Online Appendix for "How Judges' Professional Experience Impacts Case Outcomes: An Examination of Public Defenders and Criminal Sentencing"

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This Appendix contains additional analyses for "How Judges' Professional Experience Impacts Case Outcomes: An Examination of Public Defenders and Criminal Sentencing."

1 Explanation of Coding for Judges' Previous Criminal Justice Experience

To code judges' previous criminal justice experience, we first relied on biographical information from the Federal Judicial Center (FJC). For each Article III judge, the FJC provides an approximately one-paragraph blurb documenting previous professional experience chronologically. Any judge whose biographical blurb included the term "defender" or "defense" was coded by software as having public defender experience. This largely included people who listed employment at, e.g., "Office of the Public Defender," or people who actually listed their previous employment as "Public Defender," "public defense attorney," and the like. This did not include any individuals who had criminal defense experience in private practice because such individuals generally list "private practice," followed by the location and dates.

For example, for Obama appointee Raymond P. Moore, a district judge in Colorado (who took senior status in 2023), the FJC entry included:

> Private practice, Denver, Colorado, 1978-1982, 1986-1992 Assistant U.S. attorney, District of Colorado, 1982-1986 Office of the Federal Public Defender, Districts of Colorado and Wyoming, 1993-2013; assistant federal public defender, 1993-2003; acting federal public defender, 2003; federal public defender, 2004-2013

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He thus was coded as being a former public defender. The automated coding was double checked and confirmed for accuracy by trained research assistants (RAs).

Second, for judges listing public defense or private practice experience, the RAs examined each candidate's confirmation materials, starting with the questionnaires and moving to confirmation hearing transcripts and broader internet searches when questionnaires were unavailable. (This was the case for many of the earliest nominations in the dataset.) This thorough review of confirmation questionnaires and transcripts uncovered two additional judges with public defense experience that was not included in their FJC biographies (Judges W. Allen Pepper Jr. and Layn R. Phillips). In addition, anyone whose questionnaire or hearing contained references to the paid representation of criminal defendants was coded as having private practice criminal defense experience. (Some individuals had both public defender and private practice criminal defense experience.)

Third, some individuals had only *pro bono* (unpaid or volunteer) experience representing criminal defendants, or their defense experience was limited to an internship or fellowship position. Because these kinds of experiences are qualitatively different than paid experience – lawyers can be highly selective in pro bono cases, which are not a huge part of their practice, and fellowships and internships are competitive opportunities for lawyers to increase their training – these were coded separately by the RAs.

Lastly, a handful of individuals had what the RAs described as negligible private practice criminal defense experience. These we defined as a specific mention in their questionnaire that, over the course of their private practice career, the judge handled only five or fewer criminal defense cases or they indicated that criminal defense experience represented less than five percent of their practice.

For those in private practice, there is, moreover, variation in how judges describe their past criminal defense experience and the type of detail they provide. (We do not see this variation for those who worked in public defenders' offices.) For example, some judges' questionnaires mentioned they handled "criminal matters" while others discussed in more detail the types of criminal cases they handled. Many judges in small or personal private practices mentioned taking on court-assigned criminal cases as part of their practice, while other judges with large law firm experience indicate that their practice included white-collar criminal defense, which are a very small share of criminal charges.

Due to these nuanced variations in experience and reporting, our coding of the variety of

judges' past private criminal defense experience is necessarily blunt. However, we have effectively captured whether judges had any criminal defense experience while in private practice, separate from working as a public defender, which helps us disaggregate between private and public defense criminal experience. Future research might more thoroughly probe variations in judges' previous private practice criminal law experience and leverage this in separate analyses.

2 Analysis of Procedural Choices That Could be Affected by Public Defender Status

A defendant's choice to plea or go to trial could itself be impacted by a judge's criminal justice experience, since the decision to enter into a plea bargain would take place "in the shadow" of the judge. For example, if a judge is perceived to be more lenient in sentencing (perhaps precisely because of their past experience as a public defender), then the defense may have an incentive to not enter into a plea and instead push for a trial. This type of decision-making process complicates the pattern observed in the main text for incarceration length for cases going to trial. For example, for such a process to to fully explain the findings on reduced sentence length and on the reduced probability of extreme sentences, defendants would have to be entering into plea agreements at higher rates for "severe" charges when bargaining "in the shadow" of a public defender. This seems unlikely since public defenders are likely more sympathetic to defendants, making a trial (not a plea) more attractive. It is possible that a general push for more trials would result in a greater share of less "severe" charges assigned to public defenders going to trial, but that would not explain the reduced probability of extremely long sentences shown in the main text.

To better understand empirically how these patterns may vary according to public defender status—and thus, whether selection bias may be explaining some of the main results at the sentencing stage—Table 1 looks at the two procedural outcomes that could be affected by "bargaining in the shadow of the judge" as the quantities of interest: (1) whether an incoming charge eventually proceeded to trial (bench or jury); or (2) whether the defendant entered into a plea agreement. Interestingly, assignment to a public defender (Column 1) is slightly—0.3 percentage points—less likely to be associated with charges going to a trial. This is close enough to 0 not to be a meaningful effect. The relationship of public defender status to the decision to plea is not significant (Column 2).

Table 1: Outcome is whether any charge, regardless of guilt or procedural posture that could be influenced by public defender status, proceeded to a jury or bench trial (Column 1), or was pled (Column 2). All models are linear probability models and include fixed effects for district, month, year, and identity of appointing president. Standard errors clustered at the case and defendant level.

