ADDITIONAL SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR "PREVENTING REBEL RESURGENCE AFTER CIVIL WAR: A FIELD EXPERIMENT IN SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROVISION IN RURAL COLOMBIA"

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S.1 STRUCTURE AND TIMELINE OF THE *ComunPaz* PROGRAM

ComunPaz was implemented over eight months between October 2018 and May 2019. The program consisted of four modules, each lasting a day and staggered over the course of three months in each treatment community, with one week between Modules 1 and 2, seven weeks between Modules 2 and 3, and four weeks between Modules 3 and 4. (Communities were treated at different times, which is why the intervention as a whole lasted eight months.)

Module 1 consisted of a one-day workshop targeting police commanders and Police Inspectors, with one workshop per region. Participants were first asked to describe their own personal experiences in the field and their own understanding of their professional roles and responsibilities. They were then divided into groups and provided with flashcards listing the legal functions associated with state and communal authorities. They affixed these flashcards to posters on the wall, each with the name of one authority at the top. Facilitators helped participants correct mistakes and misperceptions. Next, participants listed the most common conflicts in their municipalities, then mapped the steps they typically take to adjudicate them. Facilitators helped participants identify procedures that deviate from Colombian law and encouraged them to consider ways to integrate JACs into previously established "response routes."

Module 2 targeted JACs, with one workshop per treatment community. Participants were asked to identify the most common conflicts in their communities, the methods they use to resolve those conflicts, and the challenges they face in reaching and enforcing resolutions. Participants were then given flashcards listing a variety of potential mechanisms for dispute resolution and asked to construct a complete response route for specific hypothetical conflicts. Facilitators helped participants identify any discrepancies between their own strategies for resolving disputes and the strategies available to them under Colombian law. Facilitators also encouraged participants to consider ways to improve the services they provide to residents, including through collaboration with state authorities.

Drawing on the challenges and opportunities identified in the previous two modules, Module 3 aimed to increase the degree of coordination between state and communal authorities. The module consisted of a one-day workshop in which JAC leaders from treatment communities were invited to the municipal capital to meet with police commanders and Police Inspectors. Facilitators brought the information gathered in Modules 1 and 2 on the conflicts, challenges, and response routes that are most prevalent in treatment communities. Facilitators then used this information to help participants generate proposals for collaborating more directly with one another, within the bounds of Colombian law. Importantly, facilitators did not assume the existence of a single

"correct" way to induce cooperation between the state and communal institutions, and allowed these proposals to vary across municipalities and communities.

Module 4 sought to inform the population of each treatment community about the agreements reached in Module 3 and further cement nascent mechanisms of communication and cooperation between JACs, police officers, and Police Inspectors. The module included both formal and pedagogical components, including a discussion with residents about the contents of the new agreements, as well as a "signing ceremony" at which the agreements were officially validated by both state and communal authorities. Following the conclusion of Module 4, facilitators followed up with Police Inspectors and JAC leaders multiple times in person and by phone to reinforce the messages of the workshops and encourage participants to adhere to any commitments made during the intervention (e.g. pledges of greater communication and coordination, often in relation to specific issues or disputes).

S.2 Ancillary analyses and robustness checks

S.2.1 Manipulation check

Table S.1 reports the ITT of the *ComunPaz* program on awareness of any dispute resolution program in the community (columns 1 and 2) and awareness of the *ComunPaz* program specifically (columns 3 and 4). We code dummies for awareness of these programs among residents and leaders. Not surprisingly, we find that treatment group residents and leaders were more aware of these programs.

S.2.2 Marginal effects from endorsement experiment

Figure S.1 plots marginal effects from the endorsement experiment designed to measure perceptions of armed groups and governmental and communal institutions.

S.2.3 Marginal effects from heterogeneous treatment effect analyses

Figure S.2 plots marginal effects on the prevalence of unresolved and violent disputes by connectedness; Figures S.3 and S.4 plot marginal effects on the prevalence of unresolved and violent disputes, respectively, by rebel and paramilitary governance; and Figures S.5 and S.6 plot marginal effects on the prevalence of unresolved and violent disputes, respectively, by exposure to violence perpetrated by government, rebel, and paramilitary forces. (Because we use an AES estimator to test for heterogeneous treatment effects on reliance on armed groups and state and communal authorities to resolve disputes, we do not plot marginal effects for these tables.)

