Online appendix for Rodriguez, Marisella and Brandon J Kinne, "Blue Helmets, Red Flags: Institutional, Societal, and Military Determinants of Peacekeeping Abuses", *International Studies Quarterly*

Appendix A: Data Collection on Peacekeeping Abuses

We collected event data on peacekeeping abuses using LexisNexis Academic and the Phoenix processing pipeline. Event data are commonly used to capture discrete interactions between pairs of actors.[1] Our objective was to collect precise information on peacekeeping soldiers violating the human rights of host country civilians during ongoing peacekeeping missions. This appendix details each step in the data collection process.

We accessed LexisNexis Academic through the University of California, Davis, library database to collect newspaper and newswire reports documenting instances of human rights abuses during peacekeeping missions. We searched LexisNexis content using a search string likely to capture instances of physical abuse by peacekeeping soldiers against host-country civilians. The search string included the following terms: "UN; united nations; peacekeep!; abuse; violence; assault; mission; troop*; soldier*."[2] We restricted the search command further to limit the timeline of events from January 2000 to May 2011. This search command allows up to six months for abuses in late 2010 to surface. We follow Nordås & Rustad (2013), Karim & Beardsley (2016) and Moncrief (2017) in focusing on missions post-2000. From there, we restricted search findings to international newspaper articles and newswire reports with English publications.

Newspaper articles are an advantageous resource for event data because they provide large amounts of information in a highly condensed delivery. Although official records, perhaps from the UN or participating countries, would likely provide more information, the reporting of peacekeeping abuses is highly sensitive information that, until recently, was not widely acknowledged at the institutional or state level.[3] However, the content of newspaper articles can be tailored to the audience it serves (Weidmann 2015). Previous work suggests that newspaper articles introduce a selection bias in the data collection process with respect to what is reported on, the location of the event, and the level of violence (Weidmann 2015, Davenport & Ball 2002). To mitigate this concern, we also include newswire reports, which are less selective in their content given that they provide an ongoing feed of brief, up-to-date information on breaking and occurring events.

One common concern with media-based event data is that multiple news outlets may report on the same event (Weidmann & Rød 2015). We avoid duplication in two phases of the data collection process. First, we restricted the LexisNexis results to exclude news reports with even moderate similarity.[4] Moderate similarity means that the search results will permit a high level of difference between two documents and still evaluate them as potential duplicates (LexisNexis 2015). The deduplication setting then allows users to remove the identified duplicates from the compiled news results. We then downloaded the news reports as unstructured text files and uploaded them to the Phoenix processing pipeline.[5]

[1] Previous uses of events data include research on violence and armed conflict (see Raleigh, Linke, Hegre & Karlsen (2010) and Sundberg & Melander (2013)) and social and political unrest (see Saleyan, Hendrix, Hamner, Case, Linebarger, Stull & Williams (2012) and Nardulli (2011)).

[2] The search truncation (!) and wildcard (*) terms find the root word along with a combination of additional letters. For example, "peacekeep!" searches for "peacekeeper" and "peacekeeping." Two other search strings used are (1) "UN; united nations; peacekeep!; abuse; violence; assault; mission" and (2) "UN; united nations; peacekeep!; abuse; violence; assault; mission; troops; soldiers."

[3] The UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services has recently started to release reports evaluating mission effectiveness in deterring abuses, largely specific to the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse.

[4] We selected the "Duplicates Option On – Moderate similarity" option.

[5] LexisNexis allows for a maximum of 500 articles downloaded in a single batch. We converted the articles

The second stage at which we accounted for duplication was during the event data parsing process. We used the Phoenix event data parsing platform provided by the Open Event Data Alliance (OEDA) to transform unstructured text into event data. The Phoenix platform uses sentence structure and dictionary entries to assess initiator/target/action sequences from sentence structures and to identify *whom did what to whom* (Open Event Data Alliance 2014). The Phoenix pipeline relies on the Petrarch or PETRARCH (Python Engine for Text Resolution And Related Coding Hierarchy) processing engine to formulate syntax trees, where "each node in the tree has a meaning, and the meaning of a node is a combination of the meanings of its children" (Norris 2016, 1).[6] In other words, Petrarch considers a syntax tree at both the word and sentence levels to reduce sentence structures to concise noun, verb, and prepositional phrases (Norris 2016). These phrases (predominantly verb phrases) capture the meaning of a given sentence and return coded phrases using the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO) ontology (Norris 2016). The returned data are then de-duplicated by actor dyad, date, and event code using Phoenix's "one-a-day filter," resulting in a maximum of one event code per actor dyad, per day (Schrodt 2014).[7] The Phoenix duplication filter "eliminates multiple reports of the same event by the same source or by multiple sources" (Schrodt 2014).

