Extortion, Civic Action, and Political Participation among Guatemalan Deportees

Elaine K. Denny[‡], David A. Dow[¶], Gabriella Levy[†],

& Mateo Villamizar-Chaparro[§]

June 5, 2023

Abstract

How do deported migrants engage in civic and political life after being forcibly returned to their home countries? Do experiences during the migration journey impact how deportees (re)engage? We explore how extortion experienced during the migration journey alters preferences for political and civic engagement. We utilize a multi-method approach combining original survey data of Guatemalans deported from the U.S. and a series of qualitative deportee interviews. We find that extortion during migration has a significant direct effect on increased citizen engagement. Economic hardship exacerbated by extortion may mediate this effect. Overall, extortion experienced while migrating has long-term financial consequences for deportees, with implications for their reintegration and the broader health of civic institutions in their home countries.

Word Count: 11,296
Keywords: Deported migrants, Political Participation, Extortion, Migration, Guatemala.
JEL codes: D72, D74, O15

[‡] Elaine Denny is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Merced

[¶] David Dow is a Research Scientist with the Arizona Policy Lab in the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Arizona

[†] Gabriella Levy is a Peace Scholar Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace and Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Political Science at Duke University. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Institute of Peace or the Minerva Research Institute

[§] Mateo Villamizar-Chaparro is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Political Science at Duke University.

"Migrating is very hard. I'd tell others not to go, to keep striving here in our country. I'd ask them not to make the decision to migrate because [extortion] happened to me, I lost money, and now things are complicated for me because of the American Dream."

– Deportee 5, Group 2

1 Introduction

How do deported migrants engage in civic and political life after being forcibly returned to their home countries? Do experiences during the migration journey impact how deportees (re)engage? Hundreds of thousands of people are deported each year from North America and the European Union; over 1.1 million deportations occurred between 2019 and 2021 alone.[1] In some countries, deportees comprise a measurable percentage of the population. For example, 271,000 Guatemalans – 1.5% of the national population – have been deported from the US and Mexico in the last four years.[2] While there is an extensive literature on migrants' political behavior in receiving countries (e.g. Dancygier, 2017; Kustov, 2021; Hainmueller et al., 2015), we have limited knowledge about deportees' political behavior after returning to their country of origin.

Knowing if and how deportees reinsert themselves into the civic fabric of their home countries is valuable. When home countries have weak governance structures, highly contentious politics, or economic insecurity and violence, the (dis)engagement of deportees has the potential to influence national politics. Particularly in countries with large migrant outflows and weak institutions, such as Guatemala, Venezuela, Haiti, or Niger, deportee civic (dis)engagement may impact community strength and institutional stability.

One salient and unfortunately common part of the migration journey is extortion (Vogt, 2013; MSF, 2017; Heidbrink, 2019). Extortion amplifies the kinds of economic and security hardships commonly experienced among deportees and migrants more generally. Consequently, extortion may have important downstream consequences for engagement. Many existing studies of the effect of victimization on citizen engagement (e.g. Bauer et al., 2016; Ley, 2018) are complicated by the fact that adverse economic and security conditions are usually endogenous to an individual and their local circumstances. For example, violence and economic coercion are more likely to occur in places with high crime rates, and local criminal networks may also shape how and to what degree one is willing to take civic action. In contrast, we examine victimization which occurs in a geographically distinct location from

[1] The United States' Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency deported over 600,000 people (DHS, 2021), the European Union deported almost 300,000 migrants (Eurostat, 2022, 2023), and Mexico deported approximately 260,000 people (Unidad de Política Migratoria, 2023).

[2] The percentage is higher (2.25%) if one considers only the population over 15 (2/3 of total population) and assumes that most deportees are in this age range. See Table A1.

civic and political engagement, allowing us to disentangle the experience of extortion from potential confounders in one's home environment.

We argue that, on the one hand, extortion is an economic shock that exacerbates migrants' economic hardship; such economic conditions may have catalyzed migration in the first place (Cohn et al., 2017; Abuelafia et al., 2019; Meyer, 2022). We suggest that this economic shock generates grievances, thereby increasing engagement (e.g. Aguilar and Pacek, 2000; Rhodes-Purdy et al., 2021). On the other hand, extortion is a form of victimization that increases fear of crime (e.g. Perreira and Ornelas, 2013; Dammert and Malone, 2003); fear is demobilizing (e.g. Druckman and McDermott, 2008; Cohn et al., 2015). Thus, we have divergent expectations about whether extortion during migration decreases or increases the civic and political engagement of deportees.

We examine extortion during migration, which we demonstrate occurred quasi-randomly in this setting, to begin to understand how deportees reengage in civic life as well as how migration experiences affect this involvement. We use original survey data from Guatemalan deportees who were surveyed immediately upon their return to Guatemala, as well as 1 and 6 months later. We also conduct a series of qualitative interviews to gain a more nuanced understanding of the mechanisms at work. We find evidence of two distinct competing mechanisms linking extortion and civic/political behaviors. Our results suggest that extortion increases economic hardship, fear of crime, and citizen engagement. We also find some suggestive evidence that economic hardship mediates the relationship between extortion and increased civic action. These findings demonstrate that extortion experienced while migrating has long-term financial consequences for deportees which may shape reintegration into their home countries.

2 Citizen Engagement of Migrants and Deportees

To build expectations for the citizen engagement of deportees, we briefly discuss existing research on citizen engagement by migrants more broadly. First, we define a few key terms. "Citizen engagement" encompasses both political and civic activities which citizens undertake to influence their government and their broader community (Boulding and Holzner, 2021). A "migrant" is a person who moves away from their place of residence, whether within or outside of their home country.[3] "Returnees" are migrants who return to their country of origin, and "deportees" are a subset of returnees that have been forcibly returned; we use the two terms interchangeably to refer to deportees. "Extortion" is the act of using force or threats to obtain something of value.

[3]For details, visit `https://www.iom.int/who-is-a-migrant`.

Literature on migrants and citizen participation can be divided into three strands. First, a range of works consider whether migrants are politically engaged. There is robust evidence that international migrants tend to vote less in receiving countries when compared to natives (e.g. Leal, 2002; Verba et al., 1995; Lim, 2023). The same may be true for internal migrants (Rozo and Vargas, 2021; Gaikwad and Nellis, 2021). Migrants may vote less as a result of rules restricting participation (Dancygier, 2017; Bhavnani and Lacina, 2018), policies that make registration harder (Gaikwad and Nellis, 2021), country of origin policies limiting voter enfranchisement abroad (Wellman, 2021), or difficulties surrounding naturalization (Hainmueller et al., 2015). Deportees, however, do not face these constraints, leaving open the question of how deportees engage politically.

Second, research on how settlement patterns affect migrant vote choice suggests that, for example, migrants may move to places where other migrants with similar political ideas live, leading to increased left-wing vote shares, cosmopolitanism, and over-representation of home country interests in areas with large migrant populations (Maxwell, 2019; Lueders, 2022; Lim, 2023). Yet, this literature assumes that migrants choose where to live; deportees, however, are forcibly moved back to their country of origin.

Third, more limited work has been conducted on migrant civic engagement. Civic engagement of migrants in their receiving countries may depend on how assimilated they are (Ahmadov and Sasse, 2016), whether they have assimilation plans (Leal, 2002), or whether they face nativist policy threats (Zepeda-Millán, 2017). In some cases, research finds little difference in citizen engagement between migrants and non-migrants (Leal, 2002).

3 Theory: Catalysts of Deportee (Dis)Engagement

Deportees are distinct from other migrants on several key dimensions. For example, they do not face host country constraints on voting, and self-selection into specific geographic areas via relocation has been expressly thwarted. For deportees, the location of possible citizen engagement is their home country, not receiving countries. At the same time, deportees have unique experiences that make them distinct from non-migrants in their home country.

Here, we focus on the experience of extortion during migration. In our survey, over 17% of coyote-using deportees reported being extorted while migrating. Extortion amplifies the kinds of economic hardship or trauma experienced more broadly by migrants during their journey. In the following sections, we discuss how the consequences of extortion may affect citizen engagement. We argue that extortion should affect deportees' citizen engagement via two potential mediators: victimization-caused fear of crime and a grievance-generating economic shock.

3.1 Extortion

Many migrants are extorted on their journey to the United States (e.g. Heidbrink, 2019; Vogt, 2013; MSF, 2017), though extortion is widespread in much of Latin America (Dammert, 2021; LAPOP, 2019) and occurs in a wide range of contexts around the world (e.g. Chin, 2000; Frye, 2002; Gambetta, 1996; Magaloni et al., 2020). Such criminal extortion can have consequences for citizen engagement. Several other scholars have also studied the relationship between criminal activity and political engagement (e.g. Ley, 2018; Córdova, 2019; Ley, 2022); these studies, however, do not focus specifically on extortion but examine the interactions between communities and groups which engage in extortion as one tactic among many. Moncada (2022) studies different strategies communities adopt in order to resist criminal victimization. He suggests that extortion can lead to violent forms of civic engagement by analyzing the repeated interaction between businesses and criminals. However, unlike him, we focus on nonviolent citizen engagement after a one-time, geographically-distinct interaction between individuals and criminals.

How does the experience of extortion itself – separate from community conditions – shape citizen engagement? The question is particularly important in countries with high volumes of returned migrants who have experienced hardships such as extortion on the migration journey. Citizen (dis)engagement among returnees has implications for the strength of civic and political institutions. To formulate our expectations about extortion's impact on deportee behavior, we turn to broader theories tying two elements of the extortion experience – victimization and economic hardship – to citizen engagement.

3.2 Victimization, Fear, and Citizen Disengagement

Although there is little research on how migrant exposure to violence affects political participation, there is a wide range of research (with mixed findings) on the relationship between victimization and political participation more broadly. This literature considers violence or the threat of violence in the context of both crime and armed conflict. Some research suggests that people exposed to violence will be more politically engaged (e.g. Bauer et al., 2016; Bateson, 2012; Sønderskov et al., 2022). Scholars have suggested a range of explanations, including individual growth and activation following trauma (Blattman, 2009), anger (Ditton et al., 1999), and the social affirmation of in-group membership (Schuessler, 2000; Dorff, 2017). Conversely, other work suggests that victimized individuals lose faith in government institutions and withdraw from public life (Collier and Vicente, 2014; Ley, 2018; Coupé and Obrizan, 2016).

Many mechanisms which may explain the relationship between victimization and political

engagement in general do not seem to apply to deportees. For example, it is not clear why victimization that deportees experience while migrating should cause them to lose faith in the government of the country which they had already left. Post-traumatic growth requires major life crises which rupture people's assumptions about their world, but extortion is only one trauma among many that migrants experience. In terms of arguments grounded in political participation as the affirmation of in-group identity, it is not clear what identity deportees could be affirming unless they left their home country because of persecution on the basis of identity. Deportees do not typically know each other and often arrive in small groups. Thus, we posit two other mechanisms tying extortion to citizen engagement: fear of crime and economic grievance.

Fear and lingering trauma from migration victimization are evidenced by a range of non-political outcomes. Experiencing abuse while migrating is predictive of depression and alcohol dependency (Altman et al., 2018). In one study, among those individuals victimized during the migration process, such as being robbed or attacked, 21% are at risk for PTSD (Perreira and Ornelas, 2013). This is true not only for Central American migrants, but in migration populations around the world. For example, one meta-analysis of 113 articles confirms that exposure to violence during migration affects mental health; the most frequent consequences include post-traumatic stress disorder (Kirmayer et al., 2011). PTSD is closely tied to anxiety (Torres, 2020).

We theorize that victimization from extortion is correlated with increased fear of repeated crime. We follow Gabriel and Greve (2003) in defining fear of crime as a "disposition (trait) [which] describes my tendency to experience fear of crime in certain situations" (p. 601). As such, fear of crime varies across individuals. A series of studies in diverse contexts have shown a correlation between victimization and fear of crime (Dammert and Malone, 2003; Singer et al., 2019). In a non-medical context, one way to evaluate respondents' levels of fear of crime is to consider whether they avoid everyday activities out of fear.

