Online Appendix to "Designing Truth: Facilitating Perpetrator Participation at Truth Commissions," by Kelebogile Zvobgo, in *The Journal of Human Rights*.

A Approximating the Population of Perpetrators

The ideal measure for comparing levels of perpetrator participation across truth commissions would be perpetrator testimony divided by the total number of perpetrators of abuses within a commission's mandate. However, truth commissions rarely report the raw number of perpetrators. Thus, the article's measure of perpetrator participation at truth commissions (perpetrator testimony divided by all testimony) is the best measure available. To ascertain the robustness of this measure, the article develops three proxy measures for approximating the population of perpetrators: *duration*, *actors*, and *victims*.

Truth commission reports, supplemented by domestic and international NGO reports, fairly consistently report the duration of violence, the actors involved in abuses, and the number of victims identified and/or violations perpetrated. The discrepancy between reporting on perpetrators and reporting on victims may be due to, at least in part, the historical conception of truth commissions as victim-centric mechanisms of transitional justice. In addition, the identities of perpetrators may not be known by either victims or the truth commission, making calculating the number of perpetrators more difficult. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that most truth commissions (33 out of Hayner's (2011) universe of 40) do not report soliciting perpetrator testimony—testimony which could supply information on perpetrator identities and numbers. Moreover, in some cases, the number of perpetrators—and even the number of victims and violations—may be unquantifiable/unknowable.

Conflict datasets and scholarship can identify the number of perpetrators in armed conflicts. For example, Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) report 80,000 people in Sierra Leone who took up arms to challenge the state, protect the government, or defend their commitments (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008: 439). However, similar information on perpetrators in South Africa and in Timor-Leste, which were authoritarian governments—the former with domestic roots, the latter with foreign roots—is not available at present.

The three proxy measures, *duration*, *actors*, and *victims*, are applied to both the cases studied

in the article (see Table 2 in the main text) and the universe of truth commissions (see Table A1). Data used to calculate the proxy measures are drawn from the respective truth commission documents, including charters, mandates and final reports. These sources are supplemented by the United States Institute for Peace Truth Commission Digital Collection; reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Center for Transitional Justice; and Hayner (2011).

A.1 Proxy Measure 1: Duration

Intuition: The longer the duration of violence, the more perpetrators there will likely be.

Measure: The *duration* of violence refers to the time elapsed between the commission "mandate start" and "mandate close" years. The categorical variable, *duration*, takes the following values: 1, if the duration of violence is 10 or fewer years; 2, if the duration of violence is between 11 and 30 years; or 3, if the duration of violence is greater than 31 years.

Application: The Sierra Leonean civil war lasted 11 years, the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste 25 years, and South African apartheid 34 years (the commission starts with forcible displacement of non-whites in 1960, not the election of the National Party in 1948). Using this proxy measure, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste are both in category 2, while South Africa is in category 3.

A.2 Proxy Measure 2: Actors

Intuition: The greater the number of major groups involved in abuses, the more perpetrators there will likely be.

Measure: *Actors* refers to the number of major groups perpetrating abuses during inter- or intra-state violence or under authoritarian government. The categorical variable, *actors*, takes the following values: 1, if abuses were one-sided, i.e., perpetrated by one major group, such as the government or a foreign occupier; 2, if abuses were perpetrated by two major groups, such as the government and its opposition; or 3, if abuses were perpetrated by three or more major groups, such as the government and multiple opposition groups.

Application: The Revolutionary United Front and Government of Sierra Leone were the two major actors in the Sierra Leonean conflict. The National Party, African National Congress, Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, and Inkatha Freedom Party were among the major groups whose members or supporters perpetrated abuses under apartheid in South Africa. The Indonesian military (and the East Timorese militias it supported) was the major group perpetrating abuses in Timor-Leste. Using this proxy measure, Sierra Leone is in category 2, South Africa in category 3, and Timor-Leste in category 1.

A.3 Proxy Measure 3: Victims

Intuition: The greater the number victims, the more perpetrators there will likely be.[1]

Measure: *Victims* refers to the number of individuals against whom abuses were perpetrated. The categorical variable, *victims*, takes the following values: 1, if there were fewer than 1,000 victims identified in the examined period; 2, if there were between 1,001 and 100,000 victims identified; 3, if there were between 100,001 and 1 million victims identified; or 4, if there were more than 1 million victims identified.

Application: There were approximately 2.6 million victims of the Sierra Leonean conflict and just over 100,000 victims of the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste. However, the number of victims in South Africa is unquantifiable. Given its 26 million-person population (average of the period, 1960-1994), 92% of which is non-white, South Africa likely had the largest number of victims of politically-motivated crimes of the three cases examined in this study. Using this proxy measure, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste are in categories 4 and 3, respectively. I assign a missing value to South Africa.

