Autocratic Regime Features

Codebook

Version 1.0*

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How Dictatorships Work
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The data set includes the following materials:

- GWF Codebook.pdf
- GWF Raw data.xls
- GWF Clean data.xls
- GWF Raw data.dta
- GWF Clean data.dta
- clean-GWF-raw-data.do

We ask that all users of this data set cite the following:

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Label variable definitions

`cowcode`: Correlates of War country code[1]

`year`: calendar year

`gwf_country`: name of country

`gwf_casename`: a country name and set of years during which an **autocratic regime** was in power. An **autocratic regime** is defined as a set of formal and/or informal rules for choosing leaders and policies; there can be multiple regimes within an **autocratic spell**. An **autocratic spell** is the consecutive calendar years in which some autocratic regime ruled the country; **autocratic spell** may be interrupted by years in which a democracy, foreign occupier, or failed state controlled the majority of the territory.

`gwf_caseid`: a unique identifying number for each **autocratic regime** in power on January 1 of consecutive observation years within the same country.

`gwf_case_duration`: a counter variable that marks the number of years the **autocratic regime** has been in power, up to and including the observation year; duration = 0 in the calendar year the **autocratic regime** took power; duration = 1 in the calendar year for the first calendar year in which the **autocratic regime** holds power on January 1. Duration time includes years the **autocratic regime** held power prior to 1946 for independent countries. There is therefore no left-censoring in the data.

`gwf_case_fail`: a binary indicator variable for whether the **autocratic regime** fails (i.e., collapses or ends) in the observation year.

`gwf_leadername`: the name of the **regime leader** on January 1 of the observation year. A **regime leader** is the *de facto* leader of the **autocratic regime**.[2]

`gwf_leaderid`: a unique identifying number for each **regime leader** on January 1 of the observation year. A **regime leader** is the *de facto* leader of the **autocratic regime**.[3] We encourage

[1]Countries that have changed territory during the period from 1946 to 2010 have the following country codes in this data set: Czechoslovakia (315); East Germany (265); Ethiopia (530); Eritrea (531); Russia and Soviet Union (365); South Vietnam (817); South Yemen (680); Vietnam/North Vietnam (816); Yemen/ North Yemen (678); Yugoslavia/Serbia (435). Note that regimes that either lost (Ethiopia) or gained territory (Vietnam/North Vietnam) during the lifetime of the regime have the same country code throughout the entire regime spell. Users should note this feature of the data set when merging with other data sets.

[2]Some autocratic regime leaders are in power less than a year and are not in power on January 1 of an observation year. These leaders are omitted from the data set.

[3]The same individual may be regime leader in more than one autocratic regime. For example, Joaquin Balaguer is considered the regime leader of Trujillo's regime in 1962 after Trujillo's assassination in 1961. Balaguer is also the regime leader of a distinct regime from 1966 to 1978. (He is coded as such starting in 1967 because the codings are based on who is in power on January 1 of an observation year.) The leader id variable treats each leader episode as a distinct regime leader. Further, the same individual can be regime leader more than once within the lifetime of the same

users to utilize this unique identifier instead of the leader names because the latter contain some names shared across regimes and different sources spell names differently.

`gwf_leader_duration`: a counter variable that marks the number of years the **regime leader** has been in power, up to and including the observation year; duration = 1 in the calendar year for the first calendar year in which the **regime leader** holds power on January 1. Duration time includes years the **regime leader** held power prior to 1946 for independent countries.

`gwf_leader_fail`: a binary indicator variable for whether the **regime leader** on January 1 of the observation year exits the regime leadership position in the observation year.[4]

`gwf_case_startdate`: numeric code for the calendar date of the political event that constitutes the start of the regime.

`gwf_case_enddate`: numeric code for the calendar date of the political event that constitutes the end of the regime.

`gwf_case_prior`: a categorical variable indicating the regime type prior to the observed regime-case.

- `democracy`: the country was an independent, sovereign country before the observed autocratic regime took power and the regime that preceded it was democratic as coded by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014).
- `dictatorship_mil`: the country was an independent, sovereign country before the observed autocratic regime took power and the regime that preceded it was autocratic and led by the military, as coded by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014).
- `dictatorship_nonmil`: the country was an independent, sovereign country before the observed autocratic regime took power and the regime that preceded it was autocratic and was NOT led by the military, as coded by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014); this includes states such Ethiopia prior to 1889 and Nepal prior to 1846 that were ruled by prior dynasties.
- `foreign-occupied`: the country was occupied by a foreign military power before the observed autocratic regime took power; this includes cases such as U.S. occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq after U.S. invasions, post-WWII regimes created by conquering super-powers, including Soviet satellite states such as East Germany.
- `not-independent`: the country was *not* an independent, sovereign country before the observed autocratic regime took power; this includes post-colonial/protectorate regimes, post-Soviet regimes, and regimes in countries that secceeded from larger countries, such as Bangladesh and Eritrea.

autocratic regime. For example, Crown Prince Faisal (he became King in 1964) is considered the regime leader in Saudi Arabia in 1959 and 1960, as well as for a second longer stint from 1962 to his (natural) death in 1975. The leader id variable treats these leader episodes as distinct.

