WEB APPENDIX FOR
"A Delicate Balancing Act: Women's Rights and US Military Intervention in the Arab World"

This document is a web appendix for the attached manuscript. It contains all additional analyses to which we refer in the text but which space considerations prevent us from reporting in full in the main document.

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Figure A1. US Troop Deployments to the Middle East (Source: Lake 2009)



Table A1. Variables and Summary Statistics

Variable	Source and Coding	Mean (SD)
Women's Political Rights	Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay (2014). 0 indicates that women's political rights were not guaranteed by law. 1 indicates that women's political rights were guaranteed in law,but severely prohibited in practice. 2 indicates that women's political rights were guaranteed in law, but were still moderately prohibited in practice. 3 indicates that women's political rights were guaranteed in both law and practice.	1.11 (0.79)
Democracy	Polity IV	-6.22 (3.98)
GDP Per Capita (Log)	World Development Indicators	7.75 (1.37)
GDP Growth	World Development Indicators	1.72 (8.32)
Aid p.c. (1000s)	World Development Indicators	0.05 (0.08)
Trade Openness	World Development Indicators	73.55 (36.20)
Fuel (Percent Exports)	World Development Indicators	0.18 (0.22)
Urbanization	World Development Indicators	59.32 (22.43)
Islamist Strength	Kurzman and Naqvi (2010). 0 indicates that there are no significant Islamist parties in politics; 1 indicates that Islamist parties compete but do not receive significant support; 2 indicates that Islamist parties receive sizeable support in votes and seats. See Table A2 below for coding by country.	1.67 (0.64)
Protest Data	Banks Cross-National Time Series Data (2013)	0.09 (0.28)
US Troops in region (Log)	Lake (2009); Department of Defense, Military Personnel Statistics, http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm	8.73 (1.19)

Table A2. Countries in Arab Sample with their Islamist Strength Coding

As described in the text, we construct a categorical *Islamist Strength* variable based on Kurzman and Naqvi's electoral performance data. This variable is constant by country over time. We therefore also conducted an expert survey asking scholars to rate each country in the region on two dimensions – the *threat to regime survival* posed by Islamists and the *mobilizational strength* of Islamist forces – for each five year period from 1980-2010. The advantage of this measure is that it allows *latent Islamist Power* to vary by country over time as is evident from the standard deviations below. We combine the two dimensions into a multiplicative index and use it to assess the robustness of our results. All results hold (see Table A5 below).

Country	Islamist Strength (based on Kurzman & Naqvi data)	Islamist Power (Expert coding) Threat mean	Strength mean
Algeria	2	2.01	2.58
		(0.61)	(0.65)
Bahrain	2	1.25	2.39
		(0.31)	(0.43)
Egypt	2	2.03	3.05
		(0.19)	(0.13)
Iraq	1	1.81	2.22
		(0.49)	(0.86)
Jordan	2	1.73	2.71
		(0.11)	(0.13)
Kuwait	2	1.56	2.73
		(0.13)	(0.38)
Lebanon	2	2.17	3.23
		(0.23)	(0.39)
Libya	1	1.38	1.54
		(0.23)	(0.31)
Morocco	2	1.38	2.61
		(0.04)	(0.39)
Oman	0	1.04	1.62
		(0.07)	(0.15)
Qatar	1	1	1.78
		(0)	(0.20)
Saudi Arabia	2	1.66	2.81
		(0.20)	(0.07)
Somalia	0	2.58	3.21
		(0.19)	(0.28)
Sudan	2	1.96	3.08
		(0.06)	(0.12)
Syria	0	1.34	1.82
		(0.27)	(0.36)
Tunisia	1	1.32	1.72
		(0.24)	(0.41)
United Arab Emirates	1	1.03	1.40
		(0.06)	(0.15)

Yemen	2	1.92 (0.19)	3.01 (0.15)

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Countries in *italics* are missing from the estimation sample reported in Table 1 in the paper due to missing data on one or more covariates.

Table A3. Robustness Check: Ordered Probit Models

Variable	Model 1	Model 2
US Regional Troop Deployments (Log)	-0.01	0.98***
	(0.08)	(0.32)
Islamist (3-category)	-0.97*	2.41
	(0.51)	(1.52)
Troops X Islamist Interaction		-0.38***
		(0.13)
GDP per capita (Log)	-0.67	-0.75
	(0.64)	(0.63)
GDP per capita Growth Rate	0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Urban Population	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Democracy (Polity)	0.08	0.09
	(0.06)	(0.05)
Trade Openness (% GDP)	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Oil Rents (% GDP)	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Aid per capita (in thousand $)	0.18	0.39
	(1.65)	(1.52)
Year Time Trend	0.07*	0.08*
	(0.04)	(0.04)
τ_1	132.98	152.17
τ_2	135.11	154.41
No. of Observations	282	282
No. of Countries	15	15
R-squared	0.49	0.55

Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering by country. Iraq, Somalia, and Syria are excluded.

Table A4. Robustness Check: Using Physical Integrity Score as DV

Variable	Model 1	Model 2
US Regional Troop Deployments (Log)	0.06	0.19
	(0.05)	(0.16)
Islamist (3-category)	-0.75*	-0.31
	(0.42)	(0.66)
Troops X Islamist Interaction		-0.05
		(0.06)
GDP per capita (Log)	1.36	1.36
	(0.64)	(0.64)
GDP per capita Growth Rate	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Urban Population	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Democracy (Polity)	0.09	0.09
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Trade Openness (% GDP)	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Oil Rents (% GDP)	-0.02*	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Aid per capita (in thousand $)	-0.002*	-2.15*
	(0.001)	(1.12)
Year Time Trend	-0.09***	-0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	169.35	167.61
	(54.51)	(53.71)
No. of Observations	281	281
No. of Countries	15	15
R-squared	0.54	0.55

Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering by country. Iraq, Somalia, and Syria are excluded due to missing data.

Table A5. Robustness Check: Using Expert Coding of Islamist Power (1980-2010)

Variable	OLS		Ordered Probit	
	1	2	3	4
US Regional Troops (Log)	-0.001	0.14*	0.002	0.48**
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.19)
Islamist Power (expert coding)	-0.05**	0.25	-0.16**	0.82**
	(0.02)	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.35)
Troops X Islamist Power (expert)		-0.03**		-0.11***
		(0.02)		(0.04)
GDP per capita (Log)	-0.14	-0.19	-0.33	-0.52
	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.59)	(0.54)
GDP per capita Growth Rate	0.002	0.001	0.004	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Urban Population	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Democracy (Polity)	0.03	0.03*	0.08	0.09
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Trade Openness (% GDP)	-0.001	-0.001	-0.01	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Oil Rents (% GDP)	-0.01	-0.01**	-0.02*	-0.02*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Aid per capita ($1000s)	0.56	0.33	2.56	1.77
	(0.47)	(0.72)	(1.59)	(2.57)
Year Time Trend	0.03***	0.03***	0.11***	0.11
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
τ_1			204.82	209.19
τ_2			206.98	211.46
No. of Observations	269	269	269	269
No. of Countries	16	16	16	16

Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10. Standard errors are corrected for clustering by country. Iraq and Somalia are excluded due to missing data.

T**able A6: Robustness Check: Instrumental Variable Analyses (Pages 24-25)**

When Hispanic turnout is higher, Democratic candidates are more likely to be elected to office (Barreto et al. 2008; Barreto, Collingwood, and Manzano 2010). Democratic presidents historically are less likely to seek military solutions in the Middle East (Lesch and Haas 2013). Therefore, when Hispanic turnout is higher, we should see lower US troop deployments in the Middle East.[1] Yet, there is no conceivable reason that Hispanic turnout in US mid-term and presidential election-years should affect (or be influenced by) the status of women in Arab countries. Theoretically then we think this should be a reliable instrument that meets the exclusion restriction.[2] We estimate the IV model using a limited information maximum likelihood framework. The results of both stages of the IV model are reported below, and they confirm the results of the models discussed above.

Table A6: Instrumental Variables Regression

Dependent Variable →	**First-Stage Results** ***Troops in Region***	***Troops in Region X Islamist Strength***	**Second-Stage** ***Women's Political Rights***
Independent Variables↓			
(2SLS): Troops in Region			0.49
			(0.25)
(2SLS): Troops in Region			-0.15*
X Islamist Strength			(0.09)
Islamist Strength	-0.21	12.13***	1.02
	(0.42)	(0.81)	(0.89)
GDP *p.c.* (Logged)	0.14	0.25	-0.29**
	(0.10)	(0.24)	(0.11)
GDP *p.c.* Growth Rate	0.01	0.06	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.01)
Urban Population (%)	-0.01	-0.01	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democracy	-0.01	-0.01	0.05
	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Trade Openness (% GDP)	-0.001	-0.001	0.001

[1] The data corroborate this intuition. The strength of the correlation between the instrument and the endogenous regressors is an important factor determining the suitability of the IV strategy (Sovey and Green 2011). An F-test on HISPANIC TURNOUT and HISPANIC TURNOUT X ISLAMIST STRENGTH in the first-stage regression indicates that the correlation passes the weak instruments test handily (see Table A6).

[2] While the F-statistics are significant, the correlation between the instruments and US troop deployments is slightly weak, as revealed through the Partial R^2 of the excluded instruments. Even if the exclusion restrictions are valid, this can bias the IV estimates towards the OLS estimates. To assuage concerns, we follow Gabel and Scheve (2007) and estimate the reduced-form regression of WOMEN'S POLITICAL RIGHTS on our instruments, HISPANIC TURNOUT and HISPANIC TURNOUT X ISLAMIST STRENGTH, as well as the other exogenous covariates. These estimates are unbiased and proportional to the coefficient of interest even with weak instruments. The estimated direction of the effects is therefore correct. The results of this regression show a negative effect of US HISPANIC TURNOUT and a positive effect of US HISPANIC TURNOUT X ISLAMIST STRENGTH, which is as we'd expect given the posited inverse relationship between Hispanic turnout and US troop deployments to the Middle East. This indicates that the signs of the IV results are correct.

	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Oil Rents (% GDP)	0.0003	0.01	-0.01***
	(0.002)	(0.01)	(0.003)
Aid *p.c.* (constant US$)	0.98	2.43	-0.75
	(0.94)	(2.60)	(0.84)
Time trend	0.10***	0.27***	0.001
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.001)
US Hispanic Turnout (%)	-0.10**	0.13***	
	(0.04)	(0.08)	
US Hispanic Turnout (%)	0.01	-0.12***	
X Islamist Strength	(0.02)	(0.03)	
Constant	-197.62***	-533.33***	
	(10.55)	(55.73)	
F-stat of excluded instrument	51.40	41.37	
F-stat (p-value)	0.000	0.000	
Partial R^2 of excluded inst.	0.07	0.07	
No. of Observations	282		
No. of Countries	15		

Notes: * p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10. Estimates from two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) using US Hispanic Turnout in the prior election year to instrument for the number of US troops deployed in the MENA region in a given year. Country-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses.