Supplementary online appendix for "IMF Lending Programs and Repression in Autocracies"

***Note*:** For all of the results reported in the main paper and in the supporting information contained in the appendix, the replication file contains three primary datasets (pertaining to IMF program participation and human rights scores in autocratic regimes, 1975-2014, IMF program participation and human rights scores in developing democracies, 1975-2014), and types of IMF conditions and human rights scores, 1985-2014), a dataset for reproducing Figure 1 in the article, as well as the .do file with Stata commands to reproduce the results.

Table A1: descriptive statistics for variables included in the main statistical tests for impact of IMF program participation on repression in autocracies.

Table A2: pairwise correlations between the variables included in the main statistical tests for impact of IMF program participation on repression in autocracies.

Table A3: descriptive statistics for variables included in the main statistical tests for impact of IMF program participation on repression in developing democracies.

Table A4: pairwise correlations between the variables included in the main statistical tests for impact of IMF program participation on repression in developing democracies.

Table A5: descriptive statistics for variables included in the main statistical tests for impact of different types of conditions in IMF programs on repression in autocracies.

Table A6: pairwise correlations between the variables included in the main statistical tests for impact of types of conditions in IMF programs on repression in autocracies

Table A7: full results from 2SLS tests for impact of IMF program participation on repression in developing democracies (displayed in Fig. 3 in the paper).

Table A8: first-stage results from 2SLS tests for impact of IMF program participation on repression in autocracies (based on Table 1 in the paper).

Table A9: full results from 2SLS tests for longer-run impact of IMF program participation on repression in autocracies using different lags of the compound instrument for IMF programs (t-1, t-2…,t-7) (reported as Fig. 4 in the paper).

Table A10: results from 2SLS tests for impact of IMF program participation on repression in autocracies with heteroskedastic and autocorrelation (HAC) consistent standard errors.

Table A11: results from 2SLS tests for impact of IMF program participation on repression in autocracies with additional covariates (index of economic liberalization, measure of total population size, index of the size and frequency of mass mobilizations, measure of state capacity, coups d'etat, corruption level, and different varieties of autocracies).

Table A12: results from 2SLS tests for impact of IMF program participation on repression in autocracies substituting the V-Dem measure of physical integrity rights protection as the dependent variable.

Table A13: results from placebo-style tests that substitute the V-Dem measure of the frequency and severity of non-state violence as the dependent variable.

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics (autocratic sample, 1975-2014)

Variable (source)	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Variable description
Human rights protection score (Fariss 2019)	-0.807	1.058	-3.767	2.167	The main outcome variable in the analyses is a continuous indicator of the degree of state protection of citizens' physical integrity rights. The variable is measured as the posterior mean of the latent variable (human rights protection). Fariss (2014) describes the procedure for generating the variable using existing human rights datasets. We use the improved and updated posterior mean (*theta_mean*) from Fariss (2019).
log(IMF liquidity$_{t-1}$) x IMF prog. probability$_{t-1}$ (Lang 2021, Vreeland 2003, Kentikelenis and Stubbs 2023, authors)	1.542	1.447	0	6.319	The variable we use as the shift-share instrument for IMF program participation is an interaction between the logged (and lagged by 1-year) measure of IMF liquidity (originally collected by Lang 2021) interacted with the (lagged by 1-year) moving average (1970 to year *t*) of countries' participation in IMF lending arrangements (over-time probability of IMF involvement).
IMF prog. probability$_{t-1}$ (Vreeland 2003, Kentikelenis and Stubbs 2023, authors)	0.300	0.278	0	1	Moving average (1970 to year *t*) of countries' participation in IMF lending arrangements (over-time probability of IMF involvement).
(log)GDP per capita (Coppedge et al. 2020)	8.067	1.198	0.06	12.305	Logged real GDP per capita (base 10). Drawn from the V-Dem 10.0 dataset (*e_migdppcln*). Originally collected by the Maddison Project Database.
Access to justice index (Coppedge et al. 2020)	0.428	0.230	0.002	0.926	Interval score, drawn from the V-Dem 10.0 database, of the extent that citizens enjoy secure and effective access to justice (*v2xcl_acjst*).
Legitimating ideology index (Coppedge et al. 2020)	0.421	1.239	-2.72	3.585	Ordinal variable converted to interval score (*v2exl_legitideol*) capturing the extent to which the "current government promote a specific ideology or societal model (an officially codified set of beliefs used to justify a particular set of social, political, and economic relations; for example, socialism, nationalism, religious traditionalism, etc.) in order to justify the regime in place." Drawn from the V-Dem 10.0 database.
Magnitude of war violence (Marshall 2015)	1.137	2.274	0	14	Summed magnitudes of violence of civil and interstate wars involving non-democratic country *i* in year *t*.