The Petrarch processing system evaluates a sentence at the syntactic level and "stores this data as a tree structure of linked nodes, where each node is a Phrase object" (Norris 2016, 1). The noun, verb, and prepositional phrases are considered according to each particular phrase logic to evaluate the source actor, action type, and target actor (Norris 2016). In the context of this study, we focused on peacekeeping soldiers as source actors, human rights abuses as action types, and civilian victims as target actors. Petrarch then transforms noun, verb, and prepositional phrases into event codes by first matching phrases to entries in five distinct dictionaries, namely Verb, Actor, Agent, Issue, and Discard dictionaries, and then codes the data according to the 20 broad event (i.e., verb) categories and a hierarchical actor coding schema defined by CAMEO.[8] CAMEO codes actors by one or more three-character elements that are interpreted hierarchically such that actor identifiers are nested, where "the allowable code in the second element depends on the content of the first element, and the third element depends on the second" (Schrodt, Ömür Yilmaz & Hermrick 2008, 2). Similarly, CAMEO nests event subcategories that focus on particular forms of behavior that reflect the more general category (Schrodt 2012).

We focused on four subcategories under the general category, "Assault." The four subcategories identify distinct forms of physical abuse, including acts of torture, the use of unconventional violence, sexual violence, and death by physical assault (Schrodt 2012). The subcategories are defined by Schrodt (2012, 81) as follows:

- Torture: inflicting extreme pain on individuals
- Unconventional violence: physical violence which does not require high levels of organization or conventional weaponry
- Sexual violence: sexually abusing or assaulting the sexual integrity of individuals
- Kill by physical assault: killing individuals by physically assaulting them without the use of weaponry

into .txt files for ease of use when uploading the documents to the Phoenix parsing platform.

[6] Petrarch refers to PETRARCH2, the second generation processor.

[7] The data collection process would be improved by gathering data on one account of reported abuse between a peacekeeping soldier from a particular contributing military contingent and civilian per day. However, such highly sensitive information with respect to perpetrator identity is difficult to collect. Although we are limited to information on a single abuse per day, the data still reveal substantial variation in abuses across peacekeeping missions.

[8] There are 20 broad CAMEO event code categories and 283 subcategories. For a complete list of event code categories, see the CAMEO codebook: `http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/data.dir/cameo.html`

Once we compiled the data into subcategories, we restricted the identifiable actors to peacekeeping soldiers ("IGOPKO") and civilian victims ("CIV"). This condition ensures that the data are representative of events where peacekeeping soldiers (Actor A) commit transgressions against host country civilians (Actor B). We then merged the event dataset with the *Providing for Peacekeeping* dataset, which includes information on mission-level characteristics.[9] The *Providing for Peacekeeping* dataset includes the location, time period, contributing countries, and number of peacekeepers for ongoing missions. We used this information to drop events that did not occur in host countries, during active mission years, or during mission years with an absence of peacekeeping soldiers. Limiting the location and time period of possible abuses to match that of the *Providing for Peacekeeping* dataset ensures the plausibility of reported abuses during active deployment. From here, we proceeded to compile open-sourced data on host and contributing country attributes, as discussed in the main paper.

Appendix B: Robustness Checks

We conducted extensive robustness checks to ensure that the results reported in the main paper are not artifacts of omitted variable bias, spurious correlations, selection effects, or measurement error. We first consider the possibility that unique political, military, or other features of the UN peacekeeping missions themselves influence human rights abuses. Prima facie, this argument seems plausible; missions that include more extensive accountability mechanisms, implement greater oversight of personnel, and/or allocate more resources to achieving the mission's goals should, in principle, see fewer abuses. As we note in the main paper, however, peacekeeping missions commonly suffer from weak institutionalization. All missions are initially governed by the same model SOFA. Further, contributor countries may informally command their personnel even after deployment, and missions themselves face well-known challenges with group cohesion. We thus anticipate that missions are best characterized as "the sum of their parts," which in turn implies that larger structural features of missions, though important, will generally be less influential than host- and contributor-country attributes.

We empirically explored mission-level influences using a variety of available data. While we cannot directly measure, say, the degree to which a UN force commander maintains control over, and effectively disciplines, individual peacekeepers, we can identify proxies for such influences. In Model 1 of Table 1, we incorporate a dummy variable, *OECD military leader*, that equals one if the appointed military commander of the mission comes from a member state of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Insofar as the militaries of economically developed countries tend to be better trained and disciplined (Beckley 2010), commanders who come from those countries may be better equipped to ensure compliance with UN standards. In Model 2, we extend this logic by including a dummy variable to indicate OECD political heads. Models 3 and 4 consider two other potentially important features of peacekeeping missions: the maximum authorized number of troops, and the maximum authorized budget. Ceteris paribus, larger budgets and troop allotments should indicate a greater willingness on the part of UN member states to allocate resources, which may in turn translate into more concerted efforts at well-structured, accountable missions.[10] Finally, Model 5 includes a dummy variable to indicate missions hosted by African countries, which have historically been plagued by organizational problems (Bariagaber 2008, Cleaver & May 1995).

As the estimates show, these additional checks do not tell a consistent story. OECD military

[9]The *Providing for Peacekeeping* dataset is a publicly available source for statistics on uniformed contributions to UN peacekeeping. See `http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/` for more information.

[10]Numerous studies have found that larger deployments increase the probability of mission success. For example, see Hultman, Kathman & Shannon (2013) and Kathman & Melin (2016). We note, however, that the overall success of a mission is analytically distinct from, and may only be loosely correlated with, human rights abuses by peacekeepers.

