A Construction of the Explanatory Variable

Our measure of states' propensity to vote against the US, which we call the Probability of Voting Against the US (PVAUS), results from the following regression. The dependent variable takes the value of 0 if a state voted the same way as the US, 1 if the state voted the opposite as the US, and 0.5 if a state abstained but the US cast a yes or no vote. We regress this outcome, for all combinations of states, i, and General Assembly resolutions, j, in a given year, t, on which the US did not abstain, on state-specific fixed effects. Our PVAUS measure is simply the estimated coefficients for the state fixed effects, as this represents the state's latent propensity to vote against the US.

$$\mathbb{I}(vote_{i,j,t} \neq vote_{US,j,t}) = \textit{PVAUS}_{i,t} + \eta_{i,j,t} \quad (1)$$

[15]

As discussed, if state i's two-year term on the UNSC consists of years t (SC_1) and $t+1$ (SC_2), its USVP from the year preceding i's term, $t-1$, comprises the fixed, lagged PVAUS, which is denoted by $\overline{\text{PVAUS}}$.

$$\overline{\text{PVAUS}} := \text{PVAUS}_{SC_1,SC_2} = \text{PVAUS}_{t-1} \quad (2)$$

We then obtain the relative propensity of a state on the UNSC to vote against the US in a given year based on their PVAUS relative to the PVAUS of all other members of the UNSC, as specified in equation 3. We refer to this as a state's *Contribution to DIsagreement*, as discussed in text.

$$\textit{Contribution to Disagreement}_{i,t} = \text{PVAUS}_{i,t} \Big/ \sum_{k \text{ on UNSC in year } t} \text{PVAUS}_{k,t} \quad (3)$$

and perform the regression analysis specified by equation 4,

$$\ln(AID_{i,t+1}) = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \varphi_{i,t}\textit{Contribution to Disagreement}_{i,t} + \mathbf{X}_{i,t}\beta + \epsilon_{i,t}. \quad (4)$$

[15] In fact, the LHS may take values of 0.5 in the case of state i's abstention on resolution j. Note also, we suppress the constant such that PVAUS takes values between 0 and 1.

B Distribution of the Dependent Variable









C Descriptive Analysis of the Data

Table V: States Whose *Contribution to Disagreement* Decreased

Non-Permanent UNSC Member State	Second Year	↓ Military Aid	Zero Military Aid in First Year	↓ Economic Aid	Zero Economic Aid in First Year
Algeria	2005				
Argentina	1972	x			x
Argentina	1995			x	
Austria	1992	x			
Belgium	1972	x			x
Belgium	1992	x			
Benin	2005		x		
Bolivia	1979	x		x	
Brazil	1994			x	
Brazil	2005				
Bulgaria	1987		x		x
Burundi	1971		x		
Cabo Verde	1993		x		x
Canada	1978		x		x
Chile	1997				
Colombia	1970				
Congo	1987	x		x	
Costa Rica	1998				
Cuba	1991		x	x	
Czech Republic	1995	x		x	
Czechoslovakia	1979	x		x	
Dem. Rep. of Congo	1991	x		x	
Djibouti	1994				
Ecuador	1992	x			
Egypt	1997	x			
Finland	1970				x
Gabon	1979		x	x	
Germany	1978		x		x
Ghana	1987			x	
Guinea-Bissau	1997	x		x	
Hungary	1993				
India	1978				
India	1992	x			
Italy	1972		x		x
Ivory Coast	1991		x	x	
Japan	1972	x			x
Japan	1993			x	
Japan	1998			x	
Kenya	1998				
Kuwait	1979	x			x
Mauritius	1978			x	
Morocco	1993				
Nepal	1970				
New Zealand	1994			x	x
Nicaragua	1971				
Nigeria	1979	x			x
Nigeria	1995	x			x
Oman	1995				x
Pakistan	1994			x	x
Philippines	2005				
Poland	1971			x	
Poland	1997				
Portugal	1998				
Rep. of Korea	1997	x			
Romania	1991			x	x
Romania	2005				
Rwanda	1995	x			x
Sierra Leone	1971			x	
Somalia	1972	x			
Spain	1970				
Spain	1994				x
Sweden	1998			x	
Syria	1971			x	
UAE	1987			x	
Venezuela	1978	x			
Venezuela	1987				
Venezuela	1993				
Yemen	1991	x			x
Zambia	1970			x	x
Zimbabwe	1992	x			

Notes: For non-permanent UNSC member states whose *Contribution to Disagreement* decreases from the first to the second year of their term, vote-buying theory predicts that they receive a relatively lower share of payments made to UNSC rotating members or that, having been relatively more expensive than other votes, they received zero in the first (and possibly second) year of their term. In our sample, 70 states become relatively less expensive. With respect to military aid, 23 receive relatively more assistance in their second year, and 22 receive no assistance in their second year, meaning 64% of the sample comports with theory. With respect to economic aid, 24 receive relatively more assistance in their second year, and 18 receive no assistance in their second year, constituting 60% of the sample that receives payments following the predictions of vote-buying theory.

Table VI: States Whose *Contribution to Disagreement* Increased

Non-Permanent UNSC Member State	Second Year of Term	↑ Military Aid	Zero Military Aid in Second Year	↑ Economic Aid	Zero Economic Aid in Second Year
Algeria	1969		x		
Algeria	1989				x
Angola	2004	x			
Argentina	1988			x	
Argentina	2000				
Argentina	2006	x		x	
Australia	1974	x		x	
Australia	1986	x		x	
Austria	1974	x		x	
Bahrain	1999			x	
Bangladesh	1980				
Bangladesh	2001	x		x	
Belarus	1975	x		x	
Benin	1977		x	x	
Botswana	1996				
Brazil	1968				
Brazil	1989				
Brazil	1999				
Bulgaria	2003				
Burkina Faso	1985	x		x	
Cameroon	1975	x		x	
Cameroon	2003				
Canada	1968		x		x
Canada	1990	x			x
Canada	2000				x
Chile	2004	x			
Colombia	1990	x			
Colombia	2002	x			
Costa Rica	1975	x		x	
Dem. Rep. of Congo	1983	x		x	
Denmark	1968		x		x
Denmark	1986	x		x	
Denmark	2006	x		x	
Egypt	1985	x		x	
Ethiopia	1968				
Ethiopia	1990		x		
Finland	1990	x			x
GDR	1981		x	x	
Gabon	1999	x			
Gambia	1999		x		x
Germany	1988		x		x
Germany	1996		x		x
Germany	2004				
Greece	2006			x	
Guinea	1973		x		
Guinea	2003				
Guyana	1976		x		
Guyana	1983		x		
Honduras	1996				
Hungary	1969		x	x	
India	1968				
India	1973	x			
India	1985	x		x	
Indonesia	1974	x		x	
Indonesia	1996				
Iraq	1975	x		x	
Ireland	1982	x			x
Ireland	2002			x	
Italy	1976		x		
Italy	1988		x		x
Italy	1996		x		x
Jamaica	1980	x			
Jamaica	2001	x		x	
Japan	1976		x		x
Japan	1982	x			x
Japan	1988		x		x
Japan	2006	x		x	
Jordan	1983	x		x	
Kenya	1974	x		x	
Libya	1977		x	x	
Madagascar	1986	x		x	
Malaysia	1990		x		
Malaysia	2000				
Mali	2001	x		x	
Malta	1984		x	x	
Mauritania	1975	x		x	
Mauritius	2002	x			
Mexico	1981			x	
Mexico	2003			x	
Namibia	2000				
Nepal	1989				
Netherlands	1984		x	x	
Netherlands	2000		x		x
Nicaragua	1984		x		x
Niger	1981			x	
Norway	1980		x		x
Norway	2002	x			x
Pakistan	1969				
Pakistan	1977			x	
Pakistan	1984			x	
Pakistan	2004	x			
Panama	1973				
Panama	1977			x	
Panama	1982	x			
Paraguay	1969				
Peru	1974	x		x	
Peru	1985			x	
Philippines	1981			x	
Poland	1983	x			
Portugal	1980				
Romania	1977		x	x	
Senegal	1969				
Senegal	1989				
Singapore	2002	x			x
Slovenia	1999				x
Spain	1982	x			
Spain	2004		x	x	
Sudan	1973		x		x
Sweden	1976		x		x
Syria	2003		x	x	
Tanzania	1976		x		
Tanzania	2006	x		x	
Thailand	1986			x	
Togo	1983	x		x	
Trinidad and Tobago	1986	x		x	
Tunisia	1981	x		x	
Tunisia	2001	x		x	
Uganda	1982	x			
Ukraine	1985	x		x	
Ukraine	2001	x		x	
Yugoslavia	1973		x		x
Yugoslavia	1989		x		x
Zambia	1980		x		
Zambia	1988		x		
Zimbabwe	1984			x	

Notes: For non-permanent UNSC member states whose *Contribution to Disagreement* increases from the first to the second year of their term, vote-buying theory predicts that they receive a relatively higher share of payments made to UNSC rotating members or that, having become too expensive relative to other votes, they receive zero in the second (and possibly first) year of their term. In our sample, 125 states become relatively more expensive. With respect to military aid, 51 receive relatively more assistance in their second year, and 35 receive no assistance in their second year, meaning just under 70% of the sample comports with theory. With respect to economic aid, 55 receive relatively more assistance in their second year, and 25 receive no assistance in their second year, such that 64% of the sample receives payments that follow the predictions of vote-buying theory.

