Everybody Hurts Sometimes: How Economic Context and Insecurities Shape Policy Preferences

Supplemental Material

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In this supplemental document, we include further details about our models and measures, as well as details about rival explanations for our findings. Specifically, we organize this document by showing: results using alternative measures of key variables, results from an ordered logit model, results using additional model specifications, results exploring rival explanations (compression and elasticity), and in all of these cases, we present tables and figures showing the robustness of our substantive findings to these details.

1 Alternative Measures of Key Variables

In our paper, we use a three year moving average when creating our economic insecurity measures. Because it captures the variation in the economy leading up to survey questions about preferences, we argue that this better reflects how individuals perceive their own and the national economy. In Table 1, we offer results from models where we use additional measures of economic insecurity, showing the robustness of our results: the change in collective insecurity from the previous year, the change in the three year moving average, and the inter-quartile range of occupational unemployment. In addition, in Table 2 we present models with additional measurements of personal and collective insecurity: lagged variables, five year moving averages, lag and change variables, lag and change of the three year moving average variables.

[Tables 1 and 2 about here]

In Table 3, we show the results when we change the cut-point of the dependent variable. The dependent variable here combines: (1) "Spend much more," (2) "Spend more," (3) "Spend the same," while lumping together (4) "Spend less," and (5) "Spend much less."

[Table 3 about here]

2 Results from an Ordered Logit Model

For ease of presentation in the paper, we presented the results from logit models, where the dependent variable was dichotomous. The original ISSP survey question offered five answers. In Table 4, we present the results from an ordered logit model where we use the full variation in the dependent variable.

[Table 4 about here]

3 Alternative Model Specifications

To show the robustness of our findings to alternative model specifications, in Table 5, we show additional results. Both the models with random effects and country fixed effects shows similar results to those in the original model in the paper. In addition, in Table 6, we present results using these same alternative specifications but with the ordered logit model from Table 4.

[Tables 5 and 6 about here]

When studying phenomenon across countries, questions of how country level differences may affect individual level preferences can arise. Although in Table 5, we show the results of a model with country fixed effects, in Table 7, we include specific country-level considerations in our model that capture a country's wealth and culture. We control for wealth with a measure of a country's GPD per capita, and we include indicators of culture by including dummy variables for language family: English, German, Romantic, Slavic, and Ural with Japanese as the omitted category. Table 8 shows results for the ordered logit model that includes these additional measures.

[Tables 7 and 8 about here]

4 Additional Figures

Interactive relationships between two variables are symmetrical, so the effect of one variable is contingent on that of the other (Berry, Golder and Milton 2012). Although we are only interested in (and theorize about) one half of our interactive relationships, we show here the three figures (Figures 1, 2 and 3) that illustrate the marginal effects of collective insecurity across individual insecurity, as well as institutional insecurity across collective and individual insecurity.

[Figures 1, 2, and 3 about here]

To parallel the results form the logit models presented above, in Figures 4 through 9, we present the graphical illustrations of the results from these models.

[Figures 4 through 9 about here]

5 Compression of Preferences

In the paper, we note that the patterns we observe in Figure 1 of the main text could be interpreted to suggest that the effects of individual insecurity and other variables are such that respondents with high levels of individual insecurity are already so highly likely to support increases in spending on unemployment assistance that there is a ceiling effect in terms of how much more likely they can be to support such policies. With a binomial logit model such as ours, this type of a diminishing marginal return can be particularly acute due to compression on the extreme ends of the logit s-curve. To explore whether our results might be due to compression, we calculated the $x_i\hat{\beta}$ values from our models for respondents who were at or above the median value for individual risk and for those respondents who were below the median value for individual risk. The results from these calculations are displayed in Supplemental Figure 10 together with the logistic s-curve. As we can see, for each group

of individuals, the center of the distribution of the $x_i\hat{\beta}$ values is well to the left side of the logit s-curve. This indicates that we are far from the location where we would begin to see ceiling-effects from compression for the positive impact of an increase in unemployment on support for spending. We thus confidently rule out this rival explanation for the pattern observed in Figure 1 of the main text.

[Figure 10 about here]

6 Elasticity of Occupational and National Unemployment

Also mentioned in the paper is another plausible rival explanation for the patterns in Figure 1 of the main text: differing levels of unemployment risk elasticity across the professions in which individuals are employed. Because some occupations may be more or less affected by collective/national economic insecurity, we explore the possibility that the influence of national unemployment on individual preferences is conditional on the sensitivity of one's occupation to the national rate of unemployment. To test this, we estimated unemployment risk elasticities (the responsiveness of occupational unemployment to national unemployment) and then included this measure in our models. Although this measure has a significant effect in the expected direction (individuals with higher unemployment risk elasticity are more responsive to changes in national unemployment in terms of their support for increased spending on unemployment assistance), the inclusion of such variables did not change the results presented in this paper. Below, we discuss and show in detail below the model represented by equation (1) and results to test this rival explanation:

Col_k = collective insecurity in country-year k

Ind_i = individual insecurity

Sec_k = institutional insecurity in country-year k, and

$E_k = \frac{\delta Ind}{\delta Col}$, historical elasticity of occupational and collective insecurity in country k. Measured by regressing observed collective insecurity on occupational insecurity for the post-war period, estimated separately for each country 10-category occupational code. Correlations between these variables are reported in Table 9 below.

$$\begin{aligned} Pr(y_{ik} = 1) = \alpha &+ \beta_1 Col_k + \beta_2 Ind_i + \beta_3 Sec_k \\ &+ \beta_4 Col_k \cdot Ind_i + \beta_5 Ind_i \cdot Sec_k + \beta_6 Sec_k \cdot Col_k \\ &+ \beta_7 E_k \cdot Col_k + \beta_8 E_k \cdot Ind_i + \beta_9 E_k + ... + \epsilon \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

Results from this model are reported in Table 10.

[Tables 9 and 10 about here.]

Collective insecurity should increase support for spending directly (in equation 2, we expect $\delta/\delta Col > 0$), and this effect will (a) be less where individual insecurity is greater (we expect $\beta_4 Ind_i < 0$, which is supported in Figure 11 below), (b) be less where institutional insecurity is greater ($\beta_6 Sec_k < 0$, which is our H3, and is supported in Figure 12), and (c) will also be *greater* when the sensititivy of one's own occupation to national unemployment rates is greater ($\beta_8 E_k > 0$, supported in Figure 13).

$$\frac{\delta}{\delta Col} = \beta_1 + \beta_4 Ind_i + \beta_6 Sec_k + \beta_7 E_k \tag{2}$$

[Figures 11-18 about here]

Equation 3 reflects our expectation that individual insecurity should increase support for spending directly ($\delta/\delta Ind > 0$), and this effect will: (a) be less where collective insecurity is greater ($\beta_4 Col_k < 0$, which is our H1 and is supported in Figure 14) and (b) be greater

where institutional insecurity is greater ($\beta_5 Sec_k > 0$, our H2, supported in Figure 15). Further, when one's own occupation is more sensitive to collective insecurity, individual insecurity should be less influential in shaping preferences, so $\beta_8 E_k < 0$, supported in Figure 16.

$$\frac{\delta}{\delta Ind} = \beta_2 + \beta_4 Col_k + \beta_5 Sec_k + \beta_8 E_k \tag{3}$$

In equation 4, institutional security should decrease support for spending directly ($\delta/\delta Sec < 0$), and this effect will: (a) be larger where individual insecurity is greater ($\beta_5 Ind_i > 0$, supported in Figure 17) and (b) be larger where collective security is greater ($\beta_6 Col_k > 0$, shown but not supported in Figure 18).

$$\frac{\delta}{\delta Sec} = \beta_3 + \beta_5 Ind_i + \beta_6 Col_k \tag{4}$$

Finally, we have no extant hypothesis about the effect of individual-collective insecurity elasticity on preferences through any mechanism other than β_7 and β_8, so although E_k is included as an independent variable in our model, we have no expectations about the magnitude or sign of β_9.

References

Berry, William D, Matt Golder and Daniel Milton. 2012. "Improving tests of theories positing interaction." *The Journal of Politics* 74(3):653–671.

Table 1: Additional Specifications of Models of Individual Support for Increased Spending on Unemployment Benefits

	Δ	Δ & 3yr ma	Occ. IQR	Wealth
Individual Insecurity, 3yr ma	0.081***	0.002	0.196***	−0.014
	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.016)
Institutional Insecurity	−2.562***	−2.981***	−4.560***	−7.004***
	(0.309)	(0.300)	(0.333)	(0.592)
Institutional Insec. × Individual Insec., 3yr ma	0.072	0.298***	−0.096*	0.352***
	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Δ Collective Insecurity	−0.221			
	(0.123)			
Δ Collective Insec. × Individual Insec., 3yr ma	0.031***			
	(0.008)			
Δ Collective Insec. × Institutional Insec.	−0.957**			
	(0.294)			
Δ Collective Insec., 3 yr ma		−1.094***		
		(0.135)		
Δ Collective Insec., 3 yr ma × Indiv. Insec., 3yr ma		0.027***		
		(0.007)		
Δ Collective Insec., 3 yr ma × Instit. Insec.		1.654***		
		(0.349)		
Inter-quartile Range			−0.050	
			(0.036)	
Inter-quartile Range × Indiv. Insec., 3yr ma			−0.015***	
			(0.002)	
Inter-quartile Range× Inst. Insec.			0.811***	
			(0.091)	
GDP per capita, constant USD2010				−0.030***
				(0.004)
GDP per capita× Individual Insec., 3yr ma				−0.001
				(0.000)
GDP per capita× Institutional Insec.				0.081***
				(0.010)
Household Income, decile	−0.086***	−0.086***	−0.092***	−0.093***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Education, years	−0.030***	−0.032***	−0.011	−0.026***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Age, years	−0.001	−0.000	0.002	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.112*	0.131**	0.129**	0.147***
	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Spouse is Unemployed	0.415**	0.475***	0.456***	0.452***
	(0.131)	(0.125)	(0.106)	(0.106)
Union Member	−0.088	−0.140**	−0.121**	−0.121**
	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.045)	(0.046)
Self Employed	−0.266***	−0.276***	−0.276***	−0.301***
	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.072)
Public Employee	−0.107	−0.075	−0.106	−0.099

Continued on next page

Table 1 – *Continued from previous page*

	Δ	Δ & 3yr ma	Occ. IQR	Wealth
	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.064)
2006 Survey	0.130∗	0.287∗∗∗	0.375∗∗∗	0.255∗∗∗
	(0.060)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.051)
Constant	0.076	0.137	−0.408	1.736∗∗∗
	(0.221)	(0.205)	(0.217)	(0.235)
N	11,507	12,073	13,954	13,954

Note: Dependent variable is individual support for increased spending on unemployment insurance benefits. Logistic estimation with robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ for a two-tailed hypothesis test.

Table 2: Lagged and Differenced Insecurity Models

	Main Model	Lagged	5 yr MA	Lag & Δ	Lag & Δ, 3yr ma
Institutional Insecurity	-1.47^{***}	-1.56^{***}	-1.54^{***}	-1.50^{***}	-1.80^{***}
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Individual Insecurity, 3yr ma	0.04^{***}				0.05^{***}
	(0.01)				(0.01)
Collective Insecurity, 3yr ma	0.11^{***}				0.09^{***}
	(0.01)				(0.01)
Individual Insecurity$t-1$		0.05^{***}		0.05^{***}	
		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Collective Insecurity$t-1$		0.19^{***}		0.16^{***}	
		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Individual Insecurity, 5yr ma			0.05^{***}		
			(0.01)		
Collective Insecurity, 5yr ma			0.10^{***}		
			(0.01)		
Δ Collective Insecurity				-0.16^{***}	
				(0.04)	
Δ Collective Insecurity, 3 yr ma					-0.29^{***}
					(0.03)
Household Income, decile	-0.10^{***}	-0.10^{***}	-0.10^{***}	-0.10^{***}	-0.10^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education, years	-0.04^{***}	-0.04^{***}	-0.04^{***}	-0.04^{***}	-0.04^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age, years	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.14^{***}	0.10^{*}	0.16^{***}	0.10^{*}	0.13^{**}
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Spouse is Unemployed	0.42^{***}	0.36^{**}	0.42^{***}	0.35^{**}	0.38^{**}
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Union Member	-0.15^{***}	-0.13^{*}	-0.18^{***}	-0.12^{*}	-0.17^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Self Employed	-0.32^{***}	-0.34^{***}	-0.31^{***}	-0.34^{***}	-0.29^{***}
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Public Employee	-0.08	-0.12	-0.12	-0.13	-0.10
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
2006 Survey	0.37^{***}	0.63^{***}	0.35^{***}	0.55^{***}	0.35^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Constant	-0.58^{***}	-1.24^{***}	-0.58^{***}	-1.12^{***}	-0.52^{**}
	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.19)
N			13,954		

Note: Dependent variable is individual support for increased spending on unemployment insurance benefits. Logistic estimation with robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ for a two-tailed hypothesis test.

Table 3: Models with Support Measured using Alternative Cutpoint

	Additive	Interactive
Individual Insecurity, 3yr ma	0.052***	0.035
	(0.009)	(0.024)
Collective Insecurity, 3yr ma	0.106***	0.218***
	(0.009)	(0.026)
Institutional Insecurity	−1.117***	−0.497
	(0.117)	(0.360)
Individual Insecurity, 3yr ma × Collective Insecurity, 3yr ma		−0.005***
		(0.001)
Collective Insecurity, 3yr ma × Institutional Insecurity		−0.236***
		(0.064)
Individual Insecurity, 3yr ma × Institutional Insecurity		0.188***
		(0.047)
Household Income, decile	−0.066***	−0.065***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Education, years	0.007	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Age, years	0.010***	0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.232***	0.231***
	(0.041)	(0.041)
Spouse is Unemployed	0.582***	0.591***
	(0.160)	(0.159)
Union Member	−0.262***	−0.260***
	(0.046)	(0.046)
Self Employed	−0.445***	−0.448***
	(0.062)	(0.062)
Public Employee	−0.022	−0.008
	(0.061)	(0.061)
2006 Survey	0.271***	0.272***
	(0.049)	(0.050)
Constant	0.172	−0.345
	(0.154)	(0.233)
N	13,954	13,954

Note: Dependent variable is equal to "1" if an individual respondent indicates "neither agree nor disagree" or "agree," or "strongly agree" and equal to "0" if a respondent indicates they "disagree" or "strongly disagree" with spending more on unemployment insurance benefits. Logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ for a two-tailed hypothesis test.

Table 4: Ordered Logit Models

	Additive	Interactive
Individual Insecurity, 3yr ma	0.048***	0.058**
	(0.006)	(0.018)
Collective Insecurity, 3yr ma	0.100***	0.195***
	(0.006)	(0.018)
Institutional Insecurity	−1.209***	−1.094***
	(0.100)	(0.268)
Individual Insecurity, 3yr ma × Collective Insecurity, 3yr ma		−0.006***
		(0.001)
Collective Insecurity, 3yr ma × Institutional Insecurity		−0.133**
		(0.046)
Individual Insecurity, 3yr ma × Institutional Insecurity		0.168***
		(0.038)
Household Income, decile	−0.086***	−0.084***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Education, years	−0.018***	−0.015**
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age, years	0.005***	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.183***	0.177***
	(0.032)	(0.032)
Spouse is Unemployed	0.502***	0.524***
	(0.093)	(0.092)
Union Member	−0.184***	−0.188***
	(0.035)	(0.035)
Self Employed	−0.404***	−0.413***
	(0.055)	(0.055)
Public Employee	−0.043	−0.033
	(0.048)	(0.048)
2006 Survey	0.298***	0.330***
	(0.040)	(0.041)
Cut 1	−2.536***	−1.989***
	(0.125)	(0.180)
Cut 2	−0.904***	−0.348
	(0.121)	(0.178)
Cut 3	1.224***	1.793***
	(0.121)	(0.179)
Cut 4	3.013***	3.575***
	(0.126)	(0.181)
N	13,954	13,954

Note: Dependent variable is individual support for increased spending on unemployment insurance benefits. Ordered logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ for a two-tailed hypothesis test.

