# International Organizations "Going Public"? - Online Appendix

Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt

*Table A.1: Covered IO-years*

| Name | Years covered | | N |
|---|---|---|---|
| | First | Last | |
| African Civil Service Observatory (ACSO) | 1991 | 2015 | 25 |
| African Union (AU) | 1963 | 2015 | 53 |
| Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) | 1989 | 2015 | 27 |
| Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) | 1989 | 2015 | 27 |
| Asian Development Bank (ADB) | 1966 | 2015 | 50 |
| Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) | 1967 | 2015 | 49 |
| Bank for International Settlements (BIS) | 1950 | 2015 | 66 |
| Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone (BSEC) | 1993 | 2015 | 23 |
| Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) | 1973 | 2015 | 43 |
| Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) | 1980 | 2015 | 36 |
| Central European Initiative (CEI) | 1989 | 2015 | 27 |
| Commonwealth (COMW) | 1950 | 2015 | 66 |
| Comuinidade dos Paises de Lingua Portuguesa (CPLP) | 2000 | 2015 | 16 |
| Council of Europe (CoE) | 1950 | 2015 | 66 |
| Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) | 1985 | 2015 | 31 |
| Economic and Monetary/Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (CEMAC/CEUCA) | 1964 | 2015 | 52 |
| European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) | 1991 | 2015 | 25 |
| European Collaboration on Measurement Standards (EUROMET) | 1988 | 2015 | 28 |
| European Free Trade Association (EFTA) | 1960 | 2015 | 56 |
| Intergovernmental Authority on (Draught and) Development (IGAD/IGADD) | 1996 | 2015 | 20 |
| Intern. Regional Org. against Plant and Animal Diseases (OIRSA) | 2004 | 2015 | 12 |
| Intern. Bureau for the Prot. of the Moselle agst. Pollution (IKSMS) | 1962 | 2015 | 54 |
| Intern. Coffee Organization (ICO) | 1963 | 2015 | 53 |
| Intern. Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) | 1964 | 2015 | 52 |
| Intern. Criminal Court (ICC) | 2002 | 2015 | 14 |
| Intern. Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO) | 2001 | 2015 | 15 |
| Intern. Monetary Fund (IMF) | 1950 | 2015 | 66 |
| Intern. Telecommunications Satellites Organization (ITSO) | 2001 | 2015 | 15 |
| Intern. Whaling Commission (IWC) | 1950 | 2015 | 66 |
| Niger Basin Authority (ABN) | 1980 | 2015 | 36 |
| Nordic Council (NC) | 1993 | 2015 | 23 |
| North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) | 1994 | 2015 | 22 |
| North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) | 1950 | 2015 | 66 |
| North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) | 1982 | 2015 | 34 |
| Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) | 1979 | 2015 | 37 |
| Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) | 1961 | 2015 | 55 |
| Organization/Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE/CSCE) | 1994 | 2015 | 22 |
| Organization of American States (OAS) | 1951 | 2015 | 65 |
| Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) | 1968 | 2015 | 48 |
| Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) | 1988 | 2015 | 28 |
| Pacific Islands Forum/South Pacific Forum (PIF/SPF) | 1976 | 2015 | 40 |
| Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) | 2001 | 2015 | 15 |
| South Asia Co-operative Environment Program (SACEP) | 1982 | 2015 | 34 |
| United Nations (UN) | 1950 | 2015 | 66 |
| Wassenaar Arrangement (Wassenaar) | 1998 | 2015 | 18 |
| Western European Union (WEU) | 1954 | 2011 | 58 |
| World Bank Group (WB) | 1950 | 2015 | 66 |
| World Trade Organization/General Agr. On Tariffs and Trade (WTO/GATT) | 1950 | 2015 | 66 |

