CODEBOOK AND DATA SOURCES

Giovanni Capoccia, Lawrence Saez, and Eline de Rooij, "When State Responses Fail: Religion and Secessionism in India 1952-2002", *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 74, N. 4, October 2012, 1010-1022

Additional Information on Data and Variables

Regional political actors

To qualify for inclusion in the dataset, a party or group has to be present in one Indian state or part thereof, or in several states but representing a self-defined cultural, linguistic, territorial, or tribal unit, sometime during the period 1952-2002. This gives a total of 363 regional political parties or groups, and excludes the regional breakaway factions of the Congress Party and the Janata Dal, about twenty in total, which result from personal clashes within the leadership of these larger parties rather than express regional grievances (moreover, these splinter actors do not pose territorial demands). For 310 of the 363 regional parties and groups full information is available on their exact period of existence. Of these, 181 have posed territorial demands at some point during their life span. Territorial demands can be of different intensity: the most intense involve secession, i.e. the creation of a new sovereign polity out of the territory of the pre-existing state. Less intense territorial demands may refer instead to increased forms of autonomy for specific regions within the existing polity. In the Indian case, this has generally meant demanding the creation of a new federated state within the Indian Union, carved out of the boundaries of existing ones—a quite demanding request both politically and bureaucratically. These 181 actors constitute the units of our analysis.

Of the 363 regional political actors, full information on the period of existence is not available for 18 of the 114 religious actors, and for 35 of the 249 non-religious actors; a non-significant difference (chi^2 = .188, Pr = .664). Moreover, only 7 of the 53 actors for which full information is lacking posed a territorial demand; of these 7, 4 are religious, 1 operated in

Gujarat, 3 in Jammu and Kashmir, and 3 in Manipur. If we assume that actors with missing data are more similar to actors missing from the data altogether, this comparison of actors with and without missing data suggests that there is little systematic bias in terms of religion or state as a result of missing cases.

Table A1 shows the percentage of non-religious and religious actors by whether a territorial demand was posed. Although religious actors more often pose territorial demands, it is important to note that our population of interest is actors *that pose demands*; that is, we condition on the fact that actors have a demand in the first place. Our aim is not to make inferences about regional political actors in general; consequently our conclusions apply only to regional political actors that pose territorial demands. In the on-line Appendix accompanying the main study we discuss two alternative models that use the type of demand and the type of conflict, rather than the actors, as the unit of analysis.

The dataset also includes information on characteristics of the regional political parties and groups, on policy and institutional responses by the Indian national governments over the years affecting the groups and parties, and on structural characteristics related to the geographical area in which the party or group operates.

Data sources on regional political actors and their territorial demands

1. Primary and internet sources, electoral reports

Basic information on regional political *parties* and their characteristics is taken from the Election Commission of India website, available at <www.eci.gov.in>. For supplemental electoral data from 1952-1985, see V.B. Singh and Shankar Bose, *State Elections in India, Data Handbook on Vidhan Sabha Elections.* Vol 1-5. (New Delhi: Sage 1987). For supplemental electoral data from 1952-1991, see David Butler, Ashok Lahiri, and Prannoy Roy, *India Decides*, 2nd ed. (New Delhi: Living Media India, 1991). The information on regional political *non-party groups* and their characteristics is taken from the South Asia Terrorism Portal, available at <www.satp.org>, the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs website, available at <mha.nic.in>, as well

as from the secondary sources listed below. The same secondary sources provided the necessary information on the *temporal dynamics of the territorial demands* of all political actors studied:

2. Secondary sources

Punjab

- Ahmed Masood, Maqsood and Peter Stockdale, *The Khalistan Riddle*. Islamabad: Modern Book Depot, 1988;
- Chander Arora, Subhash, *Strategies to Combat Terrorism: A Study of Punjab*. New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1999;
- Chima, Jugdep, *The Sikh Separatist Insurgency in India: Political Leadership and Ethnonationalist Movements*. New Delhi: Sage, 2010.
- Dang, Satyapal, *Genesis of Terrorism: An Analytical Study of Punjab Terrorists*. New Delhi : Patriot, 1988;
- Deol, Harnik, *Religion and Nationalism in India: The Case of Punjab*. London: Routledge, 2000;
- Dhillon, Kirpal, *Identity and Survival: Sikh Militancy in India (1978-1993)*. New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2006;
- Jain, Sharda, *Politics of Terrorism in India: The Case of Punjab*. New Delhi : Deep & Deep Publications, 1995;
- Joshi, Manoj, *Combating Terrorism in Punjab: Indian Democracy in Crisis*. London : Research Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1993;
- Kaushal, Rachana, *Terrorism and Militancy: A Case Study of Political Development in Punjab*. Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1999;
- Kumar, Ram Narayan, Terror in Punjab: Narratives, Knowledge, and Truth. Delhi : Shipra Publications, 2008;
- Narayanan, V.N., *Tryst with Terror: Punjab's Turbulent Decade*. Delhi: Ajanta, 1996;
- Rudra, Kalyan, *Rise and Fall of Punjab Terrorism (1978-1993)*. Delhi : Bright Law House, 2005;
- Singh Barapind, Buta, *Rise and Fall of Khalistan Movement*. Jalandhar : International Research Centre, 2007;
- Singh, Gopal, *Politics of Sikh Homeland, 1940-1990*. Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1994;
- Singh, Gurharpal, *Ethnic Conflict in India: A Case-Study of the Punjab*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000;
- Singh, Joginder, *Myth and Reality of the Sikh Militancy in Punjab*. New Delhi : Shree, 2006;
- Singha, Satindara, *Khalistan: An Academic Analysis*. New Delhi, 1982;

