Appendix 1: Robustness Checks

Appendix Table 1 includes parallel runs for each variant of the model presented in the paper, but using the *Lobbying $* variable. To save space, we show only estimates using the *Number of Lobbying Reports* variable in the main text. Columns 1-2 contain the runs with *StateHigh* as the dependent variable; columns 3-4 contain the estimates using *State* as the dependent variable.

All of the results are consistent with the models using *Number of Lobbying Reports*. The one minor difference is that the estimate of *Lobbying $* in column 4 is only significant at the p=.078 level.

Appendix Table 1. Models including Trade and Diplomatic Representation using the *Lobbying $* variable.

	(1) *StateHigh*	(2) *StateHigh*	(3) *State*	(4) *State*
Lobbying $ (log)	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(2.49)	(2.24)	(-3.42)	(-2.71)
Amnesty Rating	0.15	0.22	0.43	0.41
	(2.11)	(3.53)	(26.63)	(28.94)
Bilateral US Economic Aid (log)	0.02	0.02	-0.004	-0.01
	(2.41)	(2.77)	(-2.00)	(-2.82)
Regime Type	0.03	0.03	-0.02	-0.02
	(2.08)	(2.35)	(-7.43)	(-7.81)
GDP (log)	-2.96	-2.35	0.98	0.85
	(-6.72)	(-7.02)	(10.05)	(11.88)
Per Capita GDP (log)	3.35	2.40	-1.20	-1.02
	(6.98)	(6.21)	(-11.48)	(-12.37)
Alliance with US	0.67	0.14	0.25	0.44
	(1.01)	(0.21)	(1.67)	(3.37)
Cold War	0.30	0.49	-0.18	-0.22
	(1.88)	(3.39)	(-4.72)	(-6.73)
Trade with US (log)	-0.10		0.02	
	(-2.09)		(1.57)	
Diplomatic Representation in US		0.14		-0.09
		(1.73)		(-5.05)
Constant			0.91	1.18
			(2.16)	(3.99)
Observations	2,805	3,402	3,067	3,677
Number of countries	130	132	147	147

Note: z-statistics in parentheses. Columns 1-2 estimated using logistic regression with country fixed-effects. Columns 3-4 estimated using OLS with country fixed-effects.

Appendix Table 2 substitutes a measure of military aid (also from the USAID Greenbook) for our measure of economic aid. As shown below, this substitution has no bearing on our estimates of interest in the first two rows. The new variable, *Military Aid*, is itself statistically significant in columns 3 and 4.

Appendix Table 2. Models substituting Military Aid for Economic Aid

	(1) *StateHigh*	(2) *StateHigh*	(3) *State*	(4) *State*
Number of Lobbying Reports (log)	0.07		-0.01	
	(3.24)		(-2.48)	
Lobbying $ (log)		0.02		-0.004
		(2.29)		(-2.99)
Amnesty Rating	0.22	0.21	0.42	0.42
	(3.65)	(3.41)	(30.10)	(29.68)
Military Aid from US (log)	0.0001	-0.001	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.01)	(-0.23)	(-2.42)	(-2.76)
Regime Type	0.03	0.03	-0.02	-0.02
	(2.52)	(2.53)	(-8.05)	(-7.68)
GDP (log)	-2.36	-2.27	0.84	0.82
	(-7.18)	(-6.83)	(11.98)	(11.46)
Per Capita GDP (log)	2.42	2.38	-1.03	-1.00
	(6.43)	(6.23)	(-12.68)	(-12.13)
Alliance with US	0.30	0.36	0.34	0.40
	(0.50)	(0.54)	(2.69)	(3.09)
Cold War	0.48	0.47	-0.23	-0.22
	(3.38)	(3.26)	(-6.84)	(-6.55)
Constant			0.96	1.03
			(3.28)	(3.49)
Observations	3,504	3,430	3,789	3,719
Number of countries	133	132	147	147

Note: z-statistics in parentheses. Columns 1-2 estimated using logistic regression with country fixed-effects. Columns 3-4 estimated using OLS with country fixed-effects.

Appendix Table 3 excludes all observations prior to 1980 due to Nieman and Ring's (2015) concern over data quality from the 1970s in the State Department reports. Excluding these years of data has no bearing on our models.

