Supplementary Appendix

Laissez Faire and the Clean Development Mechanism: Determinants of Project Implementation in Indian States, 2003-2011

Patrick Bayer — Washington University in St. Louis
Johannes Urpelainen — Columbia University
Alice Xu — ICF International

March 18, 2014

Contents

1 Data Description **APP-3**

2 Additional Marginal Effect Plots **APP-9**

3 Robustness: Different Control Variables **APP-12**

4 Robustness: Accounting for Winning Margin **APP-14**

5 Robustness: Controlling for Partisanship **APP-16**

6 Robustness: Controlling for Pre- and Post-Election Effects **APP-18**

7 Robustness: First Difference of Fixed Capital **APP-21**

8 Robustness: Spatial Diffusion **APP-23**

9 Robustness: Models with State Fixed Effects **APP-25**

10 Robustness: Controlling for Renewable Energy Potential **APP-27**

11 Robustness: Controlling for CDM Promotion Policies **APP-32**

12 Robustness: Models without 2011 Projects **APP-36**

13 Project Counts and Project Size **APP-40**

14 Full Model Results **APP-41**

1 Data Description

The following figures further illustrate distributions of our key variables. Figures A1 to A10 summarize the most important aspects of our data.

- Figure A1 shows the distribution of number of CDM projects, 2003-2011.
- Figure A2 shows the distribution of number of renewable CDM projects, 2003-2011.
- Figure A3 shows the distribution of number of non-renewable CDM projects, 2003-2011.
- Figure A4 shows the distribution of private electricity generation capacity.
- Figure A5 shows the distribution of public electricity generation capacity.
- Figure A6 shows the distribution of fixed capital.
- Figure A7 shows the distribution of public debt.
- Figure A8 shows the distribution of GDP per capita
- Figure A9 shows the distribution of population.
- Figure A10 shows the distribution of growth.



Figure A1: Histogram of the number of CDM projects.



Figure A2: Histogram of the number of renewable CDM projects.



Figure A3: Histogram of the number of non-renewable CDM projects.



Figure A4: Histogram of private electricity generation capacity (in megawatts) (logarithm).



Figure A5: Histogram of public electricity generation capacity (in megawatts) (logarithm).



Figure A6: Histogram of fixed capital (interpolated) (logarithm).



Figure A7: Histogram of public debt (outstanding liabilities) (percentage of GSDP).



Figure A8: Histogram of GDP per capita (logarithm).



Figure A9: Histogram of total population (logarithm) (interpolated.



Figure A10: Histogram of economic growth variable (percent change in GDP per capita).

2 Additional Marginal Effect Plots

Figures A11 and A12 show substantive effect plots for renewable and non-renewable CDM projects, respectively. Again, simulations come from 1,000 draws from a multivariate normal distribution with continuous variables held at their means and binary variables held at their median value. As in the main text, simulations are based on the models without controls; error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.



Figure A11: Substantive effects for renewable CDM projects. For the three continuous variables, we consider a change from the mean to one standard deviation above the mean. For the elections dummy, we compare a change from zero to one. Error bars indicate 95% confidence interval.



Figure A12: Substantive effects for non-renewable CDM projects. For the three continuous variables, we consider a change from the mean to one standard deviation above the mean. For the elections dummy, we compare a change from zero to one. Error bars indicate 95% confidence interval.

3 Robustness: Different Control Variables

Table A1 shows regression results for a negative binomial model with random effects for a different set of control variables. Specifically, we include distribution and transmission losses in percent and two measures for corruption, that is the logarithmized number of corruption cases brought before court and, alternatively, data from Transparency International's (2005) corruption index. The first two variables are extrapolated until 2011 to avoid loss of later years, while data from the corruption is only available for 2005. We estimate models for all CDM projects, but cannot include the full set of control variables from the main text for reasons of estimation stability.

The estimation results testify to the robustness of our findings even though levels of statistical significance attenuate a bit. The fixed capital base variable obtains consistently positive coefficients, which show even higher levels of statistical significance in those models in which we use the corruption index. Similarly, the election year dummy remains negative and is statistically significant for the first four models, but lacks significance for non-renewable projects. This mirrors the findings in our main models.

Models with different set of control variables

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6) Model
Private electricity capacity (log)	-0.005	-0.037	0.032	-0.022	-0.024	-0.020
	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.035)	(0.031)
Public electricity capacity (log)	0.326	-0.040	0.149	-0.223	0.690***	0.349
	(0.233)	(0.315)	(0.313)	(0.466)	(0.256)	(0.322)
Election year	-0.269**	-0.279***	-0.422***	-0.389**	-0.079	-0.109
	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.127)	(0.119)
Fixed capital (log, interpolated)	0.198*	0.423***	0.105	0.352	0.202	0.371**
	(0.114)	(0.149)	(0.151)	(0.235)	(0.144)	(0.160)
Transmission Losses (%, interpolated)	-0.004	-0.006	0.005	0.000	-0.009	-0.014
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Corruption cases (log, interpolated)	0.194**		0.339***		-0.001	
	(0.094)		(0.128)		(0.110)	
Corruption index		-0.001		0.000		-0.001
		(0.002)		(0.003)		(0.002)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zonal Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	213	180	213	180	213	180

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable in Models (1) and (2): Number of CDM Projects.
Dependent Variable in Models (3) and (4): Number of Renewable CDM Projects.
Dependent Variable in Models (5) and (6): Number of Non-renewable CDM Projects.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A1: Regression results from random effects count model with a different set of control variables.

4 Robustness: Accounting for Winning Margin

To study the effects of political uncertainty in greater detail, we re-estimate our main models while accounting for winning margins in the subnational elections. For this, we collected data about seat shares at the subnational level from the Election Commission of India.[1] For each election, we calculate the winning margin between the first and second placed parties and code election years as zero, instead of "1," in years in which the winning margin was particularly large, i.e., above the 75% percentile of the distribution of winning margins in our sample.

Results are shown in Table A2 and testify to the verisimilitude of our hypothesis about political uncertainty. The negative effect of election years in which political competition is contested, that is in years in which the winning margin is comparatively close, is stronger. Thus, political uncertainty disincentivizes CDM project registration more when there is a credible risk of change in the political environment.

[1] See `http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx`. Accessed March 7, 2014.

Models for elections with small winning margins

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model
Private electricity capacity (log)	-0.018	-0.024	-0.027	-0.026	-0.011
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Public electricity capacity (log)	0.384	0.714**	0.506	0.537	0.553
	(0.240)	(0.358)	(0.473)	(0.473)	(0.432)
Fixed capital (log, interpolated)	0.227**	0.248**	0.260**	0.268**	0.278**
	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.132)
Election year	-0.372***	-0.368***	-0.355***	-0.369***	-0.370***
	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.115)	(0.118)	(0.115)
Population (log, interpolated)		-0.336	-0.123	-0.178	0.059
		(0.273)	(0.450)	(0.457)	(0.465)
GDP per capita (1,000 rupee) (log)			0.457	0.330	1.024
			(0.811)	(0.824)	(0.883)
Economic growth (pct)				0.008	0.012
				(0.014)	(0.014)
Public debt (pct)					0.032***
					(0.011)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zonal Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	223	223	218	217	207

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable in Model (1) to (5): Total Number of CDM Projects.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A2: Regression results from random effects count model when accounting for winning margin.

5 Robustness: Controlling for Partisanship

As party cohesion may affect the allocation of CDM project allocation, we create a partisanship dummy variable, which is coded "1" for all state-years in which the elected party at the national level is identical to the strongest party in subnational elections; otherwise, we coded the partisanship variable zero. During the period of study, there was only one change in the 2004 federal elections, when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was replaced with the Indian National Congress (INC) party. Therefore, our partisanship dummy is coded "1" in 2003 when subnational governments are controlled by BJP, but are also coded "1" in all following years when INC is the strongest party in state-level elections. For all other cases, the partisanship dummy is zero.

From the estimation results, we see that partisanship does apparently not shape CDM allocation patterns as the sign of the created variable is inconclusive. Importantly, for our analysis here, Table A3 testifies to the robustness of our results.

Models with partisanship control

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model
Private electricity capacity (log)	-0.020	-0.026	-0.028	-0.028	-0.013
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Public electricity capacity (log)	0.359	0.679*	0.470	0.483	0.468
	(0.248)	(0.368)	(0.495)	(0.497)	(0.453)
Fixed capital (log, interpolated)	0.240**	0.259**	0.270**	0.274**	0.284**
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.134)
Election year	-0.239**	-0.229**	-0.210**	-0.214**	-0.217**
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.102)
Partisanship	0.020	0.008	0.001	-0.002	0.044
	(0.165)	(0.167)	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.164)
Population (log, interpolated)		-0.321	-0.116	-0.141	0.133
		(0.276)	(0.466)	(0.475)	(0.487)
GDP per capita (1,000 rupee) (log)			0.441	0.381	1.109
			(0.827)	(0.852)	(0.915)
Economic growth (pct)				0.004	0.008
				(0.014)	(0.014)
Public debt (pct)					0.032***
					(0.011)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zonal Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	223	223	218	217	207

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable in Model (1) to (5): Total Number of CDM Projects.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A3: Regression results from random effects count model with partisanship control.

6 Robustness: Controlling for Pre- and Post-Election Effects

To check for the robustness of the election year effect, we control for potential anticipation or backlog effects from elections that are either called at the beginning or the end of a particular year. For this, we create a pre-election dummy and a post-election dummy, where the former scores "1" in the year prior to a subnational election, while the latter is coded "1" the year after an election took place. All other state-years are coded zero.

We report results for all CDM projects in Tables A4 and A5 below. While all our main results continue to hold, it is particularly important to note that our negative election year effect does not go away. On the same account, pre-election year dummies do not show consistent effects, with coefficients being positive and negative depending on model choice, while post-election year indicators are always positive. None of these additional temporal controls are however statistically significant. This makes us confident to believe that anticipation or backlog effects do not play a major role in the allocation patterns of CDM projects in India. Political uncertainty is most prevalent in election years.

Models with pre-election year control

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model
Private electricity capacity (log)	-0.019	-0.026	-0.029	-0.028	-0.014
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Public electricity capacity (log)	0.363	0.682*	0.486	0.497	0.473
	(0.245)	(0.364)	(0.497)	(0.498)	(0.452)
Fixed capital (log, interpolated)	0.239**	0.258**	0.270**	0.273**	0.280**
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.120)	(0.122)	(0.132)
Election year	-0.236**	-0.226**	-0.220**	-0.225**	-0.220**
	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.102)
Pre-election year	0.003	0.006	-0.044	-0.044	-0.040
	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.097)
Population (log, interpolated)		-0.322	-0.133	-0.156	0.133
		(0.276)	(0.466)	(0.474)	(0.486)
GDP per capita (1,000 rupee) (log)			0.397	0.343	1.113
			(0.822)	(0.845)	(0.911)
Economic growth (pct)				0.003	0.008
				(0.014)	(0.014)
Public debt (pct)					0.032***
					(0.011)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zonal Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	223	223	218	217	207

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable in Model (1) to (5): Total Number of CDM Projects.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A4: Regression results from random effects count model with a pre-election year control.

Models with post-election year control

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model
Private electricity capacity (log)	-0.022	-0.028	-0.030	-0.029	-0.014
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Public electricity capacity (log)	0.366	0.673*	0.462	0.476	0.458
	(0.245)	(0.364)	(0.495)	(0.496)	(0.452)
Fixed capital (log, interpolated)	0.235**	0.255**	0.267**	0.271**	0.280**
	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.132)
Election year	-0.216**	-0.210**	-0.193*	-0.198*	-0.195*
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.102)
Post-election year	0.082	0.075	0.069	0.070	0.069
	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.090)
Population (log, interpolated)		-0.309	-0.106	-0.134	0.148
		(0.276)	(0.462)	(0.470)	(0.483)
GDP per capita (1,000 rupee) (log)			0.434	0.369	1.120
			(0.810)	(0.834)	(0.901)
Economic growth (pct)				0.004	0.008
				(0.014)	(0.014)
Public debt (pct)					0.032***
					(0.011)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zonal Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	223	223	218	217	207

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable in Model (1) to (5): Total Number of CDM Projects.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A5: Regression results from random effects count model with a post-election year control.

7 Robustness: First Difference of Fixed Capital

In our main analysis, we only use the levels of fixed capital, which is somewhat inaccurate as capital needs to be renewed over time. To investigate if new capital is any different from already invested capital, we re-estimate our main models with both the level and the change in the net fixed capital from $t-1$ to t. These first differences allow to estimate the effects of capital which is renewed annually.

The estimate results in Table A6 indicate that while our main results are robust, there is no empirical evidence that changes in the capital base shape CDM allocation patterns.

Models with first difference of fixed capital

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model
Private electricity capacity (log)	-0.018	-0.023	-0.026	-0.026	-0.011
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Public electricity capacity (log)	0.368	0.650*	0.416	0.430	0.365
	(0.245)	(0.366)	(0.495)	(0.497)	(0.457)
Fixed capital (log, interpolated)	0.253**	0.274**	0.286**	0.290**	0.253*
	(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.142)
Fixed capital (first diff)	-0.115	-0.145	-0.158	-0.161	0.116
	(0.192)	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.203)	(0.307)
Election year	-0.236**	-0.228**	-0.210**	-0.214**	-0.212**
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.101)	(0.103)	(0.099)
Population (log, interpolated)		-0.297	-0.064	-0.092	0.310
		(0.290)	(0.474)	(0.485)	(0.513)
GDP per capita (1,000 rupee) (log)			0.495	0.436	1.293
			(0.807)	(0.833)	(0.921)
Economic growth (pct)				0.004	0.006
				(0.014)	(0.014)
Public debt (pct)					0.032***
					(0.011)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zonal Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	222	222	217	216	206

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable in Model (1) to (5): Total Number of CDM Projects.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A6: Regression results from random effects count model with first difference of fixed capital.

8 Robustness: Spatial Diffusion

Spatial diffusion may shape the allocation pattern of CDM projects. To study this effect of spatial dependence, we create a contiguity variable for project counts in neighboring Indian states. To avoid artificially inflating this variable for states with many neighboring states, we normalize this contiguity measure by the count of neighboring states.

We add this variable to our main model specifications and find that controlling for spatial dependence does not comprise our main results. Interestingly though, the contiguity measure has a consistently negative and statistically significant sign. This finding seems to suggest that Indian states with a lot of CDM projects in their neighboring states host on average fewer CDM projects. Even though beyond the scope of this paper, this effect may warrant closer investigation in future research as it can potentially shed light on a rivalry effect in CDM project allocation.

Models with spatial dependence

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model
Private electricity capacity (log)	-0.025	-0.030	-0.031	-0.030	-0.016
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Public electricity capacity (log)	0.367*	0.618*	0.472	0.485	0.478
	(0.220)	(0.346)	(0.456)	(0.457)	(0.429)
Fixed capital (log, interpolated)	0.217**	0.232**	0.240**	0.244**	0.250**
	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.126)
Election year	-0.199**	-0.194*	-0.165*	-0.170*	-0.182*
	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.095)
Contiguity	-0.027**	-0.026**	-0.033***	-0.033***	-0.032***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Population (log, interpolated)		-0.250	-0.106	-0.133	0.107
		(0.268)	(0.441)	(0.449)	(0.464)
GDP per capita (1,000 rupee) (log)			0.244	0.186	0.920
			(0.740)	(0.759)	(0.859)
Economic growth (pct)				0.004	0.009
				(0.014)	(0.014)
Public debt (pct)					0.032***
					(0.010)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zonal Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	223	223	218	217	207

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable in Model (1) to (5): Total Number of CDM Projects.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A7: Regression results from random effects count model with spatial dependence.

9 Robustness: Models with State Fixed Effects

As an additional robustness check, we also estimate our main model specification with state fixed effects instead of zonal fixed effects. Note that we can only do so for the first four models for the sample with all CDM projects as otherwise our negative binomial count models do no longer converge. Given the amount of coefficients that is estimated in these models, this is not too surprising given our relatively small panel data set. Despite this, the results for the first four models reported in Table A8 are sufficiently similar to our main results. Thus, our choice of zonal fixed effects seems innocuous and comes with the upside of allowing us to estimate more comprehensive models and to disaggregate our analysis by project type.

