Rematch:
Islamic Politics, Mobilization, and the Indonesian Presidential Election

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Abstract

Indonesia's 2019 presidential election brings a rematch between incumbent Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, though against a backdrop of increasingly active conservative Islamic movements. Analyses of this contest—as well as of contemporary Indonesian politics more generally—are often based on assumptions around which constituencies matter and which political factions they support. This paper examines those assumptions using an original dataset of fine-grained returns and census data, including a latent variable to capture the independent effect of Islamic conservatism. We find that conservative Muslim areas overwhelmingly supported Prabowo in 2014, but turned out in relatively low numbers. By contrast, rural poor areas turned out heavily for Widodo. This suggests that the conservative vote was under-mobilized and has a greater electoral potential than previously demonstrated. Given the recent mobilization by conservative segments in society, observers should be prepared for significant shifts in the Indonesian electorate in 2019 and beyond.

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Indonesia is the largest Muslim majority country in the world, the biggest economy in Southeast Asia, and one of the most diverse archipelagos on the planet. It is also the most vibrant democracy in the region. In April 2019, its highest position, the Indonesian Presidency, will again be contested by Joko Widodo (better known as Jokowi) and Prabowo Subianto. Jokowi won a clear victory in 2014, but the tides of 2019 could prove more challenging. On the one hand, the President remains popular and maintains a comfortable lead in most recent polls. On the other, much of Jokowi's original policy agenda remains incomplete, while debt and inflation remain uncomfortably high.

Ultimately, the winner will have to garner the support of at least 20 percent of voters in over 50 percent of all provinces and will thus have to appeal to the broad spectrum of Indonesians, a majority of which live in poor and underdeveloped parts of the vast country. Moreover, conservative political Islam, which was relatively subdued in the previous two general and presidential elections, has gained new urgency in Indonesian politics (Arifianto 2018b; Mietzner 2018; Mietzner and Muhtadi 2018).[1] The ouster of Jakarta's popular Christian and ethnic Chinese mayor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama—better known as Ahok—in 2017 is the clearest example of this (Nastiti and Ratri 2018; Setijadi 2018). More broadly, religious appeals aimed at boosting turnout and swaying voters were employed throughout the country in early 2018 regional elections and are expected to play an important role in the presidential election in 2019.[2]

Given the stakes, we can expect that both candidates will make spirited appeals on both popular and religious grounds. Observers, however, still lack a clear sense of how Indonesia's core political constituencies interact in the context of national presidential contests. The prevailing narrative, which has changed little since 2014, holds that Prabowo, as a defender of the economic and political establishment, appeals to more conservative voters prominent among the middle class and in urban areas. Moreover, Prabowo was not shy about courting right-wing Islamist groups—such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI)—during the 2014 campaign, and appears to be doing so again (Arifianto 2018a). By contrast, Jokowi is believed to appeal to poorer and more rural voters, while offering a moderate vision of Islam that draws support from ethnic minorities.

At the same time, Prabowo's populist rhetoric and policy proposals are clearly intended to resonate with the less educated rural voters, while Jokowi's progressive stance is sometimes portrayed as the choice of urban educated elite (Tapsell 2015). Indeed, despite branding himself as an outsider, Jokowi may be seen as a member of Indonesia's new regional elite, whose rise is closely tied to Indonesia's 'big bang' decentralization

[1] See Menchik (2016) and Suryadinata ("Pancasila and the Challenge of Political Islam: Past and Present") for a comprehensive discussion of Islam and democracy in Indonesia.

[2] Jokowi was widely expected to name a younger member from his coalition as running mate. As such, the choice of the elderly Ma'ruf, who has little influence in the legislature, clearly indicated the perceived importance of the conservative Muslim vote. See also Pepinsky (2018).

(Lane 2015; Ostwald, Tajima, and Samphantharak 2016). On Islam, there is little ambiguity in Prabowo's bid to cast himself as the purer Muslim. Indeed, Prabowo played a role in Ahok's ouster by backing a chief rival. Jokowi has sought to counter this presumed vulnerability by naming Ma'ruf Amin, an elderly conservative cleric and former leader of the world's largest independent Islamic organization—Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)—as his running mate in 2019.

There is, in other words, considerable ambiguity in the conventional wisdom around which political and social identities matter most for electability, towards which of the two political factions they lean, and how they impact turnout. Clarifying these patterns is clearly important for the 2019 election, given the parallels to the previous election. More generally, the assumptions that underlie the conventional wisdom of electoral politics form the framework through which contemporary Indonesian politics are understood, broadening the implications well beyond 2019.

While the different strands of the conventional wisdom are all individually plausible, systematic evidence to support them has been largely limited to interviews and survey data. These methods have significant advantages, but they provide only indirect indications of actual voting behaviour and are vulnerable to bias, particularly since voting is costly and subject to social pressures. Empirically, the challenge of evaluating conventional wisdoms is further complicated by the fact that poverty, urban development, and religious orthodoxy are correlated.

This paper builds upon existing work by examining how the competing narratives of Indonesian voting patterns match actual election returns. It does this by using polling station-level data from the 2014 presidential election, matched against district and sub-district level socio-economic indicators from the census and PODES. This original dataset allows us to assess with greater precision than previous studies the nuanced characteristics of pro-Prabowo and pro-Jokowi districts, providing new empirical insights into the fundamental assumptions of Indonesian politics. To incorporate the role of conservative Islam, we create a latent variable for the degree of Islamic orthodoxy based on relevant attributes from census data, allowing us to disaggregate the effects of religious conservatism, poverty, and geographic context.

Our results can be summarized through three takeaways. First, voters in religiously conservative districts overwhelmingly supported the Prabowo-Hatta ticket in 2014, even after taking other socioeconomic variables and potential confounds into account. Second, poverty and rural residence are associated with support for Jokowi, even after controlling for religious conservatism. Third and most consequentially, voters in conservative Muslim districts turned out to vote at significantly lower rates in 2014 than their more moderate Muslim and ethnic minority counterparts, who heavily supported the Joko-Kalla ticket. This suggests that the conservative vote was under-mobilized and has a greater electoral potential than previously demonstrated.

Taken together, the evidence suggests that 2014 was a very good scenario for Jokowi, and that recent mobilization by conservative segments in Indonesian society have significant potential to turn out voters against him.

1 The 2014 Election

The close parallels between the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections indicate considerable durability of the underlying political cleavages. A dominant narrative among observers in 2014 held that Indonesia's democracy itself was at stake, in that a Prabowo presidency would have put Indonesia 'on a path of authoritarian revival' (Mietzner 2014, p. 111). The concern was driven by Prabowo's brand of right-wing populism, which combined with conservative Islamic appeals to produce an exclusionary vehicle that was seen as potentially hostile to ethnic minorities and progressive elements.[3] While Jokowi was also seen as populist—at least economically—his was a 'more polite' (Aspinall 2015) and inclusive variant (Hadiz 2018).

The view of the two candidates largely followed from their campaign strategies. Prabowo appealed strongly to nationalist and conservative religious sentiments, with speeches that occasionally questioned fundamental pillars of democracy, including the direct election of the presidency and lower level officials (Mietzner 2014). Jokowi focused more on economic matters and governance reform. These contrasting strategies, together with survey results and interviews, drove the conventional wisdom that Prabowo drew support from the religious conservatives and the middle class, in part out of fear of disorder (Pepinsky 2017). Despite Prabowo's heavy campaigning in rural regions and promises of large-scale development projects, many accounts see Jokowi as the preferred candidate among the rural poor, especially among ethnic minorities and religious moderates in those communities (Aspinall and Mietzner 2014; Pepinsky 2017).