Appendix Table 3. Models including only post-1980 observations

	(1) *StateHigh*	(2) *StateHigh*	(3) *State*	(4) *State*
Number of Lobbying Reports (log)	0.07		-0.01	
	(3.16)		(-2.84)	
Lobbying $ (log)		0.02		-0.01
		(2.17)		(-3.63)
Amnesty Rating	0.26	0.25	0.41	0.41
	(3.89)	(3.85)	(28.04)	(28.12)
Bilateral US Economic Aid (log)	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(2.60)	(2.63)	(-3.34)	(-3.47)
Regime Type	0.04	0.04	-0.02	-0.02
	(2.96)	(2.88)	(-7.64)	(-7.63)
GDP (log)	-2.26	-2.15	0.75	0.73
	(-6.20)	(-5.98)	(9.76)	(9.66)
Per Capita GDP (log)	2.36	2.23	-0.92	-0.90
	(5.54)	(5.30)	(-10.29)	(-10.15)
Alliance with US	-0.16	-0.10	0.46	0.45
	(-0.20)	(-0.13)	(3.25)	(3.20)
Cold War	0.41	0.43	-0.20	-0.20
	(2.79)	(2.88)	(-5.79)	(-5.82)
Constant			1.20	1.22
			(3.97)	(4.06)
Observations	3,189	3,189	3,506	3,506
Number of countries	130	130	147	147

Note: z-statistics in parentheses. Columns 1-2 estimated using logistic regression with country fixed-effects. Columns 3-4 estimated using OLS with country fixed-effects.

Appendix Table 4 introduces the Fariss (2014) measure of human rights abuses as a control, substituting for the Amnesty measure. The use of this new measure makes little difference in our estimates. Only the final estimate of *Lobbying $* dips under the $p<0.05$ level of statistical significance ($p = 0.060$). We treat all of these estimates with caution, however, since the Fariss measure includes the State Department's rating as measured by the PTS data. This means that the Fariss measure is partially capturing movement in our dependent variable.

Appendix Table 4. Models using Fariss data to control for actual human rights behavior.

	(1) *StateHigh*	(2) *StateHigh*	(3) *State*	(4) *State*
Number of Lobbying Reports (log)	0.07		-0.01	
	(3.21)		(-2.62)	
Lobbying $ (log)		0.02		-0.02
		(2.51)		(-1.88)
Fariss HR Rating	-0.03	0.002	-0.85	-0.85
	(-0.37)	(0.02)	(-53.29)	(-52.29)
Bilateral US Economic Aid (log)	0.02	0.02	0.001	0.001
	(2.87)	(2.64)	(0.52)	(0.57)
Regime Type	0.02	0.02	0.004	0.01
	(1.31)	(1.51)	(1.61)	(2.18)
GDP (log)	-2.29	-2.20	1.11	1.08
	(-7.51)	(-6.95)	(21.77)	(20.35)
Per Capita GDP (log)	2.36	2.31	-1.00	-0.96
	(6.71)	(6.30)	(-17.11)	(-15.78)
Alliance with US	-0.13	-0.36	0.43	0.46
	(-0.26)	(-0.61)	(5.19)	(5.24)
Cold War	0.49	0.48	-0.28	-0.27
	(3.53)	(3.46)	(-11.26)	(-10.70)
Constant			-0.83	-0.80
			(-3.59)	(-3.41)
Observations	3,796	3,663	4,646	4,481
Number of countries	139	138	147	147

Note: z-statistics in parentheses. Columns 1-2 estimated using logistic regression with country fixed-effects. Columns 3-4 estimated using OLS with country fixed-effects.

Appendix Table 5 adds a control for media exposure of human rights abuses as measured by Hendrix and Wong (2014). This new variable does achieve statistical significance in the estimates with *State* as the dependent variable (columns 3 and 4), but its inclusion does not alter the estimates of our key independent variables of interest.

Appendix Table 5. Models including measures of state human rights media exposure.