According to appraisal models of emotions and judgement/decision making, fear and sadness are both correlated with pessimistic estimates of risk and thus risk-aversion (e.g. Keltner et al., 1993; Lerner et al., 2015). Fear in particular leads to lowered risk tolerance and behavioral avoidance among a wide range of individuals (e.g. Druckman and McDermott, 2008; Campos-Vazquez and Cuilty, 2014; Guiso et al., 2018). Thus, we hypothesize that those deportees who were extorted during the migration process will suffer from higher levels of fear of crime than other deportees; this fear will predict citizen disengagement.

3.3 Economic Hardship, Grievance, and Citizen Engagement

While extortion has psychological effects, it also has economic consequences. Like the literature on victimization, research into the relationship between economic shocks, limited economic resources, and political engagement is inconclusive. On the one hand, people with fewer resources are less able to engage in politics. Yet, negative income shocks may prompt grievances against the government, leading to increased political engagement.

Those who face economic insecurity or who grew up economically disadvantaged are less likely to participate in politics compared to people who are more socioeconomically prosperous (Blais, 2006; Schlozman et al., 2013; Smets and van Ham, 2013; Ojeda, 2018).[4] At the individual level, the resource model of civic engagement provides one explanation: time, money, and civic skills provide the resources required to engage in politics (Brady et al., 1995). Because deportees who have been extorted are likely to be less socioeconomically prosperous than deportees who have not, this model suggests that victims of extortion will be less likely to participate in politics.

However, work focused on grievance suggests that people experiencing negative economic shocks may be more motivated to participate politically. For example, increased unemployment rates in the United States are correlated with higher turnout (Burden and Wichowsky, 2014; Cebula, 2017). These effects may vary across race and ethnic groups (Huyser et al., 2018) as well as region (Boulding and Holzner, 2021). Aguilar and Pacek (2000) similarly argue that macroeconomic downturns in developing nations increase turnout, in particular among those who are most affected, i.e. lower-status voters. In a test of the grievance mechanism, Rhodes-Purdy et al. (2021) find that economic crises prompt anger.[5]

One author summarizes the distinction between these two literatures thus: "structural economic disadvantage unambiguously demobilises individuals, [whereas] the deterioration of economic prospects instead increases political activity" (Kurer et al., 2019, p. 866). Given this distinction, we suggest that the literature on negative economic shocks better captures the situation extorted deportees face. Deportees are on average socioeconomically disadvantaged, regardless of whether they have been extorted or not. They have left their home countries, frequently in search of better jobs, and then they were forcibly deported. Extorted deportees, however, have suffered from an additional and unexpected deterioration of their economic prospects. This economic shock will increase citizen engagement.

[4] An exception comes from Boulding and Holzner (2021), who argue that resource constrained individuals in Latin America tend to participate in politics at higher rates than their wealthier counterparts.

[5] In contrast, Hall et al. (2021) find that counties affected by larger increases in foreclosure in the United States had lower turnout.

3.4 Study Expectations

In summary, extortion should affect deportees' political and civic engagement. This effect may work via two distinct – and counteracting – mediators. We theorize that extortion is a form of victimization which will depress engagement by increasing fear of crime. At the same time, extortion is a grievance-generating economic shock, which increases citizen engagement. These arguments can be formally hypothesized as follows:

- *Hypothesis 1a (Extortion to Increased Fear of Crime):* Deportees extorted while migrating are more likely to fear crime compared to deportees who were not extorted.
- *Hypothesis 1b (Extortion to Increased Economic Hardship):* Deportees extorted while migrating are more likely to experience economic hardship than those who were not extorted.
- *Hypothesis 2a (Fear of Crime Mediator):* Extortion's positive effect on fear of crime will lead to lower citizen engagement.
- *Hypothesis 2b (Economic Hardship Mediator):* Extortion's positive effect on economic hardship will lead to higher citizen engagement.

If fear and economic hardship both mediate the relationship between extortion and political engagement, a final hypothesis should concern which mechanism plays a larger role. However, we have no prior reason to believe that one mechanism is more or less important than the other. Thus, we explore this issue empirically.

4 Migration from and Deportation to Guatemala

Guatemala is an important context in which to study these expectations given both the prevalence of deportees in the population and the nature of the country's institutions. Between 2012 and 2021, Guatemala received approximately 379,000 deportees from the United States, or 8 percent of the total deportations from the United States (DHS, 2021). Hundreds of thousands more were deported from Mexico.[6] These large numbers of deportations make it crucial to understand how and when deported migrants are able to reintegrate into their "home" societies and political systems, often after years abroad. To that end, we provide an overview of the conditions in Guatemala that contribute to migration, consider the experience of extortion during migration, and describe the experiences of deportees upon their return to Guatemala.

[6] See, for example, Table A1.

Qualitative and policy studies suggest that a range of macro-level conditions in Guatemala have contributed to recent emigration to the United States: socioeconomic difficulties (e.g. Cheatham, 2019; Abuelafia et al., 2019; Meyer, 2022), violence associated with transnational organized crime (e.g. MSF, 2017; Bermeo, 2018; Cheatham, 2019), and corruption (e.g. Cheatham, 2019; Meyer, 2022). As a result of these push factors, between 2012 and 2021, the United States Border Patrol apprehended over 1 million Guatemalan migrants (DHS, 2021).

Many migrants from Central America suffer extortion, assault, kidnapping, and/or rape during the journey (e.g. Abuelafia et al., 2019; Infante et al., 2012; Slack et al., 2018). A cross-sectional study of over twelve thousand migrants in transit through Mexico to the United States suggests that nearly a third of migrants from Central America report experiencing physical, psychological, and/or sexual violence during the journey (Leyva-Flores et al., 2019).

Our original data, described in the Research Design section below, suggests that, upon their forced return to Guatemala, the median deportee had spent a year and a half in the United States. More than 80 percent of deportees have left at least one family member in the United States, and many parted with significant savings.[7] Having left behind family and assets, deportees arrive via plane to Guatemala City – a city where only 5 percent of deportees are originally from. Most migrants then return to towns of their birthplace; 80 percent of deportees report being in locations with 5 or more family members one month after their arrival (see Figure A2 for departments of origin). Deportees face a range of challenges in the locations in which they settle. Over 80 percent of respondents indicate that their community has no employment opportunities, and more than 50 percent indicate that there is either some or a lot of gang activity. Deportees also suffer from police harassment (Figure A1). When we asked deportees the degree to which needing to pay outstanding debts poses a challenge to reintegration, on a 10-point scale, the average response was 7.[8] 37 percent of deportees in the original sample intend to re-migrate in the next year. For more details, see Dow et al. (2021) and Table A3.

It also is important to briefly describe the strength and nature of political institutions deportees encounter upon their return to their country of origin – particularly given that weak institutions often contribute to the conditions driving migration in the first place. Guatemala's party system has a low level of institutionalization (Sánchez, 2008; Mainwaring, 2018), and the military plays a prominent role in politics (Isaacs and Schwartz, 2020). There is evidence of vote-buying and violence against voters (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2020) as well

[7]Around the world, returnees lack social networks in their country of origin and are more closely tied to the country from which they were deported (e.g. Kanstroom, 2012; Slack, 2019; Caldwell, 2019).

[8]Related studies indicate that debt incurred during migration can fuel cycles of migration, deportation, and re-migration for deportees (Schuster and Majidi, 2013; Heidbrink, 2019).

as corruption (CICIG, 2019; Trejo and Nieto-Matiz, 2022). In the 2019 presidential election, only 42 percent of the country's registered voters turned out to vote (Cuffe, 2019).

Even if they do not participate in organized national politics, many Guatemalans engage in the civic life of their community. For example, civil watches and community patrols play an influential, if often harmful, role in the country (Bateson, 2017; CICIG, 2019). Indigenous governance structures are important too (Hawkins et al., 2013; Sieder, 2020).

In terms of generalizability, Guatemala has one of the highest volumes of deportees globally. Guatemala's Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) is very close to the average for all countries that receive deportees from both the United States and the European Union. Thus, in terms of democratic engagement, our results could plausibly travel to other similar cases. At the same time, Guatemala's Party Institutionalization Index (PII) is below average for countries that receive most deportees, but Guatemala is not an extreme case. Countries like Afghanistan, Haiti, the Philippines, and Egypt also have similar or worse levels of party institutionalization (see Figure A3 and related discussion).[9] Thus, our results for political engagement specifically may generalize more directly to other states with weak party systems.

5 Research Design: Data and Methods

5.1 Deportee Survey

We employ data from an original survey of migrants recently deported from the United States and returned to Guatemala.[10] Beginning in October 2019, we partnered with RTI International and Te Conecta, a Guatemalan NGO, to implement a face-to-face survey of newly arrived deportees at the Air Force airport in Guatemala City. This airport is the main arrival point for deportees sent to Guatemala and typically received 3-5 planes of deportees 4-5 days per week. The first stage of the survey was implemented upon returnee arrival and was conducted from October 2019 and March 2020. After that, COVID-19 made in-person data collection impossible; follow-up surveys were conducted by phone. To initially recruit respondents, our survey team greeted deportees after they had been processed and as they were leaving the airport. Enumerators were instructed to randomly select individuals to approach with information about the study and not to select based on any observable characteristics. In practice, this meant selecting approximately every third deportee and providing them with a voucher to take to a nearby office to participate in the survey. Respondents were offered 50 Quetzales, equivalent to about 6.50 USD, to participate in the first

[9]The data used in this figure comes from the V-Dem project (Bizzarro et al., 2017; Coppedge et al., 2017), the U.S. government (ICE, 2020), and the European Union (Eurostat, 2023).

[10]The project was approved by Duke University's IRB, protocol 2020-0075.

survey round. Out of the returnees that received vouchers in a given week, approximately 12% completed a survey. In total, we interviewed 1,357 deportees upon their arrival to the country.

This recruitment procedure produced data with average demographics similar to official ICE data on deportees tracked by Syracuse University's TRAC Immigration (TRAC, 2023). For example, in FY 2019, roughly 11 percent of Guatemalans deported were women; 8 percent of our sample were women. Further, most deportations of Guatemalans departed from Texas (50%) and Arizona (26%); our sample reported these states as the ones they spent the most time in while in the U.S. (50% and 19% respectively). Many other characteristics of deportees to Guatemala are withheld by ICE, such as age, border versus interior apprehension, and previous deportations. In aggregate, however, ICE does report that 33.5% of removals were from the interior of the US in FY 2020 (see ICE (2022)). This corresponds closely to our sample, of which 34.7% reported being deported from the interior of the US. Our systematic recruitment method, combined with these similarities with official ICE deportation data, gives us confidence that our sample is relatively representative of Guatemalan deportees more generally.

Respondents who provided contact information were contacted for 1-month and 6 month follow-ups. The follow-up surveys were conducted over the phone, and respondents who completed these surveys received a phone balance credit of at least 50 Quetzales for each survey. Phone surveys continued through October of 2020, and we collected a total of 645 follow-up surveys across the two waves, with 210 respondents interviewed in both follow-up waves. Questions relevant to our analysis here were primarily asked in rounds 2 (1-month follow-up) and 3 (6-months follow-up). We pool round 2 and round 3 results, and all regressions utilize robust standard errors clustered by respondent. The multi-wave survey contains a wide variety of questions covering topics ranging from demographics to experiences in the United States and Guatemala; specific wording for relevant survey questions is in Appendix A.2.