Kashmir

- Bloeria, Sudhir, *Pakistan's Insurgency vs India's Security: Tackling Militancy in Kashmir*. New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2000;
- Bose, Sumantra, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003.
- Chandran, Suba, "India and Armed Non State Actors in the Kashmir Conflict." In Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Bushra Asif, and Cyrus Samii, eds., *Kashmir*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2006;

- Ganguly, Sumit, "Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay." *International Security*, 21, 2 (1996): 76-107.
- Ganguly, Sumit, *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace*. New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Khurshid, Salman, *Beyond Terrorism: New Hope for Kashmir*. New Delhi: UBS Publishers' Distributors, 1994;
- Santhanam, K., *Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery*. New Delhi: Sage, 2003;
- Schofield, Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War. London: I. B. Tauris, 2003;
- Schofield, Victoria, *Kashmir in the Crossfire*. London : I. B. Tauris, 1996;
- Sharma, Rajeev, *Pak Proxy War*. New Delhi: Kaveri Books, 1999;
- Thakur, Pradeeep, *Militant Monologues: Echoes from the Kashmir Valley*. New Delhi: Parity, 2003;

Northeastern states

- Baruah, Sanjib, "The State and Separatist Militancy in Assam: Winning the Battle and Losing the War?" *Asian Survey*, 34, 10 (1994);
- Baruah, Sanjib, *Durable Disorders: Understanding the Politics of Northeast India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005;
- Bhattacharya, H.K., *The Silent Invasion*, New Delhi, Spectrum Publications 2001;
- Chandra, Sudhir, "Understanding the Problem of Northeast India." *India Review*, 6, 1 (2007);
- Dasgupta, Jyotirindra, "Community, Authenticity and Autonomy: Insurgence and Institutional Development in India's Northeast." In Amrita Basu and Atul Kohli*, Community Conflicts and the State in India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 183-214.
- Dommen A.J., "Separatist Tendencies in Eastern India." *Asian Survey*, 7, 10 (1967): 726-739;
- Hazarika, Sanjay, *Strangers in the Mist*. New Delhi: Viking, 1994;
- Lacina, Bethany, "Does Counterinsurgency Theory Apply in Northeast India?' 2007. *India Review,* 6, 3 (2007): 165-183.
- Ray, Asok Kumar and B.J. Deb (eds.), *Terrorism and Human Rights in North East India*. New Delhi: Om Publications, 2007;
- Saikia, Jaideep, Terror Sans Frontiers: Islamic Militancy in North East India. ACDIS Occasional Paper 1 (2003);
- Sareen H.K., *Insurgency in North East India*. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1980;
- Sharma S.C., Insurgency or Ethnic Conflict. New Delhi: Magnum, 2000.
- Upadhyay, Archana, *India's Fragile Borderlands: The Dynamics of Terrorism in North East India*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2008;
- Verghese B.G., India's Northeast Resurgent: Ethnicity, Insurgency, Governance, Development. New Delhi: Konark, 1997;
- Zhimomi, Kuhoi, *Politics and Militancy in Nagaland*, New Delhi, Deep and Deep Publications, 2004

