Democratic Subversion:
Elite Cooptation and Opposition Fragmentation

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ONLINE APPENDIX

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Appendix 1. Summary of Per-Election Payoffs

	Incumbent (I)	Opposition Leader (L)	Opposition Member (M)
UNIFICATION			
I win, appoint L	$R - d$	u	0
I win, inside appointment	R	0	0
L win, appoint M	0	R	u
FRAGMENTATION			
I win, appoint L	$R - d$	u	0
I win, appoint M	$R - d$	0	u
I win, inside appointment	R	0	0
L win, appoint M	0	$R - d$	u
L win, inside appointment	0	R	0
M win, appoint L	0	u	$R - d$
M win, inside appointment	0	0	R

Note: $0 < \max[d,u] < R$.

Appendix 2. Model Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1:

We first show that "fragment" is a weakly dominated strategy for the opposition leader, whereas the opposition member potentially has an incentive to defect to "fragment". We then show that the opposition member's expected payoff under fragmentation is larger when outside appointments were made in the past.

If the leader chooses $f_t^L = 1$, fragmentation occurs, and each opposition candidate's expected payoff is:

$0.5p_t(1)\pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},0,1)u +$

$(1 - p_t(1))0.5[R - D_t(q_t) + p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(q_t,1))V_{t+1} + \pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},1,1)u]$.

If the leader chooses $f_t^L = 0$, then fragmentation occurs if $f_t^M = 1$, and unification occurs if $f_t^M = 0$. Under unification, the opposition leader's expected payoff is

$p_t(0)\pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},0,0)u + (1 - p_t(0))[R + p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(0,1))V_{t+1}]$.

We want to show that:

$p_t(0)\pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},0,0)u + (1 - p_t(0))[R + p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(0,1))V_{t+1}] >$

$0.5p_t(1)\pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},0,1)u +$

$(1 - p_t(1))0.5[R - D_t(q_t) + p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(q_t,1))V_{t+1} + \pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},1,1)u]$.

We note that $\pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},0,0)$ and $\pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},0,1)$ should be equal, given that the first 4 arguments of both expressions for π_t are identical and that the fourth argument is 0. The 4th argument being 0 means that election t is won by the incumbent, who is unconstrained in choosing q_t. Given the first 3 arguments of π_t, beliefs about what value a victorious incumbent in

election cycle t would choose for q_t should not depend on whether fragmentation occurred or not in that election cycle. This means that the first term on the left-hand side (LHS) of the preceding inequality exceeds the first term on the right-hand side (RHS) of the inequality, given that $0.5p_t(1) < 0.5 \leq p_t(0)$.

Thus, it is sufficient (but not necessary) to show that

$(1 - p_t(0))[R + p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(0,1))V_{t+1}] >$

$(1 - p_t(1))0.5[R - D_t(q_t) + p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(q_t,1))V_{t+1} + \pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},1,1)u]$.

Given that $p_t(0) < p_t(1)$, the first term of the product on the LHS of the preceding inequality exceeds the first term of the product on the RHS. What remains on the LHS is the payoff for winning the election as an opposition leader, and what remains on the RHS is the expected payoff that incorporates both the possibility of winning (as an opposition leader) and losing the election. That would seem to suggest that what remains of the LHS of the preceding inequality exceeds what remains of the RHS, particularly because the RHS subtracts $D_t(q_t)$ whereas the LHS does not. A potential problem, however, is that $p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(0,1))$ is on the LHS whereas a different term $p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(q_t,1))$ is on the RHS. There are only 4 possible combinations of values for these 2 terms, and 3 of those combinations imply that the preceding inequality is obviously satisfied. The only interesting case involves $p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(0,1)) = p_{t+1}(0)$ and $p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(q_t,1)) = p_{t+1}(1)$. In that case we can rewrite the preceding inequality as:

$(1 - p_t(0))[R + p_{t+1}(0)V_{t+1}] > (1 - p_t(1))0.5[R - D_t(q_t) + p_{t+1}(1)V_{t+1} + \pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},1,1)u]$.

This can be rewritten as:

$$(1 + p_t(1))R + D_t(q_t) + \left(2p_t(0) + \left(p_t(1)\right)^2\right)V_{t+1} + p_t(1)\pi u$$

$$> 2p_t(0)R + p_t(1)D_t(q_t) + \left(2\left(p_t(0)\right)^2 + p_t(1)\right)V_{t+1} + \pi u$$

The coefficients of R, $D_t(q_t)$, and V_{t+1} on the LHS exceed those on the RHS. The opposite is true for the coefficient of u. But $R > u$, and the difference between the R coefficients on both sides of the inequality exceeds the difference between the u coefficients, so the preceding inequality holds.

Under unification, the leader enjoys a higher probability of winning than under fragmentation, because he must only defeat one opponent rather than two. Moreover, conditional on losing, his chances of getting the administrative job are higher than under fragmentation; this is because if $q_t = 1$ the leader gets the position with certainty under unification but only with probability 0.5 under fragmentation. Thus, conditional on $f_t^M = 0$, the leader's expected payoff from choosing $f_t^L = 0$ is strictly higher than from choosing $f_t^L = 1$, thereby establishing that strategies involving $f_t^L = 1$ are weakly dominated.

Under fragmentation, the opposition member's expected payoff is:

$$0.5p_t(1)\pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},0,1)u + (1 - p_t(1))0.5[R - D_t(q_t) + p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(q_t,1))V_{t+1} + \pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},1,1)u].$$

If the member observes $q_{t-1} = 1$, he infers that the incumbent would choose $q_t = 1$ in the event of an incumbent victory. Therefore, $\pi_t(1,N_{t-1},F_{t-1},1,1) > \pi_t(0,N_{t-1},F_{t-1},1,1)$. The opposition member's expected payoff under fragmentation is larger when the incumbent has made an outside appointment in the past, $q_{t-1} = 1$. This does not necessarily mean that the opposition member will choose to fragment – this proposition simply observes that opposition fragmentation is more likely when outside appointments were made in the past because the opposition member's expected payoff of fragmentation is larger when $q_{t-1} = 1$, compared to when $q_{t-1} = 0$.

