Appendix: Who dissents? Self-efficacy and opposition action after state-sponsored election violence

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A Background information on qualitative interviews

A.1 List of qualitative interview participants

Table A.1: List of qualitative interview participants

Date	Gender	Description	Format	Location	Urban/Rural
5/19/15	Female	opposition supporter	FGD	Mashonaland East	Rural
5/19/15	Male	opposition supporter	FGD	Mashonaland East	Rural
5/19/15	Male	opposition supporter	FGD	Mashonaland East	Rural
5/19/15	Male	opposition supporter	FGD	Mashonaland East	Rural
5/18/15	Male	opposition supporter	FGD	Mashonaland East	Rural
5/18/15	Male	opposition supporter	FGD	Mashonaland East	Rural
5/18/15	Male	opposition supporter	FGD	Mashonaland East	Rural
5/18/15	Male	opposition supporter	FGD	Mashonaland East	Rural
5/18/15	Male	opposition supporter	FGD	Mashonaland East	Rural
5/21/15	Male	opposition supporter	FGD	Harare	Urban
5/21/15	Male	opposition supporter	FGD	Harare	Urban
5/21/15	Male	opposition supporter	FGD	Harare	Urban
5/21/15	Female	opposition supporter	FGD	Harare	Urban

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Table A.1 – *Continued from previous page*

Date	Gender	Description	Format	Location	Urban/Rural
5/21/15	Female	opposition supporter	FGD	Harare	Urban
5/21/15	Female	opposition supporter	FGD	Harare	Urban
5/22/15	Male	opposition activist	FGD	Harare	Urban
5/22/15	Male	opposition activist	FGD	Harare	Urban
5/22/15	Female	opposition activist	FGD	Harare	Urban
5/23/15	Male	opposition activist	FGD	Harare	Urban
5/23/15	Male	opposition activist	FGD	Harare	Urban
5/23/15	Female	opposition activist	FGD	Harare	Urban
5/23/15	Male	opposition supporter	FGD	Harare	Urban
5/23/15	Female	opposition supporter	FGD	Harare	Urban
5/23/15	Female	opposition supporter	FGD	Harare	Urban
7/6/16	Male	opposition candidate	interview	Harare	Urban
7/8/16	Male	opposition candidate	interview	Harare	Urban
7/11/16	Male	opposition supporter	interview	Harare	Urban
7/11/16	Female	opposition mobilizer	interview	Harare	Urban
7/11/16	Male	opposition organizer	interview	Harare	Urban
7/18/16	Male	social movement organizer	Interview	Harare	Urban
7/20/16	Male	opposition organizer	Interview	Harare	Urban
7/20/16	Male	social movement organizer	Interview	Harare	Urban
7/20/16	Male	opposition organizer	Interview	Harare	Urban
7/22/16	Female	opposition supporter	Interview	Harare	Urban
7/22/16	Female	opposition supporter	Interview	Harare	Urban
7/22/16	Female	opposition supporter	Interview	Harare	Urban
7/22/16	Male	opposition organizer	Interview	Harare	Urban
7/27/16	Male	opposition youth organizer	Interview	Harare	Urban
7/27/16	Female	opposition organizer	Interview	Harare	Urban
7/27/16	Female	opposition supporter	Interview	Harare	Urban
8/3/16	Male	opposition organizer	Interview	Harare	Urban

B Survey measures

The variables used to measure each outcome and control variable are described in Table B.1.

Table B.1: Measurement details

Measure	*Description*	*Responses*
Asset index	Includes quality of housing, land ownership, major assets like generators and cars, small assets like mobile phones and radios, and livestock. Adapted from the last Zimbabwean Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) and calculated separately for urban and rural households	First principal component
Self-efficacy	Index of 10 questions based on Jerusalem & Schwarzer (1995)	5-point agreement scale
Past exposure to political violence	Version of Harvard Trauma Questionnaire adapted to Zimbabwean context that measures whether the respondent has personally experienced 8 types of political violence since the year 2000	Binary
Past participation in dissent	Frequency of participation in eight acts of dissent since 2000	4-point frequency scale

Survey modules appeared in the following order:

1. Demographics
2. Self-efficacy
3. Emotion induction experiment - treatment and measurement
4. Repression scenarios
5. Political participation
6. Past repression

C Ethical considerations

****This section is reproduced from the Appendix of Young (2019).****

Given the sensitivity of the topic and context of this study, ethical questions concerning the participants and study team were first order. Although field research, including experiments, on sensitive topics in authoritarian (Guan & Green, 2006; Tsai, 2007) or violence-affected contexts (Wood, 2003; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007; Lyall et al., 2013) has exploded in recent years, there remains a lack of consensus about how to apply the principles for protection of human subjects outlined in the Belmont Report in such settings, or whether additional ethical principles should be invoked. In addition, the ethics of field research in areas affected by conflict is highly context-dependent and requires researcher judgment, so simply adhering to a set of standard practices is almost certainly insufficient (Wood, 2006).