A.4 Summary

Taken together, the proxy measures indicate that each of the cases studied had a large number of perpetrators. The measures collectively suggest that South Africa had the highest number of perpetrators of the three countries studied (see Table 2 in main text). This is consistent with the

[1] Theoretically, few perpetrators can harm many victims and many perpetrators can harm few victims. However, I assume that, in general, there exists a linear relationship between the numbers of perpetrators and victims (i.e., the number of perpetrators will generally be positively related to the number of victims).

absolute number of perpetrator participants at the three truth commissions. South Africa had the greatest absolute number of perpetrator participants (2,500), whereas and Timor-Leste had fewer (1,541), and Sierra Leone even fewer (51).

South Africa scores in the highest category for *duration* and *actors* (and, likely, victims). Sierra Leone scores in the lowest category for *duration*, the middle category for *actors*, and the highest category for *victims*. Finally, Timor-Leste scores in the lowest category for both *actors* and *victims*. The proxy measures suggest that the rate of perpetrator participation calculated in the article may be somewhat inflated for the South African case. There were more major actors engaging in abuses over a longer period of time in South Africa than in the other two cases. The real rate of perpetrator participation in South Africa may thus be lower than reported and the testimony gathered from approximately 2,500 individuals less noteworthy, at least from a numerical point of view. The proxy measures also suggest a larger number of perpetrators in Sierra Leone than in Timor-Leste. If this is so, the real rate of perpetrator participation in Sierra Leone is even lower than estimated. The middle absolute number of perpetrator participants and the highest rate of perpetrator participation in Timor-Leste is consistent with low scores across the three proxy measures.

Overall, the proxy measures suggest that the main measure of perpetrator participation in the article is a reasonable representation of the construct. Since this is a three-case comparison, variation among the three cases and their relative order is more significant in specific percentages. Thus, consistency with the proxy measures supports the categorization and relative ordering in the article—low, medium, and high perpetrator participation for Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Timor-Leste, respectively.

Table A1. List of Truth Commissions and Commission Coverage

country	mandate start	mandate close	commission start	commission close	transitional	duration	actors	victims
Argentina	1976	1983	1983	1984	Yes	1	1	2
Bolivia	1967	1982	1984	1984	*Disbanded*	2	1	2
Canada	1874	1996	2009	2015	No	3	1	3
Chad	1982	1990	1991	1992	Yes	1	2	2
Chile 1	1973	1990	1990	1991	Yes	2	1	2
Chile 2	1973	1990	2003	2005	*Follow-up to Chile 1*	2	1	2
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1960	2006	2004	2006	Yes	3	3	4
Ecuador 1	1979	1996	1996	1997	*Disbanded*	2	1	1
Ecuador 2	1984	2008	2008	2010	*Follow-up to Ecuador 1*	2	1	1
El Salvador	1980	1991	1992	1993	Yes	2	2	2
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	1980	2000	2001	2003	*Disbanded*	2	3	3
Germany 1	1945	1992	1992	1994	Yes	3	1	*NA*
Germany 2	1945	1995	1995	1998	*Follow-up to Germany 1*	3	1	*NA*
Ghana	1957	1993	2002	2004	No	3	3	2
Guatemala	1962	1996	1997	1999	Yes	3	2	3
Haiti	1991	1994	1995	1996	Yes	1	2	2
Indonesia & Timor-Leste	1999	1999	2005	2008	No	1	1	3
Kenya	1963	2008	2009	2013	*Also covered present regime.*	3	3	*NA*
Liberia	1979	2003	2006	2009	Yes	2	3	2
Mauritius	1638	2009	2009	2011	*Also covered present regime.*	3	3	*NA*
Morocco	1956	1999	2004	2006	No	3	1	1
Nepal	1961	1990	1990	1991	Yes	2	1	1
Nigeria	1966	1999	1999	2000	Yes	3	1	2
Panama	1968	1989	2001	2002	No	2	1	1

Paraguay	1954	2003	2004	2008	*Also covered present regime.*	3	1	3
Peru	1980	2000	2001	2003	Yes	2	3	2
Philippines	1972	1986	1986	1987	*Disbanded*	2	1	*NA*
Sierra Leone	1991	2002	2002	2004	Yes	2	2	4
Solomon Islands	1998	2003	2009	2011	No	1	2	1
South Africa	1960	1994	1995	2002	Yes	3	3	*NA*
South Korea 1	1975	1987	2000	2004	No	2	1	1
South Korea 2	1905	2005	2005	2009	*Follow-up to South Korea 1*	3	1	2
Sri Lanka	1988	1994	1994	1997	Yes	1	1	2
Timor-Leste	1974	1999	2002	2005	Yes	2	1	3
Togo	1958	2005	2009	2012	No	3	1	2
Uganda 1	1971	1974	1974	1974	*Incumbent self-investigation*	1	1	1
Uganda 2	1962	1986	1986	1995	Yes	2	1	3
Uruguay 1	1973	1982	1985	1985	Yes	1	1	1
Uruguay 2	1973	1985	2000	2003	No	2	1	1
Zimbabwe	1980	1985	1985	1985	*Incumbent self-investigation*	1	1	2

Source: Data from the respective truth commission charters/mandates and reports. Data supplemented by the United States Institute for Peace Truth Commission Digital Collection; reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Center for Transitional Justice; and Hayner (2011).

B South Africa: Subpoenas exercised by the TRC

1. President PW Botha

   Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. (1997) Subpoena was deliver[ed] to PW Botha at 1230 PM. Government Press Statement, November 20, 1997. Available at: http://www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/pr/1997/pr1120b.html (accessed 22 October 2015).

2. Former Commissioner of Police, General Johan Coetzee

   Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. (1996) General Johan Coetzee served with a subpoena. Government Press Statement, October 17, 1996. Available at: http://www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/pr/1996/pr1017.html (accessed 22 October 2015).

3. Minister of Defense, General Magnus Malan

   Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. (1997) Statement on political and military subpoenas. Government Press Statement, September 30, 1997. Available at: http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/media/pr/1997/p970930a.htm (accessed 22 October 2015).

4. Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok

   Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. (1996) TRC to subpoena Adriaan Vlok and police officers. Government Press Statement, October 3, 1996. Available at: http://www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/pr/1996/pr1003.html (accessed 22 October 2015).

5. Foreign Minister, Roelof (Pik) Botha and Deputy Ministers of Law and Order Roelf Meyer and Leon Wessels

   South African History Online. (1997) Appearance of Former Ministers before the TRC. Government Press Statement, October 14, 1997. Available at: http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/appearance-former-ministers-trc (accessed 22 October 2015).

6. South African Defense Forces Chief, General Georg Meiring and State Security Council Member, General Pierre van der Westhuizen

   Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. (1997) Statement on political and military subpoenas. Government Press Statement, September 30, 1997. Available at: http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/media/pr/1997/p970930a.htm (accessed 22 October 2015).

7. Senior Security police officers, Major-General Nick van Rensburg and Brigadier Willem Schoon

   Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. (1996) Two more subpoenaed to appear before the TRC. Government Press Statement, November 5, 1996. Available at: http://www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/pr/1996/pr1105c.html (accessed 22 October 2015).

8. Five former Security policemen, Brigadier Jack Cronje, Colonel Roelf Venter, Captain Wouter Mentz, Captain Jacques Hechter, and Warrant Officer Paul van Vuuren

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. (1997) TRC statement on subpoenas served on former security personnel. Government Press Statement, April 23, 1997. Available at: http://www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/pr/1997/pr0423b.html (accessed 22 October 2015).

9. South African Police Officers, Major General Izak Johannes ("Krappies") Engelbrecht, Lieutenant General Johann Le Roux, and Lieutenant General Sebastiaan ("Basie") Smit

   Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. (1996) Lieutenant General Johan Le Roux served subpoena. Government Press Statement, October 15, 1996. Available at: http://www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/pr/1996/pr1015a.html (accessed 22 October 2015).

10. "Trojan Horse Police" Policemen, Sergeant Alexander Jacobus Rossell, Police Director Christian Loedoelf, Inspector Andre John Smith, South African National Defence Force (SANDF) member, Lieutenant Colonel Salmon Pienaar, Police officer, Sergeant Albertus Myburgh Smit.

    Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. (1997) Subpoenas served on Trojan Horse policemen. Government Press Statement, April 29, 1997. Available at: http://www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/pr/1997/pr0429a.html (accessed 22 October 2015).

11. Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB): Former CCB Managing Director, Mr Joe Verster, Treasurer, Mr Wouter Jacobus Basson, alias Christo Brits, and Member of the CCB's region six, Mr Abram "Slang" van Zyl

    Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. (1998) TRC Subpoenas two CCB members. Government Press Statement, February 18, 1998. Available at: http://www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/pr/1998/pr0218e.html (accessed 22 October 2015).

    Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (1997) TRC subpoenaed three former CCB members. Government Press Statement, July 16, 1997. Available at: http://www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/pr/1997/pr0716.html (accessed 22 October 2015).

12. 10 former members of the Soweto Security Branch: Ignatius Coetzee, Wilhelm Coetzee, SP Nienaber, Hume du Toit, Jan Potgieter, Anton Pretorius, Jan Augustyn, DFM Bosman, Louis Watermeyer and Louis de Jager.

    Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. (1998) Statement - Another Mandela United Football Club Hearing. Government Press Statement, January 12, 1998. Available at: http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/media/pr/1998/p980112a.htm (accessed 22 October 2015).

13. 5 policemen: Andre Kritzinger of the Soweto murder and robbery unit, Vlakplaas commander Eugene de Kock, Soweto Molaba of the former SAP detentive services, Norman Lemmer, investigating officer on some MUDF linked cases, and Adv Van Vuuren, former deputy attorney-general of the former Transvaal province.

    Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. (1998) Statement - Another Mandela United Football Club Hearing. Government Press Statement, January 12, 1998. Available at: http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/media/pr/1998/p980112a.htm (accessed 22 October 2015).

14. Former member of the South African Youth Congress, Geoffrey Brown

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. (1997) Former SAYCO member subpoenaed. Government Press Statement, September 29, 1997. Available at: http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/media/pr/1997/p970929b.htm (accessed 22 October 2015).

15. Liberation movement Bombers, Mr Robert McBride and Ms Greta Appelgren

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. (1997) TRC on subpoenas. Government Press Statement, April 13, 1997. Available at: http://www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/pr/1997/pr0413.html (accessed 22 October 2015)