Tamil Nadu/South India

- Chandran, Subramaniam "From Separatism to Coalition: Variants in Language Politics and Leadership Pattern in Dravidian Movement." World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology, 75, 107 (2011);
- Chidambaram M., "Cultural Entrepreneurs and Language Strategists: DMK in Tamil Nadu." *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, 48, 3 (1987);
- Forrester D.B., "The Madras Anti-Hindi Agitation, 1965: Political Protest and Its Effects on Language Policy in India." *Pacific Affairs*, 39, 1/2 (1966);
- Hardgrave R.L., "The DMK and the Politics of Tamil Nationalism." Pacific Affairs, 37, 4 (1964);
- Hardgrave R.L., The Dravidian Movement. Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1965;
- Irshick, Eugene, *Politics and Social Conflict in South India: The Non-Brahman Movement and Tamil Separatism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969;
- Omvedt, Gail, *Dalit Visions: The Anti-caste Movement and the Construction on an Indian Identity*. Bombay: Orient Longman, 2006;
- Ram, Mohan, *Hindi Against India: The Meaning of DMK*. New Delhi: Rachna Prakashan, 1968;
- Sattanathan A.N., *The Dravidian Movement in Tamil Nadu and its Legacy*. Madras: University of Madras Press, 1982;

Others/Comparative case studies

- Barnett M.R., *The Politics of Cultural Nationalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976;
- Basu Sajal, *Regional Movements, Politics of Language, Ethnicity-Identity*. New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1992;
- Bhatnagar Ved, *Challenges to India's Integrity: Terrorism, Casteism, Communalism*. Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 1998;
- Chadda Maya, *Ethnicity, Security, and Separatism in India*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997;
- Chandhoke Neera, "A State of One's Own: Secessionism and Federalism in India." Crisis States Programme Working Paper Series, no. 1, Working Paper no. 80. Development Studies Institute (DESTIN), London School of Economics, 2006;
- Connor Walker, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993;
- Ganguly Sumit and David Fidler (eds.), *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*. London: Routledge, 2009;
- McHenry Dean, "The Weakened State Explanation for the Rise of Separatist Movements: The Experience of India," unpublished manuscript 1998.
- Muni S.D., "Ethnic Conflict, Federalism and Democracy in India." In Kumar Rupesinghe and Valery Tishkov (eds.), *Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1996;
- Phadnis Urmila, *Ethnicity and Nation-Building in South Asia*. New Delhi: Sage, 2001;
- Prakash Karat, *Language and Nationality Politics in India*. Bombay: Orient Longman, 1973
- Prakash Ved, *Terrorism in Northern India: Jammu and Kashmir and the Punjab*. Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2008;

- Rajagopalan Rajesh, "Force and Compromise: India's Counter-Insurgency Grand Strategy." *South Asia*, 30, 1 (2007): 75-91;
- Sáez Lawrence, *Federalism Without a Center*. New Delhi: Sage, 2002;
- Singh Bhawani, *Regionalism and Politics of Separatism in India*. London Routledge, 1993;
- Telford Hamish, "Counter-Insurgency in India: Observations from Punjab and Kashmir." *Journal of Conflict Studies* (2001);
- Wallace Paul, "Countering Terrorist Movements in India: Kashmir and Khalistan." In Robert Art and Louise Richardson (eds.), *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past*. Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, 2006, pp. 425-482;
- Widmalm Sten, *Kashmir in Comparative Perspective: Democracy and Violent Separatism in India*. London: Routledge, 2002;

Dependent Variable: Moderation of Territorial Demands ("demand moderation")

The dependent variable, *demand moderation*, is a dichotomous variable that measures *any move downward* along the "demand intensity scale" -- including "secessionist demands" as the most intense, "less-than-secessionist" demands (in most cases consisting of the demand for a new federated state) as the middle item (less intense demands such as the creation of a "Union Territory" or of an "autonomous council" within a state, or the endowment of a state with special competencies, have been much rarer), and "no demands" as the bottom of the scale -- by indicating whether in a given year an actor reduced the intensity of its territorial demand (1) or not (0). "Reducing the intensity" of demands might occur for different reasons: 16 out of the 49 actors (33%) that moderated their demand did so because the demand had been granted, 6 (12%) were forcefully disbanded in response to their territorial demands, and the remaining 27 actors (55%) moderated their demand because of some other reason. In most instances of "demand moderation", therefore, the regional party or group continued its existence after having voluntarily changed its territorial demands. However, actors are only included in the data until their demand is moderated; or, alternatively, until they cease to exist or because they reach the end of the time span of our analysis.

The "demand moderation" variable described above captures with good approximation a complex dynamic of territorial demands on the part of dozens of Indian regional political actors.

Our results are robust to different specifications of this variable. Below we give more detailed information on the trajectories of territorial demands posed by the regional actors in our dataset.

Moderating demands

Demand moderation is the typical trajectory that we observe in our data, and occurs in two ways: by dropping a territorial demand altogether, or by shifting from a more intense demand to a less intense one. The overwhelming majority of actors moderated their territorial demand to posing no demand at all. Only in a few cases did actors moderate their demand for independence to a demand of a separate state, or less than a separate state:

- *Bodo Liberation Tiger* (BLT): Shifts from a demand for independence to a demand for less than a state in 2001.
- *Kuki Defense Force* (KDF): Shifts from a demand for independence to a demand for a separate state in 1996.
- *Kuki National Assembly* (KNA): Demand for the maintenance of a separate state of Manipur, which it moderates in favour of a separate revenue district in 1975. It is coded as moderating its demand in 1975.
- *Plains Tribals Council of Assam* (PTCA): It moderates its demand for a separate state of Udyachal in 1977 and demands an autonomous region (or union territory) instead. It is coded as moderating its demand in 1977.
- *United Mizo Front Organization* (UMFO): Shifts from a demand for independence to a demand for a separate state in 1953.

Finally, only one actor, *Mizo National Front* (MNF), moderated its territorial demands *twice*, at separate time points, along the three-item scale. In this case, only the first move downward in 1971 was coded.

The dynamics discussed above —i.e. different forms of demand moderation— are typical of almost the whole universe of our cases. A few actors in our dataset, however, were

characterized by more complex demand dynamics. Below we account for our coding decisions in these cases.

Moving from no demand to posing a demand

Very little evidence exists of *escalation* of territorial demands (as opposed to escalation of violence): only nine actors moved *upwards* on the scale, posing no demand in the first phase of their existence, and 'escalating' to posing territorial demands later on. We have included these in the analysis from the first time they posed a demand. Excluding them from the analysis altogether does not change the overall results (see the online Appendix to the main study). This applies to the following parties and groups:

- *All Bodoland Student Union* (ABSU): Shifts up from no demand to demanding a separate state in 1980. It is only included in the dataset from 1980 onwards.
- *All Bodoland Student Union (Upen Brahma faction)* (ABSU (UB)): Initially demands the division of the Brahmaputra valley. In 1988 it replaces this demand in favour of one calling for the creation of a separate state. It is included in the dataset from 1988 onwards.
- *Jamaat-e-Islami* (JeI): Shifts up from no demand to a demand for independence in 1987. It is included in the dataset from 1987 onwards.
- *Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front* (JKLF): Shifts from no demand to a demand for independence in 1988. It included in the dataset from then onwards.
- *Jammu and Kashmir People's League* (JKPL): Shifts from no demand to a demand for independence in 1975. It is included from then onwards in the dataset.
- *Lashkar-e-Toiba* (LeT): Shifts from no demand to a demand for independence in 1995. It is included in the dataset from then onwards.

- *Muslim United Front* (MUF): Shifts from no demand to a demand for independence in 1989. It is included in the dataset from then onwards.
- *Tripura Rajya Multi Parishad* (TRMP): Shifts from no demand to a demand for the creation of an autonomous district council for tribals (i.e. less than a state) in 1967. It is included in the dataset from 1967 onwards as demanding a separate state.
- *Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti* (TUJS): Initially demands formation of autonomous districts councils. In 1998 it presses for the creation of a separate state composed of the existing Tripura Tribal Area Autonomous District Council. Included in the dataset from 1998 onwards.

Finally, *Shiromani Akali Dal (Amristar)* (SAD(A)) shifted up from a demand for a separate state to demand for independence in 1994. It is coded on the basis of its first demand and the shift up is not recorded.

Re-posing demands

Only two regional actors re-posed a demand after having initially moderated it. These actors are only included in the dataset until the moderation of their first demand:

- *All India Gorkha League* (AIGL): Moderated its demand for a separate state in 1950, but intensified its demand again from no demand to a demand for a separate state in 1973. It is only included in the dataset until 1950.
- *Garo National* Council (GNC): Moderated its demand for a separate state in 1970, but intensified its demand again from no demand to a demand for a separate state in 1992. It is only included in the dataset until 1970.

Demands for less than a state

All territorial demands which are short of secessionism, even though they do not have as their object the creation of a separate state within India (e.g. demand for the creation of a new Union

Territory, or the demand for special cultural rights) have been coded as being of the same intensity as the demand for a new federated state. The vast majority of regional parties and groups in that category of demand intensity, however, have posed a demand for a separate state within the Indian Union. Exceptions:

- *Hmar People's Convention* (HPC): Demands an autonomous district for Hmar tribals, which it moderates to no demand on 1994.
- *Hmar People's Convention (Democratic)* (HPC (D)): Demands an autonomous district for Hmar tribals.
- *Khasi Jaintia National Federated States National Conference* (KJF): Demands the creation of an autonomous district council for Khasis, which it moderates to no demand in 1950.
- *Mizoram People's Conference* (MPC): Demands a separate administrative unit linking all Mizos living in Mizoram, which it moderates to no demand in 1986.
- *Mizo Union* (MUL): Demands the creation of an autonomous tribal district for Mizos living in Assam, which it moderates in 1972.
- *Tripura National Volunteers* (TNV): Demands autonomous district councils, which it moderates to no demand in 1988.
- *Tripura Resurrection Army* (TRA): Demands the creation of autonomous district councils in Tripura, which it moderates in 1997.
- *Zoram Nationalist Party* (ZNP): Demands the creation of a single administrative unit for all Mizos living in Mizoram.