	Jury or Bench Trial	Pled
Former Pub Defender	−0.003***	−0.005
	(0.001)	(0.003)
Former Prosecutor	−0.004***	−0.002
	(0.000)	(0.002)
Private Criminal Defense Experience	−0.003***	−0.014***
	(0.000)	(0.002)
Female Judge	−0.002***	−0.009***
	(0.000)	(0.002)
African American Judge	−0.003***	−0.005+
	(0.001)	(0.003)
Judge Race Other	−0.008***	−0.019***
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Judge Commission Year	−0.001***	0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Charge is a Felony	−0.001	0.057***
	(0.001)	(0.004)
Trump Appointee	−0.014***	−0.048***
	(0.001)	(0.007)
Bush I Appointee	−0.013***	0.097***
	(0.002)	(0.009)
Bush II Appointee	−0.004***	0.043***
	(0.001)	(0.004)
Ford Appointee	−0.013	0.147***
	(0.010)	(0.021)
Carter Appointee	−0.022***	0.100***
	(0.003)	(0.015)
Reagan Appointee	−0.019***	0.113***
	(0.002)	(0.012)
Clinton Appointee	−0.007***	0.080***
	(0.001)	(0.007)
Num.Obs.	734 992	734 992
R2	0.063	0.075
Log.Lik.	462 510.028	−504 958.499
Std.Errors	by: Case & Participant	by: Case & Participant
FE: District	X	X
FE: Month	X	X
FE: Year	X	X

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note that, if the decision to proceed to trial fully explained our finding that assignment to a former public defender reduces the probability of extreme sentences, defendants would have to be entering into plea agreements at higher rates for "severe" charges when assigned to a public defender, which seems unlikely. Finally, if attorneys do consider judges' sentencing records—which, as we show, are influenced by their professional backgrounds—when crafting plea agreements, such a process would not invalidate the effect of judges' criminal defense experience on their decisions, nor the possibility of learning as a mechanism. Rather, it would suggest that attorneys may take this into account in approaching the plea agreements.

3 Analysis of (Post-Treatment) Guilty Dispositions

In the analyses presented in the main text, we do not condition on guilty status (coded in the data for each charge as a "guilty disposition"), because it is—especially for bench trials and or pleas—determined after a charge has been assigned to a judge. For example, it would be possible for trial proceedings presided over by former public defenders to be more likely to end with a finding of "not guilty." Looking only at guilty dispositions could therefore potentially bias our inferences.

Intuitively, the decision not to condition on guilty disposition may seem odd: it would make sense to examine defendants who plead or are found guilty, as these are overwhelmingly the individuals who are sentenced. In addition, policy makers may care about how policy-related judicial appointments may impact individuals who plea or are found guilty, regardless of whether the assigned judge's characteristics impacted this finding.

Mindful of the post-treatment nature of this subsetting, we therefore replicated the analyses in the text but conditioned on a charge having resulted in a guilty disposition. This dropped some pleas (about 1.5%) and some charges that proceeded to trial (about 16%). Table 2 and 3 replicate the main results, and they are substantively similar in direction, rough magnitude, and significance to the unconditional results presented in the main text.

Table 2: Analyses for charges that result in a guilty disposition only. Outcome is whether sentence (if any) included any incarceration (Column 1, linear probability model) and incarcetation length (Column 2, OLS). All models include fixed effects for district, month, year, and identity of appointing president. Standard errors clustered at the case and defendant level.

	Incarceration Among Guilty	Incarceration Length Among Guilty Trials
Former Pub Defender	−0.021***	−18.298**
	(0.003)	(7.001)
Former Prosecutor	0.028***	1.195
	(0.001)	(4.155)
Private Criminal Defense Experience	−0.014***	−9.735*
	(0.001)	(3.916)
Female Judge	0.012***	−7.952+
	(0.001)	(4.325)
African American Judge	0.007**	1.043
	(0.002)	(7.114)
Judge Race Other	−0.006***	−10.804*
	(0.002)	(4.405)
Judge Commission Year	−0.004***	0.747
	(0.000)	(1.070)
Charge is a Felony	0.140***	6.736
	(0.004)	(9.314)
Trump Appointee	0.028***	30.322
	(0.006)	(22.173)
Bush I Appointee	−0.044***	22.585
	(0.008)	(23.578)
Bush II Appointee	0.011**	24.931*
	(0.003)	(10.664)
Ford Appointee	−0.120***	35.926
	(0.018)	(41.194)
Carter Appointee	−0.105***	25.106
	(0.012)	(37.388)
Reagan Appointee	−0.056***	34.269
	(0.010)	(29.854)
Clinton Appointee	−0.032***	24.800
	(0.006)	(18.835)
Num.Obs.	719 993	30 878
R2	0.064	0.097
Log.Lik.	−337 432.914	−209 373.998
Std.Errors	by: Case & Participant	by: Case & Participant
FE: District	X	X
FE: Month	X	X
FE: Year	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 3: Analyses for charges that result in a guilty disposition only. Outcome is incarceration length being greater than some length (yes or no). All models are linear probability models and include fixed effects for district, month, year, and identity of appointing president. Standard errors clustered at the case and defendant level.

	More than 100 Years	More than 70 Years	More than 30 Years
Former Pub Defender	−0.011*	−0.012*	−0.023**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Former Prosecutor	−0.001	−0.001	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Private Criminal Defense Experience	−0.003	−0.002	−0.009*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Female Judge	−0.004	−0.004	−0.009+
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)
African American Judge	0.004	0.003	0.007
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Judge Race Other	0.000	0.000	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Judge Commission Year	0.000	0.000	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Charge is a Felony	−0.006	−0.006	0.002
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Trump Appointee	0.002	0.000	0.000
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.027)
Bush I Appointee	0.003	0.003	0.029
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.026)
Bush II Appointee	0.012	0.013	0.024*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)
Ford Appointee	0.015	0.015	0.061
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.045)
Carter Appointee	0.006	0.005	0.040
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.041)
Reagan Appointee	0.011	0.010	0.045
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.033)
Clinton Appointee	0.008	0.008	0.031
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.021)
Num.Obs.	30 878	30 878	30 878
R2	0.033	0.034	0.062
Log.Lik.	10 728.210	9742.450	−1485.736
Std.Errors	by: Case & Participant	by: Case & Participant	by: Case & Participant
FE: District	X	X	X
FE: Month	X	X	X
FE: Year	X	X	X

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

4 Incarceration Length for Pleas vs. Trials

Figure 1 shows the density of incarceration length for charges that eventually went to a jury or bench trial (left) and those that pled (right). The figure shows that, for charges proceeding to trial, former public defenders appear to give very long sentences less frequently. Sentence lengths for pleas, on the other hand, appear similar across judges (in months, truncated at 1200 months, or 100 years).