Note: Sample from the results reported in Table 1 (column 1) in the main paper used for calculating values reported in the above table.

Table A2: pairwise variable correlations (autocratic sample, 1975-2014)

	Human rights score	IMF liquidity x prob(IMF)	IMF program prob.	(log)GDP per capita	Access to justice	Legitimating ideology	Magnitude of war violence
Human rights score	1.00						
(log) IMF liquidity $_{t-1}$ x IMF program prob.$_{t-1}$	-0.10	1.00					
IMF program prob.$_{t-1}$	-0.13	0.98	1.00				
(log)GDP per capita	0.18	-0.25	-0.25	1.00			
Access to justice	0.52	0.06	0.02	0.12	1.00		
Legitimating ideology	-0.16	-0.34	-0.31	0.10	-0.22	1.00	
Magnitude of war violence	-0.65	-0.07	-0.05	-0.12	-0.31	0.12	1.00

Note: Sample from the results reported in Table 1 (column 1) in the main paper used for calculating values reported in the above table.

Table A3: Descriptive Statistics (developing democracies sample, 1975-2014)

Variable (source)	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Variable description
Human rights protection score (Fariss 2019)	-0.032	1.296	-3.135	3.089	The main outcome variable in the analyses is a continuous indicator of the degree of state protection of citizens' physical integrity rights. The variable is measured as the posterior mean of the latent variable (human rights protection). Fariss (2014) describes the procedure for generating the variable using existing human rights datasets. We use the improved and updated posterior mean (*theta_mean*) from Fariss (2019).
V-Dem physical violence index (Coppedge et al. 2020)	0.732	0.216	0.067	0.975	Drawn from the V-Dem 10.0 dataset, the physical violence index (*v2x_clphy*) is an interval score (ranging from 0 to 1) tapping the degree to which people are free from "political killings and torture by the government. Among the set of civil liberties, these liberal rights are the most relevant for political competition and accountability. The index is based on indicators that reflect violence committed by government agents and that are not directly referring to elections."
log(IMF liquidity$_{t-1}$) x IMF prog. probability$_{t-1}$ (Lang 2021, Vreeland 2003, Kentikelenis and Stubbs 2023, authors)	2.718	1.438	0	6.583	The variable we use as the shift-share instrument for IMF program participation is an interaction between the logged (and lagged by 1-year) measure of IMF liquidity (originally collected by Lang 2021) interacted with the (lagged by 1-year) moving average (1970 to year *t*) of countries' participation in IMF lending arrangements (over-time probability of IMF involvement).
IMF prog. probability $_{t-1}$ (Vreeland 2003, Kentikelenis and Stubbs 2023, authors)	0.492	0.248	0	1	Moving average (1970 to year *t*) of countries' participation in IMF lending arrangements (over-time probability of IMF involvement).
(log)GDP per capita (Coppedge et al. 2020)	8.689	0.937	6.545	10.636	Logged GDP per capita (base 10). Drawn from the V-Dem 10.0 dataset (e_migdppcln). Originally collected by the Maddison Project Database.
Access to justice index (Coppedge et al. 2020)	0.675	0.223	0.002	0.971	Interval score, drawn from the V-Dem 10.0 database, of the extent that citizens enjoy secure and effective access to justice (*v2xcl_acjst*).
Legitimating ideology index (Coppedge et al. 2020)	-0.711	1.092	-2.72	2.052	Ordinal variable converted to interval score (*v2exl_legitideol*) capturing the extent to which the "current government promote a specific ideology or societal model (an officially codified set of beliefs used to justify a particular set of social, political, and economic relations; for example, socialism, nationalism, religious traditionalism, etc.) in order to justify the regime in place." Drawn from the V-Dem 10.0 database.
Magnitude of war violence (Marshall 2015)	0.812	1.774	0	10	Summed magnitudes of violence of civil and interstate wars involving non-democratic country *i* in year *t*.

Note: Sample from the results reported in Figure 3 in the main paper (and Table A7, column 1) used for calculating values reported in the above table.

Table A4: Pairwise variable correlations (developing democracies sample, 1975-2014)

	Human rights score	IMF liquidity x prob(IMF)	IMF program prob.	(log)GDP per capita	Access to justice	Legitimating ideology	Magnitude of war violence
Human rights score	1.00						
(log) IMF liquidity $_{t-1}$ x IMF program prob.$_{t-1}$	0.08	1.00					
IMF program prob.$_{t-1}$	0.04	0.96	1.00				
(log)GDP per capita	0.34	-0.11	-0.15	1.00			
Access to justice	0.59	-0.01	-0.04	0.42	1.00		
Legitimating ideology	-0.28	-0.10	-0.12	-0.12	-0.29	1.00	
Magnitude of war violence	-0.64	-0.14	-0.14	-0.14	-0.30	0.20	1.00

Note: Sample from the results reported Table A7 (column 1) used for calculating values reported in the above table.

Table A5: Summary Statistics (IMF conditionality sample, 1985-2014)

Variable (source)	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Variable description
Human rights protection score (Fariss 2019)	-0.716	1.105	-3.211	1.967	The main outcome variable in the analyses is a continuous indicator of the degree of state protection of citizens' physical integrity rights. The variable is measured as the posterior mean of the latent variable (human rights protection). Fariss (2014) describes the procedure for generating the variable using existing human rights datasets. We use the improved and updated posterior mean (*theta_mean*) from Fariss (2019).
Structural conditions (Kentikelenis and Stubbs 2023)	3.236	5.043	0	33.333	3-year averages of the number of (binding) structural performance criteria included in IMF lending programs. Structural conditions are defined by Kentikelenis and Stubbs 2023 as: "Microeconomic binding reforms that alter the underlying structure of an economy and/or specify the policy means toward meeting macroeconomic targets and other objectives. These must be undertaken—or otherwise require waivers—before the Executive Board concludes a review."
Quantitative conditions (Kentikelenis and Stubbs 2023)	13.665	9.946	0	45.333	3-year averages of the number of (binding) quantitative (macroeconomic stabilization-oriented) performance criteria included in IMF lending programs. Quantitative conditions are defined by Kentikelenis and Stubbs 2023 as: "Quantifiable binding macroeconomic targets, such as monetary and credit aggregates, international reserves, fiscal balances, and external borrowing. These are typically monitored at quarterly intervals and compose the majority of conditionality. These must be met—or otherwise require waivers—for the Executive Board to conclude a review. These targets specify policy ends rather than means, and governments can—in theory—pursue a range of alternative policies to meet them."
Labor-related conditions (Kentikelenis and Stubbs 2023)	0.366	1.001	0	11.333	3-year averages of binding labor-oriented conditions in IMF lending programs (includes binding conditions related to labor issues such as wage and employment limits, pensions, and social security institutions).
Privatization-related conditions (Kentikelenis and Stubbs 2023)	0.221	0.612	0	4.667	3-year averages of binding conditions in IMF lending programs pertaining to privatization of state-owned enterprises (includes binding conditions related to privatization of non-financial state-owned enterprises (including joint stock companies, tenders, etc.), liquidation of state-owned enterprises (under the rationale that government is relinquishing ownership), and bankruptcy proceedings of state-owned enterprises).
(log)GDP per capita (Coppedge et al. 2020)	8.087	1.195	6.053	11.903	Logged real GDP per capita (base 10). Drawn from the V-Dem 10.0 dataset (*e_migdppcln*). Originally collected by the Maddison Project Database.

Access to justice index (Coppedge et al. 2020)	0.491	0.223	0.059	0.908	Interval score, drawn from the V-Dem 10.0 database, of the extent that citizens enjoy secure and effective access to justice (*v2xcl_acjst*).
Legitimating ideology index (Coppedge et al. 2020)	-0.122	1.082	-2.73	2.913	Ordinal variable converted to interval score (*v2exl_legitideol*) capturing the extent to which the "current government promote a specific ideology or societal model (an officially codified set of beliefs used to justify a particular set of social, political, and economic relations; for example, socialism, nationalism, religious traditionalism, etc.) in order to justify the regime in place." Drawn from the V-Dem 10.0 database.
Magnitude of war violence (Marshall 2015)	1.119	2.248	0	9	Summed magnitudes of violence of civil and interstate wars involving non-democratic country *i* in year *t*.

Note: Sample from the results reported in Table 2 in the main paper used for calculating values reported in the above table.

Table A6: Pairwise variable correlations (IMF conditionality sample)

	Human rights score	Structural conditions	Quantitative conditions	Labor-related conditions	Privat.-related cond.	(log)GDP per capita	Access to justice	Legitimating ideology	Magnitude of war violence
Human rights score	1.00								
Structural binding conditions	0.12	1.00							
Quantitative binding conditions	0.05	0.54	1.00						
Labor-related conditions	0.14	0.54	0.37	1.00					
Privatization-related conditions	0.08	0.66	0.30	0.39	1.00				
log(GDP per capita)	0.42	0.13	0.14	0.20	0.05	1.00			
Access to justice	0.54	0.23	0.05	0.15	0.12	0.33	1.00		
Legitimating ideology	-0.01	0.14	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.31	0.10	1.00	
Magnitude of war violence	-0.70	-0.05	0.03	-0.09	-0.04	-0.20	-0.39	0.11	1.00

Note: Sample from the results reported in Table 2 in the main paper used for calculating values reported in the above table.

Brief descriptions of additional covariates included in the statistical tests

Debt crisis (Laeven and Valencia 2018): dichotomous indicator of the presence/absence of a sovereign debt crisis in country *i* in year *t*.

UNGA affinity score (Bailey et al. 2017): continuous indicator using country votes in UN General Assembly sessions to identify foreign policy ideal point similarity with the United States (the post-WWII hegemon leading the "liberal international order").

Economic liberalization index (Kaire 2019): index composed of measures of countries' levels of economic transparency, openness to trade, and size of the government.

(log)Population size (Coppedge et al. 2020): logged measure of countries' total population size, drawn from the V-Dem 10.0 database (originally collected by the World Bank World Development Indicators).

Varieties of autocracies (Geddes et al. 2014): dummy variables that distinguish varieties of authoritarian regimes that are likeliest to engage in harsh repression (military, monarchical, and military varieties included, with personalist dictatorships as the omitted reference category).

Mass mobilization index (Coppedge et al. 2020): ordinal variable converted to interval score (*v2_cagenmob*) capturing the annual frequency and size of mass mobilization events ("the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins"). Drawn from the V-Dem 10.0 database.

Political corruption index (Coppedge et al. 2020): interval score measuring the extent of political corruption in a regime (*v2x_corr*). Drawn from the V-Dem 10.0 database. The V-Dem codebook notes: "The directionality of the V-Dem corruption index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt unlike the other V-Dem variables that generally run from less democratic to more democratic situation. The corruption index includes measures of six distinct types of corruption that cover both different areas and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. Within the executive realm, the measures also distinguish between corruption mostly pertaining to bribery and corruption due to embezzlement. Finally, they differentiate between corruption in the highest echelons of the executive at the level of the rulers/cabinet on the one hand, and in the public sector at large on the other. The measures thus tap into several distinguished types of corruption: both 'petty' and 'grand'; both bribery and theft; both corruption aimed and influencing law making and that affecting implementation." The level of political corruption is statistically linked to physical integrity rights protection in Englehart (2009).

Coups d'etat (Coppedge et al. 2020): categorical indicator of coups (0 = no coup attempted; 1 = coup attempted and failed; 2 = successful coup attempt). Drawn from the V-Dem 10.0 database (*e_pt_coup*). Based on data originally collected by Powell and Thyne (2011). According to the V-Dem v.10 codebook: "Coups d'etat are defined as 'overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting head of state using unconstitutional means (. . .) there is no minimal death threshold for defining a coup. A coup attempt is defined as successful if the coup perpetrators seize and hold power for at least seven days'" (Powell and Thyne 2011: 252).

Non-state political violence index (Coppedge et al. 2020): ordinal variable converted to interval scale measuring the frequency of the use of violence by non-state actors against persons (*v2caviol*). Drawn from the V-Dem 10.0 database. The V-Dem v.10 codebook notes: "We understand political violence as the use of physical force to achieve political objectives by non-state actors. The restriction to political objectives excludes profit-driven crime-related violence, for instance. By non-state actors we refer to individuals or entities that are not formally part of the state. Thus, politically oriented militias and youth groups count as non-state actors even though they might potentially be informally affiliated with the ruling party or the state. Political violence against persons excludes psychological and symbolic violence (e.g. destruction of objects)."

Table A7: 2SLS Models of IMF Program Participation and Human Rights Scores in Developing Democracies, 1975–2014

Covariates	(1)	(2)
IMF Program (instr.) $_{(t\text{-}1)}$	0.186*	-0.027
	(0.103)	(0.025)
IMF Program Probability$_{(t\text{-}1)}$	-0.299**	0.047
	(0.132)	(0.029)
Human Rights Score$_{(t\text{-}1)}$	0.894***	0.687***
	(0.012)	(0.046)
(Log)Real GDP Per Capita	0.070	-0.001
	(0.052)	(0.015)
Access to Justice Index	0.315***	0.169***
	(0.075)	(0.035)
Ideological Commitment Index	0.062***	-0.003
	(0.017)	(0.005)
Magnitude of War Intensity	-0.026***	-0.012***
	(0.005)	(0.002)
Country Fixed Effects	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y
Kleibergen-Paap *F*-statistic	20.41	24.45
Number of Observations	1,551	1,563
Number of Countries	70	71

Notes: The dependent variable in column (1) is the human rights protection score from Fariss (2019). The dependent variable in column (2) is the V-Dem physical violence index (Coppedge et al. 2020). As in the main models of the impact of IMF program participation on human rights scores in autocracies, we instrument for the (endogenous) IMF program participation variable with the (plausibly exogenous) compound instrument (log(IMF liquidity$_{t\text{-}1}$) x IMF probability$_{t\text{-}1}$). The sample for both specifications includes only developing democratic country-year observations (democracies are distinguished from autocracies by Cheibub et al. (2010) up to 2008 and extended by Kaire (2019) to the year 2014). * = $p < 0.1$, ** = $p < 0.05$, *** = $p < 0.01$.

Table A8: Main 2SLS Models of IMF Program Participation and Human Rights Scores in Non-Democracies, Including First Stage Results

Covariates	(1)	(2)
Second-stage results (outcome variable is human rights protection score)		
IMF Program (instr.) $_{(t-1)}$	-0.157**	-0.160**
	(0.075)	(0.076)
IMF Program Probability$_{(t-1)}$	0.031	0.007
	(0.083)	(0.086)
Human Rights Score$_{(t-1)}$	0.864***	0.855***
	(0.015)	(0.016)
(log)Real GDP Per Capita	0.004	-0.003
	(0.019)	(0.021)
Access to Justice Index	0.374***	0.350**
	(0.099)	(0.112)
Ideological Commitment Index	-0.020**	-0.021*
	(0.010)	(0.011)
Magnitude of War Intensity	-0.037***	-0.042***
	(0.004)	(0.005)
Debt Crisis		0.043
		(0.030)
UNGA Affinity Score		0.029
		(0.018)
First-stage results (outcome variable is binary IMF program participation)		
Log(IMF Liquidity)$_{(t-1)}$ x IMF Prob. $_{(t-1)}$	-0.290***	-0.298***
	(0.037)	(0.039)
IMF Program Probability$_{(t-1)}$	2.565***	2.568***
	(0.200)	(0.206)
Human Rights Score$_{(t-1)}$	0.014	0.012
	(0.014)	(0.015)
(log)Real GDP Per Capita	-0.079***	-0.084***
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Access to Justice Index	0.529***	0.515***
	(0.087)	(0.096)
Ideological Commitment Index	-0.019	-0.023
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Magnitude of War Intensity	-0.010**	-0.012**
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Debt Crisis		0.247***
		(0.064)
UNGA Affinity Score		0.096***
		(0.025)
Country Fixed Effects	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y
Kleibergen-Paap *F*-statistic	60.84	59.48
Number of Observations	2,858	2,680

Number of Countries	106	105

Notes: The outcomes in the first stage of the 2SLS models are the dichotomous measure of IMF program participation (originally collected by Vreeland (2003) and extended by Kentikelenis and Stubbs 2023). The dependent variable in the second stage in each model is the human rights protection score from Fariss (2019). * = p < 0.1, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01.

Table A9: Longer-Run Relationship between IMF Program Participation and Human Rights Scores in Autocracies

Covariates	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Human Rights Score$_{(t-1)}$	0.864***	0.864***	0.867***	0.865***	0.869***	0.863***	0.868***
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.017)
(log) GDP Per Capita	0.004	0.002	0.005	0.011	0.014	0.018	0.030
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Access to Justice Index	0.374***	0.478***	0.493***	0.522***	0.556***	0.519***	0.484***
	(0.099)	(0.114)	(0.118)	(0.122)	(0.120)	(0.130)	(0.130)
Ideol. Commitment Index	-0.020**	-0.014	-0.007	-0.006	-0.011	-0.014	-0.013
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Magnitude of War Intensity	-0.037***	-0.036***	-0.034***	-0.033***	-0.031***	-0.030***	-0.028***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
IMF Program Probability$_{(t-1..t-7)}$	0.022	0.242**	0.276**	0.294**	0.271**	0.183*	0.098
	(0.092)	(0.123)	(0.129)	(0.138)	(0.133)	(0.108)	(0.104)
IMF Program (instr.) $_{(t-1)}$	-0.157**						
	(0.075)						
IMF Program (instr.) $_{(t-2)}$		-0.311***					
		(0.103					
IMF Program (instr.) $_{(t-3)}$			-0.324***				
			(0.103)				
IMF Program (instr.) $_{(t-4)}$				-0.327***			
				(0.105)			
IMF Program (instr.) $_{(t-5)}$					-0.282**		
					(0.098)		
IMF Program (instr.) $_{(t-6)}$						-0.200**	
						(0.081)	
IMF Program (instr.) $_{(t-7)}$							-0.105
							(0.076)
Country Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kleibergen-Paap *F*-statistic	60.84	45.05	39.42	34.82	35.97	39.62	38.23
Number of Observations	2,858	2,649	2,531	2,416	2,305	2,201	2,107
Number of Countries	106	105	103	102	101	101	101

