A Appendices

A Appendices **A-1**

A.1 Summary Tables A-2

A.2 Additional Figures and Tables A-6

A.3 Immigration Policy Index Construction A-18

A.1 Summary Tables

Table A1: Summary Statistics for 24 Democracies from 1946 to 2013

Variable	Source	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Immigration Policy	Peters (2015); Author	-0.853	0.752	-2.879	0.507	1315
ln(Oil Income per Capita)	Haber and Menaldo (2011); World Bank (2014)	2.812	2.675	0	9.816	1297
ln(Oil Income per Capita, R&M)	Ross and Mahdavi (2015)	3.053	2.695	0	9.791	1217
Oil Income as % of GDP	Haber and Menaldo (2011); World Bank (2014)	0.022	0.065	0	0.536	1297
Oil Income as % of GDP, R &M	Ross and Mahdavi (2015)	0.019	0.054	0	0.469	1217
ln(Oil Exports Income per Capita)	Ross and Mahdavi (2015)	3.005	2.711	0	8.071	625
ln(Metal Income per Capita)	Haber and Menaldo (2011); World Bank (2014))	2.851	2.168	0	7.994	1315
ln(Coal Income per Capita)	Haber and Menaldo (2011); World Bank (2014)	2.46	2.032	0	8.574	1315
ln(Oil + Gas Income per Capita)	Haber and Menaldo (2011); World Bank (2014)	3.278	2.752	0	10.037	1297
ln(GDP per capita)	Haber and Menaldo (2011); World Bank (2014)	9.550	0.579	7.2	10.541	1315
GDP Growth	Haber and Menaldo (2011); World Bank (2014)	0.035	0.04	-0.121	0.701	1309
ln(Population)	Haber and Menaldo (2011); World Bank (2014)	16.73	1.245	14.38	19.55	1315
Polity Score	Marshall and Gurr (2014)	9.225	2.268	-9	10	1310

Tariff Rate	Clemens and Williamson (2004); Peters (2015); World Bank (2014); Johansen (1985)	4.54	4.387	0.147	38.1	1235
Real Effective Exchange Rate	Darvas (2012a,b,c)	101.947	44.851	50.87	571.86	1062
Welfare Taxes (% GDP)	Cusack (2000); Cusack and Beramendi (2006); Author	7.781	5.548	0	21.27	1010
Personal Income Taxes (% GDP)	Cusack (2000); Cusack and Beramendi (2006); Author	10.554	4.711	2.768	27.818	1001
Union Density	Armingeon, Isler, Knöpfel et al. (2016); Visser (2015)	39.658	18.868	7.548	87.427	859
Right-wing Populism Vote Share	Swank (2014)	2.842	5.94	0	29	1017
Schengen Membership	Schengen (2016)	0.109	0.311	0	1	1315
OECD Membership	OECD (2016)	0.672	0.47	0	1	1264
EU Membership	Armingeon, Isler, Knöpfel et al. (2016)	0.451	0.498	0	1	871
% of Population over 65	Armingeon, Isler, Knöpfel et al. (2016); OECD (various years)	13.219	2.846	5.727	23.024	871
Seat Share of Right Parties in Government	Armingeon, Isler, Knöpfel et al. (2016); Schmidt and Beyer (1992)	23.015	23.32	0	78.5	871
Electoral System	Armingeon, Isler, Knöpfel et al. (2016); European Journal of Political Research (various years); Ismayr (2003); Lijphart (2012)	1.39	0.820	0	2	871
Presidentialism	Armingeon, Isler, Knöpfel et al. (2016); European Journal of Political Research (various years); Huber, Ragin, Stephens et al. (2004); Ismayr (2003, 2006, 2010); Lijphart (2012)	0.63	1.159	0	4	871

Years of Secondary Education (Age 15+)	Barro and Lee (2013)	2.901	1.391	0.35	6.84	1246
% Population with Secondary Education (Age 15+)	Barro and Lee (2013)	23.313	13.42	1.992	57.038	1246
Years of Tertiary Education (Age 15+)	Barro and Lee (2013)	0.432	0.317	0.023	1.614	1246
% Population with Tertiary Education (Age 15+)	Barro and Lee (2013)	7.543	5.686	0.32	30.038	1246
Years of Secondary Education (Age 25+)	Barro and Lee (2013)	2.76	1.431	0.323	6.899	1246
% Population with Secondary Education (Age 25+)	Barro and Lee (2013)	21.869	13.432	1.7	56.854	1246
Years of Tertiary Education (Age 25+)	Barro and Lee (2013)	0.461	0.344	0.032	1.764	1246
% Population with Tertiary Education (Age 25+)	Barro and Lee (2013)	8.592	6.537	0.461	34.786	1246
Population % of Migrants (Total)	World Bank (2014); Author's calculation	0.082	0.056	0.003	0.261	1055
Population % of Migrants (Original Non-OECD)	World Bank (2014); Author's calculation	0.047	0.033	0.002	0.175	1055
Population % of Migrants (Ascension Non-OECD)	World Bank (2014); Author's calculation	0.033	0.024	0.001	0.126	1055
Population % of Migrants (Original Non-OECD + Turkey)	World Bank (2014); Author's calculation	0.05	0.035	0.002	0.176	1055
Population % of Migrants (Ascension Non-OECD + Turkey & Mexico)	World Bank (2014); Author's calculation	0.037	0.027	0.001	0.128	1055

Table A2: Oil Income per Capita (By Country)

Country	*Mean*	*SD*	*Min*	*Max*
Argentina	178.21	153.62	15.74	587.73
Australia	278.85	276.28	0	1004.72
Austria	44.93	28.16	15.71	153.44
Belgium	0	0	0	0
Brazil	38.14	40.67	0.02	162.66
Canada	623.00	534.29	7.38	2070.37
Chile	22.12	22.92	1.53	106.30
Denmark	245.79	319.55	0	1301.631
France	6.94	4.97	0.11	18.84
Germany	12.04	8.74	1.35	40.19
Ireland	0	0	0	0
Japan	1.08	0.65	0.35	2.86
Netherlands	34.87	28.13	0.55	125.27
Norway	4280.69	5466.97	0	18314.82
New Zealand	98.61	163.93	0	913.25
South Africa	1.05	2.42	0	10.55
South Korea	0	0	0	0
Spain	5.42	8.48	0	39.43
Sweden	0.10	0.33	0	2.06
Switzerland	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom	316.49	367.70	0.09	1296.59
United States	367.47	274.28	139.45	1281.38
Venezuela	1916.48	957.41	812.23	5328.97

A.2 Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Marginal Effects of Ln(Oil and Gas Income per Capita) (t-1) with 95% Confidence Intervals



(a) Model A23 (b) Model A25 (c) Model A27 (d) Model A28

Note: This figure shows the marginal effect of oil and gas income per capita on immigration policy depending on the tariff rate as calculated from Table A7: Models A23, A25, A27 and A28.

Figure A2: Marginal Effects of Ln(Oil Income per Capita) with 95% Confidence Intervals



(a) Model A53 (b) Model A55 (c) Model A57 (d) Model A58

Note: This figure shows the marginal effect of oil income per capita on immigration policy depending on the tariff rate as calculated from Table A11: Models A53, A55, A57 and A58.

Table A3: Oil Wealth and Decline in the Manufacturing Sector

	(A0)	(A1)
Manufacturing Value Added (t-1)		0.962***
		(0.017)
Ln(Oil Income per Capita)	-1.054***	-0.044*
	(0.149)	(0.018)
Tariff Rate	12.378	-1.173
	(8.408)	(2.631)
Ln(GDP per Capita)	-0.006	-0.137
	(1.226)	(0.211)
GDP Growth	10.164	0.266
	(7.544)	(2.989)
Polity Score	-1.003***	-0.077*
	(0.255)	(0.030)
Ln(Population)	0.001	-0.034
	(0.466)	(0.031)
Observations	630	609
Countries	23	23

Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis of the value added in the manufacturing sector (as % of GDP) with year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on country and shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and $^{+}$ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.

Table A4: Oil Wealth and Immigration Policy (Models A2-A5)

Model	(A2)	(A3)	(A4)	(A5)
Years	1961–2012	1961–2012	1985–2012	1985–2012
Immigration Policy (t-1)	0.873***	0.878***	0.669***	0.632***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.038)	(0.062)
Oil Income as % of GDP (t-1)	0.369^{+}			
	(0.202)			
Oil Income as % of GDP, R&M (t-1)		0.775*		
		(0.332)		
Ln(Oil Exports Income per Capita) (t-1)			0.001	-0.001
			(0.005)	(0.007)
Welfare Taxes (% GDP) (t-1)	-0.001	-0.000		-0.020*
	(0.003)	(0.004)		(0.008)
Personal Income Taxes (% GDP) (t-1)	-0.007*	-0.004		-0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.004)
Right-wing Populist Vote Share (t-1)	-0.003*	-0.002*		-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)
Common Controls Included: Ln(GDP per Capita) (t-1); GDP Growth (t-1); Ln(Population) (t-1); Polity Score (t-1); Tariff Rate (t-1); and Real Effective Exchange Rate (t-1)				
Observations	805	821	573	447
Countries	17	17	23	17
R^2	0.991	0.991	0.996	0.997

Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis of Immigration Policy in year *t*. Panel-corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and $^{+}$ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Country and year fixed effects as well as country-specific time trends are included in all models.