D Robustness Checks, Placebo Tests & Extensions

Table VII: Robustness Check: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US on Military Aid Received from the US with Varying Rank Cutpoints

	Rank ≤ 5	Rank ≤ 7	Rank ≤ 8
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Contribution to Disagreement	76.150***	97.194***	82.148***
	(22.060)	(23.668)	(30.748)
Ruling Coalition Shift	-3.638***	-0.639	1.307
	(1.145)	(1.087)	(1.288)
Polity Score	-0.410	-0.214	0.787
	(.)	(.)	(0.549)
MID with US	-0.010	-0.066	13.010
	(.)	(.)	(8.330)
Second Year	5.034	-0.752***	-1.114
	(.)	(0.234)	(0.712)
Alliance with US		1.960***	2.298***
		(0.377)	(0.572)
Constant	18.036	-10.459*	-0.367
	(.)	(5.920)	(11.354)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	200	276	313

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table VIII: Robustness Check: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US on Economic Aid Received from the US with Varying Rank Cutpoints

	Rank ≤ 5	Rank ≤ 7	Rank ≤ 8
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Contribution to Disagreement	74.626***	19.696	-22.850
	(17.251)	(22.806)	(29.582)
Ruling Coalition Shift	-2.923	0.010	0.395
	(3.323)	(1.574)	(1.159)
Polity Score	-0.102	-0.160***	-0.207***
	(0.210)	(0.022)	(0.029)
MID with US	0.722	-3.096*	-4.187***
	(0.617)	(1.837)	(1.401)
Second Year	-6.372***	-2.983***	-2.125***
	(0.204)	(0.173)	(0.178)
Alliance with US		0.925**	0.035
		(0.363)	(0.486)
Constant	-43.165***	-21.865***	-14.361**
	(5.819)	(5.288)	(6.276)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	200	276	313

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table IX: Robustness Check: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US on Military Aid Received from the US as a % of GDP

	Rank ≤ 6	Rank ≤ 6	All Non-Permanent Members	All Non-Permanent Members
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Contribution to Disagreement	16158.326***	16302.455***	3950.344	9332.800
	(2475.056)	(2500.071)	(5181.631)	(5779.896)
Ruling Coalition Shift		-34.639		18.707
		(156.180)		(73.752)
Polity Score		-63.420***		83.186
		(10.415)		(66.934)
Second Year		-172.802***		186.551
		(22.170)		(150.125)
MID with US				2144.684**
				(1011.639)
Alliance with US				354.264***
				(95.859)
Constant	-1368.316**	-2655.342***	-2638.614***	-2202.798***
	(536.498)	(597.286)	(445.588)	(638.380)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	217	215	347	340

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table X: Robustness Check: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US on Economic Aid Received from the US as a % of GDP

	Rank ≤ 6	Rank ≤ 6	All Non-Permanent Members	All Non-Permanent Members
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Contribution to Disagreement	1.34e+05***	1.36e+05***	-8526.146	3863.859
	(37762.340)	(37809.168)	(29314.473)	(29763.935)
Ruling Coalition Shift		92.718		2944.656***
		(543.869)		(1010.315)
Polity Score		98.827		139.964
		(72.505)		(90.602)
Second Year		-709.959		-738.980***
		(.)		(152.245)
MID with US				-1466.297**
				(675.950)
Alliance with US				396.455
				(541.203)
Constant	-1.75e+04**	-2.01e+04**	2281.016	2592.280
	(7600.301)	(8000.271)	(3072.087)	(3226.049)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	217	215	347	340

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table XI: Placebo Test: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US on Military Aid Received from the US During Following Year

	Rank ≤ 6	Rank ≤ 6	All Non-Permanent Members	All Non-Permanent Members
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Contribution to Disagreement	7.079	-7.336	-56.815	-43.013
	(21.015)	(22.583)	(57.777)	(69.498)
Ruling Coalition Shift		2.491*		0.811
		(1.349)		(0.635)
Polity Score		-0.109		-0.074
		(0.193)		(0.088)
MID with US		-5.418*		-3.212**
		(2.811)		(1.532)
Second Year		0.420		-0.027
		(0.442)		(0.371)
Alliance with US				-0.387
				(1.151)
Constant	19.443***	22.812***	-2.887	-4.268
	(5.741)	(7.289)	(4.966)	(5.376)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	239	237	395	384

