Intergovernmental bargaining in multilevel autocracies:

The Case of the 2018 FIFA World Cup Russia

Forthcoming in Territory, Politics, Governance

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Online Appendix

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Appendix A

Figure A.1: Structure of the 2018 FIFA World Cup costs, billion rubles



Sources: RBK (2018); Karnaukhov and Chumakova (2018).

Figure A.1 shows that costs on preparations for the championship in Moscow (city) exceeded 188 billion rubles (3.3 billion U.S. dollars), while in Tatarstan they totaled 4.4 billion rubles (0.08 billion U.S. dollars). On the other hand, Moscow received only 0.03 billion rubles of federal funds, while Tatarstan - 1.9 billion rubles. These estimates are based on program documents, meaning the actual amount of federal transfers spent in each region is likely to be higher (RBK, 2018).

Alternative explanations of the selection as a World Cup venue

Following the economic arguments (Turovsky and Gaivoronsky, 2017; Starodubtsev, 2018), one may expect that such factors as economic development or investment attractiveness of the nominated venues could play some role in the selection process. Table A.1 displays the data on the average gross regional product (GRP) per capita and the average rank of investment potential of the nominated regions between 2007 and 2011.

On the one hand, these data suggest that some candidates like Moscow, Saint Petersburg, and Tatarstan had higher than average GRP per capita, while other regions, like the Republic of Mordovia, Rostov, and Volgograd oblasts were below the national average. On the other hand, except for Mordovia, all other candidates had above average investment rating. As a result, the final selection of the championship venues cannot be explained either by their GRP per capita or by their investment rating. While no details are available concerning the criteria for the selection of the candidate venues, it is quite likely that GRP per capita or investment rating were taken into account at the early stage of the selection process when the Russian Organizing Committee proposed the list of potential venues for hosting the World Cup.

Population size and availability of sports infrastructure might also be taken into consideration by the Organizing Committee. However, the capital of Mordovia, Saransk, with less than 300,000 inhabitants, was selected while Krasnodar and Yaroslavl, each with more than 600,000 inhabitants, were not (FIFA, 2010). In addition, except for Moscow and Yekaterinburg, those stadiums according to the FIFA (2010, 11-12) required "major renovation," the stadiums in all other nominated venues were proposed "to be built." The construction of the stadiums was financed from the federal budget. The major candidates, Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Sochi, and Kazan, already had developed infrastructure. For example, Moscow's Luzhniki stadium was renovated and Otkritie Arena was newly-built. The construction of Saint Petersburg stadium was initiated already in 2007. Kazan Arena was constructed for the 2013 Summer Universiade. Sochi's Fisht Stadium was built for the 2014 Winter Olympics. Table A.2 displays the main characteristics of the nominated venues.

The city of Krasnodar was the only one of the remaining candidates that had a private investor, Sergey Galitsky, the owner of the "Krasnodar" football club, who was ready to co-finance the construction of the new stadium. Following Krasnodar's non-selection as

Table A.1: Economic characteristics of the nominated regions, 2007-2011 average

No	Region	GRP per capita	EXPERT-RA ranking
1	Krasnodar	175 437.42	2.60
2	Saint Petersburg	322 221.32	2.80
3	Moscow	712 147.08	4.00
4	Tatarstan	256 329.46	5.00
5	Volgograd	157 494.32	5.80
6	Samara	211 016.14	5.00
7	Mordovia	117 565.38	7.00
8	Rostov	140 199.00	3.20
9	Nizhniy Novgorod	182 008.70	5.00
10	Sverdlovsk Oblast	226 503.00	4.00
11	Kaliningrad	195 664.28	6.20
12	Yaroslavl	177 727.36	6.00
13	Moscow Oblast	243 311.60	3.40

Sources: Rosstat, Russian Regions. Social and Economic Indicators 2013, available at http://www.gks.ru; EXPERT-RA, Ratings of regions' investment attractiveness, available at https://raexpert.ru/rankings.

EXPERT-RA categorical ranking was transformed by the author into a continuous scale: 1–1A, 2–2A, 3–3A, 4–1B, 5–2B, 6–3B1, 7–3B2, 8–1C, 9–2C, 10–3C1, 11–3C2, 12–3D. The lower value indicates that the region is more attractive.

the World Cup venue, Galitsky spent around 300 million U.S. dollars on the construction of a new private stadium, which was finished in 2016 two years before the start of the FIFA World Cup in Russia (RIA News Sport, 2018). Furthermore, Krasnodar even has two football clubs, "Krasnodar" and "Kuban," playing in the Russian Premier League. In 2011, the games with "Krasnodar" were well attended by football fans. After the non-selection of the city, Galitsky wrote in his Twitter account: "the most soccer-mad city was shut out, I simply cannot believe that" (Popov and Protsenko, 2012; The New York Times, 2018). The evidence above suggests that neither the availability of private investors nor the popularity of football in the region has eventually played any significant role in the selection process.