[4]All regime failure events entail leadership failure: 223 observation-years in the data are coded as regime failure events; 469 observation years contain leadership failure events. Thus more than half of leadership failures are in observation years during which an autocratic regime does not collapse.

- `warlord`: the country's territory was ruled by warlords without a central government prior to the observed autocratic regime.

`gwf_leader_firstyear`: the first year the regime leader was in power on January 1 of an observation year. This variable is coded to coincide with the first year of each leadership spell (accounting for left censoring) of an *autocratic* leader.[5]

`gwf_case_fail_subsregime`:

- Coded `0` if the regime has not ended by December 31, 2010.
- Coded `1` if the regime that follows the last year of the regime being coded is democratic.

  Democratic is defined as a regime in which the executive achieved power through a direct competitive election in which at least ten percent of the total population (equivalent to about 40 percent of the adult male population) was eligible to vote, all major parties were permitted to compete, and neither fraud nor violence determined the election outcome; or indirect election by a body at least 60 percent of which was elected in direct competitive elections (defined in the same way as for directly elected executives).

  Provisional governments charged with conducting elections as part of a transition to democracy are coded democratic if the elections actually take place and if the candidate and party elected are allowed to take office. This sometimes takes more than a year.

  If a provisional government is following the rules agreed to with regard to power sharing and preparing for a fair election, and it lasts through January 1 of the year following its creation or longer, but is later ousted by a group different from the incumbent group that preceded it, code it as democratic (defined as above) during the time it governed.

  Reconvening a legislature or constituent assembly previously elected in a competitive election for the purpose of managing a transition to democracy is coded as democratic if the transition is carried out.
- Coded `2` if the regime in the year following the last year of the regime being coded is autocratic, that is, included in our autocratic data set.
- Coded `3` if the regime is followed by a period that is neither autocratic nor democratic. These include:

  Periods in which the country has no government or has multiple governments, no one of which controls most of the resources of the state.

  Periods in which foreign troops occupy the country and the occupying power governs it, or exercises major influence over how it is governed.

  Failures that occur when a country ceases to exist because it has been incorporated into another (e.g., East Germany, South Yemen).

`gwf_case_fail_type`:

[5]For example, Hugo Chavez' first year is coded as 2006 since the autocratic regime started in 2005, even though his first year in office was 1999 while the country was still democratic.

- Coded `0` if the regime had not ended by December 31, 2010.
- Coded `1` if regime insiders changed the rules for choosing leaders and policies, or the executive was removed by elite actors other than the military, ending the period of time in which one set of formal and informal rules remained in force.

  Use this code for cases in which regime insiders changed the formal or informal rules under which elections were held such that, for example, all parties could participate or suffrage was extended to most of the population, thus changing the identity of the actors who could influence policy. Examples might include transitions from indirect military rule to democracy and transitions from oligarchy to democracy.
- Coded `2` if the incumbent, or a party, coalition, or candidate supported by the incumbent, lost an election and allowed the candidate or party that won to take office.
- Coded `3` if a regime held a competitive election in which no major candidate or party supported by the incumbent ran, as a means of choosing the next government, and allowed the winner of the election to take office.

  Also use this code if the incumbent group handed power to a transitional government for the purpose of holding an election to determine the next government – even if the transitional election did not ultimately occur – as long as democratization was not prevented by the current incumbent.
- Coded `4` if the regime was ousted by popular uprising.

  Popular uprising is defined as widespread, mostly unarmed demonstrations, riots, and/or strikes.
- Coded `5` if the regime was overthrown by military coup (defined as ouster by the military of the regime in power).

  Overthrows by insurgencies led by ex-officers are coded as insurgencies not coups.

  Handovers to the military in the context of popular uprisings, where the military acts as a facilitator of regime change, are coded as popular uprisings not coups.

  Transitions from direct to indirect military rule are coded as coups because they are made by the military of the regime in power.
- Coded `6` if regime is ousted by insurgents, revolutionaries, or combatants fighting a civil war.

  Insurgency, revolution, or civil war defined as involving organized armed conflict.
- Coded `7` if regime changed through foreign imposition or invasion.
- Coded `8` if a new leader chosen in a regular autocratic succession changed the formal and informal rules defining the regime after his accession to power while himself remaining in power.

  If the regime's formal and informal rules were changed sufficiently to code it as a new regime, it will appear in the list of cases as a separate entry.

  Regular autocratic successions defined as: the retirement, illness, or death of the original leader and his replacement by someone who previously occupied the formal position of successor, or was selected by the retiring leader, or was chosen by a group of regime insiders such as the party executive committee, high level officers, or a combination of the two.

