Supporting Information

Why Governments Have Their Troops Trained Abroad: Evidence from Latin America

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SI.1 Summary statistics

1) **Summary statistics for main analysis.** Table SI.1.1 provides summary statistics on variables of the main analysis, the tests on probing the mechanism, and the robustness checks.

2) **Summary statistics for training effects.** Table SI.1.2 offers summary statistics on variables used in the analysis on military effectiveness (Section SI.5).

3) **Summary statistics for course selection.** Table SI.1.3 gives summary statistics on variables used in the analysis on the selection of course types (Section SI.5).

Table SI.1.1. Summary statistics.

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
All SOA courses	Count	1586	37.99	78.53	0.00	786.00
Enlisted ranks courses	Count	1586	12.86	35.80	0.00	564.00
Officer ranks courses	Count	1586	24.29	57.07	0.00	530.00
Similarity with US foreign policy[a]	Continous	1545	2.78	1.07	0.00	4.89
Stationed US troops[a,b]	Continous	1573	3.11	2.11	0.00	9.77
Military dictatorship	Binary	1586	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00
Guerrilla attack[a]	Binary	1540	0.18	0.38	0.00	1.00
Guerrilla attacks[a]	Count	1540	0.27	0.82	0.00	14.00
Insurgent war (Lyall & Wilson)[a]	Binary	1573	0.09	0.29	0.00	1.00
Insurgent war (Kalyvas & Balcells)[a]	Binary	1573	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00
Strike[a]	Binary	1540	0.17	0.38	0.00	1.00
Strikes[a]	Count	1540	0.27	0.76	0.00	13.00
Demonstration[a]	Binary	1540	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
Demonstrations[a]	Count	1540	0.55	1.24	0.00	15.00
Riot[a]	Binary	1540	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
Riots[a]	Count	1540	0.46	1.12	0.00	15.00
Conventional war[a]	Binary	1573	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
Conventional war[a]	Count	1573	0.26	0.57	0.00	4.00
Trade relations with US[a,b]	Continous	1374	11.03	14.68	0.00	165.48
Carter administration	Binary	1586	0.07	0.26	0.00	1.00
Reagan administration	Binary	1586	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00
Military capacity[a,b]	Continous	1370	2.60	1.26	0.00	5.75
Post-Cold War	Binary	1586	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00
Troop quality[a,b]	Continous	1261	8.21	1.22	0.00	11.48
Inflation rate[a,b]	Continous	1415	3.87	0.65	0.10	9.52
COIN focus (1964-1989)	Binary	1586	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
SOA in the USA (1984-2006)	Binary	1586	0.42	0.49	0.00	1.00
Military cabinet members (share)	Continous	954	0.12	0.19	0.00	1.00
Military cabinet members (share)[a]	Continous	930	0.12	0.19	0.00	1.00
Time since last coup	Count	1506	13.56	12.13	1.00	55.00
Time since last coup^2	Count	1506	330.89	525.68	1.00	3025.00
Time since last coup^{3,c}	Count	1506	10.50	23.61	0.00	166.38
Democracy[a]	Binary	1553	0.62	0.49	0.00	1.00

Note: [a] Variable lagged by one year. [b] Variable logarithmized. [c] Variable divided by 1000.

Table SI.1.2. Summary statistics on suppressing insurgent wars.

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Insurgent war (Lyall & Wilson)	Binary	1586	0.09	0.29	0.00	1.00
Insurgent war (Kalyvas & Balcells)	Binary	1586	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00
All courses[a,b]	Count	1553	1.88	2.01	0.00	6.67
All warfare courses[a,b]	Count	1553	1.60	1.88	0.00	6.67
Conventional warfare courses[a,b]	Count	1553	1.76	1.92	0.00	6.67
Counterinsurgency courses[a,b]	Count	1553	0.69	1.18	0.00	6.12
Counterinsurgency courses (fraction)[a]	Continous	839	0.14	0.20	0.00	1.00
Guerrilla attack[a]	Binary	1540	0.18	0.38	0.00	1.00
Strike[a]	Binary	1540	0.17	0.38	0.00	1.00
Demonstration[a]	Binary	1540	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
Riot[a]	Binary	1540	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
Conventional war[a]	Binary	1573	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
Similarity with US foreign policy[a]	Continous	1545	2.78	1.07	0.00	4.89
Trade relations with US[a,b]	Continous	1374	11.03	14.68	0.00	165.48
Carter administration	Binary	1586	0.07	0.26	0.00	1.00
Reagan administration	Binary	1586	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00
Post-Cold War	Binary	1586	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00
Troop quality[a,b]	Continous	1261	8.21	1.22	0.00	11.48
Inflation rate[a,b]	Continous	1415	3.87	0.65	0.10	9.52
Time till war (Lyall & Wilson)	Continous	1586	20.65	15.96	1.00	59.00
Time^2 till war (Lyall & Wilson)	Continous	1586	681.25	853.76	1.00	3481.00
Time^3 till war (Lyall & Wilson)	Continous	1586	27.07	44.95	0.00	205.38
Time till war (Kalyvas & Balcells)	Continous	1586	22.31	16.35	1.00	59.00
Time^2 till war (Kalyvas & Balcells)	Continous	1586	764.76	906.07	1.00	3481.00
Time^3 till war (Kalyvas & Balcells)	Continous	1586	31.24	48.62	0.00	205.38

Note: [a] Variable lagged by one year. [b] Variable logarithmized.

