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A configurational analysis of ethnic protest in Europe

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Abstract

This article analyzes the conditions under which ethnic minorities intensify or moderate their protest behavior. While this question has been previously asked, we find that prior studies tend to generalize explanations across a varied set of ethnic groups and assume that causal conditions can independently explain whether groups are more or less mobilized. By contrast, this study employs a technique – fuzzy-set analysis – that is geared toward matching comparable groups to specific analytical configurations of causal factors to explain the choice for strong and weak protest. The analysis draws on a sample of 29 ethnic minorities in Europe and uses three group and two contextual conditions inspired by Gurr's ethnopolitical conflict model to understand why some ethnic minorities protest more frequently than others. We find that two group-related factors have the strongest claim to being generalizable: while territorial concentration is a necessary condition for strong protest, national pride is a necessary condition for weak protest. The contextual factors of level of democracy and ethnic fractionalization, which are often emphasized in the literature, and the perceived political discrimination of a group, are neither necessary nor individually sufficient conditions for either strong or weak protest. Hence, they help understanding some cases, but not all, and only in combination with other conditions. Such causal complexity, inherent in the phenomenon of ethnic protest, underscores the need for a case-sensitive, yet comparative, approach.

Keywords

Causal complexity, ethnic protest, Europe, fuzzy-set analysis, minorities at risk

Introduction

Ethnic diversity and its resulting dynamics, such as ethnic contention in its various forms, have been issues of constant academic interest in recent decades. It is a common belief in the literature that ethnic diversity poses a substantial risk to social stability in any country (Gurr, 1996; Horowitz, 2000; Huntington, 1996). In Europe, the powerful force of ethnic diversity was at work for

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centuries, molding conflicts and ethnic movements. More recently, the collapse of communism and the formation of new democratic regimes in Eastern Europe unlocked a reservoir of ethnic potential and opened a wide range of opportunities for ethnic movements to manifest. In Europe, ethnic movements are mostly peaceful, with violence as an exception rather than a common trend. In fact, empirical evidence suggests a global shift in mobilization behavior from violent rebellion to peaceful protest (Gurr, 2000). This evidence coincides with one of the long-standing predictions in the literature that while ethnic movements will decrease (Dogan, 1994), peaceful contention will increase as part of a deep-rooted intergenerational change in both individual and societal behavior (Barnes et al., 1979; Inglehart, 1990; Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002). As a result, an increase in peaceful contention should be viewed as 'an extension of the political repertory of democratic citizens' (Kaase, 2010) to peacefully accommodate the challenging demands of ethnic diversity.

Despite the wider phenomenon of protest mobilization, it is striking that most of the attention in the current literature continues to analyze ethnic violence. Compared with the current scholarship on ethnic violence, the literature on protest mobilization is rare and unsystematic (Heymann, 1992; Koopmans, 1993; Martin, 1994; Olzak, 1998). Some theorists combine the study of protest and violent contention to produce indexed measures in analyzing joint patterns of mobilization of ethnic groups (Benson and Saxton, 2010; Davenport, 1995; Gurr, 1989; Muller, 1979; Saxton and Benson, 2006). Yet, when targeting mobilization behavior, a choice pattern must be underlined: protest and rebellion must be viewed as 'one strategic choice among others in the decision to mobilize' (McAdam et al., 1996: 17). According to this idea, *ceteris paribus*, protest is seen as a strategic option by ethnic groups that is of a different intensity than violence and that has an established scope to obtain the desired outcomes given specific configurations of existing conditions at a given time.

This analysis looks at the protest actions of 29 ethnic minority groups in Europe from 1991 to 2003. Europe is characterized by a high degree of ethnic diversity, which originates in complex ethnic settings that allowed different nations to intermingle and to transform across time. The occurring ethnic dynamics were often accompanied by conflict, frequent border changes, assimilation and integration processes. With the increasing democratic standards in the region, many of the ethnic grievances previously solved in a violent manner are currently brought into the political arena where ethnic movements are set to peacefully promote minorities' interests. Although protest is an available choice for politically organized ethnic groups, not all of them choose to mobilize in pursuing their group demands. Thus, there is a legitimate question of why some politically organized groups protest while others do not. The choice for protest mobilization is rarely influenced by a single condition; it is usually a configuration of conditions that provide the proper context in which minority groups mobilize. This article examines the configurational nature of protest mobilization by analyzing the necessary and sufficient conditions, or combinations of conditions, for the weak and strong political mobilization of ethnic groups.

This article applies fuzzy-set analysis, which is part of an emerging methodology called Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin, 1987, 2008). This approach allows us to investigate how a number of conditions interact in determining the degree to which ethnic minority groups engage in strong or moderate protest. QCA formalizes case-oriented analysis with a focus on identifying necessary and sufficient conditions that define the context of a particular outcome (for an introduction, see Rihoux and Ragin, 2009; Schneider and Wagemann, 2010). Fuzzy-set analysis is geared toward modeling small or medium-sized datasets of 10–50 cases (for a discussion of the potential and the advantages of QCA and fuzzy-set analysis, see Rihoux, 2006; Vis, 2012).

While fuzzy-set analysis is particularly suited for macro- and group-level analyses, its use in the field of ethnic contention is almost non-existent (see Ragin, 2000: 273–278, for an illustration of

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the advantages of using fuzzy-set in the analysis of protest mobilization). This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, the analysis adds to existing scholarship by conducting a study of European minorities from both East and West, which display more peaceful mobilization trends than violent conflict, which was more intensively researched. Second, we employ a new methodological approach oriented toward exploring the configurational effects of five group and contextual conditions on the two poles of ethnic protest: strong and weak protest mobilization. In so doing, we reveal evidence from a new empirical angle, which differs from the existing statistical and case-study approaches. Third, the analysis bridges different approaches in the literature with a comprehensive theoretical framework for the study of ethnic protest, which combines various traditional factors in explaining ethnic contention: the level of democracy, the degree of ethnic fractionalization of a country, the degree of political discrimination, territorial concentration, and the sense of national pride among members of the minority group.

The first section of this article presents the theoretical framework from which the hypotheses are derived. Subsequently, the following section presents the operationalization of the conditions and the fuzzy-set methodology employed in this study. The next section presents the main findings, including the analysis of necessity and sufficiency for strong and weak protest. This study concludes with some reflections and implications of the current study and for future research.

A theory of protest mobilization

The existing literature in the area of ethnicity and conflict is abundant and comprises studies of ethnopolitical, elite, and nationalist behavior. The scholarship on the political configuration of the nationalist demands pertains to voting and campaign activities, non-violent social protest, and violent unrest. The conflict resulting from ethnopolitical dynamics was previously analyzed from the angle of intensity that protest or rebellion may take. With the availability of large-scale quantitative data, the literature concentrated on observing the likelihood of moving up the ladder of ethnic contention: from no actions of conflict to mobilized actions of conflict, from protest to rebellion, or from low-intensity to high-intensity unrest. Alternatively, the qualitative literature on nationalism and ethnopolitical behavior focused on specific, context-oriented case studies of violent or non-violent contention. So far, no coherent theory-making approached ethnic mobilization in its configurational nature, where both strong and weak actions of unrest are simultaneously explained by various combinations of interacting conditions. This study tries to fill this gap.

This article brings together two threads of literature with a somewhat different take on protest mobilization. First, we find the 'ethnopolitical conflict' literature, which aims to understand the dynamics of peaceful and violent mobilization at the ethnic group level (Gurr, 1993a, 1993b, 1994, 2000). This stream of literature has three distinct but often interlinked analytical components: one cluster of studies approaches protest as an independent non-violent form of expressing ethnopolitical demands (DeNardo, 1985; Gurr, 1989; Heymann, 1992; Olzak, 1998); another cluster of research looks into violent means of ethnopolitical conflict such as rebellion, terrorist actions, or civil wars (Cederman et al., 2011; Cederman and Girardin, 2005; Cunningham, 2011; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Gurr and Moore, 1997; Ward et al., 2010); while a third cluster of scholars attempts to merge and analyze violent and non-violent unrest as a single, multi-level intensity scale of conflict mobilization (Benson and Rochon, 2004; Benson and Saxton, 2010; Davenport, 1995; Muller, 1979; Saxton and Benson, 2006).

