidate	0.110	-0.077	-0.185	-0.121
	[0.152]	[0.183]	[0.062]**	[0.073]
Latinx Candidate	0.082	0.112	-0.215	-0.247
	[0.152]	[0.199]	[0.061]**	[0.079]**
Moderator x Female Candidate	-0.048	-0.052	0.133	0.149
	[0.028]	[0.037]	[0.098]	[0.137]
Moderator x Black Candidate	-0.058	-0.005	0.184	0.068
	[0.040]	[0.048]	[0.135]	[0.161]
Moderator x Latinx Candidate	-0.052	-0.062	0.230	0.284
	[0.040]	[0.052]	[0.135]	[0.178]
Moderator	0.062	0.054	-0.199	-0.187
	[0.026]*	[0.036]	[0.093]*	[0.125]
Republican Chair (1=yes)		0.108		0.172
		[0.210]		[0.097]
Moderator x Republican Chair		0.022		-0.039
		[0.052]		[0.185]
Republican Chair x Female Candidate		-0.046		0.021
		[0.212]		[0.089]
Republican Chair x Black Candidate		0.525		-0.174
		[0.316]		[0.130]
Republican Chair x Latinx Candidate		-0.066		0.089
		[0.310]		[0.124]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Female Candidate		0.010		-0.033
		[0.056]		[0.192]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Black Candidate		-0.146		0.313
		[0.082]		[0.286]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Latinx Candidate		0.022		-0.147
		[0.081]		[0.273]
Constant	0.304	0.055	0.587	0.359
	[0.238]	[0.241]	[0.211]**	[0.205]
Observations	7678	7678	8392	8392
R-squared	0.084	0.086	0.085	0.086
Joint Significance of Interactions (p-value; 2-way interactions in odd numbered columns, 3-way in even numbered columns)				
Female Candidate Interaction	0.088	0.853	0.177	0.863
Black Candidate Interaction	0.146	0.077	0.174	0.275
Latinx Candidate Interaction	0.191	0.789	0.088	0.590

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by respondent, in brackets. Column headers are the moderating variable considered in each model. County level attitudinal measures are constructed using data from the 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES). Indicators for the full set of candidate characteristics, as well as for respondents assigned to a condition where a given type of descriptor was not presented, are included in the models; coefficients suppressed to save space. Full models available upon request. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table A11. Moderating Effects of Electoral Competitiveness

	(1)	(2)
	Deviation from 50/50 2-Party Split (2012 Pres.; logged)	
Female Candidate	-0.017	-0.005
	[0.024]	[0.029]
Black Candidate	-0.067	-0.026
	[0.033]*	[0.047]
Latinx Candidate	-0.118	-0.112
	[0.030]**	[0.038]**
Moderator x Female Candidate	0.007	0.001
	[0.009]	[0.012]
Moderator x Black Candidate	-0.011	-0.030
	[0.013]	[0.018]
Moderator x Latinx Candidate	0.005	-0.002
	[0.012]	[0.016]
Moderator	-0.001	0.009
	[0.008]	[0.012]
Republican Chair (1=yes)		0.123
		[0.063]
Moderator x Republican Chair		-0.022
		[0.016]
Republican Chair x Female Candidate		-0.026
		[0.051]
Republican Chair x Black Candidate		-0.095
		[0.064]
Republican Chair x Latinx Candidate		-0.009
		[0.061]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Female Candidate		0.013
		[0.020]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Black Candidate		0.043
		[0.025]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Latinx Candidate		0.015
		[0.024]
Constant	0.420	0.293
	[0.171]*	[0.172]
Observations	11364	11364
R-squared	0.079	0.079
Female Candidate Interaction	0.459	0.520
Black Candidate Interaction	0.382	0.091
Latinx Candidate Interaction	0.674	0.523

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by respondent, in brackets. Column headers are the moderating variable considered in each model. Indicators for the full set of candidate characteristics, as well as for respondents assigned to a condition where a given type of descriptor was not presented, are included in the models; coefficients suppressed to save space. Full models available upon request. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table A12. Moderating Effects of Electoral Experience with Female or Minority Legislators

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All		Democratic Chairs		Republican Chairs	
Female Candidate	-0.027	-0.007	-0.028	-0.015	-0.022	0.009
	[0.012]*	[0.021]	[0.016]	[0.028]	[0.018]	[0.033]
Black Candidate	-0.091	-0.118	-0.093	-0.135	-0.080	-0.076
	[0.017]**	[0.028]**	[0.023]**	[0.037]**	[0.027]**	[0.045]
Latinx Candidate	-0.110	-0.145	-0.114	-0.160	-0.103	-0.119
	[0.016]**	[0.027]**	[0.021]**	[0.037]**	[0.023]**	[0.039]**
Any Female Legislators (1=yes)	-0.024	-0.025	-0.017	-0.017	-0.042	-0.042
	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.025]	[0.026]
Female Candidate x Any Female Legislators (1=yes)	0.061	0.060	0.054	0.053	0.068	0.067
	[0.019]**	[0.019]**	[0.026]*	[0.026]*	[0.028]*	[0.029]*
Black Candidate x Any Female Legislators (1=yes)	-0.007	-0.007	-0.017	-0.018	0.008	0.009
	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.033]	[0.033]	[0.040]	[0.041]
Latinx Candidate x Any Female Legislators (1=yes)	-0.012	-0.009	-0.028	-0.024	0.013	0.014
	[0.026]	[0.025]	[0.034]	[0.034]	[0.037]	[0.037]
Any Black Legislators (1=yes)	-0.025	-0.010	-0.033	-0.019	-0.004	0.005
	[0.026]	[0.032]	[0.038]	[0.044]	[0.036]	[0.046]
Female Candidate x Any Black Legislators (1=yes)	0.021	0.031	0.048	0.052	-0.015	0.005
	[0.032]	[0.038]	[0.040]	[0.048]	[0.049]	[0.059]
Black Candidate x Any Black Legislators (1=yes)	0.020	-0.038	0.076	-0.010	-0.039	-0.063
	[0.041]	[0.049]	[0.056]	[0.066]	[0.057]	[0.072]
Latinx Candidate x Any Black Legislators (1=yes)	0.028	0.032	-0.003	0.026	0.071	0.041
	[0.036]	[0.045]	[0.052]	[0.062]	[0.051]	[0.066]
Any Hispanic Legislators (1=yes)	-0.006	-0.003	-0.048	-0.037	0.017	0.005
	[0.035]	[0.036]	[0.040]	[0.042]	[0.059]	[0.061]
Female Candidate x Any Hispanic Legislators (1=yes)	-0.041	-0.026	-0.060	-0.046	-0.008	0.014
	[0.046]	[0.045]	[0.069]	[0.066]	[0.056]	[0.059]
Black Candidate x Any Hispanic Legislators (1=yes)	-0.032	-0.031	0.015	0.023	-0.065	-0.053
	[0.054]	[0.054]	[0.077]	[0.076]	[0.079]	[0.079]
Latinx Candidate x Any Hispanic Legislators (1=yes)	0.090	0.051	0.188	0.115	-0.019	-0.024
	[0.053]	[0.052]	[0.055]**	[0.053]*	[0.081]	[0.082]
Percent Black Households (ln)		-0.007		-0.006		-0.004
		[0.009]		[0.012]		[0.014]
Female Candidate x Percent Black Households (ln)		-0.006		-0.003		-0.010
		[0.011]		[0.014]		[0.016]
Black Candidate x Percent Black Households (ln)		0.029		0.045		0.011
		[0.014]*		[0.018]*		[0.021]
Latinx Candidate x Percent Black Households (ln)		-0.002		-0.017		0.014
		[0.013]		[0.017]		[0.019]
Percent Hispanic Households (ln)		-0.002		-0.010		0.009
		[0.009]		[0.012]		[0.013]
Female Candidate x Percent Hispanic Households (ln)		-0.009		-0.006		-0.013
		[0.010]		[0.015]		[0.014]
Black Candidate x Percent Hispanic Households (ln)		-0.003		-0.005		-0.011
		[0.013]		[0.018]		[0.020]
Latinx Candidate x Percent Hispanic Households (ln)		0.025		0.045		0.001
		[0.014]		[0.018]*		[0.020]
Constant	0.450	0.446	-1.272	-1.257	0.142	0.132
	[0.172]**	[0.170]**	[0.349]**	[0.348]**	[0.207]	[0.207]
Observations	11364	11364	6578	6578	4786	4786
R-squared	0.080	0.081	0.093	0.096	0.107	0.108