Table SI.1.3. Summary statistics on course selection.

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Conventional warfare courses	Count	1586	31.59	68.82	0.00	785.00
Counterinsurgency courses	Count	1586	5.40	22.44	0.00	454.00
Similarity with US foreign policy[a]	Continous	1545	2.78	1.07	0.00	4.89
Single guerrilla attacks (Banks)[a]	Binary	1540	0.12	0.33	0.00	1.00
Full insurgent war (Kalyvas & Balcells)[a]	Binary	1573	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00
Strike[a]	Binary	1540	0.17	0.38	0.00	1.00
Riot[a]	Binary	1540	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
Demonstration[a]	Binary	1540	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
Conventional war[a]	Binary	1573	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
Trade relations with US[a,b]	Continous	1374	11.03	14.68	0.00	165.48
Carter administration	Binary	1586	0.07	0.26	0.00	1.00
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Military capacity[a,b]	Continous	1370	2.60	1.26	0.00	5.75
Post-Cold War	Binary	1586	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00
Troop quality[a,b]	Continous	1261	8.21	1.22	0.00	11.48
Inflation rate[a,b]	Continous	1415	3.87	0.65	0.10	9.52

Note: [a] Variable lagged by one year. [b] Variable logarithmized.

SI.2 Additional case information

1) **Admission to the School of the Americas (SOA).** Following the nomination by the home government, US administrations decided over individual applications. The School was not involved in this selection process (US Army School of the Americas (SOA) 2019). Before 1997 there were no background checks or standardized vetting procedures. Since 1997 only US funded students undergo such a procedure. These nominees are checked and interviewed by US country experts. In practice, the thoroughness of this procedure depends on the interest, commitment, and resources of US embassy staff as well as on the availability of information. The course selection is part of the application process. Country teams offer advice, but the final decision rests with the sending government and its military (Amnesty International (AI) 2002, 31-2).

2) **Course attendance across time and dataset coverage.** Figure SI.2.1 depicts sending patterns across all countries covered in the dataset. Years in which at least one student attended the SOA are colored in grey. The figure shows that countries such as Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Honduras, among others, regularly sent soldiers to the school. The figure also reveals how the political orientation of Latin American countries influenced their decision to request SOA training. For example, Cuba never had troops trained at the SOA and the socialist Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua immediately halted all training when they overthrew pro-US dictator Anastasio Somoza in 1979. The figure also shows that some countries interrupted training at the SOA. For example, this is the case for the military dictatorship in Chile. The Chilean junta, which illegally assumed power in 1973, sent troops to the SOA till 1975. After pro-US dictator Augosto Pinochet had cemented his political influence, he relinquished SOA training, indicating the strong personalization of power. Pinochet's unquestioned pro-US stance did not require him to renew his commitment. Three years before the referendum in 1988, however, he resumed sending soldiers to the SOA, which can be interpreted as a way of ensuring the US of Chile's partnership, and may also explain why training continued after the new, pro-US democratic government had assumed office. Finally, the case of Panama demonstrates how the decision of *not* sending soldiers to the SOA for training can indicate strained US relations. In mid-1980s, when relations with the US deteriorated, Panama's dictator Manuel Noriega first reduced and eventually entirely stopped sending soldiers to the SOA. This was two years before the US invasion.

3) **Course attendance across countries.** Figure SI.2.2 depicts the average number of annually attended SOA courses for each Latin American country. It shows countries like Argentina, Brazil, or Paraguay kept training at comparatively low levels. Countries such as Chile, Colombia, or El Salvador demanded high numbers of courses on average.



Figure SI.2.1. Training at the School of the Americas, 1946-2004

Note: Graph shows countries covered in the analysis dataset. Years in which at which at least one student attended the SOA are colored in grey.



Figure SI.2.2. Course attendance at the School of the Americas, 1946-2004

SI.3 Descriptive evidence

1) **Descriptive evidence on diplomatic and military logics.** Panel (a) shows the difference in foreign policies between countries that decided to send soldiers to the SOA and countries that did not. As is visible, agreement with US foreign policy generally declined during the Cold War, but this trend was substantively weaker for countries that sent soldiers to the school. In contrast, countries that did not draw on SOA training broke internationally with the US in the 1960s and 70s. This was the time when nationalist agendas motivated many Latin American governments to reconsider their foreign alignments and established relations with the Soviet Union and China. Panel (b) depicts the extent of guerrilla activity for countries with and without SOA training. There are clear spikes in insurgent activity during the Cuban Revolution (late 1950s), the armed rebellions in South America (early 1970s), and the civil wars in Central America (early to mid 1980s). One can see that in the mid 1960s, when the SOA started to offer extensive counterinsurgency training, many countries threatened by guerrilla attacks demanded SOA training.



Figure SI.3.1. Diplomatic and military logics of SOA training

Note: Graphs distinguishes countries with and without SOA course attendance: Panel (a) shows averages in similarity with US foreign policy, Panel (b) the percent of countries with guerrilla attacks.

SI.4 Probing the mechanism

This section offers evidence on the proposed mechanism. Due to space constraints, regression tables do not show coefficient estimates for control variables included in the statistical analyses.