S.2.4 Alternate coding rules for dependent variables

Following our PAP, Table S.2 reports the ITT on reliance on JACs and police officers and Police Inspectors, disaggregating by jurisdiction. We test whether the program increased reliance on JACs in cases JACs are legally authorized to resolve (columns 1 and 2) and in cases they are not

(columns 3 and 4). We also test whether the program increased reliance on police officers and Police Inspectors in cases JACs are legally authorized to resolve (columns 5 and 6) and in cases they are not (columns 7 and 8). Our ITT estimates remain statistically indistinguishable from 0.

Also following our PAP, Table S.3 reports the ITT on consensus around dispute resolution, using alternate constructions of the dependent variable. For each of four hypothetical scenarios of conflict and crime, respondents were asked which authority they would report to first, and which they believed should provide a "definitive" resolution. We take the modal response to each of these questions among residents, then test for effects on the likelihood that each resident's response (column 1) and each leader's response (column 2) matches the modal resident response. We also take the modal response among leaders and test for effects on the likelihood that each resident's response (column 3) and each leader's response (column 4) matches the modal leader response. Our ITT estimates remain statistically indistinguishable from 0 regardless of specification.

S.2.5 TABLES WITH COEFFICIENTS ON CONTROL VARIABLES

Tables S.4 through S.12 reproduce all analyses in the article and appendix that use OLS, reporting coefficients on control variables as well as the coefficient on the treatment indicator. (We cannot report coefficients on control variables for analyses that use the AES estimator, since the coefficients on control variables do not have a meaningful interpretation in the AES setup.)

Table S.1: **Manipulation check**

	Heard of dispute resolution program		**Heard of *ComunPaz* program**	
	(1) Residents	(2) Leaders	(3) Residents	(4) Leaders
Assigned to treatment	0.042***	0.094***	0.030**	0.117***
	[0.014]	[0.028]	[0.013]	[0.027]
Observations	2673	1182	2673	1182
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Community controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS

Notes: All specifications include individual- and community-level controls, block fixed effects, and inverse probability weights. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure S.1: **Perceptions of armed groups and governmental and communal institutions among residents using endorsement experiment**



Notes: Marginal effects of the *ComunPaz* program on perceptions of armed groups and governmental and communal institutions among residents in the endorsement experiment. Specification includes individual- and community-level controls, block fixed effects, and inverse probability weights. Standard errors are clustered by community. Lines denote 95% confidence intervals.

Figure S.2: **Prevalence of unresolved and violent disputes, heterogeneity by connectedness**



Notes: Heterogeneous treatment effects (HTEs) of the *ComunPaz* program by connectedness to local and municipal power. All specifications include individual- and community-level controls, block fixed effects, and inverse probability weights. Standard errors are clustered by community. Lines denote 95% confidence intervals.

Figure S.3: **Prevalence of unresolved disputes, heterogeneity by armed groups governance**



Notes: Heterogeneous treatment effects (HTEs) of the *ComunPaz* program by armed group governance. All specifications include individual- and community-level controls, block fixed effects, and inverse probability weights. Standard errors are clustered by community. Lines denote 95% confidence intervals.

Figure S.4: **Prevalence of violent disputes, heterogeneity by armed groups governance**



Notes: Heterogeneous treatment effects (HTEs) of the *ComunPaz* program by armed group governance. All specifications include individual- and community-level controls, block fixed effects, and inverse probability weights. Standard errors are clustered by community. Lines denote 95% confidence intervals.

Figure S.5: **Prevalence of unresolved disputes, heterogeneity by exposure to violence**



Notes: Heterogeneous treatment effects (HTEs) of the *ComunPaz* program by exposure to violence. All specifications includes individual- and community-level controls, block fixed effects, and inverse probability weights. Standard errors are clustered by community. Lines denote 95% confidence intervals.

Figure S.6: **Prevalence of violent disputes, heterogeneity by exposure to violence**



Notes: Heterogeneous treatment effects (HTEs) of the *ComunPaz* program by exposure to violence. All specifications includes individual- and community-level controls, block fixed effects, and inverse probability weights. Standard errors are clustered by community. Lines denote 95% confidence intervals.