Regular autocratic successions also include original leaders who leave office because of term limits and are succeeded by a leader chosen by the retiring leader; or a group of regime insiders such as the party executive committee, high level officers, or a combination of the two.

- Coded `9` if regime ends because the state ceases to exist or the government loses control of most of its territory.

`gwf_case_fail_violent`:

- Coded `0` if the regime had not ended by December 31, 2010.
- Coded `1` if non-violent, defined as involving no deaths.
- Coded `2` if a few deaths occurred during the transition. If numbers are available, 'a few' means 1-25.
- Coded `3` if many deaths occurred during the transition. If numbers are available, 'many' means more than 25 but less than 1000.
- Coded `4` if more than 1000 deaths occurred. (These should be included in Fearon & Laitin.)

`period1`: binary indicator for the five-year period from 1951-1955.

`period2`: binary indicator for the five-year period from 1956-1960.

`period3`: binary indicator for the five-year period from 1961-1965.

`period4`: binary indicator for the five-year period from 1966-1970.

`period5`: binary indicator for the five-year period from 1971-1975.

`period6`: binary indicator for the five-year period from 1976-1980.

`period7`: binary indicator for the five-year period from 1981-1985.

`period8`: binary indicator for the five-year period from 1986-1990.

`period9`: binary indicator for the five-year period from 1991-1995.

`period10`: binary indicator for the five-year period from 1996-2000.

`period11`: binary indicator for the five-year period from 2001-2005.

`period12`: binary indicator for the five-year period from 2006-2010.

`coldwar`: binary indicator for the Cold War period (1946-1989).

`ld`: Log regime-case duration (natural log `gwf_case_duration`).

NOTE: This data set does not include a categorical variable for **regime type**. An autocratic **regime type** is one of the categories or typologies that group similar **autocratic regimes** together. A regime type indicator is time invariant across a regime's duration; examples include: military, party, personalist, and monarchy. Those interested in using the autocratic **regime type** data should consult:

Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2014. "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set." *Perspectives on Politics* 12(2): 313-331; data set available here (`http://sites.psu.edu/dictators/`)

Illustrative examples of autocratic regimes

When using the data to model autocratic regime survival, the unit of analysis is the **autocratic regime**, which is coded in the variable `gwf_casename`. The unit of analysis for authoritarian regime survival is not the autocratic spell or the regime leader spell.[6]

Algeria

- 1962-1992: FLN/military
- 1992-2010: military rule

The **autocratic spell** lasts from 1962 to 2010 and is right-censored. Each bullet point lists a distinct **autocratic regime**. Regime failure (`gwf_fail`) occurs in 1992: the January 11, 1992 military coup that ousted Benjedid. The **autocratic regime** from 1992-2010 is right-censored because it has not failed as of December 31, 2010. Algeria has six autocratic **regime leaders** during this period, three in the first regime (Ben Bella, Boumediene, and Benjedid) and three in the second regime (Nezzar, Zeroual, and Bouteflika).

Chile

- 1973-1989: military junta rules under Pinochet

The **autocratic spell** lasts from 1973 to 1989; it is *not* right-censored. The bullet point lists one **autocratic regime**. Regime failure (`gwf_fail`) and the **autocratic spell** failure occur in 1989. Only one regime failure (`gwf_fail`) event occurs at the end of the **autocratic spell**: the December 14, 1989 election that leads to democracy the following year. There is only one **regime leader** (`gwf_leadername`) during this period: Pinochet.

Congo/DRC/Zaire

- 1960-1997: Mobutu regime
- 1997-2010: Kabila (father and son) regime

[6]See Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) and Wright and Bak (2016) for discussion of differences in modeling autocratice regime survival and leader survival.

The **autocratic spell** lasts from 1960 to 2010 and is right-censored. Each of the bullet points lists a distinct **autocratic regime**. **Regime failure** occurs in 1997. Only one **regime failure** event occurs during the **autocratic spell**: May 17, 1997 when Laurent Kabila's forces take Kinshasa. The **autocratic regime** from 1997-2010 is right-censored because it has not failed as of December 31, 2010. There are three **regime leaders** during this **autocratic spell**, one in the first regime (Mobutu) and two in the second (Laurent Kabila and Joseph Kabila).

Thailand

- 1944-1947: Pridi regime
- 1947-1957: Phibun regime
- 1957-1973: Sarit, Thanom and the military
- 1976-1988: Prem Tinsulanonda and the military
- 1991-1992: military junta
- 2006-2007: military junta

There are six **autocratic regimes** and four **autocratic spells**; none are right-censored. Each bullet point lists a distinct **autocratic regime**. The first three **autocratic regimes** (1944-1947, 1947-1957, and 1957-1973) ruled consecutively, uninterrupted by a non-autocratic regime, and thus constitute one **autocratic spell**: 1944-1973. The other three **autocratic regimes** (1976-1988, 1991-1992, and 2006-2007) each ended in democracy and thus constitute separate **autocratic spells**. There are nine autocratic **regime leaders** during the sample period: one in the first regime (Pridi); one in the second (Luang Phibun Songkhram); two in the third (Sarit and Thanom); three in the fourth (Sangad Chalayu, Kriangsak, and Prem Tinsulanonda); one in the fifth (Suchinda Kraprayoon); one in the sixth (Sonthi).