Table A5: Conditional Effect of Oil Wealth on Immigration Policy (Models A6-A10)

Model	(A6)	(A7)	(A8)	(A9)	(A10)
Years	1961–2013	1961–2013	1961–2013	1961–2013	1961–2013
Immigration Policy (t-1)	0.884***	0.868***	0.880***	0.880***	0.869***
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Ln(Oil Income per Capita) (t-1)	-0.025***	-0.022**	-0.027***	-0.028***	-0.023**
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Tariff Rate (t-1)	0.003	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Ln(Oil Income per Capita) × Tariff Rate (t-1)	0.002^{+}	0.001^{+}	0.002**	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ln(GDP per Capita) (t-1)	0.029	-0.049	0.007	0.058	0.001
	(0.083)	(0.085)	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.091)
GDP Growth (t-1)	-0.071	-0.054	-0.058	-0.103	-0.058
	(0.209)	(0.203)	(0.201)	(0.202)	(0.209)
Ln(Population) (t-1)	-0.926***	-1.254***	-0.913***	-0.945***	-1.330***
	(0.279)	(0.312)	(0.276)	(0.279)	(0.316)
Polity Score (t-1)	-0.033^{+}	-0.037*	-0.031^{+}	-0.035*	-0.038*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Union Density (t-1)	0.002				0.002
	(0.001)				(0.001)
% Population over 65 (t-1)		-0.019*			-0.021*
		(0.008)			(0.009)
Seat Share of Right Parties in Government (t-1)			0.000*		0.000*
			(0.000)		(0.000)
Electoral System (t-1)			0.027		0.036
			(0.025)		(0.031)
Presidentialism (t-1)			0.000		-0.001
			(0.013)		(0.013)
EU Member (t-1)				0.062*	0.054^{+}
				(0.030)	(0.031)
Schengen Member (t-1)				0.020	0.017
				(0.022)	(0.022)
OECD Member (t-1)				0.034	0.066
				(0.040)	(0.047)
Observations	806	816	816	816	806
Countries	17	17	17	17	17
R^2	0.992	0.992	0.992	0.992	0.992

Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis of Immigration Policy in year *t*. Panel-corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and $^{+}$ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Country and year fixed effects as well as country-specific time trends are included in all models.

Table A6: Oil and Gas Wealth and Immigration Policy (Models A11-A20)

Model	(A11)	(A12)	(A13)	(A14)	(A15)	(A16)	(A17)	(A18)	(A19)	(A20)
Years	1901–2013	1901–2013	1901-1913	1914-1945	1946-2013	1946–2013	1961–2013	1951–1995	1951-2012	1961–1995
Immigration Policy (t-1)	0.913***	0.912***	0.560***	0.774***	0.905***	0.895***	0.900***	0.893***	0.894***	0.873***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.116)	(0.066)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Ln(Oil & Gas Income per Capita) (t-1)	-0.006**	-0.006**	0.023	0.042	-0.009**	-0.009*	-0.012**	-0.008^{+}	-0.005	-0.014**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Ln(GDP per Capita) (t-1)		-0.033^{+}	-0.065	-0.115	-0.040	-0.001	0.029	-0.069	-0.012	-0.087
		(0.017)	(0.150)	(0.096)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.086)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.085)
GDP Growth (t-1)		0.115*	-0.031	0.277*	0.066	0.042	0.023	-0.188	-0.159	-0.149
		(0.048)	(0.201)	(0.131)	(0.071)	(0.127)	(0.202)	(0.171)	(0.156)	(0.208)
Ln(Population) (t-1)		-0.007	1.067	0.216	0.097	0.189	0.001	-0.152	-0.103	-0.715**
		(0.073)	(1.236)	(0.235)	(0.112)	(0.175)	(0.226)	(0.229)	(0.220)	(0.273)
Polity Score (t-1)		0.001	-0.051	0.010^{+}	-0.008*	-0.001	-0.005	-0.008	-0.008	-0.038*
		(0.002)	(0.060)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.018)
Tariff Rate (t-1)						0.004**	0.005^{+}	0.008**	0.007**	0.009*
						(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Real Effective Exchange Rate (t-1)							0.000			-0.000
							(0.000)			(0.000)
Welfare Taxes (% GDP) (t-1)								-0.004		-0.003
								(0.003)		(0.003)
Personal Income Taxes (% GDP) (t-1)								-0.010***		-0.009**
								(0.003)		(0.003)
Right-wing Populist Vote Share (t-1)									-0.003**	-0.002*
									(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	1651	1635	109	263	1263	1198	995	921	939	805
Countries	24	24	9	10	24	24	23	17	17	17
R^2	0.988	0.988	0.996	0.968	0.989	0.990	0.991	0.991	0.990	0.992

Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis of Immigration Policy in year *t*. Panel-corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and $^{+}$ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Country and year fixed effects as well as country-specific time trends are included in all models.