Additionally, we conducted 18 semi-structured phone interviews with deported migrants from our survey sample. These interviews covered the deported migrants' experiences after their return to Guatemala as well as the migration experience itself. The goal of these interviews was to provide more detailed process tracing for mechanisms linking extortion (or lack thereof) and downstream behaviors in Guatemala. To recruit interview participants, we divided all survey respondents for whom we had contact information and who reported using a coyote into four groups, varying along two theoretically important dimensions: (a) whether they experienced extortion and (b) their intention to remigrate. From each of these four groups, we selected a random sample of respondents and interviewed 4-5 respondents

per group. Interviews lasted on average 30 minutes, and participants were compensated with 50 Quetzales of phone credit. See Appendix A.3 for more information about the final number of interviews from each group and a full list of interview questions.

It is important to briefly discuss a few ethical considerations, given the vulnerability of the population on whom this research focuses and the sensitive nature of some of the questions. Firstly, it was essential to safeguard the confidentiality of respondents. Thus, upon completion of the surveys, non-identifiable data was stored in encrypted form on an Amazon Web Services S3 server; only principal investigators on the project were able to download the data for decryption and analysis. Furthermore, all identifiable contact information for respondents was collected offline using paper and pencil and then stored in an encrypted database separate from the survey answers. Once transferred to the encrypted database, the pen and paper versions of the contact information was destroyed. Similarly, all qualitative interview recordings were made on devices without internet connectivity, and they were deleted once transcripts were completed. All identifiable information has been removed from the transcripts. Secondly, we took measures to ensure that respondents were not coerced into taking the survey. Participants were able to skip questions and stop the surveys/interviews at any point, though they only received compensation if they completed a given survey. Given literacy rates, enumerators provided written copies of consent forms but also read the consent script out loud. The compensation provided to respondents was reasonable and appreciated, according to field notes, and was not so large that it placed participants at undue risk by carrying large volumes of money in Guatemala. Finally, COVID-19 posed ethical issues to continuing in-person surveys. Thus, once COVID-19 became a threat, we ceased all in-person surveys and conducted all remaining surveys exclusively by phone.

Our key independent variable, "Extortion," measures whether respondents (or their families) were forced (via threats to them or their families) to pay coyotes additional smuggling fees beyond what they had originally agreed to pay. For respondents who traveled to the U.S. multiple times, this question was asked specifically in regard to their most recent journey. This question was only asked to the 87% of respondents who used a coyote at some point in their migration journey.[11] While migrants who do and do not use coyotes to enter the U.S. differ in systematic ways, such as indigeneity and age (Appendix Table A7), we focus our analysis exclusively on the majority of respondents who did use a coyote, and of whom 17% experienced extortion. 10% of coyote-utilizing migrants were extorted en route to the U.S., while the remaining 7% were extorted after crossing the border. This extortion question was asked during our baseline survey upon arrival and is unlikely to have primed respon-

[11] We cannot assume that migrants who did not use a coyote did not experience extortion from some other criminal actor, but their experience is sufficiently distinct that we focus on coyote-using migrants only here.

dents when answering questions about their economic circumstances or citizen engagement in follow-up surveys months later.

We draw on several survey measures to build a summary index measuring deportees' degree of economic hardship. Following Anderson (2008), we construct a standardized inverse covariance index. This "Economic Hardship Index" uses information about respondents' monthly income ("Monthly Income"), unemployment status ("Currently Unemployed"), how bad their current economic situation is ("Econ Situation (Bad)"), and economic difficulties since returning to Guatemala ("Economic Difficulties"). We collected each of these at 1- and 6-month post-arrival survey waves. For all measures, higher values indicate more negative or difficult economic situations. We construct indices to avoid problems stemming from comparisons of multiple outcome variables.

To conceptualize fear of crime, we use a set of questions asked in the second and third survey waves about actions taken by respondents since their deportation out of *fear of being a crime victim.* The behaviors include: avoiding leaving their homes by themselves, avoiding using public transit, preventing children from leaving the house, feeling the need to move to a different neighborhood, changing their job or place of study, or obtaining a weapon for personal security. For our main analysis, we use the variable "Fear of Crime (Count)" (ranging from 0-6), which is a count of the number of fear items the respondent selected.

We measure civic action and political engagement using two separate indices. Index items measured respondent likelihood (on a 5-point scale) of taking different types of action in the coming year. For the civic action index, we track three behaviors: participating in community meetings, volunteering, and mentoring youth. We thus analyze civic action as a simple 3-item average "Civic Action Index." Separately, we also analyze a "Political Action Index," constructed as the average response on 3 key types of behavior indicative of political engagement: protest, affiliating with a political party, and voting.[12]

We include a range of control variables across our regression models, such as a binary measure of whether respondents left assets in the United States, a count of the number of children the respondent has in the United States or in Guatemala, a measure of the highest level of education completed, a binary variable indicating whether the respondent was last apprehended at the border, a log of the number of years in the United States, and overall employment status since returning to Guatemala. We also control for the degree of migrants' social integration in the locality to which they returned: the number of family and friends living nearby at the time of the follow-up survey. We also include various demographic variables. "Indigenous" refers to whether respondents' mother tongue is anything besides

[12]National elections in Guatemala would not occur for another three or four years (in 2023), so this measure may be a weak indicator of actual voting intent.

Spanish. We also include a variable indicating whether respondents have visible tattoos because of affiliations between gangs and tattoos in Guatemala. Finally, we control for survey round. The 1- and 6-month follow-up surveys straddled the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, so this control variable also captures any changes in the dependent variable that may be linked to the pandemic, such as an overall lower interest in (or expectation of) civic/political engagement. Summary statistics can be found in Table A3.

In terms of social desirability bias, the U.S. and Guatemalan governments already knew that respondents had crossed borders without the required documentation, and they had thus been deported. As a result, respondents had little to hide in discussing their migration experience. It is possible, however, that respondents were hesitant to admit that they had been victimized. This would be likely if the perpetrators had ties to Guatemala and could threaten deportees for speaking about the extortion. However, our concerns about this are limited given the openness of interviewees in discussing their victimization experiences during migration as well as mentioning victimization experienced by people they know.

5.2 Randomness of Extortion

We argue that extortion suffered while migrating is a quasi-random experience. Both qualitative evidence concerning migration through Mexico, as well as a quantitative analysis of balance within our sample support this argument.

Violence, including extortion, can happen to any migrant. Put simply, "there is no subgroup that seems to be particularly at risk among deportees... kidnapping occurs simply because one is a migrant" (Slack et al., 2018, p. 196). Another scholar suggests that individuals of any income can be kidnapped to extort money from their families; the kidnappers "know that their families will send money even if they cannot afford to" (Vogt, 2013, p. 764). Indeed, violence along the migration route is viewed by many migrants as a necessary evil; it is in a sense expected (Vogt, 2013). Statistically, years of schooling, having children, and having entered the U.S. previously are not correlated with the likelihood of experiencing violence (Leyva-Flores et al., 2019). Thus, random chance plays a significant role in who experiences victimization during migration.[13]

Migrants could theoretically reduce the likelihood of victimization by selecting "good" coyotes before they begin their journey. However, migrants do not always have the capacity to gauge the trustworthiness of coyotes because of the networked structure of the coyote business; initial coyotes frequently transfer migrants to others for different route stages.

[13]Extortion during migration may extract contact information for family and include threats to family members. Yet, these community ties occur as a result of the extortion act, rather than causing it, allowing us to maintain our expectation of quasi-randomness, orthogonal to sending community conditions.

Additionally, many migrants travel to border towns on their own and then contract coyotes there; such migrants are "in effect, giving themselves over to fate" (Spener, 2009, p. 179). Even as our interviewees recommend that new migrants know the coyotes with whom they leave Guatemala, their broader advice for avoiding extortion is limited and underscores extortion's frequency and randomness. Two interviewees say that putting oneself in God's hands is the best suggestion they have to avoid extortion. Others note:

- "All the routes are the same... dangerous" (Group 1 Interview 2)
- "It's common for you to be extorted, robbed... You can't prevent it" (Group 4, Interview 2)
- "I haven't heard of anything [to avoid extortion]" (Group 4 Interview 1)
- "There is no good recommendation." (Group 2 Interview 5)

Table 1 below provides support for the randomness of extortion by showing that the "extortion" and "non-extortion" samples of survey respondents are well-balanced upon reentry to Guatemala along a range of theoretically relevant variables.

There are two exceptions. First, women were slightly more likely to report extortion during the migration journey. This difference is substantively small, though, and only significant at the 90% confidence level. It is also based on a very small sample size, as only 8% of the sample were women. Second, the extortion group has a slightly higher mean number of past migration trips (1.77) compared to the non-extortion sample (1.62). The sample remains balanced when we restrict respondents to those who completed the follow-up sample, with the exception of small differences in gender, number of children in Guatemala, and whether the individual was detained at the border. This analysis suggests that attrition between survey waves did not lead to imbalance in extortion experiences (Table A6).[14]

[14]We, however, acknowledge that this quasi-randomness of extortion by coyotes in this context may not travel across time and space. There are other processes that could affect the use of extortion like collaboration with drug cartels (Izcara Palacios, 2015; Slack and Martínez, 2018) and the type of routes that migrants and/or coyotes choose (Farfán Méndez, 2019)

Table 1: Extortion During Migration - Arrival Survey Responses

Variable	(1) No Extortion	(2) Extortion	(3) Difference
Age	30.981	30.990	0.009
	(9.476)	(8.962)	(0.734)
Indigenous	0.387	0.432	0.045
	(0.487)	(0.497)	(0.038)
Female	0.075	0.111	0.036+
	(0.263)	(0.314)	(0.021)
Highest Education	6.262	6.764	0.502
	(4.481)	(4.479)	(0.350)
Married	0.297	0.256	-0.040
	(0.457)	(0.438)	(0.035)
Children in US	1.198	1.241	0.043
	(1.589)	(1.655)	(0.125)
Children in GT	0.406	0.518	0.112
	(0.942)	(1.226)	(0.078)
Detained at Border	0.659	0.615	-0.044
	(0.474)	(0.488)	(0.038)
Ln(Years in US)	0.194	0.117	-0.077
	(2.209)	(2.318)	(0.176)
No. of Migrations	1.622	1.774	0.152+
	(1.090)	(1.084)	(0.085)
Visible Tattoos	0.084	0.076	-0.007
	(0.277)	(0.266)	(0.022)
Intend Return U.S.	0.427	0.480	0.053
	(0.495)	(0.501)	(0.041)
Intend Visit Local Relatives	0.725	0.737	0.012
	(0.447)	(0.441)	(0.035)
Observations	924	199	1,337

Notes: Difference between group means in two-tailed t-test
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Demographically, our panel sample is largely similar to our initial arrival sample as shown in Table A4. The follow up sample, however, has fewer Indigenous language speakers, more women, higher average education levels, and slightly fewer past migration trips when compared to the group that dropped out of our sample.[15] Yet, the samples are similar across all other dimensions, including rates of extortion. Finally, since personality characteristics might predict both attrition and future engagement, we show that sample attrition across follow-up waves does not appear driven by personality (Table A5).[16] To help account for non-random attrition, we control for each of these variables (and other factors) in our later regression analysis.

6 Results

First, we explore extortion's effect on the two conditions theorized to affect civic and political actions: economic hardship and fear of crime. We test our expectation that extortion

[15]Though we made a concerted effort to limit it, this kind of attrition across demographic characteristics is quite common in many survey settings. See, for example, Alderman et al. (2001).
[16]These personality questions were only asked in round 2 and not in the arrival survey.

will cause both increased fear of further crime victimization (H1a) and greater economic hardship (H1b) using OLS regression models. The effects of extortion on these outcomes are shown in Figure 1. Full numerical regression results can be found in Table A8.[17]

Figure 1: Extortion Predicts Poor Outcomes: Fear of Crime and Economic Hardship



Note: Y-axis displays dependent variables. DVs are on standardized scale. Estimates are OLS regression coefficients for the extortion variable on each DV (95% and 90% confidence intervals).

As Figure 1 demonstrates, we find a statistically significant positive relationship between extortion and both fear of crime and economic hardship. Respondents who experienced extortion report levels of fear 0.30 standard deviations higher than respondents that were not extorted. This amounts to taking roughly 0.45 more avoidant behaviors due to a fear of crime (on a scale from 0-6). The qualitative evidence supports this finding. For example, one respondent said of a friend who had been extorted: "the fear stayed with him" (Group 1, Interview 4). Another returnee who had been extorted said one reason they are so scared is that "things that happen during the trip... like threats... wake you up to the fact that this is something common" (Group 2, Interview 5).

Respondents who experienced extortion also report levels of economic hardship 0.29 standard deviations greater than respondents that did not suffer from extortion. The qualitative interviews echo this; respondents frequently and openly expressed their concerns about debt repayment and lack of economic opportunities in Guatemala. When asked about what has

[17]It is important to note that migrants who were extorted were no more likely to be educated or indigenous; both of these variables may proxy for pre-migration socioeconomic status (Table 1).

been hardest for them upon reentry to Guatemala, interviewees almost unanimously cited a lack of work as the biggest challenge. Debts from the migration journey – exacerbated by extortion – compounded this stress. For example, Interviewee 5 from Group 2 was detained and threatened by coyotes until they were paid more money (and sooner) than initially agreed upon. This deportee had to take out a loan at 10% monthly interest to pay off the debt. The individual explained, "sometimes one can't even sleep, thinking about how there's a payment due tomorrow but there's no money."

We include a series of robustness checks in the Appendix. We find a positive impact of extortion on fear of crime using a negative binomial model for our unstandardized count variable and a logistic regression model for a binary dependent variable (Table A9). We also show models for each dependent variable used to construct the economic hardship index (Table A9). In addition to our economic hardship index, Column 7 in Table A9 shows that respondents who suffered extortion expect debt to be a larger barrier to reintegration.[18]

6.1 Extortion's Effect on Engagement

We now examine both direct and indirect effects of extortion on citizen engagement. First, we find a large direct effect of extortion on civic action (Figures 2 and 3; see Tables A10 and A11 for corresponding full regression tables with controls). For civic action (community meetings, volunteering, and mentoring), extortion during migration correlates with a desire to take civic action that is 0.21 points higher on a 5-point scale. This direct effect is equivalent to an increase of about 0.25 standard deviations on the civic action index. The direct effect of extortion on political participation is of similar magnitude but estimated with less precision: 0.23 units on a 5-point scale, or about 0.20 standard deviations (significant at the 90% level).

The direct effect of extortion on political participation is almost exclusively driven by the index's "protest" component. Extortion has a positive and statistically significant effect on protest but virtually no effect (in magnitude or significance) on political parties or voting (see Table A12). Protest is a form of political action outside the existing political system, while voting and joining parties are actions within the existing system. This raises the question of whether extortion drives interest in institutional change but also disillusionment with the existing political process.

Our qualitative interviews support this argument, providing some insight into the difference in coefficient strength between political and civic engagement. Some extorted deportees have less desire to remigrate due to financial constraints or trauma. Consequently, they talk about what they want to do to improve their home communities now that they are staying.

[18]This survey question on debt was asked during our arrival survey but not during follow-up waves.

Yet, even those who are invested in their communities (helping neighbors, going to community meetings, etc.) are generally apathetic toward local politicians. For example, one returnee indicates that they are an active community member and explains, "I am a taxi driver and I always help people at any hour" (Group 1, Interview 2), but also notes that "from politicians, you can never get any help."

We turn to mediation analysis to test whether extortion mobilizes via economic hardship or fear of crime. We follow the approach described in Imai et al. (2010) to estimate both the Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME) of extortion via our hypothesized mediators. Estimating causal effects from mediation analysis requires the strong assumption of sequential ignorability. Sequential ignorability requires, first, that our "treatment" variable (extortion) is independent of the potential outcomes of both the mediating variables (fear and economic hardship) and the political/civic engagement outcomes (conditional on observed pre-treatment covariates). Given the quasi-random nature of extortion, we believe this is a reasonable assumption. Second, however, sequential ignorability also requires the observed mediators to be independent of all potential outcomes conditional on the treatment and pre-treatment covariates. This is a more difficult assumption to meet in our context since both fear of crime and economic hardship are likely to be affected by factors other than migration journey victimization. We therefore interpret our estimates of mediation effects as more suggestive than causal.

We conduct a separate mediation analysis for the two mediators, fear and economic hardship. Figure 2 presents estimates of ACME and ADE for extortion and the "fear of crime" mediator. The left panel shows effects on the civic action index outcome, while the right panel displays effects on the political action index. We find very little evidence of any causal mediation effect for extortion via fear on either civic or political action. The point estimates for the ACME are near zero and not significant when looking at either action index. This challenges our expectation that fear acts as a demobilizing force – in this case, fear of crime appears to have little relationship at all with citizen engagement.

By comparison, Figure 3 plots the results of the mediation analysis using economic hardship as the mediator. For the civic action outcome, we do find a suggestive positive ACME of 0.02, but it is very close to zero and only significant at the 85% level. As a result, we only interpret this finding as suggestive. Further, the mediated effect is quite small compared to the ADE of extortion on civic action, representing about 9% of the total effect. Finally, the ACME is estimated to be near zero for political participation.

Figure 2: Mediation Analysis: Extortion and Fear of Crime on Citizen Engagement



Figure 3: Mediation Analysis: Extortion and Economic Hardship on Citizen Engagement



Notes: Mediation effects computed over 2000 simulations using the "mediation" package in Stata. Models are OLS regressions. Plots show 90% and 95% confidence intervals.

Broadly, the results visualized in Figures 2 and 3 indicate that, for Guatemalan migrants, economic shocks experienced hundreds of miles/kilometers away predict increased interest in civic action and protest after deportation back to their home country. This effect appears robust across our main outcomes, including when we control for personality characteristics and use department-level fixed effects to account for the location in which returnees live (see Table A13).[19] Interestingly, this positive correlation between extortion and engagement does not appear to generalize to another common type of victimization – assault – which does not have the same direct economic consequences. Regressing the civic and political indices against a dummy variable for migration journey assault shows no correlation (see Table A14). This is another indication that an economic-grievance mechanism may be more powerful than a fear-based one.

Our qualitative evidence further suggests the importance of the link between extortion, economic hardship, and civic engagement. Despite widespread disaffection with political parties and national political systems, respondents talked about civic engagement outside of the traditional political system, such as volunteering labor for a potable water project (Group 2, Interview 5) or helping single moms or the elderly (Group 2, Interview 3). For some, a sense of frustration related to migration victimization, lingering debt, and an ongoing lack of employment opportunities fuel a determination to pursue change themselves. Multiple respondents use the word "luchar" in describing this focus, which translates broadly to striving, struggling, and/or fighting for change. For example, one individual who was extorted said, "there is no work, and we have very low economic status, and for this reason it is difficult to continue onward. But we have to fight, to hope" (Group 1, Interview 1). Another migrant said, "particularly because of the debt, [it would be good] if there were some institution or something that could provide me help" (Group 3, Interview 4). This implies that there are limited formal or governmental institutions to provide support, and thus returnees and their communities must help themselves. Indeed, the sense that change comes not from politicians but from the community may help explain why extortion predicts higher interest in both civic engagement and protest but not other forms of political participation.

In summary, our study demonstrates that extortion has *direct* effects on civic action, as well as direct effects on economic hardship and fear of crime. We find some, though limited, evidence that economic hardship partially mediates this relationship between extortion and increased civic engagement. There is no evidence that fear of crime is a mediator, perhaps

[19]Since we are testing multiple hypotheses related to the extortion variable, we also report Romano-Wolf corrected p-values for our main outcomes in Table A15. The Romano-Wolf correction helps to control the familywise error rate (FWER). More details on this procedure can be found in the Appendix. Overall, while the adjusted p-values are slightly larger, as we would expect, our results on fear of crime, economic hardship, and civic action remain statistically significant at the 95% level and political action remains significant at the 90% level.

because the violence occurred in a distinct location. Further research should explore the extent to which victimization contributes to fear of additional similar victimization (i.e. extortion on the migration journey) versus creating a more generalized sense of fear. While the pathway through economic hardship to civic action is most supported in our analysis, the direct effect of extortion on civic action is much larger than the mediated effect. Thus, alternative mechanisms, including cognitive or emotional ones, should be explored in the future. For instance, threats made during extortion attempts against migrants' family members in Guatemala might generate a psycho-social response for deportees to engage in participatory actions and community work once they return to those same local/family contexts.[20]

7 Conclusion and Implications

We find that extortion has a significant direct effect on increased citizen engagement, especially when such action occurs outside strictly political spaces. Specifically, extortion is correlated with increased desire to attend community meetings, volunteer in the community, and protest. However, regardless of extortion status, deportees remain relatively disengaged from national politics and explicitly political spaces. Qualitative evidence supports the argument that extortion increases a desire to build community, even amid dissatisfaction with political institutions. Our analysis also explores extortion's potentially oppositional psychological and economic effects. We find that extortion increases both fear of crime and economic hardship. Economic hardship exacerbated by extortion may mediate some of the relationship between extortion and increased citizen engagement.

Given the large volume of migration to the United States from Central America and deportation from the United States back to Central America, it is crucial to understand the impact that forcibly relocating migrants has on deportees' interactions with their "home" communities and the prospects for stable governance there. This is especially true given the rise of nationalist parties and anti-immigrant voter sentiment (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Brader et al., 2008; Hooghe and Dassonneville, 2018; Gaikwad and Nellis, 2020; Choi et al., 2023) driving deportation as a policy tool. We focus on Central American/Northern Triangle countries with US migration, but migration from North Africa and Middle East to Europe is also important to consider. Indeed, in terms of generalizability, Guatemala is about average in democratic strength, compared to other deportee-receiving countries (Figure A3). Thus, deportees' perceptions of and interactions with civic spaces or institutions may on average extend to other contexts. In contrast, Guatemala's party system is weaker than many other countries, so it is possible that the weaker relationship we find with political engagement is

[20]We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this alternative mechanism.

due in part to lower interest generally in engaging with weak political institutions.[21]

Our results provide insights for policymakers and programs working to support displaced persons and migrants suffering from the negative psychological and economic effects of migration-related trauma. Information campaigns in sending communities might educate potential migrants and their networks about the true financial cost of migration, which with extortion can be higher than expected or originally quoted by coyotes. Such information would enable households to make more informed decisions, more accurately incorporating the risk and cost of extortion into their migration decision. In addition, our results highlight a vicious cycle: economic hardship is a main driver of migration through Mexico to the U.S., and extortion – particularly for deported migrants – compounds and extends economic need.

However, in another sense, our results are promising for the community reintegration of deported migrants: economic shocks and grievances seems to motivate individuals to become more civically active. This presents an opportunity for initiatives seeking to strengthen democratic norms and institutions – particularly if the newly engaged returnees are able to feel efficacious in their heightened community engagement. On the other hand, initial higher levels of engagement may lead to lingering resentment and discontent if underlying economic stressors are not addressed. Programs that seek to promote social cohesion and civic engagement among migrants and returnees would benefit from considering underlying motivations for participation; if economic hardship is reduced, programming may need to include more outreach, education, and alternative motivations to achieve higher levels of engagement. The results also suggest that one particular challenge for such policies and programs is to build trust in politicians and increase formal political engagement. Thus, programming or reforms that increase the accountability of political officials and the Guatemalan government is essential in order to channel this increased engagement of returnees into formal institutions. An increase in state-led reintegration programming and support would likely serve to better incorporate deportees in the future.

8 Supplementary Material

The supplementary material for this article can be found at

[21]Is interesting to note, as Table A16 illustrates, that when looking at differences between Guatemalan migrants and non migrants, the two groups are not significantly different in most of our measures of citizen engagement. The main difference arises in voting during the last elections, which could result from migrants being more likely to be outside the country at the time.