Table 1: Variations in mission command

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
OECD military leader	-0.811*				
	(0.443)				
OECD political leader		0.729**			
		(0.314)			
Max. authorized troops			0.219*		
			(0.127)		
Max. authorized budget				-0.0977	
				(0.111)	
Africa mission					1.101**
					(0.502)
HOST COUNTRY ATTRIBUTES					
Rule of law	-1.303**	-1.107*	-0.942**	-1.097**	-1.437***
	(0.597)	(0.605)	(0.474)	(0.557)	(0.543)
Press freedoms	-0.0551***	-0.0452***	-0.0638***	-0.0612***	-0.0477***
	(0.0154)	(0.0147)	(0.0137)	(0.0165)	(0.0141)
GDP/capita (logged)	0.872***	0.834***	0.245	0.228	1.033***
	(0.261)	(0.252)	(0.175)	(0.197)	(0.267)
Democracy	1.308**	0.834	1.031*	0.752	1.481***
	(0.603)	(0.617)	(0.546)	(0.549)	(0.575)
CONTRIBUTING COUNTRY ATTRIBUTES (WEIGHTED)					
Rule of law	-0.635	-0.214	-2.938***	-1.194	-0.623
	(1.079)	(1.040)	(1.124)	(1.219)	(1.052)
Press freedoms	-0.101**	-0.129***	-0.0886**	-0.137**	-0.0944**
	(0.0416)	(0.0407)	(0.0445)	(0.0566)	(0.0413)
Maternal mortality	0.00413	0.00493**	0.00384*	0.00504*	0.00416*
	(0.00256)	(0.00241)	(0.00214)	(0.00286)	(0.00250)
Gini coefficient	0.0271	0.0413	-0.0218	0.0381	0.0383
	(0.0283)	(0.0298)	(0.0430)	(0.0414)	(0.0291)
Secondary enrollment	0.0179	0.00131	0.0548**	0.0395	0.00941
	(0.0267)	(0.0243)	(0.0216)	(0.0287)	(0.0238)
IHL legislation	1.168**	1.263**	1.019*	1.308*	0.994
	(0.587)	(0.571)	(0.573)	(0.716)	(0.621)
IHL enforcement	-2.105***	-2.438***	-1.979***	-2.924***	-2.209***
	(0.484)	(0.526)	(0.406)	(0.783)	(0.502)
Conscription	0.782	1.460	2.374**	3.616**	0.871
	(1.135)	(1.064)	(1.047)	(1.481)	(1.012)
Democracy	-0.672	-0.352	-0.462	0.294	-0.129
	(1.288)	(1.200)	(1.190)	(1.361)	(1.342)
GDP/capita (logged)	2.255***	2.646***	2.133***	2.203***	2.387***
	(0.841)	(0.798)	(0.687)	(0.822)	(0.790)
Total troops$^{\frac{1}{2}}$	0.0200***	0.0186***	0.0181***	0.0197***	0.0185***
	(0.00565)	(0.00555)	(0.00502)	(0.00415)	(0.00578)
Constant	-18.30**	-19.44***	-16.46***	-11.52	-21.87***
	(7.290)	(6.579)	(5.946)	(7.437)	(7.027)
$\ln(\alpha)$	0.397**	0.372**	0.0663	0.0760	0.389**
	(0.174)	(0.172)	(0.162)	(0.177)	(0.170)
N	123	123	118	113	123
pseudo R^2	0.116	0.118	0.167	0.166	0.117
AIC	650.8	649.4	591.9	552.2	649.9
Log-likelihood	-307.4	-306.7	-277.9	-258.1	-306.9

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

leadership does reduce abuses by a small amount, but, contrary to expectations, OECD political leadership increases abuses. Large troop authorizations slightly increase abuses, but large budget authorizations have no effect. Missions hosted by African governments do indeed see more

abuses. Overall, including these variables in the equation has virtually no effect on the estimates of interest. Press freedoms (in both host countries and contributing countries) reduce abuses, as does host-country rule of law. Overall, there appears to not be a strong relationship between structural features of peacekeeping missions and human rights abuses. Just as importantly, the key variables in which we are interested are largely unaffected by these measures.

We next turn to alternative measures of military culture in peacekeepers' home countries. In the main paper, we include separate measures for troop-contributing countries' (TCC's) IHL-related legislative activity, IHL compliance, and military service requirements. While military culture is notoriously difficult to measure,[11] scholars have explored a few possibilities related to soldier professionalization. Bove & Elia (2011) examine "militarization rate," defined as the ratio of a country's total military personnel to its total population. Biddle (2004) considers a country's total military power, as defined by the Correlates of War project's composite index of national capabilities (CINC). And Pickering (2011) and Vasquez (2005) measure TCCs' per-troop defense spending, defined as total defense expenditures divided by number of troops (Singer, Bremer & Stuckey 1972, Singer 1987).

In Table 2, we introduce these new variables into the model sequentially, while omitting the military variables used in the main paper. Model 6 includes per-troop defense spending. Model 7 includes the militarization rate. And Model 8 includes CINC scores. Estimates for the first two variables are not significant at conventional levels. The estimate for CINC scores is highly significant in the positive direction. In Model 9, we include all three of the alternative measures, and in Model 10, we also include the measures of military culture used in the main paper.