Table A.2: Main characteristics of the candidate cities

No	City	No of inhabitants	International airport	Stadium	Football club*
1	Krasnodar	710686	yes	To be built	yes
2	Sochi	337947	yes	To be built	no
3	Moscow	10508971	yes	Major renovation	yes
4	Kazan	1130717	yes	To be built	yes
5	Saint Petersburg	4581854	yes	To be built	yes
6	Volgograd	981909	yes	To be built	no
7	Samara	1134716	yes	To be built	yes
8	Saransk	296054	yes	To be built	no
9	Rostov-on-Don	1048991	yes	To be built	yes
10	Nizhniy Novgorod	1272527	yes	To be built	no
11	Yekaterinburg	1332264	yes	Major renovation	no
12	Kaliningrad	420480	yes	To be built	no
13	Yaroslavl	606336	yes	To be built	no
14	Podol'sk	200059	yes	To be built	no

Source: FIFA (2010, 6-11, 30).
* Football club playing in the premier league between 2007 and 2011.

Method, data and calibration

Calibration of conditions

Table A.3: Descriptive statistics, voting results, per cent

Elections	Mean	Median	Min.	Max.	Sd.	N
2007 State Duma elections	65.01	61.77	48.78	99.36	11.10	83
2008 Presidential elections	69.76	67.25	59.26	91.92	8.42	83
2011 State Duma elections	49.16	43.54	29.04	99.48	16.91	83
2012 Presidential elections	64.42	61.85	46.95	99.76	10.29	83

Source: Dataset on political elites and economic performance in Russia, available at https://iims.hse.ru/en/csid/databases.

Table A.4: The list of cases and the raw data

	Case	Case label	VOT	STAB	CAP	LOB	OUT
1	Yaroslavl	YAR	2	8.00	19	2	2
2	Moscow (Obl)	MOS	4	6.60	33	4	1
3	Nizhniy Novgorod	NIZ	3	2.80	28	6	3
4	Samara	SAM	3	5.70	21	7	3
5	Volgograd	VGG	3	35.50	15	6	3
6	Sverdlovsk Oblast	SVE	3	2.60	18	7	3
7	Krasnodar I	KDA I	6	5.80	59	9	2
8	Krasnodar II	KDA II	6	5.80	59	9	4
9	Rostov	ROS	7	4.00	26	6	3
10	Mordovia	MO	8	8.40	62	8	3
11	Kaliningrad	KAL	3	11.20	7	6	3
12	Saint Petersburg	SPE	4	7.00	22	12	4
13	Moscow (City)	MOW	4	15.40	36	11	4
14	Tatarstan	TA	8	2.90	43	9	4

Figure A.2: Distribution of the raw data



Figure A.3: Distribution of the fuzzy set membership scores



Figure A.4: Plots of the raw data against the fuzzy set membership scores



Table A.5: Calibrated dataset

	Case	Case label	VOT	STAB	CAP	LOB	OUT
1	Yaroslavl	YAR	0.00	0.33	0.33	0.00	0.33
2	Moscow Oblast	MOS	0.33	0.33	0.67	0.33	0.00
3	Nizhniy Novgorod	NIZ	0.33	1.00	0.67	0.67	0.67
4	Samara	SAM	0.33	0.33	0.67	0.67	0.67
5	Volgograd	VGG	0.33	0.00	0.33	0.67	0.67
6	Sverdlovsk Oblast	SVE	0.33	1.00	0.33	0.67	0.67
7	Krasnodar I	KDA I	0.67	0.33	1.00	1.00	0.33
8	Krasnodar II	KDA II	0.67	0.33	1.00	1.00	1.00
9	Rostov	ROS	1.00	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67
10	Mordovia	MO	1.00	0.33	1.00	0.67	0.67
11	Kaliningrad	KAL	0.33	0.00	0.00	0.67	0.67
12	Saint Petersburg	SPE	0.33	0.33	0.67	1.00	1.00
13	Moscow	MOW	0.33	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
14	Tatarstan	TA	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

The analysis of the outcome, selection as a World Cup venue

Table A.6: Parameters of fit, necessity, outcome selection as a World Cup venue

Condition	Consistency of Necessity	Coverage of Necessity	Relevance of Necessity
VOT	0.604	0.809	0.841
STAB	0.534	0.834	0.890
CAP	0.820	0.821	0.736
LOB	0.965	0.900	0.799
vot	0.607	0.809	0.839
stab	0.643	0.749	0.748
cap	0.391	0.785	0.903
lob	0.282	0.663	0.882

Figure A.5: Necessity plot, LOB, outcome selection as a World Cup venue



The analysis of sufficiency produces conservative, parsimonious, and intermediate solution formulas. The difference between them is that the conservative solution formula is based on empirically observed evidence only. The parsimonious solution is based on simplifying assumptions–the logical remainder rows, which contribute to parsimony. The intermediate solution formula is based on those simplifying assumptions that at the same time represent easy counterfactuals, meaning they are in line with theoretical expectations (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). The conservative solution is selected for substantive discussion as it provides richer evidence for interpretation. Figure A.6 below displays XY-plots.