The second stream of literature is more sociologically oriented, where the theoretical foundation for protest is sought not so much through ethnopolitics, but rather in the inter-personal dynamics of *political participation* (Almond and Verba, 1989 [1963]; Catterberg, 2003; Gherghina and Jiglau, 2011; Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002; Koopmans, 1993; Sandovici and Listhaug, 2010;

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Tilly, 1978). Initially, studies on political participation focused on voting and party activities with limited or no inclusion of the ethnic component (Berelson et al., 1954). Starting with Almond and Verba (1989 [1963]), the concept of political participation was broadened to include communal activities, which have the potential for the inclusion of ethnic movements. All actions of political participation that take place via the institutionalized paths of campaign and non-campaign communal activities are classified as conventional protest. In contrast, the non-institutionalized protest such as mass demonstrations, petitioning, and violent mayhem are labeled as unconventional (Barnes et al., 1979) or 'elite challenging' (Marsh, 1990) actions of political participation. Currently, the 'conventional' and 'unconventional' denominations are increasingly contested by scholars with certain unconventional acts of political participation influencing the decision-making process (Stolle and Hooghe, 2011).

This study bridges the gap between the two strands of the literature by linking the theoretical streams of peaceful ethnopolitical conflict and actions of political participation. The conceptual framework that permits such a link is the notion of *contentious politics*, defined as 'collective activities on the part of claimants – or those who claim to represent them – relying at least in part on non-institutional forms of interaction with elites, opponents or the state' (Tarrow, 1996: 874). According to this concept, there is practically no discontinuity between ethnopolitical actions of protest and institutional or non-institutional forms of political participation. Hence, we view protest mobilization as a non-violent form of contentious politics. This definition includes peaceful actions of mobilization at the ethnic group level, directed against the dominant ruling authority in the state and with an aim to protect and enhance the interests of the mobilized ethnic community. In so doing, the range of protest activities may vary in intensity from verbal opposition and symbolic resistance to large-scale demonstrations and actions of peaceful unrest.

The time frame of the analysis is from 1991 to 2003. In Europe, this period coincides with significant ethnic dynamics following the end of the East–West ideological divide. These dynamics mark a significant shift in ethnic activism from violent rebellion to more peaceful protest (Gurr, 2000: xiii). The change toward more peaceful protest is due to an increased attention on policies of recognition and the integration of ethnic minorities (Gurr, 2000: xiv). This process makes multiculturalists believe that the border between assimilation and integration of ethnic diversity is disappearing in many European countries (Modood, 2005: 5). In general, non-violent mobilization means are preferred by ethnic groups for two well-documented reasons (Fox, 2003; Gurr, 2000). First, peaceful protest is more likely to encourage the decision-making authority to negotiate grievances and group demands. Second, ethnic groups prefer peaceful mobilization as long as they are confident that societal dialogue will reach the target authority and result in positive outcomes.

Accounting for collective actions of ethnic contention

While the literature on ethnic mobilization includes a wide variety of factors that are linked to protest, the theoretical framework of this analysis is based on five conditions that reflect the predominant model in explaining contentious politics as developed by Gurr (1993a, 2000). Specifically, Gurr indicates that both peaceful and violent contention are more likely to develop alongside several risk factors, including *opportunity, capacity, incentive*, and values of *identity*. Group actions depend on contextual opportunity factors, such as the character of the state, that influence the choice and mobilization strategies of ethnic groups. The capacity of ethnic groups for collective action relies on the strength of the group or the supra-group identities, as well as on grievances that provide the right incentive for mobilization. Simply put, a number of contextual and group conditions come together to shape human action. Hence, collective mobilization is assumed to be configurational, where an independent factor rarely leads fully to the presence or the absence of ethnic

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contention. Yet, independently treating the impact of each condition on conflict, as is usually done in the literature, restricts the measure of complexity that Gurr's (1993a, 2000) theoretical model assumes. This article assumes that the configuration between the opportunity, incentive, capacity, and identity conditions produces causal dynamics that increase or moderate the intensity of ethnopolitical contention. We now introduce the five conditions that relate to these factors outlined by Gurr and discuss how their presence and absence can be linked set-theoretically (focusing on necessary and sufficient conditions) to strong and weak political protest among ethnic groups. The measurement of these conditions is then discussed in the next section.

Level of democracy: The context of opportunity. The literature underlines the influence that contextual opportunity structures have on the timing and strategic choice of the intensity of unrest (Benson and Saxton, 2010; Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010). The level of institutionalized democracy is mentioned as a key characteristic of the state in determining group opportunities to engage in contentious actions (Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010; Gurr, 1993a, 1993b; Kaase, 2010; Marshall and Gurr, 2003; Martin, 1994). Previous studies found that strong democratic environments have a positive effect on decreasing violent tendencies of potentially rebellious ethnic groups (Davenport, 1995, 1999; Gurr, 1993a; Gurr and Moore, 1997). The argument is based on the idea that democratic states have the necessary instruments to manage pluralism peacefully and therefore rarely rely on coercive means for managing ethnic disputes. Especially in durable democratic regimes, claims-making is naturally channeled toward non-violent forms of ethnic contention. Conversely, the decrease in democratic standards associated with regime change, albeit transient, was found to increase the opportunity for more intense, if not more violent, contention (Horowitz, 1993; Olzak and Tsutsui, 1998; Posen, 1993; Saideman et al., 2002; Snyder, 1999). The opportunity for protest is high at the time of transition because it produces institutional chaos, which is viewed by ethnic elites as the proper environment to push for more ethnic demands (Horowitz, 2000). Taking into account the reasons presented above, it is expected that strong democracies would accommodate protest actions by means of decreasing the contextual opportunity for violent mobilization. At the same time, the absence of a democratic context is expected to serve as an opportunity for protest if the claims-makers perceive it as the proper juncture to advance their demands. Because a relatively high level of democracy may thus be hypothetically linked to both weak and strong protest, it is unlikely that level of democracy is a necessary condition for protest mobilization. Rather, we expect that the level of democracy is part of a more complex configuration of sufficient conditions linked to the presence or absence of strong protest. In particular, we see democracy level as Insufficient but Non-redundant part of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the occurrence of the effect (INUS) Mackie (1980). We come back to this aspect in our analysis.

Ethnic fractionalization: Accounting for ethnic diversity. The degree of ethnic diversity in a country is seen in the literature as a key predictor for ethnic contention. This study employs ethnic fractionalization as a measure of ethnic diversity (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Ethnic fractionalization reveals the degree to which ethnic units divide the national population of a particular state. Research points to the fact that ethnically fractionalized societies are more likely to experience instability and contention (Alesina et al., 2003; Cederman et al., 2010; Cederman and Girardin, 2005; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). We thus expect strong ethnic fractionalization to be a sufficient condition for strong protest and weak ethnic fractionalization to be a sufficient condition for weak protest. However, based on the literature, we do not expect this condition to be a necessary condition for weak or strong protest; after all, strong or weak protest is generally not seen to depend solely on ethnic fractionalization.

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Territorial concentration: The capacity to protest. When the ethnic factor is linked to a specific territorial location, it provides capacity to become mobilized (Gurr, 1993b, 2000). Scholars found that territorially concentrated minorities are more likely to start ethnic strikes, whereas the dispersed, especially urban, minorities are the least predisposed to unrest (Posen, 1993; Toft, 2001, 2003). The same studies further note that countries with more than two regionally compact minorities are more likely to experience ethnic contention. More recent data and follow-up studies validated previous findings and confirmed the argument that there is a strong link between territorial concentration and more ethnic unrest (Weidmann, 2009; Weidmann et al., 2010).

Stronger mobilization capacity comes from the fact that territorially compressed minorities have better intra-group communication and stronger feelings of in-group 'we' identity. At the same time, territorial concentration weakens the out-group, national identity and creates interethnic frictions (Korostelina, 2004). Either way, it is easier for territorial *ethnies* to mobilize in accommodating their group demands. Given the unequivocal opinion among scholars that strong contention is likely present in ethnic-compact territorial units, we hypothesize that this condition is sufficient, if not necessary, for strong protest. In a symmetrical view, we expect that a dispersed territorial status is a sufficient condition for weak protest. Yet, a weak territorial concentration is unlikely a necessary condition for weak protest, as it does not provide a compelling reason of why ethnic groups do not mobilize strongly.

Political discrimination: The incentive for protest. Any form of discrimination incites protest. The collective disadvantages resulting from political circumstances lead to grievances and conflict (Gurr, 2000). Previous studies reveal that ethnic groups are more likely to mobilize when their political status is threatened by the ruling authority (Cederman et al., 2010; Gurr, 1993a, 1993b; Gurr and Moore, 1997; Walter, 2006). Furthermore, ethnic groups feel deprived when their political representation is lower than that of other groups in the country. In this case, they blame the state for their status and perceive the discrimination as an act of political injustice (Horowitz, 2000; Marshall and Gurr, 2003). The context of the state (i.e. the level of democracy and ethnic fractionalization) is thus configurationally important in modeling the degree of political discrimination leading to contention. In other words, we expect political discrimination be an INUS condition.

