APPENDICES

Deservingness Heuristics and Policy Attitudes Toward the Elderly in an Aging Society: Evidence from Japan

Contents

Appendix A Comparison between Target Quota and Collected Data **A3**

Appendix B Survey Instruments **A4**

B.1 Treatment Group Vignettes A4

B.2 Manipulation Check (Treatment groups only) A5

B.3 Post-treatment Question A6

Appendix C Summary Statistics of Survey Experiment Data by Experimental Condition **A7**

Appendix D Distribution of Outcome Variable **A9**

Appendix E Balance Test **A11**

Appendix F Full Output of Table 1 **A13**

Appendix G Predicted Probability of Elderly Support by Age and Treatment Groups **A14**

Appendix H Reanalysis: OLS Estimates **A16**

Appendix I Reanalysis of Tables 1 and 2 Using Ordered Logit Regression **A22**

Appendix J Reanalysis of Table 1: Using Age Dummy **A24**

Appendix K Reanalysis of Table 1 Including "Decline to Answer" responses **A26**

Appendix L Treatment Effects by Household Income Levels **A27**

Appendix M Treatment Effects Using Different Thresholds for Skill Levels **A28**

Appendix N Full Output of Table 2 **A29**

Appendix O Age Effect on Support for Different Types of Social Welfare **A30**

Appendix A Comparison between Target Quota and Collected Data

Target Quota (within +-5%)
(Based on the 2017 Census)

	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-79
male	7.0%	8.4%	10.3%	8.1%	9.3%	6.6%
female	6.6%	8.1%	10.0%	8.1%	9.7%	7.9%

Hokkaido/Tohoku	11.3%
Kanto	33.7%
Chubu	18.1%
Kinki	16.9%
Chugoku/Shikoku	8.6%
Kyushu/Okinawa	11.4%

Collected (%)

	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-79
male	6.5%	8.7%	9.8%	9.6%	8.9%	7.9%
female	6.1%	7.9%	8.9%	8.4%	10.3%	7.3%

Hokkaido/Tohoku	11.9%
Kanto	31.5%
Chubu	18.4%
Kinki	17.8%
Chugoku/Shikoku	10.4%
Kyushu/Okinawa	10.2%

Collected (#)

	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-79
male	130	174	196	191	177	157
female	121	158	177	167	206	146

Hokkaido/Tohoku	238
Kanto	629
Chubu	367
Kinki	355
Chugoku/Shikoku	208
Kyushu/Okinawa	203

Appendix B　Survey Instruments

B.1　Treatment Group Vignettes

A. Needs Cue Group

世界第三位の経済大国である日本には、貧困はほとんどないと思うかもしれません。しかし、社会の高齢化が進むにつれ、65歳以上の人口においては貧困化が進んでいます。その結果、**消費財や食料品を買う余裕のない高齢者が増加しており**、経済的に苦しんでいます。

As the nation with the third largest economy in the world, one may assume that poverty in Japan is very rare. However, as the society is rapidly aging, poverty among the over-65 population is rising. As a consequence, **a growing number of seniors cannot afford basic consumer goods and groceries** and are struggling to meet their basic economic needs.

B. Needs+Effort Cue Group

世界第三位の経済大国である日本には、貧困は存在しないと思うかもしれません。しかし、社会の高齢化が進むにつれ、65歳以上の人口においては貧困化が進んでいます。**退職年齢を過ぎても低賃金で非正規の仕事を始める高齢者が増加しており**、経済的に苦しんでいます。

As the nation with the third largest economy in the world, one may assume that poverty in Japan is very rare. However, as the society is rapidly aging, poverty among the over-65 population is rising. **A growing number of seniors continue to work past their retirement age**, struggling to meet their basic economic needs.

