Online Appendix for
"Does Counterinsurgent Success Match Social Support?
Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Colombia"

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Sampling:

This section presents a description of both the sampling frame and sampling design of the survey conducted in Colombia.

Sampling frame:

In department capitals, the sampling frame consisted of 2005 census mapping for municipal planning stratified at the block level; in other municipalities, the sampling frame consisted of 2001 census mapping.

Sampling design:

We used a stratified probability clustering, with selection probabilities proportional to size (PPS). The municipalities that compose the clusters were stratified by the region to which they belong and the size of the population. The final stages of selection in both sub-samples were by a systematic jump from a random start for household, and then probabilistic selection from a list of those 18 and older in the household using a table designed by the survey firm. The firm that conducted the face-to-face surveys was the Bogota-based *Centro Nacional de Consultoría* (CNC). We trained the firm's staff before the interviews were conducted.

Survey Questions in the Original Spanish:

Direct question:

"Algunas personas creen que las fuerzas militares colombianas deberían tener mayor libertad para defender la nación de la manera en que ellas lo consideren adecuado. ¿Usted apoya que las fuerzas militares colombianas tengan mayor libertad para defender la nación de la manera en que ellas lo consideren adecuado?"

Items for the indirect question (in which the framing of the question was identical to the direct question):

"Las naciones suramericanas deberían crear el Banco de Sur América.

A través de un impuesto especial se debería financiar la ampliación de parques y zonas verdes en su barrio.

La ideología política conservadora debería ganar más influencia en la sociedad colombiana.

[Las fuerzas militares colombianas deberían tener mayor libertad para defender la nación de la manera en que ellas lo consideren adecuado."]

Contextual Independent Variables

This section presents more description of the three contextual variables used in the analysis of support for the military.

Armed Actor Territorial Control:

Stathis Kalyvas (2006) proposes that armed actor territorial control ranges from zones of total incumbent/counterinsurgent control to zones of total insurgent control. Following this framework, we developed the measure of *armed actor territorial control* to capture whether a municipality is under state or guerrilla control, or, the added category in this case, paramilitary control.

Drawing on Kalyvas' insight that armed actor control produces different patterns of violence (2006), we use what we can observe (patterns of violence) to capture a phenomenon that has an unobservable dimension (armed actor control). The measure builds on a longitudinal database on violent actions perpetrated by guerrillas and paramilitaries in every Colombian municipality between 2002 and 2009, as well as an earlier period as a robustness check, 1988-2003.[1]

Using these data, we developed a procedure attempting to distinguishing municipalities controlled or disputed by different armed actors. The advantage of the measure is that, although it uses information on armed actions, the variables that it produces are not raw measures of violent events perpetrated by armed actors, although we check them against government indicators of control and our own hand coding, as described below. Daniel Nagin developed a

[1] Violent actions included in the database are: terrorist acts, attacks on public property, attacks on private property, blocking of roads, ambushes, combats, piracy, massacres, homicides, assaults against individuals, political kidnappings, and assaults against public officials. The source of this database was a report on violent actions published by *Centro de Ivestigación y Educación Popular*, CINEP.

statistical method to capture trajectories emerging from longitudinal data: in these longitudinal data, there is the possibility that observations will follow common patterns within subgroups that differ from others in the sample (Nagin 2005). This technique allows the identification of subgroups of observations that describe a similar developing pattern (Nagin 2005: 15).

Using Nagin's method, we identify different trajectories of violent events perpetrated by each armed actor over time. Longitudinal data on violent events in Colombia show clear differences in patterns across the sample but similarities within subgroups. In some municipalities, the incidence of armed actions is almost zero; others show continuous high levels of violent events, or increasing or decreasing trajectories. These trajectories represent subgroups of municipalities that have similar patterns in terms of violent events, and, we propose thus indicate control by different armed actors. In order to measure territorial control, then, we first identified trajectories of violent events perpetrated by the different armed actors. Using the longitudinal data on violent actions executed by guerrillas and paramilitaries in every Colombian municipality from 2002 to 2009, we estimated a semiparametric group-based model for each armed actor.[2] To estimating the trajectories, we had to make three general decisions: parametric form (Poisson vs. normal vs. logit), the number of groups or trajectories, and the form of the trajectory over time. The selection of the parametric form depends on the type of data analyzed. To choose the number of groups that best described our data, we compared the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) of models with different groups. Once the addition of an extra group resulted in a weaker BIC, we identified the previous number as the optimal number of trajectories. Once we identified the numbers of groups, we again relied on BIC scores and our own intuitions about the behavior of the data to identify their form, as recommended (Nagin

