Online Appendix

Page No.

Online Appendix A: Table of SPA Experiments **3**

Table A1: Experiments Using Subnational Performance Assessments 4

Online Appendix B: List of Indicators for Specialized and Full MBEI **7**

Figure B1: List of MBEI Indicators 7

Table B1: List of Indicators for Specialized DAO and GAD Indexes 10

Online Appendix C: Sample Slides of Facilitation **11**

Figure C1: Sample Slides from the Facilitation Workshop 11

Online Appendix D: Elements of Facilitation and Qualitative Examples **12**

Figure D1: Elements of Facilitation and Qualitative Examples 15

Online Appendix E: Additional Empirical Results (Main Results) **16**

Figure E1: Share of Treated Townships and Change in Core MBEI 16

Table E1: Balance on Outcome and Control Variables 17

Table E2: Impact of Facilitation on Weighted Core Index 18

Table E3: Robust to Use of Only Survey Data and Only Administrative Data 19

Table E4: Analysis at Township Level 20

Table E5: Impact of Facilitation on New 2020 Indicators 22

Table E6: Impact of Facilitation on New 2020 Indicators 22

Table E7: Impact of Facilitation by Subindex 23

Online Appendix F: Additional Empirical Results (Decentralization) 24

Figure F1: Diff-in-Diff Results by Agency and State/Region 24

Table F1: Direct Comparison of DAO and GAD Indicators (Triple Interaction) . . . 25

Table F2: Impact of Facilitation by Agency on New 2020 Indicators 26

Table F3: Direct Comparison of DAO and GAD Indicators (Triple Interaction w/ Clustered SEs) 27

Table F4: Impact of Facilitation by Agency (Clustered SEs) 28

Table F5: Impact of Facilitation by Agency and Data Type on Core Indicators . . . 29

Table F6: Impact of Facilitation by Agency and Data Type on new Indicators 30

Table F7: Impact of Facilitation by Agency (Township Level) 31

Table F8: Impact of Facilitation on New Indicators (Township Level) 32

Online Appendix A: Table of SPA Experiments

Table A1 Experiments using Subnational Performance Assessments

Paper	Country	National or Subnational Sample	Treatment Population (Citizens, Politicians, or Bureaucrats)	How was informational treatment presented?	Was presentation interactive? (group discussions, feedback, etc.)	Outcome Variables	Significance and Direction of Main Effects
Adida et. al. (2020)	Benin	Subnational	Citizens	Video with performance information	No	Incumbent vote share	Positive effects of information on rewarding good performers and punishing bad ones if combined with salience and coordination conditions
Anderson et. al. (2019)	China	National	Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Citizens	PITI index information---Annual index release, online (Weibo and Wechat) and mail to agencies	No	Noncompliance to central government mandate to release pollution info (PITI index scores)	Positive
Arias et. al. (2018)	Mexico	Subnational	Citizens	Flyers with information on local funding and malfeasance	No	Beliefs on incumbent party malfeasance and party vote share	Heterogenous effects on voter beliefs over malfeasance and positive effect on incumbent party vote share by priors
Arias et. al. (2018)	Mexico	Subnational	Citizens	Flyers with local and comparative information on local funding and malfeasance	No	Beliefs on incumbent party malfeasance and party vote share	Null effects of both the local and comparative information treatment on party vote share
Banerjee et. al. (2011)	India	Subnational	Citizens	Report Cards via door-to-door distribution	No	Voter knowledge, voter perceptions, Turnout, Vote-buying	Null effects on voter knowledge and voter perceptions, but higher turnout and reduced vote-buying
Boas and Hidalgo (2019)	Brazil	Subnational	Citizens	Survey information treatment on municipal performance to eradicate mosquito borne illnesses	No	Intention to vote for incumbent	Null on intention to vote for incumbent
Boas, Hidalgo, and Melo (2019)	Brazil	Subnational	Citizens	Fliers with information on whether mayor's accounts were accepted or rejected (implying malfeasance)	No	Vote choice	Null effects on vote choice for mayor
Buntaine et. al. (2018)	Uganda	Subnational	Citizens	Text messages on budget corruption	No	Vote choice	Increased likelihood to vote for incumbent chair in good news condition, Null effects on likelihood to vote for incumbent chair in bad news

Paper	Country	National or Subnational Sample	Treatment Population (Citizens, Politicians, or Bureaucrats)	How was informational treatment presented?	Was presentation interactive? (group discussions, feedback, etc.)	Outcome Variables	Significance and Direction of Main Effects
Chong et. al. (2013)	Peru	Subnational	Citizens	Various messages encouraging recycling	Yes	Participation in recycling	Null
Chong et. al. (2015)	Mexico	Subnational	Citizens	Flyers, treatment was information on mayoral corruption, versus no info and placebo info flyers	No	Beliefs and Opinions about Politicians, Turnout	Null on beliefs, Negative effects on turnout
Collier and Vicente (2014)	Nigeria	Subnational	Citizens	Areas exposed to anti-violence campaigns	Yes	Perceptions of violence, empowerment, Turnout	Diminished perceptions of violence, increased empowerment, Increased turnout
Cruz et. al. ৩(2021)	Philippines	Subnational	Citizens	Flyer with information about local development fund under jurisdiction of local mayor, and similar treatment including candidate statement on funds	No	Support for incumbent	Negative effect of treatment 1 on support for incumbent, Positive effect of treatment 2 on salience and vote-buying offers
Fujiwara and Wantchekon (2013)	Benin	Subnational	Citizens	Townhall meetings with dialogue and debate	Yes	Clientelism and vote-buying	Positive effects on clientelist index (lower clientelism) and null effects on vote-buying
Gottlieb (2016)	Mali	Subnational	Citizens	2-3 day civics course with capacity treatment (information on local government responsibilities and performance standards) + Performance treatment (relative village performance compared to neighbors)	No	Voter expectations of politician performance	Positive effect of capacity, positive effect of performance for high performing villages
Grossman and Michelitch (2018)	Uganda	Subnational	Citizens	Meeting of citizens with fliers, posters, and calendars	No	Politician performance measures (such as a performance mean index)	Null, but positive for competitive districts
Humphreys and Weinstein (2012)	Uganda	Subnational	Citizens	Workshops, scorecards, pamphlets	Yes	Citizens attitudes and perceived voting behavior towards MPs, MP performance	Positive voter attitudes, Negative but null workshop effect

Paper	Country	National or Subnational Sample	Treatment Population (Citizens, Politicians, or Bureaucrats)	How was informational treatment presented?	Was presentation interactive? (group discussions, feedback, etc.)	Outcome Variables	Significance and Direction of Main Effects
Kendall et. al. (2015)	Italy	Subnational	Citizens	Direct mailing and phone calls for a competence (valence) flyer or a political stance (ideology) flyer	No	Vote choice, Beliefs about incumbent and opponent	Increase in incumbent vote share, Ideology treatment shifts perceived ideology of incumbent to the left and opponent to the right, Information on valence increases perceived competence
Lieberman et. al. (2014)	Kenya	Subnational	Citizens	Test results of children and information on strategies to improve child performance, per household	No	Parents' active participation in child's education	Null
Platas and Raffler (2020)	Uganda	Subnational	Citizens	Privately viewed videos (good and bad news defined as congruence between candidate and citizen views for policy and expert assessment for image)	No	Turnout, Vote Choice (propensity to vote)	Turnout positive for good news not significant for bad news, positive effect on vote choice for good news null effect for bad news
Raffler (2020)	Uganda	Subnational	Politicians and Bureaucrats	Training Workshop on roles and responsibilities of politicians and bureaucrats as well as training to improve monitoring capacity	Yes	Knowledge and Political Oversight	Positive effects on both Knowledge and Oversight

Online Appendix B: List of Indicators for Specialized and Full MBEI

Figure B1 List of MBEI Indicators



Note: The following figure lists all of the indicators included in the 2020 MBEI. This figure is available in pages 22-24 of the report.

5 Subindex 5: Infrastructure

CORE INDICATORS

1. Hours out of service of telephone and other telecommunication services last month (hours)
2. Hours of power outage last month (hours)
3. Number of days in a year that roads are blocked by flooding, mud, or poor road conditions (#)
4. Firm was damaged by an unexpected power outage or unstable power supply (% agree)
5. Number of power outages experienced last month (#)
6. Time between registering for and receiving electrical service (aggregate, days)
7. Urban roads are good or very good (%)
8. Telephones are good or very good (%)
9. Electricity is good or very good (%)
10. Internet is good or very good (%)
11. Water quality is good or very good (%)
12. Hospital/clinic quality is good or very good (%)
13. Mobile phones per capita (%)

NEW INDICATORS

14. Number of the last five outages that were announced in advance (#)
15. Rural roads are good or very good (%)
16. Time between registering for and receiving electrical service (private home meter, days)
17. Time between registering for and receiving electrical service (public home meter, days)
18. Time between registering for and receiving electrical service (private business meter, days)
19. Time between registering for and receiving electrical service (public business meter, days)
20. Households with access to water during dry season (%)
21. Individuals aged 15 and above who used the internet in the last seven days (%)
22. Railroad density (km/km2)
23. Road density, weighted by road type (km/km2)
24. Share of households with a public or community electrical grid (%)

6 Subindex 6: Transparency

CORE INDICATORS

1. Accessibility of state or region's budget (%)
2. Accessibility of Union laws (%)
3. Accessibility of implementing documents and regulations of Union ministries (%)
4. Accessibility of state/region laws and regulations (%)
5. Accessibility of new infrastructure plans (%)
6. Accessibility of public investment plans such as hydropower projects, airports, and highways (%)
7. Accessibility of land-use allocation plans and maps (%)
8. Accessibility of planning documents for the development of state/region industries and sectors (%)
9. Accessibility of forms for completing regulatory procedures (%)
10. Predictability of changes in laws and regulations at the Union level (%)
11. Predictability of changes in regulations at the S/R level (%)
12. Predictability of implementation rules at the S/R level (%)
13. Share of GAD documents with information publicly posted (%)
14. Share of DAO documents with information publicly posted (%)

NEW INDICATORS

15. Share of DAO documents with examples provided
16. Share of DALMS documents with examples provided
17. Share of DALMS documents with information publicly posted
18. Ease of acquiring information on DAO schedule of fees (score of 1–3)
19. Transparency survey score for government websites (possible range: 0 to 15)

7 Subindex 7: Favoritism in Policy

CORE INDICATORS

1. No Favoritism by local authorities towards businesses with strong connections (%)
2. Favoritism in land access (%)
3. Favoritism in loan access (%)
4. Favoritism in mineral exploitation licenses (%)
5. Favoritism in simpler administrative procedures (%)
6. Favoritism in state agency contracts (%)
7. Favoritism in information access (%)

NEW INDICATORS

8. Other privileges and favoritism (%)

8 Subindex 8: Environmental Compliance

CORE INDICATORS

1. Pollution has a slight or no negative effect on the firm's business prospects (%)
2. Overall environmental quality is good (%)
3. Local authorities take timely action to deal with pollution (%)
4. State support for saving water (%)
5. State support for waste recycling (%)
6. Purpose of government inspections is to protect society and the environment (% agree)
7. Households with improved toilet sanitation (%)

NEW INDICATORS

8. State support for reducing air pollution (%)
9. State support for reducing water pollution (%)
10. State support for saving electricity (%)
11. Number of garbage trucks per 10,000 people (#)
12. Road transport carbon intensity of the economy

9 Subindex 9: Labor Recruitment

CORE INDICATORS

1. Ease of recruiting rank-and-file manual workers (%)
2. Ease of recruiting technicians (%)
3. Ease of recruiting accountants (%)
4. Ease of recruiting supervisors (%)
5. Ease of recruiting managers (%)
6. Primary school enrollment rate (%)
7. Middle school enrollment rate (%)

NEW INDICATORS

8. Firm needs to train new employees (%)
9. Quality of local labor meets the firm's needs (%)
10. Number of days after hiring before employee can do the job (#)
11. High school enrollment rate (%)
12. Labor exchange office placements per 10,000 people (#)

10 Subindex 10: Law and Order

CORE INDICATORS

1. If an official breaks the law, I can appeal to a higher level for resolution
(%)
2. When violations of the law are discovered, officials will discipline the offending staff (%)
3. Legal system will uphold property rights and contracts (% agree)
4. Business disputes are heard by courts at all levels in the state or region (% agree)
5. Court hears/resolves economic cases quickly in the state or region (% agree)
6. Court enforces economic cases quickly in the state or region (% agree)
7. State or region legal aid agencies support businesses when disputes arise (% agree)
8. Judgements by the court are fair (% agree)
9. The security situation is good (% agree)
10. Victim of crime last year (%)
11. Reported to the local police (%)
12. Total number of selected crimes per 10,000 citizens per year (#, 2018)

NEW INDICATORS

13. Number of judges per 10,000 citizens (#, 2018)
14. Number of riots and protests per 10,000 citizens (#, 2014-2017)
15. Number of armed clashes per 10,000 citizens per year (#, 2018)

Table B1 List of Indicators for Specialized DAO and GAD Indexes

Development Affairs Office Index	General Administration Department Index
Favoritism in simpler administrative procedures (%) (Subindex 3: Post-Entry Regulation)	Favoritism in land access (%) (Subindex 7: Favoritism in Policy)
Fees are listed publicly (% agree) (Subindex 3: Post-Entry Regulation)	Accessibility of land-use allocation plans and maps (%) (Subindex 6: Transparency)
Agreement that the DAO staff was helpful and knowledgeable (%) (Subindex 1: Entry Costs)	GAD staff are helpful (%) (Subindex 3: Post-Entry Regulation)
Share of DAO documents with information publicly posted (%) (Subindex 6: Transparency)	Share of GAD documents with information publicly posted (%) (Subindex 6: Transparency)
Number of days for operating license at DAO (#) (Subindex 1: Entry Costs)	Length of time to obtain land documentation (days) (Subindex 2: Land Access and Security)
Share of documents required to obtain a DAO business operating license (%) (Subindex 1: Entry Costs)	Firm believes it has at least moderate risk of expropriation (%) (Subindex 2: Land Access and Security)
Number of inspection visits for businesses (# of examination) (Subindex 3: Post-Entry Regulation)	Firm believes it is likely to receive fair compensation in case of expropriation (%) (Subindex 2: Land Access and Security)
Doesn't take many trips to get stamps and signatures (% agree) (Subindex 3: Post-Entry)	Firm owns land and has title (%) (Subindex 2: Land Access and Security)
Paperwork is simple (% agree) (Subindex 3: Post-Entry Regulation)	Victim of crime last year (%) (Subindex 10: Law and Order)
Urban roads are good or very good (%) (Subindex 5: Infrastructure)	Reported to the local police (%) (Subindex 10: Law and Order)
Number of days in a year that roads are blocked by flooding, mud, or poor road conditions (#) (Subindex 5: Infrastructure)	Total number of selected crimes per 10,000 citizens per year (Subindex 10: Law and Order)

Online Appendix C: Sample Slides of Facilitation

Figure C1 Sample Slides from the Facilitation Workshops



(a) Diagnostics for Bago Region **(b)** Share of firms with documentation

Note: The above slides are samples from the presentation of the MBEI results in the Bago region. Panel A presents a slide for the diagnostics of Bago region along the 10 subindices. Panel B presents the breakdown of the share of firms that have acquired a variety of relevant documents .

Online Appendix D: Elements of Facilitation and Qualitative Examples

This section outlines the details of the township facilitation workshops. Officials were presented with the results of the MBEI that were tailored for the locality. Sample slides from the presentation are presented in Figure C1. Higher scores indicate better economic governance in the township. Bureaucrats can also assess their performance in any of the 10 subindices by examining their subindex scores (Malesky, Dulay and Peltovuori 2020). The standard workshop proceeded as follows: the morning sessions would include a presentation of the MBEI methodology, a definition of the subindices, and then move to the visualization of the indicators through graphs, and then finally a Q/A session. Samples of the slides presented to conference participants are displayed in Figure C1a. After showing the officials visualizations of important results, the presentations would then show sunburst graphs of the S/Rs and then the specific townships' performance. This is visualized in comparison to other S/Rs to give context to their scores. Policy recommendations related to the localities' strengths and weaknesses are also included in this presentation. The Q&A session was particularly fruitful as a vehicle for improving organizational learning. It was an exercise in active engagement and deliberation, allowing the participants to clarify issues with the MBEI that were unclear to them as well as make suggestions for future improvements to the MBEI.

The participants were engaged and critical throughout, and asked questions relating to all aspects of the presentation. For example, a participant in Hintharta asked the presenters to clarify what was meant by Environmental Compliance, and to justify the indicators used to create this subindex. Other participants focused on more statistical concerns. They asked questions on the sample size of the township and why that was sufficient for inference (Hintharta and Wakema Township Report pp.1-2). As another example, officials in Paung township in Mon State asked why the sample did not include foreign firms and how the Transparency subindex was defineed (Paung Township Report, p. 1). The Q&A also clearly facilitated acceptance of the report by working through tensions that arise between the "intuition" of the policymakers and quantitative evidence provided by the TAF team. For example, a participant said that his "gut feel" over his

townships performance on favoritism was good, especially with regard to government contracting, but the MBEI scored his township low on this subindex. The TAF team responded by saying that indeed his township scored well on contracting, but poorly on other indicators such as favoritism in land access and loan access, leading to the low overall subindex score (Hintharta and Wakema Township Report, p.1). This anecdotal example shows that in some cases intuition and quantitative evidence are consistent. This leads to increased credibility for the MBEI. Learning about the MBEI in this way was meant to facilitate the acceptance of the index and its use within the government department.

In the 12 cases with full day workshops, the workshop was broken down into two discussion sessions. First, the group would discuss the relevance of the MBEI indicators and which indicators should be changed or removed. This is where important feedback was introduced by the MBEI team, as policymakers and business owners discuss which indicators (survey questions and administrative data) matter for determining subindex scores. The participants would then brainstorm on the potential reasons behind specific subindex scores for their township. For example, the officials at the township meeting postulated that line faults, load sheds, temporary shut downs and system breakdowns were primarily responsible for the low score on infrastructure (Hintharta and Wakema Township Report, p.3). This demonstrated the value of merging knowledge of the SPAs with the on-the-ground knowledge of the bureaucrats—the SPAs provide a launching pad for them to hone in on specific relevant local issues.

The group would then discuss actions the government departments could take to improve the business environment. This group discussion was a unique opportunity for business owners from various industries to directly communicate with policymakers. For example, as a response to the infrastructural concerns noted above, the same policymakers suggested an amended budget to directly tackle these issues (Hintharta and Wakema Township Report, p.3). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the recommendations that come from policymakers seem to have had an effect on the ground: in Sagaing, policymakers were able to emphasize educating people/business firms to access information documents. In other states, policymakers committed to reduce red tape to lessen

informal payments and publish information on permit licensing procedures on social media. This direct discussion and commitment to policy change was especially important for fostering ownership of township performance on the officials; it further allowed them to move beyond information from the MBEI to focus on actual implementation and coordination (Rakhine State Report, pp.3-4).

Further anecdotal evidence corroborates the efficacy of the facilitation workshops. In one township, 0% of respondents said that the posting of fees was transparent. The facilitation workshop took place in this township. Township leaders jointly came up with a plan: they would post fee schedules outside of government offices so that they would be visible to everyone. In the second survey round, that same township was now one of only two townships where 100% of respondents reported that the posting of fees was transparent.[17]

[17]The full podcast providing more examples and qualitative evidence is here: https://asiafoundation.org/2020/12/09/hows-business-we-have-a-benchmark-for-that/

Figure D1 Elements of Facilitation and Examples of Cases

Elements of Facilitation	Quotes or Cases from MBEI Facilitation
Aids the organization in recognizing the value of externally generated, research-based knowledge	Morning sessions of facilitation workshop would include a presentation of the MBEI methodology and results followed by a questions and answers session (MBEI Workshop Reports p.3)
Establishes knowledge sharing processes, brought about by back-and-forth deliberation, where participants can learn from each others' experiences	Mandalay officials stated that sharing information with everyone and having regular public-private business meetings to identify bottlenecks and ideas for resolution was recommended. (MBEI Workshop Reports p. 7)
Brings in new, evidence-based ideas	Facilitation workshops also aim to make officials aware of what the MBEI is and how the results can be utilised. (MBEI Workshop Reports p. 3)
Allows for knowledge sharing through collaboration	The participants from Pokkoku township encouraged sharing knowledge by online system and pamphlet distribution to facilitate entry costs. (MBEI Workshop Reports p. 9)
Leads to shared goals amongst participants	Mandalay officials agreed that sharing information with everyone and having regular public-private business meetings to identify bottlenecks and ideas for resolution was recommended. This shared solution induces accountability and joint commitment. (MBEI Workshop Reports p. 7)
Orients the members of the workshop towards continuous progress in the achievement of their goals	The feedback and Q&A results are incorporated into the second round of the MBEI survey (post-facilitation), and townships will be able to see their performance once the second round results are released (MBEI Workshop Notes p. 2)

Online Appendix E: Additional Empirical Results (Main Results)

Figure E1 Share of Townships and Change in Core MBEI



Note: Regression plot of changes in MBEI at the state and region level on the share of townships treated in each state and region, controlling for population size and surface area

Table E1 Balance on Outcome and Control Variables

Variables	Observations	Facilitation Workshop		No Facilitation		Difference	p-value
		Mean	SE	Mean	SE		
Final MBEI	1,112	55.130	(0.413)	55.974	(0.351)	-0.844	(0.157)
Aggregate Unweighted Index	1,183	59.821	(0.455)	62.220	(0.301)	-2.399	(0.002)
Subindex 1: Entry Costs	1,148	7.541	(0.374)	7.787	(0.174)	-0.246	(0.569)
Subindex 2: Land Access	1,183	5.714	(0.127)	5.787	(0.095)	-0.074	(0.656)
Subindex 3: Post-Entry Regulations	1,183	5.782	(0.294)	6.328	(0.118)	-0.545	(0.128)
Subindex 4: Informal Payments	1,183	8.093	(0.223)	8.780	(0.053)	-0.687	(0.018)
Subindex 5: Infrastructure	1,183	5.342	(0.163)	5.659	(0.060)	-0.317	(0.106)
Subindex 6: Transparency	1,183	1.634	(0.139)	1.382	(0.031)	0.252	(0.129)
Subindex 7: Favoritism	1,183	8.808	(0.152)	9.147	(0.104)	-0.338	(0.113)
Subindex 8: Environmental Compliance	1,183	4.714	(0.070)	4.975	(0.134)	-0.260	(0.120)
Subindex 9: Labor Recruitment	1,146	5.216	(0.133)	4.925	(0.118)	0.290	(0.138)
Subindex 10: Law and Order	1,183	7.682	(0.072)	7.659	(0.062)	0.023	(0.817)
Owner is a University Grade=1	1,183	0.481	(0.036)	0.369	(0.029)	0.112	(0.042)
Owner is Male=1	1,183	0.757	(0.036)	0.713	(0.030)	0.043	(0.371)
Years in Operation	1,177	20.992	(0.859)	18.754	(0.847)	2.237	(0.103)
Equity above 500 Lakh=1	1,183	0.357	(0.049)	0.346	(0.044)	0.011	(0.868)
Has Formal Documentation=1	1,183	0.978	(0.007)	0.940	(0.015)	0.037	(0.052)
Employment Size in 2019	1,183	14.945	(1.886)	13.261	(1.462)	1.684	(0.486)
Manufacturing Firm	1,183	0.307	(0.041)	0.305	(0.024)	0.002	(0.969)
Area of Township	60	2.198	(0.402)	1.902	(0.274)	0.296	(0.545)
Total Population	60	195,387	(29,374)	221,149	(19,996)	-25,762	(0.471)
Literacy Rate	60	90.326	(2.366)	90.036	(1.611)	0.290	(0.920)
NLD Vote Share in 2015 (%)	59	0.561	(0.041)	0.589	(0.029)	-0.028	(0.584)
Township Population Density	60	4.716	(2.005)	2.070	(1.365)	2.646	(0.280)
Township GDP 2019	60	388,487	(151,235)	553,896	(102,953)	-165,409	(0.370)

Note: T-tests on survey data use inverse probability and post-stratification weights, which adjust for township level clustering. Variables with 60 observations are measured at the township level.

Table E2 Impact of Facilitation on Weighted Core Index

	Survey Weights				Township Cluster Standard Errors			
	Baseline	State FE	Controls	No Capital	Baseline	State FE	Controls	No Capital
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Time	4.189***	3.943***	3.861***	4.063***	4.529***	4.458***	4.327***	4.532***
	(0.588)	(0.351)	(0.353)	(0.400)	(0.626)	(0.616)	(0.598)	(0.829)
Facilitation Workshop	-0.844	-0.164	-0.221	-1.263ˆ	-0.619	-0.287	-0.168	-0.785
	(0.566)	(0.716)	(0.662)	(0.734)	(0.593)	(0.610)	(0.611)	(0.750)
Time*Workshop	2.613**	2.601***	2.488***	2.389***	2.015*	1.959*	1.866*	1.571
	(0.796)	(0.597)	(0.596)	(0.640)	(0.827)	(0.842)	(0.833)	(0.999)
Capital==1		1.419**	1.220**			1.337**	0.957ˆ	
		(0.447)	(0.434)			(0.410)	(0.480)	
State Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Township Control Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Constant	55.974***	55.264***	51.638***	53.018***	55.746***	55.201***	47.964***	45.033***
	(0.380)	(0.667)	(4.113)	(4.423)	(0.462)	(0.388)	(4.364)	(4.415)
Observations	2,312	2,312	2,312	1,464	2,312	2,312	2,312	1,464
R-squared	0.158	0.228	0.234	0.270	0.160	0.241	0.247	0.290
RMSE	.	.	.	.	6.012	5.733	5.714	5.740

Note: OLS with standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, p̂<0.1). Models 1-4 use inverse probability and post-stratification weights with standard errors clustered at the township level. Models 5-8 only cluster standard errors at the township level. Models 3, 4, 7, and 8 control for township literacy rate, GDP per capita (ln), and surface area in kilometers for townships in 2018 and 2020.

Table E3 Robust to Use of Only Survey Data and Only Administrative Data

	Only Survey Data				Only Administrative and Observational Data			
	Baseline	State FE	Controls	No Capital	Baseline	State FE	Controls	No Capital
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Time	1.879***	1.412***	1.412***	0.944*	4.005***	4.005***	4.065***	4.598***
	(0.335)	(0.335)	(0.335)	(0.357)	(0.501)	(0.429)	(0.426)	(0.520)
Facilitation Workshop	0.107	0.019	0.019	-0.862	-0.728	-0.754	-0.739	-0.320
	(0.399)	(0.499)	(0.499)	(0.551)	(0.630)	(0.572)	(0.565)	(0.649)
Time*Workshop	0.982	1.450*	1.450*	2.157**	0.907	0.907	1.013	0.378
	(0.660)	(0.577)	(0.577)	(0.675)	(0.891)	(0.763)	(0.754)	(0.875)
Capital==1		0.303	0.303			0.887*	0.534	
		(0.389)	(0.389)			(0.429)	(0.472)	
State Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Township Control Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Constant	42.289***	39.499***	39.499***	34.823***	18.662***	18.449***	10.264*	9.458^
	(0.242)	(3.371)	(3.371)	(3.153)	(0.354)	(0.335)	(3.956)	(4.894)
Observations	2,383	2,383	2,383	1,495	120	120	120	90
R-squared	0.048	0.088	0.088	0.083	0.484	0.670	0.690	0.716
RMSE	.	.	.	.	2.269	1.944	1.915	1.971

Note: OLS with standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, p̂<0.1). Models 1-4 use inverse probability and post-stratification weights with standard errors clustered at the township level. Models 5-8 report unadjusted standard errors. Models 3, 4, 7, and 8 control for township literacy rate, GDP per capita (ln), and surface area in kilometers for townships in 2018 and 2020.

Table E4 Analysis at Township Level

	DV: Unweighted Core Index			
	Baseline	State FE	Controls	Drop Capitals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time	5.709***	5.709***	5.732***	5.952***
	(0.720)	(0.660)	(0.659)	(0.790)
Facilitation Workshop	-1.260	-0.977	-0.976	-0.573
	(0.904)	(0.880)	(0.873)	(0.986)
Time*Workshop	2.054	2.054ˆ	2.146ˆ	1.190
	(1.279)	(1.174)	(1.165)	(1.328)
Capital==1		1.294ˆ	0.574	
		(0.659)	(0.728)	
State Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Township Control Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Constant	61.089***	60.676***	46.717***	42.131***
	(0.509)	(0.515)	(6.111)	(7.434)
Observations	120	120	120	90
R-squared	0.502	0.635	0.653	0.677
RMSE	3.258	2.991	2.958	2.995

Note: OLS with standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, p̂<0.1).. Model 3 and 4 controls for township literacy rate, GDP per capita (ln), and surface area in kilometers for townships in 2018 and 2020.

Table E5 Impact of Facilitation on New 2020 Indicators

	Survey Weights				Township Cluster Standard Errors			
	Baseline	State FE	Controls	No Capital	Baseline	State FE	Controls	No Capital
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Facilitation Workshop	1.963*	1.381*	1.174*	1.157	1.764	0.981	1.046ˆ	0.463
	(0.441)	(0.417)	(0.378)	(0.564)	(1.095)	(0.682)	(0.564)	(0.666)
Capital==1		1.452*	1.020*			1.467**	0.806	
		(0.323)	(0.363)			(0.485)	(0.561)	
State Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Township Control Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Constant	63.469***	61.550***	52.415***	51.621***	63.502***	63.202***	51.133***	48.508***
	(0.202)	(0.660)	(3.058)	(4.276)	(0.833)	(0.373)	(4.984)	(5.651)
Observations	1,200	1,200	1,200	756	1,200	1,200	1,200	756
R-squared	0.033	0.330	0.336	0.412	0.026	0.351	0.372	0.428
RMSE	.	.	.	.	5.029	4.130	4.069	4.076

Note: OLS with standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, p̂<0.1). Models 1-4 use inverse probability and post-stratification weights with standard errors clustered at the township level. Models 5-8 report standard errors clustered at the township level. Models 3, 4, 7, and 8 control for township literacy rate, GDP per capita (ln), and surface area in kilometers for townships in 2018 and 2020.

Table E6 Impact of Facilitation on New 2020 Indicators (Township Level)

	Only Administrative and Observational Data			
	Baseline	State FE	Controls	Drop Capitals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Facilitation Workshop	1.045ˆ	0.467	0.523	0.698ˆ
	(0.536)	(0.350)	(0.327)	(0.397)
Capital==1		0.059	-0.382	
		(0.352)	(0.360)	
State Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Township Control Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Constant	17.195***	17.363***	8.552**	11.695**
	(0.302)	(0.211)	(2.881)	(3.788)
Observations	60	60	60	45
R-squared	0.062	0.763	0.812	0.766
RMSE	1.932	1.127	1.041	1.121

Note: OLS with standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, p̂<0.1). Models 1-4 report unadjusted standard errors. Models 3, and 4 control for township literacy rate, GDP per capita (ln), and surface area in kilometers for townships in 2018 and 2020.

Table E7 Impact of Facilitation by Subindex

	DAO		GAD			Shared Responsibility				
	Entry	Post-Entry	Infra.	Land	Law	Informal	Trans.	Favoritism	Environ.	Labor
Time	-0.139	0.459***	1.553***	-0.108	-0.374***	-0.088	0.839***	0.104	0.480***	1.034***
	(0.177)	(0.125)	(0.072)	(0.103)	(0.089)	(0.064)	(0.087)	(0.187)	(0.084)	(0.139)
Facilitation Workshop	-0.185	-0.558*	-0.303ˆ	-0.167	-0.040	-0.460**	0.106	-0.348ˆ	0.181	0.380*
	(0.341)	(0.259)	(0.155)	(0.167)	(0.163)	(0.157)	(0.119)	(0.205)	(0.151)	(0.176)
Time*Workshop	0.168	0.618**	0.609***	0.233	0.310	0.722***	-0.266ˆ	0.545*	0.353*	0.231
	(0.364)	(0.190)	(0.126)	(0.210)	(0.191)	(0.193)	(0.139)	(0.269)	(0.137)	(0.236)
Capital==1	-0.194	0.410**	0.135	-0.117	-0.000	0.006	-0.001	0.191	0.544***	0.168
	(0.203)	(0.140)	(0.093)	(0.131)	(0.111)	(0.099)	(0.106)	(0.147)	(0.100)	(0.152)
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Township Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	6.962**	4.632**	5.576***	4.401**	5.535***	8.631***	0.141	9.887***	6.543***	5.451***
	(2.340)	(1.715)	(0.866)	(1.263)	(1.149)	(0.933)	(1.032)	(1.282)	(1.029)	(1.491)
Observations	2,348	2,383	2,383	2,383	2,383	2,383	2,383	2,383	2,383	2,346
R-Squared	0.230	0.270	0.553	0.025	0.073	0.173	0.233	0.041	0.332	0.142

Note: OLS with standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, p̂<0.1). All models use inverse probability and post-stratification weights and standard errors clustered at the township level and control for township literacy rate, GDP per capita (ln), and surface area in kilometers for townships in 2018 and 2020.

Online Appendix F: Additional Empirical Results (Decentralization)

Figure F1 Diff-in-Diff Results by Agency and State/Region



****

Table F1 Direct Comparison of DAO and GAD Indicators (Triple Interaction)

	Specialized Index		Survey Indicators				Observational Indicators			
	10-Point Scale		Favoritism=1		Information Posted=1		Staff Helpful=1		Share Docs %	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Time	0.599***	0.597***	-0.094**	-0.079**	0.098***	0.068**	0.177*	0.160ˆ	0.171***	0.163***
	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.033)	(0.031)
Facilitation workshop	0.237	0.197	0.014	0.017	0.020	-0.064ˆ	0.066	0.010	-0.003	-0.007
	(0.163)	(0.139)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.017)	(0.037)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.010)	(0.024)
DAO Indicator=1	-0.323***	-0.323***	-0.117***	-0.117***	0.420***	0.412***	0.037	0.022	0.016	0.012
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.056)	(0.063)	(0.014)	(0.018)
Time*Workshop	-0.134	-0.186	-0.022	-0.037	-0.020	0.022	-0.032	-0.032	0.032	0.024
	(0.225)	(0.208)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.147)	(0.138)	(0.060)	(0.055)
Time*DAO	-0.327**	-0.327**	0.121***	0.121***	0.051	0.067	0.056	0.072	-0.064	-0.060
	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.111)	(0.109)	(0.044)	(0.042)
Workshop*DAO	-0.439ˆ	-0.438ˆ	0.063ˆ	0.063ˆ	0.090	0.093	-0.070	-0.075	0.007	0.023
	(0.233)	(0.229)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.027)	(0.035)
Time*Workshop*DAO	0.651ˆ	0.651ˆ	-0.081*	-0.081*	0.034	0.025	0.074	0.079	0.020	0.004
	(0.331)	(0.329)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.189)	(0.184)	(0.089)	(0.081)
Capital=1		0.030		-0.016		0.026		-0.024		0.037ˆ
		(0.089)		(0.017)		(0.028)		(0.058)		(0.019)
State Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Township Control Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Constant	6.347***	4.757***	0.164***	0.034	0.040***	0.165	0.534***	0.091	0.011	0.021
	(0.070)	(1.154)	(0.023)	(0.154)	(0.009)	(0.312)	(0.049)	(0.601)	(0.007)	(0.246)
Observations	4,733	4,733	4,766	4,766	4,213	4,213	216	216	242	242
R-squared	0.117	0.141	0.027	0.042	0.272	0.304	0.096	0.220	0.223	0.364
RMSE	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.345	0.336	0.150	0.141

Note: OLS with standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, p̂<0.1). Models 1-6 use inverse probability and post-stratification weights with standard errors clustered at the township level. Models 7-10 use unadjusted standard errors. Models 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 control for state fixed effects township literacy rate, GDP per capita (ln), and surface area in kilometers for townships in 2018 and 2020. The specialized index is a 10-point score created by the indicators in Appendix Table B1. Favoritism is defined by "Favoritism in simpler procedures" for DAO and "Favoritism in land access for GAD." Information Posted is defined as "Fees are listed publicly for DAO" and "Accessibility of land use allocation plans and maps for GAD." Helpful is defined as "Agreement that DAO/GAD staff were helpful and knowledgeable." "Share of Documents" is defined as share of DAO/GAD documents with information publicly posted.

Table F2 Impact of Facilitation by Agency on New 2020 Indicators

	Development Affairs Organization Index				General Administrative Department Index			
	Baseline	State FE	Controls	No Capital	Baseline	State FE	Controls	No Capital
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Facilitation Workshop	0.532*	0.137	0.073	0.621*	0.186	0.161	0.118	-0.001
	(0.146)	(0.212)	(0.187)	(0.184)	(0.170)	(0.160)	(0.165)	(0.180)
Capital==1		0.024	-0.035			0.013	-0.014	
		(0.132)	(0.174)			(0.129)	(0.145)	
State Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Township Control Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Constant	6.931***	5.318***	4.745^	1.125	7.190***	6.516***	6.528**	9.968**
	(0.072)	(0.189)	(1.878)	(1.081)	(0.101)	(0.236)	(1.127)	(1.576)
Observations	1,200	1,200	1,200	756	1,200	1,200	1,200	756
R-squared	0.034	0.257	0.264	0.346	0.003	0.131	0.134	0.116

Note: OLS with standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, p̂<0.1). All models use inverse probability and post-stratification weights. Models 3, 4, 6, and 8 control for township literacy rate, GDP per capita (ln), and surface area in kilometers for townships in 2018 and 2020.

Table F3 Direct Comparison of DAO and GAD Index Indicators (Triple Interaction w/ Only Clustered SEs)

	Specialized Index		Survey Indicators			
	10-Point Scale		Favoritism=1		Information Posted=1	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Time	0.540**	0.508**	-0.103***	-0.103***	0.068*	0.050^
	(0.178)	(0.168)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Facilitation workshop	-0.010	-0.050	0.013	0.006	-0.010	-0.029
	(0.180)	(0.191)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.021)	(0.035)
DAO Indicator=1	0.103	0.073	-0.013	-0.014	0.018	0.017
	(0.314)	(0.316)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.040)
Time*Workshop	-0.672***	-0.672***	-0.110***	-0.110***	0.375***	0.367***
	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Time*DAO	0.051	0.051	0.112***	0.112***	0.130**	0.144**
	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Workshop*DAO	-0.017	-0.006	0.048	0.048	0.061	0.062
	(0.256)	(0.257)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.066)	(0.065)
Time*Workshop*DAO	0.132	0.121	-0.050	-0.050	0.039	0.036
	(0.346)	(0.345)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.112)	(0.111)
Capital=1		-0.024		-0.009		0.021
		(0.109)		(0.012)		(0.022)
State Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Township Control Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Constant	6.433***	5.317***	0.157***	0.146	0.060***	0.167
	(0.087)	(0.985)	(0.017)	(0.119)	(0.015)	(0.217)
Observations	4,767	4,767	4,800	4,800	4,245	4,245
R-squared	0.159	0.177	0.028	0.041	0.269	0.296
RMSE	1.020	1.011	0.274	0.273	0.407	0.401

Note: All models cluster standard errors at the treatment level. Models 2, 4, and 6 control for state fixed effects township literacy rate, GDP per capita (ln), and surface area in kilometers for townships in 2018 and 2020. The specialized index is a 10-point score created by the indicators in Appendix Table B1. Favoritism is defined by "Favoritism in simpler procedures" for DAO and "Favoritism in land access for GAD." Information Posted is defined as "Fees are listed publicly for DAO" and "Accessibility of land use allocation plans and maps for GAD." Helpful is defined as "Agreement that DAO/GAD staff were helpful and knowledgeable." "Share of Documents" is defined as share of DAO/GAD documents with information publicly posted.

Table F4 Impact of Facilitation by Agency (Only Clustered SEs)

	Development Affairs Organization Index				General Administrative Department Index			
	Baseline	State FE	Controls	No Capital	Baseline	State FE	Controls	No Capital
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Time	0.591*	0.590*	0.556*	0.532	0.540**	0.541**	0.512**	0.322
	(0.229)	(0.230)	(0.230)	(0.369)	(0.178)	(0.179)	(0.172)	(0.195)
Facilitation Workshop	-0.027	-0.056	0.006	0.001	-0.010	-0.121	-0.120	-0.275
	(0.197)	(0.180)	(0.167)	(0.197)	(0.180)	(0.206)	(0.195)	(0.218)
Time*Workshop	0.235	0.238	0.191	0.172	0.103	0.100	0.084	0.199
	(0.289)	(0.289)	(0.270)	(0.356)	(0.314)	(0.315)	(0.316)	(0.357)
Capital==1		0.020	0.031			0.058	-0.083	
		(0.128)	(0.150)			(0.106)	(0.121)	
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Township Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	5.761***	5.763***	6.430***	5.388**	6.433***	6.446***	3.508***	3.476***
	(0.104)	(0.111)	(1.490)	(1.669)	(0.087)	(0.113)	(1.005)	(0.935)
Observations	2,367	2,367	2,367	1,505	2,400	2,400	2,400	1,512
R-squared	0.106	0.140	0.156	0.166	0.069	0.110	0.128	0.126
RMSE	0.985	0.969	0.961	0.964	1.053	1.033	1.024	1.041

Note: OLS with township-clustered standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, p̂<0.1). Models 3, 4, 7, and 8 control for township literacy rate, GDP per capita (ln), and surface area in kilometers for townships in 2018 and 2020.