Table 5: Alternative Specifications

	Random Effects		Country FE Incl.	
Individual Insecurity, 3yr ma	0.039***	0.017	0.039***	0.020
	(0.007)	(0.025)	(0.007)	(0.025)
Collective Insecurity, 3yr ma	0.015	0.187***	0.009	0.217***
	(0.012)	(0.041)	(0.012)	(0.043)
Institutional Insecurity	−3.049***	1.788	−3.663***	3.402*
	(0.715)	(1.409)	(0.973)	(1.718)
Individual Insec., 3yr ma × Collective Insec., 3yr ma		−0.001		−0.001
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Collective Insec., 3yr ma × Institutional Insec.		−0.748***		−0.905***
		(0.148)		(0.155)
Individual Insec., 3yr ma × Institutional Insec.		0.119*		0.115*
		(0.048)		(0.048)
Household Income, decile	−0.106***	−0.105***	−0.106***	−0.105***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Education, years	−0.044***	−0.043***	−0.044***	−0.042***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Age, years	0.004*	0.004*	0.004*	0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.141***	0.144***	0.142***	0.145***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Spouse is Unemployed	0.395***	0.405***	0.397***	0.403***
	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)
Union Member	−0.174***	−0.160***	−0.175***	−0.157**
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Self Employed	−0.338***	−0.347***	−0.335***	−0.348***
	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Public Employee	−0.005	−0.001	−0.002	−0.003
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)
2006 Survey	0.048	−0.057	0.038	−0.086
	(0.061)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.066)
Constant	0.728*	−0.358	0.273	−1.987**
	(0.364)	(0.536)	(0.516)	(0.739)
var(Country)	0.479**	0.762**		
	(0.177)	(0.295)		
N	13,954	13,954	13,954	13,954

Note: Dependent variable is individual support for increased spending on unemployment insurance benefits. Logistic estimation with robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ for a two-tailed hypothesis test.

Table 6: Ordered Logit, Alternative Specifications

	Random Effects		Country FE Incl.	
Individual Insecurity, 3yr ma	0.041***	0.026	0.041***	0.023
	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.006)	(0.021)
Collective Insecurity, 3yr ma	0.011	0.158***	0.004	0.162***
	(0.011)	(0.032)	(0.011)	(0.033)
Institutional Insecurity	−3.349***	0.290	−4.357***	−0.081
	(0.638)	(0.976)	(0.779)	(1.122)
Individual Insec., 3yr ma × Collective Insec., 3yr ma		−0.000		−0.000
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Collective Insec., 3yr ma × Institutional Insec.		−0.660***		−0.712***
		(0.106)		(0.107)
Individual Insec., 3yr ma × Institutional Insec.		0.060		0.064
		(0.039)		(0.039)
Household Income, decile	−0.091***	−0.090***	−0.091***	−0.090***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Education, years	−0.015**	−0.015**	−0.015**	−0.015**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age, years	0.009***	0.009***	0.009***	0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.182***	0.186***	0.183***	0.187***
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Spouse is Unemployed	0.498***	0.504***	0.502***	0.506***
	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)
Union Member	−0.161***	−0.143***	−0.162***	−0.142***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Self Employed	−0.377***	−0.386***	−0.374***	−0.385***
	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.054)
Public Employee	0.039	0.044	0.042	0.045
	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.050)
2006 Survey	0.045	−0.082	0.046	−0.093
	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.052)
Cut 1	−4.215***	−3.561***	−4.210***	−3.154***
	(0.322)	(0.432)	(0.402)	(0.513)
Cut 2	−2.489***	−1.833***	−2.482***	−1.426**
	(0.321)	(0.431)	(0.401)	(0.513)
Cut 3	−0.216	0.446	−0.208	0.855
	(0.320)	(0.431)	(0.400)	(0.513)
Cut 4	1.613***	2.280***	1.622***	2.690***
	(0.320)	(0.431)	(0.401)	(0.513)
var(Country)	0.401**	0.637**		
	(0.154)	(0.242)		
N	13,954	13,954	13,954	13,954

Note: Dependent variable is individual support for increased spending on unemployment insurance benefits. Ordered logit regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ for a two-tailed hypothesis test.

Table 7: Original Model Specification with Wealth and Culture Controls

	Wealth Incl.		Language FE Incl.	
	*linear*2	*interactive*2	*linear*3	*interactive*3
	b/*se*	*b*/*se*	*b*/*se*	*b*/*se*
Gov. should spend more on unemployment benefits, 0-1				
Individual Insecurity, 3yr ma	0.042***	0.011	0.049***	0.111***
	(0.007)	(0.022)	(0.007)	(0.024)
Collective Insecurity, 3yr ma	0.097***	0.205***	0.093***	0.175***
	(0.009)	(0.025)	(0.010)	(0.030)
Institutional Insecurity	−1.486***	−1.726***	0.480*	0.272
	(0.150)	(0.385)	(0.244)	(0.465)
Individual Insecurity, 3yr ma × Collective Insecurity, 3yr ma		−0.006***		−0.008***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Collective Insecurity, 3yr ma × Institutional Insecurity		−0.183**		−0.034
		(0.061)		(0.069)
Individual Insecurity, 3yr ma × Institutional Insecurity		0.282***		0.083
		(0.050)		(0.051)
Household Income, decile	−0.102***	−0.101***	−0.102***	−0.099***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Education, years	−0.043***	−0.042***	−0.046***	−0.045***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Age, years	−0.000	0.001	0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.135**	0.125**	0.135**	0.123**
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Spouse is Unemployed	0.400***	0.415***	0.405***	0.425***
	(0.107)	(0.105)	(0.109)	(0.108)
Union Member	−0.170***	−0.178***	−0.194***	−0.202***
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Self Employed	−0.315***	−0.341***	−0.378***	−0.372***
	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.075)
Public Employee	−0.096	−0.089	0.032	0.043
	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.066)
2006 Survey	0.405***	0.420***	−0.230***	−0.260***
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.063)	(0.065)
GDP per capita, constant USD2010	−0.005**	−0.004*	0.030***	0.037***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)
German Language Family			0.524***	0.425***
			(0.097)	(0.099)
Slavic Language Family			1.525***	1.622***
			(0.119)	(0.131)
Romantic Lanuage Family			2.275***	2.219***
			(0.119)	(0.125)
Ural Language Family			1.462***	1.536***
			(0.144)	(0.150)
Baltic Language Family			1.792***	2.136***
			(0.163)	(0.176)
Japanese Language			1.252***	1.408***
			(0.142)	(0.146)

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Table 7 – *Continued from previous page*

	Wealth Incl.		Language FE Incl.	
Constant	−0.327	−0.773**	−2.647***	−3.490***
	(0.171)	(0.261)	(0.255)	(0.374)
N	13,954	13,954	13,954	13,954

Note: Dependent variable is individual support for increased spending on unemployment insurance benefits. Logistic estimation with robust standard errors in parentheses. English Language is the omitted category. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ for a two-tailed hypothesis test.

Table 8: Ordered Logit Models with Wealth and Culture Controls

	Wealth Incl.		Language FE Incl.	
Individual Insecurity, 3yr ma	0.050***	0.063***	0.048***	0.135***
	(0.006)	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.019)
Collective Insecurity, 3yr ma	0.111***	0.222***	0.110***	0.181***
	(0.007)	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.024)
Institutional Insecurity	−1.207***	−0.945***	1.045***	1.239***
	(0.100)	(0.271)	(0.181)	(0.331)
Individual Insec., 3yr ma × Collective Insec., 3yr ma		−0.007***		−0.008***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Collective Insec., 3yr ma × Institutional Insec.		−0.163***		−0.028
		(0.047)		(0.057)
Individual Insec., 3yr ma × Institutional Insec.		0.179***		−0.004
		(0.038)		(0.039)
Household Income, decile	−0.084***	−0.081***	−0.087***	−0.084***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Education, years	−0.020***	−0.017**	−0.018***	−0.016**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age, years	0.005***	0.006***	0.007***	0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.185***	0.178***	0.179***	0.171***
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Spouse is Unemployed	0.522***	0.548***	0.499***	0.523***
	(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.094)
Union Member	−0.170***	−0.169***	−0.170***	−0.171***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Self Employed	−0.404***	−0.412***	−0.411***	−0.396***
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Public Employee	−0.032	−0.017	0.071	0.084
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)
2006 Survey	0.255***	0.277***	−0.290***	−0.300***
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.051)
GDP per capita, constant USD2010	0.006***	0.007***	0.037***	0.042***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
German Language Family			0.754***	0.655***
			(0.076)	(0.081)
Slavic Language Family			1.582***	1.648***
			(0.088)	(0.094)
Romantic Lanuage Family			2.288***	2.208***
			(0.091)	(0.093)
Ural Language Family			1.509***	1.530***
			(0.114)	(0.116)
Baltic Language Family			1.851***	2.145***

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Table 8 – *Continued from previous page*

	Wealth Incl.		Language FE Incl.	
			(0.122)	(0.134)
Japanese Language			1.195***	1.289***
			(0.134)	(0.136)
Cut 1	−2.275***	−1.577***	0.057	0.863***
	(0.141)	(0.202)	(0.188)	(0.259)
Cut 2	−0.640***	0.070	1.739***	2.556***
	(0.138)	(0.200)	(0.187)	(0.259)
Cut 3	1.490***	2.213***	3.948***	4.774***
	(0.138)	(0.200)	(0.189)	(0.261)
Cut 4	3.277***	3.993***	5.774***	6.592***
	(0.143)	(0.203)	(0.193)	(0.263)
N	13,954	13,954	13,954	13,954

Note: Dependent variable is individual support for increased spending on unemployment insurance benefits. Ordered logit regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. English is the omitted category. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ for a two-tailed hypothesis test.

Table 9: Pairwise Correlations

	Individual Insecurity	Collective Insecurity	Elasticity of Insecurity
Individual Insecurity	1.0000		
Collective Insecurity	0.6354	1.0000	
	(0.0000)		
Elasticity of Insecurity	0.4407	0.0546	1.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	

Note: Correlation coefficients reported with p-values in parentheses.

Table 10: Models of Policy Preferences, with Insecurity Elasticity

	Linear	Interactive
Individual Insecurity, 3yr ma	0.040***	0.075*
	(0.008)	(0.030)
Collective Insecurity, 3yr ma	0.110***	0.198***
	(0.008)	(0.025)
Institutional Insecurity$_{t-1}$	−1.464***	−1.653***
	(0.148)	(0.385)
Insecurity Elasticity, Occ/Nat	0.053	0.209*
	(0.036)	(0.106)
Individual Insec., 3yr ma × Collective Insec., 3yr ma		−0.007***
		(0.001)
Collective Insec., 3yr ma × Institutional Insec.$_{t-1}$		−0.162**
		(0.061)
Individual Insec., 3yr ma × Institutional Insec.$_{t-1}$		0.250***
		(0.051)
Insecurity Elasticity, Occ/Nat × Collective Insec., 3yr ma		0.033*
		(0.016)
Insecurity Elasticity, Occ/Nat × Individual Insec., 3yr ma		−0.056***
		(0.016)
Household Income, decile	−0.099***	−0.097***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Education, years	−0.043***	−0.036***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Age, years	−0.000	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.147***	0.139***
	(0.041)	(0.042)
Spouse is Unemployed	0.419***	0.431***
	(0.107)	(0.105)
Union Member	−0.152***	−0.166***
	(0.045)	(0.045)
Self Employed	−0.316***	−0.325***
	(0.071)	(0.072)
Public Employee	−0.082	−0.061
	(0.063)	(0.064)
2006 Survey	0.375***	0.388***
	(0.051)	(0.052)
Constant	−0.657***	−1.325***
	(0.159)	(0.248)
N	13,954	13,954

Note: Dependent variable is individual support for increased spending on unemployment insurance benefits. Logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ for a two-tailed hypothesis test.



Figure 1: Marginal Effect of Collective Insecurity (Main Model)



Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Institutional Insecurity (Main Model)



Figure 3: Marginal Effect of Institutional Insecurity (Main Model)



Figure 4: Marginal Effect of Individual Insecurity (Main Model, Ordered logit)



Figure 5: Marginal Effect of Individual Insecurity (Main Model, Ordered logit)



Figure 6: Marginal Effect of Collective Insecurity (Main Model, Ordered logit)



Figure 7: Marginal Effect of Collective Insecurity (Main Model, Ordered logit)



Figure 8: Marginal Effect of Institutional Insecurity (Main Model, Ordered logit)



Figure 9: Marginal Effect of Institutional Insecurity (Main Model, Ordered logit)



Figure 10: Compression in Logistic Regression



Figure 11: Marginal effect of Col_k over Ind_i, from Table 10 with Insecurity Elasticity included



Figure 12: Marginal effect of Col_k over Sec_k, from Table 10 with Insecurity Elasticity included



Figure 13: Marginal effect of Col_k over E_k, from Table 10 with Insecurity Elasticity included



Figure 14: Marginal effect of Ind_i over Col_k, from Table 10 with Insecurity Elasticity included



Figure 15: Marginal effect of Ind_i over Sec_k, from Table 10 with Insecurity Elasticity included



Figure 16: Marginal effect of Ind_i over E_k



Figure 17: Marginal effect of Sec_k over Ind_i, from Table 10 with Insecurity Elasticity included



Figure 18: Marginal effect of Sec_k over Col_k, from Table 10 with Insecurity Elasticity included



Figure 19: Scenarios, 2006, from Table 10 with Insecurity Elasticity included