Proof of Proposition 2:

Part (i), concerning the fragmentation equilibrium, is stated as follows. If $p(0) \leq \frac{Rp(1)-d}{R-d}$ *there exists a SPNE in pure strategies in which in every election t the leader plays the strategy "*$f_t^L = 0$*; if* $f_t^M = 0$ *then* $q_t = 0$*, and if* $f_t^M = 1$ *then* $q_t = 1$*"; member plays "*$f_t^M = 1$*;* $q_t = 1$*", and the incumbent plays "*$q_t = 1$*."*

Part (ii), concerning the unification equilibrium, is stated as follows. If $p(0) > \frac{Rp(1)-d}{R-d}$*, there exists a SPNE in pure strategies in which in every election t the leader plays "*$f_t^L = 0$*;* $q_t = 0$*"; the member plays "*$f_t^M = 0$*"; and the incumbent plays "*$q_t = 0$*".* To prove this proposition, we first address the *Fragmentation Equilibrium* and use backward induction. The problem in period 3 of election cycle *t* involves finding optimal choices for the election winner by solving a discrete-time, stationary dynamic program. There are no constrained winners in a fragmentation equilibrium, so we focus only on unconstrained winners. The unconstrained winner chooses q_t to maximize V_t, where:

$V_t = R - D_t(q_t) + p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(q_t,N_t))V_{t+1}$

Stationarity of the problem implies $V_t = V_{t+1}$, so $V_t = \frac{R-D_t(q_t)}{1-p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(q_t,N_t))}$.

Denoting V_t as a function of q_t, the unconstrained winner chooses $q_t = 1$ if $V_t(1) > V_t(0)$, or if:

$$\frac{R-d}{1-p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(1,N_t))} > \frac{R}{1-p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(0,N_t))}$$

Therefore, the unconstrained winner chooses $q_t = 0$ if $V_t(1) < V_t(0)$, or if:

$$\frac{R-d}{1-p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(1,N_t))} < \frac{R}{1-p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(0,N_t))}$$

Rewriting $V_t(1) > V_t(0)$ yields:

$(R - d)[1 - p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(0,N_t))] > R[1 - p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(1,N_t))]$.

In order for the inequality to hold, it needs to be the case that $F_{t+1}(1,N_t) = 1$ and $F_{t+1}(0,N_t) = 0$.[1] There are 4 possible combinations of values for $F_{t+1}(1,N_t)$ and $F_{t+1}(0,N_t)$, and 3 of them lead to failure of the preceding inequality. If $F_{t+1}(1,N_t)$ and $F_{t+1}(0,N_t)$ are either both 0 or both 1, then the terms in square brackets on both sides of the preceding inequality are identical and drop out, giving $R - d > R$, which is false. The preceding inequality also fails if $F_{t+1}(1,N_t) = 0$ and $F_{t+1}(0,N_t) = 1$. It only holds when $1 - p_{t+1}(1)$ appears in the square brackets in the inequality's RHS and $1 - p_{t+1}(0)$ appears in the square brackets in the inequality's LHS, a situation which is ensured by $F_{t+1}(1,N_t) = 1$ and $F_{t+1}(0,N_t) = 0$, two conditions to be discussed shortly.

Using this fact and the stationarity of the problem, the preceding inequality simplifies to

$$p(0) \leq \frac{Rp(1) - d}{R - d}$$

Since there are no choice problems in period 2, consider period 1. We assume the leader's weakly dominated strategy will not be played in equilibrium, so we restrict our attention to $f_t^L = 0$, meaning that the member's decision determines whether the opposition fragments or unifies, i.e., $F_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1}) = f_t^M$. The member chooses $f_t^M = 1$ if:

$0.5p_t(1)\pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},0,1)u +$

$(1 - p_t(1))0.5[R - D_t(q_t) + p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(q_t,1))V_{t+1} + \pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},1,1)u] \geq (1 - p_t(0))u$.

This condition can be rewritten based on the following four facts. First, $q_t = 1$ in the equilibrium in part (i), so $D_t(q_t) = d$. Second, $F_{t+1}(q_t,1) = 1$ on the LHS of the preceding inequality, since the

[1] The required conditions for $F_{t+1}(1,N_t) = 1$ and $F_{t+1}(0,N_t) = 0$ are stated at the end of the portion of the proof that concerns the fragmentation equilibrium. The discussion is deferred until then because it relies on period-1 actions, which are not covered until the end of the backward induction argument.

member faces the same choice problem in each election cycle, so that if $f_t^M = F_t = 1$ is optimal in election t it must also be optimal in election t+1, so $p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(q_t,1)) = p(1)$. Third,

$$V_{t+1} = \frac{R - D_{t+1}(q_{t+1})}{1 - p_{t+2}\big(F_{t+2}(q_{t+1}, N_{t+1})\big)}$$

or

$$V_{t+1} = \frac{R - d}{1 - p_{t+2}(1)}$$

using earlier facts.

Fourth, $\pi_t(1,N_{t-1},F_{t-1},0,1) = \pi_t(1,N_{t-1},F_{t-1},1,1) = 1$ in the equilibrium, because all election winners are unconstrained, so if they choose $q_{t-1} = 1$ they will also choose $q_t = 1$. Using these four facts along with the stationarity of the problem, the condition for $f_t^M = 1$ can be rewritten as:

$$0.5p(1)u + \big(1 - p(1)\big)0.5\left[R - d + u + \frac{p(1)(R-d)}{1-p(1)}\right] \geq \big(1 - p(0)\big)u$$

which simplifies to:

$R \geq d + (1 - 2p(0))u$. Therefore, the condition ensuring that unconstrained winners choose $q_t = 1$ and that members choose $f_t^M = 1$ (so that fragmentation occurs) is:

$$R \geq max\left[\frac{d\big(1 - p(0)\big)}{p(1) - p(0)}, d + (1 - 2p(0)u)\right]$$

Given that $p(0) \geq ½$, this condition reduces to

$$p(0) \leq \frac{Rp(1) - d}{R - d}$$

Finally, and before turning to the unification equilibrium, consider the conditions required for $F_{t+1}(1,N_t) = 1$ and $F_{t+1}(0,N_t) = 0$. The first of these expressions says that, regardless of who wins election t, if that unconstrained winner chooses to appoint outside the party in election t then fragmentation will occur in election t+1. Fragmentation in election t+1 requires

that the opposition member played "fragment", so we must verify that this choice will indeed be made given that the opposition leader plays "unify".

The member chooses $f_{t+1}^{M} = 1$ if (substituting $q_t = 1$ into the expression below):

$0.5p_{t+1}(1)\pi_{t+1}(1,N_t,F_t,0,1)u +$

$(1 - p_{t+1}(1))0.5[R - D_{t+1}(q_{t+1}) + p_{t+2}(F_{t+2}(q_{t+1},1))V_{t+2} + \pi_{t+1}(1,N_t,F_t,1,1)u] \geq (1 - p_{t+1}(0))u.$

All election winners are unconstrained, so if they choose $q_{t-1} = 1$ then $q_t = 1$. Thus, $\pi_{t+1}(1,N_t,F_t,0,1) = 1$, which implies that the first term on the LHS of the preceding inequality is at least as large as the RHS, so $F_{t+1}(1,N_t) = 1$.

The second expression, i.e., $F_{t+1}(0,N_t) = 0$, is less straightforward because it involves the off-the-equilibrium-path move $q_t = 0$. The expression must hold both for $N_t = 1$ and for $N_t = 0$. If the off-path move $q_t = 0$ is played, then it must be (given the stated equilibrium profile) that the opposition member plays the off-path move $f_t^{M} = 0$. Given the opposition leader's behavior in the equilibrium profile (i.e., $f_t^{L} = 0$), we then have $F_t = 0$. If $N_t = 1$, the rules of the game require $q_t = 0$. This yields $F_{t+1}(0,1) = 0$, so the expression of interest holds when $N_t = 1$. But if $N_t = 0$, then the equilibrium profile requires a choice of $q_t = 1$ rather than $q_t = 0$, so in the absence of further assumptions nothing could be said about $F_{t+1}(0,0)$. We therefore assume, as noted earlier, that whenever the opposition member plays off the equilibrium path in election cycle *t*, the incumbent plays $q_t = 0$. This assumption ensures $F_{t+1}(0,0) = 0$, and therefore $F_{t+1}(0,N_t) = 0$.

Now we address the *Unification Equilibrium.* The condition required for unconstrained winners to choose $q_t = 0$ is:

$(R - d)[1 - p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(0,N_t))] < R[1 - p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(1,N_t))].$

When does this inequality hold? F_{t+1} must be either 1 or 0, so there are 4 possible combinations of values for the terms in square brackets on both sides of the inequality:

Combination	LHS term in [ ] is …	RHS term in [ ] is …	Inequality
1	$1 - p_{t+1}(1)$	$1 - p_{t+1}(1)$	Holds (reduces to $R - d < R$)
2	$1 - p_{t+1}(1)$	$1 - p_{t+1}(0)$	Holds
3	$1 - p_{t+1}(0)$	$1 - p_{t+1}(1)$	Holds if $d > \left(\frac{p(1)-p(0)}{1-p(0)}\right) R$.
4	$1 - p_{t+1}(0)$	$1 - p_{t+1}(0)$	Holds (reduces to $R - d < R$)

Therefore, the inequality holds if d is sufficiently large.

The member chooses $f_t^M = 0$ if:

$0.5p_t(1)\pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},0,1)u +$

$(1 - p_t(1))0.5[R - D_t(q_t) + p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(q_t,1))V_{t+1} + \pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},1,1)u] < (1 - p_t(0))u.$

This condition can be rewritten based on the following three facts. First, $q_t = 0$ in the equilibrium in part (ii), so $D_t(q_t) = 0$. Second, $F_{t+1}(q_t,1) = 0$ since the member faces the same choice problem in each election, so that if $f_t^M = F_t = 0$ is optimal in election cycle t it must also be optimal in t+1, so $p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(q_t,1)) = p(0)$. Third,

$$V_{t+1} = \frac{R - D_{t+1}(q_{t+1})}{1 - p_{t+2}\big(F_{t+2}(q_{t+1}, N_{t+1})\big)}$$

or

$$V_{t+1} = \frac{R}{1 - p_{t+2}(0)}$$

using earlier facts. Using these three facts along with the stationarity of the problem, the condition for $f_t^M = 0$ can be simplified to:

$$p_t(1)\pi_t(q_{t-1}, N_{t-1}, F_{t-1}, 0,1)u + \big(1 - p_t(1)\big)\left[R + \frac{p_{t+1}(0)R}{1 - p_{t+2}(0)} + \pi_t(q_{t-1}, N_{t-1}, F_{t-1}, 1,1)u\right]$$

$$< 2\big(1 - p_t(0)\big)u$$

This can be simplified further by noting that $\pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},0,1) = \pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},1,1)$ given that in both cases the winner is unconstrained. So we have:

$$R\big(1-p_t(1)\big)\left[1+\frac{p_{t+1}(0)}{1-p_{t+2}(0)}\right] < \big[2\big(1-p_t(0)\big)-\big(1+p_t(1)\big)\pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},1,1)\big]u$$

Recognizing the stationarity of the problem, this can be rewritten as:

$$\frac{R}{u} < \frac{2\big(1-p(0)\big)-\big(1+p(1)\big)\pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},1,1)}{\big(1-p(1)\big)\left[1+\frac{p(0)}{1-p(0)}\right]}$$

Recall that the condition ensuring that unconstrained winners choose $q_t = 0$ is

$(R - d)[1 - p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(0,N_t))] < R[1 - p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(1,N_t))]$, or

$R[p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(1,N_t)) - p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(0,N_t))] < d[1 - p_{t+1}(F_{t+1}(0,N_t))]$.

Combining the two conditions on R yields the following condition required for existence of the SPNE described in (ii):

$R < \min[k_1,k_2]$ where

$$k_1 = \frac{u\big[2\big(1-p(0)\big)-\big(1-p(1)\big)\pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},1,1)\big]}{\big(1-p(1)\big)\left[1+\frac{p(0)}{1-p(0)}\right]}$$

and

$$k_2 = \frac{d\big[1-p_{t+1}\big(F_{t+1}(0,N_t)\big)\big]}{p_{t+1}\big(F_{t+1}(1,N_t)\big)-p_{t+1}\big(F_{t+1}(0,N_t)\big)}$$

Note that

$$k_2 = \frac{d\big[1-p_{t+1}\big(F_{t+1}(0,N_t)\big)\big]}{p_{t+1}\big(F_{t+1}(1,N_t)\big)-p_{t+1}\big(F_{t+1}(0,N_t)\big)}$$

is identical to the condition $d > \left(\frac{p(1)-p(0)}{1-p(0)}\right) R$ specified earlier.

If $k_2 \le k_1$ then the thresholds for R in parts (i) and (ii) coincide, whereas they differ if $k_2 > k_1$, with no SPNE in pure strategies existing for values of R in the interval $k_1 < R < k_2$. Proposition

2's condition that $\frac{d}{u}$ be sufficiently small guarantees that $k_1 < k_2$. The specific condition, which ensures that the SPNE exists, is as follows:

$$\frac{d}{u} > \frac{\left[2\left(1-p(0)\right)-\left(1-p(1)\right)\pi_t(q_{t-1},N_{t-1},F_{t-1},1,1)\right]\left[p_{t+1}\left(F_{t+1}(1,N_t)\right)-p_{t+1}\left(F_{t+1}(0,N_t)\right)\right]}{\left(1-p(1)\right)\left[1+\frac{p(0)}{1-p(0)}\right]\left[1-p_{t+1}\left(F_{t+1}(0,N_t)\right)\right]}$$

Q.E.D.