Figure 1: Density of incarceration length for all (black), prosecutor (red) or defender (blue) judges. Left panel–charges resolved in a jury or bench trial; right panel–charges that were pled. Incarceration length truncated at 100 years (1200 months).

5 Possible Interactions

We conducted various analyses interacting public defender status with other characteristics of interest to scholars.

Race. Research on criminal sentencing points to important differences between Black and White judges on sentencing, with Black judges at times being more or less harsh than their White counterparts. (To our knowledge, similar effects have not been found for judges who identify as Latino/Hispanic, although the number of Latino/Hispanic judges has historically been smaller, which has made scholarly inquiry challenging.) However, this does vary with defendants' race.

While we do not have defendant race in our data—meaning that these analyses are not necessarily assessing the same interactive effects as previous work—we do have judges' race or ethnicity coded in the judicial biographical data. Table 4 shows analyses that interact public defender status with whether the assigned judge is Black. As the table shows, there is no significant interaction between judge race and public defender experience, suggesting no increase/decrease in the likelihood of incarceration or on incarceration length.

Gender. Along with judge race, there are corresponding studies looking into the relationship between gender and judicial decision making. As we discussed, most of these connect gender and decision making concerning civil complaints involving gender/sex discrimination or harassment, Title IX, and reproductive rights. Some papers have shown gender-based differences in sentencing (Steffensmeier and Hebert, 1999), although, given that an overwhelming majority of defendants are male, the mechanisms are not so clear.

In our context, an important consideration is that women are overrepresented as public defenders, the opposite of most other legal practice areas.[1] Thus, it may be the case that former public defenders who are women have different or more empowering experiences. Table 5 shows the analyses, with public defender status interacted with judge gender. In contrast to a story where female public defenders have a distinctive experience, the data suggest that we cannot rule out that there is no difference in how public defender experience operates across genders. The only exception here is the significant coefficient on the interaction of public defender and judge gender for pleas. But there is no consistent story.

[1] `https://www.zippia.com/public-defender-jobs/demographics/`

Table 4: For Columns 1-3, outcome is whether sentence (if any) included any incarceration. Models are linear probability models and include fixed effects for district, month, year, and identity of appointing president interacted with public defender. For Column 4, outcome is truncated sentence length for sentences with jury or bench trials. For all models, standard errors clustered at the case and defendant level.

	Any Incarceration (Trials)	Any Incarceration (Pleas)	Any Incarceration (All)	Incarceration Length
Former Pub Defender	−0.008	−0.018***	−0.026***	−16.433*
	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(6.801)
Black	0.004	0.007**	0.006*	2.467
	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(6.731)
Former Prosecutor	−0.004	0.035***	0.027***	0.670
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(3.667)
Private Criminal Defense Experience	0.006	−0.014***	−0.014***	−10.711**
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(3.306)
Female Judge	0.000	0.008***	0.012***	−8.813*
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(3.744)
Judge Commission Year	−0.004**	−0.003***	−0.004***	0.718
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.951)
Charge is a Felony	0.093***	0.094***	0.108***	7.740
	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(7.509)
Trump Appointee	−0.006	0.070***	0.029***	30.502
	(0.039)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(19.373)
Bush I Appointee	−0.075**	−0.049***	−0.040***	22.416
	(0.028)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(20.732)
Bush II Appointee	0.002	0.005	0.013***	21.704*
	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(9.299)
Ford Appointee	−0.114*	−0.128***	−0.117***	32.930
	(0.051)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(36.553)
Carter Appointee	−0.082+	−0.100***	−0.102***	25.771
	(0.043)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(33.166)
Reagan Appointee	−0.073*	−0.063***	−0.053***	34.546
	(0.035)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(26.124)
Clinton Appointee	−0.031	−0.041***	−0.030***	24.609
	(0.021)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(16.624)
Pub Defender * Black	−0.012	−0.007	0.011+	−7.060
	(0.020)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(13.620)
Num.Obs.	37 069	618 626	740 785	37 069
R2	0.029	0.067	0.062	0.108
Log.Lik.	−12 230.025	−290 011.333	−348 650.315	−248 585.404
FE: District	X	X	X	X
FE: Month	X	X	X	X
FE: Year	X	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 5: For Columns 1-3, outcome is whether sentence (if any) included any incarceration. Models are linear probability models and include fixed effects for district, month, year, and identity of appointing president. For Column 4, outcome is truncated sentence length for sentences with jury or bench trials. For all models, standard errors clustered at the case and defendant level.