	(1) *StateHigh*	(2) *StateHigh*	(3) *State*	(4) *State*
Number of Lobbying Reports (log)	0.09		-0.02	
	(2.59)		(-2.33)	
Lobbying $ (log)		0.02		-0.01
		(1.98)		(-3.27)
Amnesty Rating	0.06	0.06	0.39	0.39
	(0.64)	(0.60)	(17.49)	(17.54)
Bilateral US Economic Aid (log)	0.04	0.04	-0.01	-0.01
	(2.77)	(2.82)	(-2.77)	(-2.89)
Regime Type	0.03	0.03	-0.02	-0.02
	(1.58)	(1.56)	(-4.69)	(-4.72)
GDP (log)	-2.58	-2.39	0.53	0.52
	(-3.43)	(-3.21)	(2.98)	(2.94)
Per Capita GDP (log)	2.83	2.63	-0.92	-0.91
	(3.50)	(3.29)	(-4.88)	(-4.88)
Alliance with US	1.92	2.03	0.20	0.16
	(1.46)	(1.55)	(0.60)	(0.49)
Cold War	0.23	0.26	-0.22	-0.22
	(1.16)	(1.32)	(-4.57)	(-4.66)
Average Media Coverage	-0.03	-0.03	0.05	0.05
	(-0.48)	(-0.52)	(3.11)	(3.18)
Constant			3.56	3.69
			(4.49)	(4.67)
Observations	1,592	1,592	1,863	1,863
Number of countries	102	102	130	130

Note: z-statistics in parentheses. Columns 1-2 estimated using logistic regression with country fixed-effects. Columns 3-4 estimated using OLS with country fixed-effects.

Appendix Table 6 presents the estimates of two different models that control for different years in our period of observation. The first two test both our independent variables of interest controlling for the 1992-1994 period when our data-gathering process on those two variables differed from other years. As shown in the first two columns, the introduction of this variable has no bearing on our results. Neither does the introduction of a variable controlling for the pre-1993 period, shown in columns 3 and 4.

Appendix Table 6. Models including measures of state human rights media exposure.

	(1) *State*	(2) *State*	(3) *State*	(4) *State*
Number of Lobbying Reports (log)	-0.01		-0.01	
	(-2.49)		(-2.59)	
Lobbying $ (log)		-0.05		-0.05
		(-3.12)		(-3.19)
Amnesty Rating	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42
	(30.42)	(30.05)	(30.39)	(30.03)
Bilateral US Economic Aid (log)	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(-2.91)	(-3.24)	(-2.96)	(-3.29)
Regime Type	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(-8.29)	(-7.99)	(-8.26)	(-7.95)
GDP (log)	0.84	0.82	0.82	0.80
	(11.81)	(11.28)	(10.92)	(10.39)
Per Capita GDP (log)	-1.01	-0.99	-0.99	-0.97
	(-12.50)	(-11.92)	(-11.96)	(-11.36)
Alliance with US	0.33	0.40	0.32	0.39
	(2.67)	(3.03)	(2.60)	(2.96)
Cold War	-0.22	-0.21	-0.22	-0.22
	(-6.32)	(-6.08)	(-6.07)	(-5.89)
Indicators for 92-94	0.03	0.03		
	(0.89)	(0.83)		
Pre-1993 Indicator			-0.02	-0.01
			(-0.45)	(-0.40)
Constant	0.86	0.92	1.00	1.05
	(2.81)	(2.97)	(3.12)	(3.23)
Observations	3,788	3,718	3,788	3,718
Number of countries	147	147	147	147

Note: z-statistics in parentheses. All models estimated using OLS with country fixed-effects.

Appendix Table 7 presents a robustness check on our *State* dependent variable. While we treat the variable as continuous in our OLS estimates, ordered logit with fixed-effects could be used given the discrete nature of the outcome variable. As shown in Table 8 below, our variables of interest continue to have the correct sign and maintain statistical significance.

Appendix Table 7. Fixed-effects ordered logit estimates.