1) **Reversing logics.** This test demonstrates the qualitative difference between the diplomatic and military logics. Besides the original variable, each stage also contains the independent variables of the other logic. Table SI.4.1 shows that only the original independent variables are robustly correlated with the probability (inflation equation) and amount (count equation) of SOA training.

2) **Structural changes.** This test exploits two structural changes—the school's relocation to the US in 1984 and its extensive counterinsurgency (COIN) orientation between 1964 and 1989—to provide further evidence on the diplomatic and military logics. I include the binary variables *SOA in the USA (1984-2006)* and *COIN focus (1964-1989)* on each stage. Model 1 in Table SI.4.2 shows that the strong COIN focus remained insignificant for the decision of sending soldiers to the US (see coefficient in inflation equation), but significantly added to the amount of training (see count equation). In contrast, as is visible in Model 2, the school's relocation further increased the likelihood of sending soldiers (see inflation equation), but decreased the overall amount of training demanded (see count equation).

3) **Insurgent wars and training patterns.** This descriptive test provides further evidence on the military logic using data on wars from Lyall and Wilson (2009). Figure SI.4.1 depicts the increase in SOA attendance levels after the outbreak of insurgent uprisings.



Figure SI.4.1. Start of insurgent wars and SOA training

Note: Graph depicts SOA training levels 12 months before and 24 months after the war start.

Table SI.4.1. Reversing diplomatic and military logic.

	(1)	(2)
Inflation equation: Diplomatic logic		
Similarity with US foreign policy	-0.771^{***}	-1.265^{**}
	(0.185)	(0.430)
Guerrilla attack	-0.820	-0.786
	(0.645)	(0.569)
Strike	$-1.057^{\dagger}$	-1.097^{*}
	(0.541)	(0.435)
Demonstration	-0.819^{**}	-0.462
	(0.260)	(0.284)
Riot	-0.209	-0.249
	(0.318)	(0.299)
Conventional war	-0.309	-0.302
	(0.329)	(0.385)
Count equation: Military logic		
Guerrilla attack	0.870^{**}	0.839^{**}
	(0.271)	(0.265)
Strike	$-0.250^{\dagger}$	-0.217
	(0.145)	(0.137)
Demonstration	0.003	0.061
	(0.110)	(0.112)
Riot	-0.157	-0.153
	(0.140)	(0.145)
Conventional war	0.135	0.005
	(0.137)	(0.136)
Similarity with US foreign policy	0.093	-0.050
	(0.121)	(0.144)
Dispersion parameter		
Ln(Alpha)	0.629^{*}	0.506^{*}
	(0.270)	(0.200)
AIC	10649.29	8490.09
Clusters	33	28
Observations	1532	1061
Zero observations	676	356
Controls *Inflation equation*	✗	✓
Controls *Count equation*	✗	✓

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on countries.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.4.2. Structural changes in the School of the Americas.

	(1) Curriculum	(2) Location
Inflation equation: Diplomatic logic		
COIN focus (1964-1989)	−0.560	
	(1.103)	
SOA in the USA (1984-2006)		−1.535*
		(0.754)
Similarity with US foreign policy	−1.125***	−1.553**
	(0.341)	(0.538)
Count equation: Military logic		
COIN focus (1964-1989)	0.486**	
	(0.148)	
SOA in the USA (1984-2006)		−0.594*
		(0.276)
Guerrilla attack	0.804**	0.925***
	(0.271)	(0.270)
Strike	−0.178	−0.094
	(0.132)	(0.140)
Demonstration	0.096	0.171
	(0.107)	(0.122)
Riot	−0.171	−0.312*
	(0.157)	(0.138)
Conventional war	0.018	0.006
	(0.134)	(0.135)
Dispersion parameter		
Ln(Alpha)	0.426*	0.449*
	(0.187)	(0.194)
AIC	8508.77	8497.21
Clusters	28	28
Observations	1061	1061
Zero observations	356	356
Controls *Inflation equation*	✓	✓
Controls *Count equation*	✓	✓

Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on countries.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

SI.5 Effects of training at the School of the Americas

This section offers evidence on the military benefits of SOA training and tests implications for course selection. Due to space constraints, regression tables do not show coefficient estimates for control variables included in the statistical analyses.

1) **Suppressing insurgent wars.** This analysis offers a comprehensive assessment of the influence of SOA training on military effectiveness. Such a test is, however, not easy to undertake due to potential problems with selection effects and reverse causality. I therefore exploit that insurgencies follow an escalation process. Most insurgencies start with insurgents staging isolated hit-and-run attacks in the hope of escalating their campaign to a full insurgent war. This latter stage is reflected in the data by Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) and Lyall and Wilson (2009). Both data sources employ high fatality thresholds to capture insurgent wars. Lyall and Wilson (2009, 70) code insurgent wars with "a minimum 1,000 battle death[s]" and "at least 100 casualties suffered on each side." Kalyvas and Balcells (2010, 417, footnote 5) identify insurgent wars with "more than 1,000 war-related deaths during the entire war and in at least one single year of the war." In the empirical test, I use the high cutoffs to analyze whether SOA training can interrupt the insurgents' escalation process and prevent the outbreak of full insurgent wars after first isolated guerrilla attacks had occurred. The dependent variable in the analysis is binary capturing the occurrence of a full insurgent war in a given year. I employ logistic regressions and I use data by Lyall and Wilson (2009) as well as Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) to assess robustness.

   Based on the military logic, I expect that only counterinsurgency courses transmit the skills, knowledge, and tactics that enable soldiers to effectively suppress insurgent wars. To check for the differential effect of different course types, I code five independent variables. The variable *All courses* captures all SOA courses independent of their content. The variable *All warfare courses* counts all courses with warfare-related content excluding, for example, courses on International Humanitarian Law, human rights, or disaster relief. The variable *Conventional warfare courses* only consists of courses like, for example, "Command and General Staff," "Field Artillery," "Heavy Weapons," or "Engineer Combat and Construction." The variable *Counterinsurgency courses* only counts courses like "Counterinsurrrection," "Irregular Warfare," "Jungle Operations," "Intelligence Interrogator," "Urban Counterinsurgency Operations," or "Military Intelligence." Finally, I create a variable *Counterinsurgency courses (fraction)* that measures the relative share of counterinsurgency courses. To this end, I divide the number of counterinsurgency courses by the number of all SOA courses attended. I expect only the two counterinsurgency variables to be negatively correlated with the outcome variable.

   Results are shown in Table SI.5.1 and SI.5.2. Overall the findings demonstrate that SOA counterinsurgency courses decreased the risk of a full insurgent war, whereas courses on general or conventional warfare fueled the escalation of insurgencies. The variables *All courses*, *All warfare courses*, and *Conventional warfare courses* are all positively and significantly correlated with the occurrence of full internal wars. This suggest that conventional tactics designed for combating regular armies were unsuited for the struggle against irregular groups. In contrast, the variables *Counterinsurgency courses* and *Counterinsurgency courses (fraction)* are negatively correlated with the occurrence of insurgent wars. Figure SI.5.1 shows for the relative

share of counterinsurgency courses that this effect is statistically significant and substantive. Note that results are weaker for insurgent wars identified by Kalyvas and Balcells (2010), which is driven by the very high coding threshold and the relatively small number of coded civil war cases. The statistical results, however, still indicate that conventional training adds to the escalation potential, while counterinsurgency courses do not. Overall, the findings underline the skill-enhancing effect of SOA training. SOA courses increased military capacity and proved helpful in preventing full-scale civil wars. The results corroborate a key part of the military logic. Foreign military training generates military benefits for sending governments when the offered courses match acute security threats.

2) **Threat escalation and course selection.** This analysis draws on the finding for military effectiveness to probe additional implications of the military logic. I have argued that governments are strategic in their demand for foreign military training. In combination with the results for military effectiveness, this suggests two additional, testable implications for course selection. First, governments should have their troops trained in counterinsurgency courses when facing isolated guerrilla attacks. Second, once governments confront a full internal war they should turn to conventional warfare courses as this promises higher chances of victory against well-equipped rebels. To test both implications, I re-run the main analysis by using counterinsurgency courses and general warfare courses as separate dependent variables. I then introduce the independent variables *Single guerrilla attacks*, which identifies isolated insurgent attacks outside of ongoing insurgent wars, and *Full insurgent war*, which indicates an ongoing conflict based on the coding of Kalyvas and Balcells (2010). Table SI.5.3 lists all wars included in the analysis.

Results in Table SI.5.4 support both expectations. The variable *Single guerrilla attacks* is strongly and significantly correlated with counterinsurgency courses, whereas the estimated coefficient for *Full insurgent war* fails to reach any conventional level of statistical significance (see count equation). In contrast, when turning to conventional warfare courses the coefficient estimate of *Full insurgent war* is statistically significant and substantively gains in size, while the coefficient of *Single guerrilla attacks* is more than halved in size (see count equation). In response to insurgent attacks governments were more likely to demand courses on counterinsurgency warfare. However, once governments faced a full insurgent war, troops were predominantly enrolled in conventional warfare courses. Together this demonstrates that sending governments are strategically selecting courses. Governments enroll soldiers in courses that promise the largest military benefits, i.e. courses that yield skills and tactics unavailable at home but are helpful in countering acute security threats.

Finally, the results in Table SI.5.4 also support the diplomatic logic. Governments interested in demonstrating their international commitment to the US should make use of general courses rather than of specialized courses designed for specific military purposes. As expected, the independent variable *Similarity with US foreign policy* in Table SI.5.4 is significantly correlated (negative coefficient) with courses on general warfare but is barely significant for counterinsurgency courses (see inflation equation). Governments draw on courses of general content to substantiate their diplomatic alignment with the host country rather than on specialized courses that satisfy acute military needs.

Table SI.5.1. Training content and occurrence of insurgent war (Lyall & Wilson).

	All training	Warfare training	Different tactics	Tactics ratio
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
All courses	0.303**			
	(0.105)			
All warfare courses		0.257*		
		(0.101)		
Conventional warfare courses			0.554***	
			(0.127)	
Counterinsurgency courses			−0.458***	
			(0.108)	
Counterinsurgency courses (fraction)				−2.503***
				(0.625)
Guerrilla attack	1.599*	1.597*	1.794*	1.643*
	(0.743)	(0.740)	(0.773)	(0.767)
Strike	−0.054	−0.027	−0.085	0.523
	(0.721)	(0.706)	(0.737)	(0.438)
Demonstration	−0.282	−0.325	−0.267	−0.616
	(0.508)	(0.515)	(0.518)	(0.526)
Riot	0.387	0.416	0.585	0.035
	(0.577)	(0.594)	(0.573)	(0.737)
Conventional war	−0.129	−0.114	−0.081	0.040
	(0.702)	(0.702)	(0.693)	(0.952)
AIC	170.34	171.67	166.59	133.81
Clusters	28	28	28	19
Observations	1061	1061	1061	702
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time polynomials	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on countries.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.5.2. Training content and occurrence of insurgent war (Kalyvas & Balcells).

	All training	Warfare training	Different tactics	Tactics ratio
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
All courses	0.561**			
	(0.183)			
All warfare courses		0.519**		
		(0.160)		
Conventional warfare courses			0.637**	
			(0.229)	
Counterinsurgency courses			−0.049	
			(0.255)	
Counterinsurgency courses (fraction)				−0.919
				(1.682)
Guerrilla attack	2.128***	2.201***	2.306***	1.793***
	(0.487)	(0.463)	(0.481)	(0.469)
Strike	−1.628†	−1.568†	−1.626†	−0.547
	(0.883)	(0.863)	(0.974)	(0.787)
Demonstration	−0.210	−0.193	−0.172	−1.784†
	(0.810)	(0.789)	(0.828)	(1.048)
Riot	1.013	0.873	1.222	2.085*
	(0.916)	(0.997)	(0.944)	(1.041)
Conventional war	−0.178	−0.164	−0.325	0.088
	(0.421)	(0.358)	(0.398)	(0.658)
AIC	127.93	128.83	129.07	100.79
Clusters	28	28	28	19
Observations	1061	1061	1061	702
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time polynomials	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on countries.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001



Figure SI.5.1. Course type and suppression of insurgent wars

Table SI.5.3. Full insurgent wars (Kalyvas & Balcells), 1946-2004.

Country	Insurgents	Start year	End year
Bolivia	MNR	1952	1952
Colombia	FARC, ELN, drug cartels, others	1978	Ongoing
Cuba	26th of July Movement, others	1958	1959
El Salvador	FMLN	1979	1992
Guatemala	Communists	1966	1972
Guatemala	Communists, Indigenous	1978	1994
Nicaragua	FSLN	1978	1979
Nicaragua	Contras, Miskitos	1981	1990
Peru	Sendero Luminoso, Tupac Amaru	1980	1996

Table SI.5.4. Threat escalation and course types.

	Counterinsurgency courses			Conventional warfare courses		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Inflation equation: Diplomatic logic						
Similarity with US foreign policy	−1.777†	−1.719†	−1.779†	−1.314**	−1.187**	−1.172**
	(1.003)	(0.936)	(1.068)	(0.439)	(0.414)	(0.409)
Count equation: Military logic						
Single guerrilla attacks (Banks)	0.854**		0.942**	0.135		0.420***
	(0.280)		(0.294)	(0.178)		(0.115)
Full insurgent war (Kalyvas & Balcells)		0.647	0.853		1.427**	1.504**
		(0.589)	(0.612)		(0.454)	(0.464)
Strike	−0.043	−0.218	−0.114	−0.051	−0.199	−0.167
	(0.224)	(0.224)	(0.215)	(0.152)	(0.128)	(0.135)
Demonstration	0.576†	0.491*	0.392*	0.125	0.062	0.048
	(0.325)	(0.197)	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.114)	(0.108)
Riot	−0.145	0.284	0.038	−0.143	0.116	0.025
	(0.244)	(0.197)	(0.185)	(0.175)	(0.112)	(0.129)
Conventional war	0.088	0.145	0.104	0.100	0.061	0.063
	(0.289)	(0.328)	(0.302)	(0.181)	(0.152)	(0.146)
Dispersion parameter						
Ln(Alpha)	1.620***	1.633***	1.613***	0.728**	0.549*	0.529*
	(0.158)	(0.159)	(0.155)	(0.237)	(0.246)	(0.244)
AIC	4666.40	4678.62	4659.66	8240.51	8148.08	8139.62
Clusters	28	28	28	28	28	28
Observations	1061	1061	1061	1061	1061	1061
Zero observations	610	610	610	365	365	365
Controls *Inflation equation*	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls *Count equation*	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on countries.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

SI.6 Robustness checks

This section offers findings from key robustness checks. Due to space constraints, regression tables do not show coefficient estimates for control variables included in the statistical analyses.

1) **Distinguishing student types.** This check probes the robustness of the original findings across attendee types. I code two refined versions of the original dependent variable: the first variable only counts SOA courses attended by enlisted ranks while the second variable only includes courses attended by officers. Results, which are shown in Table SI.6.1, are robust across both attendee types.

2) **Alternative measures of pro-US foreign policy.** This check replicates the main finding for the diplomatic logic using two alternative measures of pro-US foreign policy: Stationed US troops and military dictatorships. In the Latin American context, countries that hosted US troops and countries ruled by military regimes should have been interested in upholding their friendly relations with the US and therefore more likely to sent personnel to the SOA (Blanton 2000, 127). Results in Table SI.6.2 show that this is the case. As can be seen in the inflation equation, both variables are significantly correlated with a higher probability (negative coefficient) of having soldiers trained at the SOA. The estimated relationship is hereby substantively larger and statistically more significant for stationed US troops. This finding is not surprising given that some military dictatorships, like Juan Velasco in Peru, disapproved close relations with the US (Brands 2010, 136-7).

3) **Alternative measures of guerrilla threat.** This check replicates the main finding for the military logic using two alternative measures for insurgent threat. Drawing

on the datasets by Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) and Lyall and Wilson (2009), I code two versions of the variable *Insurgent war* indicating sustained guerrilla campaigns. Results in Table SI.6.3 show that both variables are positively and significantly correlated with increases in the amount of SOA training (see count equation). The findings corroborate that the amount of requested foreign training is driven by military considerations.

4) **Count measures of threat variables.** This check replicates the main findings using count measures of the original threat variables *Guerrilla attacks*, *Strikes*, *Riots*, *Demonstrations*, and *Conventional war*. Table SI.6.4 shows that the results remain stable and unchanged if count variables are employed.

5) **Controlling for military influence over politics.** This check replicates the main findings while controlling for the military's political influence. Drawing on data by White (2017), I code the variable *Military cabinet members* giving the share of military officers with cabinet positions. I use the lagged and unlagged versions of the variable to check for immediate and delayed effects. Results in Table SI.6.5 show that the share of military officers with cabinet positions is not significantly correlated with the decision to send soldiers to the SOA for training. The effect of *Similarity with US foreign policy* remains largely unaffected by the inclusion of the control variables. Results also show that a higher share of military cabinet members increases the amount of courses attended at the SOA. This may point to the goal of military cabinet members to increase professionalization of the troops. The effect does, however, not change the original finding regarding the effects of different threat types, including that of guerrilla attacks. Overall, the results indicate that military influence over politics does not alter the diplomatic and military considerations behind sending soldiers abroad for training.

6) **Controlling for democratic regimes.** This check replicates the main findings while controlling for democratic regimes. If democratic and autocratic governments face different political repercussions from sending troops abroad for training, we should observe that the regimes show significantly different sending patterns. I therefore include the variable *Democracy* in the statistical analysis, which is 1 for democracies and 0 for autocracies. Table SI.6.6 shows that the variable is statistically insignificant across all model specifications. The original results remain unchanged. This suggests that democratic and autocratic governments base their decisions to demand foreign military training on similar considerations.

7) **Controlling for coup-proofing.** This check replicates the main findings while controlling for a potential coup-proofing logic. If coup-proofing plays a role, we should observe that right after coup attempts both the likelihood of governments sending soldiers to the SOA (see inflation equation) and the amount of SOA training (see count equation) increases. I therefore include the *Time since last coup attempt* in the statistical analysis. To capture non-linear effects, I also add squared and cubed versions of the variable. The results in Table SI.6.7 show that the coup variables are not significantly correlated with the decision to send soldiers to the SOA for training. The effect of *Similarity with US foreign policy* remains unaffected by the inclusion of the three variables. Results also show that the coup variables are not robustly correlated with the amount of SOA courses attended. Only in Model 6 do the coefficient estimates reach conventional levels of statistical significance. However,

counter to a coup-proofing logic, the coefficient estimate for *Time since last coup* is negative. This suggests that the amount of SOA courses decreases after coup attempts, followed by a marginal increase and a further decline (see coefficients for *Time since last coup*^{2} and *Time since last coup*^{3}). Overall, the results suggest that diplomatic and military considerations do not mask a potential coup-proofing logic nor do coup attempts seem to influence both logics.

8) **Outlier test.** Finally, this check employs country-wise jackknifing to assess the potential influence of outlier observations. The test is based on the idea that the original findings would significantly change (e.g., coefficient estimates becoming statistically insignificant or switching signs) if the original findings depended on a few influential observations that are then omitted from the analysis. Outlier-robust results should therefore experience minimal changes when observations are excluded from the analysis. The check also allows me to assess whether findings are driven by entire groups of data points rather than by single observations, and it works well with non-linear regression methods, which usually lack straightforward outlier tests.

To undertake the test, I run the main analysis, Model 3 in Table 1, 28 times. In each run, I exclude the observations for an entire country. This is a particularly strong test since results need to stay up against the exclusion of 38 country-year observations on average. Table SI.6.8 lists the number of observations dropped in each run and their share among all observations of the main analysis.

The results of the outlier test are shown in Figure SI.6.1. As is visible, the results are highly robust to the exclusion of entire countries. There are only minimal changes in sign, size, or statistical significance of the coefficient estimates. The results are robust to outliers.

Table SI.6.1. Distinguishing student types.