Appendix 3. Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Presidential candidates	8.644	5.752	1	33	135
Presidential candidates >0.5%	5.044	2.524	1	15	135
Presidential candidates >1%	4.637	2.368	1	15	135
Incumbent vote share	0.613	0.186	0.270	1	134
Incumbent election victory	0.818	0.387	0	1	132
Opposition participation in prior cabinet	0.622	0.487	0	1	135
Opposition proportion of prior cabinet	0.232	0.263	0	0.923	135
Party institutionalization	0.476	0.140	0.196	0.854	134
Incumbent party survives founder	0.356	0.480	0	1	135
Incumbent share of legislature	0.673	0.185	0.187	1	130
Runoff system	0.711	0.455	0	1	135
Ethnic fractionalization (Posner)	0.419	0.211	0	0.800	132
Ethnic fractionalization (Fearon)	0.759	0.151	0.180	0.953	131
Consecutive presidential elections	4.600	2.847	0	12	135
Liberal democracy	0.283	0.159	0.0520	0.635	135
Electoral democracy	0.419	0.156	0.0950	0.744	135
Political rights	3.652	1.733	1	7	135
GDP per capita (log)	6.801	0.928	5.170	9.896	134
Population (log)	16.05	1.157	13.15	19.01	134
Oil rents (log)	0.301	1.570	-7.832	3.900	135
Election boycott	0.185	0.390	0	1	135
Cabinet size	23.69	5.827	11.50	43.50	135
Post-conflict regime	0.178	0.384	0	1	135
Liberation regime	0.126	0.333	0	1	135

Appendix 4. Number of Presidential Candidates
[Alternate Models]

	Pooled OLS	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	Detrended
Opposition proportion in prior cabinet	7.717***	6.428***	4.015**	3.878**
	(1.984)	(1.655)	(1.831)	(1.805)
Party institutionalization	-5.606	-5.281	1.075	-1.288
	(3.494)	(3.440)	(9.480)	(9.204)
Incumbent party survives founder	2.379**	1.669	0.587	-0.860
	(1.079)	(1.235)	(1.822)	(1.796)
Incumbent share of legislature	-4.012	-2.909	0.347	-0.512
	(2.419)	(2.616)	(3.445)	(3.445)
Constant	11.336***	10.990***	6.729	-0.037
	(2.289)	(2.216)	(5.756)	(0.110)
Number of observations	130	130	130	130
Number of countries	35	35	35	35
R^2 (within)		0.024	0.031	
R^2 (between)		0.402	0.244	
R^2 (overall)	0.225	0.223	0.150	0.030

Note: Dependent variable is the total number of presidential candidates. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 5. Sensitivity Analysis

We conduct the sensitivity analysis test developed by Oster (2017) to estimate the level of unobserved confounding necessary for a researcher to mistakenly detect a significant effect when the true effect is zero. This test calculates the ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on observables for various levels of R^2 that would be necessary for the estimated effect of the main independent variable to disappear.

R^2 Max	Ratio of Selection on Unobservables to Selection on Observables
0.4	6.8
0.5	2.8
0.6	1.8
0.7	1.3

For R^2 values between 0.4 and 0.7, we find that observations would have to select into the cooptation sample on the basis of unobserved characteristics at a rate of 1.3 to 6.8 times more than all the observable characteristics for the estimated effect of cooptation to disappear. Only when assuming R^2 levels greater than 0.8 do unobservables play an equally important role as observables in driving selection that would lead us to mistakenly detect a significant effect of cooptation when the true effect is zero.

Appendix 6. Number of Presidential Candidates
[Random Effects Analysis]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Opposition proportion in prior cabinet	6.796***	6.428***	4.392***
	(1.569)	(1.655)	(1.351)
Party institutionalization		-5.281	-10.917**
		(3.440)	(4.410)
Incumbent party survives founder		1.669	1.189
		(1.235)	(1.025)
Incumbent share of legislature		-2.909	-3.217
		(2.616)	(2.764)
Runoff system			-0.126
			(2.978)
Ethnic fractionalization			-1.952
			(4.697)
Runoff system × ethnic fractionalization			2.916
			(7.644)
Consecutive presidential elections			0.264
			(0.259)
Liberal democracy			7.307*
			(4.160)
GDP per capita			0.875
			(0.577)
Population			1.144*
			(0.627)
Oil			0.791***
			(0.268)
Constant	7.137***	10.990***	-13.316
	(0.570)	(2.216)	(11.528)
Number of observations	135	130	126
Number of countries	35	35	34
R^2 (within)	0.024	0.024	0.118
R^2 (between)	0.313	0.402	0.610
R^2 (overall)	0.169	0.223	0.385

Note: Random effects regression. Dependent variable is the total number of presidential candidates. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 7. Number of Presidential Candidates
[Accounting for Election Boycotts]

	Control for Boycotts	Exclude Boycotts
Opposition proportion in prior cabinet	5.879***	4.756**
	(1.560)	(1.800)
Election boycott	-3.633***	
	(1.014)	
Party institutionalization	-14.617***	-17.021***
	(4.380)	(5.775)
Incumbent party survives founder	1.448	1.360
	(0.908)	(0.968)
Incumbent share of legislature	-1.389	-0.630
	(2.936)	(3.525)
Runoff system	0.827	-0.488
	(2.576)	(3.121)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.834	-2.102
	(4.213)	(4.628)
Runoff system × ethnic fractionalization	0.853	3.986
	(6.325)	(7.661)
Consecutive presidential elections	0.120	0.189
	(0.224)	(0.259)
Liberal democracy	6.936*	5.594
	(4.041)	(4.442)
GDP per capita	1.506**	1.638**
	(0.578)	(0.701)
Population	1.034	1.023
	(0.618)	(0.647)
Oil	0.668***	0.641**
	(0.234)	(0.268)
Constant	-15.004	-14.043
	(11.835)	(13.151)
Number of observations	126	106
Number of countries	34	33
R^2	0.431	0.409

Note: Pooled OLS regression. Dependent variable is the total number of presidential candidates. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 8. Number of Presidential Candidates
[Substituting Fearon Ethnic Fractionalization]

