Left Out: How Political Ideology Affects Support for Migrants in Colombia: Supplementary Information*

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S1 Examples of the Importance of Migrants' Political Views in Multiple Contexts

There are many historical examples in which political concerns have affected the treatment of immigrants. The U.S., for instance, has a long history of limiting immigration and citizenship rights in reaction to political fears. In the colonial and early Republic period of the U.S., concerns that Catholic immigrants would be loyal to the Pope, rather than to the English monarch and later to the Republic, led to laws prohibited Catholics from naturalization or serving as elected officials under the New York Constitution unless they renounced their faith. These laws stayed in place until 1806 (Duncan, 2005). In the wake of the French Revolution, the arrival of refugees from France and radical sympathizers from Great Britain and Ireland led to fears that immigrants would spread radical ideas, leading to the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts (Cogliano, 1999, p.662).

Political concerns about immigrants resurfaced in the twentieth century around the spread of socialist, communist, and anarchist ideas (Higham, 1983). In Europe, a spate of political assassinations by anarchists led to deportations and increased political vetting of immigrants. In the U.S., the Alien Exclusion Act of 1903 banned anarchists and a 1906 law denaturalized anarchists (Kraut, 2020, p.59). At the height of the Red Scare of the 1920s, approximately 3,000 immigrants were held as radicals at Ellis Island and 556 were deported (Kraut, 2020, p.74) and concerns about the spread of leftist ideas help motivate the 1921 and 1924 Quota Acts (Kraut, 2012, 2020).

Political fears can also involve misperceptions about the views of entire national groups. A clear example comes from the internment of Japanese-Americans as potential fascists, even though most had come decades before or were born in the U.S. Similarly, Vietnamese refugees were often portrayed as communist enemies in the 1970s, even though most were fleeing the policies of their government (e.g. Wooten, 1975).

In the developing world, migrants often leave countries pursuing extreme ideological projects and cross to neighboring countries. Host countries may worry about possible "contagion" in which political movements in a neighboring country spread to their own. For instance, in Thailand the government and media portrayed Vietnamese refugees as communist sympathizers and a potential "vanguard" for a Communist invasion, even while the majority of refugees disavowed their government, as a way to discredit local socialist groups (Flood, 1977, 39).

Work on emigration begins from the opposite assumption, that migrants are critics of their home governments (for a review, see Kapur (2014)). Governments often consider emigration a useful safety valve to relieve political tensions and the exit of political opponents–and sometimes the deliberate exile of high-profile dissidents–can stabilize authoritarian governments (Miller and Peters, 2020). From this perspective, migrants are more likely to be political dissidents or at least come to oppose the policies that force them to leave.

S2 Respondent Demographic Covariates

S2.1 Respondent Summary Statistics

Table S1: Descriptive statistics of Colombian respondents

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Median	Max
Male	1,005	0.45	0.50	0	0	1
Age Group	1,005	3.50	1.40	1	4	5
Race	963	2.10	1.10	1	2	6
Education	1,000	2.20	1.10	0	2	5
Number of Children	1,005	2.10	1.90	0	2	14
Marriage Status	1,005	2.40	1.40	1	2	5
Religion	958	1.40	0.65	1	1	3
Religiosity	998	2.60	0.74	0	3	3
Wealth Index	1,005	4.80	2.60	0	5	13
Labor Contract	397	1.60	0.85	1	1	3
Salary	993	2.30	0.89	1	2	4
Political Ideology	1,005	2.30	0.65	1	2	3
Public Benefits Index	1,005	1.40	1.20	0	1	5
Indirect Contact Index	1,005	0.87	0.84	0.00	1.00	3.00
Direct Contact Index	1,005	1.80	0.66	0.00	1.80	3.00
Internally Displaced	1,001	0.13	0.34	0	0	1
Family Internally Displaced	1,002	0.25	0.43	0	0	1

Table S2: Descriptive statistics of Venezuelan respondents

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Median	Max
Male	1,612	0.39	0.49	0	0	1
Age Group	1,612	2.20	1.10	1	2	5
Race	1,407	2.10	1.10	1	2	6
Education	1,605	2.10	0.91	0	2	5
Number of Children	1,602	2.10	1.80	0	2	13
Marriage Status	1,610	2.20	1.40	1	2	5
Religion	1,518	1.60	0.77	1	1	3
Religiosity	1,585	2.70	0.65	0	3	3
Wealth Index	1,612	1.10	0.92	0	1	6
Labor Contract	821	1.10	0.39	1	1	3
Salary	1,601	2.20	0.90	1	2	4
Political Ideology	1,418	2.40	0.69	1	2	3
Public Benefits Index	1,612	0.44	0.71	0	0	4

S2.2 Demographics for Colombians



Figure S1: Colombian respondent demographics.