After a difficult first two years, Jokowi's position strengthened in 2016 and 2017 following improving economic conditions and a series of savvy moves to consolidate power. With the Prabowo-aligned opposition failing to stall Jokowi's growing momentum through institutional channels, it increasingly shifted to extra-institutional means by ramping up ethno-populist Islamic appeals and taking to the streets (Mietzner 2018). The anti-Ahok protests and the Jakarta governor's subsequent electoral defeat bolstered confidence in the potential of this strategy, which appeared to both boost turnout and to sway some voters that approved of Ahok's performance to vote against him based on vaguely specified religious obligations (Nugroho 2018). The strategy featured prominently in the 2018 regional elections as well and again produced significant results (Arifianto 2018b).

[3]Not all observers, however, attribute Indonesia's democratic breakdown to radical elements. Menchik (2019) argues that moderate organizations and actors have likewise played a role in that process.

Substantial divergences between regional and presidential politics–specifically differences in how votes translate into seats and the greater importance of party dynamics in the latter–limit the inferences that can be drawn from regional elections. Nonetheless, mobilization on Islamist appeals is likely to feature strongly in the foreseeable future of Indonesian politics and will create vulnerabilities for candidates who are perceived as hostile to or weak on Islam. Anticipation of this explains Jokowi's choice of Ma'ruf Amin, a conservative cleric who was widely seen as one of the architects of the anti-Ahok movement, as his vice-presidential candidate and running mate.

Understanding electoral dynamics requires not only clarity on *patterns of support*, but also on the *strength of support*. Thus, even if the conventional narratives on who supported who in the 2014 election prove generally accurate, they are relatively ineffective predictors of future electoral behaviour without corresponding information on turnout across key subgroups. As such, patterns of turnout in 2014 may be as important as revealed preferences for making sense of electoral outcomes.

In the following two sections, we review existing attempts—based mainly on surveys, interviews, and exit-polling—to understand voter preferences in 2014. We then introduce our strategy of leveraging actual election returns to study voter preferences and turnout. A main advantage of our method is its ability to disaggregate overlapping identities and social cleavages. Its main limitation is the challenge of ecological inferencing (King 1997). Nonetheless, applying an election returns-based method to the 2014 election allows us to formulate relatively uncontroversial propositions about the future.

2 Evidence for the Conventional Wisdom

While the conventional narratives of where the respective political camps draw support from are plausible, their inconsistencies point to a lack of refinement and at least some inaccuracy. In terms of socio-economic status, the dominant narrative holds that Jokowi performed most strongly among less educated and poorer rural voters. This is supported by exit polls from election day (Aspinall and Mietzner 2014). Other evidence, however, challenges this narrative: key measures of support for Jokowi in 2017, for example, did not vary significantly by income or education levels (Fossati, Yew-Foong, and Siwage 2017).

Evidence for the narratives on the role of Islam is even more ambiguous. The least contentious component involves the sentiments of Indonesia's relatively small non-Muslim population, who appear to have heavily supported Jokowi (Mietzner 2014, p. 124). Less clear and of greater importance is how different variants of Islamic practice and belief—specifically the degree of conservatism—impacted vote choice. The prevailing assumption is that Jokowi performed poorly in more conservative areas, as Prabowo effectively positioned

himself as the candidate of choice for advancing Islamic and Islamist interests, despite arguably having weaker Islamic credentials himself.[4]

The evidence for this proposition, however, is not unassailable. Surveys typically do not disaggregate support for Jokowi (or other prominent political figures) by degree of religious conservatism, limiting the inferences that can be drawn from that source. Where attempts to capture the strength of an individual's association with Islam have been made, they have focused on a range of observables—including religious intolerance (Menchik and Trost 2018; Sumaktoyo 2018), support for Islam in politics (Fossati 2017), or piety (Blaydes and Linzer 2012; Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2018)–that are socially important, but do not readily allow for conclusions on voting behaviour. Moreover, some findings contest the notion that Jokowi has the same vulnerabilities vis-à-vis Islam that Ahok did: Polls in the aftermath of the Ahok blasphemy case, for example, suggest that a majority of voters do not think of Jokowi as hostile to Islam, making implications for electoral behaviour more a function of nuanced differences between political alternatives rather than a blunt reaction against an 'anti-Islamic' side.[5]

Our primary concern is establishing the relationship between the orthodoxy of the Islam practiced in a given area and the corresponding effect on voting behaviour, since this provides the most direct insights into how groups of voters responded to the politically-motivated Islamist appeals. We are guided by this in the types of appeals made by Prabowo, which were strongly linked to the purity of Islamic practice. His party manifesto, for example, claimed that the state is 'expected to guarantee the purity of religious teachings'—a statement that can easily be interpreted as enforcing Islamic orthodoxy. This relates to measures of piety that assess the degree to which respondents who identify with the santri group are more likely to support pure expressions of Islam as opposed to other groups, who are more open to including practices derived from Hindu or other animist traditions (Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2012; Satria 2017).

Against this backdrop, we examine whether respondents who live in areas where more conservative (meaning more orthodox) forms of Islam are practiced were indeed more likely to support Prabowo than Jokowi. Importantly, orthodoxy in Indonesia tends to overlap with other factors, including poverty and geographic context. Accordingly, we also examine the degree to which respondents in rural or poorer areas supported Jokowi over Prabowo independent of religious practices. Finally, if recent examples of Islamic mobilization are indicative of the 2019 presidential campaign and subsequent elections in Indonesia, then turnout will play an increasingly important role, as even relatively small shifts can substantially affect election outcomes. Consequently, we examine patterns of turnout across those dimensions.

[4]Prabowo is widely known to come from a family with religiously diverse—including non-Muslim—members.

[5]See the Jakarta Globe article of October 12, 2017 "Jokowi Defends Islam, Approval Rating Remains High: Poll" by Dames Alexander Sinaga and Yustinus Paat Jakarta Globe. http://jakartaglobe.id/news/jokowi-defends-islam-approval-rating-remains-high-poll/

Figure 1: Joko-Kalla Support (District Level)

3 Our Approach

Our goal in this paper is to bring new data to bear on ambiguities in the conventional wisdom. Specifically, we examine assumptions against data from actual election results, coupled with census data on population demographics, wealth distribution, and industry composition. We are not the first to approach election results in this way. Unfortunately, data constraints have limited previous work to highly aggregated analyses, mainly at the national or provincial levels. In a decentralized country of over 260 million spread across a mosaic of mountains, peninsulas, and islands, such a coarse view leaves too much rich variation hidden by pooling units that are not directly comparable. The smallest province (Maluku Utara), for instance, delivered about 380 thousand votes, while the largest (Jawa Barat) brought in more than 23 million. By drilling down to the individual polling stations, we offer a more nuanced portrait of the 2014 contest.

To do this, we leverage an internationally unprecedented crowdsourcing exercise undertaken to guard against electoral fraud during the vote counting process, in which electoral returns from each of the country's roughly 486,000 polling station precincts were scanned and posted online. These were then tabulated by hundreds of volunteers known as 'Guards of the Election.' We scraped and organized these thousands of scanned tabulations to generate a measure of the relative vote share for Jokowi and Prabowo at the precinct level. Figure 1 provides a graphical map of district-level election results, depicted as difference in vote shares, with darker colours representing larger winning margins for the Joko-Kalla ticket.

In total, our elections dataset spans over 470,000 polling stations, which aggregate into over 75,000 villages, 6,500 districts, 497 regencies, and 33 provinces across Indonesia. To assess the impact of socio-economic factors on the outcome, we combine this rich election data with census data compiled by the Indonesian Statistics Bureau, using a national, scientific sample of Indonesian households in 2010. Table 1

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Ballots Cast					
Province	33	11,700,000	9,408,712	381,646	23,700,000
Regency	497	581,110	475,614	8920	2,489,022
District	6,995	37,235	33,810	197	263,734
Village	81,309	4,738	6,497	11	78,814
Polling Station	472,452	277	97	1	803
Jokowi Win Share					
Province	33	53.2%	11.2%	23.1%	73.4%
Regency	497	53.5%	14.9%	14.4%	100.0%
District	6995	53.6%	16.7%	0.0%	100.0%
Village	81309	53.7%	18.9%	0.0%	100.0%
Polling Station	472452	53.7%	21.4%	0.0%	100.0%
Covariates (Village Level)					
Turnout	460829	8.9%	11.3%	0.0%	100.0%
Poverty Level	462326	0.14	0.12	0.0%	100.0%
Covariates (District Level)					
Turnout	6102	71.17%	10.47%	0.0%	100.00%
Poverty					
Poverty Level	6834	0.17	0.14	0.00	98.48%
Religion					
Muslim	6550	76.5%	36.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Christian	6550	15.5%	29.5%	0.0%	100.0%
Catholic	6550	5.6%	17.6%	0.0%	100.0%
Buddhist	6550	0.4%	2.1%	0.0%	49.1%
Hindu	6550	1.2%	8.7%	0.0%	99.8%

Note: All district averages are unweighted shares. For instance, including district weights brings up the average Muslim share of religion to 87.4%.

offers a summary of our primary statistics aggregated nationally and sub-nationally. While election outcomes are available down to the polling station level, most other variables are more precisely measured at the district level. For example, official data on registered voters is available from the KPU, but only at the district level.[6]

Relying on election results, as opposed to surveys, does introduce well-known ecological inference problems (King 1997). Specifically, this empirical strategy confines the analysis to the smallest administrative units at which we have differentiated data on an attribute of interest, since it does not contain information on how individual Indonesians voted. For example, we can determine whether wealthier subdistricts delivered more votes for Prabowo than Joko, but asserting that this means economic elite preferred Prabowo to Jokowi requires some assumptions about the aggregation of preferences.

First and foremost, a constituency level analysis assumes that population demographics translate into voter demographics. This assumption is tenuous if some groups turn out to vote in higher numbers than

[6]We can compensate for this shortcoming by taking advantage of general population statistics, which are available down to the village level. Unfortunately, calculating turnout based on general population statistics rather than registered voters results in markedly lower turnout figures.

others. As such, we approach the problem with a considerably weaker assumption that each constituency-level variable is itself a realization of voter preference along with some random error. This does not mean that each constituency-level observation is a one-to-one reflection of voter preference, but it does assume that the error in the relationship is not systematic.

By treating constituencies as random samples, we are also assuming that each constituency is operating under similar electoral parameters. This assumption may be violated in the instance of significant strategic voting. For Indonesia's presidential election—where there are only two tickets on the ballot and election outcomes are based on a national constituency rather than district outcomes—there are few reasons to expect this may occur.[7] Nonetheless, we remain conservative in our interpretation of how group-level variables may or may not map on to individual-level preferences. This is true for each of our tests, and the results we report should be interpreted in this light.

3.1 Cleavages

As discussed, our primary concern is how attributes like socio-economic status, geographic context, and religious conservatism map onto candidate support in the 2014 presidential election. While data are available on many of these attributes, this is not true for religious conservatism, requiring us to construct a measure. To accomplish this, we rely on a common statistical technique for measuring unobservable quantities, in which we look for latent cleavages by examining the covariance matrices of several theoretically relevant observables. In Table 2, we list the specific observables the we include in our factor analysis along with how they load together along the latent cleavages.

Table 2: Latent Socio-Economic Cleavages

Indicator	**Latent Factors**			**Uniqueness**
	F1: Rural	**F2: Poor**	**F3: Conservative**	
Muslim Share of Population	-0.165	-0.175	0.504	0.688
Female Divorce Disparity	-0.056	-0.096	0.314	0.889
Female Literacy Disparity	-0.029	-0.067	0.381	0.850
Female Senior High Disparity	0.197	0.653	-0.124	0.519
Fertility Rate 10-19 years old	0.163	0.513	0.032	0.709
Poverty Level	0.211	0.390	-0.271	0.730
Rural Share of Population	0.788	0.119	-0.075	0.359
Indoor Plumbing	-0.481	-0.078	-0.085	0.755
No Internet Access	0.776	0.121	-0.050	0.382

For descriptive purposes, we affix labels to each of the latent factors produced by this exercise based

[7] The only election rule of relevance is that the winner must earn support of at least 20 percent of voters in over 50 percent of all provinces. Given that both campaigns had broad support across the archipelago, both were well above this threshold.