[2] All models were estimated using a SAS based routine called PROC TRAJ developed by Jones, Nagin and Roeder (2001).

2005). Figure SI.1 depicts the trajectories obtained from the two semi-parametric group-based models. Results from these models capture a picture of the different trajectories of political violence between 2002 and 2009.[3] Solid lines represent trajectories of paramilitary violence and dotted lines represent those of guerrilla violence. Under the graphs, the number in parentheses indicates the percentage of municipalities included in each trajectory.[4] As shown in figure SI.1, all trajectories describe a similar shape; however, guerrilla violence presents more variability, in terms of intensity, than paramilitary violence. For this reason the semiparametric group-based modeling procedure allowed us to identify three guerrilla violence trajectories, and only two paramilitary violence paths.

Figure SI.1. Trajectories of Guerrilla and paramilitary Violence 2002 - 2009



[3] Parameter estimates and model fit measures are available upon request to the authors.
[4] Note that the "optimal" number of trajectories for guerrilla violence is three and for paramilitary violence is two. This indicates that paramilitary violence is not as diverse as guerrilla violence, probably as a consequence of the sharp reduction of paramilitary activity that occurred after the 2005 demobilization.

Given that Kalyvas' levels of territorial control are associated with changes in violence intensity by different armed actors, we can use this analysis to identify different scenarios of territorial control. These trajectories describe variation in violent events over time, and by combining these armed actor trajectories, we can identify what the status of that municipality is at the end of our longitudinal data (which runs through 2009, and so finishes just before our survey experiment in early 2010). Contested municipalities feature high levels of violent events perpetrated by multiple armed actors (a variable that we also measure and assess, of course). Municipalities controlled or under strong influence of guerrilla groups, on the other hand, feature a few violent events by paramilitary groups, for example, but then guerrilla-perpetrated violent events that then decrease over time as the guerrillas consolidate a hegemonic position. Municipalities can thus be contested or controlled by any of the armed actors involved in the conflict. These zones of control are similar to those described by Kalyvas (2006: 220-224): consolidating territorial control implies the use of an important amount of violence, but, once an armed actor reaches hegemonic status, violent events decrease. Thus, from the intersection of trajectories of violent events perpetrated by different armed actors, we created three dummy variables capturing state, guerrilla and paramilitary control. In another variable, we also separately capture those territories that are then contested in 2010. Table SI.1 displays the scenarios of control resulting from the intersection of the trajectories. The number in parentheses indicates the percentage of municipalities included in each scenario.

Municipalities controlled by the state are those resulting from the intersection of guerrilla and paramilitaries trajectories of very low or no activity from 2002 to 2009, as well as those that had initially moderate levels of guerrilla activity that then decreases during the same period. In both cases, the state is thought to come out on top. For instance, the cities of Bogotá,

Barranquilla, Cali, and Medellín are included in this group because they registered very low levels of both paramilitary and guerrilla activity. Also included in this group are municipalities that report near to zero violent events. These are the cases of Cota and Madrid, located near Bogotá, and Itagüi a municipality neighboring Medellín.