Two important findings stand out. First, estimates for the key independent variables of interest—rule of law and press freedoms—change very little. These variables seem to be largely unrelated to the various measures of military culture. One exception is contributor-country press freedoms, the estimate for which becomes insignificant in some specifications. However, this result obtains only when we do not properly control for contributor countries' IHL status and recruitment practices. Second, the alternative measures substantially worsen the model's fit. At best, the alternative model yields a pseudo-R^2 of about 0.09. In contrast, inclusion of our preferred variables improves the fit to 0.115. Our preferred specification also improves the AIC substantially. Overall, then, while military culture remains a nebulous concept, the variables we emphasize in the main paper better account for variation in human rights abuses than do alternative measures.

We next consider the possibility that certain types of countries "self select" into certain types of missions. For example, the inverse correlation between, say, press freedoms and abuses may be an artifact of the tendency for certain types of countries—e.g., wealthy and democratic—to choose more manageable missions, which are in turn less likely to see extensive abuses. We generally do not find this to be plausible, as contributor countries appear to be more concerned with the act of contributing troops than with specific mission choices (Kathman & Melin 2016). Participation in missions is exclusively on a volunteer basis. The UN Security Council first outlines a mission mandate, detailing an estimated number of troops necessary for success, and UN Headquarters then approaches all member states to request personnel and deploy them (Choi 2018). Because the UNSC often falls short of its mandated personnel goals, member-state contributions are unlikely to be declined (Passmore, Shannon & Hart 2017).

Nonetheless, we explored numerous ways of controlling for potential self selection. In a traditional selection problem, a specific subset of a population nonrandomly selects itself into—or is selected into—a smaller sample. Empirical models must then account for the possibility that those influences that affect selection also affect the outcome of interest. In the case of peacekeeping missions, the potential selection problem is different. Here, the question is about *which particular missions* countries choose to contribute to. We thus conduct robustness checks focusing on exogenous influences that are potentially correlated both with a contributing country's

[11] To our knowledge, a cross-national measure of military culture does not exist.

Table 2: Alternative measures of military culture

	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Per-troop spending (TCC)	0.877			0.187	0.683
	(0.681)			(0.856)	(0.857)
Militarization rate (TCC)		-0.702		0.385	-0.313
		(1.157)		(1.272)	(1.229)
Military power (TCC)			31.32***	31.21**	8.015
			(12.05)	(14.31)	(15.75)
HOST COUNTRY ATTRIBUTES					
Rule of law	-2.177***	-2.065***	-2.310***	-2.379***	-1.186*
	(0.603)	(0.614)	(0.590)	(0.619)	(0.691)
Press freedoms	-0.0434***	-0.0466***	-0.0419***	-0.0418***	-0.0444***
	(0.0160)	(0.0169)	(0.0160)	(0.0155)	(0.0141)
GDP/capita (logged)	0.944***	0.945***	1.008***	1.044***	0.698**
	(0.284)	(0.317)	(0.273)	(0.309)	(0.347)
Democracy	1.934***	1.969***	2.250***	2.318***	1.094
	(0.653)	(0.744)	(0.653)	(0.742)	(0.764)
CONTRIBUTING COUNTRY ATTRIBUTES (WEIGHTED)					
Rule of law	0.827	1.049	0.355	0.317	-0.889
	(1.121)	(1.063)	(1.082)	(1.079)	(1.119)
Press freedoms	-0.0596*	-0.0716**	-0.0432	-0.0400	-0.0822**
	(0.0338)	(0.0303)	(0.0334)	(0.0327)	(0.0409)
Maternal mortality	0.000613	-0.000993	0.00136	0.00206	0.00324
	(0.00216)	(0.00265)	(0.00208)	(0.00316)	(0.00330)
Gini coefficient	0.0329	0.0287	0.0357	0.0376	0.0353
	(0.0307)	(0.0306)	(0.0298)	(0.0307)	(0.0314)
Secondary enrollment	0.00393	0.00215	0.00846	0.00641	0.0101
	(0.0232)	(0.0238)	(0.0231)	(0.0238)	(0.0266)
IHL legislation					1.233**
					(0.578)
IHL enforcement					-2.058***
					(0.503)
Conscription					1.574
					(1.198)
Democracy	-1.036	-1.360	-0.651	-0.407	-1.232
	(0.839)	(1.109)	(0.826)	(1.143)	(1.576)
GDP/capita (logged)	0.123	0.839	0.794	0.619	1.776*
	(0.851)	(0.813)	(0.761)	(0.908)	(0.977)
Total troops$^{\frac{1}{2}}$	0.0289***	0.0307***	0.0281***	0.0277***	0.0212***
	(0.00628)	(0.00615)	(0.00597)	(0.00606)	(0.00566)
Constant	-15.40	-15.27	-15.19*	-14.01	-22.91***
	(9.409)	(10.77)	(8.271)	(10.32)	(8.825)
$\ln(\alpha)$	0.638***	0.648***	0.599***	0.601***	0.390**
	(0.158)	(0.155)	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.184)
N	123	123	123	123	123
Pseudo R^2	0.085	0.084	0.089	0.090	0.115
AIC	665.9	666.9	663.0	666.9	655.4
Log-likelihood	-318.0	-318.5	-316.5	-316.5	-307.7

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

propensity to choose particular missions and with human rights abuses themselves. The question, then, is whether contributing countries choose missions based on exogenous characteristics of hosts that might also affect human rights abuses.