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table XII: Placebo Test: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US on Economic Aid Received from the US During Following Year

	Rank ≤ 6	Rank ≤ 6	All Non-Permanent Members	All Non-Permanent Members
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Contribution to Disagreement	-230.445***	-226.410***	54.336	65.746
	(82.989)	(84.837)	(43.065)	(48.630)
Ruling Coalition Shift		-1.675		-0.790
		(2.067)		(0.776)
Polity Score		0.088		-0.044
		(0.083)		(0.060)
MID with US		2.628		0.103
		(2.663)		(0.487)
Second Year		1.368*		0.283**
		(0.763)		(0.135)
Alliance with US				1.477
				(0.894)
Constant	32.562**	37.819**	10.525***	10.043**
	(14.193)	(15.548)	(3.768)	(4.215)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	239	237	395	384

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table XIII: Extension: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US on Military Aid Received from the US During the Cold War

	Rank ≤ 6	Rank ≤ 6	All Non-Permanent Members	All Non-Permanent Members
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Contribution to Disagreement	79.518***	79.846***	82.960**	94.113**
	(19.649)	(19.533)	(36.607)	(42.174)
Ruling Coalition Shift		-2.815***		0.514
		(0.004)		(2.771)
Polity Score		-0.311		0.102
		(.)		(0.095)
MID with US		0.657		3.523
		(.)		(3.943)
Second Year				-1.747***
				(0.505)
Alliance with US				-52.023***
				(4.219)
Constant	0.927	-1.932	-20.231**	-21.471***
	(5.585)	(5.529)	(8.682)	(3.651)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	149	148	245	236

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table XIV: Extension: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US on Military Aid Received from the US After the Cold War

	Rank ≤ 6	Rank ≤ 6	All Non-Permanent Members	All Non-Permanent Members
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Contribution to Disagreement	-142.023	274.935	-138.353*	-198.214
	(115.180)	(325.647)	(79.844)	(129.991)
Ruling Coalition Shift		-2.744*		-0.081
		(1.607)		(0.937)
Polity Score		0.000		-0.267
		(.)		(.)
MID with US		0.000		0.000
		(.)		(.)
Second Year				0.398
				(.)
Alliance with US				-2.464
				(2.164)
Constant	39.160**	-26.942	16.789***	25.222
	(18.260)	(51.626)	(3.952)	(.)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	90	89	150	148

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table XV: Extension: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US and Democracy on Military Aid Received from the US

	Rank ≤ 6	Rank ≤ 6	All Non-Permanent Members	All Non-Permanent Members
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Contribution to Disagreement	16.464	33.618	47.743	47.903
	(50.038)	(48.263)	(31.028)	(35.329)
Democratic state (Polity≥6)	9.881*	5.295	3.782	3.107
	(5.322)	(4.815)	(2.453)	(.)
Contribution to disagreement × dem. state	-135.708**	-124.708**	-68.910**	-68.863**
	(58.285)	(57.617)	(26.871)	(28.800)
Ruling Coalition Shift		-2.201**		0.038
		(1.011)		(0.880)
MID with US		-1.379		-0.710
		(.)		(.)
Second Year		0.852**		-1.668***
		(0.423)		(0.282)
Alliance with US				0.032
				(1.032)
Constant	16.432	16.355	-13.833	-15.211***
	(11.666)	(12.718)	(.)	(3.610)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	239	237	395	386

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table XVI: Extension: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US and Democracy on Economic Aid Received from the US

	Rank ≤ 6	Rank ≤ 6	All Non-Permanent Members	All Non-Permanent Members
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Contribution to Disagreement	93.952***	93.826***	21.065	21.647
	(30.158)	(31.360)	(21.488)	(22.314)
Democratic state (Polity≥6)	-1.434	-0.238	3.670***	4.876***
	(2.031)	(3.308)	(1.126)	(1.643)
Contribution to disagreement × dem. state	23.106	22.986	-28.812**	-30.834**
	(22.220)	(23.332)	(12.191)	(12.857)
Ruling Coalition Shift		0.105		0.740
		(2.279)		(0.666)
MID with US		1.080		-0.810
		(0.768)		(0.663)
Second Year		-3.026***		-1.439***
		(0.233)		(0.172)
Alliance with US				0.024
				(0.360)
Constant	-21.794***	-33.885***	14.438***	12.977***
	(6.811)	(7.855)	(2.294)	(2.391)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	239	237	395	386

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$