	(1) *State*	(2) *State*
Number of Lobbying Reports (log)	-0.04	
	(-2.56)	
Lobbying $ (log)		-0.02
		(-2.96)
Amnesty Rating	1.48	1.49
	(25.68)	(25.33)
Bilateral US Economic Aid (log)	-0.02	-0.02
	(-2.88)	(-3.14)
Regime Type	-0.09	-0.09
	(-8.66)	(-8.34)
GDP (log)	3.01	2.95
	(11.26)	(10.77)
Per Capita GDP (log)	-3.56	-3.49
	(-11.57)	(-11.05)
Alliance with US	1.41	1.56
	(3.02)	(3.21)
Cold War	-0.86	-0.84
	(-6.69)	(-6.47)
/cut1	9.59	9.40
	(5.41)	(5.25)
/cut2	13.52	13.35
	(7.59)	(7.42)
/cut3	16.91	16.77
	(9.45)	(9.28)
/cut4	19.78	19.65
	(11.02)	(10.84)
Observations	3,788	3,718

Note: z-statistics in parentheses. All models estimated using ordered logit with country fixed-effects.

Appendix Table 8 includes descriptive statistics for all variables used in the preceding analyses.

Appendix Table 8. Descriptive Statistics.

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
StateHigh	4,091	0.27	0.44	0	1
NetState	4,091	-0.11	0.72	-3	2
State	4,286	2.64	1.12	1	5
Lobbying Repts (log)	4,418	-0.78	2.94	-4.61	4.65
Lobbying $ (log)	4,279	5.02	9.05	-4.61	21.75
Amnesty Rating	4,139	2.81	1.09	1	5
Bilat. Econ. Aid (log)	4,414	12.97	8.53	-4.61	22.93
Regime Type	4,189	0.93	7.32	-10	10
GDP (log)	3,966	10.68	1.98	4.71	16.18
Per capita GDP (log)	3,966	8.27	1.24	5.03	11.73
Alliance with US	4,418	0.30	0.46	0	1
Cold War	4,418	0.31	0.46	0	1
Trade (log)	3,690	5.23	3.41	-4.61	12.66
Diplo. Rep. in US	4,364	2.69	0.85	0	3
Defense Pact	4,125	0.31	0.46	0	1
Bilat. Mil. Aid (log)	4,418	7.80	9.44	-4.61	23.09
Fariss HR Measure	4,418	-0.06	1.16	-3.11	3.89
Avg. Media Coverage	2,020	0.39	1.26	0	25.51

Appendix 2: FARA coding

Our research team coded the semi-annual Foreign Agent Registration Act reports back to 1942. We obtained the FARA Reports to Congress through the FARA website (http://www.fara.gov/annualrpts.html) and via CD through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for older reports that were not listed online.[1]

We coded reports from 1997-2012 using an automated extraction process using Perl Script. We manually coded reports before 1997 because the age of these reports rendered blurry text that could not be machine-read with an Optical Character Recognition (OCR) program. Furthermore, the format of the reports varied so much from year-to-year before 1997 that we could not establish a standard automated coding process across the years. Our research team manually typed information from the PDF reports into an excel template for all years prior to 1997.

We coded the following variables:

1. **Report:** The name of the report. Many times, reports were semi-annual, so we tracked this information here (e.g. 1st report 2012 or 2nd report 2012).

2. **Year:** The year of the report.

    - It is worth noting that many foreign agents track their fees and revenue from foreign principals at different time intervals that may not line up perfectly with the year of the report. (For example, in the June 2012 report, Foley Hoag, LLP #4776 acted as a foreign agent for the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, Embassy. They received $210,706.23 for the six-month period ending March 31, 2012. In the same June 2012 report, the Podesta Group, Inc. #5926 acted as a foreign agent for Republic of Albania. They received $184,214.00 for the six-month period ending June 30, 2012. These two six month periods are obviously different, but both are tracked in the year 2012 because the monthly timeframe is information is not systematically provided by foreign agents. In other words, we associate instances of foreign lobbying with the year in which they are reported.

3. **Country:** The country (of the foreign principal) that is declared in the report. Note that this does not have to be a UN-recognized state, but instead can be a disputed territory (like Palestine). We simply record the raw information that is listed in the FARA report.

    - Earlier reports do not list the country. In these cases, we made our best attempt to discover the country-of-origin for the principal by googling the company name, NGO, etc.

[1] Since our coding process began, all FARA Reports to Congress are now available online.