C.1 Process of developing ethical practices

The first phase of this project was focused on 1) assessing the risks of doing research on political violence in Zimbabwe were and 2) identifying the relevant ethical principles.

C.1.1 Risk assessment

To assess the risks of doing research on political violence in Zimbabwe, I carried out a long period of informal consultations and then created more formal relationships with a senior professor and research organization. I began by consulting a wide network of international and domestic researchers and policymakers over 22 months from my first exploratory trip to Zimbabwe in 2013 to the start of fieldwork in 2015. I also worked as a consultant on a politically sensitive survey that was carried out by one of the leading Zimbabwean survey firms as part of a USAID-funded evaluation of a governance program. These efforts provided me with a network of current and former PhD students, research professionals, and policymakers who could inform me of their experiences running programs and research on sensitive subjects related to political violence, provide their assessments of the current risks, and advise me on my research plans.

These initial consultations and experiences led me to a second phase of risk assessments in which I set up more formal relationships with both an academic advisor who had no personal

stake in the project, and a data collection organization. Eldred Masunungure, a senior professor at the University of Zimbabwe and the head of the Zimbabwean research firm that carries out the Afrobarometer survey in Zimbabwe, began providing feedback on a regular basis as I developed a specific research design. As a prominent Zimbabwean academic who has overseen numerous surveys on political beliefs and experiences and a frequent commentator on elite politics and political risk in Zimbabwe, his insights into what was feasible were extremely important. He also provided a review of my research protocol, including data collection materials, to my university's Institutional Review Board. His experience and independence as a senior scholar who had nothing at stake in the project gave me confidence that his assessments of the risks were well-informed and presented without bias.

The second source of information on risks that I solicited was from the organization that I hired to implement the research. This was more difficult because the organization was an interested party in the research, and I worried that they might have incentives to under-report risks in order to avoid losing the contract. However, there is no other source of information on highly localized or rapidly shifting risks, and VfD's local knowledge was one of the reasons I chose to work with them. As described in Section C.2, I took a number of steps to try to make the research team feel that it was in their best interest to share accurate information about risks with me.

The third source of information on risk that I consulted were quantitative data sources on political violence, particularly the monthly reports of the Zimbabwe Peace Project. I used these reports to assess where violence was occurring and who was targeted during the period preceding the fieldwork. These reports and the existence of an easily accessible independent media in Zimbabwe that covers political violence made it possible to cross-check the information that I was getting on the risk of violence from VfD and my local advisors with a totally independent and contemporary source.

C.1.2 Identifying appropriate ethical principles

A second step in this research was identifying the appropriate ethical principles to follow, and reviews to conduct. I took the position that the review of my university's Institutional Review

Board (IRB) was necessary but not sufficient, in part because the IRB review did not explicitly consider the safety of the research staff. There is no Zimbabwean research ethics review board that governs social science research.

My university's IRB process provided an assessment of whether the research met the Belmont Report principles of beneficence, respect for persons, and justice. The protocol was first approved in April 2015, and modifications were approved in May, June, and September 2015 as the methodology was finalized.

I also sought the advice of local researchers on any additional ethical considerations specific to the Zimbabwean context. This was partly informed by an IRB requirement that I submit a "cultural appropriateness letter" from a Zimbabwe expert. Dr. Masunungure reviewed my IRB protocol and submitted a letter stating that the research met local ethical standards and did not violate local practices or customs. In practice, the local customs that were most relevant were standards around asking Zimbabweans about political beliefs and past trauma. Dr. Masunungure's feedback, the adoption of questions from surveys that had already been successfully fielded in Zimbabwe, consultation with the survey team, and piloting helped ensure that the survey did not violate any local norms.

Finally, I found that the IRB framework provided little guidance on how to ethically engage with a local research team. A small methods literature around research in violence-affected or authoritarian contexts has noted the ethical imperative to consider the impact of research on local partners (Paluck, 2009; Lü, 2016). I ultimately ended up applying a similar standard of beneficence and respect for persons in my dealings with the surveyors, although this was not explicitly required by my IRB.

C.2 Processes for protecting participants

This section describes protocols developed to minimize the risks of re-traumatization and retribution, as well as general practices taken to enable informed consent and ensure that the research team followed safety procedures.

The first risk to participants that I identified and worked to minimize and monitor was the risk of re-traumatization. Because the study asked respondents to answer questions about

political violence, and in some cases to describe political or non-political events that made them afraid, there was a risk that they could be re-traumatized during the interview. For the closed questions, I tried to minimize the risk of re-traumatization by using a shortened and modified version of the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire that had been used in surveys with Zimbabweans, including in a national poll (ActionAid International, 2005; ZTVP, 2008; Bratton, 2011). This section asked whether the respondent had experienced or heard about seven types of violence using yes or no questions.