Models for all CDM projects with state fixed effects

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model
Private electricity capacity (log)	-0.033	-0.050*	-0.048	-0.048*
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Public electricity capacity (log)	0.040	-0.220	-0.271	-0.292
	(0.507)	(0.503)	(0.485)	(0.486)
Fixed capital (log, interpolated)	0.334*	0.410**	0.386**	0.376**
	(0.174)	(0.176)	(0.185)	(0.185)
Election year	-0.227**	-0.220**	-0.247***	-0.239***
	(0.093)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.092)
Population (log, interpolated)		15.948**	9.199	9.840
		(6.484)	(6.615)	(6.688)
GDP per capita (1,000 rupee) (log)			2.422**	2.654**
			(1.161)	(1.199)
Economic growth (pct)				-0.008
				(0.012)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	223	223	218	217

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable in Model (1) to (5): Total Number of CDM Projects.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A8: Main regression results from random effects model with state-level fixed effects.

10 Robustness: Controlling for Renewable Energy Potential

The allocation of CDM projects is highly dependent on geographical and physical conditions. To ensure that our results are not driven by such effects, we control for renewable energy potential. Specifically, we control for solar, hydro, and wind potential by creating the following renewable potential dummy variables.

First, to code solar potential, we use direct normal radiation data provided by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory for India.[2] In line with Hang et al. (2008, 2510), our solar dummy is coded "1" for states with more than 5 kWh per square meter per day. Using this practice, we identify the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punja, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal to have high solar potential and code them accordingly; all other states are coded as zero.

Second, to assess hydroelectricity potential in India, we draw on data provided by the Energy Alternative India.[3] This results in Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, and Uttarakhand begin coded as "1" for our hydroelectricity potential dummy; all other states are coded as zero.

Finally, our binary indicator variable for wind potential uses data from the Indian Wind Energy Association[4], which leaves us with Indian states Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan, and Tamil Nadu to be categorized as ones with high wind potential, while all other states are coded zero.

Since governments at the sub-national level were active in attracting CDM projects, we control for promotional policies that are meant to incentivize CDM project implementation in Indian states. To account for the possibility that these promotion programs bias our results, we created a binary control variable that scores "1" if Indian state governments set up so-called "CDM cells," while the variable is coded zero otherwise. Such CDM cells were established in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, and West Bengal.[5]

Tables A9 to A11 below show estimation results once we control for renewable energy potential. Our

[2] See `http://www.nrel.gov/gis/pdfs/swera/china/china40kmdir.pdf` and `http://www.nrel.gov/international/images/dni_annual.jpg`. Accessed March 6, 2014

[3] See `http://www.eai.in/ref/ae/hyd/hyd.html`. Accessed March 6, 2014.

[4] See `http://www.inwea.org/aboutwindenergy.htm`. Accessed March 6, 2014.

[5] The data on CDM cells in India come from TERI, GIZ, and the Gujarat Urban Development Company Ltd., which are all available online from `http://www.teriin.org/files/fastcdm.pdf`, `http://www.giz.de/themen/en/30419.htm`, and `http://www.gudcltd.com/gudc-cmdcell.asp`, respectively. Accessed March 6, 2014.

findings suggest that, if anything, our results become stronger as particularly for non-renewable CDM projects the fixed capital variable becomes statistically significant. Except for the hydroelectricity dummy, which affects renewable CDM project allocation positively and non-renewable CDM projects negatively, none of the other renewable energy potential controls seem to exercise much influence.

Models for all CDM projects with renewable potential controls

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model
Private electricity capacity (log)	-0.025	-0.026	-0.025	-0.025	-0.014
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Public electricity capacity (log)	0.552**	0.738**	0.405	0.407	0.432
	(0.267)	(0.357)	(0.475)	(0.478)	(0.436)
Fixed capital (log, interpolated)	0.200*	0.214*	0.201	0.201	0.240*
	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.128)	(0.130)	(0.145)
Election year	-0.219**	-0.218**	-0.205**	-0.206**	-0.199**
	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.100)	(0.103)	(0.098)
Solar potential	-0.374	-0.255	-0.106	-0.104	-0.877*
	(0.455)	(0.473)	(0.509)	(0.509)	(0.498)
Hydroelectricity potential	0.578	0.525	0.714	0.710	-0.536
	(0.616)	(0.616)	(0.678)	(0.687)	(0.660)
Wind potential	0.402	0.412	0.586	0.585	0.485
	(0.467)	(0.464)	(0.516)	(0.517)	(0.469)
Population (log, interpolated)		-0.232	0.118	0.112	0.387
		(0.297)	(0.498)	(0.513)	(0.506)
GDP per capita (1,000 rupee) (log)			0.816	0.805	1.489*
			(0.848)	(0.886)	(0.893)
Economic growth (pct)				0.001	0.008
				(0.014)	(0.014)
Public debt (pct)					0.036***
					(0.012)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zonal Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	223	223	218	217	207

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable in Model (1) to (5): Total Number of CDM Projects.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A9: Main regression results from random effects model with controls for renewable energy potential.

Models for renewable CDM projects with renewable potential controls

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model
Private electricity capacity (log)	0.022	0.022	0.017	0.022	0.009
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Public electricity capacity (log)	0.740*	0.821*	0.606	0.609	0.512
	(0.394)	(0.498)	(0.655)	(0.646)	(0.520)
Fixed capital (log, interpolated)	-0.037	-0.032	0.007	0.041	-0.011
	(0.158)	(0.159)	(0.177)	(0.179)	(0.171)
Election year	-0.361**	-0.362**	-0.358**	-0.406**	-0.370***
	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.161)	(0.167)	(0.143)
Solar potential	0.125	0.179	0.424	0.480	-0.940*
	(0.613)	(0.643)	(0.652)	(0.630)	(0.557)
Hydroelectricity potential	1.813**	1.780**	1.860**	1.759**	0.110
	(0.854)	(0.864)	(0.854)	(0.855)	(0.772)
Wind potential	0.771	0.767	0.805	0.825	0.799
	(0.607)	(0.609)	(0.680)	(0.680)	(0.533)
Population (log, interpolated)		-0.101	0.002	-0.126	0.668
		(0.383)	(0.695)	(0.684)	(0.567)
GDP per capita (1,000 rupee) (log)			0.225	-0.072	1.707*
			(1.214)	(1.194)	(0.944)
Economic growth (pct)				0.025	0.033
				(0.021)	(0.021)
Public debt (pct)					0.043***
					(0.016)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zonal Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	223	223	218	217	207

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable in Model (1) to (5): Number of Renewable CDM Projects.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A10: Regression results from random effects count model for renewable CDM projects with controls for renewable energy potential.

Models for non-renewable CDM projects with renewable potential controls

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model
Private electricity capacity (log)	-0.014	-0.015	-0.006	-0.007	0.003
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Public electricity capacity (log)	0.467*	0.687*	0.556	0.512	0.476
	(0.271)	(0.380)	(0.508)	(0.512)	(0.536)
Fixed capital (log, interpolated)	0.262*	0.283**	0.298**	0.285**	0.361**
	(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.181)
Election year	-0.065	-0.060	-0.061	-0.053	-0.045
	(0.123)	(0.124)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.128)
Solar potential	-0.505	-0.427	-0.387	-0.381	-0.593
	(0.421)	(0.419)	(0.437)	(0.440)	(0.500)
Hydroelectricity potential	-1.430**	-1.506**	-1.533**	-1.472**	-2.014***
	(0.615)	(0.618)	(0.648)	(0.657)	(0.763)
Wind potential	0.425	0.410	0.455	0.500	0.494
	(0.433)	(0.424)	(0.471)	(0.479)	(0.507)
Population (log, interpolated)		-0.254	-0.160	-0.089	-0.091
		(0.316)	(0.491)	(0.504)	(0.582)
GDP per capita (1,000 rupee) (log)			0.170	0.296	0.481
			(0.719)	(0.748)	(0.980)
Economic growth (pct)				-0.011	-0.007
				(0.016)	(0.017)
Public debt (pct)					0.019
					(0.013)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zonal Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	223	223	218	217	207

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable in Model (1) to (5): Number of Renewable CDM Projects.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A11: Regression results from random effects count model for non-renewable CDM projects with with controls for renewable energy potential.

11 Robustness: Controlling for CDM Promotion Policies

Since governments at the sub-national level were active in attracting CDM projects, we control for promotional policies that are meant to incentivize CDM project implementation in Indian states. To account for the possibility that these promotion programs bias our results, we created a binary control variable that scores "1" if Indian state governments set up so-called "CDM cells," while the variable is coded zero otherwise. Such CDM cells were established in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, and West Bengal.[6]

Tables A12 to A14 below demonstrate that our main results continue to hold even after controlling for CDM promotion policies. Moreover, the CDM cell dummy itself has a negative sign in all models, but is never statistically significant. This suggests that CDM policies, as implemented at the moment, are not sufficient to shape patterns of CDM allocation in India, while the negative sign may be an artifact of those states setting up CDM cells, which have seen little CDM projects in the past.

[6]The data on CDM cells in India come from TERI, GIZ, and the Gujarat Urban Development Company Ltd., which are all available online from `http://www.teriin.org/files/fastcdm.pdf`, `http://www.giz.de/themen/en/30419.htm`, and `http://www.gudcltd.com/gudc-cmdcell.asp`, respectively. Accessed March 6, 2014.

Models for all CDM projects with control for CDM cells

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model
Private electricity capacity (log)	-0.020	-0.026	-0.029	-0.028	-0.010
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Public electricity capacity (log)	0.421*	0.718**	0.557	0.572	0.645
	(0.250)	(0.363)	(0.516)	(0.519)	(0.478)
Fixed capital (log, interpolated)	0.227**	0.246**	0.262**	0.265**	0.266**
	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.128)
Election year	-0.220**	-0.213**	-0.199*	-0.204**	-0.197*
	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.101)
CDM promotion policy	-0.355	-0.336	-0.286	-0.283	-0.436
	(0.353)	(0.355)	(0.382)	(0.381)	(0.354)
Population (log, interpolated)		-0.308	-0.169	-0.195	0.014
		(0.275)	(0.470)	(0.480)	(0.495)
GDP per capita (1,000 rupee) (log)			0.279	0.220	0.771
			(0.841)	(0.866)	(0.921)
Economic growth (pct)				0.003	0.009
				(0.014)	(0.014)
Public debt (pct)					0.034***
					(0.011)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zonal Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	223	223	218	217	207

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable in Model (1) to (5): Total Number of CDM Projects.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A12: Main regression results from random effects model with control variable for CDM promotion policies.

Models for renewable CDM projects with control for CDM cells

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model
Private electricity capacity (log)	0.009	0.003	-0.006	-0.002	0.015
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.040)
Public electricity capacity (log)	0.243	0.579	0.511	0.592	0.958*
	(0.382)	(0.536)	(0.747)	(0.733)	(0.535)
Fixed capital (log, interpolated)	0.132	0.140	0.192	0.221	0.112
	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.174)	(0.173)	(0.144)
Election year	-0.339**	-0.331**	-0.319**	-0.369**	-0.374**
	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.157)	(0.165)	(0.151)
CDM promotion policy	-0.540	-0.565	-0.574	-0.550	-0.640*
	(0.436)	(0.447)	(0.461)	(0.453)	(0.344)
Population (log, interpolated)		-0.320	-0.348	-0.498	-0.139
		(0.359)	(0.695)	(0.681)	(0.522)
GDP per capita (1,000 rupee) (log)			-0.230	-0.677	0.312
			(1.383)	(1.361)	(0.914)
Economic growth (pct)				0.026	0.039*
				(0.021)	(0.021)
Public debt (pct)					0.049***
					(0.013)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zonal Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	223	223	218	217	207

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable in Model (1) to (5): Number of Renewable CDM Projects.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A13: Regression results from random effects count model for renewable CDM projects with control variable for CDM promotion policies.