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by respondent, in brackets. Legislator indicators based on state legislator characteristics just prior to the 2016 election. These measures are set to 1 if the county the chair serves is represented by at least one state legislator with that characteristic. Indicators for the full set of candidate characteristics, as well as for respondents assigned to a condition where a given type of descriptor was not presented, are included in the models; coefficients suppressed to save space. Full models available upon request. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table B1. Model Used to Calculate AMCEs (Linear Outcome)

	(1)
	Relative Strength of Candidate (-100 to 100)
Female Candidate	0.328
	[0.777]
Black Candidate	-8.938
	[1.038]**
Latinx Candidate	-9.808
	[1.069]**
Party Congruent: Abortion	24.897
	[4.659]**
Party Congruent: Family Leave	28.876
	[4.431]**
Party Congruent: Guns	29.739
	[6.681]**
Gun Laws - Same	28.684
	[4.227]**
Party Congruent: Food Stamps	36.313
	[5.089]**
Food Stamps - Same	24.124
	[3.265]**
Has Political Experience	22.483
	[1.498]**
Constant	-8.059
	[14.777]
Observations	16054
R-squared	0.082

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by respondent, in brackets. Indicators for the full set of candidate characteristics, as well as for respondents assigned to a condition where a given type of descriptor was not presented, are included in the models; coefficients suppressed to save space. Full model available upon request. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table B2. Masking Effects (Linear Outcome)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Relative Strength of Candidate (-100 to 100)		
Female Candidate	-1.446	0.144	-0.149
	[1.375]	[1.051]	[1.031]
Black Candidate	-9.321	-6.828	-9.230
	[1.899]**	[1.365]**	[1.389]**
Latinx Candidate	-10.670	-8.831	-9.603
	[1.881]**	[1.396]**	[1.409]**
Compromise Presented (1=yes)	-0.663		
	[2.067]		
Compromise Presented x Female Candidate	1.963		
	[1.878]		
Compromise Presented x Black Candidate	-1.283		
	[2.525]		
Compromise Presented x Latinx Candidate	-0.306		
	[2.613]		
Issue Position Presented (1=yes)	-16.162		
	[2.380]**		
Issue Position Presented x Female Candidate	3.319		
	[1.943]		
Issue Position Presented x Black Candidate	2.792		
	[2.660]		
Issue Position Presented x Latinx Candidate	3.100		
	[2.614]		
Experience Not Presented x Female Candidate		0.370	
		[1.561]	
Experience Not Presented x Black Candidate		-4.517	
		[2.091]*	
Experience Not Presented x Latinx Candidate		-2.131	
		[2.156]	
Experience Not Presented		5.637	
		[2.978]	
Occupation Not Presented x Female Candidate			1.047
			[1.561]
Occupation Not Presented x Black Candidate			0.640
			[2.091]
Occupation Not Presented x Latinx Candidate			-0.486
			[2.161]
Occupation Not Presented			-15.688
			[3.011]**
Constant	-29.833	-6.386	-5.197
	[4.124]**	[15.571]	[15.646]
Observations	16054	16054	16054
R-squared	0.082	0.082	0.082
Joint Significance of Race/Ethnicity Interactions (p-value)	0.523	0.096	0.859