Opposition proportion in prior cabinet	5.996***
	(1.584)
Party institutionalization	-12.017***
	(3.732)
Incumbent party survives founder	1.140
	(1.042)
Incumbent share of legislature	-2.490
	(2.520)
Runoff system	2.894
	(3.050)
Ethnic fractionalization (Fearon)	3.806*
	(2.110)
Runoff system × ethnic fractionalization (Fearon)	-2.396
	(4.086)
Consecutive presidential elections	0.138
	(0.235)
Liberal democracy	7.705*
	(4.352)
GDP per capita	1.471**
	(0.621)
Population	0.931
	(0.657)
Oil	0.637**
	(0.272)
Constant	-17.517
	(12.852)
Number of observations	125
Number of countries	34
R^2	0.395

Note: Pooled OLS regression. Dependent variable is the total number of presidential candidates. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 9. Number of Presidential Candidates
[Substituting Electoral Democracy and Political Rights Indices]

	Electoral Democracy	Political Rights
Opposition proportion in prior cabinet	5.473***	6.385***
	(1.531)	(1.579)
Party institutionalization	-11.075**	-10.290**
	(4.264)	(4.834)
Incumbent party survives founder	1.393	1.326
	(0.975)	(0.969)
Incumbent share of legislature	-3.451	-3.177
	(2.769)	(2.883)
Runoff system	0.060	0.682
	(2.680)	(2.845)
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.316	-1.058
	(4.260)	(4.375)
Runoff system × ethnic fractionalization	2.218	1.523
	(6.520)	(6.588)
Consecutive presidential elections	0.166	0.282
	(0.238)	(0.251)
Electoral democracy	8.882**	
	(3.979)	
Political rights		0.516
		(0.338)
GDP per capita	1.151*	1.366**
	(0.589)	(0.641)
Population	1.032	1.178*
	(0.649)	(0.681)
Oil	0.725**	0.567*
	(0.276)	(0.283)
Constant	-14.944	-18.518
	(12.570)	(13.440)
Number of observations	126	126
Number of countries	34	34
R^2	0.396	0.380

Note: Pooled OLS regression. Dependent variable is the total number of presidential candidates. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 10. Number of Presidential Candidates
[Accounting for Cabinet Size]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Opposition proportion in prior cabinet	7.298***	5.605**	4.868***
	(2.417)	(2.188)	(1.751)
Cabinet size	0.283**	0.283**	0.180
	(0.113)	(0.116)	(0.107)
Party institutionalization		-6.144	-11.189**
		(3.933)	(4.597)
Incumbent party survives founder		1.462	1.350
		(1.200)	(1.098)
Incumbent share of legislature		-4.235*	-3.615
		(2.084)	(2.599)
Runoff system			-0.056
			(2.901)
Ethnic fractionalization			-1.469
			(4.377)
Runoff system × ethnic fractionalization			2.842
			(6.881)
Consecutive presidential elections			0.153
			(0.236)
Liberal democracy			9.499**
			(4.617)
GDP per capita			0.663
			(0.618)
Population			0.413
			(0.591)
Oil			0.657**
			(0.252)
Constant	0.249	5.817	-4.543
	(2.410)	(3.911)	(12.125)
Number of observations	135	130	126
Number of countries	35	35	34
R^2	0.247	0.301	0.413

Note: Pooled OLS regression. Dependent variable is the total number of presidential candidates. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 11. Number of Presidential Candidates
[Dropping First Post-Cold War Elections]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Opposition proportion in prior cabinet	7.457***	7.249***	6.751***
	(2.550)	(2.452)	(1.884)
Party institutionalization		-7.793*	-11.929**
		(4.342)	(5.191)
Incumbent party survives founder		3.624**	2.512*
		(1.428)	(1.354)
Incumbent share of legislature		0.611	2.595
		(2.270)	(2.392)
Runoff system			2.719
			(2.550)
Ethnic fractionalization			2.880
			(4.367)
Runoff system × ethnic fractionalization			-3.474
			(5.647)
Consecutive presidential elections			0.316
			(0.261)
Liberal democracy			8.843**
			(3.400)
GDP per capita			1.288*
			(0.731)
Population			0.698
			(0.813)
Oil			0.374
			(0.373)
Constant	7.007***	8.921***	-16.756
	(0.638)	(2.106)	(14.759)
Number of observations	100	98	95
Number of countries	33	33	31
R^2	0.130	0.224	0.440

Note: Pooled OLS regression. Dependent variable is the total number of presidential candidates. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 12. Number of Presidential Candidates
[Lagging Number of Presidential Candidates]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Opposition proportion in prior cabinet	5.163**	5.345**	6.338***
	(2.165)	(2.250)	(2.059)
Lag of presidential candidates	0.322**	0.252**	0.075
	(0.119)	(0.114)	(0.094)
Party institutionalization		-6.347	-11.154**
		(3.938)	(4.937)
Incumbent party survives founder		2.692**	2.329*
		(1.248)	(1.333)
Incumbent share of legislature		1.368	2.838
		(2.176)	(2.459)
Runoff system			2.392
			(2.467)
Ethnic fractionalization			2.564
			(4.191)
Runoff system × ethnic fractionalization			-2.799
			(5.507)
Consecutive presidential elections			0.313
			(0.253)
Liberal democracy			8.729**
			(3.356)
GDP per capita			1.090
			(0.693)
Population			0.563
			(0.723)
Oil			0.353
			(0.361)
Constant	5.043***	6.544***	-13.909
	(0.913)	(2.185)	(13.069)
Number of observations	99	97	94
Number of countries	33	33	31
R^2	0.235	0.284	0.445

Note: Pooled OLS regression. Dependent variable is the total number of presidential candidates. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 13. Number of Presidential Candidates
[Limiting Sample to Presidential Candidates >0.5% and >1%]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Candidates receiving at least 0.5% vote share		Candidates receiving at least 1% vote share	
Opposition proportion in prior cabinet	2.877***	1.642**	2.366***	1.510***
	(0.869)	(0.660)	(0.756)	(0.522)
Party institutionalization		-0.834		-0.814
		(1.352)		(1.063)
Incumbent party survives founder		-0.312		0.129
		(0.489)		(0.403)
Incumbent share of legislature		-3.330***		-1.720*
		(1.201)		(0.930)
Runoff system		4.369***		5.116***
		(0.805)		(0.775)
Ethnic fractionalization		4.380***		4.581***
		(1.038)		(1.077)
Runoff system × ethnic fractionalization		-5.300***		-7.667***
		(1.737)		(1.654)
Consecutive presidential elections		0.212**		0.069
		(0.084)		(0.084)
Liberal democracy		-1.010		0.615
		(2.207)		(1.829)
GDP per capita		-0.265		-0.360
		(0.216)		(0.225)
Population		-0.646***		-0.566***
		(0.178)		(0.176)
Oil		0.272**		0.235**
		(0.104)		(0.111)
Constant	4.378***	15.304***	4.089***	13.279***
	(0.254)	(3.319)	(0.267)	(3.721)
Number of observations	135	126	135	126
Number of countries	35	34	35	34
R^2	0.090	0.333	0.069	0.393

Note: Pooled OLS regression. Dependent variable is the total number of presidential candidates. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 14. Number of Presidential Candidates
[Accounting for Election Fraud and Election Violence]

	Model 1 Opposition Cooptation	Model 2 Control for Fraud & Violence
Opposition proportion in prior cabinet		5.791***
		(1.557)
Election free and fair	-0.008	0.246
	(0.030)	(0.511)
Election violence	0.004	0.359
	(0.033)	(0.458)
Party institutionalization		-10.630**
		(4.416)
Incumbent party survives founder		1.555
		(1.002)
Incumbent share of legislature		-3.563
		(2.717)
Runoff system		0.460
		(2.801)
Ethnic fractionalization		-1.077
		(4.619)
Runoff system × ethnic fractionalization		1.645
		(6.585)
Consecutive presidential elections		0.203
		(0.240)
Liberal democracy		5.410
		(5.829)
GDP per capita		1.175**
		(0.549)
Population		1.108*
		(0.623)
Oil		0.738**
		(0.283)
Constant	0.248**	-15.014
	(0.091)	(11.214)
Number of observations	134	125
Number of countries	35	34
R^2	0.001	0.387

Note: Pooled OLS regression. Dependent variable in Model 1 is the opposition proportion in the cabinet. Dependent variable in Model 2 is the total number of presidential candidates. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 15. Number of Presidential Candidates
[Accounting for Additional Campaign and Party Controls]

	Model 1 Campaign finance	Model 2 Candidate registration and party formation	Model 3 Campaign media and social media	Model 4 All campaign and party controls
Opposition proportion in prior cabinet	4.559***	5.800***	5.206***	4.142***
	(1.472)	(1.325)	(1.444)	(1.426)
Campaign donation rules	0.993*			0.730
	(0.502)			(0.567)
Public financing for campaigns	-0.512			-0.627
	(0.519)			(0.570)
Candidate registration restrictions		-3.006*		-2.064
		(1.546)		(1.738)
Barriers to party formation		0.523		0.258
		(0.792)		(0.796)
Free election campaign media			0.239	0.371
			(0.399)	(0.505)
Paid ads by campaigns			0.976	0.745
			(0.717)	(0.731)
Paid ads by individuals			0.523	0.375
			(1.006)	(0.952)
Internet access			0.009	0.000
			(0.046)	(0.049)
Party institutionalization	-11.943***	-11.685**	-10.585**	-11.958**
	(4.193)	(4.643)	(4.743)	(4.704)
Incumbent party survives founder	1.550	1.797	1.458	1.640
	(0.940)	(1.134)	(1.000)	(1.081)
Incumbent share of legislature	-3.174	-2.680	-4.311	-3.153
	(2.873)	(2.548)	(2.722)	(2.751)
Runoff system	0.510	0.115	-1.637	-1.579
	(2.892)	(2.830)	(3.223)	(3.642)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.929	3.505	-2.791	0.904
	(4.802)	(4.585)	(4.930)	(5.809)
Runoff system × ethnic fractionalization	0.604	1.161	4.794	3.245
	(6.886)	(6.681)	(7.259)	(8.093)
Consecutive presidential elections	0.166	0.363	0.244	0.319
	(0.238)	(0.258)	(0.200)	(0.253)
Liberal democracy	7.297*	5.796	2.040	1.207
	(4.119)	(6.328)	(6.436)	(7.746)
GDP per capita	1.145*	0.319	0.915	0.580
	(0.566)	(0.656)	(0.612)	(0.745)
Population	1.119	0.396	0.813	0.637
	(0.702)	(0.743)	(0.701)	(0.836)
Oil	0.726**	0.841***	0.758***	0.813***
	(0.275)	(0.268)	(0.246)	(0.261)
Constant	-14.027	0.087	-6.121	-1.793
	(12.856)	(15.095)	(13.629)	(16.379)
Number of observations	126	126	125	125
Number of countries	34	34	33	33
R^2	0.409	0.414	0.410	0.434

Note: Pooled OLS regression. Dependent variable is the total number of presidential candidates. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 16. Number of Presidential Candidates
[Limiting Sample to Less Institutionalized Party Systems]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Opposition proportion in prior cabinet	10.257***	9.356***	5.879***
	(2.263)	(2.335)	(1.762)
Party institutionalization		-15.254	-18.099
		(10.571)	(11.954)
Incumbent party survives founder		2.162	1.981
		(1.989)	(1.995)
Incumbent share of legislature		-3.208	-2.424
		(3.391)	(4.365)
Runoff system			-4.351
			(8.785)
Ethnic fractionalization			-8.880
			(13.108)
Runoff system × ethnic fractionalization			11.583
			(16.847)
Consecutive presidential elections			0.570*
			(0.294)
Liberal democracy			9.641*
			(5.072)
GDP per capita			-0.255
			(1.032)
Population			1.541
			(1.832)
Oil			0.613
			(0.416)
Constant	6.599***	13.744***	-9.113
	(0.648)	(3.992)	(17.865)
Number of observations	69	67	66
Number of countries	23	23	22
R^2	0.214	0.262	0.435

Note: Pooled OLS regression. Dependent variable is the total number of presidential candidates. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 17. Number of Presidential Candidates
[Limiting Sample to Runoff Systems]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Opposition proportion in prior cabinet	10.968***	9.315***	6.136***
	(2.275)	(2.286)	(1.958)
Party institutionalization		-3.676	-15.014***
		(3.720)	(4.737)
Incumbent party survives founder		2.065	1.837
		(1.555)	(1.241)
Incumbent share of legislature		-7.035**	-5.990
		(3.429)	(3.835)
Ethnic fractionalization			1.186
			(3.424)
Consecutive presidential elections			-0.028
			(0.280)
Liberal democracy			11.817**
			(4.877)
GDP per capita			1.464**
			(0.667)
Population			1.032
			(0.674)
Oil			0.759**
			(0.286)
Constant	6.352***	12.446***	-12.771
	(0.530)	(2.814)	(12.800)
Number of observations	96	93	89
Number of countries	30	30	29
R^2	0.224	0.285	0.444

Note: Pooled OLS regression. Dependent variable is the total number of presidential candidates. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 18. Number of Presidential Candidates
[Limiting Sample to Elections with First Round Only]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Opposition proportion in prior cabinet	5.202**	5.274**	3.846***
	(1.913)	(1.941)	(1.366)
Party institutionalization		-0.857	-1.654
		(2.552)	(3.150)
Incumbent party survives founder		2.401**	0.722
		(1.045)	(1.035)
Incumbent share of legislature		-1.840	-0.674
		(2.561)	(2.579)
Runoff system			3.212
			(2.128)
Ethnic fractionalization			2.872
			(3.200)
Runoff system × ethnic fractionalization			-7.390*
			(4.228)
Consecutive presidential elections			-0.005
			(0.212)
Liberal democracy			3.855
			(3.607)
GDP per capita			1.676**
			(0.632)
Population			1.603**
			(0.701)
Oil			0.839**
			(0.392)
Constant	6.524***	7.415***	-32.359**
	(0.528)	(1.929)	(13.308)
Number of observations	109	106	102
Number of countries	32	32	31
R^2	0.075	0.139	0.424

Note: Pooled OLS regression. Dependent variable is the total number of presidential candidates. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 19. Number of Presidential Candidates
[Limiting Sample to Runoff Systems with No Second Round]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Opposition proportion in prior cabinet	7.109***	7.315***	5.045**
	(2.171)	(2.425)	(1.852)
Party institutionalization		2.272	-3.925
		(3.065)	(4.281)
Incumbent party survives founder		1.788	0.966
		(1.447)	(1.230)
Incumbent share of legislature		-4.755	-2.914
		(3.291)	(3.660)
Ethnic fractionalization			-4.174
			(2.453)
Consecutive presidential elections			-0.237
			(0.251)
Liberal democracy			7.017
			(5.370)
GDP per capita			1.865**
			(0.785)
Population			1.703**
			(0.723)
Oil			0.759*
			(0.410)
Constant	6.110***	7.771***	-29.817*
	(0.551)	(2.534)	(15.259)
Number of observations	70	69	65
Number of countries	26	26	25
R^2	0.125	0.189	0.481

Note: Pooled OLS regression. Dependent variable is the total number of presidential candidates. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 20. Incumbent Election Victory in Runoff System

Number of presidential candidates	0.015*
	(0.008)
Party institutionalization	0.857*
	(0.433)
Incumbent party survives founder	-0.083
	(0.068)
Incumbent share of legislature	0.597**
	(0.273)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.137
	(0.286)
Consecutive presidential elections	-0.004
	(0.020)
Liberal democracy	-0.777***
	(0.249)
GDP per capita	-0.018
	(0.056)
Population	-0.004
	(0.042)
Oil	-0.027**
	(0.012)
Constant	0.275
	(0.736)
Number of observations	87
Number of countries	29
R^2	0.203

Note: Pooled OLS regression. Dependent variable is incumbent election victory. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 21. Incumbent Election Victory in Second Round of Runoff Systems

	Model 1	Model 2
Number of presidential candidates	2.400**	3.147***
	(0.978)	(0.726)
Opposition proportion in prior cabinet	0.593*	0.758**
	(0.322)	(0.316)
Party institutionalization		1.138**
		(0.503)
Incumbent party survives founder		-0.245
		(0.201)
Incumbent share of legislature		-0.538*
		(0.265)
Ethnic fractionalization		0.261
		(0.550)
Consecutive presidential elections		0.067**
		(0.023)
Liberal democracy		-1.763***
		(0.412)
GDP per capita		-0.205
		(0.130)
Population		-0.292***
		(0.083)
Oil		-0.003
		(0.033)
Constant	-0.673**	5.084***
	(0.252)	(1.240)
Number of observations	23	22
Number of countries	14	13
R^2	0.535	0.877

Note: Pooled OLS regression. Dependent variable is incumbent election victory. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 22. Number of Presidential Candidates
[Accounting for Powersharing]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Legislative Majority		No Legislative Majority
Opposition proportion in prior cabinet	8.759***	6.262***	8.804**
	(3.037)	(2.162)	(2.886)
Party institutionalization		-11.502**	
		(4.673)	
Incumbent party survives founder		2.491**	
		(1.122)	
Runoff system		2.202	
		(2.257)	
Ethnic fractionalization		0.822	
		(3.901)	
Runoff system × ethnic fractionalization		-2.922	
		(5.015)	
Consecutive presidential elections		0.171	
		(0.307)	
Liberal democracy		10.441**	
		(4.822)	
GDP per capita		0.949	
		(0.619)	
Population		0.842	
		(0.736)	
Oil		0.741*	
		(0.384)	
Constant	6.442***	-13.375	7.602***
	(0.567)	(12.899)	(1.335)
Number of observations	115	110	20
Number of countries	33	32	11
R^2	0.139	0.414	0.259

Note: Pooled OLS regression. Dependent variable is the total number of presidential candidates. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The limited number of observations for the "No Legislative Majority" subsample precludes the inclusion of controls. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 23. Number of Presidential Candidates
[Accounting for Post-Conflict Regimes]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Cooptation by Post-Conflict	Control for Post-Conflict	Exclude Post-Conflict
Opposition proportion in prior cabinet		6.567***	6.739***
		(1.601)	(1.779)
Post-conflict regime	0.277***	-1.282	
	(0.078)	(1.121)	
Party institutionalization	-0.448*	-11.159**	-9.751*
	(0.259)	(4.330)	(5.415)
Incumbent party survives founder	-0.076	1.751	1.936
	(0.059)	(1.037)	(1.276)
Incumbent share of legislature	-0.189	-3.259	-0.347
	(0.130)	(2.861)	(2.462)
Runoff system	-0.147	0.166	2.172
	(0.199)	(2.618)	(2.488)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.310	-1.458	0.574
	(0.398)	(4.089)	(3.780)
Runoff system × ethnic fractionalization	0.324	2.757	-2.787
	(0.391)	(6.319)	(6.438)
Consecutive presidential elections	0.011	0.169	0.089
	(0.012)	(0.230)	(0.267)
Liberal democracy	0.282	7.440*	9.415**
	(0.255)	(4.348)	(4.508)
GDP per capita	-0.003	0.958*	0.970
	(0.037)	(0.541)	(0.656)
Population	0.021	0.981	0.881
	(0.031)	(0.605)	(0.775)
Oil	0.018	0.753***	0.878***
	(0.013)	(0.259)	(0.265)
Constant	0.239	-11.626	-13.922
	(0.601)	(11.282)	(15.466)
Number of observations	126	126	103
Number of countries	34	34	28
R^2	0.301	0.397	0.416

Note: Pooled OLS regression. Dependent variable in Model 1 is the opposition proportion in the cabinet. Dependent variable in Models 2 and 3 is the total number of presidential candidates. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 24. Number of Presidential Candidates
[Accounting for Liberation Regimes]

	Model 1 Cooptation by Liberation	Model 2 Control for Liberation	Model 3 Exclude Liberation
Opposition proportion in prior cabinet		6.147***	6.289***
		(1.641)	(1.702)
Liberation regime	-0.186**	0.800	
	(0.071)	(1.517)	
Party institutionalization	-0.413	-11.508**	-11.629*
	(0.302)	(4.787)	(6.161)
Incumbent party survives founder	-0.045	1.587	1.012
	(0.058)	(1.015)	(1.203)
Incumbent share of legislature	-0.183	-3.363	-3.693
	(0.139)	(2.811)	(3.171)
Runoff system	-0.136	0.054	-0.585
	(0.244)	(2.680)	(3.075)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.269	-1.770	-3.580
	(0.447)	(4.336)	(5.342)
Runoff system × ethnic fractionalization	0.491	2.201	3.561
	(0.435)	(6.488)	(7.295)
Consecutive presidential elections	0.002	0.216	0.322
	(0.014)	(0.239)	(0.256)
Liberal democracy	0.105	8.305*	4.957
	(0.263)	(4.310)	(5.107)
GDP per capita	-0.019	1.023*	1.157*
	(0.035)	(0.586)	(0.680)
Population	0.014	1.023	1.504*
	(0.030)	(0.674)	(0.778)
Oil	0.015	0.774***	0.624**
	(0.012)	(0.255)	(0.251)
Constant	0.545	-12.812	-19.704
	(0.547)	(12.795)	(13.291)
Number of observations	126	126	109
Number of countries	34	34	28
R^2	0.230	0.394	0.403

Note: Pooled OLS regression. Dependent variable in Model 1 is the opposition proportion in the cabinet. Dependent variable in Models 2 and 3 is the total number of presidential candidates. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 25. Opposition Appointments to Cabinet
[Excluding Election Boycotts]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Incumbent vote share	-0.898***	-0.714**	-0.814***
	(0.227)	(0.271)	(0.287)
Party institutionalization		-0.674**	-0.958**
		(0.291)	(0.396)
Incumbent party survives founder		-0.022	-0.020
		(0.056)	(0.066)
Incumbent share of legislature		0.319	0.332
		(0.193)	(0.197)
Runoff system			-0.297*
			(0.156)
Ethnic fractionalization			-0.243
			(0.345)
Runoff system × ethnic fractionalization			0.582*
			(0.321)
Consecutive presidential elections			-0.007
			(0.014)
Liberal democracy			0.147
			(0.302)
GDP per capita			0.052
			(0.043)
Population			0.022
			(0.033)
Oil rents			0.003
			(0.020)
Constant	0.744***	0.779***	0.385
	(0.145)	(0.162)	(0.603)
Number of observations	70	68	68
Number of countries	28	27	27
R^2	0.236	0.333	0.419

Note: Pooled OLS regression. Dependent variable is the proportion of opposition members appointed to the cabinet. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 26. Opposition Appointments to Cabinet
[Alternate Models]

	Pooled OLS	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	Detrended
Incumbent vote share	-0.561**	-0.574***	-0.544***	-0.367***
	(0.231)	(0.165)	(0.154)	(0.111)
Party institutionalization	-0.651***	-0.400	0.793	-0.637
	(0.237)	(0.285)	(0.593)	(0.523)
Incumbent party survives founder	-0.006	0.019	0.041	-0.036
	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.060)	(0.058)
Incumbent share of legislature	0.126	0.350**	0.534**	-0.421**
	(0.196)	(0.178)	(0.204)	(0.189)
Constant	0.813***	0.554***	-0.197	0.001
	(0.169)	(0.204)	(0.372)	(0.005)
Number of observations	83	83	83	83
Number of countries	32	32	32	32
R^2 (within)		0.125	0.208	
R^2 (between)		0.166	0.035	
R^2 (overall)	0.153	0.224	0.049	0.164

Note: Random effects regression. Dependent variable is the proportion of opposition members appointed to the cabinet. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 27. Opposition Appointments to Cabinet
[Random Effects Analysis]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Incumbent vote share	-0.326**	-0.574***	-0.515***
	(0.129)	(0.165)	(0.165)
Party institutionalization		-0.400	-0.393
		(0.285)	(0.381)
Incumbent party survives founder		0.019	0.011
		(0.054)	(0.068)
Incumbent share of legislature		0.350**	0.353**
		(0.178)	(0.171)
Runoff system			-0.080
			(0.085)
Ethnic fractionalization			-0.201
			(0.233)
Runoff system × ethnic fractionalization			0.249
			(0.188)
Consecutive presidential elections			0.014
			(0.020)
Liberal democracy			-0.092
			(0.305)
GDP per capita			-0.021
			(0.040)
Population			0.059*
			(0.030)
Oil rents			-0.003
			(0.015)
Constant	0.465***	0.554***	-0.249
	(0.099)	(0.204)	(0.567)
Number of observations	87	83	82
Number of countries	32	32	31
R^2 (within)	0.030	0.125	0.208
R^2 (between)	0.241	0.166	0.191
R^2 (overall)	0.153	0.224	0.175

Note: Random effects regression. Dependent variable is the proportion of opposition members appointed to the cabinet. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.

Appendix 28. Incumbent Election Victory Opposition Fragmentation & Cooptation

	Opposition Fragmentation	Opposition Cooptation
Number of presidential candidates	0.022**	
	(0.011)	
Opposition proportion in prior cabinet		0.500**
		(0.210)
Party institutionalization	1.167**	1.224**
	(0.521)	(0.495)
Incumbent party survives founder	-0.132	-0.096
	(0.100)	(0.098)
Incumbent share of legislature	0.019	-0.002
	(0.396)	(0.417)
Runoff system	-0.017	0.056
	(0.251)	(0.326)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.640	0.646
	(0.389)	(0.454)
Runoff system × ethnic fractionalization	-0.023	-0.167
	(0.586)	(0.750)
Consecutive presidential elections	0.026	0.027
	(0.030)	(0.030)
Liberal democracy	-0.841**	-0.936***
	(0.322)	(0.305)
GDP per capita	-0.040	-0.016
	(0.069)	(0.083)
Population	-0.090*	-0.078*
	(0.045)	(0.044)
Oil	-0.032*	-0.021
	(0.016)	(0.018)
Constant	1.576*	1.283
	(0.917)	(1.033)
Number of observations	69	69
Number of countries	27	27
R^2	0.187	0.219

Note: Pooled OLS regression. Dependent variable is incumbent election victory. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests.