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Self-legitimation in the face of politicization: Why international organizations centralized public communication

Review of International Organizations (2017, online first)

Online Appendix

Table A.1: IO-years covered by the analysis

Name	Years covered		N
	First	Last	
African Civil Service Observatory (ACSO)	1991	2015	25
African Union (AU)	1963	2015	53
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)	1989	2015	27
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)	1989	2015	27
Asian Development Bank (ADB)	1966	2015	50
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)	1967	2015	49
Bank for International Settlements (BIS)	1950	2015	66
Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone (BSEC)	1993	2015	23
Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM)	1973	2015	43
Caribbean Development Bank (CDB)	1980	2015	36
Central European Initiative (CEI)	1989	2015	27
Commonwealth (COMW)	1950	2015	66
Comunidade dos Paises de Lingua Portuguesa (CPLP)	2000	2015	16
Council of Europe (CoE)	1950	2015	66
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)	1985	2015	31
Econ. and Monet./Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (CEMAC/CEUCA)	1964	2015	52
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)	1991	2015	25
European Collaboration on Measurement Standards (EUROMET)	1988	2015	28
European Free Trade Association (EFTA)	1960	2015	56
Intergovernmental Authority on (Draught and) Development (IGAD/IGADD)	1996	2015	20
Intern. Regional Org. against Plant and Animal Diseases (OIRSA)	2004	2015	12
Intern. Bureau for the Prot. of the Moselle agst. Pollution (IKSMS)	1962	2015	54
Intern. Coffee Organization (ICO)	1963	2015	53
Intern. Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)	1964	2015	52
Intern. Criminal Court (ICC)	2002	2015	14
Intern. Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO)	2001	2015	15
Intern. Monetary Fund (IMF)	1950	2015	66
Intern. Telecommunications Satellites Organization (ITSO)	2001	2015	15
Intern. Whaling Commission (IWC)	1950	2015	66
Niger Basin Authority (ABN)	1980	2015	36
Nordic Council (NC)	1993	2015	23
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)	1994	2015	22
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	1950	2015	66
North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC)	1982	2015	34
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO)	1979	2015	37
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)	1961	2015	55
Organization/Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE/CSCE)	1994	2015	22
Organization of American States (OAS)	1951	2015	65
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)	1968	2015	48
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)	1988	2015	28
Pacific Islands Forum/South Pacific Forum (PIF/SPF)	1976	2015	40
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)	2001	2015	15
South Asia Co-operative Environment Program (SACEP)	1982	2015	34
United Nations (UN)	1950	2015	66
Wassenaar Arrangement (Wassenaar)	1998	2015	18
Western European Union (WEU)	1954	2011	58
World Bank Group (WB)	1950	2015	66
World Trade Organization/General Agreement On Tariffs and Trade (WTO/GATT)	1950	2015	66

Table A.2: Codebook Communication Tasks

Category	Definition	Example
GENERAL PUBLICS	All kinds of communication that addresses a general public that typically includes laypersons; includes the production of text, pictures, radio or films etc. but also networking with mass media organizations and journalists	"Description of the present Press and Information work of the DPI: … diffusion of news via the *mass media* and the various services offered by the Press Division" (CoE, 1975: 249).
NONSTATE PUBLICS	All kinds of communication that addresses *specific publics (including networks)* of civil-society organizations and lobbies	"Among the specific groups with which the IMF engages in its outreach activities are *civil society organizations and youth leaders, trade and labor unions*…." (IMF, 2014: 70).
EXPERT PUBLICS	All kinds of communication addressing experts that have "special knowledge," typically from academia or think tanks; a focus on publication of studies and datasets	"The Directorate … uses a variety of means including … partnerships with *academia*…" (AU, 2014: 55)
COORDINATION	Internal governance of division of labor, facilitating cooperation and monitoring of various communication units and projects	"During NATO operations, the Public Information Adviser is … dealing with public information matters and … *coordinates* … public information strategies" (NATO, 2006: 102).
RESEARCH	Systematic empirical measurement of audiences, communication output and impact	"The DPI issues a periodical review of press coverage results and analyses the impact of selected events" (CoE, 1975: 252).
STRATEGIC PLANNING	Development of long-term strategies (including action plans), goals, target audiences, responsibilities and key-messages	"As requested…, the Public Information and Documentation Section (PIDS) will present a Strategic Communications Plan at the ninth session of the ASP" (ICC, 2010: 119).

Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Centralization	1853	3.546	3.257	0	12
Task Codification	1853	2.261	1.851	0	6
Departmentalization	1932	1.370	0.877	0	2
Democratic Membership	1932	4.111	4.948	-8.857	10.000
Transnational Access	1899	0.261	0.273	0.000	1.217
Protest (0/1)	1884	0.082	0.274	0	1
Protest Coverage	1884	0.129	0.502	0.000	4.248
Scandal (0/1)	1884	0.016	0.125	0	1
Scandal Coverage	1884	0.024	0.232	0.000	3.892
Local Implementation	1719	0.214	0.227	0.000	0.833
Security Area	1932	0.092	0.268	0	1
Commodities Area	1932	0.101	0.292	0	1
Development Area	1932	0.109	0.288	0	1
Environmental Issues Area	1932	0.137	0.328	0	1
Human Rights Area	1932	0.030	0.098	0	1
Financial Issues Area	1932	0.090	0.252	0	1
Technical Issues Area	1932	0.044	0.171	0	1
Trade Area	1932	0.127	0.291	0	1
Minimal Budget	1932	0.890	0.313	0	1

Table A.4: Simplified models with biannual fixed effects used for Figures 2-4

	Model 10 Used for simulated effects of *Transnational Access* (Figure 2) and *Scandal Coverage* (Figure 4)	Model 11 Used for simulated effect of *Protest Coverage* (Figure 3)
Transnational Access	1.271**	1.023*
	(0.444)	(0.409)
Protest Coverage	0.181*	0.225**
	(0.080)	(0.075)
Scandal Coverage	0.252**	0.130*
	(0.096)	(0.059)
Democratic Membership	-0.032	-0.016
	(0.030)	(0.026)
Local Implementation	-0.792	-0.601
	(0.546)	(0.504)
Development	0.730**	0.612*
	(0.278)	(0.289)
Environmental	-0.431	-0.320
	(0.391)	(0.447)
Human Rights	0.553	0.808
	(0.615)	(0.679)
Finance	0.913*	0.757#
	(0.377)	(0.402)
Technology	-2.370**	-2.510**
	(0.904)	(0.843)
Trade	0.296	0.176
	(0.405)	(0.404)
Security	0.148	0.074
	(0.526)	(0.538)
Commodities	0.482	0.529
	(0.409)	(0.431)
Minimal Budget	1.515*	1.551*
	(0.631)	(0.642)
Alpha	0.275**	0.219*
	(0.126)	(0.130)
p	0.000	0.000
chi2	12162.1	290.0
Log Likelihood	-3459.5	-2740.8
N IO-Years	1644	1291
Covered Years	1950-2015	1976-2015
N IOs	48	48

Note: Figures 2-4 are based on simulations with CLARIFY (Tomz et al., 2003) and using two slightly simplified models with biannual fixed effects and clustered standard errors (including year fixed effects and clustered standard errors CLARIFY reports a "not positive definite matrix"). The table reports coefficients from these two negative-binomial regression models. Robust standard errors clustered over IOs are given in parentheses. Results for biannual fixed effects and constant terms have been omitted. # p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5: Ordered Logit vs. Tobit Regression Estimates

	Ordered Logit				Tobit			
	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Transnational Access	1.854	2.903*	1.924	2.968*	4.110*	5.185**	4.270*	5.346**
	(1.323)	(1.299)	(1.348)	(1.334)	(1.646)	(1.831)	(1.673)	(1.885)
Protest (0/1)	1.670**	1.296**			2.424***	2.029**		
	(0.518)	(0.429)			(0.687)	(0.664)		
Scandal (0/1)	1.609*	2.399***			2.136**	3.380***		
	(0.649)	(0.717)			(0.699)	(0.773)		
Protest Coverage			0.851**	0.670**			1.265***	1.069**
			(0.290)	(0.234)			(0.356)	(0.337)
Scandal Coverage			0.652*	1.036**			0.858**	1.425***
			(0.304)	(0.355)			(0.322)	(0.389)
Democratic Membership	-0.057	-0.084	-0.060	-0.086	-0.089	-0.144	-0.092	-0.148
	(0.079)	(0.090)	(0.080)	(0.091)	(0.104)	(0.114)	(0.104)	(0.116)
Local Implementation	-2.107	-2.042	-1.992	-1.994	-2.324	-2.916	-2.192	-2.865
	(1.569)	(1.490)	(1.552)	(1.497)	(2.076)	(2.201)	(2.072)	(2.221)
Development	2.468**	2.573***	2.487**	2.584***	3.169**	3.740***	3.196**	3.774***
	(0.839)	(0.743)	(0.846)	(0.745)	(1.198)	(1.113)	(1.212)	(1.127)
Environmental	0.105	-0.076	0.164	-0.044	-0.768	-0.915	-0.719	-0.882
	(1.154)	(0.968)	(1.159)	(0.976)	(1.617)	(1.407)	(1.637)	(1.414)
Human Rights	12.728*	6.985#	12.754*	6.993#	7.033**	5.591*	6.952**	5.483*
	(6.098)	(3.771)	(6.035)	(3.921)	(2.620)	(2.526)	(2.665)	(2.579)
Finance	2.278#	2.830*	2.416*	2.883*	3.425*	4.198**	3.605*	4.290**
	(1.175)	(1.116)	(1.171)	(1.121)	(1.584)	(1.439)	(1.603)	(1.450)
Technology	-3.990*	-3.912*	-3.982*	-3.916*	-7.618**	-7.397**	-7.659**	-7.444**
	(1.550)	(1.659)	(1.555)	(1.674)	(2.351)	(2.587)	(2.379)	(2.623)
Trade	1.033	1.324	1.056	1.314	0.812	1.410	0.836	1.402
	(1.356)	(1.331)	(1.355)	(1.345)	(1.782)	(1.769)	(1.780)	(1.777)
Security	0.377	0.906	0.490	0.981	0.311	1.022	0.496	1.153
	(1.192)	(1.098)	(1.244)	(1.136)	(1.772)	(1.701)	(1.857)	(1.762)

(continued)

Table A.5: Ordered Logit vs. Tobit Regression Estimates (continued)

	Ordered Logit				Tobit			
	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Commodities	1.735	1.610	1.711	1.574	1.780	1.806	1.739	1.756
	(1.309)	(1.269)	(1.299)	(1.273)	(1.680)	(1.566)	(1.692)	(1.578)
Minimal Budget	3.648#	3.647#	3.613#	3.629#	5.065*	5.007*	5.059*	5.024*
	(1.970)	(2.080)	(1.944)	(2.066)	(2.073)	(2.135)	(2.079)	(2.141)
Cut1	2.876	3.659	2.926	3.669				
	(2.452)	(2.773)	(2.430)	(2.771)				
Cut2	3.017	3.816	3.067	3.826				
	(2.478)	(2.811)	(2.456)	(2.810)				
Cut3	4.343#	5.109#	4.382#	5.111#				
	(2.625)	(2.916)	(2.600)	(2.912)				
Cut4	4.496#	5.223#	4.534#	5.224#				
	(2.562)	(2.874)	(2.538)	(2.872)				
Cut5	5.673*	6.373*	5.698*	6.363*				
	(2.607)	(2.934)	(2.581)	(2.930)				
Cut6	5.693*	6.389*	5.718*	6.379*				
	(2.608)	(2.934)	(2.582)	(2.930)				
Cut7	6.741**	7.530*	6.754**	7.509*				
	(2.615)	(2.994)	(2.589)	(2.992)				
Cut8	8.342**	8.855**	8.342**	8.815**				
	(2.667)	(3.165)	(2.643)	(3.167)				
Cut9	10.375***	11.168***	10.366***	11.109***				
	(2.622)	(2.831)	(2.594)	(2.831)				
Sigma					2.857***	2.914***	2.870***	2.931***
					(0.265)	(0.249)	(0.261)	(0.249)
Log Likelihood	-1940.5	-2482.15	-1947.0	-2490.8	-2566.6	-3249.3	-2571.0	-3256.3
N IO-Years	1291	1644	1291	1644	1291	1644	1291	1644
Covered Years	1976-2015	1950-2015	1976-2015	1950-2015	1976-2015	1950-2015	1976-2015	1950-2015
N IOs	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48