Excluding these parties and groups from the analysis altogether does not change the overall results (see the on line Appendix to the main study).

Explanatory Variables

Religious actor:

The worldview of the regional political actor posing territorial demands. It takes the value (1) if the actor has a religious identity and (0) if not. To code a regionally-based party or group as "religious", we refer to its self-definition as it emerges from the party or group's own sources or to unquestioned descriptions in the secondary literature. Although this variable is allowed to vary over time, only two actors changed their official worldview in the period under consideration. In both cases the actors changed from a non-religious worldview to a religious one.

Initial demand intensity:

The kind of territorial demand first posed by a regional political actor. It takes the value (0) for regional actors with a demand for a separate state, or lesser forms of autonomy, within the Indian Union, and (1) for regional actors with a demand for independence from the Indian Union. See the on-line Appendix to the main study for information on shows the percentage of parties and groups by the intensity of the territorial demand initially posed and models run with different specification of this variable.

Size:

The size of a regional political actor. A political party's size is measured by the average percentage of votes it polled in all the state legislative assembly elections where it has participated and for which information is available. The size of a political group is measured by the number of members. The size of a group or party was originally coded trichotomously: small (<5% of the vote in the target territory for parties and <1,000 members for groups), medium (5-20% of the vote in the target territory for parties and 1,000 to 10,000 members for groups), and large (>20% of the vote in the target territory for parties and >10,000 members for groups). However, as small and medium actors do not significantly differ in their likelihood of moderating territorial demands we opted for a dichotomous measure in the final analysis by combining the small and medium categories. Due to shortage of information on many groups or parties the values refer to

one point in time only during their existence. When more than one data point was available, we have averaged them, to determine the classification of the party or group. The data on group size are from Santhanam et al. (2003) and the South Asia Terrorism Portal (http://www.satp.org). Electoral data are published by the Electoral Commission of India (http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/StatisticalReports/ElectionStatistics.asp). Both accessed 29 March 2011.

Violence:

Whether in a given year a regional political actor used violence (1) or not (0). Information on this comes from the following sources: the South Asia Terrorism Portal (http://www.satp.org) and the India Subnational Problems Dataset (http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm). Both accessed 29 March 2011. From the India Subnational Problems Dataset the following variables were used: conflict number (CNUM), conflict tag number (CTAG), conflict type (CTYPE), conflict actor (ACTOR1-3) and conflict target group (TARGET1-2). For CNUM, we selected those variables where the conflict was violent and inherently political. For CTAG, we selected those conflicts which were tagged as being mega-conflicts and "nested" meta-conflicts, discreet meta-conflicts, meta-conflict events, and discreet micro-conflict events. For CTYPE, we selected those conflict types that were coded as being ethnic/identity warfare, political/economic warfare, anti-government terrorist campaign, and communal terrorism campaign, or terrorist incidents. Finally, we selected those conflict actors and conflict target groups where the dyads were confessional groups and ethno-identity groups vs. government authorities.

Organization:

Whether the organizational form of the regional political actor is a group or a party. A regional political actor changes from being a 'group' to a 'party' at its first state or national election, unless it only came into being a few years before its first election (thus clearly intending to be a party), or is banned from participating in elections, but would clearly do so if not banned. This variable

is allowed to vary over time. Only five actors changed their organizational form, and all do so by becoming a party.

Territory change:

Any change in a Union Territory or state's geographical territory or in its status that might affect a regional political actor's demand moderation. It is coded (1) for years in which states are newly created from other states, in which an autonomous region obtains the status of a Union Territory, or in which a Union Territory become a state; and is coded (0) when there is no such change. States that lose part of their territory in the formation of a second state; states that change their name, but of which the territory remains essentially unchanged; and states of which the territory is newly incorporated into the Indian Union are not coded as changing territory.

