To examine whether the substantive conclusions of "Testing Theories of Lawmaking" (May 2007, *Journal of Politics*) are a consequence of sample selection issues, I perform several robustness checks. Specifically, I replicate the analysis using: an alternative measure of final passage, the sample of votes decided under standing House rules (as opposed to suspended procedures), and the sample of votes dealing with domestic, non-appropriation legislation. None of the substantive conclusions change.

Although it is tempting to compare the sizes of the gridlock intervals across the various analyses, recall that the estimates are not comparable because the scales are not comparable.

Checking Robustness: Multiple Dimensions

A potential objection to the text's results is the possibility that the detected differences are due to the insufficiency of the empirical model. In other words, the party gatekeeping and majoritarian theory may be true, but the assumption that the analyzed roll calls are determined by the same underlying preference dimension may be false. Because the statistical voting model allows for errors, nonzero gridlock intervals may be a consequence of projecting a higher dimensional space onto a lower dimension representation with error. That is, if actual voting behavior is structured by multiple dimensions, incorrectly estimating a single dimension may create the observed differences. If so, the problem lies not with the theories, but rather with the statistical voting model.

Although it has previously been argued that contemporary congressional voting is largely structured by a single dimension (see, for example, Poole and Rosenthal 1987) and existing tests of the party gatekeeping and majoritarian theories use ideal points that assume a unidimensional space, the determination of "how many dimensions" is arguably a substantive rather than statistical question (see Jackman (2001) and Poole (2005)). To examine whether the results are due to misestimating the dimensionality of the policy space, I replicate the analysis using only successful final passage votes on non-appropriations bills dealing with domestic issues.[1] Restricting the analysis to this sample of votes relaxes the assumption

[1] I use the determinations of Rohde (2004) – specifically, whether the *issue* addresses: *Economy, Taxes and*

Congress	**Roll Calls Analyzed**	**Avg. Coalition Size**	**Distance [95% HPD]**	**Pct. Invalid Cutpoints**
90 (1967-1969)	137	296	.74 [.65,.84]	22.0%
91 (1969-71)	132	301	.68 [.60,.77]	22.8%
92 (1971-3)	149	301	.61 [.52,.70]	12.8%
93 (1973-5)	250	322	.63 [.55,.71]	9.6%
94 (1975-7)	311	315	.48 [.42,.54]	5.0%
95 (1977-9)	310	327	.39 [.34,.45]	17.3%
96 (1979-81)	187	319	.46 [.39,.52]	19.0%
97 (1981-3)	107	321	.64 [.55,.72]	22.5%
98 (1983-5)	135	331	.41 [.35,.48]	18.2%
99 (1985-7)	77	323	.53 [.45,.62]	21.6%
100 (1987-9)	137	340	.55 [.47,.63]	22.7%
101 (1987-9)	103	331	.53 [.46,.61]	26.3%
102 (1987-9)	110	316	.41 [.34,.47]	23.2%
103 (1987-9)	127	323	.49 [.43,.55]	22.5%
104 (1987-9)	104	328	.46 [.40,.51]	17.9%
105 (1987-9)	117	325	.58 [.52,.65]	15.5%
106 (1987-9)	145	342	.61 [.54,.68]	15.2%

Table 1: Successful Final Passage Votes on Non-Appropriation, Domestic Legislation

imposed in the text and assumes instead that member policy preferences on domestic, non-appropriation legislation (as opposed to all legislation) are structured by a single dimension.

As Table 1 makes clear, analyzing successful final passage votes this more restrictive sample of votes does not change the substantive conclusion. Using fewer votes, but votes for which we may have stronger reasons to believe a common underlying preference dimension might exist, reveals no difference. Consequently, the results are not likely to be an artifice of differing member policy preferences on domestic and foreign issues being projected onto a common dimension. (Further subsets of the policy space could be investigated using more nuanced substantive classifications of the roll calls, but the more restrictive the definition of the issue becomes, the fewer votes there are to be analyzed. With fewer votes, the resulting estimates become increasingly imprecise and it becomes more difficult to reject the theoretical predictions. A trade-off between substantive specificity and the ability to recover estimates of sufficiently useful precision exists.)

Budget Issues (500's), *Energy and Environment* (600's), *Government Operations, Civil Rights, and Justice* (700's), *Welfare and Human Services* (800's), or *Miscellaneous Domestic* (900's).

An additional concern is the possibility that the policy dimensions may not be separable – as might be the case if committee deference and logrolls occur. However, precisely because logrolls are possible on these issues, the votes are presumably of sufficiently low salience so as to be outside the scope of either theory. In other words, removing the less important votes arguably insulates the test from the criticism that the estimates are confounded by logrolling and other threats to the behavioral assumption that members vote sincerely based on policy preferences.