Table A7: Conditional Effect of Oil and Gas Wealth on Immigration Policy (Models A21-A30)

Model	(A21)	(A22)	(A23)	(A24)	(A25)	(A26)	(A27)	(A28)	(A29)	(A30)
Years	1947–2013	1961–2013	1951–2013	1951–2012	1961–2012	1961–2013	1961–2013	1961–2013	1961–2013	1961–2013
Immigration Policy (t-1)	0.896***	0.901***	0.890***	0.892***	0.868***	0.886***	0.869***	0.883***	0.883***	0.869***
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Ln(Oil & Gas Income per Capita) (t-1)	-0.008	-0.009+	-0.014*	-0.009	-0.021***	-0.016**	-0.015*	-0.019**	-0.019**	-0.015*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Tariff Rate (t-1)	0.005***	0.007***	0.005+	0.006*	0.004	0.004	0.006	0.004	0.006	0.006
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Ln(Oil & Gas Income per Capita) × Tariff Rate (t-1)	-0.000	-0.001	0.001+	0.001	0.002+	0.001	0.001	0.002*	0.001	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ln(GDP per Capita) (t-1)	-0.007	0.014	-0.043	0.007	-0.055	0.021	-0.072	0.001	0.038	-0.030
	(0.040)	(0.090)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.092)
GDP Growth (t-1)	0.041	0.025	-0.198	-0.163	-0.161	-0.091	-0.061	-0.079	-0.116	-0.065
	(0.127)	(0.201)	(0.171)	(0.157)	(0.209)	(0.212)	(0.205)	(0.203)	(0.204)	(0.212)
Ln(Population) (t-1)	0.190	0.012	-0.196	-0.144	-0.819**	-0.891**	-1.279***	-0.884**	-0.910**	-1.358***
	(0.175)	(0.230)	(0.234)	(0.230)	(0.283)	(0.278)	(0.313)	(0.276)	(0.278)	(0.319)
Polity Score (t-1)	-0.001	-0.005	-0.008	-0.008	-0.040*	-0.032+	-0.037*	-0.031+	-0.034+	-0.037*
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Real Effective Exchange Rate (t-1)		0.000			-0.000					
		(0.000)			(0.000)					
Welfare Taxes (% GDP) (t-1)			-0.003		-0.001					
			(0.003)		(0.004)					
Personal Income Taxes (% GDP) (t-1)			-0.011***		-0.010**					
			(0.003)		(0.003)					
Right-wing Populist Vote Share (t-1)				-0.003**	-0.002*					
				(0.001)	(0.001)					
Union Density (t-1)						0.002				0.002
						(0.001)				(0.001)
% Population over 65 (t-1)							-0.021**			-0.024**
							(0.008)			(0.008)
Seat Share of Right Parties in Government (t-1)								0.000+		0.000*
								(0.000)		(0.000)
Electoral System (t-1)								0.027		0.036
								(0.025)		(0.031)
Presidentialism (t-1)								0.000		-0.001
								(0.013)		(0.013)
EU Member (t-1)									0.056+	0.048
									(0.030)	(0.031)
Schengen Member (t-1)									0.019	0.016
									(0.022)	(0.023)
OECD Member (t-1)									0.031	0.055
									(0.039)	(0.045)
Observations	1198	995	921	939	805	806	816	816	816	806
Countries	24	23	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
R^2	0.990	0.991	0.991	0.990	0.992	0.992	0.992	0.992	0.992	0.992

Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis of Immigration Policy in year *t*. Panel-corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Country and year fixed effects as well as country-specific time trends are included in all models.

Table A8: Natura Resources and Immigration Policy (Models A31-A34)

Model	(A31)	(A32)	(A33)	(A34)
Years	1947–2013	1947–2013	1901–2013	1891–2013
Immigration Policy (t-1)	0.897***	0.894***	0.908***	0.910***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Ln(Metal Income per Capita) (t-1)	-0.004		-0.002	
	(0.008)		(0.004)	
Ln(Coal Income per Capita) (t-1)		0.010+		0.003
		(0.005)		(0.004)
Ln(GDP per Capita) (t-1)	-0.001	-0.012	-0.001	-0.007
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.028)
GDP Growth (t-1)	0.012	0.016	0.023	0.015
	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.081)	(0.078)
Ln(Population) (t-1)	0.259+	0.309+	0.028	0.025
	(0.157)	(0.161)	(0.105)	(0.094)
Polity Score (t-1)	-0.001	-0.000	0.005	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Tariff Rate (t-1)	0.003*	0.004**	0.004***	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	1215	1215	1502	1552
Countries	24	24	24	24
R^2	0.990	0.990	0.989	0.989

Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis of Immigration Policy in year *t*. Panel-corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Country and year fixed effects as well as country-specific time trends are included in all models.