	Any Incarceration (Trials)	Any Incarceration (Pleas)	Any Incarceration (All)	Incarceration Length
Former Pub Defender	−0.020*	−0.011**	−0.021***	−17.309**
	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(6.355)
Female Judge	−0.007	0.011***	0.013***	−7.912*
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(3.868)
Former Prosecutor	−0.006	0.036***	0.028***	1.053
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(3.670)
Private Criminal Defense Experience	0.002	−0.013***	−0.014***	−10.028**
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(3.365)
African American Judge	0.006	0.005*	0.006**	0.300
	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(6.121)
Judge Race Other	0.044***	−0.009***	−0.007***	−10.115**
	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(3.640)
Judge Commission Year	−0.003**	−0.004***	−0.004***	0.660
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.950)
Charge is a Felony	0.092***	0.094***	0.109***	8.133
	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(7.480)
Trump Appointee	0.001	0.067***	0.028***	28.350
	(0.038)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(19.385)
Bush I Appointee	−0.060*	−0.052***	−0.043***	19.647
	(0.028)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(20.819)
Bush II Appointee	0.006	0.003	0.012***	20.844*
	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(9.319)
Ford Appointee	−0.100*	−0.130***	−0.118***	30.722
	(0.051)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(36.580)
Carter Appointee	−0.065	−0.104***	−0.104***	22.644
	(0.043)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(33.230)
Reagan Appointee	−0.054	−0.066***	−0.055***	31.027
	(0.035)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(26.216)
Clinton Appointee	−0.021	−0.043***	−0.032***	22.945
	(0.021)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(16.675)
Pub Defender * Female	0.016	−0.019***	−0.007	3.675
	(0.021)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(14.905)
Num.Obs.	37 069	618 626	734 992	37 069
R2	0.031	0.067	0.062	0.108
Log.Lik.	−12 203.573	−289 984.461	−345 541.770	−248 581.350
FE: District	X	X	X	X
FE: Month	X	X	X	X
FE: Year	X	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 6: For Columns 1-3, outcome is whether sentence (if any) included any incarceration. Models are linear probability models and include fixed effects for district, month, year, and identity of appointing president. For Column 4, outcome is truncated sentence length for sentences with jury or bench trials. For all models, standard errors clustered at the case and defendant level.

	Any Incarceration (Trials)	Any Incarceration (Pleas)	Any Incarceration (All)	Incarceration Length
Former Pub Defender	−0.013	−0.037***	−0.042***	−25.233**
	(0.019)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(9.096)
Trump Appointee	0.037	0.061***	0.022***	26.373
	(0.037)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(19.564)
Bush I Appointee	−0.069*	−0.052***	−0.046***	17.609
	(0.029)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(20.919)
Bush II Appointee	0.002	0.002	0.009**	19.573*
	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(9.672)
Ford Appointee	−0.098+	−0.127***	−0.120***	28.526
	(0.052)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(36.706)
Carter Appointee	−0.074+	−0.101***	−0.106***	18.148
	(0.045)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(33.195)
Reagan Appointee	−0.057	−0.063***	−0.055***	28.776
	(0.036)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(26.337)
Clinton Appointee	−0.024	−0.048***	−0.039***	19.997
	(0.022)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(16.935)
Former Prosecutor	−0.006	0.038***	0.029***	1.494
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(3.703)
Private Criminal Defense Experience	0.007	−0.013***	−0.014***	−9.940**
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(3.389)
Female Judge	−0.006	0.010***	0.013***	−7.769*
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(3.747)
African American Judge	0.001	0.007**	0.008***	0.454
	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(6.109)
Judge Race Other	0.026***	−0.013***	−0.008***	−10.422**
	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(3.661)
Judge Commission Year	−0.003*	−0.003***	−0.004***	0.643
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.953)
Charge is a Felony	0.090***	0.095***	0.140***	8.212
	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(7.422)
Pub Defender * Bush I	0.082***	0.109***	0.108***	16.784
	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(34.285)
Pub Defender * Bush II	0.017	−0.010	−0.007	−2.276
	(0.025)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(14.385)
Pub Defender * Carter	0.003	0.007	0.021	44.768
	(0.039)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(54.139)
Pub Defender * Reagan	−0.070	0.021	0.005	11.757
	(0.046)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(29.401)
Pub Defender * Clinton	−0.011	0.060***	0.059***	20.317
	(0.025)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(14.004)
Num.Obs.	30 878	607 653	719 993	37 069
R2	0.028	0.069	0.064	0.108
Log.Lik.	−8883.034	−285 000.858	−337 292.102	−248 578.027
FE: District	X	X	X	X
FE: Month	X	X	X	X
FE: Year	X	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Identity of the Appointing President. The main text includes analyses that interact defender status with party of the appointing president. However, it could be the case that there are interactions with the identity of the appointing president, not just the party. For example, it could be the case that Obama appointments who were defense attorneys were more impactful on sentencing than were Clinton appointments who were also defense attorneys. (At our time of writing, we lack sufficient information on the records of Biden nominees to make firm statements about these.)

These analyses are included in Table 6. (Barack Obama is the omitted variable on president.) Because of the low numbers of defenders historically appointed, we have limited information on possible interactions, and no real patterns among presidents emerge (though the first-order coefficients are mostly consistent to what we found in other analyses). In addition, some more recent presidents (such as Donald J. Trump) appointed no or very few former public defenders.

6 Robustness on Truncation Decisions

There is huge variation in incarceration length, particularly at the higher end, which makes it easy for outlier sentences (for example, those in excess of 100 years) to skew results. In the main analysis we used data that were truncated at 100 years; that is: any sentence above 100 years (for example, a sentence of 250 years) was just re-recorded as 100 years in the data. However, Table 7 shows different years of truncation starting with 80 years, 70 years, and so on. The table shows that, regardless of how we truncate the data, public defenders still sentence defendants to fewer months of incarceration (among charges that proceeded to trial).

Table 7: Outcome is sentence length truncated at different years. For all models, standard errors clustered at the case and defendant level. Models include fixed effects for district, month, year, and identity of appointing president.

	80 Years	70 Years	60 Years	50 Years
Former Pub Defender	−10.839**	−9.918**	−8.947**	−7.766*
	(3.318)	(3.232)	(3.139)	(3.029)
Former Prosecutor	3.386+	3.246+	3.130+	3.051+
	(1.951)	(1.868)	(1.776)	(1.668)
Private Criminal Defense Experience	−9.046***	−8.856***	−8.537***	−8.135***
	(1.765)	(1.699)	(1.623)	(1.530)
Female Judge	−5.925**	−5.602**	−5.271**	−4.951**
	(2.027)	(1.950)	(1.865)	(1.760)
African American Judge	−0.428	−0.799	−1.083	−1.290
	(3.330)	(3.142)	(2.955)	(2.751)
Judge Race Other	−11.233***	−11.141***	−11.088***	−11.090***
	(2.226)	(2.135)	(2.036)	(1.925)
Judge Commission Year	0.363	0.371	0.361	0.327
	(0.500)	(0.479)	(0.455)	(0.428)
Trump Appointee	29.139*	28.685*	28.330*	27.183*
	(14.021)	(13.524)	(13.086)	(12.380)
Bush I Appointee	9.249	10.045	10.442	10.327
	(11.097)	(10.592)	(10.063)	(9.470)
Bush II Appointee	8.446+	8.458+	8.205+	7.774+
	(4.945)	(4.728)	(4.500)	(4.233)
Ford Appointee	10.643	10.761	10.208	8.983
	(19.565)	(18.658)	(17.704)	(16.643)
Carter Appointee	7.635	8.406	8.484	7.959
	(17.272)	(16.504)	(15.685)	(14.749)
Reagan Appointee	13.434	14.040	14.080	13.562
	(13.919)	(13.295)	(12.634)	(11.877)
Clinton Appointee	12.848	13.014	12.659	11.989
	(8.646)	(8.258)	(7.836)	(7.352)
Num.Obs.	37 069	37 069	37 069	37 069
R2	0.127	0.132	0.138	0.146
Log.Lik.	−228 948.555	−227 445.271	−225 716.303	−223 544.833
FE: District	X	X	X	X
FE: Month	X	X	X	X
FE: Year	X	X	X	X

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

7 Community Service and Probation

Next, we investigate other important sentencing outcomes that are of special concern. First, a pattern evidenced in the left-side panel of Figure 1 is that public defenders appear to be less likely to sentence individuals in the 0-20 month range – on the lower end of possible sentences. A possible explanation is that they instead steer punishment to incarceration alternatives like community service or probation. Of the various alternatives (community service, probations, or fines), fines are probably the most lenient, followed by community service and then probation. Because fines are present in nearly all charges in our sentencing data, we limit our inquiry to community service and probation.

Thus, Table 8 Column 1 looks at charges where the defendant was not sentenced to incarceration but instead was sentenced to community service only, an alternative to incarceration and one that perhaps would be more amenable to judges with public defender experience. In Table 8 Column 2 we look at any community service *or* probation (but again no incarceration) as the outcome, while in Column 3 we look at any community service *and* probation (but no incarceration) as the outcome. In this way, the three columns represent more lenient (but increasingly punitive) sentences compared to incarceration. For all specifications, we use a linear probability model with the usual suite of controls and fixed effects.

For all three columns, the assignment of cases to a former public defender results in small but significant effects. For community service and community service and probation (Columns 1 and 3) the coefficients are indeed very small, close to 0. But the coefficient for community service or probation ($\sim$2.3 percentage points) is significant and meaningful. Taken with our previous findings, this lends some support to the idea that public defenders are more likely to consider alternatives to incarceration.

Table 8: Outcome is no incarceration, but community service only (Column 1), community service or probation only (Column 2), and community service and probation only (Column 3). All models are linear probability models and include fixed effects for district, month, year, and identity of appointing president. Standard errors clustered at the case and defendant level.

	Comm. Service Only	Comm. Service or Probation	Comm. Service & Probation
Former Pub Defender	0.001***	0.023***	0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Former Prosecutor	0.000	−0.028***	−0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Private Criminal Defense Experience	0.000**	0.014***	−0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Female Judge	0.000	−0.013***	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
African American Judge	−0.001**	−0.006**	−0.001+
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Judge Race Other	0.000+	0.007***	−0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Judge Commission Year	0.000**	0.004***	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Charge is a Felony	−0.001*	−0.109***	−0.004***
	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Trump Appointee	0.000	−0.027***	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.001)
Bush I Appointee	−0.001+	0.042***	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.002)
Bush II Appointee	−0.001**	−0.012***	−0.002*
	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Ford Appointee	−0.005*	0.118***	0.007
	(0.002)	(0.017)	(0.007)
Carter Appointee	0.000	0.104***	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.003)
Reagan Appointee	−0.003**	0.055***	−0.003+
	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.002)
Clinton Appointee	−0.001+	0.031***	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.001)
Num.Obs.	734 992	734 992	734 992
R2	0.007	0.062	0.018
Log.Lik.	1 306 799.268	−345 543.301	764 678.401
Std.Errors	by: Case & Participant	by: Case & Participant	by: Case & Participant
FE: District	X	X	X
FE: Month	X	X	X
FE: Year	X	X	X

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

8 Restricting Sample Only to Felonies

In our original analysis, we excluded cases heard by magistrate judges, for whom we have no biographical (professional experience) data. These cases involve non-felonies, such as misdemeanors or petty offenses. As an alternative, we limit our analyses to only cases involving felony charges. These must be assigned to a district court judge. Fortunately, felonies are coded in the data.

These results are presented in Table 9, which subsets the data to only felonies. These correspond substantively to the results in the main text.

Table 9: Analyses of felonies only. For Column 1, outcome is whether sentence (if any) included any incarceration (LPM). For Column 2, outcome is truncated sentence length (OLS). For Column 3, outcome is whether incarceration is longer than 30 years (LPM). For all models, standard errors clustered at the case and defendant level. Models include fixed effects for district, month, year, and identity of appointing president.