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by respondent, in brackets. Indicators for the full set of candidate characteristics, as well as for respondents assigned to a condition where a given type of descriptor was not presented, are included in the models; coefficients suppressed to save space. Full models available upon request. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table B3. Treatment Effects by Chair Characteristics (Linear Outcome)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Relative Strength of Candidate (-100 to 100)			
Female Candidate	1.610	0.961	-0.297	1.955
	[0.942]	[0.792]	[0.986]	[1.198]
Black Candidate	-8.396	-8.440	-10.230	-9.456
	[1.323]**	[1.080]**	[1.305]**	[1.643]**
Latinx Candidate	-9.012	-10.328	-11.528	-11.273
	[1.355]**	[1.099]**	[1.382]**	[1.753]**
Female (1=yes)	2.912			2.004
	[1.487]			[1.546]
Female Candidate x Female (1=yes)	-3.741			-3.405
	[1.641]*			[1.679]*
Black Candidate x Female (1=yes)	-1.637			-0.922
	[2.127]			[2.206]
Latinx Candidate x Female (1=yes)	-2.370			-0.795
	[2.200]			[2.294]
Black Chair (1=yes)		4.647		3.235
		[7.146]		[7.261]
Female Candidate x Black Chair (1=yes)		-2.889		-1.887
		[3.611]		[3.706]
Black Candidate x Black Chair (1=yes)		-4.674		-3.029
		[10.854]		[10.986]
Latinx Candidate x Black Chair (1=yes)		-8.503		-7.032
		[10.608]		[10.665]
Hispanic Chair (1=yes)		-3.918		-3.068
		[6.922]		[6.821]
Female Candidate x Hispanic Chair (1=yes)		-6.316		-7.265
		[10.364]		[10.128]
Black Candidate x Hispanic Chair (1=yes)		-9.030		-9.110
		[8.545]		[8.417]
Latinx Candidate x Hispanic Chair (1=yes)		27.152		26.570
		[12.785]*		[12.891]*
Other race / Skipped (1=yes)		3.934		4.382
		[3.107]		[3.097]
Female Candidate x Other race / Skipped (1=yes)		-7.572		-7.841
		[3.885]		[3.869]*
Black Candidate x Other race / Skipped (1=yes)		-4.668		-5.089
		[4.198]		[4.242]
Latinx Candidate x Other race / Skipped (1=yes)		4.786		4.301
		[4.480]		[4.546]
Republican			6.113	6.928
			[4.517]	[4.577]
Female Candidate x Republican			1.609	0.484
			[1.599]	[1.687]
Black Candidate x Republican			3.465	3.499
			[2.167]	[2.271]
Latinx Candidate x Republican			4.553	3.261
			[2.174]*	[2.364]
Age (mean-centered)				0.048
				[0.064]
Female Candidate x Age (mean-centered)				-0.064
				[0.064]
Black Candidate x Age (mean-centered)				0.016
				[0.090]
Latinx Candidate x Age (mean-centered)				-0.053
				[0.092]
Education (mean-centered)				0.109
				[0.621]
Female Candidate x Education (mean-centered)				-0.509
				[0.692]
Black Candidate x Education (mean-centered)				0.340
				[0.934]
Latinx Candidate x Education (mean-centered)				-0.201
				[0.975]
Income (mean-centered)				-0.271
				[0.290]
Female Candidate x Income (mean-centered)				0.364
				[0.315]
Black Candidate x Income (mean-centered)				-0.063
				[0.415]
Latinx Candidate x Income (mean-centered)				0.523
				[0.443]
Constant	-5.867	-4.880	-17.193	-16.282
	[15.537]	[15.294]	[15.608]	[15.171]
Observations	16054	16054	16054	16054
R-squared	0.082	0.084	0.082	0.085

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by respondent, in brackets. Indicators for the full set of candidate characteristics, as well as for respondents assigned to a condition where a given type of descriptor was not presented, are included in the models; coefficients suppressed to save space. Full models available upon request. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table B4. Moderating Effects of County Characteristics (Linear Outcome)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Percent Black Households (ln)		Percent Hispanic Households (ln)		Mean Racial Resentment (1-5)		Percent Support Path to Citizenship	
Female Candidate	-0.947	-3.595	-0.036	-1.051	2.247	10.193	-3.225	-3.579
	[1.408]	[1.834]	[1.913]	[2.541]	[7.021]	[9.683]	[2.898]	[4.344]
Black Candidate	-13.241	-16.491	-12.127	-14.594	-1.768	-10.519	-12.587	-13.909
	[1.951]**	[2.549]**	[2.579]**	[3.232]**	[8.907]	[13.297]	[3.746]**	[5.449]*
Latinx Candidate	-12.492	-13.320	-16.434	-24.078	-6.297	6.757	-16.243	-23.699
	[2.011]**	[2.821]**	[2.703]**	[3.556]**	[9.196]	[14.910]	[4.048]**	[6.413]**
Moderator x Female Candidate	0.240	1.414	-0.366	-0.416	-0.783	-3.119	6.039	4.135
	[0.917]	[1.114]	[1.082]	[1.542]	[1.806]	[2.514]	[6.443]	[9.475]
Moderator x Black Candidate	2.699	4.771	1.565	2.695	-2.139	0.067	6.150	8.679
	[1.227]*	[1.686]**	[1.498]	[1.849]	[2.263]	[3.406]	[8.240]	[11.668]
Moderator x Latinx Candidate	1.217	0.675	3.594	7.649	-1.290	-5.028	11.849	25.815
	[1.122]	[1.597]	[1.622]*	[1.910]**	[2.343]	[3.868]	[8.770]	[13.743]
Moderator	-1.375	-2.272	-1.430	-2.949	1.554	3.246	-9.117	-11.958
	[0.829]	[1.147]*	[0.924]	[1.210]*	[1.684]	[2.614]	[5.622]	[8.447]
Republican Chair (1=yes)		3.739		0.707		20.335		4.160
		[5.694]		[6.227]		[14.528]		[7.451]
Moderator x Republican Chair		2.001		3.587		-2.982		4.380
		[1.634]		[1.884]		[3.386]		[11.471]
Republican Chair x Female Candidate		6.121		2.196		-12.994		0.493
		[2.821]*		[3.882]		[13.945]		[5.846]
Republican Chair x Black Candidate		7.330		5.793		18.369		2.610
		[3.934]		[5.307]		[18.015]		[7.495]
Republican Chair x Latinx Candidate		2.051		17.922		-23.372		14.906
		[3.946]		[5.263]**		[18.757]		[8.043]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Female Candidate		-2.604		0.269		4.025		5.336
		[1.867]		[2.142]		[3.576]		[13.001]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Black Candidate		-4.389		-2.627		-4.576		-4.653
		[2.435]		[3.056]		[4.573]		[16.637]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Latinx Candidate		1.178		-9.373		6.913		-26.806
		[2.194]		[3.146]**		[4.750]		[17.520]
Constant	-7.880	-17.576	-6.295	-14.401	-13.764	-34.405	-6.297	-15.416
	[18.313]	[18.472]	[18.223]	[18.310]	[20.239]	[21.927]	[19.071]	[19.414]
Observations	10804	10804	10804	10804	10430	10430	10544	10544
R-squared	0.084	0.085	0.084	0.086	0.086	0.087	0.084	0.085
Joint Significance of Interactions (p-value; 2-way interactions in odd numbered columns, 3-way in even numbered columns)								
Female Candidate Interaction	0.794	0.164	0.735	0.900	0.665	0.261	0.349	0.682
Black Candidate Interaction	0.028	0.072	0.297	0.390	0.345	0.317	0.456	0.780
Latinx Candidate Interaction	0.278	0.591	0.027	0.003	0.582	0.146	0.177	0.127