State or U.T.:

A time-varying measure of whether the 'state' a regional political actor operated in has the official status of a state (0) or of a Union Territory (UT) or less (1). For instance, Meghalaya was an autonomous region within Assam from 1970 to 1971, when it became a state. It is coded (1) for 1970 and 1971. It is important to note that several changes of the state boundaries occurred in India since its independence in 1947. The biggest change occurred in 1956 when the States Reorganisation Act came into effect. States and Union Territories are coded on the basis of this Act. The few regional political actors that came into existence before 1956 in a region that became or remained a state or Union Territory (UT) in 1956 are coded as continuously operating in that state or UT. There are only 2 regional political actors that solely existed before 1956. They are coded as operating in Tamil Nadu (named Madras State until 1969) and in Assam, respectively. Since 1956 several territories joined the Indian Union, gained a substantial amount of autonomy, or became new UTs or states. Goa joined the Indian Union in 1961. The first territorial demand was posed in 1963. Gujarat was formed from part of Bombay state in 1960, and experienced its first territorial demand in 1967. We consider Maharashtra the continuation of

what was formerly Bombay state, but code it as changing its territory (see previous variable) in 1960. The one actor operating in Bombay state until 1960 moderated its demand when Maharashtra was formed. Formerly known as the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), Arunachal Pradesh became a UT in 1972. The first territorial demand was not posed until 1990. Haryana was formed out of Punjab in 1966. The one regional actor demanding a separate state of Haryana is coded as operating in Punjab until 1965 and in Haryana in 1966, when it moderated its demand. Meghalaya became an autonomous region within Assam in 1970. The three political actors demanding a separate state of Meghalaya are coded as operating in Assam until 1969 and in Meghalaya from 1970 onwards. In 1952 Mizo Hills obtained a certain amount of autonomy from Assam and in 1972 became a UT. The two political actors making territorial demands on behalf of the Mizos living in Assam are coded as operating in Assam until 1951 and in Mizoram from 1952 onwards. Nagaland, formerly part of Assam, became a UT in 1957, but no territorial demand was posed until 1962. Source: National Informatics Centre, Government of India. *National Portal of India: States and Union Territories*. Available at http://india.gov.in/knowindia/state_uts.php. [Accessed 9 April 2007]

Presidential rule:

Whether Presidential Rule (PR) was officially applied in a given year in a state in which a regional political actor was active as a result of insurgent activities and/or movements posing territorial demands (1); or not (0). In the North-eastern states the imposition of AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Powers Act) in 1958 is coded as (1). Our sources of information on Presidential Rule are:

- Adeney, Katharine, *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and Pakistan*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007;
- Arora, Subhash Chander *President's Rule in Indian States*. New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1990;
- Bernstorff, Dagmar "Eclipse of 'Reddy-Raj'? The Attempted Restructuring of the Congress Party Leadership in Andhra Pradesh." *Asian Survey*, 13, 10 (1973), pp. 959-979;
- Bhatt S.C. and Gopal Bhargava (eds.), *Land and People of Indian States and Union Territories*. 36 volumes. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing, 2005;

- Grover Verinder and Ranjana Arora (eds.), *Encyclopaedia of India and her States.* 10 volumes. New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1998;
- Hartmann, Horst "Changing Political Behaviour in Kerala." *Economic and Political Weekly*, 3, 1/2 (1968), pp. 163-78;
- Maheshwari, Shriram. *President's Rule in India.* Delhi: MacMillan, 1977;
- Shah, Ghanshyam "The Upsurge in Gujarat." *Economic and Political Weekly*, 9, 32/34 (1974), pp. 1429-54;
- Windmiller, Marshall "The Andhra Election." *Far Eastern Survey*, 24, 4 (1955), pp. 57-64;

State repression:

This variable provides an alternative measure of state repression experienced by a regional political actor in a given year. It is derived from the India Subnational Problems Dataset (ISPD), available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm. The entries in ISPD were matched to correspond with the variable as follows: we coded (1) for years in which one of the actors or targets in the conflict (columns M-Q in the ISPD) was a *government authority* (actors 71-92 in the ISPD) and the other actor in the conflict was either an *ethno-identity group* (actors 11-27), a regionally-based political party (actor 49 in ISPD), or a communist and Naxalite group (actors 65, 68). The ISPD labels these latter two groups as being *political groups* and *econo-caste groups*. The variable was coded (0) in all other instances.

Enemy border state:

Whether a regional political actor operated in a state that borders with a friendly (1) or an enemy (2) foreign country, or does not border any foreign country (0). As enemy foreign countries are coded Pakistan (1947 to 2002), China (1962 to 1988) and East Pakistan (1947 to 1971). States bordering Nepal, Burma (Myanmar) or Bhutan are coded as bordering with friendly states, unless they also bordered with an enemy state in the same time period. States bordering China or East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in time periods during which these were not considered enemy states are also coded as bordering with friendly states. Mainly for reasons of parsimony, the variable was

recoded into a dichotomous variable by merging the first two categories, thus indicating whether or not a state borders with an adversary in a given year.