S2.3 Demographics for Venezuelans



Figure S2: Venezuelan respondent demographics.

S3 Sample Representativeness: Comparing Respondents with LAPOP

S3.1 Comparison for Colombians

We use LAPOP Colombia as a comparison, which is a self-weighted, nationally representative sample with 1,663 respondents. For the salary comparison, we use LAPOP (2016), and all other variables are from LAPOP (2018). Compared to a national sample of Colombians, our Colombian respondents tended to have less children, be slightly more politically left (although the average is still towards the right), and wealthier – reflecting that our respondents are urban. They were also slightly older, less likely to be a student or employed, and more likely to be Christian (Catholic or Protestant).

Table S3: Comparing LAPOP and our Sample in Colombia: Numeric Variables

Variable	LAPOP Mean	Sample Mean	Diff. in Means	P-Value
Formal Contract	0.41	0.43	-0.02	0.48
Number of Children	2.07	1.83	0.24	0.00
Male	0.45	0.50	-0.05	0.01
Political Ideology (1 left - 10 right)	6.54	5.78	0.77	0.00
Owns Car	0.10	0.19	-0.09	0.00
Owns Cellphone	0.84	0.92	-0.08	0.00
Owns Computer	0.40	0.44	-0.04	0.02
Access to Internet	0.55	0.50	0.06	0.00
Owns TV	0.76	0.96	-0.20	0.00
Owns Washing Machine	0.49	0.68	-0.19	0.00

Table S4: Comparing LAPOP and our Sample in Colombia: Categorical Variables

Variable	Category	LAPOP Mean	Sample Mean	Diff. in Means	P-Value
Age	18-24	0.19	0.13	0.07	0.00
Age	25-34	0.25	0.16	0.08	0.00
Age	35-44	0.19	0.16	0.03	0.08
Age	45-54	0.16	0.20	-0.04	0.02
Age	55 or above	0.21	0.35	-0.14	0.00
Education	None	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.34
Education	Primary	0.27	0.26	0.01	0.47
Education	High School	0.50	0.42	0.08	0.00
Education	University/Technical	0.08	0.27	-0.20	0.00
Education	Masters/PhD	0.14	0.03	0.10	0.00
Employment	Not Seeking Work	0.31	0.33	-0.01	0.53
Employment	Looking for Work	0.13	0.23	-0.09	0.00
Employment	Student	0.08	0.04	0.05	0.00
Employment	Employed	0.47	0.41	0.06	0.00
Marriage	Single	0.35	0.35	0.00	0.87
Marriage	Married	0.25	0.24	0.01	0.80
Marriage	Separated/Divorced	0.07	0.08	-0.02	0.10
Marriage	Widow	0.30	0.26	0.03	0.07
Marriage	Civil Union	0.04	0.06	-0.02	0.06
Race	White	0.31	0.29	0.02	0.39
Race	Mestizo	0.47	0.52	-0.04	0.05
Race	Indigenous	0.06	0.03	0.02	0.01
Race	Black	0.08	0.11	-0.03	0.02
Race	Mulatto	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.43
Race	Other	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.00
Religion	Other	0.22	0.10	0.13	0.00
Religion	Catholic	0.68	0.75	-0.07	0.00
Religion	Protestant	0.10	0.16	-0.06	0.00
Religiosity	Unimportant	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.13
Religiosity	Somewhat Unimportant	0.08	0.06	0.02	0.05
Religiosity	Somewhat Important	0.17	0.14	0.04	0.02
Religiosity	Very Important	0.70	0.77	-0.07	0.00
Salary	Not Enough, Major Difficulties	0.19	0.23	-0.04	0.02
Salary	Not Enough, Some Difficulties	0.35	0.34	0.01	0.63
Salary	Enough Without Great Difficulty	0.38	0.36	0.01	0.55
Salary	Enough and Can Save	0.08	0.07	0.02	0.13

S3.2 Comparison for Venezuelans

We use LAPOP Venezuela (2016-2017) as a comparison, which is a self-weighted, nationally representative sample with 1,558 respondents. Compared to a national sample of Venezuelans in Venezuela, our respondents of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia tended to be slightly more politically left (although the average is still towards the right), wealthier, younger, more likely to be looking for work and having trouble making ends meet, more Mestizo, less Catholic and more Protestant.

Table S5: Comparing LAPOP and our Sample in Venezuela: Numeric Variables

Variable	LAPOP Mean	Sample Mean	Diff. in Means	P-Value
Number of Children	2.13	2.09	0.04	0.54
Male	0.39	0.50	-0.11	0.00
Political Ideology (1 left - 10 right)	6.89	5.87	1.01	0.00
Owns Car	0.16	0.28	-0.13	0.00
Owns Cellphone	0.76	0.88	-0.12	0.00
Owns Computer	0.42	0.56	-0.14	0.00
Access to Internet	0.36	0.52	-0.16	0.00
Owns TV	0.82	0.97	-0.16	0.00
Owns Washing Machine	0.55	0.78	-0.23	0.00

Table S6: Comparing LAPOP and our Sample in Venezuela: Categorical Variables

Variable	Category	LAPOP Mean	Sample Mean	Diff. in Means	P-Value
Age	18-24	0.19	0.29	-0.10	0.00
Age	25-34	0.23	0.38	-0.15	0.00
Age	35-44	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.96
Age	45-54	0.18	0.09	0.09	0.00
Age	55 or above	0.20	0.05	0.15	0.00
Education	None	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.39
Education	Primary	0.19	0.22	-0.03	0.05
Education	High School	0.48	0.56	-0.08	0.00
Education	University/Technical	0.08	0.20	-0.12	0.00
Education	Masters/PhD	0.24	0.01	0.23	0.00
Employment	Not Seeking Work	0.30	0.09	0.20	0.00
Employment	Looking for Work	0.11	0.39	-0.28	0.00
Employment	Student	0.07	0.00	0.07	0.00
Employment	Employed	0.52	0.51	0.00	0.83
Marriage	Single	0.42	0.49	-0.07	0.00
Marriage	Married	0.26	0.12	0.13	0.00
Marriage	Separated/Divorced	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.00
Marriage	Widow	0.19	0.33	-0.14	0.00
Marriage	Civil Union	0.05	0.01	0.04	0.00
Race	White	0.30	0.27	0.03	0.05
Race	Mestizo	0.16	0.55	-0.39	0.00
Race	Indigenous	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.74
Race	Black	0.03	0.11	-0.08	0.00
Race	Mulatto	0.02	0.04	-0.02	0.00
Race	Other	0.46	0.00	0.46	0.00
Religion	Other	0.04	0.18	-0.14	0.00
Religion	Catholic	0.80	0.55	0.25	0.00
Religion	Protestant	0.16	0.27	-0.11	0.00
Religiosity	Unimportant	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.00
Religiosity	Somewhat Unimportant	0.09	0.06	0.03	0.00
Religiosity	Somewhat Important	0.21	0.15	0.06	0.00
Religiosity	Very Important	0.67	0.78	-0.11	0.00
Salary	Not Enough, Major Difficulties	0.41	0.26	0.15	0.00
Salary	Not Enough, Some Difficulties	0.41	0.34	0.07	0.00
Salary	Enough Without Great Difficulty	0.16	0.34	-0.17	0.00
Salary	Enough and Can Save	0.02	0.07	-0.04	0.00

S4 Exploring what being left means for Venezuelans

For our Venezuelan respondents, this figure shows the relationship between being leftist and beliefs about privatization and support for Petro (if Venezuelans in Colombia could vote in the Colombian elections). Support for Petro was not correlated with supporting the left, and identifying with the left is not correlated with the belief in government ownership of industries.



Figure S3: For Venezuelans, association between being leftist and support for government ownership of industries (left plot), and supporting Petro (right plot).

S5 Additional Attitudes of Colombians about Venezuelans

More than half of our Colombian respondents (57.63%) said that they are competing with Venezuelans for work and 77.97% thought that it had become harder to obtain public services. Unlike poorer developing countries with large migrant flows, Colombia is a net fiscal contributor to hosting Venezuelan migrants and Colombians feel the strain: 62.9% believed that the international community is not providing enough aid and 80.06% thought their own taxes will go up because of the migrants. Finally, despite cultural similarities, Colombians had concerns about their societal impact: only 38.93% said that Venezuelans have integrated successfully.

S6 Correlation between Misperceptions and Welfare Concerns

For Colombian respondents, there is no relationship between believing the majority of Venezuelans are leftist and concerns over taxes increasing or concerns over access to government services, due to the presence of Venezuelans.



Figure S4: Correlations between political misperceptions (that the majority of Venezuelans are leftist) and concerns over taxes increasing or less access to government services.

S7 Additional Conjoint Results

S7.1 Main AMCE for Venezuelan respondents



Figure S5: AMCE conjoint estimates with 95% CIs for Venezuelan respondents.

S7.2 Conditional AMCE on respondent characteristics



Figure S6: AMCE estimates with 95% CIs for Venezuelan respondents, of migrant profile political polarization conditional on respondent political polarization and city.



Figure S7: AMCE of migrant profile skill level conditional on respondent skill



Figure S8: AMCE of migrant profile ability to find work conditional on respondent salary.



Figure S9: AMCE of migrant profile ability to find work conditional on respondent public benefits.



Figure S10: AMCE of migrant profile ability to find work conditional on respondent frequency of indirect contact with Venezuelans (Colombians respondents only).



Figure S11: AMCE of migrant profile origin conditions conditional on respondent region (Colombians respondents only).



Figure S12: AMCE estimates with 95% CIs of migrant profiles, conditional on respondent's race (Colombians respondents only).

S7.3 Interaction AMCE with profile attributes



Figure S13: Interaction AMCE between partisanship and skill.



Figure S14: Interaction AMCE between partisanship and employability

S8 Marginal Means for Conditional Conjoint Results

This section shows the marginal means estimates for Figure 4 in the paper using the procedure described in Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley (2020). Whereas the ACME conditional on respondent polarization and city, respectively, in those figures show the causal effect of the features shown relative to a baseline attribute, comparison across the subgroups (e.g. respondents who are Left, Center, Right) may be misleading if those subgroups diverge in preferences towards the baseline category. Thus, the marginal mean shows the average for every level of the attribute of interest, marginalizing over all over attributes. This estimate helps us descriptively compare across subgroups, and allows us to check whether subgroups do differ on there preference for the baseline category. Figures S15 and S16 below confirm that our interpretations comparing across subgroups using AMCEs hold.



Figure S15: Marginal means of migrant profile political polarization conditional on respondent political polarization.



Figure S16: Marginal means of migrant profile political polarization conditional on respondent's survey city.

S9 Tweets by Álvaro Uribe mobilizing voters for the 2018 Elections

This section presents examples of former President Álvaro Uribe's tweets in the lead-up to Colombia's presidential elections on 27 May 2018. One of the most common themes was a concern that Colombia would become a "second Venezuela" followed by a call to vote for Iván Duque:

Figure S17: @AlvaroUribeVel. "No vamos a dejar que a este país lo vuelvan una segunda Venezuela. @CeDemocratico la esperanza. Nos mueve el amor por Colombia. Con Mano firme y corazón grande, retomaremos el rumbo. Nuestra obsesión: cero corrupción, bajar impuestos, subir salarios" Twitter, 3 Dec. 2017, `twitter.com/AlvaroUribeVel/status/937480548271972353?s=20`.

Figure S18: @AlvaroUribeVel. "En las calles de Armenia, el Quindío, pedacito de Cielo, no podemos ser una segunda Venezuela, con Iván Duque y nuestra coalición por una democracia con desempeño sobresaliente en seguridad, emprendimiento y equidad." Twitter, 25 Jan 2018, `twitter.com/AlvaroUribeVel/status/956636838768398339?s=20`.

Figure S19: @AlvaroUribeVel. "Por un país seguro, con empresas vigorosas, con menos impuestos, con trabajadores reivindicados, con mejores salarios; un país solidario. ¡No a la lucha de clases! ¡No a una segunda Venezuela!" Twitter, 8 Feb. 2018, `twitter.com/AlvaroUribeVel/status/961572834685276160?s=20`.

Figure S20: @AlvaroUribeVel. "Votemos por Colombia: -Estado austero, sin corrupción -Empresas vigorosas con menos impuestos -Trabajadores reivindicados con mejores salarios - 6 días al año sin IVA para productos básicos -Pais solidario sin odio de clases -No a una 2a Venezuela Iván Duque Presidente." Twitter, 21 Feb 2018, `twitter.com/AlvaroUribeVel/status/966478804347686912?s=20`.

Figure S21: @AlvaroUribeVel. "Ciudadanos, escuchen los audios a las interceptaciones a mis llamadas, no he delinquido, he procurado desmontar la violencia moral de los narco terroristas, sus voceros y aliados. No a una segunda Venezuela. Ayúdennos a ganar." Twitter, 24 Feb 2018, `twitter.com/AlvaroUribeVel/status/967599110428733442?s=20`.

Figure S22: @AlvaroUribeVel. "Gracias Cartagena,pueblo heroico sabe decir no al odio de clases. No segunda Venezuela Cero corrupción,cero dosis personal. Patria segura con amor a los soldados y policías.Sin impunidad. Menos impuestos más salario, 6 días x año sin IVA a lo básico. País cristiano,solidario." Twitter, 26 Feb. 2018, `twitter.com/AlvaroUribeVel/status/968267406618644480?s=20`.

Figure S23: @AlvaroUribeVel. "Funza, el deterioro de Colombia no puede servir de excusa para llevarnos a ser una segunda Venezuela. Iván Duque Presidente. Marta Lucía Ramírez VicePte." Twitter, 14 Apr. 2018, `twitter.com/AlvaroUribeVel/status/985288392161325057?s=20`.

Figure S24: @AlvaroUribeVel. "Gracias Montería, el odio de clases empeora más el deteriora y lleva a una segunda Venezuela. Por un país fraterno. Iván Duque Pte Marta. Lucía Ramírez, VicePte." Twitter, 6 May 2018, `twitter.com/AlvaroUribeVel/status/993266357398536197?s=20`.

Uribe's tweets also focused on threats from socialism or Castro-Chavismo coming to Colombia. For example:

Figure S25: @AlvaroUribeVel. "Gracias Floridablanca: no permitamos un socialismo me dicen compatriotas de Santander y hermanos de Venezuela" Twitter, 6 Feb. 2018, `twitter.com/AlvaroUribeVel/status/963524737992413185?s=20`.

Figure S26: @AlvaroUribeVel. "Ni los colombianos ni la comunidad internacional alcanzamos a imaginar el poder criminal de Farc y Eln (cobalto) en Venezuela, en apoyo a la tiranía. La paz ha sido la legalización de algunos para que los otros sostengan al Castro Chavismo en Venezuela y lo impongan en Colombia" Twitter, 13 Feb. 2018, `twitter.com/AlvaroUribeVel/status/960851461046448129?s=20`.

S10 Observational Results: Factors Associated with Openness Toward Migrants

In this section, we present the results with observational data for each of the hypotheses that we outlined in our pre-analysis plan and reproduce below. To be clear, we are not making causal claims with this observational data; but we are presenting descriptive associations that are important for understanding what types of Colombians tend to feel more inclusive or exclusionary towards Venezuelan migrants.

We include a set of descriptive questions to understand Colombians' broader anxieties about Venezuelan migration. These questions examine the major concerns identified in research on immigrant reception. Respondents were given several questions on which they could agree or disagree.[1] Our main observational outcome of interest is *Openness*, which is an index to capture the extent to which Colombians approve of hosting Venezuelans and allowing additional migrants to enter. We sum over the following questions based on the scores shown, and then we rescale the index to vary between 0 and 1 for interpretability.

1. `There are too many Venezuelans in Colombia. Agree = 0, Disagree = 1`
2. `Colombia should close its borders immediately; it isn't possible to accept more migrants at this moment. Agree = 0, Disagree = 1`
3. `Which of the following statements aligns closest with what you believe Colombia should do about Venezuelan migrants:`
    - `Colombia should send back the majority of Venezuelans to Venezuela now = 0`
    - `Colombia should send back the majority of Venezuelans to Venezuela once there has been a political transition =.5`
    - `Colombia should send the majority of Venezuelans to Venezuela once the country has recovered economically = .5`
    - `Colombia should let Venezuelans who desire to stay in Colombia permanently = 1`

We expect *O1. Colombians who hold political misperceptions are less likely to support open border policies.*. It is possible that respondents hold political misperceptions because they want to close the border for unrelated reasons. We therefore also look at the broader determinants of attitudes towards open migration politics to test alternative explanations. We regress our key dependent variable on the relevant independent variables using OLS. In these models, we control for respondent demographics: city, gender, age, race, education level, number of children, marital status, religion, religiosity, wealth (based on ownership of 14 household items), skill level, salary level (4-point scale), political views, and access to welfare benefits (based on the household's receipt of the five most common social benefits). We expect political misperceptions to be more important than other common concerns in predicting border attitudes.

[1] Within each block, the statements were randomized to either be positive or negative to reduce wording effects. We find no evidence of wording effects.

For ease of interpreting coefficients, we rescale the Openness Index outcome variable to vary between minimum 0 and maximum 1, as well as the independent variables measuring: left-center-right partisanship, skilled labor index, contract formality index, salary measure, benefits index, direct contact with Venezuelans index, indirect contact with Venezuelans index, and cultural similarity index.



Figure S27: OLS estimates with 95% CIs regressing Openness to Venezuelans (Index) onto variables mapping onto political ideology (red), labor market (blue), fiscal (green), sociotropic (black), and cultural (yellow) concerns. Openness Index and all independent variables shown on the left have been rescaled to vary between 0 and 1.

Figure S27 presents the correlates of preferences for more open policies toward Venezuelan migrants. Each estimate with 95% confidence intervals is from a *separate* OLS regression of the openness index regressed on the variable of interest, while controlling for demographic characteristics. For ease of interpretation, we rescale the Openness Index outcome variable and all independent variables shown to vary between 0 and 1.

As is standard in the literature, a respondent's political views are associated with immigration attitudes. Colombians who identify with the political right are less supportive of welcoming border policies, although this does not reach conventional levels of significance. Political misperceptions also are associated with less support for open borders. Colombians who think that Venezuelans support the left or guerrilla groups are less likely to support more welcoming immigration policies.

We find relatively limited support for common explanations of immigration attitudes. The results do not support the labor market hypothesis, despite the substantial concerns voiced about competition from Venezuelan migrants. A respondent's skill level or labor market contract are not associated with openness towards Venezuelans. We also do not find support for a fiscal burden theory. Respondents' reported salary levels or whether they receive public welfare benefits have little association with their border attitudes. There also is little support for sociotropic effects; respondents in Cúcuta, which has received a much larger share of Venezuelan migrants, are less likely to say that Venezuelan migration has been good for Colombians.

There is more support for theories based on historical experience, contact, and culture. The coefficient on personal and family histories of displacement are correctly signed, being positively associated with greater openness. Neither reach conventional levels of significance, in part due to our small sample of displaced persons.[2] Colombians who have direct contact with Venezuelans are more likely to support openness than those who only have indirect or no contact. Similarly, those who say that Colombia shares a cultural history with Venezuelan are more likely to support openness. Yet, the presence of large numbers of Venezuelans seems to reify–rather than bridge–differences between groups. Respondents in Cúcuta, where most Venezuelans have arrived, are less likely to support openness and less likely to think that Venezuelans share a culture than those in Cali (although neither estimate quite reaches conventional levels of significance). Thus, it appears that political fears and direct experiences with Venezuelans through contact are the main correlates with support for tolerant immigration policies.

[2]We also excluded Colombian-Venezuelans from the sample as they are citizens of both countries, which reduces those with the most direct experiences.

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