National pride: The cohesive force of identity. National pride is a form of national attachment that boosts the desire for interethnic cohesion. Gurr (1993a, 1993b) posits that ethnic groups with the highest likelihood for protest are those with the most cohesive identities. However, instead of focusing on the frequently used group-level identities, this study considers feelings of national pride that reflect the positive esteem that individuals feel toward their country (Smith and Jarkko, 1998: 3). National pride is one of the most coherent measurements for national identity (Smith and Jarkko, 1998) and an important condition to use when studying the desire for mobilization in heterogeneous ethnic environments.

The international community is primarily represented by nation-states, in which ethnic politics evolve around one dominant nationality. Thus, national identity and the resulting national pride are values that hold nation-states together and shape the relationships between different ethnic communities. A number of sociologists and political psychologists conducted research linking feelings of national identity and nationalist behavior (Gaertner et al., 1999; Guibernau, 2006; Huddy and Khatib, 2007; Korostelina, 2004; Mansbach and Rhodes, 2007; Tiryakian, 2004). They found that in most cases, national identity moderates the effects of ethnic identity, and subsequently, the desire for ethnic mobilization. In some instances, however, national identity does not lead to national unity. There are instances when ethnic groups use loyalty to the nation solely to promote their community goals and receive additional benefits from the state (Korostelina, 2004).

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Given the strong causal link to interethnic cohesion, a strong value of national pride would imply the absence of strong contention, both on the sufficient and necessary sides. On the contrary, weak values of national pride are expected to weaken national unity and provide a sufficient boost for strong protest. Yet, as there is not a persuasive theoretical evidence to link strong protest with weak national pride, we do not expect this relationship to be a necessary one.

Research design

Defining ethnicity and ethnic groups

The analytical units of this study are ethnic groups. Before presenting the sampling procedure, the concept of ethnic group, also known as ''subnations' (Ragin, 1989: 133), must be explained. *Ethnie* refers to a set of characteristics defining one group from another (Smith, 1986: 26–28). Ethnic characteristics are seen as primordial objects such as biological traits, religion, language, territory, and so on, and it is often argued that they are powerful conditions leading to conflict (Grosby, 1994; Horowitz, 2000, 2004; McKay, 1982).

Alternatively, an ethnic community is seen as a social construction that shares a collective identity built on the characteristics of ethnicity (Weber, [1922] 1978). In Gurr's (1993a: 5) view, ethnicity and ethnic groups are continuously evolving and adapting social realms. The evolutionary process attached to ethnic groups often entails political mobilization to promote and improve their social status. Drawing on these insights, it is maintained in this study that ethnic groups are structural entities formed and preserved by both primordial features acquired at birth and by social characteristics coming with the development of multicultural societies. The essence of this statement represents the working definition of ethnic groups employed in this study.

The sample

The sample includes 29 ethnic minorities from 16 European countries (see Appendix 1 Table 5 for a complete overview). These groups were selected on the basis of the following five criteria.

First, we only include groups that are 'at risk' of discriminatory treatment in relation to other group(s) in the country (either minority or majority). According to the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project (2005), an ethnic group is considered 'at risk' when it is the subject of systematic discriminatory treatment for at least 5 years in a row, is communally organized, and collectively mobilizes to defend and promote its self-defined interests. In other words, the sample includes only disadvantaged minorities that are, at least, minimally politically mobilized. This criterion provides an ideal testing ground for this study because we are interested in uncovering what conditions lead to strong and weak protest given the same 'at risk' pressure for mobilization among all ethnic groups in the sample. Second, as the focus in this study is on traditional ethnic communities with a long-standing historical presence in a specific country, the sample excludes immigrant groups even if they fulfill the 'at risk' criteria established by MAR. Third, the country in which the ethnic group resides must have a population exceeding 500,000 with significant minorities in its territory. A significant minority has at least 100,000 members or represents at least 1 percent of the country's total population. Fourth, we include ethnic minorities only from countries that are ordinarily considered to be part of the geographical Europe, understood in a broad sense to include also the Caucasian states of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Despite having part of their land-masses within Europe, we exclude Russia and Turkey as the greater part of their territory is normally considered to be within geographical Asia. The inclusion of these two states would bring in many additional ethnic groups and mobilization contexts which would stretch the comparability of the groups included in the analysis.

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Finally, a pragmatic criterion was employed to keep only those ethnic groups for whom group-level data on national pride values are available from the European Value Survey (EVS) (see section 'Data and calibration').[1]

Fuzzy-set analysis and configurational logic

This study employs fuzzy-set analysis, which is based on the seminal work of Charles Ragin (1987, 2000, 2008) and is part of a broader family of techniques called QCA. QCA is geared toward capturing the configurational nature of social phenomena and in our view is particularly suitable for analyzing complex events such as ethnic contention. However, notwithstanding its increasing use in comparative social science (Marx et al., 2013), QCA did not fully outgrow its relative novelty. Certainly, in the field of ethnopolitical mobilization, the dominant approaches are still large-N statistical analysis and single-case studies or focused comparisons of a few cases. These traditional quantitative and qualitative approaches contribute enormously to a rich and abundant literature, yet to some extent also reinforce the somewhat artificial distinction between case- and variable-oriented research. As a result, many studies focus on the causal relevance of independent variables across a large set of rather anonymous cases and many case studies highlight causal mechanisms in one or a few cases. At the same time, there are limited studies that aim to combine comparative analysis with a case-oriented approach.

Whereas traditional quantitative analysis – still the predominant form of comparative analysis in this research domain – is often focused on detecting empirical relevance of 'independent' variables, fuzzy-set analysis makes no such assumption of independence. If anything, fuzzy-set analysis assumes conjunctural causation and aims to analyze whether individual conditions operate alone or work in conjunction with one another related to the presence or absence of the outcome. Moreover, statistical methods focus predominantly on variables and pay little attention to the empirical diversity of the cases included in the analysis. By contrast, QCA allows for a case-oriented approach, where good case knowledge is mandatory to explain the link between the theory, the cases, and the obtained findings.

A fuzzy-set is a '[…] a fine-grained, [pseudo] continuous measure that has been carefully calibrated using substantive and theoretical knowledge relevant to set membership' (Ragin, 2000: 7). Fuzzy-set analysis thus avoids the pitfalls of the previous dichotomous Boolean approach by 'calibrat[ing] partial membership scores in sets using values in the interval between [0] (non-membership) and [1] (full membership) without abandoning core set theoretic principles such as, for example, the subset relation' (Ragin, 1989: 88).

Fuzzy-set analysis revolves around the analysis of subset relations, particularly the configuration of necessary and sufficient conditions leading to a specific outcome. In the analysis of necessity, the outcome is a subset of the condition – that is, the condition has to be present for an outcome to occur (Braumoeller and Goertz, 2000). Hence, this means that for a necessary condition (where the outcome is a subset of the condition), the fuzzy score on the outcome for each case should be lower or equal to the fuzzy score on the necessary condition ($Y_i \leq X_i$). Inversely, for a sufficiency relation (where the condition is a subset of the outcome), the fuzzy scores on the condition should be lower or equal to the fuzzy scores on the outcome ($X_i \leq Y_i$).

Because we find, at best, approximations of subset relations in fuzzy-set analysis, given that cases can have membership in a set and its negation, fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) uses a parameter of fit called 'consistency' to indicate the degree to which the subset relation is approximated (Ragin, 2006). This measure ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating a perfect subset relation. While there are no absolute standards to set the benchmark for consistent subset relations, generally a consistency score of .80 is seen as the minimum cutoff point for a reliable analysis of sufficiency (Ragin, 2009:

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121; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 127). The benchmark for consistency is normally set higher when analyzing necessary conditions to reduce the likelihood of true logical contradictions (e.g. Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 139–143; see also, 221–232, on hidden and false necessary conditions).

A second important parameter of fit in fuzzy-set analysis is the score of 'coverage', which indicates the relation in size between the condition set and the outcome set. In other words, coverage 'gauges empirical relevance or importance' of conditions to the outcome (Ragin, 2006: 292). For a sufficient condition, coverage reveals the proportion of cases that are covered by the sufficient condition. For a necessary condition, coverage is better understood in terms of the relevance and trivialness of a necessary condition (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 325).

Data and calibration

For each group, our central unit of analysis, we calibrate scores on the outcome (ethnopolitical protest) and on each of the five explanatory conditions. In this context, calibration means that we transform the available 'raw' data into fuzzy-set membership scores. Before discussing the individual conditions, we must make a general remark about the time frame. Because our dataset covers the period from 1991 to 2003, we first need to calculate overall scores which typify a case on the outcome and the conditions for this 13-year period. In our analysis, we use the arithmetic mean because we aim to cover in a single indicator both the overall trend, as well as extreme values, but do not aim to prioritize either of these. The mean provides the best available measure to do so. Needless to say, in the interpretation of the results, the coding needs to be kept in mind, as using a single measure for a 13-year period allows us to capture overall differences in patterns of protest mobilization but not specific dynamics within groups over time. While variants of QCA were developed to address temporal dynamics (e.g. Caren and Panofsky, 2005), the configurational approach is generally seen as being stronger in analyzing relatively enduring patterns.