Distance to capital:

The distance, expressed per 1,000 kilometer, between the capital of the state where a regional political actor operated, and the national capital (New Delhi). The main data source used for most observations is: Maps of India. *City distance search engine* [online]. Available at http://www.mapsofindia.com/distance/index.html. [Accessed 9 September 2011]. The distance between Gandhinagar (Gujarat) and New Delhi is derived from information available at http://www.distancebetweencities.co.in [Accessed 9 September 2011]. The distance between Itanagar (Arunachal Pradesh) and New Delhi, and between Dispur (Assam) and New Delhi is calculated through: FCm Travel Solutions. *Distance calculator,* available at http://in.fcm.travel/travel-kit/distance-calculator.html [Accessed 9 September 2011]. The state of Jammu and Kashmir has two capitals, Srinagar and Jammu. For legislative purposes, the city Jammu serves as the capital during the winter months (November through April) and the city of Srinagar serves as the capital during the summer months (May through October). For the purpose of our analysis, Srinagar is considered the capital of Jammu and Kashmir since the main legislative business is undertaken here.

State Relative Income (SRI):

A measure of the state per capita income in each year of existence of a regional political actor, divided by the national per capita income in the same year. Data for this measure are only available since 1960 and come from the yearly figures of the per capita net state domestic product (NSDP) available from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). NDSP figures were estimated at both current and constant (1948-1949) prices. In 1994, the Indian Government recalculated

NDSP at both current and constant prices with base year 1993-1994 (see the websites of the RBI www.reservebank.org.in and of the Central Statistical Organisation at www.mospi.nic.in). For the analysis, we compiled data on NSDP for two broad time periods: 1960-1993 and 1993-2002. For 1960-1993, NSDP figures at current prices were derived from EPW, *Domestic Product of States of India*. (EPW 2003: 191-266). NSDP data for all states published in EPW (2003) has been compiled by the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) from the respective state government statistical bureaus. Until recently, there were no unified methodological guidelines issued by the CSO on how to compile NSDP data, and the methodological problems inherent in this method of compilation are well documented (Lakshminarayana, Rao and Rao, 1995; *Report of the National Statistical Commission*, 2001). Hence, other sources may use slightly different figures. Data presented here for this time period correspond with a matching dataset used in Tim Besley and Robin Burgess, (Besley and Burgess 2004) and available at: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/eopp/research/indian.asp. Data from EPW and Besley and Robbins cease to match after 1997. Data from the CSO are the most up-to-date for all states in India. Sources:

- Besley, Tim, and Robin Burgess. 2004. "Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence From India." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119, 1: 91-134.
- Central Statistical Organisation (CSO). 2002. *Statistical Abstract: India*. Delhi: Manager of Publications, Central Statistical Organisation. Available at mospi.nic.in
- EPW Research Foundation. 2003. *Domestic Product of States of India*. Mumbai: EPW Research Foundation.
- Lakshminarayana, S., Saroja Rama Rao, and Shrinivasa Rao. 1995. "Data Gaps in the Estimation of State Domestic Product." *Journal of Income and Wealth*, 17:1.
- *Report of the National Statistical Commission*, (2001), Volumes I and II. New Delhi, National Statistical Commission.
- Reserve Bank of India. NSDP data available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/PDFs/80185.pdf

Minority state religion:

A measure of the presence of any large non-dominant, i.e. non-Hindu, religious group in the state in which a regional political actor operated. States are coded as follows: (0) no minority; (1) Muslim (states with ≥ 25% of the population subscribing to Islam); (2) Christian (states with ≥ 25% of the population subscribing to Christianity); (3) Other (states with ≥ 25% of the population subscribing to the Sikh or Buddhist faith). In Arunachal Pradesh 31% of the population subscribes to religions other than Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh, Buddhist or Jain. It is coded as (0). Source: *Census of India 2001: The First Report on Religion Data.* New Delhi, India: Registrar General and Census Commissioner, 2004.

An overview of the coding of the state-level variables is shown in *Table A2* below. *Table A3* provides the summary statistics for all variables, and *Table A4* reports the frequencies of regional political actors for the different variables.

Tables

Table A1: Percentage of non-religious and religious actors by whether a demand was posed.

	Worldview		
Demand posed	Non-religious	Religious	**Total**
No demand	49 (104)	26 (25)	42 (129)
Demand	51 (110)	74 (71)	58 (181)
Total	*100 (214)*	*100 (96)*	*100 (310)*

Note: Number of cases in brackets.

Table A2: Coding of state-level variables, for states with regional political actors posing territorial demands.

	Forma-tion	Territory change	PR	Friendly border state	Enemy border state	Distance to capital (km)	U.T. or less	Minority state religion
Andhra Pradesh	'56	-	-	-	-	1499	-	-
Arunachal Pradesh	'72	'72, '87	'58	China <'62 and >'88; Myanmar	China '62-'88	2484	<'87	-
Assam	'56	-	'58	Bangladesh; Bhutan	East Pakistan '47-'71	2041	-	Muslim
Bihar	'56	-	-	Nepal	-	1015	-	-
Goa	'61	'87	'61	-	-	1912	<'87	Christian
Gujarat	'60	'60	-	-	Pakistan '47-'02	909	-	-
Haryana	'66	'66	-	-	-	238	-	-
Jammu and Kashmir	'56	-	'90	(China <'62 and >'88)	Pakistan '47-'02; China '62-'88	867	-	Muslim
Maharashtra	'60	'60	-	-	-	1407	-	-
Manipur	'56	'72	'58	Myanmar	-	2443	<'72	Christian
Meghalaya	'70	'70, '72	'58	Bangladesh	East Pakistan '47-'71	2059	<'72	Christian
Mizoram	'52	'52, '72, '87	'58	Bangladesh; Myanmar	East Pakistan '47-'71	2462	<'87	Christian
Nagaland	'57	'57, '63	'58	Myanmar	-	2298	<'63	Christian
Orissa	'56	-	-	-	-	1745	-	-
Punjab	'56	-	'83, '87	-	Pakistan '47-'02	238	-	Sikh
Tamil Nadu	'56	-	-	-	-	2095	-	-
Tripura	'56	'72	'58	Bangladesh	East Pakistan '47-'71	2584	<'72	-
Uttar Pradesh	'56	-	-	China <'62 and >'88; Nepal	China '62-'88	497	-	-
West Bengal	'56	-	-	Bangladesh; Bhutan; Nepal	East Pakistan '47-'71	1461	-	Muslim
Jharkhand	'00	'00	-	-	-	1162	-	-
Uttaranchal	'00	'00	-	China >'88	-	235	-	-

Notes: Formation refers to the year in which the territory first obtained the status of a state or Union Territory (U.T.) since the 1956 States Reorganisation Act, or when, what was to become a state, first gained a substantial amount of autonomy. PR = Presidential Rule (only coded when officially applied due to insurgent activities/separatist movements).

Table A3: Summary statistics for regional political actors posing demands.

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Demand moderation	181	0.27	0.45	0	1
Religious (ref.: non-religious)	181	0.39	0.49	0	1
Initial demand (ref.: federated state)	181	0.61	0.49	0	1
Size (ref.: small)	181	0.10	0.30	0	1
Violence used by actor	181	0.59	0.49	0	1
Organization (ref.: group)	181	0.20	0.40	0	1
Territory change	181	0.09	0.29	0	1
Presidential rule	181	0.24	0.43	0	1
State repression	181	0.45	0.50	0	1
Enemy border state	181	0.38	0.49	0	1
Distance to capital (in 1,000km)	181	1.62	0.75	0.24	2.58
State or U.T (ref.: state)	181	0.09	0.28	0	1
SRI	167	0.87	0.23	0.46	1.69
Number of years of existence/until demand moderation	181	12.77	9.45	1	62

Note: For the State Relative Income (SRI) the mean of all actors' average SRI across all years of existence is given. Violence used by actor, territory change, presidential rule, state repression, and state or U.T. are coded '1' for actors if they occurred at any point during an actor's existence. For all other variables the mean and standard deviation are given for the last years in which actors existed.

Table A4: Frequencies for regional political actors posing territorial demands.

	Observations	Percentage
Minority state religion:		
No minority	37	20.44
Muslim minority	89	49.17
Christian minority	46	25.41
Other minority	9	4.97
Total	*181*	*100.00*
State:		
Andhra Pradesh	4	2.21
Arunachal Pradesh	2	1.10
Assam	33	18.23
Goa	1	0.55
Gujarat	1	0.55
Haryana	2	1.10
Jammu and Kashmir	51	28.18
Maharashtra	2	1.10
Manipur	19	10.50
Meghalaya	10	5.52
Mizoram	10	5.52
Nagaland	6	3.31
Orissa	1	0.55
Punjab	9	4.97
Tamil Nadu	6	3.31
Tripura	12	6.63
Uttar Pradesh	1	0.55
West Bengal	5	2.76
Jharkhand (formerly part of Bihar)	3	1.66
Uttaranchal (formerly part of Uttar Pradesh)	3	1.66
Total	*181*	*100.00*

Note: Statistics are based on an actor's last year of existence. In the following states between 1952 and 2002 no regional actors operated that posed territorial demands: Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Sikkim.