Municipalities controlled by the armed actors are more complicated. For paramilitary groups, the single trajectory of paramilitary violence identified by the model as optimal during this period, aside from no activity, is decreasing and then stable. Thus, if the paramilitaries are active during this period, they are thought to come out on top of the guerrillas at the end given their level of activity compared to those of the guerillas: in two of the intersections, paramilitary control resulted because the path of paramilitary actions (*Decreasing – stable*) was clearly above the guerrillas' trajectories (*No action* and *Moderate –decreasing)*; in the third (paramilitaries' *Decreasing – stable* and guerrillas' *High - decreasing* trajectories) is less clear, but our understanding, including from the qualitative benchmarking presented in the paper, is that, although guerrillas are active, the paramilitaries overpower them at the end of the period.[5] In this group are included various municipalities of the Cordoba department (Montería, Planeta Rica and Tierralta). This region witnessed the emergence and consolidation of the paramilitary project. This group also includes the port of Buenaventura; a municipality located in the Pacific that has been under paramilitary influence. For the guerrillas, however, when the paramilitary has no action in this period, and the guerillas still maintain a *High-decreasing* trajectory, this should result in dominance by the guerrillas. In this group are worth mentioning the cases of Florencia and Puerto Asis, two municipalities located in the south of Colombian, near the Amazon region, an area traditionally under the FARC influence.

[5] As this scenario is not as clear as the others, we validated our coding contrasting this group of municipalities to qualitative sources. We also tried coding these as guerilla-control as an alternative (see Figure S1.6, below).

Table SI.1. Scenarios of Guerrilla and Paramilitary Control, 2002 - 2009

		Paramilitaries' Trajectories	
		No Actions	Moderate, Decreasing to Stable
Guerrillas' Trajectories	No Actions	State control (59%)	Paramilitary control (1%)
	Low - Decreasing	State control (26%)	Paramilitary control (4%)
	High, Decreasing to Stable	Guerrilla control (5%)	Paramilitary control (5%)

Note that our method of measuring control implies observing the trajectory of violent events perpetrated by the different armed actors in the previous years. We use the combinations of these trajectories, as well as the theoretical expectations on territorial control and use of violence developed by Kalyvas (2006), in order to create these measures of armed actor territorial control. Therefore, our method is not identifying control simply as a function of violent events in a single moment of time.

It is worth mentioning that although the scenarios of control are inspired by Kalyvas (2006) the resulting variables don't exactly match Kalyvas scenarios of control. For instance when we talk about guerrilla or paramilitary control we are capturing a situation of guerrilla or paramilitary hegemony or close control. Thus our variables don't distinguish total control from close to total control.

We used the procedure described above to create a second classification of territorial control. In this case, we used data on violent events from 1988 to 2003.

We decided to split our data on violent events into two periods for various reasons. First, the dynamics of the confrontation between guerrilla and paramilitaries changed significantly in the early 2000s. The consolidation of security during the Uribe administration alongside the U.S.-funded Plan Colombia reduced political violence and transformed the balance of power

between the state and the illegal armed actors, as well as between the illegal armed actors. Thus, we cannot assume that the trajectories over the 19 years between 1988 and 2009 necessarily picked up consistent patterns affecting territorial control in 2010.

Nonetheless, as a reliability test, we looked at the correlation between the territorial control variables (for each armed actor) derived from these two different periods. We do expect these measures to be correlated, despite the changes between the periods, especially for the armed actors that remained officially active in the conflict in this period: the state and the guerrillas. For guerrilla and state control, chi square tests indicate that there is a statistically significant relationship between each control measure in the first and in the second period (Guerrilla: $\chi^2(1) = 26.48 \quad Pr = 0.000$; State $\chi^2(1) = 24.46 \quad Pr = 0.000$). In the case of paramilitary control, the tests indicate no statistically significant relationship between paramilitary control measured using data from 1988 to 2003, and the measure of paramilitary control that considers information from 2002 to 2009 ($\chi^2(1) = 1.12 \quad Pr = 0.289$). This result is not surprising considering that most paramilitary fronts demobilized in 2005 after a peace process. Most areas controlled by paramilitaries in the first period were captured by the state or guerrillas in the second period.

Considering that running a reliability test using two measures based on the same operationalization procedure may be problematic, we decided to also compare our classification of control, for the period between 2002 and 2009, against very different variables that may also capture control by illegal actors (either guerrillas or paramilitaries). For this purpose, we created a variable to identify municipalities included in the "*Espada de Honor*" program, a military initiative for critical municipalities that the Colombian government targeted to regain full control. The limitation of this variable, as a measure of control, is that it does not distinguish

which illegal armed actor dominated the region. There is still a statistically significant relationship between our measure of control and the variable identifying the "*Espada de Honor*" municipalities (guerrilla: χ^2 (1) = 46.88 *Pr* = 0.000; Paramilitaries χ^2 (1) = 77.86 *Pr* = 0.000; State χ^2 (1) = 140.24 Pr = 0.000). As expected, then, most guerrilla and paramilitary-controlled municipalities that we identified are those included in the "Espada de Honor" strategy. Our state-controlled municipalities were not.

Finally, we contrasted this measure against our coding based on qualitative sources. We did this for those municipalities we were able to obtain qualitative information on guerrilla and paramilitary presence or control. In most cases our coding produced a classification consistent to the qualitative sources. The advantage of the measure described in depth here is that it removes aspects of the subjectivity compared to hand coding.

Military Actions Perpetrated by Armed Actors:

Military operations are a count of violent events committed by the military against an armed group—guerrilla or paramilitary in 2009. This variable includes attacks against members of the other armed group, such as ambushes, combat incidents, massacres, as well as attacks on public or private property. For this paper, we use dichotomous versions of this variable representing the presence of military operations.[6]

[6] This variable was also constructed using the monthly report on violent events published by CINEP (2009). Using cut points for high and low military operations have the same effects. As noted in the paper, we also used homicides with similar results.

Hectares of Coca:

The coca cultivation indicator is coded as the presence or absence of cultivation in the municipality based on the hectares of coca located there in 2009, which, as a binary variable should be fairly accurate given surveillance of these crops.[7]

[7] Data on coca cultivation are from Proyecto Simci II (2009, 2010).

Summary Statistics and Balance Table:

Table SI.0a: Summary Statistics

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Observations
Support for the Military (Direct Measure)	0.55	0.50	474
Support for the Military (Experimental Measure – Treatment)	1.62	1.00	474
Support for the Military (Experimental Measure – Control)	1.28	0.79	949
(Difference in Support for the Military (Experimental Measure)	*(0.34)*		
Contextual Variables			
State-Control	0.59	0.49	1900
Guerrilla-Control	0.10	0.30	1900
Paramilitary-Control	0.32	0.46	1900
Military Operations	0.29	0.45	1900
Coca Cultivation	0.23	0.42	1900

Table SI.0b: Balance for the Experiment

	For the List Experiment:		
	Control Mean	Treatment Mean	p-value
Age	43.33	41.77	0.40
Education	38.34	37.38	0.44
Gender (Female)	0.48	0.54	0.04
Income	42.18	40.66	0.17
Wealth	60.48	59.85	0.59
Urban	0.79	0.81	0.38
Right-Wing Party Affiliation (Uribe)	0.31	0.31	0.86
Number of Close Victims of Violence	16.84	15.58	0.34
Displaced by Violence	0.05	0.06	0.16
State-Control	0.57	0.57	0.93
Guerrilla-Control	0.10	0.09	0.38
Paramilitary-Control	0.32	0.34	0.52
Military Operations	0.29	0.28	0.69
Coca Cultivation	0.24	0.22	0.38

	For Our Experimental Comparison:		
	Direct Mean	List Experiment Mean (Control and Treatment)	p-value
Age	44.04	41.77	0.29
Education	37.97	37.38	0.67
Gender (Female)	0.50	0.54	0.19
Income	42.07	40.66	0.25
Wealth	59.51	59.85	0.80
Urban	0.77	0.81	0.18
Right-Wing Party Affiliation (Uribe)	0.33	0.31	0.45
Number of Close Victims of Violence	16.74	15.58	0.45
Displaced by Violence	0.04	0.06	0.06
State-Control	0.56	0.57	0.79
Guerrilla-Control	0.12	0.09	0.16
Paramilitary-Control	0.32	0.34	0.54
Military Operations	0.28	0.28	0.77
Coca Cultivation	0.25	0.22	0.28

Figure SI. 2. Estimated Proportion of Support for the Military across Contexts – Direct versus Indirect Measures



Regression Model with Interactions between Each Contextual Variable and Treatment

As described in the text of the paper and Table 1, the list experiment necessitates a comparison of means. That is, in order to assess levels of support, the average number of items supported in the control group (or a subsample of it) must be compared to that in the treatment group (or a subsample of it). We therefore cannot simply run a regression model. The simplest method to identify predictors is to interact the treatment with each variable of interest. This is the method that we employ in the following model (which informs Table 1), as well as in subsequent models that control for, and assess, individual level predictors of support measured indirectly (see SI.1a, SI.3-4).