Note: The table reports coefficients from ordered logit and tobit models with year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered over IOs are given in parentheses. Results for year fixed effects and constant terms have been omitted. # p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6: Dimensions of Centralization (Codification and Departmentalization)

Dependent Variable	*Codification (0-6)* (Negative Binomial Regression)				*Departmentalization (0-2)* (Ordered Logit)			
Model	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
Transnational Access	0.914**	1.079**	0.933**	1.100**	0.955	2.147	0.959	2.151
	(0.353)	(0.351)	(0.356)	(0.356)	(1.330)	(1.412)	(1.333)	(1.415)
Protest (0/1)	0.257*	0.194*			1.242#	1.254*		
	(0.105)	(0.090)			(0.642)	(0.595)		
Scandal (0/1)	0.203#	0.370***			13.316***	15.010***		
	(0.107)	(0.110)			(0.825)	(0.929)		
Protest Coverage			0.127*	0.101*			0.931*	0.940**
			(0.050)	(0.045)			(0.375)	(0.351)
Scandal Coverage			0.087*	0.152**			16.466***	21.555***
			(0.040)	(0.047)			(1.041)	(1.410)
Democratic Membership	-0.009	-0.021	-0.009	-0.022	0.032	0.001	0.032	0.001
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.070)
Local Implementation	-0.281	-0.404	-0.261	-0.401	-0.163	-0.653	-0.154	-0.634
	(0.461)	(0.491)	(0.461)	(0.492)	(1.793)	(1.786)	(1.794)	(1.785)
Development	0.356	0.462#	0.358	0.468#	3.894*	4.500*	3.883*	4.480*
	(0.268)	(0.253)	(0.269)	(0.253)	(1.804)	(2.032)	(1.806)	(2.024)
Environmental	-0.226	-0.241	-0.220	-0.235	0.443	0.267	0.450	0.272
	(0.421)	(0.416)	(0.422)	(0.414)	(1.477)	(1.329)	(1.481)	(1.329)
Human Rights	0.418	0.293	0.405	0.274	41.622*	11.535	41.270*	11.499
	(0.300)	(0.318)	(0.302)	(0.322)	(16.796)	(7.944)	(16.423)	(7.929)
Finance	0.542	0.695*	0.563#	0.707*	4.647	4.818**	4.672	4.820**
	(0.335)	(0.302)	(0.336)	(0.303)	(2.891)	(1.704)	(2.914)	(1.706)
Technology	-1.649*	-1.526*	-1.645*	-1.522*	-3.007*	-3.397*	-3.012*	-3.402*
	(0.765)	(0.764)	(0.765)	(0.765)	(1.474)	(1.600)	(1.477)	(1.602)
Trade	0.068	0.192	0.071	0.190	1.109	1.253	1.089	1.243
	(0.328)	(0.324)	(0.327)	(0.324)	(1.513)	(1.516)	(1.524)	(1.523)
Security	0.809*	0.931**	0.832*	0.952**	0.355	0.669	0.329	0.651
	(0.374)	(0.301)	(0.367)	(0.302)	(1.364)	(1.225)	(1.361)	(1.226)

(continued)

Table A.6: Dimensions of Centralization (Task Codification and Departmentalization) (continued)