Regime-case duration

The following figure shows that the distribution of the regime-case duration variable contains a handful of extreme values. The top left plot shows that Oman, with a regime start date of 1741, is the regime case that contains these extreme duration values. In the data set, we have recoded this regime to start in 1920, instead of 1741. This recoded start year corresponds to the Treaty of Seeb in 1920, which established Omani autonomy within Muscat and Oman. With this change to the data, Oman's regime duration is similar to other long-lasting regimes that begin during roughly the same historical period (e.g., Mexico and the Soviet Union).

The top right plot shows the smooth distribution for all regimes that last up to 85 years (i.e., excluding Oman 1741-NA and Nepal 1846-1951). The bottom left plot shows the raw distribution of duration time with Oman recoded to start in 1920 and the bottom right plot shows the distribution of the natural log of duration time with Oman recoded. We encourage users to employ some transformation of the distribution with Oman recoded (e.g. bottom left or right plots).



Concept clarifications

Military attributes

There are five ways that the data code military attributes, as summarized in Table 1. Note that different variables pertain specifically to the regime leader's career prior to assuming office, while others refer to the group that put the leader in power or the type of event through which the regime seized power.

Variable name	Concept
`leadermil`	regime **leader** is a member of the military prior to assuming office, not a civilian or rebel leader
`militrank`	officer rank of regime **leader** prior to assuming power if he was a member of the military at this time; ranks include generals, colonels, and junior officers/NCO's
`ldr_group_military`	military is the organized **group** that put the regime leader into office
`ldr_exp_highrank`, `ldr_exp_lowrank`	regime leader's most important **career experience**, where he is most likely to have developed his most useful support network
`seizure_coup`	the regime seized power in a coup, meaning that the **political event** used to code the start of the regime is a successful coup

Table 1: Military attributes

The first variable in Table 1 identifies whether the regime leader was a *member of the military or security service* prior to assuming office; that is, the leader was not a civilian or rebel leader prior to assuming office. This is derived using the `leaderciv` variable in the raw data set and is referred to as `leadermil` in the codebook and cleaned data. This variable is therefore very similar to the Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) coding of military regimes, which relies on the Banks data that codes the civilian-military distinction of the leader prior to his assuming office.

The second variable identifies the *military officer rank* of the leader if he was a member of the military prior to assuming power. This is `militrank` in the raw data, code book, and cleaned data. There are two leaders in the data set who are coded as being members of the military prior to assuming office but who were not ranking officers (Najibullah in Afghanistan and Sargsian in Armenia); they were security officials but not formal members of the military so they are not coded as having military rank.

The third variable identifies the *group* that put the regime leader into office. This is derived

from the `leaderrole` variable in the raw data; it is referred to as `ldr_military` in the codebook and cleaned data. A value of `1` on this variable does not mean that leaders placed in power by the military were necessarily members of the military and/or military officers in the five years prior to assuming office. For example, we code Abdelaziz Bouteflika in Algeria and Francois Duvalier in Haiti as being placed in power by the military even though they were not members of the military in the five years prior to assuming office. Similarly, members of the military (in the five years prior to assuming office) may be put into the leader position by groups other than the military. For example, Raul Castro, a high-ranking Cuban military officer prior to assuming office, was put in the leadership position by his family. Empirically, however, those most likely to be put into office by the military are members of the military, particularly officers.

The fourth variable related to the military is the regime leader's most important career *experience*, where he is most likely to have developed his most useful support network. This is derived from the `ldrexp` variable in the raw data and is referred to as `ldrexp_highrank` and `ldrexp_lowrank` in the codebook and clean data. Again, most leaders whose prior experience is based in the military will be members of the military prior to assuming office. However, some members of the military prior to assuming office, such as Anastasio Somoza Debayle and Raul Castro, are not coded as having their most important prior career experience in the military. Instead, their support network is identified as their family.

Finally, the data include a variable that codes the type of regime *seizure event*, or how the regime obtained power. This is derived from the `seizure` variable in the raw data and referred to as `seizure_coup` in the codebook and cleaned data. Note that this variable is time-invariant across leaders from the same regime. While most leaders who were military members prior to assuming power occupy the leadership position in regimes that grabbed power via a coup, some regimes born of coups did not put members of the military in the leadership position. For example, the third leader of the Algerian military regime, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, was put in charge of a regime that came to power in a 1992 coup. Conversely, some members of the military (i.e., individuals who are not civilians or rebel leaders) were given leadership positions in regimes that seized power by methods other than a coup, such as Joseph Kabila.