B.2 Manipulation Check (Treatment groups only)

Q13A.前ページの文章の内容として、当てはまるものを選んでください。 _____ の間で貧困が広がっている。（ひとつだけ）

1. 子供
2. 地方世帯
3. 都市世帯
4. 高齢者
5. わからない

Q13A.Choose the answer based on your reading. Poverty among _____ is rising. (Select one)

1. Children
2. Rural households
3. Urban households
4. The elderly
5. Don’t know

Q13B.前ページの文章の内容として、当てはまるものを選んでください。高齢者の貧困問題として、どのような側面が議論されていましたか。（ひとつだけ）

1. 定年退職後に低賃金・非正規で働かざるを得ない
2. 消費財や食料品を買う余裕がない
3. 家を買う余裕がない
4. 高齢者の貧困は深刻な問題ではない

Q13B.Choose the answer based on your reading. What specific aspect of the elderly poverty is discussed? (Select one)

1. Being forced to work at low-paying and temporary jobs after retirement age
2. Not being able to afford basic consumer goods and groceries
3. Not being able to afford to buy a house
4. The elderly poverty is not a serious issue.

B.3 Post-treatment Question

Q22.次の意見について、あなたはどの程度賛成あるいは反対しますか。政府は、高齢者に対し最低限の生活水準を提供すべきである。（ひとつだけ）

Q22.How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The government should provide a decent standard of living for the old. (Select one)

Appendix C Summary Statistics of Survey Experiment Data by Experimental Condition

C1. Control Group

	Obs #	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Support for gov't assistance to the elderly	826	.594	.491	0	1
Age	858	50.280	14.612	20	79
Left-right position	858	5.295	1.489	0	10
Incumbent vote (t-1)	858	.298	.458	0	1
Female	858	.513	.500	0	1
Market outsider	858	.301	.460	0	1
Low skill	502	.297	.457	0	1
Education	858	3.766	1.369	1	5
Occupational industry	858	13.838	6.467	0	21
Household income	858	7.066	3.120	1	16
Perceived national economic condition	858	2.628	.796	1	5
Perceived household economic condition	858	2.594	.806	1	5

C2. Needs Treatment Group

	Obs #	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Support for gov't assistance to the elderly	804	.618	.486	0	1
Age	836	50.773	14.849	20	79
Left-right position	836	5.318	1.484	0	10
Incumbent vote (t-1)	836	.313	.464	0	1
Female	836	.522	.500	0	1
Market outsider	495	.303	.460	0	1
Low skill	836	.334	.472	0	1
Education	836	3.684	1.403	1	5
Occupational industry	836	13.378	6.627	0	21
Household income	836	7.218	3.091	1	16
Perceived national economic condition	836	2.596	.756	1	5
Perceived household economic condition	836	2.599	.847	1	5

C3. Needs+effort Treatment Group

	Obs #	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Support for gov't assistance to the elderly	812	.642	.480	0	1
Age	853	50.346	14.720	20	79
Left-right position	853	5.270	1.479	0	10
Incumbent vote (t-1)	853	.322	.468	0	1
Female	853	.504	.500	0	1
Market outsider	535	.273	.446	0	1
Low skill	853	.305	.461	0	1
Education	853	3.782	1.384	1	5
Occupational industry	853	13.311	6.533	0	21
Household income	853	7.513	3.136	1	16
Perceived national economic condition	853	2.613	.748	1	5
Perceived household economic condition	853	2.601	.804	1	5

Appendix D Distribution of Outcome Variable

Figure below presents the distribution of our outcome variable (support for government assistance to the elderly) by experimental conditions. The table additionally shows the percentage of respondents supporting the elderly-related government assistance.

As shown in the figure, the patterns of support for elderly-related government assistance appear to be similar across all three experimental groups. The most frequent responses include those who agree with more government support for the elderly, followed by the responses by those who neither agree or disagree with more elderly support.

According to the table, those in the needs+effort treatment group yield the highest level of support for government aid to the elderly (when including both those who agree and strongly agree with the elderly support). With respect to age groups, senior citizens are much more likely to support government aid to the elderly than working-age respondents across all experimental groups.

D1. Distribution of Outcome Variable by Experimental Conditions



D2. % of Respondents Supporting Government Assistance to the Elderly

Group	Age (20-64)	Age (65+)
Needs treatment	58.89%	71.20%
Needs+effort treatment	61.44%	74.14%
No cue	55.71%	73.03%

Appendix E Balance Test

Table below reports the results of balance tests. In each model, the outcome variable is a categorical variable (1=control group, 2=NC treatment group, 3=NEC treatment group). Both models were estimated using multinomial logistic regression where the reference category is the control group. Column (1) includes only respondents who passed manipulation checks, and column (2) includes all respondents. Standard errors are in parentheses, and asterisks indicate statistical significance (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).

DV category		(1)	(2)
Reference Category=Control group			
Needs Treatment	Age	0.003	0.002
		(0.004)	(0.003)
	Left-right Ideology	0.013	0.000
		(0.038)	(0.036)
	Incumbent Vote	0.067	0.098
		(0.126)	(0.117)
	Female	0.105	0.020
		(0.108)	(0.100)
	Education	-0.012	-0.044
		(0.039)	(0.037)
	Industry	-0.017**	-0.011
		(0.008)	(0.008)
	Household Income	0.015	0.020
		(0.018)	(0.017)
	Perceived Macro-economy	-0.107	-0.088
		(0.081)	(0.076)
	Perceived Household Economy	-0.020	0.026
		(0.077)	(0.073)
	Intercept	-0.085	0.155
		(0.386)	(0.363)
Needs+Effort Treatment	Age	0.005	0.001
		(0.003)	(0.003)
	Left-right Ideology	-0.050	-0.038
		(0.037)	(0.036)
	Incumbent Vote	0.218*	0.153
		(0.120)	(0.116)
	Female	0.061	-0.017
		(0.104)	(0.100)
	Education	0.017	-0.010
		(0.038)	(0.037)
	Industry	-0.012	-0.013*

	(0.008)	(0.007)
Household Income	0.059***	0.051***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Perceived Macro-economy	-0.043	-0.045
	(0.079)	(0.076)
Perceived Household Economy	-0.039	-0.028
	(0.075)	(0.072)
Intercept	-0.368	0.135
	(0.375)	(0.362)
N	2,246	2,547
Pseudo R-squared	0.006	0.004

Appendix F Full Output of Table 1

Table F1. Effects on Policy Attitudes toward the Elderly

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.022***	0.022***	0.022***	0.022***	0.022***	0.022***
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Needs cue (NC)		0.159**	0.018		0.159**	0.008
		(0.076)	(0.427)		(0.080)	(0.417)
Needs+effort cue (NEC)		0.352***	0.437		0.385***	0.474
		(0.083)	(0.369)		(0.077)	(0.362)
NC X Age			0.003			0.003
			(0.008)			(0.008)
NEC X Age			-0.002			-0.002
			(0.007)			(0.008)
Left-right Ideology				-0.065	-0.088**	-0.088**
				(0.057)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Incumbent Vote				-0.011	-0.171**	-0.170**
				(0.156)	(0.084)	(0.086)
Female				-0.060	-0.033	-0.033
				(0.171)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Education				-0.031	-0.027	-0.027
				(0.045)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Industry				0.003	-0.003	-0.003
				(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Household Income				-0.064**	-0.042**	-0.042**
				(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Perceived Macro-economy				0.006	-0.071	-0.070
				(0.093)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Perceived Household Economy				-0.160*	-0.258***	-0.259***
				(0.089)	(0.077)	(0.076)
Intercept	-0.724***	-0.740***	-0.724***	0.610	1.102***	1.122**
	(0.224)	(0.138)	(0.224)	(0.589)	(0.341)	(0.447)
Pseudo R-squared	0.018	0.023	0.023	0.034	0.048	0.048
N	826	2172	2172	826	2172	2172

Note: All models were estimated using a logistic regression. Non-responses were excluded.

Models in columns 1 and 3 include the control group only. Robust standard errors are clustered by prefecture.

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix G Predicted Probability of Elderly Support by Age and Treatment Groups

Fig G1. Predicted Probability of Supporting the Elderly by Age and Treatment Groups



(a) Age=30



(b) Age=50



(c) Age=70

Note: Graphs based on Model 6 in Table 1.

Appendix H Reanalysis: OLS Estimates

Table H1. Effects on Policy Attitudes toward the Elderly — Age Dummy

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	0.011***	0.010***	0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Needs cue (NC)		0.086*	0.124
		(0.047)	(0.167)
Needs+effort cue (NEC)		0.193***	0.247*
		(0.035)	(0.129)
NC X Age			-0.001
			(0.003)
NEC X Age			-0.001
			(0.003)
Left-right Ideology	-0.073**	-0.066***	-0.066***
	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Incumbent Vote	-0.035	-0.109***	-0.110***
	(0.057)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Female	-0.075	-0.072*	-0.072*
	(0.065)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Education	-0.012	-0.018	-0.018
	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Industry	0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Household Income	-0.039***	-0.024***	-0.025***
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Perceived Macro-economy	-0.033	-0.065**	-0.064**
	(0.063)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Perceived Household Economy	-0.045	-0.131***	-0.132***
	(0.057)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Intercept	4.042***	4.312***	4.282***
	(0.341)	(0.204)	(0.237)
R-squared	0.068	0.092	0.092
N	826	2,172	2,172

Fig H1. Marginal Effects of a Needs Cue on Pr(Elderly Support)



Note: Marginal effects and 95% confidence intervals. OLS regression was used.

Fig H2. Marginal Effects of a Needs+Effort Cue on Pr(Elderly Support)



Note: Marginal effects and 95% confidence intervals. OLS regression was used.

Table H2. Heterogeneous Heuristic Effects

	(1)	(2)
Needs cue(NC)	0.151*	0.005
	(0.077)	(0.047)
Needs+effort cue (RC)	0.310***	0.189***
	(0.059)	(0.056)
Market outsider	0.317***	
	(0.089)	
NC X Outsider	-0.108	
	(0.174)	
NEC X Outsider	-0.390***	
	(0.120)	
Low skill		0.095
		(0.069)
NC X Low skill		0.140

		(0.124)
RC X Low skill		-0.102
		(0.118)
Left-right Ideology	-0.067***	-0.058**
	(0.025)	(0.022)
Incumbent Vote	-0.096*	-0.145***
	(0.051)	(0.039)
Female	-0.046	-0.061
	(0.048)	(0.038)
Education	-0.010	
	(0.024)	
Industry	0.008*	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.003)
Household Income	-0.007	-0.025**
	(0.010)	(0.009)
Perceived Macro-economy	-0.063	-0.059*
	(0.047)	(0.033)
Perceived Household Economy	-0.100**	-0.094***
	(0.048)	(0.035)
Intercept	4.257***	4.550***
	(0.237)	(0.153)
R-squared	0.062	0.059
N	1217	1866

Note: All models were estimated using a logistic regression.
Only working-age people (20-64) are included.
Robust standard errors are clustered by prefecture.
Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Fig H2. Predicted Margins for Supporting the Elderly by Employment Status



Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals. OLS regression was used.

Fig H3. Predicted Margins for Supporting the Elderly by Skill-levels



Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals. OLS regression was used.

Appendix I Reanalysis of Tables 1 and 2 Using Ordered Logit Regression

Table I1. Effects on Policy Attitudes toward the Elderly — Ordered Logit Regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age	0.022***	0.022***	0.023***		
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)		
Needs cue (NC)		0.169*	0.269	0.286**	-0.012
		(0.088)	(0.357)	(0.146)	(0.083)
Needs+effort cue (NEC)		0.382***	0.484*	0.597***	0.366***
		(0.069)	(0.256)	(0.115)	(0.097)
NC X Age			-0.002		
			(0.006)		
NEC X Age			-0.002		
			(0.005)		
Market Outsider				0.506***	
				(0.172)	
NC X Market Outsider				-0.044	
				(0.371)	
NEC X Market Outsider				-0.627***	
				(0.219)	
Low Skill					0.182
					(0.128)
NC X Low Skill					0.366
					(0.267)
RC X Low Skill					-0.243
					(0.212)
Left-right Ideology	-0.130**	-0.135***	-0.135***	-0.129**	-0.106**
	(0.062)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.051)	(0.043)
Incumbent Vote	-0.033	-0.200***	-0.201***	-0.148	-0.259***
	(0.118)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.105)	(0.081)
Female	-0.145	-0.140*	-0.140*	-0.088	-0.118
	(0.139)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.094)	(0.076)
Education	-0.022	-0.037	-0.037	-0.026	
	(0.047)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.043)	
Industry	0.002	-0.002	-0.002	0.016*	0.003
	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Household Income	-0.071***	-0.046***	-0.047***	-0.018	-0.048**
	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Perceived Macro-economy	-0.057	-0.144**	-0.143**	-0.153*	-0.126**

	(0.116)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.086)	(0.061)
Perceived Household Economy	-0.188*	-0.338***	-0.338***	-0.252***	-0.241***
	(0.107)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.089)	(0.071)
cut1	-4.093***	-4.897***	-4.831***	-4.809***	-5.205***
	(0.757)	(0.398)	(0.461)	(0.498)	(0.320)
cut2	-2.968***	-3.676***	-3.610***	-3.681***	-4.039***
	(0.670)	(0.364)	(0.428)	(0.468)	(0.300)
cut3	-1.265**	-1.940***	-1.874***	-1.898***	-2.315***
	(0.637)	(0.356)	(0.421)	(0.435)	(0.284)
cut4	0.618	0.018	0.084	-0.038	-0.430
	(0.642)	(0.344)	(0.413)	(0.401)	(0.266)
Pseudo R-squared	0.028	0.041	0.041	0.026	0.025
N	826	2172	2172	1217	1866

Appendix J Reanalysis of Table 1: Using Age Dummy

Table J1. Effects on Policy Attitudes toward the Elderly — Age Dummy

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Old Age (>64)	0.704***	0.579***	0.743***
	(0.163)	(0.090)	(0.161)
Needs cue (NC)		0.160**	0.203**
		(0.078)	(0.080)
Needs+effort cue (NEC)		0.389***	0.448***
		(0.077)	(0.080)
NC X Old Age			-0.226
			(0.218)
NEC X Old Age			-0.310
			(0.269)
Left-right Ideology	-0.073	-0.087**	-0.087**
	(0.056)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Incumbent Vote	-0.015	-0.182**	-0.183**
	(0.156)	(0.087)	(0.088)
Female	-0.085	-0.049	-0.050
	(0.180)	(0.089)	(0.090)
Education	-0.053	-0.050*	-0.050*
	(0.043)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Industry	0.007	0.002	0.002
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Household Income	-0.047*	-0.032	-0.032
	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Perceived Macro-economy	-0.014	-0.081	-0.079
	(0.099)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Perceived Household Economy	-0.165*	-0.263***	-0.263***
	(0.089)	(0.075)	(0.076)
Intercept	1.576***	2.095***	2.062***
	(0.496)	(0.295)	(0.294)
Pseudo R-squared	0.031	0.039	0.039
N	826	2172	2172

Fig J1. Predicted Probability of Supporting the Elderly by Age Groups



Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals. A dummy variable for age is used.

Appendix K Reanalysis of Table 1 Including "Decline to Answer" responses

Table K1. Effects on Policy Attitudes toward the Elderly — With "Decline to Answer" Responses

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	0.024***	0.024***	0.024***
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Needs cue (NC)		0.182**	0.002
		(0.081)	(0.398)
Needs+effort cue (NEC)		0.372***	0.567*
		(0.084)	(0.342)
NC × Age			0.004
			(0.008)
NEC × Age			-0.004
			(0.007)
Left-right Ideology	-0.066	-0.092**	-0.092**
	(0.056)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Incumbent Vote	0.044	-0.097	-0.096
	(0.150)	(0.081)	(0.084)
Female	-0.139	-0.096	-0.096
	(0.154)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Education	-0.031	-0.014	-0.014
	(0.048)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Industry	0.007	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Household Income	-0.065**	-0.043**	-0.043**
	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Perceived Macro-economy	0.021	-0.074	-0.072
	(0.090)	(0.062)	(0.061)
Perceived Household Economy	-0.144*	-0.250***	-0.251***
	(0.082)	(0.076)	(0.075)
Constant	0.330	0.879***	0.873**
	(0.594)	(0.313)	(0.413)
Pseudo R-squared	0.037	0.048	0.048
N	858	2246	2246

Note: All models were estimated using a logistic regression.

Robust standard errors are clustered by prefecture.

The first model in column (1) includes the control group only.

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix L Treatment Effects by Household Income Levels

Fig L1. Predicted Probability of Supporting the Elderly by Household Income



Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals. Only working-age people (20-64) are included.

Appendix M Treatment Effects Using Different Thresholds for Skill Levels

Fig M1. Predicted Probability of Supporting the Elderly by Skill Levels



Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals. Only working-age people (20-64) are included. A more conservative threshold for high skills is used in this robustness check. Low skill laborers include those with junior college education or below, and high skill laborers include those with university education and above.

Appendix N Full Output of Table 2

Table N1. Heterogeneous Heuristic Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Needs cue (NC)	0.378**	-0.042	0.392***	-0.017
	(0.150)	(0.101)	(0.152)	(0.102)
Needs + effort cue (NEC)	0.657***	0.365***	0.662***	0.404***
	(0.111)	(0.244)	(0.110)	(0.102)
Market Outsider	0.739***		0.609***	
	(0.222)		(0.217)	
NC X Market Outsider	-0.388		-0.460	
	(0.373)		(0.385)	
NEC X Market Outsider	-0.815 ***		-0.739***	
	(0.243)		(0.241)	
Low skill		0.336***		0.245*
		(0.123)		(0.128)
NC X Low Skill		0.376		0.308
		(0.274)		(0.280)
NEC X Low Skill		-0.364		-0.365
		(0.244)		(0.254)
Left-right Ideology			-0.078*	-0.067
			(0.044)	(0.041)
Incumbent Vote			-0.121	-0.181**
			(0.127)	(0.083)
Female			0.042	-0.017
			(0.116)	(0.100)
Education			-0.023	
			(0.035)	
Industry			0.014	0.004
			(0.009)	(0.006)
Household Income			-0.006	-0.043**
			(0.025)	(0.021)
Perceived Macro-economy			-0.055	-0.053
			(0.097)	(0.068)
Perceived Household Economy			-0.219**	-0.188**
			(0.093)	(0.076)
Intercept	-0.036	0.285***	1.081***	1.610***
	(0.104)	(0.079)	(0.366)	(0.252)
Pseudo R-squared	0.015	0.009	0.030	0.026
N	1217	1866	1217	1866

Note: All models were estimated using a logistic regression.

Only working-age people (20-64) are included.

Robust standard errors are clustered by prefecture.

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix O Age Effect on Support for Different Types of Social Welfare

Table O1. Support for Different Types of Social Welfare

	(1) Old age	(2) Sick	(3) Redistribution
Age	0.009***	0.004	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Household income	0.000	0.000	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Market outsider	0.479***	0.037	0.287*
	(0.148)	(0.181)	(0.158)
Female	0.016	0.068	0.311***
	(0.077)	(0.102)	(0.082)
Education	-0.205***	0.088*	-0.223***
	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.035)
Left-right ideology	-0.004	-0.044	-0.072***
	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.022)
Intercept	0.393	1.716***	1.984***
	(0.250)	(0.338)	(0.277)
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R-squared	0.035	0.025	0.029
N	2911	2928	2775

Note: Logistic regression with robust standard errors was used.

Data are obtained from the Role of Government modules (1996, 2006, 2016) in ISSP.

Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}\ p < 0.05$, $^{**}\ p < 0.01$, $^{***}\ p < 0.001$