Dependent Variable	*Codification (0-6)* (Negative Binomial Regression)				*Departmentalization (0-2)* (Ordered Logit)			
Model	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
Commodities	0.910**	0.965**	0.904**	0.958**	0.596	0.404	0.591	0.399
	(0.319)	(0.322)	(0.318)	(0.322)	(1.274)	(1.206)	(1.277)	(1.207)
Minimal Budget	1.112#	1.137#	1.111#	1.138#	2.690*	2.748*	2.696*	2.750*
	(0.642)	(0.654)	(0.643)	(0.654)	(1.197)	(1.213)	(1.197)	(1.211)
Alpha (over-dispersion)	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***				
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)				
Cut1					2.661	3.828#	2.659	3.823#
					(2.069)	(2.114)	(2.072)	(2.113)
Cut2					3.347#	4.560*	3.346#	4.556*
					(2.014)	(2.082)	(2.018)	(2.082)
Log Likelihood	-2201.9	-2778.5	-2203.7	-2780.2	-717.2	-1005.8	-715.6	-1004.3
N IO-Years	1291	1644	1291	1644	1291	1644	1291	1644
Covered Years	1976-2015	1950-2015	1976-2015	1950-2015	1976-2015	1950-2015	1976-2015	1950-2015
N IOs	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48

Note: The table reports coefficients from negative binomial regression and ordered logit models with year fixed effects in all models except 21 and 22. In Model 21 decade fixed effects for the periods 1960-1969 and 1970-1979 were included (plus biannual fixed effects for all years 1980-2015) to allow maximum likelihood to convergence. In Model 22 biannual fixed effects (for all years 1982-2015) were included for the same reason. Robust standard errors clustered over IOs are given in parentheses. Results for year fixed effects and constant terms have been omitted. # p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.7: Negative Binomial Regression of Centralization using alternative time lags of explanatory variables (1)

Model	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37
Lag of explanatory variables	t-1	t-2	t-3	t-4	t-5	t-1	t-2	t-3	t-4	t-5
Explanatory variables										
Transnational Access	0.975*	0.943*	0.912*	0.895*	0.871*	1.225**	1.190**	1.152**	1.133**	1.112*
	(0.402)	(0.405)	(0.410)	(0.419)	(0.431)	(0.434)	(0.434)	(0.436)	(0.439)	(0.447)
Protest (0/1)	0.468**	0.452**	0.437**	0.418**	0.412**	0.377*	0.361*	0.343*	0.326*	0.319#
	(0.144)	(0.142)	(0.145)	(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.159)	(0.158)	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.164)
Scandal (0/1)	0.324*	0.309*	0.304*	0.283*	0.254#	0.611***	0.599***	0.631**	0.645**	0.622**
	(0.127)	(0.122)	(0.137)	(0.142)	(0.139)	(0.176)	(0.175)	(0.192)	(0.207)	(0.202)

(continued)

Table A.7: Negative Binomial Regression of Centralization using alternative time lags of explanatory variables (1)

Model	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37
Lag of explanatory variables	t-1	t-2	t-3	t-4	t-5	t-1	t-2	t-3	t-4	t-5
Control variables										
Democratic Membership	-0.015	-0.015	-0.016	-0.017	-0.017	-0.031	-0.031	-0.032	-0.032	-0.032
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Local Implementation	-0.632	-0.674	-0.708	-0.745	-0.780	-0.796	-0.822	-0.841	-0.864	-0.889#
	(0.502)	(0.499)	(0.497)	(0.493)	(0.488)	(0.537)	(0.534)	(0.531)	(0.526)	(0.520)
Development	0.599*	0.603*	0.611*	0.629*	0.644*	0.717**	0.713**	0.714**	0.721**	0.733**
	(0.288)	(0.282)	(0.279)	(0.276)	(0.276)	(0.276)	(0.271)	(0.268)	(0.267)	(0.267)
Environmental	-0.335	-0.359	-0.379	-0.386	-0.400	-0.439	-0.460	-0.477	-0.479	-0.486
	(0.441)	(0.433)	(0.427)	(0.419)	(0.412)	(0.389)	(0.385)	(0.382)	(0.377)	(0.372)
Human Rights	0.821	0.844	0.873	0.899	0.935	0.577	0.598	0.623	0.641	0.677
	(0.664)	(0.702)	(0.741)	(0.788)	(0.845)	(0.599)	(0.622)	(0.647)	(0.676)	(0.716)
Finance	0.704#	0.670#	0.638	0.619	0.595	0.889*	0.856*	0.828*	0.806*	0.784*
	(0.398)	(0.397)	(0.399)	(0.400)	(0.403)	(0.375)	(0.376)	(0.380)	(0.382)	(0.385)
Technology	-2.512**	-2.480**	-2.444**	-2.393**	-2.335**	-2.371**	-2.348**	-2.323**	-2.289**	-2.236*
	(0.837)	(0.832)	(0.826)	(0.820)	(0.815)	(0.897)	(0.893)	(0.889)	(0.886)	(0.884)
Trade	0.161	0.153	0.148	0.131	0.119	0.292	0.277	0.265	0.243	0.230
	(0.402)	(0.397)	(0.393)	(0.389)	(0.385)	(0.402)	(0.397)	(0.392)	(0.388)	(0.385)
Security	0.005	0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.006	0.097	0.087	0.080	0.074	0.071
	(0.516)	(0.511)	(0.506)	(0.503)	(0.502)	(0.510)	(0.507)	(0.505)	(0.503)	(0.504)
Commodities	0.539	0.518	0.498	0.499	0.503	0.498	0.473	0.450	0.445	0.445
	(0.428)	(0.422)	(0.416)	(0.409)	(0.403)	(0.407)	(0.403)	(0.401)	(0.396)	(0.392)
Minimal Budget	1.559*	1.548*	1.534*	1.556*	1.579*	1.519*	1.503*	1.487*	1.506*	1.522*
	(0.639)	(0.633)	(0.628)	(0.620)	(0.613)	(0.630)	(0.625)	(0.620)	(0.614)	(0.608)
Alpha (over-dispersion)	0.212*	0.206*	0.198*	0.194**	0.187**	0.266**	0.258**	0.247**	0.239**	0.230**
	(0.130)	(0.128)	(0.125)	(0.123)	(0.120)	(0.125)	(0.123)	(0.121)	(0.119)	(0.117)
Log Likelihood	-2734.062	-2695.507	-2654.670	-2613.208	-2567.716	-3451.080	-3378.771	-3301.388	-3222.853	-3142.609
N IO-Years	1291	1265	1239	1214	1188	1644	1600	1555	1511	1467
Covered Years	1976-2015	1976-2015	1976-2015	1976-2015	1976-2015	1950-2015	1950-2015	1950-2015	1950-2015	1950-2015
N IOs	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48

Note: The table reports coefficients from negative-binomial regression models with year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered over IOs in parentheses. Results for year fixed effects and constant terms have been omitted. # p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.8: Negative Binomial Regression of Centralization using alternative time lags of explanatory variables (2)

Model	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47
Lag of explanatory variables	t-1	t-2	t-3	t-4	t-5	t-1	t-2	t-3	t-4	t-5
Explanatory variables										
Transnational Access	1.022*	0.987*	0.960*	0.940*	0.912*	1.270**	1.231**	1.198**	1.177**	1.153*
	(0.409)	(0.412)	(0.416)	(0.425)	(0.437)	(0.443)	(0.443)	(0.444)	(0.448)	(0.455)
Protest Coverage	0.228**	0.220**	0.208**	0.199**	0.198*	0.183*	0.176*	0.164*	0.158#	0.157#
	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.083)	(0.085)	(0.086)
Scandal Coverage	0.127*	0.118*	0.107#	0.093	0.079	0.268**	0.260**	0.259*	0.254*	0.242*
	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.108)	(0.113)	(0.112)

(continued)

Table A.8: Negative Binomial Regression of Centralization using alternative time lags of explanatory variables (2 - continued)