Table 3 illustrates estimates for a variety of potential influences. In Models 11 and 12 we control for whether the host country has experienced state failure in the prior five years. In Model 11, the focal variable is a binary indicator of failure, while in Model 12 it is an

Table 3: Potential selection on host country attributes

	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
State failure (binary)	-0.236					
	(0.332)					
State failure (ordinal)		-0.0840				
		(0.115)				
TCC distance			1.545**			
			(0.747)			
TCC contiguity				-1.224		
				(0.982)		
TCC cooperation w/host					0.108	
					(0.0663)	
Host cooperation w/TCC						-0.184
						(0.138)
Host country attributes						
Rule of law	-1.271**	-1.317**	-1.000*	-1.462**	-1.290**	-1.165**
	(0.583)	(0.590)	(0.518)	(0.597)	(0.569)	(0.553)
Press freedoms	-0.0478***	-0.0488***	-0.0635***	-0.0400**	-0.0463***	-0.0530***
	(0.0163)	(0.0159)	(0.0168)	(0.0187)	(0.0149)	(0.0157)
GDP/capita (logged)	0.827***	0.860***	0.859***	0.795***	0.795***	0.826***
	(0.267)	(0.281)	(0.236)	(0.240)	(0.265)	(0.255)
Democracy	1.233**	1.289**	1.453**	1.294**	1.299**	1.073*
	(0.599)	(0.594)	(0.630)	(0.580)	(0.589)	(0.625)
Contributing country attributes (weighted)						
Rule of law	-0.461	-0.376	0.677	0.0688	-0.265	-1.058
	(1.053)	(1.058)	(1.126)	(1.218)	(1.048)	(1.064)
Press freedoms	-0.0921**	-0.0928**	-0.110***	-0.120***	-0.0950**	-0.110***
	(0.0418)	(0.0416)	(0.0401)	(0.0460)	(0.0420)	(0.0413)
Maternal mortality	0.00331	0.00369	0.00619**	0.00360	0.00273	0.00505*
	(0.00259)	(0.00274)	(0.00297)	(0.00254)	(0.00253)	(0.00268)
Gini coefficient	0.0363	0.0374	0.0372	0.0319	0.0360	0.0344
	(0.0296)	(0.0303)	(0.0283)	(0.0281)	(0.0282)	(0.0269)
Secondary enrollment	0.000206	0.00166	0.0109	-0.000829	-0.00436	-0.00449
	(0.0245)	(0.0250)	(0.0247)	(0.0249)	(0.0241)	(0.0247)
IHL legislation	1.301**	1.222**	1.251**	1.037*	1.239**	1.546**
	(0.587)	(0.610)	(0.533)	(0.622)	(0.574)	(0.632)
IHL enforcement	-2.142***	-2.146***	-1.924***	-2.233***	-2.061***	-2.625***
	(0.528)	(0.535)	(0.501)	(0.522)	(0.479)	(0.694)
Conscription	1.393	1.358	1.883*	0.992	1.042	1.738
	(1.154)	(1.142)	(1.086)	(1.097)	(1.088)	(1.217)
Democracy	-0.917	-0.836	-0.598	-0.583	-0.824	-0.793
	(1.260)	(1.288)	(1.204)	(1.239)	(1.243)	(1.215)
GDP/capita (logged)	2.243***	2.223**	1.706**	2.395***	2.151**	3.025***
	(0.866)	(0.877)	(0.845)	(0.847)	(0.840)	(0.918)
Total troops$^{\frac{1}{2}}$	0.0234***	0.0237***	0.0213***	0.0213***	0.0199***	0.0233***
	(0.00606)	(0.00609)	(0.00506)	(0.00551)	(0.00586)	(0.00607)
Constant	-17.85**	-18.09**	-27.18***	-17.12**	-16.48**	-21.98***
	(7.330)	(7.381)	(8.339)	(7.626)	(7.161)	(7.417)
$\ln(\alpha)$	0.428***	0.427***	0.372**	0.419***	0.412**	0.432***
	(0.166)	(0.165)	(0.145)	(0.161)	(0.168)	(0.157)
N	123	123	123	123	123	123
Pseudo R^2	0.112	0.112	0.121	0.114	0.113	0.115
AIC	653.2	653.1	646.8	652.1	652.5	651.4
Log-likelihood	-308.6	-308.5	-305.4	-308.1	-308.2	-307.7

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

ordinal scale indicating magnitude of failure (Marshall, Gurr & Harff 2014). The logic here is that state failure may both dissuade certain states from committing troops and increase the resulting count of human rights abuses. However, as the estimates show, we find no evidence of a statistically significant relationship between prior state failure and human rights abuses. At the same time, the estimated effects of rule of law and press freedoms are substantively unchanged. In Model 13, we control for the (weighted, log transformed) geographic distance between the host country and contributing countries (Weidmann, Kuse & Gleditsch 2010). The logic here is that geographic proximity may be correlated both with a country's decision to contribute troops and with the subsequent behavior of those troops in country. The significantly positive estimate for *TCC distance* indicates that missions composed of troops from far-off places are indeed more likely to see frequent human rights abuses. Once again, however, estimates for rule of law and press freedoms are substantively unchanged. In Model 14, we control for direct geographic contiguity, as an alternative to distance, and we find a null result (Correlates of War Project 2017, Stinnett, Tir, Schafer, Diehl & Gochman 2002).