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by respondent, in brackets. Column headers are the moderating variable considered in each model. County level attitudinal measures are constructed using data from the 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES). Indicators for the full set of candidate characteristics, as well as for respondents assigned to a condition where a given type of descriptor was not presented, are included in the models; coefficients suppressed to save space. Full models available upon request. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table B5. Moderating Effects of County Composition (Robustness; Linear Outcome)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Percent Black Households (Raw)		Percent Black Households (ln); Counties w/0% Excluded		Percent Hispanic Households (Raw)		Percent Hispanic Households (ln); Counties w/<10% Excluded	
Female Candidate	-0.396	-2.424	-1.465	-3.987	-0.450	-1.314	-1.598	-1.251
	[1.108]	[1.438]	[1.697]	[2.080]	[1.143]	[1.540]	[2.288]	[2.913]
Black Candidate	-11.060	-13.108	-13.495	-15.172	-9.936	-11.764	-12.502	-13.269
	[1.524]**	[2.088]**	[2.265]**	[2.940]**	[1.581]**	[1.993]**	[3.036]**	[3.699]**
Latinx Candidate	-11.951	-12.418	-12.804	-12.269	-12.583	-16.949	-15.816	-25.258
	[1.566]**	[2.171]**	[2.364]**	[3.172]**	[1.558]**	[2.037]**	[3.188]**	[4.071]**
Moderator x Female Candidate	-0.039	0.100	0.453	1.561	-0.021	-0.047	0.313	-0.331
	[0.118]	[0.124]	[1.022]	[1.198]	[0.098]	[0.158]	[1.222]	[1.684]
Moderator x Black Candidate	0.202	0.445	2.817	4.202	0.028	0.183	1.750	2.145
	[0.142]	[0.250]	[1.336]*	[1.825]*	[0.138]	[0.140]	[1.666]	[2.010]
Moderator x Latinx Candidate	0.159	-0.007	1.342	0.203	0.228	0.635	3.362	8.171
	[0.119]	[0.192]	[1.240]	[1.724]	[0.148]	[0.136]**	[1.813]	[2.085]**
Moderator	-0.112	-0.168	-1.540	-1.999	-0.086	-0.261	-1.770	-3.073
	[0.098]	[0.147]	[0.911]	[1.269]	[0.080]	[0.080]**	[1.003]	[1.260]*
Republican Chair (1=yes)		5.264		9.052		3.123		2.687
		[5.591]		[6.155]		[5.651]		[6.705]
Moderator x Republican Chair		0.122		1.130		0.418		3.280
		[0.195]		[1.782]		[0.152]**		[2.073]
Republican Chair x Female Candidate		4.678		6.347		1.858		-1.101
		[2.187]*		[3.487]		[2.290]		[4.684]
Republican Chair x Black Candidate		4.416		3.800		4.431		1.775
		[3.124]		[4.637]		[3.195]		[6.334]
Republican Chair x Latinx Candidate		1.438		-1.248		10.656		23.005
		[3.125]		[4.709]		[3.008]**		[6.113]**
Moderator x Republican Chair x Female Candidate		-0.279		-2.668		0.091		1.699
		[0.225]		[2.114]		[0.182]		[2.424]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Black Candidate		-0.434		-2.908		-0.373		-0.917
		[0.298]		[2.664]		[0.263]		[3.439]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Latinx Candidate		0.311		2.570		-0.980		-11.491
		[0.235]		[2.425]		[0.256]**		[3.461]**
Constant	-8.762	-19.725	-4.612	-20.995	-7.975	-17.126	-5.778	-15.474
	[18.348]	[18.508]	[19.548]	[19.766]	[18.250]	[18.239]	[18.706]	[18.685]
Observations	10804	10804	9576	9576	10804	10804	9530	9530
R-squared	0.083	0.085	0.082	0.084	0.084	0.087	0.084	0.087
Joint Significance of Interactions (p-value; 2-way interactions in odd numbered columns, 3-way in even numbered columns)								
Female Candidate Interaction	0.740	0.215	0.658	0.207	0.831	0.620	0.798	0.484
Black Candidate Interaction	0.155	0.146	0.035	0.276	0.838	0.157	0.294	0.790
Latinx Candidate Interaction	0.180	0.187	0.280	0.290	0.124	0.000	0.064	0.001

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by respondent, in brackets. Column headers are the moderating variable considered in each model. County level attitudinal measures are constructed using data from the 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES). Indicators for the full set of candidate characteristics, as well as for respondents assigned to a condition where a given type of descriptor was not presented, are included in the models; coefficients suppressed to save space. Full models available upon request. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table B6. Moderating Effects of County Attitudes (Robustness; Linear Outcome)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Mean County Racial Resentment (1-5); At Least 10 Responses		Support Path to Citizenship (%); At Least 10 Responses	
Female Candidate	7.499	11.299	-6.074	-5.922
	[10.412]	[14.141]	[4.600]	[5.954]
Black Candidate	13.166	-2.233	-22.618	-20.404
	[15.641]	[18.481]	[6.733]**	[7.831]**
Latinx Candidate	12.778	23.917	-26.199	-31.821
	[15.326]	[20.543]	[6.454]**	[8.495]**
Moderator x Female Candidate	-1.956	-3.108	12.764	9.738
	[2.751]	[3.716]	[9.890]	[12.987]
Moderator x Black Candidate	-6.366	-2.057	26.950	24.052
	[4.119]	[4.886]	[14.582]	[16.647]
Moderator x Latinx Candidate	-6.462	-9.601	32.534	43.263
	[4.015]	[5.413]	[13.981]*	[18.320]*
Moderator	5.578	6.098	-26.046	-26.288
	[2.714]*	[3.696]	[9.400]**	[12.397]*
Republican Chair (1=yes)		20.551		12.546
		[22.061]		[10.599]
Moderator x Republican Chair		-1.099		0.722
		[5.393]		[19.093]
Republican Chair x Female Candidate		-8.284		-0.126
		[20.217]		[9.198]
Republican Chair x Black Candidate		45.319		-6.465
		[33.184]		[14.418]
Republican Chair x Latinx Candidate		-28.868		15.723
		[31.072]		[12.941]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Female Candidate		2.609		7.445
		[5.370]		[19.601]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Black Candidate		-12.536		8.864
		[8.690]		[31.487]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Latinx Candidate		8.172		-29.730
		[8.059]		[28.174]
Constant	-21.904	-49.770	5.332	-14.561
	[25.103]	[26.065]	[22.689]	[22.105]
Observations	7258	7258	7968	7968
R-squared	0.087	0.089	0.090	0.091
Joint Significance of Interactions (p-value; 2-way interactions in odd numbered columns, 3-way in even numbered columns)				
Female Candidate Interaction	0.477	0.627	0.198	0.704
Black Candidate Interaction	0.123	0.150	0.065	0.778
Latinx Candidate Interaction	0.108	0.311	0.020	0.292

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by respondent, in brackets. Column headers are the moderating variable considered in each model. County level attitudinal measures are constructed using data from the 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES). Indicators for the full set of candidate characteristics, as well as for respondents assigned to a condition where a given type of descriptor was not presented, are included in the models; coefficients suppressed to save space. Full models available upon request. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table B7. Moderating Effects of Electoral Competitiveness (Linear Outcome)

	(1)	(2)
	Deviation from 50/50 2-Party Split (2012 Pres.; logged)	
Female Candidate	-2.543	-3.212
	[2.416]	[3.081]
Black Candidate	-9.272	-7.007
	[3.235]**	[4.677]
Latinx Candidate	-11.675	-12.667
	[3.240]**	[4.338]**
Moderator x Female Candidate	0.808	0.600
	[0.938]	[1.245]
Moderator x Black Candidate	-0.201	-1.494
	[1.268]	[1.805]
Moderator x Latinx Candidate	0.319	0.097
	[1.315]	[1.789]
Moderator	-0.365	0.073
	[0.905]	[1.354]
Republican Chair (1=yes)		8.190
		[6.916]
Moderator x Republican Chair		-0.988
		[1.751]
Republican Chair x Female Candidate		1.849
		[5.013]
Republican Chair x Black Candidate		-5.197
		[6.463]
Republican Chair x Latinx Candidate		2.619
		[6.562]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Female Candidate		0.380
		[1.935]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Black Candidate		2.992
		[2.524]
Moderator x Republican Chair x Latinx Candidate		0.415
		[2.657]
Constant	-7.892	-19.632
	[18.335]	[18.591]
Observations	10804	10804
R-squared	0.083	0.084
Female Candidate Interaction	0.389	0.844
Black Candidate Interaction	0.874	0.236
Latinx Candidate Interaction	0.808	0.876

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by respondent, in brackets. Column headers are the moderating variable considered in each model. Indicators for the full set of candidate characteristics, as well as for respondents assigned to a condition where a given type of descriptor was not presented, are included in the models; coefficients suppressed to save space. Full models available upon request. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table B8. Moderating Effects of Electoral Experience with Female or Minority Legislator (Linear Outcome)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All		Democratic Chairs		Republican Chairs	
Female Candidate	-2.202	-0.951	-3.363	-3.688	-0.227	3.312
	[1.299]	[2.147]	[1.709]*	[2.875]	[1.962]	[3.239]
Black Candidate	-11.059	-16.326	-11.703	-18.742	-9.282	-11.159
	[1.829]**	[3.038]**	[2.446]**	[3.966]**	[2.763]**	[4.798]*
Latinx Candidate	-11.618	-17.246	-12.785	-22.000	-10.157	-10.465
	[1.782]**	[3.096]**	[2.445]**	[4.250]**	[2.520]**	[4.340]*
Any Female Legislators (1=yes)	-2.266	-2.379	-1.914	-2.153	-3.850	-3.942
	[1.826]	[1.821]	[2.470]	[2.440]	[2.583]	[2.610]
Female Candidate x Any Female Legislators (1=yes)	2.852	2.776	2.807	2.771	2.682	2.672
	[1.960]	[1.978]	[2.636]	[2.640]	[2.900]	[2.926]
Black Candidate x Any Female Legislators (1=yes)	2.813	2.949	1.530	1.701	4.989	5.111
	[2.754]	[2.753]	[3.457]	[3.423]	[4.337]	[4.375]
Latinx Candidate x Any Female Legislators (1=yes)	0.282	0.670	-1.218	-0.572	3.069	3.005
	[2.799]	[2.777]	[3.774]	[3.718]	[3.894]	[3.920]
Any Black Legislators (1=yes)	-2.525	-0.471	-2.872	0.689	-0.261	-0.899
	[2.788]	[3.273]	[4.092]	[4.523]	[3.716]	[5.047]
Female Candidate x Any Black Legislators (1=yes)	2.954	3.989	6.160	4.968	-1.767	2.799
	[3.178]	[3.734]	[3.917]	[4.506]	[4.959]	[6.111]
Black Candidate x Any Black Legislators (1=yes)	2.145	-3.943	6.644	-2.598	-2.594	-4.792
	[4.495]	[5.248]	[6.006]	[6.610]	[6.708]	[8.457]
Latinx Candidate x Any Black Legislators (1=yes)	1.579	0.118	-1.907	-2.224	5.675	2.176
	[4.080]	[4.747]	[5.782]	[6.508]	[5.787]	[7.165]
Any Hispanic Legislators (1=yes)	-1.396	0.247	-6.461	-3.460	1.731	1.132
	[3.048]	[2.990]	[3.662]	[3.508]	[4.948]	[4.842]
Female Candidate x Any Hispanic Legislators (1=yes)	-0.132	0.641	-6.596	-5.994	8.061	9.734
	[3.852]	[3.829]	[5.834]	[5.756]	[4.039]*	[4.256]*
Black Candidate x Any Hispanic Legislators (1=yes)	-3.403	-5.794	4.685	2.817	-10.499	-11.417
	[5.514]	[5.212]	[6.706]	[6.325]	[8.410]	[8.030]
Latinx Candidate x Any Hispanic Legislators (1=yes)	6.039	1.179	21.664	11.692	-11.670	-10.922
	[6.270]	[5.851]	[6.776]**	[5.903]*	[8.783]	[8.492]
Percent Black Households (ln)		-0.944		-1.605		0.297
		[1.040]		[1.283]		[1.689]
Female Candidate x Percent Black Households (ln)		-0.573		0.473		-2.160
		[1.162]		[1.370]		[1.940]
Black Candidate x Percent Black Households (ln)		2.990		4.702		1.063
		[1.507]*		[1.872]*		[2.370]
Latinx Candidate x Percent Black Households (ln)		0.707		-0.118		1.564
		[1.351]		[1.757]		[1.993]
Percent Hispanic Households (ln)		-1.203		-2.355		0.430
		[0.954]		[1.283]		[1.426]
Female Candidate x Percent Hispanic Households (ln)		-0.388		-0.043		-0.892
		[1.122]		[1.562]		[1.584]
Black Candidate x Percent Hispanic Households (ln)		1.445		1.389		0.465
		[1.465]		[1.938]		[2.218]
Latinx Candidate x Percent Hispanic Households (ln)		3.282		6.375		-0.845
		[1.552]*		[1.884]**		[2.324]
Constant	-6.496	-4.740	17.865	22.240	-51.409	-52.243
	[18.394]	[18.360]	[27.579]	[27.031]	[20.239]*	[20.234]*
Observations	10804	10804	6264	6264	4540	4540
R-squared	0.084	0.085	0.101	0.105	0.117	0.117

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by respondent, in brackets. Legislator indicators based on state legislator characteristics just prior to the 2016 election. These measures are set to 1 if the county the chair serves is represented by at least one state legislator with that characteristic. Indicators for the full set of candidate characteristics, as well as for respondents assigned to a condition where a given type of descriptor was not presented, are included in the models; coefficients suppressed to save space. Full models available upon request. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%