*Table A.2: Codebook on Tasks*

| **Category** | **Definition** | **Example** |
|---|---|---|
| GENERAL PUBLICS | All kinds of communication that addresses a general public that typically includes laypersons; includes the production of text, pictures, radio or films etc. but also networking with mass media organizations and journalists | "Description of the present Press and Information work of the DPI: … diffusion of news via the *mass media* and the various services offered by the Press Division" (CoE, 1975: 249). |
| NONSTATE PUBLICS | All kinds of communication that addresses *specific publics (including networks)* of civil-society organizations and lobbies | "Among the specific groups with which the IMF engages in its outreach activities are *civil society organizations and youth leaders, trade and labor unions*…." (IMF, 2014: 70). |
| EXPERT PUBLICS | All kinds of communication addressing experts that have "special knowledge," typically from academia or think tanks; a focus on publication of studies and datasets | "The Directorate … uses a variety of means including … partnerships with *academia*…" (AU, 2014: 55) |
| ADVICE | Giving advice to upper management on issues related to public communication, for example, regarding public opinion or management's own communication with external publics (bottom-up) | ADB Office of External Relations supports the ADB President "*advising* on external events and developments that directly affect ADB; … *advising* on appropriate responses to comments in the media" (ADB, 2001: 19) |
| COORDINATION | Internal governance of division of labor, facilitating cooperation and monitoring of various communication units and projects | "During NATO operations, the Public Information Adviser is … dealing with public information matters and … *coordinates* … public information strategies" (NATO, 2006: 102). |
| RESEARCH | Systematic empirical measurement of audiences, communication output and impact | "The DPI issues a periodical review of press coverage results and analyses the impact of selected events" (CoE, 1975: 252). |
| STRATEGIC PLANNING | Development of long-term strategies (including action plans), goals, target audiences, responsibilities and key-messages | "As requested…, the Public Information and Documentation Section (PIDS) will present a Strategic Communications Plan at the ninth session of the ASP" (ICC, 2010: 119). |

*Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics*

| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Democratic IO Membership* | 1932 | 4.11 | 4.95 | -8.86 | 10.00 |
| *Transparency-Accountability Index (TAI)* | 1932 | 0.52 | 0.31 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *Local Activities* | 1767 | 0.59 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| *Social Issues* | 1932 | 0.27 | 0.44 | 0 | 1 |
| *Development Issues* | 1932 | 0.25 | 0.44 | 0 | 1 |
| *Environmental Issues* | 1932 | 0.30 | 0.46 | 0 | 1 |
| *Human Rights Issues* | 1932 | 0.21 | 0.41 | 0 | 1 |
| *Protest (0/1)* | 1884 | 0.08 | 0.27 | 0 | 1 |
| *Scandal (0/1)* | 1884 | 0.02 | 0.13 | 0 | 1 |
| *Abs. Coverage of Protests (log(N))* | 1884 | 0.13 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 4.25 |
| *Abs. Coverage of Scandals (log(N))* | 1884 | 0.02 | 0.23 | 0.00 | 3.89 |
| *Rel. Coverage of Protests (%)* | 1884 | 0.10 | 0.65 | 0.00 | 10.00 |
| *Rel. Coverage of Scandals (%)* | 1884 | 0.02 | 0.37 | 0.00 | 10.33 |
| *Minimal Budget* | 1932 | 0.89 | 0.31 | 0 | 1 |

**Further analysis and checks of robustness**

The variable *Time Until Reform* combines three pieces of information as outlined in section 4.1: the definition of new communication tasks, the establishment of new communication units, and the release of new communication strategies. The descriptive results presented in section 2 of the paper already suggests that the dynamic of establishing new tasks or units (*Time Until New Units/Tasks*) differs from the release of new strategies (*Time Until New Strategy*) to some extent—with a much lower rate of reform activity that starts earlier in the case of the former compared to the latter. Therefore, one may suspect that treating these aspects separately might lead to different results than with the pooled variable as the dependent variable. To test for this possibility, I assume conditional independence of different kinds of reforms, which allows the application of a "latent survivor time approach" (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004: 168ff) to account for competing risks to reform. Accordingly, I run separate models on each kind of reform, treating episodes that end with alternative kinds of reform as right-censored. In terms of estimated coefficients, the results remain fairly stable for *Time Until New Tasks* and *Time Until New Units* but not for *Time Until New Strategy* compared to the "pooled" analysis (see Table A.4). There are notable differences in three respects: First, while the estimated coefficient for the indicator *Human Rights Issues* is of comparable size over different models, it is not significant for models with *Time Until New Strategy* as the dependent variable. Hence, there is even less statistical support for hypothesis 1 with respect to strategy development of public communication than there is for other organizational features of IO public communication.