Models 15 and 16 control for the political relationship between the host country and the contributors. We use event data from the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) to assess the overall level of conflict and cooperation between host and contributors, where higher values on a 21-point Goldstein scale indicate more cooperative relations and lower values indicate more conflictual relations (Boschee, Lautenschlager, O'Brien, Shellman, Starz & Ward 2017). The logic here, as above, is that the state of relations between a host country and potential contributors might influence both their willingness to send troops and the subsequent propensity of those troops to engage in abuses. The first variable, *TCC cooperation w/host*, measures the TCCs' cooperative/conflictual actions toward the host country, while the second variable measures the host country's cooperative/conflictual actions toward the TCCs. Neither estimate is statistically significant at conventional levels, and the estimates for rule of law and press freedoms remain substantively unchanged.

Table 4 illustrates estimates for a handful of additional robustness checks. Models 17–19 control for reporting bias. In Model 17, we use the above-cited ICEWS data source to generate annual counts of total news stories for all mission host countries. This measure varies from a minimum of 212 (Central African Republic in 2000) to a maximum of 68,394 (Iraq in 2003). Inclusion of this measure requires caution, as a large number of events may not be evidence of reporting bias, but may in fact simply reflect the political, social, and economic turmoil endemic to countries involved in crises. This measure thus comes with a high risk of spurious correlations. We incorporate the ICEWS count into the model as an exposure term, which effectively treats the dependent variable's count of human rights abuses as a ratio. We are particularly interested in whether press freedoms are sensitive to this specification. The estimates for *Press freedoms*, both at the host country and contributing country levels, remain negative and statistically significant. Interestingly, the estimate for host-country rule of law is now insignificant. Closer examination reveals that countries with high ICEWS event counts also frequently have problems with rule of law (e.g., Iraq 2003), which complicates estimation of these effects.

Model 18 controls for reporting bias by examining cell phone coverage (Pierskalla & Hollenbach 2013, Weidmann 2016). Specifically, we include a measure of the mission-host country's number of cell phone subscribers per 100 residents, as measured by World Bank (2016). Unlike the above ICEWS count, this measure is clearly separate from and unrelated to the underlying abuse data, which we believe makes it a more methodologically sound control for reporting bias. The estimate for this variable is positive and highly significant, which suggests that reporting bias may indeed exist in human rights abuses. The estimate for host-country press freedoms is larger in absolute magnitude and more precise than in the main paper. This finding is consistent with our expectation that reporting bias should generally work against, rather than in favor of, our hypotheses on press freedoms. Model 19 accounts for reporting bias by swapping the count dependent variable with a binary dependent variable, which equals one for any mission-year