Table SI.1. Model of Support for the Military with Contextual-Level Predictors –Indirect Measure as the DV

	Indirect Measure (DV)
	List
Paramilitary Control	-0.019
	(0.085)
Guerrilla Control	-0.228**
	(0.075)
Military Operations	-0.068
	(0.066)
Coca Cultivations	-0.004
	(0.077)
Treatment	0.300**
	(0.075)
Paramilitary Control x Treatment	0.022
	(0.092)
Guerrilla Control x Treatment	-0.200+
	(0.111)
Military Operations x Treatment	0.188+
	(0.097)
Coca Cultivations x Treatment	-0.148
	(0.088)
Constant	1.266**
	(0.059)
N	1,423
R-squared	0.048

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Given that some of the contextual-level variables were statistically significant in the model above (and in Table 1), we also tested the effects of the contextual variables for the experimental observations, while controlling for individual level variables, by interacting each contextual variable with a binary indicator of the experimental treatment (Table SI.1a). The contextual level variables show significant effects in these models, and, at the individual level, only gender is significant; however, this specification does not distinguish the effects of the individual level variables for the experimental versus the control observations (tested in the next section).

Table SI.1a. Regression Models on Support for the Military – Experimental Measure (List)

D.V.: Support for the Military (listmil)	Model 1 All observations	Model 2 Treatment X control	Model 3 Treatment X coca	Model 4 Treatment X operations
Age	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gender (Female)	-0.075*	-0.079*	-0.079*	-0.078*
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Wealth	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Urban-rural	-0.063	-0.060	-0.067	-0.058
	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.059)
Right Wing party Affiliation (Uribe)	0.085	0.094*	0.085	0.082
	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.057)
How Many Close Victims of Violence	0.027	0.041	0.024	0.038
	(0.125)	(0.124)	(0.127)	(0.126)
Displaced by Violence	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Treatment	0.296***	0.352***	0.341***	0.240***
	(0.050)	(0.069)	(0.059)	(0.054)
Paramilitary control		-0.004		
		(0.064)		
Guerrilla control		-0.253***		
		(0.064)		
Treatment X control		-0.116*		
		(0.063)		
Coca			-0.017	
			(0.065)	
Treatment X coca			-0.194**	
			(0.094)	
Operations				-0.052
				(0.066)
Treatment X operations				0.204**
				(0.087)
Constant	1.092***	1.126***	1.117***	1.112***
	(0.089)	(0.092)	(0.100)	(0.090)
N	1,334	1,334	1,334	1,334
R-squared	0.038	0.053	0.042	0.041

Note: Method of estimation regression analysis. DV is support for the military reported through the indirect measure. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, clustered by municipality (45 clusters). Number of observations varies due to control missingness. * $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

Regression Models for the Direct and Indirect Measures, Examining Individual-Level Predictors:

This section presents results from regression models examining individual-level variables with support for the military, measured in the two different ways, as the dependent variables. As expected, these tables show different predictors; that is, like the contextual-level predictors, the individual-level predictors have different effects depending on how we measure the dependent variable.

Table SI.2 indicates that using the direct measure as the dependent variable, education (negative), right-wing party affiliation and being displaced by violence (both positive) have statistically significant effects across all scenarios of control.

Table SI.2. Models on Support for the Military – Direct Measure

D.V.: Support for the Military	Model 1 All observations	Model 2 Control	Model 3 Coca	Model 4 Operations
Age	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gender (Female)	-0.020	-0.021	-0.020	-0.022
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Wealth	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Urban-rural	0.028	0.024	0.028	0.021
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.046)
Right-Wing Party Affiliation (Uribe)	0.165***	0.166***	0.165***	0.167***
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.056)
Displaced by Violence	0.239**	0.233**	0.237**	0.231*
	(0.117)	(0.112)	(0.115)	(0.117)
How Many Close Victims of Violence	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Guerrilla		-0.009		
		(0.037)		
Paramilitary		-0.073		
		(0.056)		
Coca			-0.011	
			(0.054)	
Operations				0.042
				(0.050)
Constant	0.524***	0.560***	0.530***	0.526***
	(0.082)	(0.089)	(0.087)	(0.080)
N	444	444	444	444
R-squared	0.060	0.065	0.060	0.062

Note: Method of estimation regression analysis. DV is support for the military reported through the direct measure. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, clustered by municipality (45 clusters). Number of observations varies due to control missingness and because certain variables perfectly predict success/failure. * $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

Following the models described above to assess predictors when support for the military is measure indirectly, we ran regression models in which all individual predictors are interacted with a binary indicator of the experimental treatment (Table SI.3). The marginal effects obtained from combining each coefficient and the interaction coefficient indicate the effect of each independent variable when treatment is equal to one (for those observations in which the list included the sensitive item) (Table SI.4)

Table SI.4 indicates that gender (female) is negative and statistically significant in most specifications. Wealth (positive), urban (negative), and right-wing party affiliation (positive) were significant in some specifications.

In sum, with the exception of right-wing party affiliation, the statistically significant predictors of support measured directly (education) are different from those measured indirectly (gender, wealth, and urban).

Table SI.3. Regression Models on Support for the Military – Experimental Measure (List) with Interactions

D.V.: Support for the Military (listmil)	Model 1 All observations	Model 2 State control	Model 3 Paramilitary control	Model 4 Guerrilla control	Model 5 No operations	Model 6 Operations	Model 7 No coca	Model 8 Coca
Age	-0.000	0.001	-0.003**	-0.000	0.000	-0.002*	-0.000	-0.003*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Education	0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.003	0.002	-0.001	0.001	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Gender (Female)	0.037	0.057	0.083	-0.267**	0.051	0.021	0.052	0.008
	(0.050)	(0.066)	(0.079)	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.125)
Wealth	0.002	0.001	0.005	-0.006**	0.003	0.002	0.002	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Urban-rural	0.007	0.024	-0.040	-0.039	0.051	-0.171	0.036	-0.044
	(0.074)	(0.119)	(0.106)	(0.178)	(0.086)	(0.155)	(0.093)	(0.116)
Right Wing party Affiliation (Uribe)	0.023	0.023	0.012	0.199**	0.033	0.024	0.063	-0.109
	(0.052)	(0.071)	(0.102)	(0.054)	(0.073)	(0.051)	(0.059)	(0.105)
How Many Close Victims of Violence	-0.000	-0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.002	-0.002	0.004*
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Displaced by Violece	0.004	0.056	0.041	-0.529*	0.002	0.001	0.088	-0.394*
	(0.120)	(0.152)	(0.208)	(0.220)	(0.169)	(0.186)	(0.129)	(0.212)
Treatment	0.364*	0.416	0.227	0.457	0.452**	0.436	0.491*	0.125
	(0.209)	(0.323)	(0.284)	(0.392)	(0.197)	(0.728)	(0.287)	(0.188)
Age x Treatment	0.001	-0.000	0.004	0.003	-0.002	0.008	0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Education x Treatment	0.001	-0.002	0.005	-0.011	-0.001	0.004	-0.002	0.009**
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Gender x Treatment	-0.330***	-0.359**	-0.439**	0.487	-0.415***	-0.204	-0.377***	-0.316
	(0.103)	(0.144)	(0.178)	(0.260)	(0.118)	(0.233)	(0.117)	(0.247)
Wealth X Treatment	0.002	0.006*	-0.002	0.007	0.002	-0.003	0.004	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Urban-rural x Treatment	-0.186	-0.249	-0.040	-0.925	-0.143	-0.180	-0.282	-0.127
	(0.154)	(0.190)	(0.282)	(0.462)	(0.147)	(0.236)	(0.172)	(0.245)
Right Wing party ID (Uribe) x Treatment	0.190	0.193	0.244*	0.035	0.227*	-0.095	0.190*	0.230
	(0.099)	(0.135)	(0.131)	(0.237)	(0.121)	(0.144)	(0.107)	(0.230)
How Many Close Victims of Viol. x Treatment	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.004	0.001	-0.003	0.000	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Displaced by Violece x Treatment	0.070	0.186	-0.208	0.964	-0.160	1.835**	0.007	0.441
	(0.195)	(0.347)	(0.345)	(0.488)	(0.229)	(0.575)	(0.247)	(0.404)
Constant	1.075***	1.057***	1.055***	1.319**	0.966***	1.305***	1.028***	1.299***
	(0.097)	(0.148)	(0.153)	(0.302)	(0.123)	(0.165)	(0.125)	(0.210)