- We mapped these countries to the Correlates of War (COW) Country Abbreviation and COW Country Code. We did not map the following countries that did not have COW codes. Even if they are 'officially' part of a larger country, we kept these records separated out so that we can analyze their effects (for example, one may want to see the kinds of things that Hong Kong lobbies for, outside of the China aggregation). These include: Anguilla, Aruba, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Curacao, Guadeloupe & Martinique, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Macao, Nagorno Karabagh, St. Christopher & Nevis, St. Eustatius, Palestine, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, St. Martin, Tibet, and Turks and Caicos Islands.
- In addition, many of the FARA reports attributed the country of the foreign principal to 'international'. In data runs that rely on a COW state code, we do not include these records (which are often associated with Intergovernmental Organization lobbying), but the records are retained for later analysis.

4. **Agent_ID:** The foreign agent's ID number.
    - We cut off the (T) from the agent ID when it was present. This signified that the agent was terminated in that period, but this information was not useful to us and prevented aggregation over agent IDs
5. **Agent_Name:** The foreign agent's name
6. **Principal:** The foreign principal's name
7. **Nature of services:** The nature of services carried out by the foreign agent for the principal
8. **Activities:** The list of detailed activities carried out by the foreign agent for the principal
9. **Finances:** The amount of money spent by the foreign principal
    - In several instances, finances were provided in foreign currency. We used a World Bank tool to translate the foreign currency to US dollars in that particular year (however, for the 1979 DFL, we could not find the 1979 exchange rate so we used the 1980 exchange rate).
    - http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.FCRF?page=4
10. **Principal Type:** In order to filter the different kinds of principals, we manually decided whether a principal was a company, government, individual, NGO, IGO, interest group, school, or political party. For the purposes of this paper, we only used data for "government" principals where our "nudge the needle" mechanism would be clearest. When it was not obvious from the Principal's name, we googled

the principal to gather more information. We used the following keywords to help us determine the principal type:

- **Company:** *corporation, Inc., Ltd., Bank, company*
- **Government:** *government of, department of, embassy, republic of, Kingdom of*
- **Individual:** *someone's name*
- **NGO:** *center, union, democracy, freedom, foundation*
- **IGO:** *European, international, world, particular regions (Asia, Central America, Arab)*
- **Interest Group:** *council, association, group, organization, chamber of commerce, board*
- **School:** *university, research institute*
- **Political Party***: party*
    - It was difficult at times to distinguish between NGO and interest group.
    - It was often difficult to distinguish between individual, party, and government.
    - Tourism was also hard to figure out when it was sponsored by the government vs. being an external board

1992-1994

Unfortunately, FARA could not provide us with copies of the Reports to Congress for the 1992-1994 period, so we made every effort to recreate these reports using the Supplemental Statements in the Document Search/ Document Type functions online. In order to recreate these reports, we followed these steps

- First, we created a list of 'potential registrant numbers' by listing all agents from the 1990, 1991, 1995, and 1996 reports. In other words, if an agent only lobbied in 1992, 1993, and 1994, but not the two years surrounding these years (either side), they would be erroneously left out of our re-created report. We therefore recognize that there might be missing records in the 1992-1994 report.
- We individually typed each of these registrant numbers in the 'Registrant #' box.
- We clicked on Jan 1, 1992 for stamped/ received date start
- We clicked on June 30 1995 for stamped/ received date end
- It was possible that this search revealed several reports within this period (1992-1994). For each report, we created a different row in the excel spreadsheet

- It was also possible that there were no reports in this period (meaning that the registrant existed in the years before 1992-1994 or after, but not during the 1992-1994 timeframe. We kept a tally of these registrant numbers
- For each report, we entered information from the report into the excel file including financial information on page 5 of the report (question 14(a)) or listed in the attachment

Additional coding notes

- In some reports (e.g. 1980), a record was marked but then "See another country" was listed, meaning that the record was duplicated. We only recorded information in the country that listed all the information to avoid duplication. For example, in 1980, Guadeloupe and Martinique have a record for the Caribbean Tourism Association, #991, but the only information listed is "see International." We therefore do not include this information in a record for Guadeloupe and Martinique but instead, record it in the 'International' category.