	(1) Enlisted ranks	(2) Officer ranks
Inflation equation: Diplomatic logic		
Similarity with US foreign policy	−1.521***	−1.227*
	(0.356)	(0.491)
Count equation: Military logic		
Guerrilla attack	0.913*	0.839**
	(0.371)	(0.280)
Strike	−0.292†	−0.058
	(0.159)	(0.117)
Demonstration	0.248	0.069
	(0.183)	(0.104)
Riot	−0.149	−0.129
	(0.162)	(0.189)
Conventional war	−0.001	0.066
	(0.183)	(0.145)
Dispersion parameter		
Ln(Alpha)	0.728***	0.684**
	(0.221)	(0.257)
AIC	5840.36	7868.88
Clusters	28	28
Observations	1061	1061
Zero observations	523	372
Controls *Inflation equation*	✓	✓
Controls *Count equation*	✓	✓

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on countries.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.6.2. Different measures of agreement with US foreign policy.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Inflation equation: Diplomatic logic				
Stationed US Troops	−1.142***	−5.986**		
	(0.174)	(2.266)		
Military dictatorship			−0.978*	−0.899†
			(0.437)	(0.486)
Count equation: Military logic				
Guerrilla attack	0.955***	0.962**	0.893***	0.883**
	(0.285)	(0.292)	(0.270)	(0.278)
Strike	−0.170	−0.147	−0.212	−0.164
	(0.151)	(0.127)	(0.138)	(0.129)
Demonstration	−0.022	0.094	−0.036	0.068
	(0.124)	(0.112)	(0.114)	(0.112)
Riot	0.001	−0.137	−0.048	−0.126
	(0.157)	(0.159)	(0.154)	(0.167)
Conventional war	0.107	−0.091	0.150	0.011
	(0.157)	(0.171)	(0.136)	(0.135)
Dispersion parameter				
Ln(Alpha)	1.028**	0.783***	0.554**	0.459*
	(0.335)	(0.220)	(0.180)	(0.187)
AIC	10662.25	8279.06	10859.68	8600.14
Clusters	33	28	33	28
Observations	1540	1063	1540	1063
Zero observations	682	356	682	356
Controls *Inflation equation*	✗	✓	✗	✓
Controls *Count equation*	✗	✓	✗	✓

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on countries.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.6.3. Different measures of insurgent threat.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Inflation equation: Diplomatic logic				
Similarity with US foreign policy	−0.643***	−1.118**	−0.639***	−1.109**
	(0.141)	(0.405)	(0.140)	(0.397)
Count equation: Military logic				
Insurgent war (Lyall & Wilson)	1.065**	1.091**		
	(0.349)	(0.366)		
Insurgent war (Kalyvas & Balcells)			1.296**	1.321**
			(0.419)	(0.442)
Strike	−0.263*	−0.195†	−0.314*	−0.245*
	(0.125)	(0.113)	(0.128)	(0.121)
Riot	0.116	0.038	0.189*	0.114
	(0.109)	(0.125)	(0.091)	(0.112)
Demonstration	0.017	0.158	−0.019	0.125
	(0.126)	(0.113)	(0.116)	(0.101)
Conventional war	0.173	0.045	0.160	0.034
	(0.150)	(0.158)	(0.144)	(0.149)
Dispersion parameter				
Ln(Alpha)	0.556**	0.482*	0.534**	0.458*
	(0.190)	(0.218)	(0.192)	(0.220)
AIC	10741.09	8517.99	10734.17	8509.88
Clusters	33	28	33	28
Observations	1532	1061	1532	1061
Zero observations	676	356	676	356
Controls *Inflation equation*	✗	✓	✗	✓
Controls *Count equation*	✗	✓	✗	✓

Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on countries.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.6.4. Count measures of threat variables.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Inflation equation: Diplomatic logic			
Similarity with US foreign policy	−0.643***	−1.375***	−1.141**
	(0.140)	(0.322)	(0.404)
Count equation: Military logic			
Guerrilla attacks	0.421*	0.376*	0.395*
	(0.165)	(0.169)	(0.189)
Strikes	−0.166	−0.172	−0.136
	(0.105)	(0.107)	(0.115)
Riots	−0.025	−0.023	−0.039
	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.063)
Demonstrations	−0.021	−0.040	−0.008
	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.055)
Conventional war	0.115	0.036	0.025
	(0.115)	(0.127)	(0.124)
Dispersion parameter			
Ln(Alpha)	0.600**	0.583**	0.556**
	(0.188)	(0.220)	(0.212)
AIC	10779.96	9176.18	8567.00
Clusters	33	33	28
Observations	1532	1255	1061
Zero observations	676	518	356
Controls *Inflation equation*	✗	✓	✓
Controls *Count equation*	✗	✗	✓

Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on countries.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.6.5. Controlling for military influence over politics.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Inflation equation: Diplomatic logic				
Similarity with US foreign policy	−0.700†	−0.681	−1.173**	−1.151*
	(0.395)	(0.420)	(0.433)	(0.454)
Military cabinet members (share)	−0.032		−0.873	
	(1.717)		(1.551)	
Military cabinet members (share lagged)		−0.024		−1.143
		(1.803)		(1.706)
Count equation: Military logic				
Guerrilla attack	1.034***	1.068***	1.030***	1.056***
	(0.303)	(0.303)	(0.295)	(0.295)
Strike	−0.237†	−0.228†	−0.184	−0.184
	(0.129)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.119)
Demonstration	−0.059	−0.041	0.039	0.049
	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.106)	(0.111)
Riot	−0.075	−0.061	−0.179	−0.153
	(0.136)	(0.135)	(0.148)	(0.153)
Conventional war	−0.108	−0.119	−0.081	−0.085
	(0.154)	(0.162)	(0.157)	(0.165)
Military cabinet members (share)	0.862*		0.920**	
	(0.336)		(0.332)	
Military cabinet members (share lagged)		0.923**		0.831*
		(0.354)		(0.365)
Dispersion parameter				
Ln(Alpha)	0.566*	0.600*	0.493*	0.535*
	(0.250)	(0.269)	(0.220)	(0.233)
AIC	7527.56	7316.01	6738.96	6537.48
Clusters	24	24	24	24
Observations	946	924	822	802
Zero observations	331	327	265	263
Controls *Inflation equation*	✗	✗	✓	✓
Controls *Count equation*	✗	✗	✓	✓

Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on countries.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.6.6. Controlling for democratic regimes.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Inflation equation: Diplomatic logic			
Similarity with US foreign policy	−0.672***	−1.375***	−1.143**
	(0.142)	(0.326)	(0.414)
Democracy	−0.236	−0.013	−0.360
	(0.490)	(0.610)	(0.653)
Count equation: Military logic			
Guerrilla attacks	0.433**	0.379*	0.400*
	(0.167)	(0.167)	(0.190)
Strikes	−0.159	−0.170	−0.131
	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.123)
Riots	−0.027	−0.024	−0.039
	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.063)
Demonstrations	−0.017	−0.039	−0.008
	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.055)
Conventional war	0.131	0.042	0.037
	(0.114)	(0.125)	(0.123)
Democracy	−0.159	−0.049	−0.108
	(0.186)	(0.186)	(0.202)
Dispersion parameter			
Ln(Alpha)	0.603**	0.583**	0.561*
	(0.194)	(0.221)	(0.221)
AIC	10778.40	9179.94	8566.49
Clusters	33	33	28
Observations	1532	1255	1061
Zero observations	676	518	356
Controls *Inflation equation*	✗	✓	✓
Controls *Count equation*	✗	✗	✓

Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on countries.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.6.7. Controlling for coup-proofing.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Inflation equation: Diplomatic logic						
Similarity with US foreign policy	−0.761***	−1.333***	−0.967*	−0.754***	−1.319***	−0.958*
	(0.184)	(0.297)	(0.397)	(0.182)	(0.292)	(0.394)
Time since last coup	0.036	0.063	0.060	0.031	0.054	0.045
	(0.061)	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.059)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Time since last coup^2	−0.000	−0.001	−0.001	−0.000	−0.001	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Time since last coup^3	−0.016	−0.008	−0.010	−0.020	−0.017	−0.023
	(0.040)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.040)	(0.055)	(0.056)
Count equation: Military logic						
Guerrilla attack	0.843**	0.811**	0.874**	0.858**	0.817**	0.871**
	(0.272)	(0.275)	(0.278)	(0.266)	(0.269)	(0.272)
Strike	−0.225	−0.233†	−0.159	−0.248†	−0.248†	−0.150
	(0.138)	(0.132)	(0.128)	(0.143)	(0.135)	(0.131)
Demonstration	−0.050	−0.049	0.083	−0.014	−0.009	0.125
	(0.116)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.114)
Riot	−0.034	−0.034	−0.146	−0.066	−0.048	−0.141
	(0.160)	(0.161)	(0.169)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.155)
Conventional war	0.141	0.043	0.019	0.120	0.021	−0.017
	(0.133)	(0.142)	(0.138)	(0.127)	(0.131)	(0.125)
Time since last coup				−0.039	−0.050	−0.094*
				(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.040)
Time since last coup^2				0.002	0.003	0.006*
				(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Time since last coup^3				−0.040	−0.052	−0.086*
				(0.032)	(0.041)	(0.037)
Dispersion parameter						
Ln(Alpha)	0.519**	0.553*	0.489*	0.494**	0.535*	0.466*
	(0.182)	(0.220)	(0.205)	(0.187)	(0.225)	(0.207)
AIC	10424.27	9140.72	8522.23	10417.56	9138.62	8514.29
Clusters	33	33	28	33	33	28
Observations	1472	1255	1061	1472	1255	1061
Zero observations	640	518	356	640	518	356
Controls *Inflation equation*	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
Controls *Count equation*	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓

Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on countries.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.6.8. Excluded observations in outlier test.

Run	Country	N	%
1	Argentina	50	4.71
2	Bahamas	6	0.57
3	Barbados	10	0.94
4	Belize	19	1.79
5	Bolivia	49	4.62
6	Brazil	50	4.71
7	Chile	49	4.62
8	Colombia	50	4.71
9	Costa Rica	37	3.49
10	Cuba	27	2.54
11	Dominican Republic	44	4.15
12	Ecuador	49	4.62
13	El Salvador	50	4.71
14	Grenada	2	0.19
15	Guatemala	50	4.71
16	Guyana	29	2.73
17	Haiti	31	2.92
18	Honduras	50	4.71
19	Jamaica	34	3.20
20	Mexico	50	4.71
21	Nicaragua	43	4.05
22	Panama	37	3.49
23	Paraguay	48	4.52
24	Peru	50	4.71
25	Suriname	21	1.98
26	Trinidad and Tobago	30	2.83
27	Uruguay	46	4.34
28	Venezuela	50	4.71



Figure SI.6.1. Outlier test with country-wise exclusion

Note: Outlier test shows sensitivity of estimates when excluding all observations of each country (y-axis) from main analysis. The results are robust. Compared to the original results there are no substantive changes in sign, size, and statistical significance of coefficient estimates.

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