Figure A.6: Plots of the conservative solution formula, outcome selection as a World Cup venue



Table A.7: Parsimonious solution formula, outcome selection as a World Cup venue

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases	Deviant cases
LOB	0.900	0.864	0.965	-	VGG SVE KAL NIZ SAM SPE MOW KDA II ROS MO TA	KDA I
Overall solution	0.900	0.864	0.965	-		

[1] Capital letters denote presence.
[2] Intermediate solution formula looks identical. Directional expectations state that all conditions are expected to contribute to the outcome in their presence.

The analysis of the outcome, non-selection as a World Cup venue

Table A.8: Parameters of fit, necessity, outcome non-selection as a World Cup venue

Condition	Consistency of Necessity	Coverage of Necessity	Relevance of Necessity
VOT	0.712	0.474	0.657
STAB	0.568	0.441	0.706
CAP	0.785	0.391	0.450
LOB	0.712	0.330	0.372
vot	0.714	0.473	0.654
stab	0.787	0.456	0.578
cap	0.641	0.639	0.848
lob	0.785	0.917	0.968

Table A.9: Parsimonious solution formula, outcome non-selection as a World Cup venue

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases
lob	0.917	0.754	0.785	-	YAR, MOS
	0.917	0.754	0.785		

[1] Small letters denote absence.

Robustness tests

Wagemann and Schneider (2015, 41) advise "to check whether changes in the calibration, in the case selection, in the raw consistency levels lead to substantively different results." For the first alternative analysis, the set of the regions delivering high voting results has been calibrated differently, namely, using the median value, which is less restrictive than the mean value employed in the original analysis. The alternative conservative solution formula, displayed in Table A.10 below, is more complex than the original solution, yet it still represents its subset.

Table A.10: Alternative conservative solution formula 1, outcome selection as a World Cup venue

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases	Deviant cases
vot*stab*LOB +	0.910	0.877	0.358	0.217	**VGG SPE MOW KAL SAM**	
VOT*CAP*LOB	0.857	0.786	0.641	0.499	**KDA II NIZ ROS MO TA**	KDA I
Overall solution	0.889	0.843	0.858			

[1] Capital letters denote presence, small letters absence, * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.
[2] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.

As Table A.11 shows, the analysis of the non-selection as a World Cup venue yields a conservative solution formula that is fully identical to the one in the main analysis.

Table A.11: Alternative conservative solution formula 1, outcome non-selection as a World Cup venue

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases
vot*stab*lob	1.000	1.000	0.501	-	YAR MOS
Overall solution	1.000	1.000	0.501		

[1] Small letters indicate absence, * stands for logical AND.

The second alternative analysis was performed with ten cases, excluding the 'main pillars'–Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Krasnodar Krai (Sochi), and Tatarstan–as their selection as championship venues was never in doubt. While the alternative conservative solution (displayed in Table A.12) is more complex than the original solution formula, it still represents its subset.

Table A.12: Alternative conservative solution formula 2, outcome selection as a World Cup venue

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases
vot*cap*LOB +	0.876	0.756	0.500	0.359	**VGG SVE KAL**
STAB*CAP*LOB	0.876	0.673	0.498	0.357	**NIZ ROS**
Overall solution	0.924	0.837	0.857		

[1] Capital letters denote presence, small letters absence, * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.
[2] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.

The analysis of the non-outcome produces a conservative solution formula that includes two combinations of conditions–see Table A.13. Both of them are in line with the results of the original analysis.

Table A.13: Alternative conservative solution formula 2, outcome non-selection as a World Cup venue

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases	Deviant cases
vot*stab*lob +	1.000	1.000	0.463	0.310	**YAR MOS**	
VOT*stab*CAP*LOB	0.854	0.663	0.461	0.308	**KDA I**	MO
Overall solution	0.907	0.799	0.771			

[1] Capital letters denote presence, small letters absence, * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.
[2] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.

For the third alternative analysis, the consistency threshold was increased from 0.80 to 0.85, which implies the exclusion of the truth table rows six and twelve from the minimization procedure. As Table A.14 below displays, the alternative conservative solution formula again represents a subset of the solution produced by the original analysis.

Table A.14: Alternative conservative solution formula 3, outcome selection as a World Cup venue

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases
vot*stab*LOB +	0.924	0.891	0.429	0.288	**VGG SPE MOW SAM KAL**
STAB*CAP*LOB	0.929	0.876	0.462	0.321	**ROS NIZ TA**
Overall solution	0.955	0.930	0.750		

[1] Capital letters denote presence, small letters absence, * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.
[2] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.

The alternative analysis of the non-outcome has not been performed as there is no possibility to either increase or decrease the consistency threshold. Overall, while the alternative solution formulas display minor differences in comparison with the original solution formulas, none of them displays significantly different results. This means that the results of the original analysis are quite robust.

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