9 Data Availability Statement

The data, replication instructions, and the data's codebook can be found at `https://dx.doi.org/doi/10.7910/DVN/RSAM58`

10 Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Erik Wibbels and Candelaria Garay for valuable feedback on earlier drafts of the article. Previous versions were presented at the 2021 Duke's Frontiers of Political Science Conference. We also want to acknowledge the help from our local partner Te Conecta, especially José Ordoñez and Enma Ruano. We are also grateful for our colleagues from RTI International and DevLab@Penn. We would also like to thank the editor and the two anonymous reviewers, whose comments and suggestions greatly improved the manuscript. The remaining errors are our own.

11 Financial Support

This paper was commissioned by the World Bank Social Sustainability and Inclusion Global Practice as part of the activity "Preventing Social Conflict and Promoting Social Cohesion in Forced Displacement Contexts." The activity is task managed by Audrey Sacks and Susan Wong with assistance from Stephen Winkler. This work is part of the program "Building the Evidence on Protracted Forced Displacement: A Multi-Stakeholder Partnership". The program is funded by UK aid from the United Kingdom's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), it is managed by the World Bank Group (WBG) and was established in partnership with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The scope of the program is to expand the global knowledge on forced displacement by funding quality research and disseminating results for the use of practitioners and policy makers. This work does not necessarily reflect the views of FCDO, the WBG or UNHCR.

12 Competing Interests

None

13 Ethical Standards

The research was conducted in accordance with the protocols approved by Duke University's ethics review board. The protocol number is 2020-0075.

References

Abuelafia, E., Del Carmen, G., and Ruiz-Arranz, M. (2019). Tras Los Pasos Del Migrante: Perspectivas y Experiencias de La Migración de El Salvador, Guatemala y Honduras En Estados Unidos. Technical report, USAID, IDB.

Aguilar, E. E. and Pacek, A. C. (2000). Macroeconomic Conditions, Voter Turnout, and the Working-class/Economically Disadvantaged Party Vote in Developing Countries. *Comparative Political Studies*, 33(8):995–1017.

Ahmadov, A. K. and Sasse, G. (2016). A Voice Despite Exit: The Role of Assimilation, Emigrant Networks, and Destination in Emigrants' Transnational Political Engagement. *Comparative Political Studies*, 49(1):78–114.

Alderman, H., Behrman, J. R., Kohler, H.-P., Maluccio, J. A., and Watkins, S. C. (2001). Attrition in Longitudinal Household Survey Data: Some Tests for Three Developing Country Samples. *Demographic Research*, 5:79–124.

Altman, C. E., Gorman, B. K., Chávez, S., Ramos, F., and Fernández, I. (2018). The Mental Well-Being of Central American Transmigrant Men in Mexico. *Global Public Health*, 13(4):383–399.

Anderson, M. (2008). Multiple Inference and Gender Differences in the Effects of Early Intervention: A Reevaluation of the Abecedarian, Perry Preschool, and Early Training Projects. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 103(484):1481–1495.

Bateson, R. (2012). Crime Victimization and Political Participation. *The American Political Science Review*, 106(3):570–587.

Bateson, R. (2017). The Socialization of Civilians and Militia Members: Evidence from Guatemala. *Journal of Peace Research*, 54(5):634–647.

Bauer, M., Blattman, C., Chytilová, J., Henrich, J., Miguel, E., and Mitts, T. (2016). Can War Foster Cooperation? *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 30(3):249–274.

Bermeo, S. (2018). Violence Drives Immigration from Central America. Technical report, Brookings Institution.

Bhavnani, R. and Lacina, B. (2018). *Nativism and Economic Integration across the Developing World: Collision and Accommodation*. Cambridge University Press.

Bizzarro, F., Hicken, A., and Self, D. (2017). The V-Dem Party Institutionalization Index: a New Global Indicator (1900-2015). *V-Dem Institute Working Paper*, 48.

Blais, A. (2006). What Affects Voter Turnout? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9(1):111–125.

Blattman, C. (2009). From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda. *American Political Science Review*, 103(2):231–247.

Boulding, C. and Holzner, C. A. (2021). *Voice and Inequality: Poverty and Political Participation in Latin American Democracies*. Oxford University Press.

Brader, T., Valentino, N. A., and Suhay, E. (2008). What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(4):959–978.

Brady, H., Verba, S., and Schlozman, K. L. (1995). Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation. *American Political Science Review*, 89(2):271 – 294.

Burden, B. C. and Wichowsky, A. (2014). Economic Discontent as a Mobilizer: Unemployment and Voter Turnout. *The Journal of Politics*, 76(4):887–898.

Caldwell, B. C. (2019). *Deported Americans: Life after Deportation to Mexico*. Duke University Press.

Campos-Vazquez, R. M. and Cuilty, E. (2014). The Role of Emotions on Risk Aversion: A Prospect Theory Experiment. *Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics*, 50:1–9.

Cebula, R. J. (2017). Unemployment and Voter Turnout Revisited: A Brief Note. *Electoral Studies*, 48:149–152.

Cheatham, A. (2019). Central America's Turbulent Northern Triangle. Technical report, Council on Foreign Relations.

Chin, K.-l. (2000). *Chinatown Gangs: Extortion, Enterprise, and Ethnicity*. Oxford University Press.

Choi, D. D., Poertner, M., and Sambanis, N. (2023). The Hijab Penalty: Feminist Backlash to Muslim Immigrants. *American Journal of Political Science*, 67(2):291–306.

CICIG (2019). Informe final de labores de la CICIG: El legado de justicia en Guatemala. Technical report, Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala.

Cohn, A., Engelmann, J., Fehr, E., and Maréchal, M. A. (2015). Evidence for Countercyclical Risk Aversion: An Experiment with Financial Professionals. *American Economic Review*, 105(2):860–885.

Cohn, D., Passel, J. S., and Gonzales-Barrera, A. (2017). Rise in U.S. Immigrants From El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras Outpaces Growth From Elsewhere. Technical report, Pew Research Center.

Collier, P. and Vicente, P. C. (2014). Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria. *The Economic Journal*, 124(574):F327–F355.

Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Glynn, A., Knutsen, K. H., Lindberg, S. I., Pernstein, D., Seim, B., Skaaning, S.-E., Teorell, J., and Altman, D. (2017). *Varieties of Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.

Córdova, A. (2019). Living in Gang-Controlled Neighborhoods: Impacts on Electoral and Nonelectoral Participation in El Salvador. *Latin American Research Review*, 54(1):201–221.

Coupé, T. and Obrizan, M. (2016). Violence and Political Outcomes in Ukraine—Evidence from Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 44(1):201–212.

Cuffe, S. (2019). Guatemala Elects Right-Wing President amid Dismal Turnout. *Washington Post*.

Dammert, L. (2021). Extortion: The Backbone of Criminal Activity in Latin America. Technical report, Florida International University.

Dammert, L. and Malone, M. F. T. (2003). Fear of Crime or Fear of Life? Public Insecurities in Chile. *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 22(1):79–101.

Dancygier, R. (2017). *Dilemmas of Inclusion: The political representation of Muslims in Europe*. Princeton University Press.

DHS (2021). Yearbook 2021. Technical report, US Department of Homeland Security.

Ditton, J., Farrall, S., Bannister, J., Gilchrist, E., and Pease, K. (1999). Reactions to Victimisation: Why has Anger been Ignored? *Crime Prevention and Community Safety*, 1(3):37–54.

Dorff, C. (2017). Violence, Kinship Networks, and Political Resilience: Evidence from Mexico. *Journal of Peace Research*, 54(4):558–573.

Dow, D., Tellez, J., Villamizar Chaparro, M., and Wibbels, E. (2021). Biden Wants to Halt Deportations. Here's What Happens When Migrants Are Sent Back. *Washington Post*.

Druckman, J. N. and McDermott, R. (2008). Emotion and the Framing of Risky Choice. *Political Behavior*, 30(3):297–321.

Eurostat (2022). Enforcement of Immigration Legislation Statistics (2021). `https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Enforcement_of_immigration_legislation_statistics`.

Eurostat (2023). Third Country Nationals Ordered to Leave by Citizenship, Age and Sex - Quarterly Data (Rounded). `https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/migr_eiord1`.

Farfán Méndez, C. (2019). Forgetting El Chapo: Why Mexico's Violence Will Remain Unabated. Central American Mexico Policy Initiative Working Paper Series, Strauss Center and USMEX - UCSD.

Frye, T. (2002). Private Protection in Russia and Poland. *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(3):572–584.

Gabriel, U. and Greve, W. (2003). The Psychology of Fear of Crime. Conceptual and Methodological Perspectives. *The British Journal of Criminology*, 43(3):600–614.

Gaikwad, N. and Nellis, G. (2020). Do Politicians Discriminate Against Internal Migrants? Evidence from Nationwide Field Experiments in India. *American Journal of Political Science*, 65(4):790–806.

Gaikwad, N. and Nellis, G. (2021). Overcoming the Political Exclusion of Migrants: Theory and Experimental Evidence from India. *American Political Science Review*, 115(4):1129–1146.

Gambetta, D. (1996). *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection*. Harvard University Press.

Gonzalez-Ocantos, E., de Jonge, C. K., Meléndez, C., Nickerson, D., and Osorio, J. (2020). Carrots and Sticks: Experimental Evidence of Vote-Buying and Voter Intimidation in Guatemala. *Journal of Peace Research*, 57(1):46–61.

Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., and Zingales, L. (2018). Time Varying Risk Aversion. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 128(3):403–421.

Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D., and Pietrantuono, G. (2015). Naturalization Fosters the Long-Term Political Integration of Immigrants. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 112(41):12651–12656.

Hall, A. B., Yoder, J., and Karandikar, N. (2021). Economic Distress and Voting: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 9(2):327–344.

Hawkins, J. P., McDonald, J. H., and Adams, W. R., editors (2013). *Crisis of Governance in Maya Guatemala: Indigenous Responses to a Failing State*. University of Oklahoma Press.

Heidbrink, L. (2019). The Coercive Power of Debt: Migration and Deportation of Guatemalan Indigenous Youth. *The Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology*, 24(1):263–281.

Hooghe, M. and Dassonneville, R. (2018). Explaining the Trump Vote: The Effect of Racist Resentment and Anti-Immigrant Sentiments. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 51(3):528–534.

Huyser, K. R., Pérez, J. M., Ybarra, V. D., Hellwege, J. M., and Sanchez, L. (2018). Differential Influence of the Great Recession on Political Participation Among Race and Ethnic Groups. *Social Science Quarterly*, 99(2):512–523.

ICE (2020). Fiscal Year 2020 Enforcement and Removal Operations Report. Technical report, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

ICE (2022). ICE Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2022. Technical report, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Imai, K., Keele, L., and Tingley, D. (2010). A General Approach to Causal Mediation Analysis. *Psychological Methods*, 15(4):309–334.

Infante, C., Idrovo, A. J., Sánchez-Domínguez, M. S., Vinhas, S., and González-Vázquez, T. (2012). Violence Committed Against Migrants in Transit: Experiences on the Northern Mexican Border. *Journal of Immigrant and Minority Health*, 14(3):449–459.

Isaacs, A. and Schwartz, R. A. (2020). Guatemala: The Military in Politics. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.

Ivarsflaten, E. (2008). What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe?: Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(1):3–23.

Izcara Palacios, S. P. (2015). Coyotaje and Drugs: Two Different Businesses. *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 34(3):324–339.

Kanstroom, D. (2012). *Aftermath: Deportation Law and the New American Diaspora*. Oxford University Press.

Keltner, D., Ellsworth, P. C., and Edwards, K. (1993). Beyond Simple Pessimism: Effects of Sadness and Anger on Social Perception. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 64(5):740–752.

Kirmayer, L. J., Narasiah, L., Munoz, M., Rashid, M., Ryder, A. G., Guzder, J., Hassan, G., Rousseau, C., and Pottie, K. (2011). Common Mental Health Problems in Immigrants and Refugees: General Approach in Primary Care. *CMAJ*, 183(12):E959–E967.