Table S.2: **Reliance on armed groups and state and communal authorities to resolve disputes, disaggregated by jurisdiction**

	Reliance on JACs (communal jurisdiction)		**Reliance on JACs (state jurisdiction)**		**Reliance on police and PIs (communal jurisdiction)**		**Reliance on police and PIs (state jurisdiction)**	
	(1) Residents	(2) Leaders	(3) Residents	(4) Leaders	(5) Residents	(6) Leaders	(7) Residents	(8) Leaders
Assigned to treatment	-0.031	-0.033	0.017	0.024	0.003	0.040	0.009	0.040
	[0.049]	[0.057]	[0.046]	[0.051]	[0.036]	[0.044]	[0.041]	[0.044]
Observations	2673	1182	2673	1182	2673	1182	2673	1182
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Community controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Estimator	AES	AES	AES	AES	AES	AES	AES	AES

Notes: All specifications include individual- and community-level controls, block fixed effects, and inverse probability weights. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. $^{***}\ p < 0.01$, $^{**}\ p < 0.05$, $^{*}\ p < 0.1$.

Table S.3: **Consensus around dispute resolution, alternate constructions of the DV**

	Consensus around dispute resolution (modal resident)		**Consensus around dispute resolution (modal leader)**	
	(1) Residents	(2) Leaders	(3) Residents	(4) Leaders
Assigned to treatment	-0.049	-0.024	-0.025	-0.040
	[0.035]	[0.038]	[0.040]	[0.030]
Observations	2673	1182	2673	1182
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Community controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Estimator	AES	AES	AES	AES

Notes: All specifications include individual- and community-level controls, block fixed effects, and inverse probability weights. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table S.4: **Prevalence of unresolved and violent disputes with coefficients on control variables**

	Any unresolved disputes		**Any violent disputes**	
	(1) Residents	(2) Leaders	(3) Residents	(4) Leaders
Assigned to treatment	-0.027	-0.093**	0.001	-0.051*
	[0.033]	[0.041]	[0.010]	[0.026]
Age	0.000	0.002	-0.000	0.002**
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Male	-0.028	-0.019	-0.001	0.012
	[0.022]	[0.031]	[0.011]	[0.023]
Household size	0.004	0.011	0.006*	-0.005
	[0.006]	[0.009]	[0.003]	[0.007]
Quality of walls	-0.026	-0.004	-0.040	-0.038
	[0.042]	[0.081]	[0.027]	[0.056]
Quality of floors	0.035	-0.063	-0.007	0.065
	[0.030]	[0.042]	[0.021]	[0.045]
Preschool	-0.082	-0.298**	-0.070*	-0.244***
	[0.069]	[0.122]	[0.039]	[0.081]
Primary school	-0.046	-0.112**	-0.041	-0.094**
	[0.044]	[0.054]	[0.030]	[0.040]
Middle school	-0.034	-0.108*	-0.030	-0.018
	[0.045]	[0.058]	[0.031]	[0.045]
Employed	-0.006	0.004	-0.004	-0.065**
	[0.023]	[0.037]	[0.012]	[0.031]
Population	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Distance to nearest arterial road (km)	0.004**	0.005**	0.002***	0.006***
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Distance to municipal capital (km)	0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.002
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Distance to municipal capital (min.)	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.001
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Constant	0.276***	0.527***	0.099**	0.114
	[0.087]	[0.141]	[0.046]	[0.108]
Observations	2673	1182	2673	1182
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Community controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS

Notes: All specifications include individual- and community-level controls, block fixed effects, and inverse probability weights. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table S.5: **Information about communities with coefficients on control variables**

	Understanding of most important disputes		
	(1) Leaders	(2) Police	(3) PIs
Assigned to treatment	-0.026	0.007	0.040
	[0.039]	[0.041]	[0.041]
Age	-0.001		
	[0.001]		
Male	-0.012		
	[0.034]		
Household size	-0.008		
	[0.010]		
Quality of walls	0.063		
	[0.071]		
Quality of floors	0.048		
	[0.063]		
Preschool	0.231*		
	[0.132]		
Primary school	0.127**		
	[0.051]		
Middle school	0.103**		
	[0.051]		
Employed	0.056		
	[0.038]		
Population	0.000*	-0.000	-0.000
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Distance to nearest arterial road (km)	-0.002	0.002	-0.001
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.003]
Distance to municipal capital (km)	0.001	-0.000	-0.001
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Distance to municipal capital (min.)	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Constant	0.229*	0.028	0.148*
	[0.121]	[0.063]	[0.088]
Observations	1182	149	149
Individual controls	Yes	No	No
Community controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS

Notes: All specifications include individual- and community-level controls, block fixed effects, and inverse probability weights. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table S.6: **Perceptions of communal authorities with coefficients on control variables**

	Understanding of most important disputes		
	(1) Leaders	(2) Police	(3) PIs
Assigned to treatment	-0.026	0.007	0.040
	[0.039]	[0.041]	[0.041]
Age	-0.001		
	[0.001]		
Male	-0.012		
	[0.034]		
Household size	-0.008		
	[0.010]		
Quality of walls	0.063		
	[0.071]		
Quality of floors	0.048		
	[0.063]		
Preschool	0.231*		
	[0.132]		
Primary school	0.127**		
	[0.051]		
Middle school	0.103**		
	[0.051]		
Employed	0.056		
	[0.038]		
Population	0.000*	-0.000	-0.000
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Distance to nearest arterial road (km)	-0.002	0.002	-0.001
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.003]
Distance to municipal capital (km)	0.001	-0.000	-0.001
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Distance to municipal capital (min.)	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Constant	0.229*	0.028	0.148*
	[0.121]	[0.063]	[0.088]
Observations	1182	149	149
Individual controls	Yes	No	No
Community controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS

Notes: All specifications include individual- and community-level controls, block fixed effects, and inverse probability weights. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table S.7: **Perceptions of armed groups and governmental and communal authorities among residents using endorsement experiment with coefficients on control variables**

	Index of approval
Assigned to treatment	-0.134
	[0.084]
JAC endorsement	-0.087
	[0.061]
Police endorsement	-0.092
	[0.061]
Armed group endorsement	-0.961***
	[0.133]
Assigned to treatment × JAC endorsement	0.154*
	[0.087]
Assigned to treatment × police endorsement	0.204**
	[0.080]
Assigned to treatment × armed group endorsement	0.051
	[0.183]
Age	0.001
	[0.001]
Male	-0.175***
	[0.041]
Household size	-0.003
	[0.013]
Quality of walls	0.007
	[0.090]
Quality of floors	0.018
	[0.065]
Preschool	0.155
	[0.121]
Primary school	0.155*
	[0.091]
Middle school	0.102
	[0.099]
Employed	0.130***
	[0.040]
Population	0.000
	[0.000]
Distance to nearest arterial road (km)	0.000
	[0.002]
Distance to municipal capital (km)	0.004**
	[0.002]
Distance to municipal capital (min.)	-0.002**
	[0.001]
Constant	0.101
	[0.192]
Observations	2673
Individual controls	Yes
Community controls	Yes
Block FE	Yes
Weights	Yes
Estimator	OLS

Notes: All specifications include individual- and community-level controls, block fixed effects, and inverse probability weights. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table S.8: **Demand for coordination between state and communal authorities using behavioral measures with coefficients on control variables**

	(1) **Any petitions**	(2) **# of petitions**	(3) **WhatsApp group**
Assigned to treatment	-0.178**	-1.139	-0.038
	[0.089]	[0.725]	[0.074]
Population	-0.000***	-0.003**	0.000
	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.000]
Distance to nearest arterial road (km)	-0.002	-0.038	0.004
	[0.004]	[0.038]	[0.003]
Distance to municipal capital (km)	-0.003	-0.073	0.002
	[0.006]	[0.046]	[0.004]
Distance to municipal capital (min.)	0.000	0.022	-0.003**
	[0.002]	[0.016]	[0.001]
Constant	1.011***	7.437***	0.222*
	[0.110]	[1.444]	[0.114]
Observations	117	117	117
Individual controls	No	No	No
Community controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS

Notes: All specifications include community-level controls, block fixed effects, and inverse probability weights. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table S.9: **Reliance on direct mediation to resolve disputes with coefficients on control variables**

