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Guide for Modifying the ASPM

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Introduction

The PIP (Parties – Institutions – Preferences) dataset combines information about political parties, party ideology, governments, parliaments and presidents in a unique way which allows for the estimation of actors' policy positions. In order to ease the re-use and modification of the Agenda Setting Power Model (ASPM) (Jahn 2016) extended replication files (hereafter referred to as "framework") and a smaller sized version of the PIP main dataset[1] are provided. Each country is modelled individually regarding the cabinet decision making, the need of minority governments to look for support in the 1st chamber (or not), and the veto players included in the veto player range. Furthermore, *the* position of the European Union (EU) will be calculated – all as a quarterly and yearly time-series for further use in subsequent analyses.

Replicating the ASPM is quite easy by simply running the two ready-made input files i.e., ESTIMATE_COUNTRIES_ASPM.do and ESTIMATE_EU_ASPM.do. This guide, in turn, provides a "walkthrough" for modifying the ASPM and explains the options available for the ASPM. For a thorough discussion and justification of the concepts please refer to *The Politics of Environmental Performance: Institutions and Preferences in Industrialized Democracies* by Jahn (2016, especially Ch. 4; for veto players in particular refer to Jahn 2010; likewise, see Jahn and Düpont 2015 for *the* position of the EU).

If you need information about the dataset, included parties, country details or data treatment in general, please refer to the codebook of the main dataset (Jahn et al. 2022).[2] All files were compiled and tested with Stata 14 and earlier versions; if you encounter any technical issue do not hesitate to get in touch.

[1] The ASPM dataset is identical to the main dataset except that the subcategories, i.e. the four digit-pers (e.g. per1011), from the Manifesto dataset have been dropped.

[2] https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KRXPH4

Replicating the ASPM – Variables

ESTIMATE_COUNTRIES_ASPM.do creates two files (a quarterly and a yearly time-series) containing most or all of the following variables. In addition, string variables carrying country-specific information about the model specifications are saved at the end of the dataset. Typing notes in Stata gives further information when the data was created.

Variable	Description and value labels
iso	Numeric country code (ISO 3166)
country	Country name
year	Year of observation
quarter	Quarter of observation
techq	Consecutive number of the quarters (Stata format: 0=1960q1, 1=1960q2…)
eu	Dummy: 1 = Member of the European Union (and its predecessors)
GOV_POS	GOVERNMENT POSITION (according to the specified models)
VP_RANGE	VETO PLAYER RANGE
median1st	Position of median parliamentarian in the 1st chamber
median2nd	Position of median parliamentarian in the 2nd chamber
pres	Position of the president
minoritygov	Quarterly time-series: Dummy, 1 = A minority government relied on support Yearly time-series: Categorical variable, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1 = In one (two, three, four) quarters of the year a minority government relied on support
govmin	Minimum position within the government
goxmax	Maximum position within the government
vm_swi	People's position (*Volksposition*; Switzerland only)
house	Position of the House (USA only)
senate	Position of the Senate (USA only)
congress	Position of the Congress (USA only)
aspi_usa	Position of the Agenda Setter (USA only)
vp_usa_int	Veto player range excluding the House (USA only)

A Walkthrough for ESTIMATE_COUNTRIES_ASPM.do

Step 0. Default or Unique Minister Coding

Beyond the PIP main dataset, we provide a second version (pip_ts_minister) that applies a slightly different coding procedure for the categorization of ministries in which only the most important minister in a field, that is one category, is coded per cabinet. This procedure may be better suited for analytical analyses because by definition no two ministers can influence the focal policy field. Otherwise, both datasets are identical, so choosing one over the other only makes a difference when modelling the government in Step 4 either according to the minister model (gov(minister:portf1,…,portf5)) or the negotiated PM-Minister model (gov(pmnegot:portf1,…,portf5)). See the "Companion PIP Minister" for more details on the differences of the default and unique minister codings.

Options for dataset	**Description**
[*empty*]	Empty [""] quotes will call datasets/pip_ts_aspm.dta (default minister codings)
minister	This will call datasets/pip_ts_aspm_minister.dta (unique minister codings)

Step 1. Ideological dimension

The dataset includes some ideological indices ready for use. Each index variable is made up of two letters referring to the author(s), followed by two digits and a suffix indicating the applied interpolation technique. The ASPM rests on the linearly interpolated left-right (Jahn 2011) and green-growth (Jahn 2016, Ch. 3.1) party scores (suffix "f"). For further options refer to the codebook of the main dataset.