N	1,334	757	442	135	954	380	1,019	315
R-squared	0.051	0.064	0.069	0.125	0.056	0.124	0.065	0.073

Note: Method of estimation regression analysis. DV is support for the military reported through the indirect measure. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, clustered by municipality (45 clusters). Number of observations varies due to control missingness. * $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

Table SI.4. Interaction Coefficients when Treatment is Equal to 1 – Experimental Measure (List)

	Model 1 All observations	Model 2 State control	Model 3 Paramilitary control	Model 4 Guerrilla control	Model 5 No operations	Model 6 Operations	Model 7 No coca	Model 8 Coca
Age	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.002	-0.001	0.005	0.001	-0.004
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Education	0.002	-0.001	0.004	-0.008	0.001	0.003	-0.001	0.009**
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Gender (Female)	-0.293***	-0.302**	-0.356**	0.220	-0.364***	-0.183	-0.326***	-0.308
	(0.089)	(0.138)	(0.148)	(0.231)	(0.088)	(0.242)	(0.107)	(0.174)
Wealth	0.004*	0.007**	0.003	-0.001	0.005*	-0.001	0.006*	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Urban-rural	-0.179	-0.225	-0.080	-0.964*	-0.093	-0.351*	-0.245*	-0.171
	(0.123)	(0.143)	(0.229)	(0.316)	(0.122)	(0.141)	(0.133)	(0.193)
Right Wing party Affiliation (Uribe)	0.213*	0.216	0.256	0.234	0.260*	-0.071	0.254**	0.121
	(0.102)	(0.131)	(0.169)	(0.243)	(0.132)	(0.123)	(0.110)	(0.258)
How Many Close Victims of Violence	-0.001	-0.002	0.001	-0.003	0.000	-0.001	-0.002	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Displaced by Violece	-0.074	0.241	-0.167	0.435	-0.158	1.836**	0.096	0.047
	(0.198)	(0.381)	(0.211)	(0.283)	(0.159)	(0.697)	(0.263)	(0.213)

Note: Based on a model in which all predictors were interacted with a binary indicator of treatment. The model including all interactions is displayed in the Supporting Information section. Coefficients capture the marginal effect of each variable when treatment is equal to 1. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, clustered by municipality (45 clusters). Number of observations varies due to control missingness. * $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

Robustness Checks

Estimated Proportion of Support for the Military across different Contexts of Armed Actors Control, 1988-2003:

The following figure compares the direct and the experimental questions across different contexts of armed actor territorial control. This figure is similar to Figure 3, presented in the paper. However, unlike Figure 3, in which the variables identifying territorial control were generated using data from 2002 to 2009, here the data to capture the variables identifying territorial covered the period from 1988 to 2003.

Figure SI.4. Estimated Proportion of Support for the Military across Territorial Control by Different Armed Actors – Direct versus Experimental Measures



Different Coding of the Independent Variables of Interest:

Figure SI.5. Estimated Proportion of Support for the Military across Territorial Control by Different Armed Actors – Direct versus Experimental Measures (Includes municipalities with military operations as disputed areas, no matter which actor controls)



Figure SI.6. Estimated Proportion of Support for the Military across Territorial Control by Different Armed Actors – Direct versus Experimental Measures (Bottom right cell coded as guerrilla control)