Military features of the regime when there is no military

Some regimes in the data set are coded as having no professionalized, domestically-controlled military, as listed in Table 2. A regime can be without a professional domestic military under regime control for a number of reasons, but the most common are the following. A foreign power either provides security (e.g., Senegal provided security for Gambia until the late 1980s) or controls the military (e.g., Eastern European countries after WWII or Central Asian Republics shortly after independence from the former Soviet Union). The latter situation, where a collapsing empire gives way to independent countries, is closely related to other instances of observing no regime-led military: initial post-independence years in some African countries (e.g., Botswana, Congo-Brazzaville, Ghana, Guniea, and Zambia). Finally, Costa Rica does not have a military and Honduras did not have a professional military until 1948 (Dodd 2005, 55-56). Afghanistan under Taliban rule is also coded as not having a professional military organization because the Taliban did not transform its informally organized insurgent armed forces into a formal military institution after seizing power.

Regime-case	*Leader*	*First year with no military or foreign officers*	*Last year with no military or foreign officers*
Afghanistan 96-01	Omar	1997	2001
Azerbaijan 91-92	Mutalibov	1992	1992
Botswana 66-NA	Khama, Seretse	1967	1977
Cameroon 60-83	Ahidjo	1961	1962
Chad 60-75	Tombalbaye	1961	1965
Congo-Brz 60-63	Youlou	1961	1963
Costa Rica 1948-49	Figueres Ferrer	1949	1949
Gabon 60-NA	M'Ba	1961	1967
Gambia 65-94	Jawara	1966	1989
Germany, East 49-90	Ulbricht	1950	1956
Ghana 60-66	Nkrumah	1961	1961
Guinea 58-84	Toure	1959	1959
Honduras 33-56	Carias	1946	1948
Ivory Coast 60-99	Houphouet-Boigny	1961	1961
Jordan 46-NA	Abdullah I	1947	1956
Kazakhstan 91-NA	Nazarbayev	1992	1992
Kyrgyzstan 91-05	Akayev	1992	1994
Libya 51-69	Idris I	1952	1958
Madagascar 60-72	Tsiranana	1961	1969
Malawi 64-94	Banda	1965	1972
Oman 1741-NA	Said	1946	1977
Poland 44-89	Bierut	1949	1956
Rwanda 62-73	Kayibanda	1963	1963
Swaziland 68-NA	Sobhuza II	1969	1973
Tajikistan 91-NA	Nabiyev	1992	1993
Turkmenistan 91-NA	Niyazov	1992	1995
UAE 71-NA	Zayid	1972	1985
Uzbekistan 91-NA	Karimov	1992	1994
Zambia 67-91	Kaunda	1968	1970

Table 2: Regimes with no domestic professional military

If the regime is coded as not having a professional military, then *some* military-related variables are coded as not having a particular military feature. For example, ethnicity in the military is coded as `0` for all variables measuring this concept (`milethnic_dom`, `milethnic_hetero`, `milethnic_homo`).

When a regime does not have a professional military, this does not necessarily mean the regime does not have a paramilitary group (`paramil_party`, `paramil_pers`, `paramil_fightrebel`); nor does it preclude the leader from consolidating power over the security apparatus (`milmerit_pers`, `milnotrial`, `sectyapp_pers`). For example, the UAE did not have a regime-led military until 1985, but promotion in the security apparatus was still based on personal loyalty to the leader

prior to 1985 (Cordesman 1997, 297). And more than a handful of regime leaders (e.g., Banda in Malawi, M'Ba in Gabon, and Zayid in the UAE) took personal control over the security apparatus (`sectyapp_pers`) or created a new paramilitary (`paramil_pers`) loyal to themselves (e.g., Tombalbaye in Chad, Karimov in Uzbekistan) prior to the regime building its own army or replacing foreign officers with national ones. Finally, even when a foreign power has direct control over the military, the regime may still have military officers present in the cabinet (e.g., East Germany and Poland in the early 1950s).

Party features of the regime when there is no support party

A regime can be coded as *not* having a support party if: (a) the regime did not come to power with the support of a pre-existing party and the regime has yet to create a new support party; or (b) the regime disbands (closes down) an existing regime support party. If a regime does not have a support party, *some* variables coded for party features of the regime cannot be logically true. For example, if there is no support party it cannot be a rubber-stamp party (`partyrbrstmp`); the party cannot control the military (`partymilit`); the cabinet cannot contain members of the party (`partymins`); the regime leader cannot be the party leader (`partyleader`); and the heir cannot be selected from the party (`heirparty`).

However, the coding of the data allow for the possibility that a regime can have a leader whose main prior experience is as a member of a dominant political party (`ldrexp_supportparty`), a leader whose initial base of support that put him in power was a dominant party (`ldr_domparty`), or a leader was selected in an election. Since these variables pertain to the leader they can be coded positively even when the regime does not have a support party. For example, some post-Soviet leaders' main prior experience and initial bases of support were via a (prior) dominant party – i.e. that of the Soviet Union – even though they either the leader left that party or it was disbanded before the regime took power. And many leaders were selected in elections even though the dictatorship had no ruling party.

The geneology of parties

The data set codes the history of regime support political parties (`partyhistory`):

- `_noparty` no support party
- `_postseizure` party created after seizure of power
- `_priorelection` prior party, created to support the autocratic leader's election before the initiation of dictatorship (e.g., Fujimori of Peru)
- `_priornosupport` prior party, never won more than 10 percent of electoral support
- `_priorwinsupport` prior party, won support under prior autocracy
- `_insurgent` insurgent/rebel party before initiation of dictatorship
- `_priordem` prior party won more than 10 percent of support in a prior democracy

There is another variable that codes a military leader's relationship to parties (`militparty`). This variable captures whether a regime leader from the military – i.e., a regime leader who was

an active duty or retired military/security officer (or NCO) prior to accession to power – created a political party to support himself and the regime. With this variable, we derive the following variables:

- _noparty regime leader's supporters are not organized in a party
- _ally regime leader allies with a pre-existing party after his accession to power[7]
- _newparty regime leader or a close ally creates a party to support the regime after his accession to office
- _priorparty regime leader's supporters were organized into a party prior to his accession to power, and that party now supports the regime

There is a large overlap between militparty_newparty and partyhistory_postseizure but this overlap is not perfect because the latter refers to the party while the former refers to the behavior of the *leader* if the leader's main prior experience is in the military. An example from the Torrijos regime in Panama (1968-1982) illustrates this. After a decade in power Torrijos created a new party in 1978 (coded as starting on January 1, 1979). Thus both militparty_newparty and partyhistory_postseizure are coded as 1 starting in 1979. However, Torrijos died in 1981 and Flores succeeded him (and is coded as the new leader starting in 1982). The partyhistory_postseizure variable is still coded as 1 in 1982 because Flores kept the support party that was created post-seizure of power (i.e. post-1968 when the regime seized power). But militparty_newparty is coded as 0 for 1982 under Flores because he did not create a new party; that is the behavior of the second regime leader (Flores) was different from that of the first (Torrijos) insofar as the first created a new support party while the second did not and instead used the support of a party he inherited from his predecessor. In these cases, partyhistory_postseizure is coded 1, while militparty_newparty is coded 0 and militparty_priorparty is coded 1. These instances arise most often when the first regime leader creates a new support party after the regime seized power but the *second* regime leader retains the support of this post-regime seizure party.

While most regimes where the first leader comes to power with a pre-existing party organized to run for office in the election just prior to the initiation of dictatorship (e.g., Francois Duvalier in Haiti and Heydar Aliyev in Azerbaijan) are not military officers just prior to seizing power, there is one instance in which a leader's primary prior experience was as a high-ranking military officer (José Antonio Remón in Panama (1954–1955)).

[7]The only difference between _ally and _priorparty (see below) is that the dictator is allied with the old party before assuming office for _priorparty, but after assuming office for _ally.

Variable definitions for Autocratic Features

These definitions are not the same as the coding rules, which are more detailed. The definitions are only intended to provide readers with a basic understanding of the type of information contained in the raw data.

- `ldr_group_` (categorical)
  identify how the regime leader achieved office and/or whose support put him in office
  - `ldr_group_priordem` prior democratic election
  - `ldr_group_domparty` dominant party
  - `ldr_group_military` military junta
  - `ldr_group_insurgency` insurgency
  - `ldr_group_hereditary` traditional hereditary succession
  - `ldr_group_civsucc` civilian autocratic succession
  - `ldr_group_other` other (interim, clerical)[8]
  - `ldr_group_foreign` foreigners played a dominant role in choosing the incumbent
- `seizure` (categorical)
  how the regime obtained power
  - `seizure_family` seizure by an armed family
  - `seizure_coup` military coup
  - `seizure_rebel` insurgency/rebels
  - `seizure_uprising` popular uprising
  - `seizure_election` election
  - `seizure_succession` authoritarian incumbent rule change to alter composition of ruling coalition
  - `seizure_foreign` foreign imposed
- `ldr_exp` (categorical)
  regime leader's most important career experience where he is most likely to have developed his most useful support network
  - `ldr_exp_highrank` high-ranking military officer
  - `ldr_exp_lowrank` low-ranking military officer or NCO

[8]There is only one interim *autocratic* leader, Monje Gutierrez (Bolivia 1947), and only one clerical regime, Iran 1979–NA. The *other* category captures situations such as: those in which the incumbent discarded or marginalized his initial supporters within a year (demonstrating he did not depend on their support); those in which one faction of a ruling group eliminates or marginalizes others; those in which the groups involved in the regime were changing; those in which there is a father to son (or other close relative) transition in regimes that lack rules about hereditary succession.

  - `ldr_exp_rebel` leader of armed insurgency that brought regime to power
  - `ldr_exp_demelect` leader in a prior party organized to run in competitive democratic elections
  - `ldr_exp_supportparty` position in regime support party and not relative of previous leader of the same regime
  - `ldr_exp_pers_loyal` chosen by prior regime leaders because of competence or loyalty and is NOT an officer, party leader, or rebel
  - `ldr_exp_pers_relative` leader is a close relative of a prior leader of the same regime, who was not himself a hereditary monarch
  - `ldr_exp_rulingfamily` member of the traditional ruling family and chosen in the way that is traditional for the tribe or country in question
  - `ldr_exp_other` leader does not fit other prior codes

- `supportparty` (binary)

  0. no support party
  1. support party

- `partyleader` (binary)

  0. no support party OR party leader selected by regime leader OR party leader selection influenced by regime leader OR party leader is not regime leader and selection controlled by group that excludes the regime leader
  1. party leader is regime leader or relative of regime leader

- `partyhistory` (categorical)

  - `partyhistory_noparty` no support party
  - `partyhistory_postseizure` party created after seizure of power
  - `partyhistory_priorelection` prior party, created to support leader election (e.g. Fujimori)
  - `partyhistory_priornosupport` prior party, won little electoral support
  - `partyhistory_priorwinsupport` prior party, ruled under prior autocracy
  - `partyhistory_insurgent` insurgent/rebel party
  - `partyhistory_priordem` prior party won support in a democracy

- `partymins` (ordinal)

  0. no support party
  1. 1/3 or more of cabinet positions go to non-party members
  2. some but fewer than 1/3 of cabinet members are not party members
  3. cabinet ministers (except defense) are party members

- `partymilit` (ordinal)
  missing if no party or military

  0. military controls party OR no party
  1. no party interference in military or military interference in party
  2. party and military influence each other
  3. party interferes in military but does not impose party structure
  4. party imposes party structure on military

- `partymilit2` (binary)

  0. regime led by a party and has a military (coded `1` to `4` on `partymilit`)
  1. regime is not led by a party or lacks a military

- `partyexcom` (categorical)

  - `partyexcom_pers` regime leader chooses party executive committee
  - `partyexcom_faction` faction that supports the regime leader dominates the party executive committee
  - `partyexcom_oppose` competition for seats on the party executive committee
  - `partyexcom_noexcom` no party executive committee (includes no support party)

- `localorgzns` (ordinal)

  0. no support party
  1. support party has few local organizations
  2. local-level branch organizations link party militants to citizens

- `excomcivn` (ordinal)

  0. no support party
  1. party executive committee is 2/3 or more military or retired military
  2. party executive committee has military or retired military, but less than 2/3
  3. party executive committee is civilian or ex-insurgent

- `multiethnic` (binary)

  0. no support party OR monoethnic
  1. party leadership is multi-ethnic/region/religious

- `monoethnic` (binary)

  0. no support party OR multiethnic
  1. party leadership is dominated by people from particular ethnicities/regions/religions

- `heirparty` (binary)

0. not 1
1. heir is high party official but not close relative of the leader

- `heirfamily` (binary)
  0. not 1
  1. heir is same family as a leader before him within the same regime
- `heirciv` (ordinal)
  0. military succession
  1. successor from insurgency
  2. civilian succession
- `heirclan` (binary)
  0. regime leader not from same clan, tribe, or ethnic group; or ethnicity/clan/tribe not politically relevant
  1. regime leader (or heir apparent) from same clan, tribe, or ethnic group as previous leader
- `legcompetn` (ordinal)
  0. no legislature
  1. appointed by regime leader
  2. indirect selection of legislative body by elected lower level body
  3. all seats from uncontested elections
  4. only front groups and ruling party members
  5. all seats from ruling front/party, but competitive multi-candidate elections
  6. only independents seated in opposition
  7. some opposition seats from elections but less than 25% (includes independents)
  8. 25% or more opposition seats from elections (includes independents)
- `leaderciv` (binary)
  0. leader was NOT civilian before being in power
  1. leader was civilian before being in power
- `leadermil` (binary)
  0. leader was NOT member of the military before assuming power
  1. leader was member of the military before assuming power
- `leaderrebel` (binary)
  0. leader was NOT member of an insurgency before assuming power
  1. leader was member of an insurgency before assuming power

- `cabciv` (ordinal)
    0. most important cabinet positions held by military OR regime leader
    1. cabinet positions held by civilians or insurgents, but some military in positions other than defense
    2. civilian cabinet (except defense)
- `cabmil` (ordinal)
    0. most positions (except defense) held by civilians OR regime leader
    1. cabinet positions held by civilians or insurgents, but some military in positions other than defense
    2. most important cabinet positions held by military
- `militrank` (ordinal)
    0. leader was not a (retired) member of the military within five years of accession; has honorific military title; or was member of an insurgency
    1. leader was rank below major
    2. leader was a colonel in a military that includes generals
    3. leader was a colonel in a military that does not include generals
    4. leader was general, admiral, or other highest ranking office
- `milmerit_pers` (ordinal)
    0. regime leader does not use loyalty in promotion AND no widespread forced retirement OR no military
    1. promotions of top officers loyal to the regime leader or from his group
    2. regime leader promotes officers loyal to himself or from his ethnic, tribal, regional, or religious group OR widespread forced retirements
- `milmerit_mil` (ordinal)
    0. officer promotion based on personal loyalty to leader OR widespread forces retirement OR no military
    1. promotions of top officers loyal to the regime leader or from his group
    2. regime leader does not promote officers loyal to himself or from his ethnic, tribal, regional, or religious group AND no widespread forced retirement
- `milconsult` (binary)
    0. no consultative body; regime leader not from the military
    1. consultative body in which the heads of service branches are represented; or if country specialists describe some other routinized method of consultation
- `milnotrial` (ordinal) regime leader imprisons/kills officers or officers from other groups without fair trial

0. regime leader does NOT kill/imprison out-group officers OR no military OR foreign officers staff military
1. regime leader imprisons/kills officers from other groups without fair trial

- `militparty` (categorical)
  whether regime leader created his own support party
  - `militparty_noparty` regime leader's supporters are not organized in a party
  - `militparty_ally` regime leader allies with a pre-existing party
  - `militparty_newparty` regime leader or a close ally creates a party to support the regime after his accession to office
  - `militparty_priorparty` regime leader's supporters were organized into a party prior to his accession to power and that party now supports the regime
  - `militparty_priorparty` regime leader's supporters were organized into a party prior to his accession to power and that party now supports the regime
  - `militparty_notmilitary` regime leader is not an active duty or retired military/security officer
- `milethnic` (categorical)
  whether officers do not come from more than one ethnic, religious, or regional group
  - `milethnic_inclusive` high ranking officers come from most of the larger, politically salient ethnic, religious, and regional groups OR no salient cleavage
  - `milethnic_hetero` salient cleavage AND one or a few regions, ethnicities, or religions are overrepresented in officer corps AND officers include **some** high ranking members from different backgrounds
  - `milethnic_homo` salient cleavage AND nearly all high ranking officers come from one or a few regions or groups
- `nomilitary` (binary)
  0. military present AND coded as one of three types of `milethnic`
  1. no military or officers are mostly foreign
- `ldrrotation` (binary)
  0. no rotation procedure; or regime leader is not from the military
  1. procedure for regular succession or rotation of the executive among military officers (including rigged elections)
- `electldr` (categorical)
  - `electldr_family` regime leader was chosen using traditional rules by a ruling family
  - `electldr_notelect` not elected
  - `electldr_priordict` elected in prior dictatorship

- `electldr_1candidate` elected in one candidate election
- `electldr_1faction` elected in election against opposition candidates but no opposition party
- `electldr_multileg` selected by legislature elected in multiparty elections
- `electldr_multiexec` elected in multiparty executive elections
- `electldr_priordem` elected in prior democracy

- `legnoms` (categorical)
  - `legnoms_noleg` no legislative body
  - `legnoms_nooppose` no opposition in legislative election
  - `legnoms_indirect` legislature selected by indirect election from lower body; comprised of local/tribal notables; or selected by regime insiders as societal representatives
  - `legnoms_veto` opposition allowed to contest but regime holds veto power of candidate selection
  - `legnoms_noveto` opposition or independents allowed to contest; and ruling party candidate selection influenced by local party leaders or faction members
  - `legnoms_priordem` legislature chosen in prior democratic regime or competitive pre-independence election

- `plebiscite` (binary)
  Has the regime leader held a plebiscite to legitimize or consolidate his rule
  0. no plebiscites on the regime leader's occupancy of the executive or the continuation of the regime have been held
  1. one or more plebiscites have been held

- `partyrbrstmp` (binary)
  0. party executive committee is a rubberstamp; no party executive committee; no support party
  1. party executive committee has some policy independence from the regime leader

- `officepers` (binary)
  0. regime leader does not have discretion over appointments to high office
  1. regime leader has discretion over appointments to high office or appoints relatives to these positions

- `leaderrelatvs` (binary)
  0. none of the regime leader's relatives[9] occupy very influential offices in the government, ruling party, or military

[9] *Relatives* are defined as including spouses, parents, grandparents, children (including adopted and step children), grandchildren, siblings, half-siblings, uncles, aunts, half-uncles, half-aunts, first cousins, and the spouse of all of these.

1. one or more of the regime leader's relatives occupy high offices in the government, ruling party, or military

- `paramil` (categorical)
  - `paramil_noparamil` no paramilitary forces created
  - `paramil_fightrebel` paramilitary forces created to fight civil war on regime's side
  - `paramil_party` party militia or paramilitary organized by dominant party
  - `paramil_pers` regime leader creates paramilitary forces, a president's guard, or new security forces apparently loyal to himself
- `sectyapp` (categorical)
  - `sectyapp_mil` security apparatus controlled by the military
  - `sectyapp_party` security apparatus controlled by dominant party
  - `sectyapp_pers` security apparatus controlled personally by regime leader

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