Second, the risk of releasing new strategies does not significantly depend on the mean level of democracy among IO member states (*Democratic IO Membership*) at any level of the *Transparency-Accountability Index*. Nevertheless, higher values of the index significantly account for a higher reform speed regarding communication strategies. While I find support for the notion that normative change plays a role in making public communication reforms more likely (unconditional public information hypothesis), I do not find evidence that democratic member states play a more decisive role in pushing for new communication strategies than non-democratic IO members.

*Table A.4: Cox Proportional Hazard Models for Specific Kinds of Communication Reforms*

| Dependent variable: | *Time Until New Task* | | | *Time Until New Unit* | | | *Time Until New Strategy* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 |
| *Local Activities* | -0.707* | -0.670* | -0.553# | -0.365# | -0.338# | -0.266 | -0.653 | -0.510 | -0.426 |
| | (0.353) | (0.339) | (0.331) | (0.197) | (0.195) | (0.186) | (0.462) | (0.451) | (0.454) |
| *Local Activities * log(time)* | 0.484** | 0.475** | 0.431** | 0.267* | 0.261* | 0.235* | 0.761# | 0.704# | 0.676 |
| | (0.160) | (0.158) | (0.160) | (0.114) | (0.113) | (0.114) | (0.433) | (0.422) | (0.424) |
| *Social Policy Issues* | 0.159 | 0.165 | 0.194 | 0.214 | 0.203 | 0.206 | -0.458 | -0.437 | -0.435 |
| | (0.222) | (0.222) | (0.202) | (0.160) | (0.161) | (0.152) | (0.391) | (0.366) | (0.347) |
| *Development Issues* | 0.053 | 0.048 | 0.111 | -0.037 | -0.020 | 0.008 | 0.514 | 0.508 | 0.509 |
| | (0.208) | (0.202) | (0.221) | (0.137) | (0.135) | (0.147) | (0.332) | (0.330) | (0.333) |
| *Environmental Issues* | 0.021 | 0.021 | 0.026 | -0.090 | -0.085 | -0.052 | -0.140 | -0.122 | -0.109 |
| | (0.258) | (0.255) | (0.260) | (0.170) | (0.169) | (0.169) | (0.446) | (0.435) | (0.429) |
| *Human Rights Issues* | 0.480* | 0.502** | 0.525* | 0.294* | 0.306* | 0.331* | 0.363 | 0.389 | 0.395 |
| | (0.201) | (0.192) | (0.214) | (0.135) | (0.133) | (0.142) | (0.379) | (0.375) | (0.386) |
| *Transparency-Accountability-Index (TAI)* | -0.654 | -0.714 | -0.553 | -0.369 | -0.390 | -0.301 | 3.040*** | 2.980*** | 3.013*** |
| | (0.489) | (0.482) | (0.386) | (0.317) | (0.309) | (0.241) | (0.909) | (0.863) | (0.873) |
| *Democratic Membership* | -0.047 | -0.046 | -0.038 | -0.033 | -0.033 | -0.026 | 0.089 | 0.091 | 0.094 |
| | (0.036) | (0.036) | (0.036) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.081) | (0.076) | (0.075) |
| *Democratic Membership* TAI* | 0.197** | 0.200** | 0.173** | 0.110* | 0.111** | 0.093* | -0.014 | -0.014 | -0.021 |
| | (0.073) | (0.073) | (0.062) | (0.045) | (0.043) | (0.037) | (0.126) | (0.120) | (0.121) |
| *Protest (0/1)* | 0.667*** | | | 0.437*** | | | 0.623* | | |
| | (0.171) | | | (0.107) | | | (0.285) | | |
| *Scandal (0/1)* | 0.918* | | | 0.468** | | | 0.826* | | |
| | (0.377) | | | (0.170) | | | (0.391) | | |
| *Abs. Coverage of Protests (log(N))* | | 0.342*** | | | 0.229*** | | | 0.214* | |
| | | (0.075) | | | (0.052) | | | (0.109) | |
| *Abs. Coverage of Scandals (log(N))* | | 0.677** | | | 0.175** | | | 0.440* | |
| | | (0.254) | | | (0.062) | | | (0.176) | |
| *Rel. Coverage of Protests (%)* | | | 0.133*** | | | 0.108*** | | | 0.103# |
| | | | (0.034) | | | (0.028) | | | (0.060) |
| *Rel. Coverage of Scandals (%)* | | | 0.363*** | | | 0.231*** | | | 0.191** |
| | | | (0.107) | | | (0.052) | | | (0.066) |
| *Minimal Budget* | 1.840* | 1.826* | 1.796* | 1.731** | 1.723** | 1.703** | 0.812 | 0.803 | 0.806 |
| | (0.735) | (0.735) | (0.741) | (0.529) | (0.531) | (0.533) | (0.633) | (0.638) | (0.642) |
| Wald chi-square | 81.810 | 105.771 | 152.931 | 93.34 | 112.50 | 130.86 | 244.04 | 236.66 | 156.54 |
| Log pseudolikelihood | -575.601 | -575.685 | -578.005 | -1263.18 | -1263.30 | -1264.95 | -252.74 | -253.67 | -254.10 |
| N IO-Years | 1550 | 1550 | 1550 | 1676 | 1676 | 1676 | 1474 | 1474 | 1474 |
| N Episodes | 235 | 235 | 235 | 336 | 336 | 336 | 214 | 214 | 214 |
| of which N end w/ observed reforms | 141 | 141 | 141 | 267 | 267 | 267 | 65 | 65 | 65 |
| of which N are right-censored | 94 | 94 | 94 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 149 | 149 | 149 |
| N IOs | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 |