Table A9: Conditional Effect of Oil Wealth on Immigration Policy (Models A35-A44)

	(A35)	(A36)	(A37)	(A38)	(A39)	(A40)	(A41)	(A42)	(A43)	(A44)
Immigration Policy (t-1)	0.896***	0.895***	0.883***	0.892***	0.878***	0.902***	0.899***	0.899***	0.908***	0.880***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Ln(Oil Income per Capita) (t-1)	0.014	0.015	0.052	0.020	0.061	-0.013***	-0.019***	-0.019***	-0.012**	-0.024***
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Ln(Imports per Capita) (t-1)	-0.043	-0.039	-0.017	-0.034	-0.003					
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.041)					
Ln(Oil Income pc) × Ln(Imports pc)	-0.002	-0.002	-0.006^{+}	-0.003	-0.006^{+}					
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)					
Imports (% GDP) (t-1)						0.021	-0.012	-0.068	-0.014	-0.075
						(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.079)
Ln(Oil Inc. pc) × Imports (% GDP)						0.040***	0.032**	0.017	0.014	0.018
						(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Ln(GDP per Capita) (t-1)	0.017	0.018	-0.070	-0.003	-0.098	-0.064^{+}	0.001	-0.147**	-0.089*	-0.126*
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.035)	(0.059)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.057)
GDP Growth (t-1)	-0.057	-0.067	-0.125	-0.042	-0.114	0.150	0.053	-0.088	-0.036	-0.085
	(0.187)	(0.189)	(0.185)	(0.189)	(0.188)	(0.110)	(0.180)	(0.171)	(0.157)	(0.187)
Ln(Population) (t-1)	-0.798**	-0.787**	-0.793**	-0.731**	-0.717**	0.150	0.048	-0.086	-0.167	-0.582*
	(0.259)	(0.262)	(0.262)	(0.262)	(0.267)	(0.132)	(0.195)	(0.159)	(0.151)	(0.262)
Polity Score (t-1)	-0.042*	-0.042*	-0.051**	-0.041*	-0.050**	-0.009*	-0.015***	-0.014^{+}	-0.012	-0.052**
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.019)
Real Effective Exchange Rate (t-1)		-0.000			-0.000		0.000			-0.000
		(0.000)			(0.000)		(0.000)			(0.000)
Welfare Taxation (%GDP) (t-1)			-0.004		-0.005			-0.007**		-0.006^{+}
			(0.003)		(0.003)			(0.003)		(0.003)
Personal Income Tax. (%GDP) (t-1)			-0.012***		-0.013***			-0.014***		-0.012***
			(0.003)		(0.003)			(0.003)		(0.003)
Right-wing Populist Vote Share (t-1)				-0.002^{+}	-0.002^{+}				-0.002*	-0.002^{+}
				(0.001)	(0.001)				(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	836	836	831	830	825	1226	1002	947	967	825
Countries	17	17	17	17	17	23	22	17	17	17
R^2	0.991	0.991	0.992	0.991	0.992	0.989	0.991	0.991	0.990	0.992

Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis of Immigration Policy in year *t*. Panel-corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and $^{+}$ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Country and year fixed effects as well as country-specific time trends are included in all models.

Table A10: Conditional Effect of Oil Wealth on Immigration Policy (Models A45-A50)

	(A45)	(A46)	(A47)	(A48)	(A49)	(A50)
Immigration Policy	0.874***	0.874***	0.874***	0.873***	0.873***	0.873***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Ln(Oil Income per Capita)	-0.025***	-0.026***	-0.027***	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.021***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Right-Wing parties as % of total cabinet posts (weighted by days)	0.000					
	(0.017)					
Ln(Oil Income per Capita) × Right-Wing Seat Share	0.004					
	(0.003)					
Right-wing Seat Share as % of All Governing Parties' Seat Share		-0.007				
		(0.017)				
Ln(Oil Income per Capita) × Right-Wing Seat Share		0.006+				
		(0.003)				
Seat Share of Right-Wing Parties in Government			-0.030			
			(0.031)			
Ln(Oil Income per Capita) × Ring-Wing Seat Share			0.013*			
			(0.006)			
Left-Wing parties as % of total cabinet posts (weighted by days)				-0.026		
				(0.018)		
Ln(Oil Income per Capita) × Left-Wing Seat Share				-0.003		
				(0.004)		
Left-wing Seat Share as % of All Governing Parties' Seat Share					-0.021	
					(0.018)	
Ln(Oil Income per Capita) × Left-Wing Seat Share					-0.004	
					(0.004)	
Seat Share of Left-Wing Parties in Government						-0.020
						(0.035)
Ln(Oil Income per Capita) × Left-Wing Seat Share						-0.010
						(0.007)
Observations	811	811	811	811	811	811
Countries	17	17	17	17	17	17
R^2	0.992	0.992	0.992	0.992	0.992	0.992

Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis of Immigration Policy in year t. Control variables (for all models) are GDP per Capita (log), GDP Growth, Population (log), Polity Score, Tariff Rate, Welfare Taxation (% GDP), and Personal Income Taxation (% GDP). All right-hand side variables are lagged $t-1$. Panel-corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and $^+$ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Country and year fixed effects as well as country-specific time trends are included in all models.