Models for non-renewable CDM projects with control for CDM cells

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model
Private electricity capacity (log)	-0.023	-0.024	-0.016	-0.017	-0.018
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.035)
Public electricity capacity (log)	0.712***	0.805**	0.621	0.582	0.607
	(0.254)	(0.406)	(0.509)	(0.511)	(0.540)
Fixed capital (log, interpolated)	0.180	0.188	0.200	0.191	0.245
	(0.137)	(0.140)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.171)
Election year	-0.057	-0.056	-0.061	-0.050	-0.043
	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.128)
CDM promotion policy	-0.416	-0.399	-0.375	-0.372	-0.385
	(0.377)	(0.377)	(0.395)	(0.398)	(0.420)
Population (log, interpolated)		-0.099	0.087	0.156	0.056
		(0.338)	(0.493)	(0.502)	(0.573)
GDP per capita (1,000 rupee) (log)			0.336	0.460	0.257
			(0.687)	(0.708)	(0.960)
Economic growth (pct)				-0.014	-0.013
				(0.016)	(0.016)
Public debt (pct)					0.006
					(0.013)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zonal Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	223	223	218	217	207

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable in Model (1) to (5): Number of Renewable CDM Projects.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A14: Regression results from random effects count model for non-renewable CDM projects with control variable for CDM promotion policies.

12 Robustness: Models without 2011 Projects

To test for temporal robustness of our findings, we iterate our empirical analysis from the main text when we exclude 2011 projects. Tables A15, A16, and A17 show output tables for all CDM projects, renewable projects, and non-renewable projects, respectively. As mentioned in the main text, our results become, if anything, more supportive of our hypotheses.

Models for all CDM projects without 2011 projects

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model
Private electricity capacity (log)	0.014	0.006	0.006	0.008	0.015
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Public electricity capacity (log)	0.484**	0.830**	0.902**	0.926**	0.801*
	(0.223)	(0.359)	(0.449)	(0.447)	(0.439)
Fixed capital (log, interpolated)	0.214*	0.237**	0.241**	0.248**	0.246*
	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.136)
Election year	-0.329***	-0.322***	-0.322***	-0.336***	-0.326***
	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.115)	(0.113)
Population (log, interpolated)		-0.340	-0.426	-0.475	-0.180
		(0.281)	(0.430)	(0.432)	(0.477)
GDP per capita (1,000 rupee) (log)			-0.173	-0.281	0.493
			(0.648)	(0.656)	(0.833)
Economic growth (pct)				0.009	0.011
				(0.014)	(0.014)
Public debt (pct)					0.025**
					(0.011)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zonal Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	198	198	197	196	188

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable in Model (1) to (5): Total Number of CDM Projects.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A15: Main regression results from random effects model without 2011 projects.

Models for renewable CDM projects without 2011 projects

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model
Private electricity capacity (log)	0.028	0.021	0.025	0.030	0.042
	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.044)
Public electricity capacity (log)	0.444	0.713	1.017	1.057*	1.004*
	(0.349)	(0.532)	(0.645)	(0.616)	(0.528)
Fixed capital (log, interpolated)	0.132	0.142	0.185	0.213	0.095
	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.164)	(0.158)
Election year	-0.548***	-0.548***	-0.551***	-0.608***	-0.582***
	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.173)	(0.176)	(0.167)
Population (log, interpolated)		-0.250	-0.638	-0.753	-0.135
		(0.374)	(0.618)	(0.579)	(0.523)
GDP per capita (1,000 rupee) (log)			-0.890	-1.259	0.490
			(1.110)	(0.999)	(0.891)
Economic growth (pct)				0.032	0.040*
				(0.021)	(0.021)
Public debt (pct)					0.039***
					(0.013)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zonal Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	198	198	197	196	188

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable in Model (1) to (5): Number of Renewable CDM Projects.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A16: Regression results from random effects count model for renewable CDM projects without 2011 projects.

Models for non-renewable CDM projects without 2011 projects

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model
Private electricity capacity (log)	0.002	-0.000	0.001	-0.001	-0.006
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Public electricity capacity (log)	0.648***	0.760*	0.596	0.575	0.600
	(0.241)	(0.408)	(0.498)	(0.500)	(0.523)
Fixed capital (log, interpolated)	0.160	0.170	0.163	0.156	0.185
	(0.140)	(0.142)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.169)
Election year	-0.068	-0.065	-0.071	-0.061	-0.059
	(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.138)	(0.139)
Population (log, interpolated)		-0.113	0.091	0.137	0.051
		(0.333)	(0.486)	(0.493)	(0.564)
GDP per capita (1,000 rupee) (log)			0.381	0.469	0.268
			(0.662)	(0.678)	(0.937)
Economic growth (pct)				-0.011	-0.011
				(0.017)	(0.017)
Public debt (pct)					-0.003
					(0.013)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zonal Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	198	198	197	196	188

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable in Model (1) to (5): Number of Renewable CDM Projects.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A17: Regression results from random effects count model for non-renewable CDM projects without 2011 projects.

13 Project Counts and Project Size

#	Province	Number of Projects	Expected CERs in Mt CO2e until 2012	Expected CERs in Mt CO2e until 2020
	Northern Zonal Council			
1	Haryana	32	6.15	47.10
2	Himachal Pradesh	78	19.78	107.38
3	Jammu and Kashmir	5	11.57	26.76
4	Punjab	65	8.81	56.77
5	Rajasthan	165	48.88	100.88
6	Delhi	12	2.18	10.58
7	Chandigarh	na	na	na
	Central Zonal Council			
8	Chhattisgarh	91	21.30	76.61
9	Uttarakhand	43	6.61	55.77
10	Uttar Pradesh	117	20.29	51.02
11	Madhya Pradesh	56	4.32	94.80
	Eastern Zonal Council			
10	Bihar	9	1.19	3.44
11	Jharkhand	14	5.80	36.36
12	Orissa	72	18.44	60.33
13	West Bengal	71	38.69	124.55
	Western Zonal Council			
14	Goa	3	0.88	1.81
15	Gujarat	248	115.97	377.70
16	Maharashtra	292	38.50	162.30
17	Daman and Diu	na	na	na
18	Dadra and Nagar Haveli	na	na	na
	South Zonal Council			
19	Andhra Pradesh	157	47.27	219.34
20	Karnataka	228	60.21	130.71
21	Kerala	20	1.08	3.24
22	Tamil Nadu	331	48.73	124.72
23	Pondicherry	na	na	na
	Northeastern Zonal Council			
24	Assam	14	0.99	3.15
25	Arunachal Pradesh	3	0.19	59.56
26	Manipur	41	3.43	20.20
27	Tripura	1	3.44	14.76
28	Mizoram	na	na	na
29	Meghalaya	3	1.37	3.98
30	Nagaland	na	na	na
31	Sikkim	7	8.88	82.11
	Total	2,295	568.92	2,111.61
	Correlation		+0.807	+0.729

Table A18: Cumulative number of projects and expected CERs by 2012 and 2020.

14 Full Model Results

Tables A19, A20, and A21 show the full results tables for the three models presented and discussed in the main text. We separately present results for all CDM projects, renewable projects, and non-renewable projects.

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model
Private electricity capacity (log)	-0.019	-0.026	-0.028	-0.028	-0.013
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Public electricity capacity (log)	0.363	0.681*	0.470	0.483	0.467
	(0.244)	(0.363)	(0.495)	(0.497)	(0.451)
Fixed capital (log, interpolated)	0.239**	0.258**	0.270**	0.274**	0.279**
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.132)
Election year	-0.236**	-0.228**	-0.209**	-0.214**	-0.211**
	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.101)	(0.103)	(0.100)
2003	-5.036***	-4.988***	-4.659***	-4.687***	-4.762***
	(1.012)	(1.013)	(1.076)	(1.081)	(1.097)
2004	-3.207***	-3.159***	-2.861***	-2.871***	-2.995***
	(0.461)	(0.463)	(0.558)	(0.561)	(0.584)
2005	-0.432**	-0.385**	-0.088	-0.114	-0.252
	(0.178)	(0.183)	(0.320)	(0.334)	(0.368)
2006	-0.048	-0.015	0.257	0.233	0.120
	(0.158)	(0.160)	(0.268)	(0.281)	(0.302)
2007	0.075	0.102	0.344	0.331	0.367
	(0.145)	(0.146)	(0.230)	(0.235)	(0.240)
2008	0.150	0.167	0.390*	0.388*	0.445**
	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.202)	(0.201)	(0.203)
2009	-0.139	-0.118	0.078	0.072	0.070
	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.177)	(0.178)	(0.174)
2010	0.024	0.032	0.196	0.191	0.157
	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.150)	(0.151)	(0.145)
Central Zonal Council	0.451	0.640	0.794	0.774	1.191**
	(0.496)	(0.518)	(0.606)	(0.609)	(0.603)
Eastern Zonal Council	0.322	0.668	0.744	0.721	0.784
	(0.507)	(0.583)	(0.644)	(0.648)	(0.599)
Western Zonal Council	0.553	0.586	0.450	0.436	0.177
	(0.575)	(0.576)	(0.682)	(0.682)	(0.669)
Southern Zonal Council	0.610	0.695	0.548	0.548	0.719
	(0.492)	(0.495)	(0.527)	(0.524)	(0.545)
Northeastern Zonal Council	0.459	0.824	0.827	0.817	1.280*
	(0.695)	(0.755)	(0.796)	(0.795)	(0.734)
Population (log, interpolated)		-0.322	-0.116	-0.142	0.144
		(0.276)	(0.464)	(0.473)	(0.484)
GDP per capita (1,000 rupee) (log)			0.441	0.381	1.142
			(0.822)	(0.847)	(0.909)
Economic growth (pct)				0.004	0.008
				(0.014)	(0.014)
Public debt (pct)					0.032***
					(0.011)
Observations	223	223	218	217	207

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable in Model (1) to (5): Total Number of CDM Projects.
Base categories: Zonal Council = Chandigarh, Year = 2011
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A19: Full results table for main random effects count model.