*Note*: The table reports coefficients from Cox regression models with robust standard errors clustered over IOs in parentheses. # p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

To further check the robustness of the findings, I replicated Models 2 to 4 on *Time Until Reform* while controlling for fundamental changes in information and communication technologies over time. These changes may have led IOs to perceive societal environments as increasingly demanding and/or receptive to public communication. The variable *Information Society* is calculated using data provided by the International Telecommunication Union (2014), which, unfortunately, is only available for the years after 1960. It measures varying degrees of public access to information and telecommunication technologies over time and IO membership. Four variables are used to construct the index *Information Society*: mobile cellular subscriptions, fixed telephone subscriptions, fixed broadband (high-speed internet) subscriptions, and Internet users (all per 100 people). *Information Society* equals the sum of the mean values of these four variables over all the regions where a specific IO has members. The component variables were normalized (range 0-.25) to obtain the same unit of measurement before aggregation. Note that the data used to construct this variable is available only for the years post-1960, which leads to the loss of 22 reform episodes, which had to be excluded from the analysis. The estimated coefficients for this variable are insignificant across models and the results for the main explanatory variables do not change remarkably. Finally, I employ *discrete time logistic regression* as an approach that constitutes an alternative to event history analysis. The models account for time dependence using a cubic polynomial of duration (Carter and Signorino, 2010), because estimates suggest that the probability of observing reforms in a given IO-year is significantly dependent on the duration of a previous period of nonreform (cf. Beck et al., 1998). Table A.5 reports the results of these models and reveals similar results to those reported in Table 2.[1]

[1] Note that due to an absence of an interaction term with time, the logit models are not suited for identifying a positive relationship for longer reform episodes—which is, however, not statistically significant according to the Cox regression results anyway.

*Table A.5: Replication with the Variable "Information Society" and TSCE-Logit Regression*

| Dependent variable: | Model 14 | Model 15 | Model 16 | Model 17 | Model 18 | Model 19 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Time Until Reform* | Cox | Cox | Cox | Logit | Logit | Logit |
| *Local Activities* | -0.398# | -0.356# | -0.293 | -0.303 | -0.265 | -0.122 |
| | (0.206) | (0.201) | (0.199) | (0.398) | (0.389) | (0.397) |
| *Local Activities * log(time)* | 0.341** | 0.330** | 0.304** | 0.324# | 0.308# | 0.258 |
| | (0.114) | (0.114) | (0.114) | (0.168) | (0.164) | (0.170) |
| *Social Policy Issues* | 0.115 | 0.102 | 0.104 | 0.006 | -0.004 | -0.021 |
| | (0.147) | (0.144) | (0.131) | (0.263) | (0.260) | (0.257) |
| *Development Issues* | 0.095 | 0.104 | 0.113 | 0.145 | 0.145 | 0.201 |
| | (0.111) | (0.108) | (0.113) | (0.180) | (0.176) | (0.207) |
| *Environmental Issues* | -0.136 | -0.130 | -0.101 | -0.088 | -0.081 | -0.047 |
| | (0.158) | (0.156) | (0.153) | (0.303) | (0.297) | (0.312) |
| *Human Rights Issues* | 0.271* | 0.280* | 0.305* | 0.632** | 0.645** | 0.696** |
| | (0.125) | (0.123) | (0.131) | (0.227) | (0.221) | (0.241) |
| *Democratic Membership* | -0.038* | -0.037* | -0.033* | -0.038 | -0.038 | -0.032 |
| | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.017) | (0.036) | (0.036) | (0.036) |
| *Transparency-Accountability-Index* | 0.217 | 0.192 | 0.296 | 0.123 | 0.130 | 0.192 |
| | (0.330) | (0.324) | (0.294) | (0.476) | (0.469) | (0.427) |
| *Democratic Membership* TA-Index* | 0.118** | 0.117** | 0.107** | 0.169* | 0.170* | 0.159* |
| | (0.038) | (0.036) | (0.033) | (0.068) | (0.066) | (0.063) |
| *Protest (0/1)* | 0.384*** | | | 0.689*** | | |
| | (0.080) | | | (0.176) | | |
| *Scandal (0/1)* | 0.415* | | | 1.351*** | | |
| | (0.172) | | | (0.262) | | |
| *Abs. Coverage of Protests (log(N))* | | 0.175*** | | | 0.337*** | |
| | | (0.043) | | | (0.088) | |
| *Abs. Coverage of Scandals (log(N))* | | 0.194* | | | 0.901*** | |
| | | (0.078) | | | (0.219) | |
| *Rel. Coverage of Protests (%)* | | | 0.075** | | | 0.146* |
| | | | (0.028) | | | (0.069) |
| *Rel. Coverage of Scandals (%)* | | | 0.165*** | | | 0.359* |
| | | | (0.026) | | | (0.157) |
| *Minimal Budget* | 1.463** | 1.458** | 1.450** | 2.103** | 2.121** | 2.105** |
| | (0.491) | (0.493) | (0.496) | (0.719) | (0.724) | (0.733) |
| *Information Society* | -0.004 | -0.003 | -0.004 | | | |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | | | |
| Constant | | | | -3.147*** | -3.173*** | -3.214*** |
| | | | | (0.816) | (0.821) | (0.823) |
| T | | | | -0.428*** | -0.428*** | -0.429*** |
| | | | | (0.075) | (0.075) | (0.077) |
| $T^2$ | | | | 0.020*** | 0.020*** | 0.020*** |
| | | | | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| $T^3$ | | | | -0.000** | -0.000** | -0.000** |
| | | | | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Wald chi-square | 193.55 | 209.29 | 193.09 | 489.12 | 401.12 | 347.47 |
| Log (pseudo)likelihood | -1332.18 | -1332.79 | -1333.66 | -652.97 | -653.04 | -659.18 |
| N IO-Years | 1625 | 1625 | 1625 | 1719 | 1719 | 1719 |
| N IOs | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 |

*Note*: The table reports coefficients from Cox and logit regression models with robust standard errors clustered over IOs in parentheses. # p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

**References**


Asian Development Bank. 2001. *Reorganization of the Asian Development Bank. September 2001*. Mandaluyong City: Asian Development Bank.

African Union. 2014. *The African Union Handbook 2014*. Addis Ababa and Wellington: African Union Commission and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade/Manat Aorere.

Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan Katz, and Richard Tucker. (1998) Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable. *American Journal of Political Science* 42:1260-88.

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M, and Bradford S Jones. (2004) *Event history modeling: A guide for social scientists*. Cambridge University Press.

Carter, David B, and Curtis S Signorino. (2010) Back to the future: Modeling time dependence in binary data. *Political Analysis* 18:271-92.

Council of Europe, Council of Ministers. 1975. *Information Policy and Programme of the Council of Europe and DPI Programme for 1975. CM (75) 176*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

International Criminal Court, Assembly of States. 2010. *Proposed Programme Budget for 2011 of the International Criminal Court. ICC-ASP/9/10*. The Hague: International Criminal Court.

International Monetary Fund 2014. *The IMF Annual Report 2014. From Stabilization to Sustainable Growth*. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publication Services.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Public Diplomacy Division. 2006. *NATO Handbook*. Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

International Telecommunication Union. 2014. *Measuring the Information Society Report 2014*. Geneva: International Telecommunication Union.