Table A10: IMF Programs and Human Rights Scores in Non-Democracies (2SLS with Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Robust (HAC) Errors)

Covariates	(1)	(2)
log(IMF Liquidity)$_{(t-1)}$ x IMF Prob. $_{(t-1)}$	-0.157*	-0.160*
	(0.086)	(0.088)
IMF Program Probability$_{(t-1)}$	0.031	0.007
	(0.096)	(0.098)
Human Rights Score$_{(t-1)}$	0.864***	0.855***
	(0.016)	(0.017)
(log)Real GDP Per Capita	0.004	-0.003
	(0.022)	(0.025)
Access to Justice Index	0.374***	0.350***
	(0.107)	(0.119)
Ideological Commitment Index	-0.020*	-0.021*
	(0.011)	(0.012)
Magnitude of War Intensity	-0.037***	-0.042***
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Debt Crisis		0.043
		(0.032)
UNGA Affinity Score		0.028
		(0.021)
Country Fixed Effects	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y
Kleibergen-Paap *F*-statistic	43.09	41.94
Number of Observations	2,857	2,679
Number of Countries	105	104

Notes: The dependent variable in the models reported in Table A10 is the human rights protection score (1975–2014) from Fariss (2019). Specifications in columns 1 and 2 with HAC errors follow Ariotti et al.'s (2022) procedure. * = p < 0.1, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01.

Table A11: 2SLS Models of IMF Program Participation and Human Rights Scores in Non-Democracies with Additional Covariates

Covariates	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
IMF Program (instr.) $_{(t-1)}$	-0.193**	-0.148*	-0.164*	-0.164**	-0.152**	-0.161**	-0.122*
	(0.080)	(0.076)	(0.093)	(0.079)	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.068)
IMF Program Probability$_{(t-1)}$	0.017	0.005	0.017	0.014	0.0002	0.007	-0.062
	(0.091)	(0.086)	(0.121)	(0.088)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.081)
Human Rights Score$_{(t-1)}$	0.855***	0.859***	0.851***	0.856***	0.854***	0.855***	0.844***
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)
(log) GDP Per Capita	0.010	-0.004	0.003	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	0.007
	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Access to Justice Index	0.362***	0.345***	0.539***	0.357***	0.341***	0.356***	0.320***
	(0.129)	(0.112)	(0.149)	(0.116)	(0.111)	(0.116)	(0.112)
Ideol. Commitment Index	-0.014	-0.020*	-0.032**	-0.020*	-0.023**	-0.020*	-0.019*
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Magnitude of War Intensity	-0.040***	-0.041***	-0.039***	-0.042***	-0.041***	-0.042***	-0.041***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Econ. Liberalization Index	-0.003						
	(0.064)						
(log)Population Size		-0.087*					
		(0.045)					
Mass Mobilization Index			-0.038***				
			(0.008)				
State Capacity				-0.011			
				(0.022)			
Coups d'Etat					-0.064***		
					(0.018)		
Corruption Index						0.032	
						(0.057)	
Military dictatorship							-0.143***
							(0.027)
Monarchic dictatorship							-0.323***
							(0.072)
Party-based dictatorship							-0.101***
							(0.027)
Debt Crisis	0.052*	0.041	0.067**	0.045	0.046	0.044	0.037
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.027)
UNGA Affinity Score	0.063***	0.028	0.030	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.045**
	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Country Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kleibergen-Paap *F*-statistic	58.47	59.77	37.23	58.27	59.72	59.13	62.53
Number of Observations	2,388	2,677	1,960	2,680	2,680	2,680	2,527
Number of Countries	99	105	83	105	105	105	105

Notes: The dependent variable in all models is the human rights protection score (1975–2014) from Fariss (2019). The economic liberalization index (column 1) is from Kaire (2019). Logged population size (column 2) drawn from the V-Dem 10.0 database (Coppedge et al. 2020).

Englehart (2009, 170) explains why population size is included in some studies of the correlates of repression: "all other things being equal, a country with a large population has more interactions between individuals and thus more 'opportunities' for abuse to occur." The mass mobilization index (column 3) is drawn from the V-Dem v.10 database (Coppedge et al. 2020). State capacity index (column 4) drawn from Hanson and Sigman (2021). Weak autocratic states have poorer revenue-raising capacities, which may increase the likelihood of IMF involvement to quell recurrent economic crises; weak capacity states struggle to rein in abuses by security or paramilitary forces on their territory and thus may also have worse human rights scores (Cole 2015; Englehart 2009). In column 5 the trichotomous coups d'etat indicator is drawn from Coppedge et al. (2020). Column 6 adds an index of political corruption from Coppedge et al. (2020). Column 7 includes covariates for military, monarchical, and party-based types of dictatorships (following Kaire 2019, 401, personalist autocratic regimes is the omitted reference category; the indicators for varieties of autocratic regimes are drawn from Geddes et al. 2014).

Table A12: 2SLS Models of IMF Program Participation and Protection from Physical Violence in Non-Democracies (V-Dem measure)

Covariates	(1)	(2)
IMF Program (instr.) $_{(t\text{-}1)}$	-0.033**	-0.031*
	(0.016)	(0.017)
IMF Program Probability$_{(t\text{-}1)}$	0.004	0.001
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Protection from Physical Violence Index$_{(t\text{-}1)}$	0.813***	0.816***
	(0.022)	(0.023)
(log)Real GDP Per Capita	-0.008**	-0.007*
	(0.003)	(0.004)
Access to Justice Index	0.234***	0.224***
	(0.036)	(0.040)
Ideological Commitment Index	-0.011***	-0.012***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Magnitude of War Intensity	-0.002***	-0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.0008)
Debt Crisis		0.017
		(0.014)
UNGA Affinity Score		0.002
		(0.004)
Country Fixed Effects	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y
Kleibergen-Paap *F*-statistic	64.87	62.81
Number of Observations	2,859	2,681
Number of Countries	106	105

Notes: The dependent variable in both models is the protection from physical violence index (1975–2014) drawn from V-Dem v.10 (Coppedge et al. 2020). * = $p < 0.1$, ** = $p < 0.05$, *** = $p < 0.01$.

Table A13: 2SLS Models of IMF Program Participation and Non-State Violence in Non-Democracies

Covariates	(1)	(2)
IMF Program (instr.) $_{(t-1)}$	0.232	0.216
	(0.199)	(0.201)
IMF Program Probability$_{(t-1)}$	-0.252	-0.253
	(0.263)	(0.264)
Non-State Violence Index$_{(t-1)}$	0.801***	0.793***
	(0.022)	(0.022)
Real GDP Per Capita (logged)	-0.030	-0.020
	(0.023)	(0.024)
Access to Justice Index	-0.640***	-0.630***
	(0.171)	(0.190)
Ideological Commitment Index	-0.009	0.003
	(0.016)	(0.015)
Mass Mobilization Index	0.076***	0.087***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Debt Crisis		-0.069
		(0.060)
UNGA Affinity Score		0.002
		(0.026)
Country Fixed Effects	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y
Kleibergen-Paap *F*-statistic	39.28	37.99
Number of Observations	2,100	1,970
Number of Countries	83	82

Notes: The dependent variable in both models is an index of non-state violence (1975–2014) from V-Dem v.10 (Coppedge et al. 2020). The specifications include the V-Dem mass mobilization index as a covariate instead of the magnitude of civil and interstate war violence indicator (the construction of which is directly influenced by the intensity of non-state violence). * = p < 0.1, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01.

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