Table F5 Impact of Facilitation by Agency and Data Type on Core Indicators

	Only Survey Data				Only Administrative and Observational Data			
	DAO		GAD		DAO		GAD	
	Baseline	Controls	Baseline	Controls	Baseline	Controls	Baseline	Controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Time	0.375***	0.317***	0.359***	0.259***	0.446***	0.446***	0.385**	0.389**
	(0.083)	(0.062)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.123)	(0.126)	(0.133)	(0.128)
Facilitation Workshop	0.085	-0.010	-0.004	-0.020	0.093	0.064	0.032	-0.155
	(0.141)	(0.090)	(0.060)	(0.071)	(0.157)	(0.170)	(0.167)	(0.169)
Time*Workshop	0.038	0.146	-0.022	0.052	-0.023	-0.012	0.046	0.063
	(0.170)	(0.111)	(0.093)	(0.091)	(0.221)	(0.226)	(0.235)	(0.226)
Capital==1		0.062		0.008		0.008		-0.131
		(0.058)		(0.058)		(0.141)		(0.141)
State Fixed Effects	4.226***	4.659***	4.080***	3.861***	1.473***	1.435	2.270***	-0.346
Township Control Variables	(0.067)	(0.535)	(0.043)	(0.395)	(0.087)	(1.170)	(0.094)	(1.184)
Constant	4.198***	4.598***	4.089***	3.931***	1.473***	1.435	2.270***	-0.346
	(0.062)	(0.476)	(0.041)	(0.397)	(0.087)	(1.170)	(0.094)	(1.184)
Observations	2,383	2,383	2,383	2,383	119	119	120	120
R-squared	0.053	0.121	0.037	0.077	0.143	0.252	0.105	0.310
RMSE	.	.	.	.	0.557	0.566	0.600	0.573

Note: OLS with standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, p̂<0.1). Models 1-4 use inverse probability and post-stratification weights. Models 5-8 use report unadjusted standard errors. Models 3, 4, 6, and 8 control for township literacy rate, GDP per capita (ln), and surface area in kilometers for townships in 2018 and 2020.

Table F6 Impact of Facilitation by Agency and Data Type on New Indicators

	Only Survey Data				Only Administrative and Observational Data			
	DAO		GAD		DAO		GAD	
	Baseline	Controls	Baseline	Controls	Baseline	Controls	Baseline	Controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Facilitation Workshop	0.132	0.215ˆ	-0.006	0.061	0.151	0.006	0.045	-0.036
	(0.107)	(0.091)	(0.176)	(0.179)	(0.186)	(0.197)	(0.130)	(0.145)
Capital==1		-0.117		-0.154		0.010		0.019
		(0.096)		(0.157)		(0.217)		(0.159)
State Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Township Control Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Constant	4.327***	3.430*	4.553***	2.860ˆ	2.804***	1.412	2.695***	3.594**
	(0.050)	(0.818)	(0.081)	(1.235)	(0.105)	(1.736)	(0.073)	(1.277)
Observations	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	60	60	60	60
R-squared	0.003	0.163	0.000	0.063	0.011	0.403	0.002	0.328
RMSE	.	.	.	.	0.670	0.627	0.467	0.461

Note: OLS with standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, p̂<0.1). Models 1-4 use inverse probability and post-stratification weights. Models 5-8 use report unadjusted standard errors. Models 3, 4, 6, and 8 control for township literacy rate, GDP per capita (ln), and surface area in kilometers for townships in 2018 and 2020.

Table F7 Impact of Facilitation by Agency (Township Level)

	Development Affairs Organization Index		General Administrative Department Index	
	Baseline	Controls	Baseline	Controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time	0.981***	0.991***	0.772***	0.760***
	(0.222)	(0.231)	(0.206)	(0.213)
Facilitation Workshop	-0.106	-0.099	0.081	-0.045
	(0.278)	(0.306)	(0.259)	(0.283)
Time*Workshop	0.281	0.292	-0.013	-0.013
	(0.394)	(0.408)	(0.367)	(0.377)
Capital==1		-0.084		-0.054
		(0.255)		(0.236)
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Township Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	5.499***	5.677**	6.319***	3.630ˆ
	(0.157)	(2.141)	(0.146)	(1.979)
Observations	120	120	120	120
R-squared	0.230	0.306	0.150	0.246
RMSE	1.003	1.036	0.935	0.958

Note: OLS with standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, p̂<0.1). Models 1-4 report unadjusted standard errors. Models 2 and 4 control for township literacy rate, GDP per capita (ln), and surface area in kilometers for townships in 2018 and 2020.

Table F8 Impact of Facilitation by Agency on New Indicators (Township Level)

	Development Affairs Organization Index		General Administrative Department Index	
	Baseline	Controls	Baseline	Controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Facilitation Workshop	0.172	0.123	-0.106	-0.045
	(0.280)	(0.333)	(0.223)	(0.291)
Capital==1		-0.213		0.330
		(0.377)		(0.330)
State Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Township Control Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes
Constant	7.148***	1.546	7.249***	8.368**
	(0.162)	(3.418)	(0.129)	(2.990)
Observations	60	60	60	60
R-squared	0.006	0.310	0.004	0.169
RMSE	1.022	0.966	0.815	0.845

Note: OLS with standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, p̂<0.1). Models 1-4 report unadjusted standard errors. Models 2 and 4 control for township literacy rate, GDP per capita (ln), and surface area in kilometers for townships in 2018 and 2020.