Model	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47
Lag of explanatory variables	t-1	t-2	t-3	t-4	t-5	t-1	t-2	t-3	t-4	t-5
Control variables										
Democratic Membership	-0.016	-0.017	-0.018	-0.018	-0.018	-0.032	-0.033	-0.034	-0.033	-0.033
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Local Implementation	-0.602	-0.645	-0.691	-0.725	-0.762	-0.790	-0.817	-0.848	-0.867	-0.892#
	(0.504)	(0.501)	(0.499)	(0.495)	(0.491)	(0.544)	(0.541)	(0.539)	(0.533)	(0.527)
Development	0.611*	0.615*	0.626*	0.639*	0.652*	0.729**	0.724**	0.727**	0.731**	0.740**
	(0.289)	(0.284)	(0.279)	(0.277)	(0.278)	(0.278)	(0.273)	(0.269)	(0.268)	(0.268)
Environmental	-0.320	-0.345	-0.366	-0.378	-0.392	-0.430	-0.451	-0.469	-0.479	-0.486
	(0.446)	(0.439)	(0.432)	(0.423)	(0.415)	(0.391)	(0.387)	(0.383)	(0.378)	(0.373)
Human Rights	0.802	0.825	0.849	0.876	0.913	0.549	0.569	0.590	0.609	0.646
	(0.679)	(0.717)	(0.756)	(0.800)	(0.854)	(0.614)	(0.636)	(0.660)	(0.687)	(0.724)
Finance	0.756#	0.719#	0.685#	0.659	0.631	0.915*	0.880*	0.849*	0.822*	0.797*
	(0.402)	(0.401)	(0.403)	(0.404)	(0.407)	(0.377)	(0.377)	(0.381)	(0.382)	(0.386)
Technology	-2.510**	-2.480**	-2.438**	-2.385**	-2.327**	-2.371**	-2.350**	-2.320**	-2.281*	-2.228*
	(0.842)	(0.837)	(0.831)	(0.825)	(0.819)	(0.904)	(0.900)	(0.896)	(0.893)	(0.891)
Trade	0.174	0.164	0.156	0.138	0.122	0.296	0.279	0.264	0.242	0.224
	(0.404)	(0.399)	(0.395)	(0.391)	(0.387)	(0.404)	(0.399)	(0.395)	(0.391)	(0.389)
Security	0.071	0.059	0.056	0.046	0.032	0.147	0.132	0.124	0.111	0.102
	(0.538)	(0.530)	(0.524)	(0.518)	(0.515)	(0.525)	(0.520)	(0.517)	(0.513)	(0.512)
Commodities	0.529	0.508	0.486	0.486	0.490	0.484	0.458	0.433	0.427	0.427
	(0.430)	(0.424)	(0.418)	(0.410)	(0.404)	(0.409)	(0.405)	(0.402)	(0.397)	(0.393)
Minimal Budget	1.552*	1.541*	1.528*	1.549*	1.574*	1.516*	1.501*	1.485*	1.502*	1.519*
	(0.642)	(0.636)	(0.630)	(0.622)	(0.615)	(0.631)	(0.625)	(0.620)	(0.613)	(0.608)
Alpha (over-dispersion)	0.218*	0.212**	0.206**	0.200**	0.192**	0.274**	0.265**	0.256**	0.247**	0.237**
	(0.130)	(0.128)	(0.125)	(0.123)	(0.120)	(0.126)	(0.124)	(0.122)	(0.120)	(0.118)
Log Likelihood	-2739.723	-2700.705	-2660.532	-2618.056	-2571.768	-3457.825	-3385.134	-3308.491	-3229.321	-3148.408
N IO-Years	1291	1265	1239	1214	1188	1644	1600	1555	1511	1467
Covered Years	1976-2015	1976-2015	1976-2015	1976-2015	1976-2015	1950-2015	1950-2015	1950-2015	1950-2015	1950-2015
N IOs	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48

Note: The table reports coefficients from negative-binomial regression models with year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered over IOs in parentheses. Results for year fixed effects and constant terms have been omitted. # p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

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