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model
Private electricity capacity (log)	0.013	0.008	-0.002	0.002	0.011
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.041)
Public electricity capacity (log)	0.269	0.596	0.423	0.488	0.675
	(0.355)	(0.521)	(0.710)	(0.694)	(0.520)
Fixed capital (log, interpolated)	0.119	0.123	0.170	0.203	0.111
	(0.155)	(0.154)	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.152)
Election year	-0.373**	-0.367**	-0.349**	-0.397**	-0.390**
	(0.160)	(0.159)	(0.158)	(0.165)	(0.152)
2003	-20.646	-20.992	-22.971	-19.487	-21.632
	(3054.872)	(3698.730)	(10896.594)	(1711.550)	(4788.578)
2004	-2.745***	-2.712***	-2.530***	-2.667***	-2.863***
	(0.474)	(0.474)	(0.672)	(0.670)	(0.607)
2005	-0.691***	-0.649**	-0.453	-0.659	-0.892**
	(0.254)	(0.257)	(0.462)	(0.474)	(0.421)
2006	-0.193	-0.167	0.037	-0.139	-0.341
	(0.219)	(0.220)	(0.370)	(0.384)	(0.343)
2007	-0.239	-0.219	-0.024	-0.110	-0.040
	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.316)	(0.316)	(0.273)
2008	-0.090	-0.083	0.105	0.088	0.193
	(0.199)	(0.198)	(0.267)	(0.266)	(0.238)
2009	-0.284	-0.270	-0.073	-0.095	-0.089
	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.233)	(0.232)	(0.216)
2010	-0.152	-0.146	0.048	0.013	-0.041
	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.198)	(0.202)	(0.194)
Central Zonal Council	-0.502	-0.340	-0.343	-0.444	0.351
	(0.630)	(0.662)	(0.696)	(0.691)	(0.612)
Eastern Zonal Council	-0.798	-0.451	-0.605	-0.775	-0.710
	(0.666)	(0.793)	(0.826)	(0.813)	(0.638)
Western Zonal Council	-0.876	-0.889	-0.881	-0.829	-0.743
	(0.733)	(0.741)	(0.927)	(0.907)	(0.751)
Southern Zonal Council	0.275	0.302	0.258	0.274	0.569
	(0.657)	(0.663)	(0.713)	(0.691)	(0.598)
Northeastern Zonal Council	-0.795	-0.473	-0.597	-0.638	0.271
	(1.023)	(1.082)	(1.119)	(1.105)	(0.852)
Population (log, interpolated)		-0.300	-0.218	-0.368	0.088
		(0.352)	(0.682)	(0.668)	(0.527)
GDP per capita (1,000 rupee) (log)			0.064	-0.387	0.862
			(1.367)	(1.338)	(0.942)
Economic growth (pct)				0.027	0.038*
				(0.022)	(0.021)
Public debt (pct)					0.044***
					(0.014)
Observations	223	223	218	217	207

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable in Model (1) to (5): Number of Renewable CDM Projects.
Base categories: Zonal Council = Chandigarh, Year = 2011
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A20: Full results table for random effects count model for renewable CDM projects.

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model
Private electricity capacity (log)	-0.025	-0.026	-0.017	-0.019	-0.021
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Public electricity capacity (log)	0.614**	0.753*	0.527	0.495	0.526
	(0.243)	(0.410)	(0.497)	(0.499)	(0.527)
Fixed capital (log, interpolated)	0.212	0.223	0.234	0.223	0.274
	(0.136)	(0.139)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.172)
Election year	-0.067	-0.064	-0.071	-0.061	-0.055
	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.127)
2003	-4.025***	-3.998***	-3.745***	-3.672***	-3.811***
	(1.015)	(1.017)	(1.078)	(1.081)	(1.123)
2004	-23.175	-22.271	-22.741	-20.765	-21.712
	(14479.062)	(9328.562)	(13200.965)	(5015.268)	(7520.626)
2005	0.096	0.116	0.295	0.348	0.246
	(0.214)	(0.221)	(0.351)	(0.356)	(0.422)
2006	0.299	0.319	0.462	0.522*	0.443
	(0.198)	(0.203)	(0.303)	(0.311)	(0.359)
2007	0.466**	0.478**	0.600**	0.632**	0.565*
	(0.184)	(0.187)	(0.269)	(0.272)	(0.302)
2008	0.566***	0.576***	0.676***	0.659***	0.615**
	(0.178)	(0.180)	(0.246)	(0.247)	(0.268)
2009	0.114	0.121	0.187	0.203	0.150
	(0.186)	(0.187)	(0.230)	(0.230)	(0.242)
2010	0.384**	0.385**	0.406**	0.423**	0.395*
	(0.167)	(0.167)	(0.198)	(0.199)	(0.202)
Central Zonal Council	1.143**	1.221**	1.340**	1.379**	1.425**
	(0.509)	(0.539)	(0.620)	(0.623)	(0.678)
Eastern Zonal Council	0.938*	1.075*	1.100*	1.124*	1.089*
	(0.482)	(0.578)	(0.611)	(0.615)	(0.632)
Western Zonal Council	1.078*	1.088*	0.827	0.849	0.959
	(0.564)	(0.558)	(0.632)	(0.631)	(0.728)
Southern Zonal Council	0.724	0.779	0.636	0.652	0.767
	(0.498)	(0.510)	(0.544)	(0.546)	(0.624)
Northeastern Zonal Council	1.344*	1.533*	1.594*	1.613*	1.650*
	(0.702)	(0.824)	(0.855)	(0.857)	(0.886)
Population (log, interpolated)		-0.143	0.099	0.165	0.055
		(0.340)	(0.490)	(0.498)	(0.566)
GDP per capita (1,000 rupee) (log)			0.451	0.574	0.340
			(0.685)	(0.704)	(0.968)
Economic growth (pct)				-0.014	-0.013
				(0.016)	(0.016)
Public debt (pct)					0.004
					(0.013)
Observations	223	223	218	217	207
Pseudo R^2					

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable in Model (1) to (5): Number of Renewable CDM Projects.
Base categories: Zonal Council = Chandigarh, Year = 2011
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A21: Full results table for random effects count model for non-renewable CDM projects.

Supplementary Appendix: References

Hang, Qu, Zhao Jun, Yu Xiao, and Cui Junkui. 2008. "Prospect of Concentrating Solar Power in China – The Sustainable Future." *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews* 12 (9): 2505–2514.

Transparency International. 2005. *India Corruption Study 2005*. New Delhi: Centre for Media Studies.