	Any Incarceration (All)	Incarceration Length (Trials)	Incarceration Length More than 30 Years (Trials)
Former Pub Defender	−0.021***	−17.917**	−0.020**
	(0.003)	(6.076)	(0.006)
Former Prosecutor	0.030***	1.775	0.002
	(0.001)	(3.752)	(0.004)
Private Criminal Defense Experience	−0.009***	−11.255***	−0.009*
	(0.001)	(3.395)	(0.003)
Female Judge	0.013***	−8.046*	−0.005
	(0.001)	(3.816)	(0.004)
African American Judge	0.003	2.263	0.008
	(0.002)	(6.443)	(0.007)
Judge Race Other	−0.010***	−9.490**	0.000
	(0.002)	(3.630)	(0.004)
Judge Commission Year	−0.003***	0.286	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.960)	(0.001)
Trump Appointee	0.048***	31.106	0.016
	(0.007)	(20.023)	(0.023)
Bush I Appointee	−0.045***	11.892	0.016
	(0.008)	(21.058)	(0.021)
Bush II Appointee	0.006+	16.366+	0.013
	(0.003)	(9.380)	(0.010)
Ford Appointee	−0.115***	7.921	0.023
	(0.017)	(36.162)	(0.037)
Carter Appointee	−0.089***	6.596	0.022
	(0.012)	(33.432)	(0.034)
Reagan Appointee	−0.055***	18.350	0.027
	(0.009)	(26.529)	(0.027)
Clinton Appointee	−0.034***	17.595	0.020
	(0.006)	(16.829)	(0.017)
Num.Obs.	700 578	35 182	35 182
R2	0.059	0.110	0.056
Log.Lik.	−323 106.078	−235 882.699	4683.161
FE: District	X	X	X
FE: Month	X	X	X
FE: Year	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

9 Congressional Session Fixed Effects

The analyses in the main text use fixed effects for the identity of the appointing president. That means that we are comparing average effects across nominees made by Barack Obama, Donald Trump, Joe Biden, etc. However, this has the potential to overlook the important role that home-state senators play in the judicial appointments process. (By "home-state," we mean senators representing the state where the vacancy is located.) Even appointments made by the same president could differ ideologically depending on whether the home-state senators are more liberal or conservative.

Table 10 includes analyses that replace fixed effects for the identity of the appointing president with fixed effects for the session of Congress, which we operationalize as the Congressional session corresponding with the date of the Senate Judiciary Committee vote. Each presidential term corresponds with two congressional sessions. By including fixed effects for congressional session (along with district fixed effects), we therefore take into account changes in the home-state senators and in the Senate's composition. This serves as a more stringent control for politics/ideology than fixed effects for the appointing president. The table shows results consistent with those in the main text.

Table 10: For Column 1, outcome is whether sentence (if any) included any incarceration (LPM). For Column 2, outcome is truncated sentence length (OLS). For Column 3, outcome is whether incarceration is longer than 30 years (LPM). For all models, standard errors clustered at the case and defendant level. Models include fixed effects for district, month, year, and identity of appointing president.

	Any Incarceration (All)	Incarceration Length (Trials)	Incarceration Length More than 30 Years (Trials)
Former Pub Defender	−0.019***	−17.104**	−0.017**
	(0.003)	(6.095)	(0.006)
Former Prosecutor	0.022***	0.165	0.001
	(0.001)	(3.708)	(0.004)
Private Criminal Defense Experience	−0.020***	−10.711**	−0.009*
	(0.001)	(3.627)	(0.004)
Female Judge	0.012***	−7.943*	−0.005
	(0.002)	(3.890)	(0.004)
African American Judge	0.003	1.348	0.007
	(0.002)	(6.180)	(0.006)
Judge Race Other	−0.006**	−9.408*	0.001
	(0.002)	(3.834)	(0.004)
Judge Commission Year	0.004*	3.208	0.002
	(0.001)	(3.708)	(0.004)
Charge is a Felony	0.108***	7.783	0.000
	(0.004)	(7.518)	(0.007)
Num.Obs.	734 992	37 069	37 069
R2	0.065	0.109	0.056
Log.Lik.	−344 365.461	−248 565.154	5047.307
FE: District	X	X	X
FE: Congressional Session	X	X	X
FE: Month	X	X	X
FE: Year	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

10 Including Measures of Judicial Ideology

In the main text, we include fixed effects for president in all specifications, unless otherwise noted (for example, when we interacted with party). However, it is possible that individuals appointed by the same president by the same home-state senators to the same jurisdiction have different ideology.

We therefore replicate the main analyses but include judicial ideology. (Column 4 in Table 3 includes one of these analyses.) For this, we first use DIME scores (also called "cfscores"), which use campaign contributions to scale federal and state judges on the same unidimensional scale as other political actors, from more liberal to more conservative. These scores have the advantage of incorporating nuanced ideological information, and so vary from judge to judge, even conditional on judges being appointed to the same jurisdiction in the same year.

Here, we use the scores from Bonica and Sen (2017), which rely on imputation to impute scores that are otherwise missing. (See their paper for a validation of this approach.) This ensures that we do not drop portions of our data and is particularly important here as the missingness may correlate with defender experience. Table 11 shows these results.

In addition, we replicate these models using Judicial Common Space (JCS) scores. JCS scores impute the ideology of the president using DW-NOMINATE scores, or, in the case where the home-state senators are of the same party, the average of these. (These are current through the 113th Congress.) Substantively, judges appointed in the same Congressional term in the same jurisdiction will be assigned the same score, making the results mostly the same as those in Table 12, which include term and district fixed effects.

Table 12 shows these results, current through the 113th Congress. The results are substantively similar to the analyses we present in the main text. Interestingly, the coefficient on the JCS score coefficients are not significant, suggesting that that perhaps they do not contain much more information over and above president fixed effects.

Table 11: For Column 1, outcome is whether sentence (if any) included any incarceration (LPM). For Column 2, outcome is truncated sentence length (OLS). For Column 3, outcome is whether incarceration is longer than 30 years (LPM). For all models, standard errors clustered at the case and defendant level. Models include fixed effects for district, month, year, and identity of appointing president.

	Any Incarceration (All)	Incarceration Length (Trials)	Incarceration Length More than 30 Years (Trials)
Former Pub Defender	−0.025***	−15.029*	−0.016*
	(0.003)	(5.991)	(0.006)
Former Prosecutor	0.029***	1.777	0.002
	(0.001)	(3.699)	(0.004)
Private Criminal Defense Experience	−0.014***	−9.027**	−0.006+
	(0.001)	(3.367)	(0.003)
Female Judge	0.012***	−6.332+	−0.003
	(0.001)	(3.792)	(0.004)
African American Judge	0.004	3.535	0.010
	(0.002)	(6.154)	(0.006)
Judge Race Other	−0.007***	−11.335**	0.000
	(0.002)	(3.671)	(0.004)
Judge Commission Year	−0.004***	0.551	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.960)	(0.001)
Charge is a Felony	0.100***	7.380	0.000
	(0.004)	(7.526)	(0.007)
Judge DIME Score (Imputed)	−0.009***	14.480***	0.014***
	(0.001)	(3.530)	(0.004)
Bush I Appointee	−0.036***	3.711	0.003
	(0.008)	(21.238)	(0.021)
Bush II Appointee	0.022***	3.639	−0.002
	(0.004)	(10.428)	(0.011)
Ford Appointee	−0.120***	21.858	0.029
	(0.017)	(36.902)	(0.037)
Carter Appointee	−0.111***	20.639	0.028
	(0.012)	(33.443)	(0.034)
Reagan Appointee	−0.048***	10.010	0.012
	(0.010)	(27.004)	(0.027)
Clinton Appointee	−0.032***	19.624	0.017
	(0.006)	(16.764)	(0.017)
Num.Obs.	723 453	36 867	36 867
R2	0.062	0.109	0.056
Log.Lik.	−338 441.512	−247 205.560	5064.081
FE: District	X	X	X
FE: Month	X	X	X
FE: Year	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 12: For Column 1, outcome is whether sentence (if any) included any incarceration (LPM). For Column 2, outcome is truncated sentence length (OLS). For Column 3, outcome is whether incarceration is longer than 30 years (LPM). For all models, standard errors clustered at the case and defendant level. Models include fixed effects for district, month, year, and identity of appointing president.

	Any Incarceration (All)	Incarceration Length (Trials)	Incarceration Length More than 30 Years (Trials)
Former Pub Defender	−0.023***	−16.210**	−0.017**
	(0.003)	(6.014)	(0.006)
Former Prosecutor	0.029***	0.938	0.001
	(0.001)	(3.724)	(0.004)
Private Criminal Defense Experience	−0.014***	−9.710**	−0.007*
	(0.001)	(3.366)	(0.003)
Female Judge	0.012***	−6.756+	−0.004
	(0.001)	(3.821)	(0.004)
African American Judge	0.006**	0.319	0.007
	(0.002)	(6.094)	(0.006)
Judge Race Other	−0.007***	−10.073**	0.001
	(0.002)	(3.655)	(0.004)
Judge Commission Year	−0.004***	0.587	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.958)	(0.001)
Charge is a Felony	0.100***	7.685	0.000
	(0.004)	(7.521)	(0.007)
Judge JCS Score (Senate DW-NOMINATE)	−0.007	25.101+	0.005
	(0.006)	(13.423)	(0.014)
Bush I Appointee	−0.040***	0.841	0.013
	(0.009)	(23.241)	(0.023)
Bush II Appointee	0.017**	2.172	0.011
	(0.005)	(13.335)	(0.013)
Ford Appointee	−0.118***	9.760	0.031
	(0.018)	(38.578)	(0.038)
Carter Appointee	−0.110***	21.421	0.028
	(0.012)	(33.361)	(0.034)
Reagan Appointee	−0.053***	12.496	0.028
	(0.010)	(27.927)	(0.028)
Clinton Appointee	−0.033***	22.574	0.020
	(0.006)	(16.703)	(0.017)
Num.Obs.	723 453	36 867	36 867
R2	0.062	0.108	0.055
Log.Lik.	−338 472.381	−247 215.702	5052.089
FE: District	X	X	X
FE: Month	X	X	X
FE: Year	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

11 Dropping the Felony Variable

The raw data included a variable called "charge type," which reported the types of charges – "f", "m" or "p," or an asterisk, which we interpret to correspond to felonies, misdemeanors, and petty offenses, and missingness, respectively. (There was no true missingness from the perspective of the models; nearly all rows for that variable are filled in.) Rather than put structure on these entries with a fixed effect, the specifications in the main text simply included an indicator for whether the variable indicated a "felony" – which are the types of charges most likely to lead to incarceration. This had the benefit of not making strong assumptions either about missingness or about how things were reported. Most importantly, this approach has the benefit of taking into account instances where a felony appears to be clearly reported, which scholars in this area have flagged as important in understanding fluctuations in sentencing.

To assess robustness to the inclusion of this variable, Table 13 presents the main findings, but drops the type of charge variable. The results are substantively identical to those presented in the main text.

Table 13: For Column 1, outcome is whether sentence (if any) included any incarceration (LPM). For Column 2, outcome is truncated sentence length (OLS). For Column 3, outcome is whether incarceration is longer than 30 years (LPM). For all models, standard errors clustered at the case and defendant level. Models include fixed effects for district, month, year, and identity of appointing president.

	Any Incarceration (All)	Incarceration Length (Trials)	Incarceration Length More than 30 Years (Trials)
Former Pub Defender	−0.025***	−16.556**	−0.017**
	(0.003)	(5.991)	(0.006)
Former Prosecutor	0.027***	1.069	0.001
	(0.001)	(3.670)	(0.004)
Private Criminal Defense Experience	−0.014***	−9.941**	−0.008*
	(0.001)	(3.349)	(0.003)
Female Judge	0.012***	−7.700*	−0.004
	(0.001)	(3.771)	(0.004)
African American Judge	0.006**	0.391	0.006
	(0.002)	(6.080)	(0.006)
Judge Race Other	−0.006***	−10.035**	0.001
	(0.002)	(3.642)	(0.004)
Judge Commission Year	−0.004***	0.651	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.949)	(0.001)
Trump Appointee	0.022***	28.394	0.013
	(0.006)	(19.390)	(0.022)
Bush I Appointee	−0.043***	19.389	0.017
	(0.008)	(20.774)	(0.021)
Bush II Appointee	0.012***	20.620*	0.015
	(0.003)	(9.319)	(0.009)
Ford Appointee	−0.123***	30.477	0.035
	(0.017)	(36.536)	(0.036)
Carter Appointee	−0.108***	22.288	0.028
	(0.012)	(33.181)	(0.033)
Reagan Appointee	−0.056***	30.723	0.031
	(0.009)	(26.197)	(0.027)
Clinton Appointee	−0.031***	22.693	0.020
	(0.006)	(16.646)	(0.017)
Num.Obs.	734 992	37 069	37 069
R2	0.059	0.108	0.055
Log.Lik.	−346 776.273	−248 582.801	5038.276
FE: District	X	X	X
FE: Month	X	X	X
FE: Year	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

12 Using Logit Specifications

Some of our outcomes are binary—for example, whether there is any incarceration (over all sentences) or whether a sentence after a trial was extremely long (over 30 years). For these, the main text uses linear probability models for ease of interpretation. However, logit regression may be preferable when more extreme values are observed. Also, many political science readers will favor a logit specification. For this reason, we replicate the main binary-outcomes findings using a fixed effects logit specification. The outcomes here are (1) whether a charge resulted in any incarceration, shown in Table 14, and (2) whether a charge proceeding to trial resulted in an extremely long sentence, shown in Table 15. (The third key outcome, sentence length, is a truncated continuous measure and so we do not replicate it using a logit specification.)

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	52.340	3.555	14.721	0.000
Former Pub Defender	-0.112	0.012	-9.613	0.000
Former Prosecutor	0.167	0.007	23.964	0.000
Private Criminal Defense Experience	-0.067	0.007	-9.226	0.000
Female	0.075	0.008	9.823	0.000
African American Judge	0.040	0.012	3.369	0.001
Judge Race Other	-0.061	0.010	-6.223	0.000
Judge Commission Year	-0.025	0.002	-14.408	0.000
Charge is a Felony	0.617	0.013	48.016	0.000
Trump Appointee	0.230	0.029	7.907	0.000
Kennedy Appointee	-0.331	0.040	-8.286	0.000
Bush II Appointee	0.056	0.017	3.206	0.001
Bush I Appointee	-0.820	0.096	-8.585	0.000
Carter Appointee	-0.737	0.062	-11.867	0.000
Nixon Appointee	-0.398	0.050	-8.011	0.000
Johnson Appointee	-0.246	0.029	-8.367	0.000

Table 14: Outcome is whether sentence (if any) included any incarceration (all sentences). Model uses a logit specification. Standard errors are clustered at the case and defendant level. Models include fixed effects for district (not shown), month (not shown), year (not shown), and identity of appointing president (shown).

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	-35.462	26.710	-1.328	0.184
Former Pub Defender	-0.286	0.104	-2.759	0.006
Former Prosecutor	0.032	0.056	0.570	0.569
Private Criminal Defense Experience	-0.166	0.059	-2.813	0.005
Female	-0.067	0.063	-1.057	0.290
African American Judge	0.117	0.087	1.351	0.177
Judge Race Other	-0.040	0.107	-0.376	0.707
Judge Commission Year	0.016	0.013	1.218	0.223
Charge is a Felony	0.003	0.123	0.024	0.981
Trump Appointee	0.287	0.431	0.666	0.505
Kennedy Appointee	0.297	0.301	0.984	0.325
Bush II Appointee	0.295	0.136	2.159	0.031
Bush I Appointee	0.642	0.781	0.821	0.412
Carter Appointee	0.448	0.467	0.960	0.337
Nixon Appointee	0.528	0.374	1.413	0.158
Johnson Appointee	0.322	0.223	1.444	0.149

Table 15: Outcome is whether incarceration is longer than 30 years (for trials only). Model uses a logit specification. Standard errors are clustered at the case and defendant level. Models include fixed effects for district (not shown), month (not shown), year (not shown), and identity of appointing president (shown).

These results are shown in Table 14 and Table 15. Note that, although these are harder to interpret, the substantive results are unchanged: assignment to a public defender is linked to lower likelihood of incarceration and lower likelihood of an extremely long incarceration sentence.

We do not rely on logit models in the main text because we have several fixed effects in nearly all specifications (district, year, and month, plus additional fixed effects such as identity

of president and/or judge race). Thus, we are concerned that the logit fixed effects regression would raise the incidental parameters problem, which can lead to bias if the number of units per fixed effects group is small (which is the case here).

13 Note on Sentencing Guidelines

The Supreme Court's decision in *United States v. Booker* in 2005 made the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Sentencing Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory. This change increased judges' discretion in sentencing, and this increase in discretion had real consequences. For example, racial disparities in sentencing increased after *Booker* and prosecutors altered their behavior in response to the decision (Yang, 2015). The data for this article only includes cases heard in the post-*Booker* era (federal district court cases from 2010 through 2019). This means the judges who heard these cases were operating under post-*Booker* advisory guidelines.

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