Figure 2: Turning out for Jokowi



Notes: Maroon triangles in Panel A and Panel B are Muslim-majority districts where Muslims make up more than 50 percent of the population. Small blue dots represent minority districts where Muslims make up less than 50 percent of the population.

on the main observables they reflect. For example, we label Factor 1 'Rural' since it most closely reflects covariance between rural population, lack of indoor plumbing, and no internet access, all common features of rural communities in Indonesia. Factor 2, labelled 'Poor', is mainly made up districts that are poor, have high levels of teen pregnancy, and exhibit high education disparities for girls attending senior high. Most importantly, the 'Conservative' Factor 3 is primarily composed of districts that are heavily Muslim, exhibit education disparities for female literacy, and high female divorce rates.

To get a sense of how our latent variable approximation of conservatism performs, we compared our estimates with external measures of conservatism available only at the provincial level. Specifically, our latent variable approximation of Conservatism provides a good approximation of recorded Hajj travellers and Islamic Legislative representation. Our conservatism factor is also a strong negative predictor of electoral support for Jokowi as well as turnout at the district level in 2014.[8]

To illustrate the relationship between conservative districts and turnout, we plot the raw distribution of turnout alongside the conservative factor as well as votes for Jokowi in Figure 2. What is immediately visible is that less conservative districts had higher turnout than conservative districts. Likewise, high-turnout districts overwhelmingly tilted in Jokowi's favour, many of which are in fact minority districts.

While the graphical interpretation from Figure 2 seems to support the general intuitions about turnout,

[8]Disparity here refers to the standardized difference between females and males in a particular attribute of interest. With respect to illiteracy, for example, if 10 males and 20 females out of a hundred are illiterate, then female illiteracy differential would be $(20 - 10)/100 = .10$.

it also raises some interesting questions. Why, for instance, do so many districts report 100 per cent turnout? According to Indonesia's election authorities and the constitution, villagers in isolated locations of Papua can have local leaders deliver votes on behalf of their constituents in a practice known colloquially as noken (Nolan 2016). While not officially endorsed, similar practices may occur in other rural settings. These particular cases aside, there is a clear general pattern of moderates and minorities turning out in greater numbers than their counterparts in more orthodox areas.

In Table 3, we take a closer look at the patterns suggested in Figure 2. Each of the models is estimated using ordinary least squares regression, where either vote share for the Joko-Kalla or turnout are regressed on the explanatory variables of interest. As baselines, Models 1 and 4 report the relationship between latent cleavages and the respective dependent variables. Models 2 and 5 include measures of employment to control for economic variation, as well as logged population at the district level and a measure of Muslim population share deciles to ensure that the conservative factor is not simply picking up Muslim-majority districts. Models 3 and 6 add in province-level fixed effects.

Table 3: Support and Turnout for the Joko-Kalla Ticket

	Joko-Kalla Vote Share			District Turnout		
	(1) Cleavages	(2) Controls	(3) Province FE	(4) Cleavages	(5) Controls	(6) Province FE
Conservative	-0.312***	-0.069**	-0.054**	-0.091***	-0.103***	-0.003
	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Poor	0.321***	0.219***	0.038	0.366***	0.353***	0.069**
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Rural	0.105***	0.065***	0.038**	0.017**	0.039***	0.028**
	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Muslim share (decile)		-0.018***	-0.011***		0.001	-0.000
		(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)
Population (log)			-0.020***			-0.014***
			(0.002)			(0.001)
Economic Controls		Y	Y		Y	Y
Provincial FE			Y			Y
Constant	0.606***	0.629***	0.790***	0.675***	0.653***	0.780***
	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.022)
Observations	6350	6349	6338	5612	5612	5601
R^2	0.122	0.190	0.455	0.118	0.179	0.378

Note: All models estimated with OLS. Conservative, Poor, and Rural are standardized latent variables. Economic controls are based on employment shares across different industries, including: Construction, Education, Finance, Healthcare, Hotelling, Information, Public, Property, Transportation, Retail Services, Ranching, Utilities, Fishing, Horticulture, Manufacturing, Mining, and Rice Cultivation. Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

Across all models we observe that rural districts overwhelmingly turned out for Joko-Kalla. Depending on model specification, a one standard deviation increase in the ruralness factor translates into a 4 to 10 per cent increase in the Joko-Kalla vote share, or a 1 to 3 per cent increase in turnout. We see a similar pattern in terms of poverty, where poorer districts favoured Jokowi over Prabowo, and turned out in higher numbers. It is notable, however, that poverty is no longer a significant predictor once provincial effects are included. The most likely explanation for this is that the models include both poverty and ruralness, so if a province has many districts that are both poor and rural, the larger effect of ruralness leaves less within-province variation for poverty to explain.[9] Overall, what we can conclude is that despite Prabowo's pandering to the poor and rural localities in 2014, voters in these regions enthusiastically backed Jokowi. Including economic controls and province fixed effects improve model fit but also soak up most of the covariance between poor districts and support for the Joko-Kalla, ticket as well as between conservatism and turnout. Crucially, we note that including the Muslim population decile does not soak up any of the predictive power from the conservatism measure, demonstrating that differences in turnout and support for Jokowi are driven by variation in orthodoxy of practice rather than confessional association alone.

4 Discussion

Our results can be summarized with three takeaways. First, voters in more conservative Muslim districts overwhelmingly supported Prabowo-Hatta in 2014, even after taking other socioeconomic variables and potential confounds into account. Voters in more moderate districts, by contrast, voted heavily in favour of the Joko-Kalla ticket. Second, Jokowi fared significantly better than Prabowo in poorer, rural regions, even after taking religious conservatism into account. Third and more importantly, voters in conservative districts turned out to vote at relatively low rates in 2014 compared to more moderate and minority districts, which heavily supported the Joko-Kalla ticket.

In short, the Islamic vote appears to have been under-mobilized in 2014, perhaps reflecting a decline in Islamic party popularity that began as early as 2009. Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani (2012) argue that greater party system institutionalization in Indonesia has served to undermine the brand premium of Islamic parties relative to coherent, secular alternatives. Yet even if that trend is real and ongoing, its relevance to presidential elections may be limited, as personalities carry more heft than party labels in the presidential election. Moreover, our argument focuses more on mobilization and turnout than it does voter preferences. While Prabowo did focus on the conservative Islamic vote in 2014—with success, as evidenced by his strong

[9] Additionally, our latent variable does a poor job of capturing poor urbanites (who also tend to be more conservative Muslim) since the districts they reside in tend to be of middling poverty as a result of high inequality.

vote share in relevant constituencies—his closer collaboration with the protagonists of the Jakarta anti-Ahok protests in 2018 indicate that he may be better positioned to energize and mobilize that vote in 2019.

How large that apparently under-mobilized constituency actually is, whether Prabowo can effectively activate in 2019, and whether it does ultimately advantage him, all remain to be seen. Yet, if the rapid mobilization by conservative segments of Indonesian society during 2017 and 2018 is any indication, the potential for substantial change in the political landscape must be taken seriously. Proactive measures by Jokowi, such as naming the elderly, conservative cleric Ma'ruf Amin as running mate, suggest his campaign is concerned about precisely such a development. That and other related moves, however, may simultaneously turn off or demobilize moderates and minorities, who were critical to Jokowi's victory in 2014; at minimum, the choice of Ma'ruf is unlikely to energize millennials (aged 17-35) who make up nearly half the Indonesian electorate and are cited as having been critical for Jokowi's success in 2014. Even if these groups stick with Jokowi, our findings demonstrate that their impact was already maxed out in 2014. Put bluntly, the political landscape for Jokowi and moderates like him will likely be less favourable in the current climate than it was in 2014.

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