Kurer, T., Häusermann, S., Wüest, B., and Enggist, M. (2019). Economic Grievances and Political Protest. *European Journal of Political Research*, 58(3):866–892.

Kustov, A. (2021). Borders of Compassion: Immigration Preferences and Parochial Altruism. *Comparative Political Studies*, 54(3-4):445–481.

LAPOP (2019). Americasbarometer datasets. `https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/raw-data.php`. Accessed: 2022-08-31.

Leal, D. L. (2002). Political Participation by Latino Non-Citizens in the United States. *British Journal of Political Science*, 32(2):353–370.

Lerner, J. S., Li, Y., Valdesolo, P., and Kassam, K. S. (2015). Emotion and Decision Making. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 66(1):799–823.

Ley, S. (2018). To Vote or Not to Vote: How Criminal Violence Shapes Electoral Participation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 62(9):1963–1990.

Ley, S. (2022). High-Risk Participation: Demanding Peace and Justice amid Criminal Violence. *Journal of Peace Research*, 59(6):794–809.

Leyva-Flores, R., Infante, C., Gutierrez, J. P., Quintino-Perez, F., Gómez-Saldivar, M., and Torres-Robles, C. (2019). Migrants in Transit through Mexico to the US: Experiences with Violence and Related Factors, 2009-2015. *PLOS ONE*, 14(8):e0220775.

Lim, J. (2023). The Electoral Consequences of International Migration in Sending Countries: Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 56(1):36–64.

Lueders, H. (2022). Rooted at Home: How Domestic Migration Separates Voters into National and Local Electorates. *Available at SSRN 3891174*.

Magaloni, B., Robles, G., Matanock, A. M., Diaz-Cayeros, A., and Romero, V. (2020). Living in Fear: The Dynamics of Extortion in Mexico's Drug War. *Comparative Political Studies*, 53(7):1124–1174.

Mainwaring, S. (2018). Introduction. In Mainwaring, S., editor, *Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, Decay, and Collapse*, pages 17–33. Cambridge University Press.

Maxwell, R. (2019). Cosmopolitan Immigration Attitudes in Large European Cities: Contextual or Compositional Effects? *American Political Science Review*, 113(2):456–474.

Meyer, P. J. (2022). Central American Migration: Root Causes and U.S. Policy. Technical report, Congressional Research Service.

Moncada, E. (2022). *Resisting Extortion*. Cambridge University Press.

MSF (2017). Forced to Flee, Report on Central American Migration. Technical report, Médecins Sans Frontières.

Ojeda, C. (2018). The Two Income-Participation Gaps. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(4):813–829.

Perreira, K. M. and Ornelas, I. (2013). Painful Passages: Traumatic Experiences and Post-Traumatic Stress Among U.S. Immigrant Latino Adolescents and their Primary Caregivers. *International Migration Review*, 47(4):976–1005.

Rhodes-Purdy, M., Navarre, R., and Utych, S. M. (2021). Populist Psychology: Economics, Culture, and Emotions. *The Journal of Politics*, 83(4):1559–1572.

Rozo, S. V. and Vargas, J. F. (2021). Brothers or Invaders? How Crisis-Driven Migrants Shape Voting Behavior. *Journal of Development Economics*, 150:102636.

Sánchez, O. (2008). Guatemala's Party Universe: A Case Study in Underinstitutionalization. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 50(1):123–151.

Schlozman, K. L., Verba, S., and Brady, H. E. (2013). *The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy*. Princeton University Press.

Schuessler, A. A. (2000). *A Logic of Expressive Choice*. Princeton University Press.

Schuster, L. and Majidi, N. (2013). What Happens Post-Deportation? The Experience of Deported Afghans. *Migration Studies*, 1(2):221–240.

Sieder, R. (2020). "To Speak the Law": Contested Jurisdictions, Legal Legibility, and Sovereignty in Guatemala. *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review*, 43(2):334–351.

Singer, A. J., Chouhy, C., Lehmann, P. S., Walzak, J. N., Gertz, M., and Biglin, S. (2019). Victimization, Fear of Crime, and Trust in Criminal Justice Institutions: A Cross-National Analysis. *Crime & Delinquency*, 65(6):822–844.

Slack, J. (2019). *Deported to Death: How Drug Violence Is Changing Migration on the US–Mexico Border*. University of California Press.

Slack, J. and Martínez, D. E. (2018). What Makes a Good Human Smuggler? The Differences Between Satisfaction with and Recommendation of Coyotes on the US-Mexico Border. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 676(1):152–173.

Slack, J., Martínez, D. E., and Whiteford, S. (2018). *The Shadow of the Wall: Violence and Migration on the U.S.-Mexico Border*. University of Arizona Press.

Smets, K. and van Ham, C. (2013). The Embarrassment of Riches? A Meta-Analysis of Individual-Level Research on Voter Turnout. *Electoral Studies*, 32(2):344–359.

Sønderskov, K. M., Dinesen, P. T., Finkel, S. E., and Hansen, K. M. (2022). Crime Victimization Increases Turnout: Evidence from Individual-Level Administrative Panel Data. *British Journal of Political Science*, 52(1):399–407.

Spener, D. (2009). *Clandestine Crossings: Migrants and Coyotes on the Texas-Mexico Border*. Cornell University Press.

Torres, F. (2020). What Is PTSD? Technical report, American Psychiatric Association. `https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/ptsd/what-is-ptsd`.

TRAC (2023). TRAC Immigration. `https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/`.

Trejo, G. and Nieto-Matiz, C. (2022). Containing Large-Scale Criminal Violence Through Internationalized Prosecution: How the Collaboration Between the CICIG and Guatemala's Law Enforcement Contributed to a Sustained Reduction in the Murder Rate. *Comparative Political Studies*, Forthcoming.

Unidad de Política Migratoria (2023). Estadísticas Migratorias. `http://portales.segob.gob.mx/es/PoliticaMigratoria/Mapa_estadisticas`.

Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., and Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Harvard University Press.

Vogt, W. A. (2013). Crossing Mexico: Structural Violence and the Commodification of Undocumented Central American Migrants. *American Ethnologist*, 40(4):764–780.

Wellman, E. I. (2021). Emigrant Inclusion in Home Country Elections: Theory and Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa. *American Political Science Review*, 115(1):82–96.

Zepeda-Millán, C. (2017). *Latino Mass Mobilization: Immigration, Racialization, and Activism*. Cambridge University Press.

Extortion, Civic Action, and Political Participation Among Guatemalan Deportees

Supplementary Appendices

Elaine K. Denny, David A. Dow, Gabriella Levy, & Mateo Villamizar-Chaparro

A.1 Deportees' Context

Table A1: Recent Deportation Statistics (Guatemalans)

Deportations to Guatemala		
	US	Mexico
2019	54919	50794
2020	29790	26149
2021	7778	53156
2022	6612	41824

Sources:
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/reports/annual-report/eroReportFY2020.pdf
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/eoy/iceAnnualReportFY2022.pdf
http://politicamigratoria.gob.mx/work/models/PoliticaMigratoria/CEM/Estadisticas/BoletinesMyH/2022/Cuadros2022/cuadro_3.3.xls
http://politicamigratoria.gob.mx/work/models/PoliticaMigratoria/CEM/Estadisticas/Series_historicas/3b_EDxPaisySexo_11_21.xls

Figure A1: Characteristics of Communities One Month After Arrival



Figure A2: Department of Origin



A.2 Question Language, Key Variables

All questions are asked in waves 2-3, except ***Extortion****.*

Extortion (*Asked only if respondent used a coyote on most recent migration trip, whether to enter the US or within the US*)

Coyotes, people who work with coyotes, and other individuals who transport people to and within the United States may use threats or other intimidating acts to make you feel too afraid to try to leave. At any stage during your most recent trip to the U.S., did any of the following happen to you?

You/your family were required to pay more smuggling fees than originally agreed or bad things would happen to you or your family?

(0) No, (1) Yes

Fear of Crime (Any)*: 0 if no to all A-F, 1 if yes to at least one A-F*
Fear of Crime (Count)*: Count of how many yes responses to A-F (0-6)*

Out of fear of being a crime victim, since you arrived back in Guatemala:

A. Have you avoided leaving your home by yourself at night?
B. Have you avoided using public transportation?
C. Have you prevented children from leaving the house?

D. Have you felt the need to move to a different neighborhood out of fear of crime?

E. Since you arrived, have you changed your job or place of study out of fear of crime?

F. Since you arrived, have you obtained a weapon for personal security?

[For A-F:] (0) No, (1) Yes

Currently Unemployed

Do you currently have a job?

(0) No, (1) Yes

Economic Difficulties

Your economic hardship in Guatemala is:

(1) Low difficulty, (2) Medium difficulty, (3) High difficulty

Economic Situation (Bad)

In general, how would you rate your current economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

(1) Very good, (2) Good, (3) Neither good nor bad, (4) Bad, (5) Very bad

Monthly Income

What is your total monthly income in Quetzales? If this varies month to month, try to give an average you expect to make.

(1) Q0, (2) Q1 – Q1,000, (3) Q1,001 – Q2,000, (4) Q2,001 – Q3,000, (5) Q3,001 – Q4,000, (6) Q4,001 – Q5,000, (7) Q5,001 – Q8,000, (8) Q8,001 or more

Civic Action Index*: average of answers to [civic] questions*
Political Action Index*: average of answers to [political] questions*

There are many ways of getting involved in one's community. Do you think you will or will not do each of the following in the coming year?

A. Attend a community meeting [civic]

B. Volunteer with a local organization [civic]

C. Mentor young people around here [civic]

D. Participate in a peaceful protest [political]

E. Affiliate with a political party [political]

F. Vote in a future national election [political]

[For A-F:](1) I definitely won't, (2) I probably won't, (3) I'm feeling about 50/50, (4) I probably will, (5) I definitely will

A.3 Qualitative Interviews

In order to more deeply contextualize the mechanisms of our main results, we conducted 18 semi-structured interviews with deportees that used a coyote for crossing into the US. We divided these individuals in four groups based on their intentions to remigrate and their experience of extortion. We then randomly selected ten from each group to contact by phone with the goal of interviewing between 4 and 5 people per group. The final number of interviewees per group can be found in Table A2. Given the COVID-19 restrictions, we conducted all of these interviews by phone. The interviews lasted an average of 30 minutes, and participants were compensated with 50 Quetzales of phone credit. Group 1 individuals were extorted and intended to remigrate, group 2 respondents were extorted and did not intend to remigrated, group 3 interview subjects were not extorted and intended to remigrate, and group 4 individuals were neither extorted nor intended to remigrate.

Table A2: Number of Interviews per group

		Extorted	
		Yes	No
Intent to Remigrate	Yes	4	5
	No	4	5

A.3.1 Semi-Structured Interview Questions, English

1. First of all, can you please tell me a little about what it has been like to reestablish yourself in Guatemala? What has gone well for you and what has been challenging?

    - How easy or hard is it to get by financially since you returned from Guatemala? (Why? Can you give examples?)

  - Do expenses from the U.S. or the migration journey make your economic situation easier or more difficult? Can you give examples?

- How does your economic situation affect how you feel about the future? Why?
  - Do these feelings affect whether you want to stay in Guatemala or return to the U.S.? How so?

- There are different ways that we all experience stress. Stress can make us more emotional, more forgetful, and more likely to make mistakes. Stress also may make it harder to sleep or to make healthy choices. To what extent do you feel stress these days, and in what ways? (Why? Examples?)
  - Is your economic situation a source of stress? Why?
  - Does this stress affect whether you want to stay in Guatemala or return to the U.S.? How so?

2. Now, I'd like you to think back to your migration experience getting to the U.S. I know that this journey can sometimes be very difficult in many different ways. Can you tell me a little about what was easy or hard about the journey? What parts of your experience would you like people in the U.S. to be aware of?

   - Did you consider using a coyote on the journey? If so, what made you decide to use one or not?
   - If you did use a coyote, was it someone familiar to you or people you know, or was it a stranger? On what parts of the journey did you use a coyote?
   - In our research, we have seen that some returnees were tricked or taken advantage of by coyotes. In your experience or the experience of people you know, do you think this is common? What kinds of experiences have you heard of like this?

3. How safe or unsafe do you feel in your community these days? Why do you feel that way?

   - How do your feelings about community safety affect the ways you are (or are not) active in your community? Why?
   - (ask if some level of discomfort or fear) What kinds of actions would you like to take if you felt more comfortable or established in your community? Are there programs, meetings, or organizations you would like to be more involved in? Why?

4. Are there ways in which your migration experience has changed who you are today? For example, are there ways you are stronger and more confident? Are there ways you are more cautious or skeptical?

5. If you could tell other Guatemalans thinking about going to the U.S. how the journey may affect them long-term, what would you say? What should they be prepared for, and how can they best move past any negative experiences they might have?

A.4 Summary Statistics

Table A3: Summary Statistics for Analysis Sample

	Count	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Extortion	520	0.20	0.40	0.0	1.0
Assault	520	0.07	0.25	0.0	1.0
Civic Action Index	517	4.53	0.87	1.0	5.0
Community Meeting	517	4.47	1.16	1.0	5.0
Volunteer	519	4.49	1.11	1.0	5.0
Mentor Youth	519	4.62	0.92	1.0	5.0
Political Action Index	510	3.54	1.14	1.0	5.0
Protest	520	3.28	1.75	1.0	5.0
Affiliate with Party	517	2.81	1.77	1.0	5.0
Intent to Vote	513	4.52	1.18	1.0	5.0
Economic Hardship Index	520	-0.02	0.70	-2.1	1.2
Econ Situation (Bad)	519	3.41	0.91	1.0	5.0
Economic Difficulties	520	2.21	0.75	1.0	3.0
Monthly Income	518	2.03	1.22	1.0	8.0
Currently Unemployed	519	0.52	0.50	0.0	1.0
Fear of Crime (Count)	520	1.94	1.45	0.0	6.0
Fear of Crime (Any)	520	0.79	0.41	0.0	1.0
Female	520	0.13	0.34	0.0	1.0
Age	520	30.85	9.10	19.0	63.0
Indigenous	520	0.37	0.48	0.0	1.0
Highest Education	520	7.08	4.52	0.0	17.0
Visible Tattoos	520	0.06	0.24	0.0	1.0
Children in GT	520	0.38	0.88	0.0	7.0
Children in US	520	1.15	1.44	0.0	7.0
Assets	520	0.13	0.34	0.0	1.0
Ln(Years in US)	520	0.25	2.06	-5.9	3.4
Local Social Network	520	2.81	0.43	1.0	3.0
Detained at Border	520	0.65	0.48	0.0	1.0

Note: Economic Hardship Index is a summary index of Monthly Income, Current Unemployment, Economic Difficulties, and Economic Rating.

A.5 Attrition and Balance

Table A4: Attrition after Arrival Survey

Variable	(1) Dropped Out After Round 1	(2) Panel Sample	(3) Difference
Extortion	0.174	0.184	0.010
	(0.379)	(0.388)	(0.024)
Age	31.428	30.919	-0.509
	(9.681)	(9.173)	(0.561)
Indigenous	0.399	0.336	-0.063*
	(0.490)	(0.473)	(0.029)
Female	0.067	0.109	0.043**
	(0.250)	(0.312)	(0.016)
Highest Education	5.917	7.212	1.295**
	(4.433)	(4.467)	(0.263)
Married	0.284	0.278	-0.007
	(0.451)	(0.449)	(0.027)
Children in US	1.222	1.190	-0.032
	(1.682)	(1.484)	(0.096)
Children in GT	0.429	0.382	-0.046
	(1.036)	(0.925)	(0.059)
Detained at Border	0.659	0.645	-0.014
	(0.474)	(0.479)	(0.029)
Ln(Years in US)	0.119	0.257	0.138
	(2.319)	(2.103)	(0.134)
No. of Migrations	1.686	1.570	-0.115+
	(1.140)	(0.888)	(0.063)
Visible Tattoos	0.092	0.076	-0.016
	(0.289)	(0.265)	(0.017)
Intend Return U.S.	0.443	0.399	-0.043
	(0.497)	(0.490)	(0.031)
Intend Visit Local Relatives	0.722	0.707	-0.015
	(0.448)	(0.456)	(0.027)
Econ Situation in US	3.040	3.110	0.070
	(1.017)	(1.031)	(0.061)
Econ Expectation in GT	1.969	1.939	-0.030
	(0.815)	(0.837)	(0.050)
Observations	916	421	

Notes: Displays differences between group means in two-tailed t-test
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A5: Survey Attrition & Personality from Rounds 2 to 3

Variable	(1) Dropped Out After R2	(2) Round 3 Sample	(3) Difference
Reserved	4.766	4.720	-0.046
	(0.756)	(0.699)	(0.081)
Critical	1.444	1.284	-0.159
	(1.046)	(0.907)	(0.109)
Anxious	1.524	1.540	0.016
	(1.172)	(1.151)	(0.131)
Observations	124	212	

Notes: Personality variables only measured in round 2 of follow-up survey
Displays differences between group means in two-tailed t-test
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A6: Extortion During Migration - Follow-Up Respondents Only

Variable	(1) No Extortion	(2) Extortion	(3) Difference
Age	30.665	30.523	-0.142
	(8.934)	(8.818)	(1.228)
Indigenous	0.345	0.400	0.055
	(0.476)	(0.494)	(0.066)
Female	0.101	0.185	0.084+
	(0.301)	(0.391)	(0.044)
Highest Education	7.198	6.769	-0.429
	(4.505)	(4.530)	(0.621)
Married	0.288	0.246	-0.042
	(0.454)	(0.434)	(0.062)
Children in US	1.162	1.031	-0.131
	(1.486)	(1.237)	(0.199)
Children in GT	0.331	0.538	0.208+
	(0.866)	(1.017)	(0.123)
Detained at Border	0.676	0.538	-0.138*
	(0.469)	(0.502)	(0.065)
Ln(Years in US)	0.372	0.134	-0.238
	(1.891)	(2.323)	(0.273)
No. of Migrations	1.532	1.738	0.206
	(0.881)	(1.020)	(0.125)
Visible Tattoos	0.068	0.046	-0.022
	(0.253)	(0.211)	(0.034)
Intend Return U.S.	0.398	0.414	0.016
	(0.490)	(0.497)	(0.072)
Intend Visit Local Relatives	0.692	0.683	-0.010
	(0.462)	(0.469)	(0.065)
Local Social Network (Avg)	2.809	2.762	-0.048
	(0.435)	(0.477)	(0.061)
Critical	1.375	1.364	-0.011
	(1.017)	(0.950)	(0.151)
Reserved	4.741	4.709	-0.032
	(0.761)	(0.658)	(0.112)
Anxious	1.567	1.564	-0.003
	(1.211)	(1.118)	(0.180)
Observations	278	65	343

Notes: Displays differences between group means in two-tailed t-test
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

A.6 Use of coyote

Table A7: Using Coyote to Attempt Entry

Variable	(1) No Coyote In	(2) Coyote Into US	(3) Difference
Age	32.422	30.952	-1.470*
	(10.176)	(9.324)	(0.661)
Indigenous	0.293	0.400	0.107**
	(0.456)	(0.490)	(0.034)
Female	0.082	0.080	-0.002
	(0.275)	(0.271)	(0.019)
Highest Education	6.203	6.357	0.154
	(4.470)	(4.479)	(0.312)
Married	0.254	0.288	0.034
	(0.436)	(0.453)	(0.031)
Children in US	1.266	1.199	-0.066
	(1.804)	(1.575)	(0.113)
Children in GT	0.328	0.434	0.106
	(0.955)	(1.012)	(0.070)
Detained at Border	0.704	0.642	-0.062+
	(0.458)	(0.480)	(0.034)
Ln(Years in US)	0.057	0.182	0.125
	(2.365)	(2.223)	(0.159)
No. of Migrations	1.664	1.645	-0.019
	(0.901)	(1.104)	(0.074)
Visible Tattoos	0.094	0.084	-0.010
	(0.292)	(0.278)	(0.020)
Observations	256	1,063	1,337

Notes: Displays differences between group means in two-tailed t-test
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

A.7 Regression Tables

Table A8: Extortion Predicts Poor Outcomes: Economic and Safety

	(1) Fear of Crime	(2) Econ Hardship Index
Extortion	0.30*	0.29*
	(0.12)	(0.12)
Female	0.19	0.36*
	(0.14)	(0.16)
Age	0.02*	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Indigenous	-0.07	-0.04
	(0.10)	(0.10)
Highest Education	-0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Visible Tattoos	0.25	0.19
	(0.20)	(0.20)
Children in GT	0.08	0.10
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Children in US	0.02	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Local Social Network	-0.12	0.07
	(0.10)	(0.13)
Ln(Years in US)	-0.07*	-0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Assets	-0.17	-0.19
	(0.14)	(0.17)
Employed	-0.27**	
	(0.09)	
Detained at Border	0.08	-0.20^{+}
	(0.11)	(0.11)
Round 3	0.35***	0.19**
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Constant	-0.34	-0.76
	(0.39)	(0.49)
Observations	520	520

Robust standard errors clustered by respondent
Standardized DVs for each model
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A9: Extortion Predicts Poor Outcomes: Economic and Safety

	(1) Fear of Crime (Count)	(2) Fear of Crime (Any)	(3) Monthly Income	(4) Currently Unemployed	(5) Economic Difficulties	(6) Economic Situation (Bad)	(7) Debt Barrier
Extortion	0.22**	0.65*	0.19+	0.28	0.23*	0.23+	0.91***
	(0.08)	(0.32)	(0.11)	(0.27)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.23)
Female	0.13	0.95+	0.32*	0.55+	0.30*	0.12	0.39
	(0.09)	(0.58)	(0.16)	(0.31)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.37)
Age	0.01*	0.03	-0.00	0.03	0.01	0.02**	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Indigenous	-0.05	-0.20	0.05	-0.44*	0.12	-0.09	0.65**
	(0.08)	(0.26)	(0.09)	(0.22)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.20)
Highest Education	-0.01	0.00	-0.02*	0.03	0.00	0.01	-0.04
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Visible Tattoos	0.17	0.11	-0.05	0.49	0.08	0.27	0.59
	(0.13)	(0.53)	(0.24)	(0.46)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.37)
Children in GT	0.06	0.44*	0.07	0.16	0.09+	0.02	-0.09
	(0.04)	(0.21)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.13)
Children in US	0.01	0.02	-0.02	-0.10	0.11**	0.04	0.18*
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Local Social Network	-0.09	-0.43	0.10	0.13	0.06	-0.02	
	(0.07)	(0.31)	(0.12)	(0.24)	(0.10)	(0.14)	
Ln(Years in US)	-0.05*	-0.02	-0.02	-0.07	-0.05*	-0.06*	-0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Assets	-0.13	0.29	-0.18	-0.18	-0.20	-0.05	0.01
	(0.11)	(0.41)	(0.19)	(0.31)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.30)
Employed	-0.21**	-0.60*					
	(0.07)	(0.24)					
Detained at Border	0.06	0.45	-0.09	-0.34	-0.22*	-0.06	0.67**
	(0.08)	(0.28)	(0.11)	(0.23)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.23)
Round 3	0.26***	0.70**	0.10	0.09	0.37***	-0.07	
	(0.05)	(0.22)	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.07)	
Constant	0.42	1.01	-0.10	-1.03	-0.64	-0.73	6.55***
	(0.28)	(1.17)	(0.52)	(0.92)	(0.39)	(0.46)	(0.57)
Observations	520	520	518	519	520	519	1078
Model	Neg. Binomial	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	OLS	OLS

Standard errors in parentheses
Robust standard errors clustered by respondent
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A10: Extortion and Fear of Crime Mediation

	(1) Fear of Crime	(2) Civic Action Index	(3) Fear of Crime	(4) Political Action Index
Extortion	0.30*	0.21*	0.32**	0.23+
	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.14)
Female	0.19	-0.03	0.18	0.02
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.19)
Age	0.02*	0.01+	0.02*	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Indigenous	-0.07	-0.10	-0.08	0.13
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Highest Education	-0.01	0.02+	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Visible Tattoos	0.24	-0.21	0.28	-0.08
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.26)
Children in GT	0.09	0.04	0.08	-0.09
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Children in US	0.02	-0.03	0.01	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Local Social Network	-0.13	0.08	-0.14	0.27*
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.13)
Ln(Years in US)	-0.07*	0.02	-0.08*	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Assets	-0.17	-0.03	-0.17	-0.01
	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.19)
Employed	-0.26**	-0.01	-0.27**	0.06
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.11)
Detained at Border	0.08	0.01	0.09	-0.15
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.13)
Round 3	0.35***	0.10	0.36***	-0.24**
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Fear of Crime		-0.01		0.02
		(0.05)		(0.06)
Constant	-0.35	3.78***	-0.30	2.55***
	(0.39)	(0.36)	(0.39)	(0.50)
Observations	517	517	510	510

Robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses
All models are OLS Linear Regressions
Column 1 is first-stage model for civic outcome in Column 2
Column 3 is first-stage model for political outcome in Column 4
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A11: Extortion and Economic Hardship Mediation Analysis

	(1) Econ Hardship Index	(2) Civic Action Index	(3) Econ Hardship Index	(4) Political Action Index
Extortion	0.20*	0.18*	0.20*	0.23+
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Female	0.26*	-0.05	0.26*	0.01
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.19)
Age	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Indigenous	-0.03	-0.09	-0.03	0.14
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.12)
Highest Education	0.00	0.02+	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Visible Tattoos	0.11	-0.22	0.14	-0.08
	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.27)
Children in GT	0.07+	0.03	0.07	-0.10
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Children in US	0.03	-0.03	0.03	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Local Social Network	0.05	0.08	0.06	0.26*
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.13)
Ln(Years in US)	-0.04*	0.02	-0.04*	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Assets	-0.13	-0.01	-0.12	-0.01
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.19)
Detained at Border	-0.14+	0.02	-0.13	-0.14
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.13)
Round 3	0.13*	0.08	0.13*	-0.23**
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Economic Hardship Index		0.10		0.04
		(0.06)		(0.08)
Constant	-0.54	3.83***	-0.57+	2.60***
	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.49)
Observations	517	517	510	510

Robust standard errors clustered by respondent
All models are OLS Linear Regressions
Column 1 is first-stage model for civic outcome in Column 2
Column 3 is first-stage model for political outcome in Column 4
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A12: Extortion and Engagement Items Disaggregated

	(Civic: 1-3)			(Political: 4-6)		
	(1) Community Meeting	(2) Volunteer	(3) Mentor Youth	(4) Protest	(5) Affiliate Party	(6) Vote
Extortion	0.26*	0.25*	0.09	0.41*	0.22	0.08
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.15)
Female	-0.07	-0.04	0.02	0.24	-0.11	-0.06
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.12)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.19)
Age	0.01+	0.01+	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Indigenous	-0.00	-0.21+	-0.07	-0.05	0.22	0.21+
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.12)
Highest Education	0.02	0.01	0.02+	-0.00	-0.03	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Visible Tattoos	-0.14	-0.26	-0.24	-0.00	0.03	-0.23
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.17)	(0.32)	(0.37)	(0.32)
Children in GT	0.03	0.04	0.03	-0.18+	-0.08	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.09)
Children in US	-0.03	-0.04	-0.01	-0.10	-0.05	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Local Social Network	0.05	0.19	0.02	0.42*	0.26	0.13
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.16)
Ln(Years in US)	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.12*	-0.00	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Assets	0.00	-0.19	0.12	-0.16	0.23	-0.11
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.20)
Employed	-0.11	0.01	0.08	0.24	-0.09	0.03
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.11)
Detained at Border	0.01	-0.02	0.03	-0.27	-0.12	-0.03
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.14)
Round 3	0.26**	0.12	-0.09	-0.57***	-0.16	0.05
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.09)
Constant	3.67***	3.47***	4.21***	2.27**	1.92**	3.45***
	(0.52)	(0.49)	(0.43)	(0.73)	(0.74)	(0.60)
Observations	517	517	517	510	510	510

Standard errors in parentheses
Robust standard errors clustered by respondent
All models are OLS Linear Regressions
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A13: Extortion and Engagement - Robustness Checks

	(1) Civic Action Index	(2) Political Action Index	(3) Civic Action Index	(4) Political Action Index
Extortion	0.26**	0.26+	0.19*	0.25+
	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Anxious	0.03	0.07		
	(0.04)	(0.06)		
Reserved	0.01	-0.02		
	(0.06)	(0.11)		
Critical	-0.10+	-0.15+		
	(0.06)	(0.08)		
Fear of Crime (Count)	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Female	-0.03	0.09	-0.06	-0.08
	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.19)
Age	0.01+	0.01	0.01+	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Indigenous	-0.08	0.17	-0.09	0.21
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.15)
Highest Education	0.02*	-0.00	0.02+	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Visible Tattoos	-0.32	-0.40	-0.19	-0.07
	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.28)
Children in GT	0.04	-0.12	0.03	-0.10
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Children in US	-0.03	-0.02	-0.04	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Local Social Network	0.13	0.31*	0.09	0.21
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Ln(Years in US)	-0.00	0.04	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Assets	-0.02	0.05	-0.02	0.02
	(0.11)	(0.22)	(0.10)	(0.20)
Employed	-0.01	0.10	-0.02	0.08
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.12)
Detained at Border	-0.04	-0.19	0.02	-0.18
	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Round 3	0.03	-0.24*	0.10	-0.24**
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Constant	3.63***	2.69***	3.68***	2.67***
	(0.47)	(0.73)	(0.39)	(0.54)
Observations	453	444	517	510
Department Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses
Robust standard errors clustered by respondent
All models are OLS Linear Regressions
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A14: Assault Not Correlated with Engagement

	(1) Civic Action Index	(2) Political Action Index
Assault	0.06	0.16
	(0.16)	(0.22)
Female	-0.01	0.05
	(0.14)	(0.19)
Age	0.01^{+}	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Indigenous	-0.08	0.14
	(0.09)	(0.12)
Highest Education	0.02^{+}	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Visible Tattoos	-0.22	-0.08
	(0.22)	(0.26)
Children in GT	0.04	-0.09
	(0.04)	(0.07)
Children in US	-0.03	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Local Social Network	0.09	0.27*
	(0.09)	(0.13)
Ln(Years in US)	0.01	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Assets	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.10)	(0.19)
Employed	-0.01	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.11)
Detained at Border	-0.01	-0.17
	(0.09)	(0.13)
Round 3	0.10	-0.23**
	(0.07)	(0.08)
Constant	3.83***	2.57***
	(0.37)	(0.50)
Observations	517	510

Standard errors in parentheses
OLS Linear Regressions; Robust standard errors clustered by respondent
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A15: Romano-Wolf Adjusted p-values for Extortion Variable

	Model p-value	Resample p-value	Romano-Wolf p-value
Civic Action Index	0.013	0.016	0.043
Political Action Index	0.078	0.076	0.076
Economic Hardship Index	0.009	0.016	0.043
Fear of Crime	0.010	0.016	0.043

Note: We calculate Romano-Wolf p-values using the "rwolf" package in Stata. We conduct 1000 bootstrap replications to estimate the resampled p-values across our main dependent variables: civic action, political action, economic hardship, and fear of crime. All standard errors calculated with clustering at the respondent level. All models include battery of controls: Female, Age, Indigenous, Highest Education, Visible Tattoos, Children US, Children GT, Assets in US, ln(Time US), Employment (for non-econ DVs), Detained at Border, Round 3 dummy

A.8 Guatemala in Context

How does the Guatemalan case fit within the other countries that receive deportees? In order to answer this question, we looked at the numbers of deported individuals from the United States and the European Union. For the United States, we looked at ICE Removals in 2020 (ICE, 2020), and from the European Union, we collected data on voluntary and involuntary forced returns for 2021 (Eurostat, 2023). Given the large number of countries that receive deportees, we focused only on the top quartile for both the US and the EU. We merged this information with data on V-dem's Party Institutionalization (Bizzarro et al., 2017) and Electoral Democracy (Coppedge et al., 2017) indexes. The results from this exercise can be found in Figure A3.

Panels b and d from Figure A3 illustrate that Guatemala's Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) is very close to the average for all countries that receive deportees from both the United States and the European Union. This shows that in terms of democratic engagement, our results might travel to other similar cases. Moreover, these plots show the large variety of democratic settings where deportees need to return. While some are returning to places with high and functioning levels of electoral democracies, a lot have to return to places where both their civic and political engagement is constrained.

Panels a and c from Figure A3 show the correlation between the number of deportees (logged) and the Party Institutionalization Index (PII). In both panels, it is plausible to observe that Guatemala has a PII below the average of the top quartile of countries that receive the most deportees. However, Guatemala is not an extreme case. Countries like Afghanistan, Haiti, The Philippines, and Egypt also have similar or worse levels of party institutionalization. Despite this, the information in Figure A3 could be an indication that our results from party membership are conducive to a very weak party system.

It might be plausible to think that Guatemala's low PII might drive some of the other measures of political and civic engagement. In order to investigate this, we looked at data from the 2018/19 wave of LAPOP in Guatemala. This survey had a series of measures of civic and political engagement as well as a question that allowed us to identify if individuals lived in another country in the last five years. We then divided respondents between those who lived abroad and those who did not and calculated simple differences in mean estimates between groups. The results can be found in Table A16. These results indicate that migrants have lower rates of vote registration and lower turnout in the 2015 elections. The latter might be a result that some respondents were outside the country in 2015. However, there are no other significant differences across groups in terms of political and civic engagement.

Figure A3: Democracy Index of countries (top quartile) with Returned Individuals from the European Union and United States (a) PII EU (b) DI EU (c) PII USA (d) DI USA



Note: Y-axis displays the Party Democratization Index (panels a and c) or the Democracy Index (panels b and d). The x-axis displays the log of the number of deportees in the top quartile of countries with more deportees from the USA (panels c and d) and The European Union (panels a and b). Data from the indexes come from the Varieties of Democracy Project, the number of deportees in the European Union comes from Eurostats, and the number of deportees from the US comes from ICE enforcement statistics

Table A16: Descriptive Statistics by Migratory Status in Guatemala (LAPOP's 2018/19)

	Not Migrated			Migrated			
	N	Mean	S.D.	N	Mean	S.D.	Difference
Registered to Vote	1545	0.66	0.47	39	0.51	0.51	-0.147*
Voted last Elections (2015)	1541	0.63	0.48	37	0.43	0.50	-0.196**
Willingness to Vote	1449	0.82	0.39	38	0.89	0.31	0.078
Clientelism	1528	0.23	0.42	37	0.24	0.43	0.013
Protest	1546	0.10	0.30	39	0.10	0.31	-0.000
Go to Church	1525	0.69	0.46	39	0.62	0.49	-0.071
Go to PTA	1531	0.49	0.50	39	0.49	0.51	-0.001
Go to community meetings	1527	0.40	0.49	39	0.51	0.51	0.111
Go to Political Party Meetings	1524	0.13	0.34	39	0.15	0.37	0.024

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Displays the descriptive statistics and its difference between Guatemalan's that have lived in another country in the past 5 years. Data comes from LAPOP's Guatemala survey from 2018/19.