The outcome to be explained in this study is 'ethnopolitical protest'. Following the framework outlined above, there are five conditions employed in this analysis: two contextual factors (level of democracy and degree of ethnic fractionalization) and three group-related factors (territorial concentration, political discrimination, and national pride). In the remainder of this section, Appendix 1 Table 4 presents a detailed overview of the calibration of the raw data while Appendix 1 Table 5 presents both the raw scores and the calibrated fuzzy-set scores for the outcome and conditions for the 29 ethnic groups in the sample. Please refer to these tables in Appendix 1 for more details.

The outcome variable, *ethnopolitical protest*, is defined from the initial 'prot' indicator of the MAR data.[2] The scores of protest range from 0 to 5, with higher scores coding more intense protest actions. The crossover score isolating weak and strong protest is placed at an average value of 1.5. This threshold is used because it indicates the overall transition from a silent form of protest, verbal opposition (prot = 1), to a more dynamic form of protest, symbolic resistance (prot = 2).

Territorial concentration is a condition originating from the 'groupcon' indicator in MAR, which measures the extent to which an ethnic group forms a compact regional community or, conversely, has an urban or country-wide dispersion. Those ethnic communities that are coded as widely dispersed (groupcon = 0) and primarily urban minorities (groupcon = 1) are considered territorially dispersed minorities. Correspondingly, ethnic communities that are the majority in one region (groupcon = 2) or that are entirely concentrated in one region (groupcon = 3) are coded as territorially concentrated minorities. To distinguish the distinction between the dispersed and concentrated communities, the crossover point of this condition is established at a value of 1.25.

Political discrimination derives from the 'poldis' indicator in MAR and captures discrimination practices toward minority groups that vary from no discrimination (poldis = 0) to exclusive and

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repressive policies toward a minority group (poldis = 4). The crossover point from absence to presence of discrimination is established at an average value of .75, which represents the edge separating values of 0 (no discrimination) and 1 (neglect/remedial policies).

Level of democracy (dem) originates from the 'fh_ipolity2' indicator which is recorded by the Quality of Governance (QoG)[3] data. This measurement is a combined Freedom House and Imputed Polity annual democracy score calculated in terms of civil liberties and political rights at the country level. This democracy index ranks countries on a scale from 0 (strong autocracies) to 10 (strong democracies). Following the guidelines established by the Polity project (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995), the crossover point between non-democratic and democratic is established at a value of 7 (neither democratic nor transitional/autocratic).

Ethnic fractionalization derives from the 'ethfract' measure in QoG data. It records the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country will belong to different ethnic groups (Fearon, 2003: 208). Ethnic fractionalization scores range from a perfectly homogenous society (0) to a highly fragmented country (1). The fuzzy-set crossover point is established at a middle value between 0 and 1 (.495).

National pride (pride) measures the average attachment among members of a minority group with their country of residence. It derives from the 'g006' indicator in the European Values Survey (EVS).[4] The initial national pride scores range from 'not at all proud' (0) to 'very proud' (3). The crossover point is established at an average value of 1.5, which reflects the scores between 'not proud' (1) and 'quite proud' (2).

Analysis

In line with the accepted standards in fuzzy-set methodology (Ragin, 2009; Schneider and Wagemann, 2010), the analysis is performed in two steps: first, we analyze necessary conditions and then analyze sufficient conditions. This study takes into account the asymmetrical nature of the social phenomenon of ethnic protest by running separate analyses both for the presence of the outcome (strong protest) and the absence of the outcome (weak protest).[5]

Necessary conditions

The analysis of necessity includes the presence and absence of all conditions in relation to the presence and absence of the outcome. Table 1 presents the outcome of the necessity analysis. With a standard consistency threshold of .90 (Ragin, 2009: 118; cf. Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 139–143), we find one necessary condition for the presence of strong ethnic protest and a different condition for its absence. Two preliminary remarks before we discuss the results are as follows: First, while it may be intuitively plausible that a necessary condition for *weak* protest is not the negation of the necessary condition for *strong* protest, such causal asymmetry is rarely observed in the literature on ethnic mobilization. Hence, we stress the importance of conducting a separate analysis for the status of necessity for strong and weak protest. Second, because the subset relation is not perfectly consistent in either of the two conditions, these conditions should be considered as 'quasi-necessary conditions'. For both conditions, the modest coverage scores also indicate that they are likely insufficient for understanding the full variation in the outcomes of strong and weak protest.

First, our evidence suggests that strong territorial concentration is a quasi-necessary condition for the occurrence of strong protest. While this observation seems to corroborate Toft's (1996, 2003) argument about the importance of territorial concentration for ethnic contention, our analysis allows us to make a more precise statement about the set-theoretic nature of the relation, namely,

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Table 1. Analysis of necessary conditions for strong and weak protest.

	Strong protest		Weak protest	
	Consistency	Coverage	Consistency	Coverage
DEM	0.74	0.71	0.62	0.58
dem	0.56	0.60	0.69	0.72
ETHFRACT	0.68	0.76	0.57	0.62
ethfract	0.66	0.61	0.77	0.70
GROUPCON	0.90*	0.62	0.78	0.53
groupcon	0.32	0.60	0.44	0.82
POLDIS	0.52	0.74	0.33	0.47
poldis	0.63	0.49	0.82	0.62
PRIDE	0.71	0.54	0.93*	0.69
pride	0.60	0.90	0.38	0.56

Source: Minorities at Risk (MAR), European Value Survey (EVS), Quality of Governance (QoG).
Note: Uppercase letters refer to the presence of a condition, and lowercase letters to the absence of a condition.
*consistency score ≥ .90.

rather than 'inducing' ethnic contention, our analysis suggests that territorial concentration is a necessary rather than sufficient condition. In other words, without having a high degree of territorial concentration, ethnic groups lack the organizational capacity to mobilize, but being strongly concentrated within a specific territory does not alone suffice to explain why some groups mobilize toward strong protest while others do not. We come back to this factor below when discussing sufficient conditions.

Second, for weak protest, we find that the presence of strong feelings of national pride among members of a minority group is a quasi-necessary condition for weak protest. Again, while this finding coincides with the constructivist argument that an overarching sense of belonging is important for the interethnic cohesion of multi-ethnic societies (Modood, 2005), our analysis allows us to make a more precise statement about the set-theoretic relation between pride and protest. In other words, members of ethnic groups that display weak protest nearly always share an overly strong feeling of national pride, but this condition does not imply that groups with a strong feeling of national pride are, by definition, always weakly mobilized.

Sufficient conditions for strong protest

In fsQCA, the analysis of sufficiency is performed on the basis of a truth table, which reduces causal complexity by outlining the logical combinations of all conditions and linking these combinations to the presence or the absence of the outcome. In our analysis, the truth table is based on five conditions and includes 32 (2^5) truth table rows or vector space corners.[6] Of these 32 logical combinations, 17 are represented by the 29 minority groups in our dataset. The truth table analysis then proceeds in two steps. First, for each of these 17 combinations, we evaluate the 'consistency' of the evidence with respect to the argument that the cases with this combination of conditions constitute a subset of the cases with the given outcome (the consistency scores are reported in Appendix 1 Tables 6 and 7).[7] Second, we 'minimize' the truth table on the basis of the Quine–McCluskey algorithm, excluding those rows with a consistency score of less than .80.[8]

Table 2 shows the parsimonious solution, which consists of four causal configurations that can be seen as sufficient conditions for strong ethnic protest.[9] The table includes the 13 minority groups

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Table 2. Fuzzy-set analysis of sufficient conditions for strong protest (parsimonious solution).

		Configuration (with set membership > 0.5)			
		1	2	3	4
Cases	Membership in outcome	Pride	GROUPCON * DEM * ETHFRAC	GROUPCON * POLDIS * ETHFRAC	GROUPCON * POLDIS DEM
Albanians FYROM	0.85	0.75	0.56	0.58	0.56
Basques Spain	0.93	0.62	0.51		
Catalans Spain	0.56		0.51		
Catholics N. Ireland	0.89				0.58
Crimean Russians Ukraine	0.89	0.94			
Gagauz Moldova	0.73			0.54	
Hungarians Romania	0.59				0.7
Hungarians Yugoslavia	0.85	0.57		0.95	
Kosovo Albanians	0.98	0.59		0.92	
Russians Estonia	0.79		0.54	0.54	0.78
Russians Latvia	0.85	0.71			
Russians Ukraine	0.52	0.66			
Serbs FYROM	0.57		0.56		
Consistency		0.90	0.93	0.87	0.91
Coverage (raw)		0.60	0.48	0.37	0.34
Consistency cutoff:	0.82				
Solution coverage:	0.81				
Solution consistency:	0.88				

Source: Truth table presented in Appendix 1 Table 6.
Note: Uppercase letters refer to the presence of a condition, and lowercase letters to the absence of a condition.

that are covered by this solution. For each case, we indicate the degree of membership in the outcome (the set of strong protest) and the case's membership in one or more of the causal configurations (if membership is higher than .5). Cases can have membership in more than one configuration or in all configurations, as is the case of the Albanians in Macedonia, because these sets may overlap. The overall solution consistency is high (.88), and the coverage is good (.81).

The first substantive observation is that there is only one condition, namely a weak sense of national pride, which is individually sufficient for strong protest (configuration 1). This suggests that feelings of national pride for ethnic groups, such as Albanians in Macedonia and Kosovo, Russians in Ukraine and Latvia, or Basques in Spain, are sufficiently weakened on institutional or primordial grounds to incite strong, yet peaceful, protest. While this coincides with constructivist literature that strongly emphasizes the importance of feelings of national identity in modeling the intensity of ethnic contention (Guibernau, 2006; Korostelina, 2004; Smith, 1991), our case-oriented analysis allows for a geographical specification of this argument. In particular, we observe that most cases covered by this solution are based in states that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union and communist Yugoslavia. In that context, after the former states collapsed, some ethnic groups that once held dominant positions (e.g. Russians in Ukraine and Latvia within the Soviet Union, Albanians and Hungarians in Kosovo and Vojvodina autonomies within socialist Yugoslavia) shifted their condition to a minority-at-risk status. By default, the newly emerged states have national identity projects that mainly attract the current ethnic majority groups. At the

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same time, the limited time that elapsed because the emergence of new states (and new minority statuses) did not allow for the construction of a strong sense of national pride among minority groups, which could enhance interethnic cohesion while reducing conflict.

Second, we observe that the other four conditions included in the analysis are all the so-called INUS conditions, that is, conditions that are themselves insufficient but nonetheless necessary parts of an unnecessary but sufficient combination of conditions. The analysis of sufficiency thus confirms that territorial concentration is not individually sufficient to understand strong ethnic protest. This, of course, does not imply that this factor is not relevant. By contrast, the territorial factor, as a quasi-necessary condition, is a key predictor for ethnic mobilization, as we would expect from a primordialist (Gurr, 2000; Toft, 1996, 2003) or a mobilization perspective (Weidmann, 2009). In terms of our theoretical framework, capacity matters but not without identity and/or opportunity. While such interactions can also be modeled in statistical analyses, we are not aware of any studies in which territorial concentration is explicitly modeled in interaction with contextual factors such as level of democracy or ethnic fractionalization or, at the group level, with a factor such as political discrimination in explaining protest mobilization. As a result, our findings challenge the standard assumption of the existence of an independent effect of a minority group's territorial concentration.

The next INUS condition we would like to highlight is political discrimination. While the evidence on the direction of the relation between political discrimination and protest is in line with the established assumptions (i.e. discrimination results in strong protest), we find that discrimination is not an individually sufficient condition. This finding is illustrated by groups such as the Basques and Catalans in Spain, which continuously negotiated their demands through protest but in the absence of a strong practice of political inequality enacted against them. In addition, we also find groups, such as Greeks in Albania or the Roma in Bulgaria, which do face strong political discrimination, yet do not manage to mobilize beyond weak manifestations of discontent.

Finally, we point to the two contextual factors, level of democracy and ethnic fractionalization, which are also INUS conditions for strong protest. Given the ambiguity in the literature surrounding the role of democracy in managing ethnic contention, we found that a consolidated democratic context is relevant, yet neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for strong protest. In other words, consolidated democracies may provide the opportunity for strong peaceful protest that groups may not otherwise have in lesser democratic contexts (Guerin et al., 2004; Scarritt et al., 2001). Yet, precisely by managing to address ethnic diversity peacefully, strong democracies also decrease the desire of ethnic groups for continuing ethnic dissent (Benson and Saxton, 2010; Saideman and Ayres, 2000). A consolidated democratic environment and high ethnic fractionalization are each relevant in two of the four causal configurations and, when configured together with territorial concentration (e.g. Basques and Catalans in Spain), they explain strong protest (see Gurr, 1993b). Only when the condition of weak national pride is present do either of these two contextual factors matter.

Sufficient conditions for weak protest

The analysis of sufficient conditions for weak protest uses the same five causal conditions employed for the analysis of strong protest. Appendix 1 Table 7 presents the truth table that reveals the set-theoretic consistency of causal combinations as subsets of weak protest. With a consistency cutoff of .85,[10] there are eight configurations where the evidence from the empirical cases indicates a sufficiency subset relation. The parsimonious solution is presented in Table 3.

The fuzzy-set analysis, on the basis of the available cases, indicates that there are four conjuncturally sufficient combinations linked to weak ethnic protest. The first aspect to be observed is the

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Table 3. Fuzzy-set analysis of sufficient conditions for weak protest (parsimonious solution).

		Configuration (with set membership > 0.5)			
		5	6	7	8
Cases	Membership in outcome	PRIDE * poldis * ethfrac	PRIDE * poldis * dem	PRIDE * dem * ethfrac	PRIDE *groupcon
Croats Bosnia	0.73		0.66		
Greeks Albania	0.53			0.59	
Lezgins Azerbaijan	0.3	0.86	0.88	0.86	0.65
Muslims Bosnia	0.85		0.87		
Poles Belarus	0.97	0.63	0.63	0.68	
Roma Bulgaria	0.64				0.83
Roma FYROM	0.91				0.65
Russians Azerbaijan	0.97	0.76	0.76	0.86	0.65
Russians Belarus	0.97	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
Russians Georgia	0.67	0.61	0.65	0.51	0.65
Sardinians Italy	0.98	0.86			
Scots UK	0.64	0.74			
Serbs Bosnia	0.56		0.87		
Slavs Moldova	0.44		0.51		0.51
South Tyrolians	0.64	0.75			
Turks Bulgaria	0.53	0.7			
Consistency		0.83	0.87	0.88	0.89
Coverage (raw)		0.64	0.56	0.50	0.44
Consistency cutoff:	0.85				
Solution coverage:	0.89				
Solution consistency:	0.82				

Source: Truth table presented in Appendix Table 7.
Note: Uppercase letters refer to the presence of a condition, and lowercase letters to the absence of a condition.

importance of the necessary condition of strong national pride. This condition is present in all four configurations, which means that all ethnic groups with a weak protest score are also characterized by a strong sense of national pride. The causal relevance of this condition underscores the significance of the symbolic construction of communities and the cohesive force of national identity even in the face of ethnic diversity. This finding confirms previous studies linking national pride with softer ethno-social tensions (Evans and Kelley, 2002; Tilley and Heath, 2007).

The analysis clearly demonstrates that strong national pride, however, is not individually sufficient for weak protest; only in conjunction with one or more of the other causal conditions does strong national pride explain weak protest. Empirically, the fact that strong pride is not individually sufficient for weak protest is illustrated by the two 'contradictory' cases included in this part of the analysis, namely the Lezgins in Azerbaijan and the Slavs in Moldova. In these two instances, despite a strong sense of national pride among the minority group members, we find a strongly mobilized form of ethnic protest. In the case of the Lezgins, in particular, their strong protest mobilization in the analyzed time-period is puzzling, given that they display strong membership in all four of the causal configurations outlined in Table 3, which would be expected to be linked to weak protest rather than the opposite. After all, apart from being largely assimilated among the majority Azeri population, they are neither strongly territorially concentrated nor politically discriminated

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against, and moreover, they find themselves in an authoritarian context where political protest is quickly perceived as challenging state authority. While Ware and Kisriev (2009) suggest that the Lezgin mobilization signals a strong form of civic engagement rather than protest expressing political dissatisfaction, this case would clearly qualify for further process-tracing analysis if scholars were to look for a 'deviant' case.

Moldova is deviant to a lesser extent due to extremely ambiguous membership (0.51) in both causal configurations and also a very moderate membership in the set of strong protest (0.56). In this ambiguous case, the ethnopolitical mobilization of Slavs (mainly Russians and Ukrainians) is influenced by the dynamics of the frozen conflict in the separatist Transnistrian region. Despite the efforts of Moldovan authorities to not antagonize the Slavic population, interethnic tensions are still regularly exhibited among the Moldovan and Slavs in the country. In this context, the moderately strong sense of national pride among the Slavic population in Moldova appears to be outweighed by the latent ethnic conflict in the country. This case-oriented configurational analysis thus highlights that it would be controversial to consider the Slavs in Moldova as a 'typical case' for either weak or strong protest. In other words, it should not be used in a subsequent process-tracing analysis to further explore the causal mechanisms that link the causal configurations outlined in Table 3 to the outcome.

Subsequently, we find weak ethnic protest among groups with strong national pride and dispersed territorial location. Many Roma minorities, for example, in Bulgaria and Macedonia, simply lack political cohesion for strong mobilization because of wide group dispersion. Other dispersed, mainly urban minorities such as Russians in Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia find themselves targets for more aggressive nation–state integration policies such as proficiency in the host-state language, national military service, and citizenship regulation policies. These measures weaken the ethnic belonging of the minority group while enforcing national attachment and civic participation. Hence, in such cases, it may be unclear whether weak protest is to be understood by either the lack of an incentive (in terms of a relatively strong affiliation with the majority population) or the lack of an opportunity to mobilize (in terms of the territorial dispersion).

All other cases of weak protest target those groups with strong national pride and at least two out of the following three conditions: lack of political discrimination, weak ethnic fractionalization, and the absence of a consolidated democracy. All cases covered by weak democratic values (configurations 6 and 7) come from Central and Eastern Europe, a region struggling with the democratic transition during the 1990s and the early 2000s. When combined with a low degree of ethnic fractionalization in the country, minorities find it difficult to mobilize in a transitional environment where national identity projects take precedence over the accommodation of minority interests (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972).

Finally, the configuration (5) with the largest empirical coverage includes not only cases in nondemocratic contexts but also the 'weaker' (salient?) ethnic minorities in democratic Western Europe, such as Sardinians, South Tyrolians, and the Scottish. At the group level, we find that in all these cases, the relative strong sense of national pride among the minority relates to a lack of political discrimination of that group by the majority population, and thus, arguably, reflects at least partly a successful assimilation project. At the contextual level, we find that the relatively low degree of ethnic fractionalization, as in Italy and the United Kingdom, also matters for understanding the weakness of ethnic protest.

Implications and conclusion

This study attempts to answer a fundamental question: under what conditions do ethnic groups intensify or moderate their protest behavior? Most of the existing research focuses on violent forms

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of ethnic contention; hence, there is a disproportionately low amount of evidence explaining the ladder of protest mobilization. This study develops a new, integrated model of assessing protest mobilization, viewed from the set-theoretic lenses of necessary and sufficient conditions.

The configurational analysis uses an adapted model of ethnopolitical behavior developed by Gurr (1993b), which includes five contextual and group conditions with a proven empirical record for understanding what drives ethnic groups to mobilize. In our model, strong and weak protest are choices of differing intensity, and their selection is an outcome of configurations between opportunity (level of democracy, ethnic fractionalization), capacity (territorial concentration), incentive (political discrimination), and identity (national pride) conditions for a sample of 29 ethnic communities in Europe. In traditional quantitative models, these conditions are over-generalized across all groups and analyzed in a causally atomic manner. By contrast, we employ a QCA technique – fuzzy-set analysis – which is specifically geared toward matching groups of cases to specific analytical configurations of causal conditions.

There are two main advantages of using QCA rather than statistical methods in our study. First, QCA targets protest mobilization from a different empirical angle than quantitative analysis. Precisely, QCA aims to observe the configurational logic of five contextual and group conditions leading to both strong and weak protest. Comparatively, statistical methods isolate the effects of a specific factor, while controlling for all possible confounders, to observe the individual impact of that factor on the dependent variable. In the realm of the complexity of characterizing protest mobilization, isolating the effects of all independent indicators would be problematic because one cannot always control for all confounders. Thus, the use of a configurational logic provides a more complex and complete explanation to the observed outcome. Second, statistical methods focus on variables and less on cases. QCA, on the other hand, uses a case-study approach to conduct the analysis, thus linking theory, cases, and results.

In summary, the analysis is novel in several ways. First, the fuzzy-set analysis lends credence to a configurational view on ethnic protest, in which individual causal conditions have a different set-theoretic status and often need to be understood in a conjunctural manner. The results show that contextual factors of level of democracy and ethnic fractionalization and the group-level condition of political discrimination, indeed matter, but they are neither necessary nor individually sufficient conditions for ethnic protest. We reveal thus the ambiguous side of assuming the impact of "*independence*" on each factor with respect to ethnic contention. In other words, while a number of the so-called INUS conditions are relevant elements in the causal configuration in which interethnic relations are shaped, our analysis contrasts with the literature which predominantly outlines causal conditions as independently sufficient explanations of either strong or weak protest. By contrast, the two remaining group-level factors – territorial concentration and national pride – stand out in our analysis as having direct individual relevance in explaining outcomes of protest. In particular, territorial concentration is a necessary condition for strong protest, while a strong feeling of national pride is a necessary condition for weak protest. Furthermore, we also find that the absence of national pride is an individual, sufficient condition for strong ethnic protest.

Second, this study points to causal '*asymmetry*', representing complex phenomena such as ethnic contention. Causal asymmetry is often overlooked in the literature, mainly because it cannot be captured easily with the standard data modeling techniques. Our findings demonstrate that what explains weak protest is not automatically the negation of the conditions (or configuration of conditions) that explains strong protest. For example, territorial concentration is a quasi-necessary condition for strong protest, while a strong sense of national pride fulfills the status of necessity for weak protest. The implication of this finding for the semantics of conflict is noteworthy: while understanding the configuration of contention is important, looking into the dynamics of non-contention reveals not a mirror image, but a different picture.

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Third, the strength of our configurational analysis is that we are able to understand different causal configurations which are driving ethnic protest among most of the groups in our study, and it can highlight those cases that are analytically similar while identifying and discussing the '*outliers*' that do not fit well with our models. While traditional quantitative methods also include ways of highlighting empirical outliers, this is typically not a feature which is emphasized much. QCA, by contrast, through its case-oriented nature explicitly matches causal configurations with empirical cases and thus provides a useful starting point for further process-tracing analysis of typical and deviant cases (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013).

This study can be considered a starting point for further research in a number of ways. Our models can be replicated and conducted in different regional contexts. Choosing different outcomes, ethnic violence for example, would provide additional configurational evidence to complement the obtained results. Additionally, other relevant conditions can be identified and included in the model. Important comparative evidence can emerge if minorities 'at risk' and 'not at risk' or minority and majority groups were compared in the light of their mobilization patterns. Finally, a time dimension could be included to test whether the configurational structure of ethnic contention holds dynamic evidence.

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Notes

1. For example, a number of minorities from Greece, France, Lithuania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Georgia, and Romania were excluded from the initial sample because no group-level data on national pride were available in EVS.
2. The MAR data are computed from various sources, including human rights reports, governmental and expert opinion, journalistic accounts, reports from the international organizations, and so on. Careful attention is given to the data to control for the coding bias and to minimize the subjective inclusion of the information coming from the use of many qualitative sources. The guideline of the MAR sampling procedure can be found on the project website: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/.
3. The QoG data are coded by researchers at the Quality of Government Institute, Goteborg University. This dataset is a compilation of different types of smaller datasets and was built on the basis of expert coded indicators, aggregated individual-level survey data, international organizations' expert data, or different demographic, social and political measures. For more information regarding this dataset, see Teorell et al. (2009).
4. EVS is a cross-national dataset with individual-level survey data gathered among European countries. It provides evidence on the attitudes, beliefs, preferences, values, and opinions of European people in multicultural countries. This study uses information gathered in two extensive data-collection waves: 1993–1999 and 2000–2004.
5. We use the software fs/QCA 2.0 for our analyses.
6. Because cases in fuzzy-set analysis have membership in the presence of a condition and its negation, rows of fuzzy-set truth tables are properly understood as corners of a multidimensional vector space (Ragin, 2009: 104).
7. For reasons of space, Appendix 1 Tables 6 and 7 only show the logical combinations that are covered by empirical cases, hence excluding the so-called logical remainders – that is, combinations of conditions that are not covered by empirical cases.
8. A consistency score of .80 or higher is generally seen as the minimum cutoff point for a reliable analysis of sufficiency; however, researchers are also encouraged to explore the truth table for logical contradictions (Ragin, 2009: 121; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 127). See also note 10.

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9. For reasons of limited space, we present only the 'parsimonious solution' and not the 'complex' and 'intermediate' solutions (available upon request from the authors). The parsimonious solution excludes all logically redundant conditions and is the superset of the intermediate and complex solutions (Ragin, 2009: 118). In this case, the parsimonious solution consists of four alternative, equally fitting solutions with two so-called essential prime implicants: pride (1) and GROUPCON * POLDIS * DEM (4). There are three logical alternatives for prime implicants 2 and 3 presented in Table 2: (DEM*ETHFRAC*GROUPCON + dem*ETHFRAC*POLDIS), (dem*ETHFRAC*POLDIS + DEM*ETHFRAC*poldis), and (DEM*ETHFRAC*poldis + ETHFRAC *GROUPCON*POLDIS). These alternatives are not more, or less, 'true', but in this case, it would be logically redundant to include more than two of these so-called inessential prime implicants. However, for a completely fitting solution, at least two prime implicants need to be included (on logically redundant prime implicants; see, Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 108–111). We select the inessential prime implicants on the basis of our theoretical expectations (on essential or inessential prime implicants, see also Thiem and Dusa, 2012: 74).
10. We apply a higher consistency threshold for the sufficiency analysis of weak ethnic protest to avoid the inclusion of the truth table rows represented by the Catalans in Spain, the Serbs in FYROM, the Russians in Ukraine, and the Crimean Russians in Ukraine in the sufficiency analysis of the presence and absence of ethnic protest (see Appendix 1 Tables 5 and 6). Including these groups in both analyses could lead to a situation where the same configuration can be quasi-sufficient for an outcome and its negation, which should be avoided (Cooper and Glaesser, 2011). Because we consider all four cases as instances of strong protest (fuzzy-set score of protest > .5), we argue that these cases are better included in the analysis of the presence rather than absence of strong protest. This methodology is in line with the standards that advise against applying a consistency threshold mechanically (Ragin, 2009: 118).

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Appendix 1

Table 4. Data sources and calibration of outcome and conditions.

Ethnopolitical protest
Source: Minorities at Risk (MAR), variable: PROT
Data for 1991–2003
Missing values: CBH, MBH, SBH: 1991; RGG: 1996, 1997; AM, SM, RM: 1991, 1992
Mode: 2; Median: 2; Mean: 1.57
Categories in original dataset:
0. No protest
1. Verbal opposition (public letters, petitions, posters, publications, agitation, etc.)
2. Symbolic resistance (scattered acts of symbolic resistance (sit-ins, blockage of traffic, sabotage, and symbolic destruction of property)
3. Small demonstrations (demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots < 10,000)
4. Medium demonstrations (demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots <100,000)
5. Large demonstrations (mass demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, total participation > 100,000)
Fuzzy-set calibration syntax in fs/QCA software: calibrate(protest,3,1.5,0.5)
Brief elaboration of calibration: 'protest' is calibrated in such a way that 0 means 'fully out of the set of strong protest' and 1 means 'fully in the set of strong protest'. For each case, we use the mean protest score for the period 1991–2003 and we establish the crossover point at the value of 1.5 (between verbal opposition and symbolic resistance). A mean protest score of 1.5 implies that in our 13-year period, ethnic groups rarely surpass the border of symbolic protest which is considered to be the softer and the least intense version of ethnopolitical protest. We consider mean scores below 0.5 fully out of the set of strong protest and mean scores above 3 fully in the set of strong protest.

Democracy level
Source: Quality of Government (QoG), variable Democracy (Freedom House/Imputed Polity, 'fh_ipolity2')
Data for: 1991–2003
Missing values: CBH, MBH, SBH: 1991; RGG: 1996, 1997; AM, SM, RM: 1991, 1992
Mode: 9.58; Median: 7.17; Mean: 6.63
From QoG codebook:
Scale ranges from 0 to 10, where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic. Average of Freedom House (fh_pr and fh_cl) is transformed to a scale 0–10 and Polity (p_polity2) is transformed to a scale 0–10. These variables are averaged into fh_polity2. The imputed version has imputed values for countries where data on Polity is missing by regressing Polity on the average Freedom House measure. Hadenius & Teorell (2005) show that this average index performs better both in terms of validity and reliability than its constituent parts.
Fuzzy-set calibration syntax in fs/QCA software: calibrate(demscore,9.5,7,2)
Brief elaboration of calibration: this condition is calibrated in such a way that 0 means 'fully out of the set of established democracies' and 1 means 'fully in the set of established democracies'. Following the guidelines established by the Polity project, the threshold value of 7 is established to separate strong democracies from emerging democracies (Jaggers and Gurr 1995: p. 479). All cases with a mean score of 2 or lower are seen as fully out of the set and with a mean score of 9.5 or higher as fully in the set of strong democracies.

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Table 4. (Continued)

Ethnic fractionalization
Source: Quality of Government (QoG), variable 'Ethnic fractionalization' ('fe_etfra')
Data for: 1991–2003
Missing values: –
Mode: 0.681; Median: 0.490; Mean: 0.429
From QoG codebook:
Restricting attention to groups that had at least 1 percent of country population in the 1990s, Fearon identifies 822 ethnic and 'ethnoreligious' groups in 160 countries. This variable reflects the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will belong to different such groups. The variable thus ranges from 0 (perfectly homogeneous) to 1 (highly fragmented).
Fuzzy-set calibration syntax in fs/QCA software: calibrate(ethfract,0.8,0.495,0)
Brief elaboration of calibration: this condition is calibrated in such a way that 0 means 'fully out of the set of ethnically fractionalized societies' and 1 means 'fully in the set of ethnically fractionalized societies'. We use a cutoff point of .495, meaning that societies where the probability of belonging to different ethnic groups is higher than 50% are considered ethnically fractionalized. We avoid using 0.5 as crossover point to make sure that countries with the score 0.5 (Spain) fall out of the analysis. As in our sample the highest degree of ethnic fractionalization is 0.80 (Serbia & Montenegro), we set the threshold for full set membership at 0.80. The threshold for being fully out of the set of ethnically fractionalized countries is 0.

Territorial concentration
Source: Minorities at Risk (MAR), variable: GROUPCON
Data for 1991–2003
Missing values: CBH, MBH, SBH: 1991; RGG: 1996, 1997; AM, SM, RM: 1991, 1992
Mode: 3; Median: 2; Mean: 2.18
Categories in original dataset:
0. Widely dispersed
1. Primarily urban or minority in one region
2. Majority in one region, others dispersed
3. Concentrated in one region
Fuzzy-set calibration syntax in fs/QCA software: calibrate(groupcon,3,1.25,0)
Brief elaboration of calibration: this condition is calibrated in such a way that 0 means 'fully out of the set of geographically concentrated minority groups' and 1 means 'fully in the set of geographically concentrated minority groups'. We consider groups that fall in categories 0 and 1 as essentially not concentrated, and those in categories 2 and 3 as essentially concentrated. Because groups that fall in category 1 are already reasonably concentrated, we place the crossover point (1.25) closer to 1 than to 2. This gives groups in category 1 a fuzzy-set score of 0.35 and groups in category 2 a fuzzy-set score of 0.78.

Political discrimination
Source: Minorities at Risk (MAR), variable: POLDIS
Data for 1991–2003
Missing values: CBH, MBH, SBH: 1991; RGG: 1996, 1997; AM, SM, RM: 1991, 1992
Mode: 0; Median: 0; Mean: 0.80
Categories in original dataset:
0. No political discrimination
1. Neglect/remedial policies
Due to historical neglect there is substantial underrepresentation in political offices.
There are public policies aimed at improving this underrepresentation)
2. Neglect/no remedial policies
Due to historical neglect there is substantial underrepresentation in political offices. There are *no* public policies aimed at improving this underrepresentation,
3. Social exclusion/neutral policy

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Table 4. (Continued)

Substantial social practices undermining the group access in political and social arena. There are inadequate policies to offset the discrimination practices.
4. Exclusion/repressive policy
Group is heavily restricted in terms of political participation. No remedial policies.
Fuzzy-set calibration syntax in fs/QCA software: calibrate(poldis,3,0.75,0)
Brief elaboration of calibration: this condition is calibrated in such a way that 0 means 'fully out of the set of strong political discrimination' and 1 means 'fully in the set of strong political discrimination'. For each case, we use the mean protest score for the period 1991–2003 and we group all cases with at least some form of discrimination in the set of discriminated groups. We thus establish the crossover point at the value 0.75 to ensure that all cases with a score of 1 are clearly in the set politically discriminated minority groups (fuzzy-set score of .58).

National pride
Source: European Value Survey, indicator 'g006'
Question in survey: How proud are you of being [nationality of country]?
Data for years: 1993–1999 (first wave) + 2000–2004 (second wave)
Missing values: Wave 1 – GA, SIT, TIT, GMD, SMD, IUK, SUK; Wave 2 – LAZ, RAZ, PBE, RBE, TBG, RBG, REE, RGG, RLT, HRO, CRU
Mode: N/A; Median: 1.86; Mean: 1.79
Categories in original dataset:
0. Not at all proud
1. Not proud
2. Quite proud
3. Very proud
The 29 groups were identified based on the following criteria: declared ethnicity (x051), language spoken at home (g016), and the region within the country where the interview was conducted (x048).
Fuzzy-set calibration syntax in fs/QCA software: calibrate(pride,2.5,1.5,0.5)
Brief elaboration of calibration: this condition is calibrated in such a way that 0 means 'fully out of the set of strong national pride' and 1 means 'fully in the set of strong national pride'. The national pride values are coded for each ethnic group present in our sample based on the responses given by individuals with those declared ethnicities. Answer categories range from "Not at all proud' (score of 0) to 'Very proud' (score 3). The cutoff membership score is assigned to a pride value of 1.5, which is a cross-border score between the negative and positive pride feelings. An overall mean score of 2.5 is regarded by the fuzzy scale as (fully in = 1) while a value of 0.5 as (fully out = 0).

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Table 5. Raw data and fuzzy-set partial membership scores.

Ethnic groups	Group ID	Protest		Democracy		Ethnic fractionalization		Geographical concentration		Political discrimination		National pride	
		Raw	FZ	Raw	FZ	Raw	FZ	Raw	FZ	Raw	FZ	Raw	FZ
Greeks Albania	GA	1.46	0.47	6.38	0.41	0.10	0.08	3	0.95	2.23	0.88	1.9	0.77
Lezgins Azerbaijan	LAZ	1.92	0.7	2.51	0.06	0.19	0.14	1	0.35	0	0.05	2.18	0.88
Russians Azerbaijan	RAZ	0.38	0.03	2.51	0.06	0.19	0.14	1	0.35	0.46	0.24	2.29	0.91
Poles Belarus	PBE	0.31	0.03	3.37	0.1	0.37	0.32	2	0.78	0.62	0.37	1.96	0.8
Russians Belarus	RBE	0.31	0.03	3.37	0.1	0.37	0.32	1	0.35	0	0.05	1.63	0.6
Croats Bosnia	CBH	1.17	0.27	3.77	0.13	0.68	0.86	2	0.78	0	0.05	1.72	0.66
Muslims Bosnia	MBH	0.92	0.15	3.77	0.13	0.68	0.86	2	0.78	0	0.05	2.56	0.96
Serbs Bosnia	SBH	1.42	0.44	3.77	0.13	0.68	0.86	2	0.78	0	0.05	2.13	0.87
Turks Bulgaria	TBG	1.46	0.47	8.56	0.87	0.30	0.23	2	0.78	0	0.05	1.79	0.7
Roma Bulgaria	RBG	1.31	0.36	8.56	0.87	0.30	0.23	0	0.05	3	0.95	2.04	0.83
Russians Estonia	REE	2.15	0.79	8.26	0.82	0.51	0.54	2	0.78	1.77	0.8	1.56	0.54
Russians Georgia	RGG	1.27	0.33	5.98	0.35	0.49	0.49	1	0.35	0.23	0.11	2.38	0.93
Sardinians Italy	SIT	0.23	0.02	9.65	0.96	0.04	0.06	3	0.95	0	0.05	2.11	0.86
South Tyrolians	TIT	1.31	0.36	9.65	0.96	0.04	0.06	3	0.95	0	0.05	1.86	0.75
Russians Latvia	RLT	2.38	0.85	8.7	0.88	0.59	0.72	1	0.35	2.62	0.92	1.2	0.29
Albanians FYROM	AM	2.36	0.85	7.2	0.56	0.53	0.59	3	0.95	1	0.58	1.14	0.25
Serbs FYROM	SM	1.64	0.57	7.2	0.56	0.53	0.59	2	0.78	0	0.05	2.13	0.87
Roma FYROM	RM	0.73	0.09	7.2	0.56	0.53	0.59	1	0.35	1.36	0.69	2.46	0.95
Gagauz Moldova	GMD	2	0.73	6.96	0.49	0.51	0.54	3	0.95	1.23	0.65	1.63	0.6
Slavs Moldova	SMD	1.62	0.56	6.96	0.49	0.51	0.54	1	0.35	0	0.05	1.52	0.51
Hungarians Rom.	HRO	1.69	0.59	7.71	0.7	0.30	0.23	3	0.95	1.92	0.83	1.66	0.62
Basques Spain	BS	2.77	0.93	9.71	0.96	0.50	0.51	3	0.95	0	0.05	1.34	0.38
Catalans Spain	CS	1.62	0.56	9.71	0.96	0.50	0.51	3	0.95	0	0.05	2.11	0.86
Catholics N. Ireland	IUK	2.54	0.89	9.65	0.96	0.32	0.26	3	0.95	1	0.58	1.86	0.75
Scots UK	SUK	1.31	0.36	9.65	0.96	0.32	0.26	3	0.95	0	0.05	2.16	0.88
Crimean Russians	CRU	2.54	0.89	6.92	0.49	0.42	0.39	3	0.95	0	0.05	0.58	0.06
Russians Ukraine	RUU	1.54	0.52	6.92	0.49	0.42	0.39	3	0.95	0	0.05	1.28	0.34
Hungarians Yugo.	HY	2.38	0.85	3.67	0.12	0.80	0.95	3	0.95	3	0.95	1.41	0.43
Kosovo Albanians	KAY	3.38	0.98	3.67	0.12	0.80	0.95	3	0.95	2.62	0.92	1.38	0.41

Note: Fuzzy-set calibration: protest (3,1.5,0.5); poldis (3,0.75,0); dem (9.5,7,2); groupcon (3,1.25,0); ethfract (0.8,0.495,0); pride (2.5,1.5,0.5). See Table 4 for details on data and calibration.

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Table 6. Truth table: set-theoretic consistency of causal combinations as subsets of strong protest.

Democracy (demscore)	Ethnic fractionalization (ethfract)	Territorial concentration (groupcon)	Political discrimination (poldis)	National pride (pride)	Protest (protest)	Consistency	Cases
1	1	1	1	0	1	0.96	Albanians FYROM
1	1	1	0	0	1	0.96	Basques Spain
1	1	0	1	0	1	0.94	Russians Latvia
0	1	1	1	0	1	0.93	Hungarians Yugoslavia; Kosovo Albanians
1	1	1	0	1	1	0.92	Catalans Spain; Serbs FYROM
1	0	1	1	1	1	0.90	Hungarians Romania; Catholics N. Ireland
1	1	1	1	1	1	0.89	Russians Estonia
0	0	1	0	0	1	0.87	Russians Ukraine; Crimean Russians Ukr.
0	1	1	1	1	1	0.82	Gagauz Moldova
1	1	0	1	1	0	0.77	Roma FYROM
0	0	1	1	1	0	0.75	Greeks Albania
0	1	0	0	1	0	0.74	Slavs Moldova
0	0	1	0	1	0	0.73	Poles Belarus
1	0	1	0	1	0	0.73	Scots UK; South Tyrolean Italy; Sardinians Italy; Turks Bulgaria
1	0	0	1	1	0	0.71	Roma Bulgaria
0	1	1	0	1	0	0.65	Croats Bosnia; Muslims Bosnia; Serbs Bosnia
0	0	0	0	1	0	0.65	Lezgins Azerbaijan; Russians Azerbaijan; Russians Belarus; Russians Georgia

Source: Truth table produced with fs/QCA software.
Note: '1' represents the presence of the causal statement (condition), and '0' denotes its absence.

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Table 7. Truth table: set-theoretic consistency of causal combinations as subsets for weak protest.

Democracy (demscore)	Ethnic fractionalization (ethfract)	Territorial concentration (groupcon)	Political discrimination (poldis)	National pride (pride)	Protest (protest)	Consistency	Cases
0	1	0	0	1	1	0.98	Slavs Moldova
0	0	1	0	1	1	0.95	Poles Belarus
1	1	0	1	1	1	0.93	Roma FYROM
0	1	1	0	1	1	0.93	Croats Bosnia; Muslims Bosnia; Serbs Bosnia
0	0	0	0	1	1	0.92	Lezgins Azerbaijan; Russians Azerbaijan; Russians Belarus; Russians Georgia
1	0	0	1	1	1	0.90	Roma Bulgaria
0	0	1	1	1	1	0.90	Greeks Albania
1	0	1	0	1	1	0.85	Scots UK; South Tyrolean Italy; Sardinians Italy; Turks Bulgaria
1	1	1	0	1	0	0.84	Catalans Spain; Serbs FYROM
0	0	1	0	0	0	0.82	Russians Ukraine; Crimean Russians Ukraine
1	1	0	1	0	0	0.78	Russians Latvia
0	1	1	1	1	0	0.74	Gagauz Moldova
1	1	1	0	0	0	0.74	Basques Spain
1	1	1	1	1	0	0.73	Russians Estonia
1	0	1	1	1	0	0.70	Hungarians Romania; Catholics N. Ireland
1	1	1	1	0	0	0.66	Albanians FYROM
0	1	1	1	0	0	0.63	Hungarians Yugoslavia; Kosovo Albanians

Source: Truth table produced with fs/QCA software.
Note: '1' represents the presence of the causal statement (condition), and '0' denotes its absence.

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