Options for ideology	**Description**
ja10f	Left-Right party scores (Jahn 2011)
ja20f	Green-Growth party scores (Jahn 2016)
bu01f	RILE (Budge et al. 2001)
ah01f	Pro/Anti EU (Warntjen, Hix, and Crombez 2008)
ah02f	Environmental Protection (Knill, Debus, and Heichel 2010)

In principle, you could create your own index by generating a new variable in the dataset located in /datasets/pip_ts_aspm.dta based on the Manifesto "pers". In order to arrive at complete time-series for as many parties and institutions as possible we traced party splits and mergers. In order to benefit from our extensive party treatments and avoid gaps in the final time-series, we recommend to rely on the interpolated variables (suffixes "c" or "f" e.g., per101c or per103f). For details and country notes refer to the Codebook.

Step 2. Outfile

In Step 2 a name for the files is assigned which are saved in the same folder as the input file. Two datasets are created, a quarterly and a yearly time-series; henceforth the suffixes "_quarterly" and "_yearly" are added to the name. Because the final variables will always (!) bear identical names, use the file name to distinguish the data if you run different model specifications. This is advisable if you want to create "mixed" time-series e.g., once with a 2nd chamber or president included as a veto player until a focal year, and excluded afterwards.

Step 3. Country List

All countries have to be listed using the three-character country code according to the official ISO classification (ISO 3166-1 Alpha-3), separated by blanks. In some cases, the parsing syntax allows some more intuitive abbreviations, though:

Options		
AUS = Australia	AUT = Austria	BEL = Belgium
BGR, BUL = Bulgaria	CAN = Canada	HRV, CRO = Croatia
CYP = Cyprus	CZE = Czech Republic	DNK = Denmark
EST = Estonia	FIN = Finland	FRA = France
DEU, GER = Germany	GRC = Greece	HUN = Hungary
ISL, ICE = Iceland	IRL, IRE = Ireland	ITA = Italy
JPN, JAP = Japan	LVA = Latvia	LTU = Lithuania
LUX = Luxembourg	MLT = Malta	NLD = the Netherlands
NZL = New Zealand	NOR = Norway	POL = Poland
PRT = Portugal	ROU, ROM = Romania	SVK = Slovakia
SVN = Slovenia	ESP, SPA = Spain	SWE = Sweden
SWI = Switzerland	GBR, UK = United Kingdom	USA = United States

Step 4.1 Government Models

We already included many cabinet decision-making models in the framework. A full discussion, their theoretical underpinnings and justifications can be found in Chapter 4 in *The Politics of Environmental Performance: Institutions and Preferences in Industrialized Democracies* (Jahn 2016). Two **general rules** apply to all estimations:

1. All parties and non-aligned persons with missing ideological data are excluded from the estimation, and weights like seat share etc. are recalculated within the estimate-files. For this reason, the weight actually applied might slightly diverge from the share displayed in the dataset (e.g., variables p109, p112, p305 etc.).

2. In case of expert governments (i.e., 100% non-aligned persons) the median of the 1st chamber is used as the final fallback (for other fallbacks see the descriptions below), because it usually still needs support in the chamber to pass legislation.

The following options to estimate the government position (POS_GOV) are available:

Options for gov(...)	**Description**
seats	Position weighted by seat share of the (coalition) parties
cabmem	Position weighted by share of cabinet members of the (coalition) parties
portfolios	Position weighted by share of portfolios of the (coalition) parties *Notes*: The total number of portfolios is the sum of all minister variables (p201-p218) which in turn are count variables based on Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge's (2000, 21–22) categorization.
uwmean	Unweighted mean position of all cabinet parties
pm	Position of the Prime Minister *Notes*: If the PM is non-aligned or ideological data is missing for his/her party in an otherwise party government, the position weighted by government seats is used as fallback 1.
minister:portf1,…,portf5	Position of minister(s) responsible for $portfolio_k$ *Notes*: $Portfolio_k$ is based on the minister variables p201-p218 (see the appendix for a list of minister variables, and the codebook respectively), and up to five portfolios can be specified as replacements. In case two or more persons from different parties share responsibility for $portfolio_k$ the unweighted mean of the party positions is used. If none of the specified ministers is present the position weighted by government seats is used as fallback 1.
pmnegot:cabinet	Negotiated position of the Prime Minister and coalition partners *Notes*: This model disassembles coalition governments into "inner coalitions" (IC), each consisting of the PM's party and $party_n$. Within an IC the position is weighted by seat share. The final position then is the unweighted mean of all IC positions.
pmnegot:portf1,…,portf5	Negotiated position of the Prime Minister and minister(s) responsible for $portfolio_k$ *Notes*: This model disassembles the coalition government into "inner coalitions" (IC), each consisting of the PM's party and $party_n$, whose minister(s) had authority over $portfolio_k$. Within an IC the position is weighted by seat share. The final position is the unweighted mean of all IC positions. The main difference to the previous model is that additional coalition parties which are not responsible for policy $area_k$ are left aside. $Portfolio_k$ is based on the minister variables p201-p218, and up to five portfolios can be specified as substitutes.
unanimity	Position under unanimity rule *Notes*: The rationale of this model is that the midpoint between the two utmost coalition parties m and n represents the compromise each one is willing to accept. Any deviation would disadvantage one party leading to a blocking of decisions.
special_aspm (USA only)	Negotiated position of the President and the Congress Notes: The ideological position of the Democrats and Republicans is constant for each member of the Congress. The Position of the agenda setter is estimated in four steps: first, the median of the House is obtained. Starting from the party with a majority in the House, the filibuster pivot of the Senate is estimated taken x times the position of the minority party into account until a filibuster proof majority is achieved. Thirdly, Conference Committees establish a compromise which is "offered" to the President in the final step.

Step 4.2 Minority Governments

Minority governments lack a majority of seats in the legislative chamber. Within the ASPM they are modeled as "minimal connected winning coalitions" (MCWC) (Axelrod 1970): Starting from the government position as defined above, and based on its (cumulative) seat share, the ideologically closest opposition parties are included until the MCWC's seat share is > 50% of total seats in the legislative chamber. In a few countries, however, some parties may be viewed by established parties as unsuitable for cooperation (*cordon sanitaire*). The framework allows for the specification of up to five parties to be excluded from the MCWC by using the five-digit party code (refer to Section Two of the codebook for party codes). POS_GOV then represents the mean weighted by seat share of the MCWC. Three options for minority(…) are available:

Options for minority(…)	**Description**
no	No minimal connected winning coalition is estimated
yes;antisys:no	A minimal connected winning coalition is estimated
yes;antisys:party1,…,party5	As above, but parties 1 to 5 are excluded from MCWC (*cordon sanitaire*)

Step 4.3 Veto Players

The final specification in Step 4 concerns the actors included for the estimation of the veto player range (VP_RANGE). Any of the following actors may be taken into account (separated by a comma).

Options for vp(…)	**Description**
gov	The two utmost government parties
1ch	1st chamber median
2ch	2nd chamber median
pres	Position of the president
special_aspm	Special cases France, Switzerland and USA only (see below)

If a minority government is specified in Step 4.2 the opposition parties included in the "minimal connected winning coalition" are considered in the estimation of the utmost government parties.

For France, Switzerland, and the USA the option special_aspm is available:

- France: for the 4th Republic only the government parties are considered. For the 5th Republic in times *without* cohabitation the included actors are the Government, the

Senat and the President. In times of cohabitation the veto player range is solely made up of the Government and the Senate (Jahn 2016, Ch. 4.1.5).

- Switzerland: when specified the veto player range includes the government, both chambers, and – in addition – the people's position (*Volksposition*) based on the referenda recommendations of the parties (Jahn 2016, Ch. 4.2.2), which takes into account how many times in a given time period a party's recommendation is in line with the final result. Make sure the file swi_referenda.dta is present in the subfolder /datasets in this case.
- USA: if specified in conjunction with gov(special_aspm) instead of the median the filibuster proof position of the Senate is taken into account (Jahn 2016, Ch. 4.2.1). Furthermore an additional veto player range is estimated excluding the House, because it has no say in the ratification of international treaties according to the Treaty Clause of the Constitution.

Step 5. Inspection

Finally, two options – erase or keep – are available. In the first case temporary country files containing intermediate steps are erased, in the second case they are kept for inspection.

Replicating *the* Position of the EU – Variables

ESTIMATE_EU_ASPM.do generates *the* position of the EU which allows for the inclusion of a time-variant measure of the impact of the European Union, or the estimation of the ideological "misfit" between the national government and the EU in subsequent analyses. A detailed discussion and justification of the included measures is given in *Estimating* the *Position of the European Union: A Tool for Macro-Quantitative Studies* (Jahn and Düpont 2015). Before running ESTIMATE_EU_ASPM.do two prerequisites need to be fulfilled:

1. You have to run ESTIMATE_COUNTRIES_ASPM.do first in order to obtain the quarterly government positions, and the variable name must be GOV_POS (the default).
2. Because the Prime Minister's (PM) position is weighted according to measures of bargaining strength the file external_data.dta must be present in the subfolder /datasets (which it is by default).

One **general rule** applies to all estimations: missing ideological data for commissioners or members of the European Parliament is replaced by the national government position. The rationale for this decision is that those members ultimately abide more to national preferences (Hix 2002; 2004; Wonka 2007; 2008).

The input file will create a yearly and a quarterly time-series containing some or all of the following variables, and the model choices are saved within the dataset again.

Variable	Description and value labels
iso	Numeric country code (ISO 3166)
country	Country name
year	Year of observation
quarter	Quarter of observation
techq	Consecutive number of the quarters (Stata format: 0=1960q1, 1=1960q2…)
eu	Dummy: 1 = Member of the European Union (and its predecessors)
GOV_POS	Government position as previously defined
EUCOU_POS	Position of the European Council (according to the chosen model)
COMM_POS	Position of the Commission (according to the chosen model)
COUNCIL_POS	Position of the Council of Ministers (according to the chosen model)
EP_POS	Position of the European Parliament (according to the chosen model)
EU_POS	*THE* POSITION OF THE EU (according to the chosen model)

A Walkthrough for ESTIMATE_EU_ASPM.do

Step 1. Ideological Dimension

Like for the government position the ideological dimension is defined on which all actors are located. For obvious reasons, you should define the same index variable as the government estimates.

Step 2. Outfile

In Step 2 a name for the files is assigned which are stored after running the estimation. The suffixes "_quarterly" and "_yearly" will be added automagically and both will be saved in the same folder as the input files. Because the final variables will always (!) bear identical names, use the file name to distinguish the data if you run different model specifications.

Step 3. Infile Containing Government Position

Most obviously for the European Council and the Council of the European Union (but for some fallbacks as well) national (government) positions need to be present. For this reason, the *quarterly* (!) dataset containing the variable GOV_POS has to be placed in the same folder as the input file (which it is by default), and has to be referred to in this step.

Step 4. Visual Inspection

Two options – erase or keep – are available. In the first case temporary files will be erased from the folder. In the second case a temporary dataset will be saved for each institution encompassing the most important intermediate steps.

European Council

Step 5: Overriding PM's Position

By default, within the European Council the Head of States are represented by the Prime Minister's position, but may be overridden by the position of the President if the latter usually attends the meetings. Those countries need to be listed by their country code according to the official ISO classification (ISO 3166-1 Alpha-3); the same abbreviations like in Step 3 of estimating government positions are allowed (otherwise fill in no). For the ease of use the terms PM and Head of States will be used synonymously from now on.

Step 6: Decision-Making within the European Council

The predominant decision-making rules are specified for five time periods reflecting major changes of the EU (Jahn and Düpont 2015, 27): the period before the Single European Act ("Luxembourg Compromise"), the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Lisbon. The models will then be used in the inter-institutional bargaining for the corresponding time periods. The following options are available:

Options for eu_council(…)	**Description**
mean	(Unweighted) mean position of all Head of States
median	(Unweighted) median position of all Head of States
unanimity	Position under unanimity rule *Notes*: The rationale of this model is that the midpoint between the two utmost Head of States represents the compromise each one is willing to accept. Any deviation would disadvantage one PM leading to a blocking of decisions.
power	Weighted mean position of Head of States *Notes*: Four kinds of weights are used for the ASPM which are specified separately in Step 6b. The final position is the unweighted mean of all weighted positions depending on how many of the four weights are chosen.

Step 6b: Applying Weights

In conjunction with power in Step 6 four different types of weights are used for the ASPM to reflect some form of "power" of Head of States, and any combination of them (separated by a comma but without blanks) is allowed. Each weighted position is estimated separately, and the final position is the unweighted mean of the chosen ones.

Options for pmweight(…)	**Description**
population	Position weighted by $country_i$'s share of EU population (in $year_t$)
gdp	Position weighted by $country_i$'s share of EU GDP (in $year_t$)
seniority	Position weighted by seniority (individual power) *Notes*: Seniority is a maximum-standardized weight based on the number of uninterrupted quarters served as PM up until the focal quarter; this reflects the expertise individual PMs acquire through the course of time.
presidency1	Position reflecting the institutional power stemming from holding the Presidency *Notes*: The rationale of this model is that the PM holding the presidency negotiates with each other PM (unweighted mean), and the final position is the simple mean of all "negotiations".
presidency2	Like presidency1 until 2009; afterwards the rotating presidency is taken into account *Notes*: The power scores PS_n for the current and successive presidencies are defined separately in Step 6c.

Step 6c: Power Scores for the Rotating Presidency

The Lisbon Treaty established the cooperation of three successive presidencies known as presidency trios. Within rotprespower the power scores for each one of them, separated by colons, are defined (e.g. "3:1:1"). The first number is the power score of the current presidency, the second number of the preceding and the third number of the successive presidency.

Step 7: Modeling the Principal-Agent Relationship

Two options – no or principal – are available. In the first case, the European Council is practically ignored for any subsequent estimation. In the latter case, the European Council acts as the principal of the Commission and the Council of Ministers, and thereby indirectly influences the estimation of the inter-institutional bargaining. If specified, every time the final position of the Commission and the Council of Ministers is drawn halfway to the position of the European Council, i.e. $Pos_{Comm\ or\ CouMin} = (Pos_{EUCouncil} + Pos_{Comm\ or\ CouMin}) / 2$ (Jahn and Düpont 2015, Ch. 3.1).

European Commission

Step 8: Decision-Making within the European Commission

The predominant rule within the European Commission can be specified for each of the five time periods separately. The following options are available:

Options for commission(…)	**Description**
mean	(Unweighted) mean position of all Commissioners
median	(Unweighted) median position of all Commissioners
unanimity	Position under unanimity rule *Notes*: The rationale of this model is that the midpoint between the two utmost Commissioners represents the compromise each one is willing to accept. Any deviation would disadvantage one Commissioner leading to a blocking of decisions.
portfolio	Position of Commissioner(s) responsible for $portfolio_k$ *Notes*: $Portfolio_k$ is based on the variables p631-p648, and up to five portfolios can be specified as substitutes (see Step 8b). In case two or more Commissioners from different parties share responsibility for $portfolio_k$ the unweighted mean of the party positions is used. If none of the specified Commissioners is present the mean position is used as the fallback.
bargaining	Position of "minimal connected winning coalition" within the European Commission *Notes*: The "minimal connected winning coalition" takes its point of origin from the negotiated compromise (unweighted mean) of the President of the Commission and the Commissioner(s) responsible for $portfolio_k$ (see Step 8b).

Step 8b: Selecting $Portfolio_k$

If portfolio or bargaining is selected in Step 8, the portfolio(s) based on the variables p631-p648 need to be specified (see the appendix for a list of variables and the Codebook respectively). Up to five portfolios can be defined as substitutes (separated by comma but without blanks). Otherwise, the global can be left blank. Because the portfolio variables mirror the national minister portfolio variables p201-p218, it is advisable for obvious reasons to match the Commission portfolios with the national portfolios selected in ESTIMATE_COUNTRIES_ASPM.do when modelling the impact on a specific policy field.

Council of European Union (Council of Ministers)

Step 9: Decision-Making within the Council of Ministers

The predominant rule within the Council of Ministers can be specified for each of the five time periods separately either taking voting weights into account or not. A minister's position reflects the government position previously specified; for this reason, the quarterly dataset containing GOV_POS needs to be present in the same folder (see Step 3). The following options are available:

Options for council(…)	**Description**
mean_uw	Unweighted mean position of all ministers
mean	Mean position of all ministers weighted by voting weights
median_uw	Unweighted median position of all ministers
median	Median position of all ministers weighted by voting weights
unanimity	Position under unanimity rule *Notes*: The rationale of this model is that the midpoint between the two utmost ministers represents the compromise each one is willing to accept. Any deviation would disadvantage one minister leading to a blocking of decisions.
qmv1_uw	Unweighted mean position of "minimal connected winning coalition" within the Council of Ministers *Notes*: The "minimal connected winning coalition" takes its point of origin from the minister or government holding the presidency. The rationale for the unweighted mean is that every minister necessary for the MCWC is equally important because the durability depends on their participation.
qmv1	Weighted mean position of "minimal connected winning coalition" within the Council of Ministers *Notes*: Like before, but the rationale for the weighted mean is that the importance of ministers for the durability of the MCWC depends on the voting strength of the countries they represent.
qmv2_uw	Like qmv1_uw but the point of origin of the MCWC is the negotiated position of the presidency trio *Notes*: The power scores for the current, preceding and successive presidencies are identical to those defined in Step 6c. The time series of qmv1_uw and qmv2_ are identical up until 2009; following the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the presidency trios they diverge from 2010 onwards.
qmv2	Like qmv1 up until 2009; from 2010 onwards taking the rotating presidency into account *Notes*: See also the notes for qmv2_uw.

European Parliament

Step 10: Decision-Making within the European Parliament

The predominant rule within the European Parliament (EP) can be specified for each of the five time periods separately. The following options are available:

Options for euparl(...)	**Description**
mean_uw	Unweighted mean position of all parties of the EP
mean	Mean position of all members of the EP weighted by seats
median_uw	Unweighted median position of all parties of the EP
median	Median position of all members of the EP based on seats
unanimity	Position under unanimity rule *Notes*: The rationale of this model is that the midpoint between the two utmost members represents the compromise each one is willing to accept. Any deviation would disadvantage one member leading to a blocking of decisions.

The Legislative Process in the European Union

For a thorough discussion of the inter-institutional bargaining refer to Jahn and Düpont (2015, Ch. 4). This is a short reminder of the applied rules for estimating *the* position of the EU (EUPo). The legislative procedures for each of the five time periods are modelled as follows:

1. Consultation ("Luxembourg compromise", until 1987q2):

$$EUPo_{Consultation} = Pos_{Council}$$

2. Cooperation (Single European Act, 1987q3-1993q3):
   a. $Common\ Position = \frac{(Pos_{Commission} * PS_{Com} + Pos_{Council} * PS_{Council})}{PS}$
   b. $Second\ Reading = \frac{(Common\ Position + Pos_{Parliament})}{2}$
   c. $Common\ Position\ 2 = Second\ Reading, if\ closer\ than\ Common\ Position;$
      $Common\ Position, if\ Second\ Reading\ further\ away\ than\ Common\ Position$
   d. $EUPo_{Cooperation} = \frac{(Common\ Position\ 2 + Pos_{Council})}{2}$
3. Co-Decision I (Maastricht Treaty, 1993q4 - 1999q1):

$$EUPo_{Co-Decision\ I} = Common\ Position$$

4. Co-Decision II (Amsterdam Treaty, 1999q2-2009q4):

$$EUPo_{Co-Decision\ II} = \frac{(Pos_{Council} * PS_{Council} + Pos_{Parliament} * PS_{Parliament})}{PS}$$

5. Co-Decision II after Lisbon Treaty (2010q1 onwards): like Co-Decision II, but taking the presidency trio(s) into account.

Step 11: Power Scores for Obtaining the "Common Position"

Under the Single European Act the Commission is not a sovereign agenda-setter but negotiates with the Council of Ministers. Within commonpos the power scores, separated by colons, are defined (e.g. "3:1"). The first number is the power score of the Council, the second number of the Commission. A score of "1:1" equals the simple mean; any other score draws the position closer to the Council or the Commission, respectively.

Step 12: Power Scores under Co-Decision II

Under the Co-Decision II procedure the Council of Minister negotiates with members of the Parliament in conciliation committees. Within codec2 the power scores are defined like in Step 11 (e.g. "3:1"), whereby the first number is the power score of the Council, and the second number of the European Parliament.

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Appendix

A: List of Minister Variables

Variable	Description and value labels
p201	Prime Minister
p202	Deputy
p203	Minister of Foreign Affairs
p204	Minister of Defense
p205	Minister of Interior
p206	Minister of Justice*
p207	Minister of Finance
p208	Minister of Economic affairs
p209	Minister of Labor
p210	Minister of Education*
p211	Minister of Health
p212	Minister of Housing
p213	Minister of Agriculture
p214	Minister of Industry and Trade*
p215	Minister of Environment
p216	Minister of Social Affairs
p217	Minister of Public Works*
p218	Other ministers*

* Variables marked with a star are **not** present in the PIP Minister dataset.

B: List of European Commissioner Variables

Variable	Description and value labels
p631	President
p632	Vice-President
p633	Commissioner for Foreign Affairs
p634	Commissioner for Defense
p635	Commissioner for Interior
p636	Commissioner for Justice
p637	Commissioner for Finance
p638	Commissioner for Economic affairs
p639	Commissioner for Labor
p640	Commissioner for Education
p641	Commissioner for Health
p642	Commissioner for Housing
p643	Commissioner for Agriculture
p644	Commissioner for Industry and Trade
p645	Commissioner for Environment
p646	Commissioner for Social Affairs
p647	Commissioner for Public Works
p648	Other Commissioner