Table A11: Conditional Effect of Oil Wealth on Immigration Policy (Models A51-A60)

Model	(A51)	(A52)	(A53)	(A54)	(A55)	(A56)	(A57)	(A58)	(A59)	(A60)
Years	1947–2013	1961–2013	1951–1995	1951–2012	1961–1995	1961–2013	1961–2013	1961–2013	1961–2013	1961–2013
Immigration Policy (t-1)	0.888***	0.882***	0.887***	0.891***	0.851***	0.877***	0.862***	0.874***	0.872***	0.859***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Ln(Oil Income per Capita)	-0.014***	-0.020***	-0.028***	-0.020**	-0.040***	-0.030***	-0.027***	-0.033***	-0.034***	-0.027***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Tariff Rate	0.006***	0.005*	0.002	0.004+	-0.002	0.002	0.001	-0.000	-0.002	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Ln(Oil Income per Capita) × Tariff Rate	0.000	0.001	0.002**	0.001+	0.004***	0.003*	0.003*	0.003***	0.004**	0.002+
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ln(GDP per Capita)	0.023	0.013	-0.026	0.010	-0.047	0.014	-0.092	-0.030	-0.020	-0.041
	(0.030)	(0.068)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.090)
GDP Growth	0.235*	0.297+	0.022	0.174	-0.035	0.176	0.230	0.222	0.170	0.192
	(0.098)	(0.161)	(0.171)	(0.164)	(0.211)	(0.211)	(0.209)	(0.207)	(0.209)	(0.211)
Ln(Population)	0.239+	0.122	-0.305	-0.209	-0.733**	-0.826**	-1.153***	-0.789**	-0.824**	-1.211***
	(0.123)	(0.156)	(0.225)	(0.222)	(0.274)	(0.262)	(0.300)	(0.262)	(0.269)	(0.306)
Polity Score	-0.008+	-0.014***	-0.009	-0.006	-0.041*	-0.026	-0.031+	-0.026	-0.027	-0.027
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Real Effective Exchange Rate		-0.000			-0.001**					
		(0.000)			(0.000)					
Welfare Taxes (% GDP)			-0.001		-0.001					
			(0.003)		(0.004)					
Personal Income Taxes (% GDP)			-0.013***		-0.015***					
			(0.003)		(0.003)					
Right-wing Populist Vote Share				-0.004***	-0.004***					
				(0.001)	(0.001)					
Union Density						0.001				0.001
						(0.001)				(0.001)
% Population over 65							-0.020*			-0.019*
							(0.008)			(0.008)
Seat Share of Right Parties in Government								0.000		0.000
								(0.000)		(0.000)
Electoral System								0.018		0.067+
								(0.030)		(0.039)
Presidentialism								-0.001		0.000
								(0.014)		(0.014)
EU Member									0.012	0.008
									(0.031)	(0.032)
Schengen Member									0.032	0.032
									(0.022)	(0.022)
OECD Member									-0.070	-0.016
									(0.055)	(0.054)
Observations	1212	1008	930	948	814	814	825	825	825	814
Countries	24	23	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
R^2	0.990	0.990	0.991	0.990	0.991	0.990	0.990	0.990	0.990	0.991

Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis of Immigration Policy in year *t*. Panel-corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Country and year fixed effects as well as country-specific time trends are included in all models.

Table A12: Conditional Effect of Oil Wealth on Immigration Policy (Models A61-A68)

	(A61)	(A62)	(A63)	(A64)	(A65)	(A66)	(A67)	(A68)
Years	1950–2010	1950–2010	1950–2010	1950–2010	1950–2010	1950–2010	1950–2010	1950–2010
Immigration Policy (t-1)	0.889***	0.890***	0.890***	0.889***	0.890***	0.890***	0.890***	0.890***
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Ln(Oil Income per Capita)	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Tariff Rate	0.005***	0.005***	0.006***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.006***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ln(Oil Income per Capita) × Tariff Rate	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ln(GDP per Capita)	0.022	0.025	0.036	0.041	0.026	0.028	0.032	0.036
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)
GDP Growth	0.313**	0.308**	0.299**	0.298**	0.306**	0.305**	0.304**	0.303**
	(0.117)	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Ln(Population)	0.289*	0.280*	0.265+	0.270*	0.281*	0.279*	0.267+	0.265+
	(0.138)	(0.135)	(0.137)	(0.136)	(0.141)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.137)
Polity Score	-0.008+	-0.008+	-0.008*	-0.008*	-0.008+	-0.008+	-0.008*	-0.008*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education Variables with Age 15+:								
Years of Secondary Education	-0.005							
	(0.006)							
% Population with Secondary Education		-0.000						
		(0.000)						
Years of Tertiary Education			0.050+					
			(0.030)					
% Population with Tertiary Education				0.003*				
				(0.002)				
Education Variables with Age 25+:								
Years of Secondary Education					-0.001			
					(0.006)			
% Population with Secondary Education						0.000		
						(0.000)		
Years of Tertiary Education							0.035	
							(0.026)	
% Population with Tertiary Education								0.003+
								(0.001)
Observations	1168	1168	1168	1168	1168	1168	1168	1168
Countries	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24
R^2	0.990	0.990	0.990	0.990	0.990	0.990	0.990	0.990

Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis of Immigration Policy in year *t*. Panel-corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Country and year fixed effects as well as country-specific time trends are included in all models.