	Direct mediation for dispute resolution	
	(1) Residents	(2) Leaders
Assigned to treatment	-0.022	-0.069*
	[0.031]	[0.037]
Age	-0.001*	0.000
	[0.001]	[0.001]
Male	0.022	0.015
	[0.022]	[0.029]
Household size	-0.013**	0.001
	[0.006]	[0.009]
Quality of walls	-0.108**	-0.118*
	[0.048]	[0.061]
Quality of floors	0.001	0.038
	[0.034]	[0.042]
Preschool	-0.089	-0.124
	[0.055]	[0.120]
Primary school	-0.066	-0.037
	[0.042]	[0.051]
Middle school	-0.089**	-0.107**
	[0.042]	[0.053]
Employed	-0.003	-0.082**
	[0.023]	[0.032]
Population	0.000	0.000
	[0.000]	[0.000]
Distance to nearest arterial road (km)	0.002	-0.002
	[0.002]	[0.002]
Distance to municipal capital (km)	-0.003	-0.003
	[0.002]	[0.002]
Distance to municipal capital (min.)	0.000	0.001*
	[0.001]	[0.001]
Constant	0.603***	0.597***
	[0.104]	[0.116]
Observations	2673	1182
Individual controls	Yes	Yes
Community controls	Yes	Yes
Block FE	Yes	Yes
Weights	Yes	Yes
Estimator	OLS	OLS

Notes: All specifications include individual- and community-level controls, block fixed effects, and inverse probability weights. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table S.10: **Prevalence of unresolved and violent disputes, heterogeneity by connectedness with coefficients on control variables**

	Any unresolved disputes		**Any violent disputes**	
	(1) Residents	(2) Leaders	(3) Residents	(4) Leaders
Assigned to treatment	-0.081	-0.137***	-0.003	-0.057*
	[0.056]	[0.052]	[0.015]	[0.029]
Connected	-0.036	0.013	0.032**	0.011
	[0.039]	[0.047]	[0.014]	[0.027]
Assigned to treatment × connected	0.080	0.085	0.004	0.013
	[0.057]	[0.062]	[0.022]	[0.039]
Age	0.000	0.002	-0.000	0.002**
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Male	-0.027	-0.024	-0.000	0.010
	[0.023]	[0.031]	[0.011]	[0.023]
Household size	0.003	0.011	0.006*	-0.005
	[0.006]	[0.009]	[0.003]	[0.007]
Quality of walls	-0.028	-0.006	-0.040	-0.039
	[0.042]	[0.080]	[0.027]	[0.056]
Quality of floors	0.037	-0.066	-0.007	0.065
	[0.030]	[0.043]	[0.021]	[0.045]
Preschool	-0.086	-0.285**	-0.068*	-0.239***
	[0.069]	[0.122]	[0.039]	[0.081]
Primary school	-0.048	-0.106**	-0.039	-0.092**
	[0.044]	[0.053]	[0.030]	[0.040]
Middle school	-0.037	-0.105*	-0.030	-0.017
	[0.046]	[0.057]	[0.031]	[0.044]
Employed	-0.007	0.006	-0.003	-0.064**
	[0.023]	[0.037]	[0.012]	[0.031]
Population	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Distance to nearest arterial road (km)	0.004**	0.005**	0.002***	0.005***
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Distance to municipal capital (km)	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.002
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Distance to municipal capital (min.)	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.001
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Constant	0.308***	0.527***	0.081*	0.110
	[0.090]	[0.145]	[0.048]	[0.109]
Observations	2673	1182	2673	1182
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Community controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS

Notes: Heterogeneous treatment effects (HTEs) of the *ComunPaz* program by connectedness to local and municipal power. All specifications include individual- and community-level controls, block fixed effects, and inverse probability weights. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table S.11: **Prevalence of unresolved and violent disputes, heterogeneity by armed group governance with coefficients on control variables**