Table 4: Additional miscellaneous robustness checks

	(17)†	(18)	(19)‡	(20)	(21)	(22)
Cellular coverage (host)		0.0357***				
		(0.00810)				
Mission years (dataset)				-0.0354		
				(0.0586)		
Mission years (mission)					0.0501*	
					(0.0263)	
Polity (TCC)						-0.194
						(0.165)
Polity (host)						0.0497
						(0.0518)
HOST COUNTRY ATTRIBUTES						
Rule of law	-0.386	-1.504***	-1.873*	-1.248**	-1.547***	-0.0603
	(0.649)	(0.519)	(1.034)	(0.580)	(0.566)	(0.522)
Press freedoms	-0.0373***	-0.0569***	-0.0841**	-0.0522***	-0.0464***	-0.0352**
	(0.0140)	(0.0144)	(0.0328)	(0.0159)	(0.0157)	(0.0166)
GDP/capita (logged)	-0.391	0.242	1.186**	0.817***	0.500*	0.415**
	(0.240)	(0.219)	(0.541)	(0.267)	(0.269)	(0.201)
Democracy	0.932	1.171**	1.131	1.379**	1.133*	
	(0.590)	(0.588)	(1.353)	(0.588)	(0.582)	
CONTRIBUTING COUNTRY ATTRIBUTES (WEIGHTED)						
Rule of law	-1.003	-0.774	-3.518*	-0.438	-0.502	-0.335
	(0.886)	(1.040)	(1.890)	(1.078)	(0.979)	(0.972)
Press freedoms	-0.0715*	-0.105**	-0.153	-0.100**	-0.112**	-0.0861
	(0.0386)	(0.0429)	(0.104)	(0.0415)	(0.0436)	(0.0616)
Maternal mortality	0.00125	0.00829***	0.00908	0.00274	0.00402	0.00507*
	(0.00239)	(0.00245)	(0.00608)	(0.00264)	(0.00249)	(0.00264)
Gini coefficient	-0.0149	0.0325	0.0595	0.0327	0.0167	0.0181
	(0.0311)	(0.0258)	(0.0671)	(0.0282)	(0.0294)	(0.0267)
Secondary enrollment	0.0206	0.0394*	0.0238	-0.00316	0.0248	0.0371
	(0.0231)	(0.0231)	(0.0380)	(0.0240)	(0.0281)	(0.0458)
IHL legislation	1.002*	1.386**	1.184	1.245**	1.255**	1.098
	(0.542)	(0.599)	(1.240)	(0.589)	(0.557)	(0.722)
IHL enforcement	-1.250***	-2.865***	-3.835***	-2.083***	-2.191***	-2.687***
	(0.475)	(0.648)	(1.257)	(0.515)	(0.511)	(0.615)
Conscription	0.619	1.982*	0.602	1.098	1.600	2.352
	(1.035)	(1.091)	(1.811)	(1.103)	(1.303)	(1.722)
Democracy	-0.569	0.371	1.403	-0.808	-1.299	
	(1.284)	(1.236)	(2.683)	(1.287)	(1.265)	
GDP/capita (logged)	1.621**	2.255***	5.249***	2.340***	1.958*	1.673*
	(0.762)	(0.744)	(1.581)	(0.846)	(1.000)	(0.954)
Total troops$^{\frac{1}{2}}$	0.0221***	0.0132**	0.0294**	0.0233***	0.0203***	0.0197***
	(0.00534)	(0.00560)	(0.0129)	(0.00570)	(0.00544)	(0.00498)
Constant	-13.83**	-16.79***	-42.51***	-17.49**	-13.74	-10.33
	(6.496)	(6.018)	(12.77)	(7.260)	(9.074)	(6.713)
$\ln(\alpha)$	0.297*	0.165		0.426**	0.398***	0.479***
	(0.160)	(0.156)		(0.170)	(0.150)	(0.166)
N	123	118	123	123	123	113
Pseudo R^2	0.147	0.144	0.454	0.112	0.119	0.107
AIC	638.5	618.3	119.5	653.4	648.5	597.5
Log-likelihood	-302.3	-291.2	-43.76	-308.7	-306.3	-281.8

Standard errors in parentheses.
† Includes host-country ICEWS count as an exposure term. ‡ Binary DV, logit model.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

with documented cases of abuse. Reporting bias may lead to highly discrepant event counts between countries; dichotomizing the dependent variable may minimize this bias (Pierskalla &

Hollenbach 2013). We estimate a standard logit model and find substantively similar results as with the negative binomial model.

In Models 20 and 21, we control for the current-year duration of the peacekeeping mission. *Mission duration (dataset)* and *Mission duration (mission)* are both annually increasing counts of mission years, where the former variable marks the count from either the first year of the mission or the first year of the dataset (whichever is earliest), and the latter variable marks the count from the documented first year of the mission, even if the mission began prior to the dataset. While the estimate for the latter specification indicates that longer missions do in fact see slightly more annual abuses, the estimates for rule of law and press freedoms remain substantively unchanged.

Finally, in Model 22 we swap our preferred binary measure of democracy with measures from the Polity IV project (Marshall & Jaggers 2002). Neither of the Polity estimates is significant at conventional levels. Notably, this specification reduces the precision of the estimates for rule of law and press freedom. Unsurprisingly, the Polity measure correlates more strongly with rule of law and press freedoms than does the binary measure of democracy. Because Polity is a broad, multifaceted measure that integrates multiple disparate components (Boix, Miller & Rosato 2012, Vreeland 2008), it captures institutional features that involve both rule of law and press freedoms. Of course, in a regression framework any shared correlation between variables is excluded from the estimates, which in turn increases the risk of multicollinearity. Including Polity alongside rule of law and press freedoms thus reduces analytical leverage over all three of these concepts. Because the dichotomous measure focuses strictly on electoral accountability and suffrage (Boix, Miller & Rosato 2012), it cleanly distinguishes between core features of democracy and institutional features that, though analytically separate, might otherwise be lumped under the democratic umbrella. We also emphasize that the fit of the Polity specification, both in terms of pseudo-R^2 and AIC, is substantially worse than the binary democracy specification. That is, the binary measure, combined with our measures of rule of law and press freedoms, better explains the observed variation in human rights abuses. For all these reasons, the binary democracy model is the more appropriate and informative specification.

Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics and Mission Information

Table 5: Descriptive statistics

	N	Mean	Min.	Max.	s.d.
Peacekeeping abuses	123	8.439024	0	136	17.34611
Rule of law (host)	123	-.9114634	-1.95	1.2	.8186
Press freedoms (host)	123	36.4878	4	82	20.68949
GDP/capita (logged, host)	123	7.300563	5.323361	10.38342	1.46982
Democracy (host)	123	.3170732	0	1	.4672394
Rule of law (TCC)	123	.0850667	-1	1.78	.7348681
Press freedoms (TCC)	123	57.18466	31	92	15.51056
Maternal mortality (TCC)	123	198.2308	5	614.3593	162.0732
Gini coefficient (TCC)	123	35.9176	0	47.78009	5.930233
Secondary enrollment (TCC)	123	73.49843	34.6683	147.6893	25.25274
IHL legislation (TCC)	123	1.117904	0	2.136323	.5171658
IHL enforcement (TCC)	123	2.05407	0	3.008118	.6286309
Conscription (TCC)	123	.3135716	0	1	.2864142
Democracy (TCC)	123	.7029297	0	1	.2964371
GDP/capita (logged, TCC)	123	8.230495	6.349514	10.72042	1.273968
Total troops$^{\frac{1}{2}}$	123	60.78103	1	136.9465	39.72863

Table 6: Further Information on UN Peacekeeping Missions

Acronym	Mission Name	Years	Mission Host Country	Soldier Contributing Countries
BONUCA	UN Peacebuilding Office in the CAF	Nov 1993-May 2004	Central African Republic	Egypt
MINUGUA	UN Verification Mission in Guatemala	Jan 1997-September 2002	Guatemala	Sweden
MINURCA	UN Mission in the CAF	April 1998-Feb 2000	Central African Republic	Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Senegal
MINURCAT	UN Mission in the CAF & Chad	Sept 2007-Dec 2010	Chad	Albania, Austria, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Congo, Croatia, Democratic Rep. of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malawi, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, USA, Uruguay
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	April 1991-Present	Western Sahara	Bangladesh, Belgium, China, Denmark, German, Ghana, Hungary, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Sweden
MINUSTAH	UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti	June 2004-Oct 2017	Haiti	Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, India, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Phillipines, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, USA, Uruguay, Yemen
MONUC	UN Organization Mission in the DRC	Nov 1999-June 2010	Democratic Rep. of the Congo	Algeria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Boliva, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Zambia
MONUSCO	UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC	July 2010-Present	Democratic Rep. of the Congo	Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, China, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malawi, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Tunisia, Uruguay
ONUB	UN Operation in Burundi	June 2004-Dec 2006	Burundi	Algeria, Belgium, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Guatemala, India, Jordan, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia
UNAMI	UN Assistance Mission for Iraq	Aug 2003-Present	Iraq	Fiji
UNAMID	African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur	July 2007-Present	Sudan	Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana,

				Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, China, Democratic Rep. of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, USA, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone	Oct 1999-Dec 2005	Sierra Leone	Bangladesh, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, India, Jordan, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Sweden, Thailand, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Zambia
UNDOF	UN Disengagement Observer Force	May 1974-Present	Syrian Arab Republic	Austria, Canada, Croatia, India, Japan, Nepal, Philippines, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden
UNFICYP	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	March 1964-Present	Cyprus	Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Nepal, Netherlands, Paraguay, Peru, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, United Kingdom, Uruguay
UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon	March 1978-Present	Lebanon	Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tanzania, Turkey, Ukraine
UNIKOM	UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	April 1991-Oct 2003	Iraq	Argentina, Bangladesh, China, Finland, France, Germany, India, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, United Kingdom, USA
UNMA	UN Mission in Angola	Aug 2000-Feb 2003	Angola	Portugal
UNMEE	UN Mission in Ethiopia & Eritrea	July 2000-July 2008	Eritrea	Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Benin, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Gambia, Ghana, India, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Namibia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Tanzania, Tunisia, United Kingdom, USA, Uruguay, Zambia
UNMIBH	UN Mission in Bosnia & Herzegovina	Dec 1995-Dec 2002	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Sweden
UNMIK	UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	June 1999-Present	Serbia	Sweden

UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia	Sept 2003-March 2018	Liberia	Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Moldova, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Togo, Ukraine, United Kingdom, USA, Yemen
UNMIS	UN Mission in the Sudan	March 2005-July 2011	Sudan	Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, China, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, India, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
UNMISET	UN Mission of Support in East Timor	May 2002-May 2005	Timore-Leste	Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Sweden, Thailand
UNMIT	UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	Aug 2006-Dec 2012	Timore-Leste	Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Singapore
UNOCI	UN Operations in Cote d'Ivoire	April 2004-June 2017	Cote'd Ivoire	Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Chad, China, Egypt, France, Gambia, Ghana, India, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia
UNOMIG	UN Observer Mission in Georgia	Aug 1993-June 2009	Georgia	Bangladesh, Egypt, Germany
UNTAET	UN Transitional Administration in East Timor	Oct 1999-May 2002	Timor-Leste	Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru,

				Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Slovakia, Sweden, Thailand, United Kingdom
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organization	May 1948-Present	Israel	Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, USA

Information compiled from the *Providing for Peacekeeping* dataset, UN Repertoire, and United Nations Peacekeeping website.
The *Providing for Peacekeeping* dataset is a publicly available source for statistics on uniformed contributions. See `http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/`
The UN Repertoire is a publicly available source for facts on UN Political Missions and Offices.
See `http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/subsidiary_organs/special_political_complete.shtml`
For more information on current and past peacekeeping operations, see `https://peacekeeping.un.org/en`

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