Table A13: Conditional Effect of Oil Wealth on Immigration Policy (Models A69-A73)

Model	(A69)	(A70)	(A71)	(A72)	(A73)
Years	1962–2013	1962–2013	1962–2013	1962–2013	1962–2013
Immigration Policy (t-1)	0.889***	0.887***	0.879***	0.887***	0.882***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Ln(Oil Income per Capita) (t-1)	-0.014**	-0.013*	-0.015**	-0.013*	-0.015**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Tariff Rate (t-1)	0.005+	0.005	0.003	0.005+	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Ln(Oil Income per Capita) × Tariff Rate (t-1)	-0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ln(GDP per Capita) (t-1)	0.023	0.022	0.007	0.023	0.007
	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.076)
GDP Growth (t-1)	0.020	0.032	0.032	0.033	0.035
	(0.203)	(0.202)	(0.205)	(0.202)	(0.204)
Ln(Population) (t-1)	-0.083	-0.122	-0.046	-0.061	-0.026
	(0.289)	(0.285)	(0.307)	(0.294)	(0.305)
Polity Score (t-1)	-0.004	-0.004	-0.005	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Population % of Migrants (t-1):					
Total	1.175**				
	(0.358)				
Original Non-OECD		1.763**			
		(0.546)			
Ascension Non-OECD			1.761***		
			(0.479)		
Original Non-OECD + Turkey				1.330**	
				(0.421)	
Ascension Non-OECD + Turkey & Mexico					1.406***
					(0.328)
Observations	990	990	990	990	990
Countries	24	24	24	24	24
R^2	0.991	0.991	0.991	0.991	0.991

Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis of Immigration Policy in year *t*. Panel-corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Country and year fixed effects as well as country-specific time trends are included in all models.

A.3 Immigration Policy Index Construction

In order to construct an index of immigration policy openness, I have considered several options. The most straightforward way is to use some of the observed policy dimensions in the regression analysis. Policies that govern the entry of immigrants are central to the hypotheses in this paper. In addition to entry restrictions based on nationality, skill, quota and recruitment, labor market policies such as labor prohibitions, deportation and enforcement are important policy areas in which both firms and native voters exercise influence. This method, however, is problematic for two reasons. First, selecting one variable over another is arbitrary and leaves little variance to be explained in the analysis. Second, policymakers may favor one type of policy over another in manifesting their stance on immigration. For instance, consider two hypothetical countries' immigration policies. Country A employs a quota and does not place any restriction on nationality. Country B has restrictions on skill and does not have any immigration quota. Using the quota variable or discrimination by skill leads to a false conclusion that Country A is more restrictive than Country B, or vice versa.

Since policymakers may choose one type of restriction over another or may employ all possible means to control immigration, it is appropriate to account for multiple policy dimensions that regulate immigration flows. For instance, one can compute a standardized average of relevant policy dimensions. This method excludes citizenship regime, refugee policy and other policies that are less relevant to firms' preferences for foreign labor. Since each dimension except for provisions is coded to vary from 0 to 5, using the average forces the index to assign equal weights to all of the policy dimensions. Researchers may choose to assign different weights to policy dimensions such that one policy dimension has more weight than another in the final makeup of the immigration policy index. Researchers, however, need to present a convincing argument to defend their choice of weights. Moreover, some of these variables are highly correlated to one another. When using the sum or the average of observed policy scores, the high

Table A14: Countries Included in the Factor Analysis

Group	No.	Country	Years Included in the Factor Analysis
"New World"	1	United States	1790–2010
	2	Australia	1787–2010
	3	Canada	1783–2010
	4	New Zealand	1840–2010
	5	South Africa	1806–2010
	6	Argentina	1810–2010
	7	Brazil	1808–2010
	8	Chile*	1950–2013
Western Europe	9	Austria*	1950–2013
	10	Belgium*	1950–2013
	11	Denmark*	1950–2013
	12	Ireland*	1950-2013
	13	France	1793–2010
	14	Germany	1871–2010
	15	Netherlands	1815–2010
	16	Norway*	1950–2013
	17	Sweden*	1950–2013
	18	Spain*	1950–2013
	19	Switzerland	1848–2010
	20	United Kingdom	1792–2010
Asian Exporters	21	Japan	1868–2010
	22	Hong Kong	1843–2010
	23	Singapore	1955–2010
	24	South Korea	1948–2010
	25	Taiwan	1949–2010
Rentier States	26	Botswana*	1966–2013
	27	Kuwait	1961–2010
	28	Saudi Arabia	1950–2010
	29	Venezuela*	1950–2013

* indicates the countries whose immigration policies have been collected and constructed by the author.

correlation between the variables overestimates the difference between restrictive and immigration policies. In addition to mis-estimating the degree of immigration policy openness, using the average or summing policy scores will explain less variance.

The main objective of constructing the immigration policy index is two-fold, (1) to summarize the policy data without losing much information; and (2) to remove redundant information from a set of highly correlated policy variables. I used factor analysis based on principal component scores to compute factor loadings and factor scores. Using the principal components is appropriate to construct an immigration policy index for the following reasons. First, it takes information from a number of highly correlated observed

variables to construct a small number of indicators. Second, principal component scores also account for most of the variance of the observed policy variables. Finally, it frees the researcher from making a structural assumption about immigration policy.

In the factor analysis, I pool both democracies and autocracies to uncover a latent structure from the 12 dimensions of immigration policy over the past two centuries. One may suggest that I should restrict the factor analysis to a set of democracies since I am only using a sample of democracies in the analysis. I propose three counterarguments against this suggestion. First and most importantly, my sample choice should not affect how immigration policy scores are generated. I have chosen a particular sample based on the theoretical assumptions of the argument. These theoretical concerns are irrelevant to the factor analysis and should not decide which observations should be included in the factor analysis. Second, I am interested in using as many observations as possible to uncover a representative latent structure of the data. Since my sample choice should not drive how factors are retrieved, I take advantage of the full dataset in constructing an immigration policy score. Third, I do not see any fundamental differences between immigration policies of democracies and autocracies based on the coding scheme. Moreover, the coding scheme is designed to compare multiple countries' immigration policies over different time periods. Excluding autocracies or countries from a certain time period ignores this comparative function of the coding scheme and sacrifices a large number of observations in the factor analysis. For theses reasons, I utilize the full dataset in order to compute a representative immigration policy score.

The standard rule is to retain factors with eigenvalues equal to or greater than 1 and disregard factors with eigenvalues smaller than 1 (the Kaiser criterion). Since eigenvalues are the variances of the factors, factors with higher eigenvalues account for more variance. As depicted in Table A16, Factor 1 and Factor 2 capture most of the variance of policies that regulate immigration flows and immigrant rights, respectively. Although Factor 3 satisfies the Kaiser criterion, the difference in eigenvalues between Factor 3 and Factor 4 is minimal,

Table A15: Factor Analysis and Correlation (Unrotated)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	3.987	1.947	0.332	0.332
Factor 2	2.040	1.013	0.170	0.502
Factor 3	1.027	0.058	0.086	0.588
Factor 4	0.969	0.197	0.081	0.669
Factor 5	0.772	0.010	0.064	0.733
Factor 6	0.762	0.178	0.064	0.796
Factor 7	0.584	0.081	0.049	0.845
Factor 8	0.503	0.059	0.042	0.887
Factor 9	0.444	0.077	0.037	0.924
Factor 10	0.367	0.048	0.031	0.955
Factor 11	0.319	0.093	0.027	0.981
Factor 12	0.226	–	0.019	1.000

LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(66) = 1.5 \times 10^4$ Prob$> \chi^2 = 0$

* All values are rounded to three decimal places.

0.067 as shown in Table A15. Moreover, it is difficult to conceptualize Factor 3 because factor loadings of similar policy measures appear inconsistent as shown in Table A16.

Table A16: Factor Loadings and Unique Variances

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Uniqueness
Nationality	0.4669	-0.0577	0.5748	0.4482
Skill	0.7386	0.0416	0.2653	0.3823
Citizenship	0.1810	0.6245	0.2144	0.5313
Other Rights	0.3746	0.7306	-0.2339	0.2712
Refugees	-0.6701	0.4318	0.1632	0.3379
Asylum	-0.5480	0.4378	0.0929	0.4994
Recruitment	0.5508	0.0867	0.5358	0.4021
Work Prohibitions	0.4687	0.5447	-0.2563	0.4180
Deportation	0.6026	0.4603	-0.1602	0.3993
Enforcement	0.7594	-0.0215	-0.1640	0.3959
Family Reunification	-0.6815	0.3654	0.2904	0.3177
Quota	0.6117	-0.2881	-0.0185	0.5425

Many researchers use rotation to facilitate the interpretations of retained factors. Rotation is likely to produce a set of more reliable factors than the unrotated ones under two assumptions (Abdi and Williams, 2010). First, each variable loads on only one factor. Second, retained factors and disregarded factors show clear differences in intensity. While

the second assumption seems plausible, the first assumption is too restrictive given the complexity of immigration policy. Moreover, unrotated factors correspond better with the descriptive history of immigration policy in each country with a high correlation at 0.945 with a simple average of nationality, skill, quota, recruitment, labor prohibitions, deportation and enforcement scores. A similar factor retrieved from rotated factor loadings is correlated at only 0.822 with the average of the seven aforementioned immigration policy measures. In the end, I decided to extract factors from unrotated factor loadings based on the costs and benefits of rotation, the correlation with raw immigration policy measures and the descriptive history of immigration policy across multiple countries.