	Any unresolved disputes		**Any violent disputes**	
	(1) Residents	(2) Leaders	(3) Residents	(4) Leaders
Assigned to treatment	0.072	-0.018	0.008	-0.018
	[0.079]	[0.102]	[0.020]	[0.040]
Rebel governance	0.074	0.127	-0.045	0.026
	[0.095]	[0.122]	[0.032]	[0.081]
Paramilitary governance	-0.042	0.088	0.035	0.165**
	[0.107]	[0.117]	[0.031]	[0.070]
Assigned to treatment × rebel governance	-0.255**	-0.113	-0.001	0.022
	[0.123]	[0.145]	[0.038]	[0.092]
Assigned to treatment × paramilitary governance	0.113	-0.009	-0.011	-0.086
	[0.124]	[0.153]	[0.037]	[0.100]
Age	0.000	0.002	-0.000	0.002**
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Male	-0.028	-0.022	-0.001	0.014
	[0.023]	[0.032]	[0.011]	[0.023]
Household size	0.003	0.013	0.006*	-0.003
	[0.006]	[0.009]	[0.003]	[0.008]
Quality of walls	-0.027	0.001	-0.041	-0.033
	[0.044]	[0.079]	[0.026]	[0.055]
Quality of floors	0.028	-0.069	-0.007	0.064
	[0.031]	[0.043]	[0.021]	[0.044]
Preschool	-0.081	-0.306**	-0.067*	-0.257***
	[0.071]	[0.119]	[0.040]	[0.079]
Primary school	-0.036	-0.119**	-0.037	-0.104**
	[0.045]	[0.054]	[0.031]	[0.041]
Middle school	-0.030	-0.111*	-0.027	-0.021
	[0.046]	[0.058]	[0.032]	[0.044]
Employed	-0.007	0.004	-0.003	-0.068**
	[0.023]	[0.037]	[0.012]	[0.031]
Population	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Distance to nearest arterial road (km)	0.004**	0.005**	0.002***	0.005***
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Distance to municipal capital (km)	0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.002
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Distance to municipal capital (min.)	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	-0.000
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Constant	0.257**	0.419***	0.106**	0.034
	[0.110]	[0.159]	[0.048]	[0.123]
Observations	2673	1182	2673	1182
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Community controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS

Notes: Heterogeneous treatment effects (HTEs) of the *ComunPaz* program by armed group governance. All specifications include individual- and community-level controls, block fixed effects, and inverse probability weights. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table S.12: **Prevalence of unresolved and violent disputes, heterogeneity by exposure to violence with coefficients on control variables**

	Any unresolved disputes		**Any violent disputes**	
	(1) Residents	(2) Leaders	(3) Residents	(4) Leaders
Assigned to treatment	-0.027	-0.079*	0.001	-0.046*
	[0.033]	[0.042]	[0.010]	[0.027]
Rebel violence	0.041**	0.034*	0.018*	0.021
	[0.021]	[0.020]	[0.010]	[0.015]
Paramilitary violence	0.037**	0.025	0.014	0.046***
	[0.017]	[0.019]	[0.011]	[0.016]
Government violence	-0.020*	-0.071*	0.021	-0.006
	[0.011]	[0.038]	[0.013]	[0.040]
Assigned to treatment × rebel violence	-0.024	0.025	0.009	0.024
	[0.030]	[0.031]	[0.014]	[0.022]
Assigned to treatment × paramilitary violence	-0.041*	-0.010	-0.008	-0.024
	[0.022]	[0.030]	[0.013]	[0.020]
Assigned to treatment × government violence	0.030**	0.038	-0.017	-0.001
	[0.014]	[0.039]	[0.015]	[0.041]
Age	0.000	0.002	-0.000	0.002*
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Male	-0.027	-0.015	-0.001	0.015
	[0.022]	[0.032]	[0.011]	[0.023]
Household size	0.003	0.012	0.007**	-0.006
	[0.006]	[0.009]	[0.003]	[0.007]
Quality of walls	-0.016	0.025	-0.033	-0.047
	[0.040]	[0.080]	[0.026]	[0.057]
Quality of floors	0.036	-0.069*	-0.008	0.063
	[0.031]	[0.041]	[0.021]	[0.044]
Preschool	-0.095	-0.310**	-0.067*	-0.242***
	[0.069]	[0.127]	[0.040]	[0.088]
Primary school	-0.047	-0.124**	-0.037	-0.091**
	[0.043]	[0.053]	[0.029]	[0.041]
Middle school	-0.032	-0.113**	-0.023	-0.016
	[0.045]	[0.056]	[0.031]	[0.045]
Employed	-0.008	0.001	-0.006	-0.066**
	[0.023]	[0.037]	[0.012]	[0.031]
Population	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Distance to nearest arterial road (km)	0.004**	0.005**	0.002***	0.004***
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Distance to municipal capital (km)	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Distance to municipal capital (min.)	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.001
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Constant	0.273***	0.511***	0.103**	0.159
	[0.084]	[0.142]	[0.044]	[0.110]
Observations	2631	1160	2631	1160
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Community controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS

Notes: Heterogeneous treatment effects (HTEs) of the *ComunPaz* program by exposure to violence. All specifications include individual- and community-level controls, block fixed effects, and inverse probability weights. Standard errors, clustered by community, are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.