Checking Robustness: Measuring Final Passage

To ensure that the results are also not due to incorrectly identifying final passage votes, I replicate the analysis for selected Houses using the final passage measures of Krehbiel, Meirowitz and Woon (2005). The measures differ, in part, because Krehbiel, Meirowitz and Woon (2005) count votes on House Resolutions (typically special rules) as final passage votes. Although I remain agnostic as to whether such votes are theoretically relevant, these differences represent a useful robustness check from a theory-testing perspective.

The Houses selected for examination include those with the largest (90th) and one of the smallest (103rd) differences based on the results reported in Table 2 in the text as well as the House with the fewest votes (99th). Table 2 presents the results.

House	**KMW Roll Calls Analyzed**	**Avg. Coalition Size**	**Distance [95% HPD]**	**Pct. Invalid Cutpoints**
90 (1967-9)	136	306	.76 [.67,.84]	37.6%
99 (1985-7)	160	303	.54 [.48,.60]	38.6%
103 (1987-9)	99	306	.39 [.34,.45]	9.1%

Table 2: Replication Using Alterative Final Passage Measure

Using a different interpretation of how observed roll calls relate to the production of policy outcomes fails to change the conclusions of Table 2 in the text; the party gatekeeping gridlock interval is nonzero in every instance.

Checking Robustness: Bill Types & House Procedures

We might also wonder if the inclusion of votes considered under suspension of the rules affects the outcome. Although it is likely that including these votes biases the results in favor of the the theories because of the requirement that 2/3 of the members present and voting support the proposal, it is also possible that the politics of issues considered under suspension of the rules differs in consequential ways from proposals considered under normal rules (perhaps because such proposals are of lower salience?).

For descriptive purposes, Table 3 reports the distribution of analyzed non-unanimous votes according to Rohde's (2004) description.

Congress	**Bill**	**Conf. Rept.**	**Res.**	**Bill** [SR]	**Res.** [SR]
90 (1967-1969)	157	37	14		
91 (1969-1971)	127	47	17	20	
92 (1971-1973)	136	54	17	46	1
93 (1973-1975)	209	89	22	63	4
94 (1975-1977)	224	88	60	83	3
95 (1977-1979)	175	84	31	146	11
96 (1979-1981)	138	59	54	63	3
97 (1981-1983)	99	27	7	41	2
98 (1983-1985)	98	33	17	70	
99 (1985-1987)	85	28	9	19	1
100 (1987-1989)	100	35	10	60	5
101 (1989-1991)	98	37	5	36	2
102 (1991-1993)	97	45	19	33	4
103 (1993-1995)	99	37	8	53	3
104 (1995-1997)	108	47	13	36	1
105 (1997-1999)	95	34	27	49	5
106 (1999-2001)	116	42	5	70	8

Table 3: Type of House Final Passage Votes

To ensure that the substantive results are not affected by including votes considered under suspended rules, Table 4 reports the results for the Houses examined in Table 2 as well as the House with the greatest number of votes considered under suspended rules (the 95th House). The 90th House results reported in Table 2 in the text already excludes such votes because the sample does not include any votes considered under suspended procedures.

Excluding successful, non-unanimous votes considered under suspension of the rules re-

House	**Roll Calls Analyzed**	**Avg. Coalition Size**	**Distance [95% HPD]**	**Pct. Invalid Cutpoints**
95 (1977-9)	290	307	.74 [.69,.80]	5.0%
99 (1985-7)	122	311	.88 [.81,.95]	25.1%
103 (1987-9)	144	302	1.10 [1.04,1.16]	19.2%

Table 4: Replication Using Non-Suspended Final Passage Votes

duces the number of analyzed roll calls by 157, 20, and 56 votes for the 95th, 99th and 103rd Houses respectively, but the substantive conclusions are unaffected. The party gatekeeping gridlock interval is nonzero in every instance.

As an additional check, and following the suggestions of an anonymous referee, I also compute the percentage of times that the chamber and party median vote together for each type of bill. This serves to check whether some types of votes might be more theoretically relevant than others (as would be the case if dramatic differences in the percentage emerged). The analysis is imperfect because the analysis assumes that the identity of the chamber and party median is known with certainty based on the estimates using all successful, non-unanimous final passage votes. Table 5 reports the percentage of times that both members vote in agreement for each vote type.

Congress	**Bill**	**Conf. Rept.**	**Res.**	**Bill** [SR]	**Res.** [SR]
90 (1967-9)	86%	80%	60%	NA	NA
95 (1977-9)	89%	93%	90%	98%	80%
99 (1985-7)	76%	67%	89%	94%	100%
103 (1993-1995)	89%	94%	75%	98%	100%

Table 5: Percent Agreement between Party and Chamber Medians on Final Passage Votes

Consistent with the reported results, the agreement is decent, but never perfect (except when there are very few votes). Although there is more agreement on votes considered under suspension of the rules procedures (as is expected given the 2/3rds passage requirement), the evident variation across vote types does not suggest that the theories are more relevant for some types of votes than others.

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