The open-ended questions that made up the fear induction had not been used before in Zimbabwe. However, I assessed that they were unlikely to pose a significant risk of re-traumatization for several reasons. First, this type of emotion induction had been used with other violence-affected populations in Colombia and Afghanistan without adverse effects (Callen et al., 2014; Bogliacino et al., 2017), and in numerous studies with student populations (Westermann et al., 1996; Lench et al., 2011; Myers & Tingley, 2016). This suggested that it could be safely used in a wide range of populations, including some similar to the study participants in terms of past trauma.

Second, asking individuals to describe an emotional stimulus in detail when prompted and encouraged by an interviewer is a well-established form of therapy for patients with anxiety or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The protocol in what some practitioners call "imaginal" exposure therapy are remarkably similar to the Affective Emotional Memory Task (AEMT) that I used in this study. One exposure therapy protocol asks participants to "relive, in their imagination, the traumatic experiences, describing it aloud 'as if it were happening now"' (Rothbaum & Schwartz, 2002, 63). Therapists also commonly probe for details of the experience. A 2002 review article on exposure therapy for PTSD concludes that "in the last 15-20 years, exposure has been applied and adapted for treatment of PTSD. In fact, exposure therapy has more empirical evidence for its efficacy than any other treatment developed for the treatment of trauma-related symptoms" (Rothbaum & Schwartz, 2002, 61). According to the 2016 Encyclopedia of Mental Health, "exposure-based treatments are the current gold-standard treatment for anxiety disorders" (Steinman et al., 2016, 186). The purpose of the AEMT in this study was not to help participants recover from trauma, and the literature on exposure therapy does not suggest that a short, one-off

session would have any positive effects. However, the fact that reliving emotional memories is part of a well-documented therapeutic protocol for patients with anxiety or PTSD also suggested to me that it was not necessarily re-traumatizing for a population that may have experienced trauma.

Before using the AEMT on a large participant population, I also took steps to assess whether these findings from the general literatures on measuring trauma, inducing emotions, and exposure therapy applied in Zimbabwe. I got feedback on the emotion induction protocol from Dr. Masunungure and from the members of the survey team during a participatory training. I also ran several pilots with smaller groups of participants in which the surveyors were instructed to assess the risk of re-traumatization. These consultations and pilots did not expose any signs that talking about a frightening past event was more traumatizing in Zimbabwe than in other contexts. The survey team did however provide the feedback during the pilots that the initial debriefing process that I had outlined was not sufficiently strong. They were concerned that some participants might leave the study feeling slightly more disempowered and pessimistic. Based on this feedback, I worked with the surveyors to develop a more prolonged and positive debriefing at the end of the interview, as described below.

Although this process convinced me that the risk of re-traumatization or other significant negative psychological effects was small, I took steps to monitor and mitigate it. First, I worked with the survey team to develop a protocol to monitor re-traumatization during and after the interview that was culturally specific. The interviewers watched participants for crying, an unusual lack of affect, jumpiness, or irritability after the emotion induction. At mild levels of these behaviors the surveyors were instructed to pause the interview and ask the participant if she wanted to continue. At more severe levels they were instructed to stop the interview. In general, the surveyors were instructed to continue the emotion induction discussion until they believed the participant felt a mild state of fear. During training we acted out scenarios in which participants (played by myself and the surveyors) exhibited these symptoms and discussed at what point the surveyor should pause or stop the interview. These practices were reinforced during the field training and piloting, when surveyors would discuss with each other how participants had reacted during the emotion inductions. Starting in the pilots, at the end of

each survey the surveyor answered a final question asking whether the participant had been re-traumatized during the interview. Putting this question on the survey was a more structured way of ensuring that the surveyors didn't forget to consider the emotional state of the participant, and enabled me and the survey manager to monitor in real time whether participants were being re-traumatized. Finally, around one week after the survey team had finished interviews in an area, they asked the community organizer who had helped them mobilize people in each community whether they had gotten any reports of re-traumatization from the people who had participated.

Second, we set up a number of practices to mitigate the risk of re-traumatization, and general negative affect after the fear induction. As mentioned above, the first step was to pause and then stop the interview for participants who showed signs of emotional distress. I did not track how frequently the surveyors paused the interview to let a participant calm down. However, the interview did not have to be stopped due to distress for any participants. The post-interview debrief was the second way that I tried to mitigate the potential negative effects of the interview. In the debrief, which was largely designed by the surveyors themselves, the surveyors talked casually with respondents about their experiences and the general situation in Zimbabwe. In most of these debriefs they discussed how the respondent had shown herself to be capable of coping with a difficult situation, and that the respondent was not alone. Although I do not think that the debrief techniques was informed by exposure therapy, emphasizing coping ability is part of many exposure therapy protocols and is in line with the theory that a belief in one's self-efficacy has a positive effect on actual ability. Emphasizing "power in numbers" was a technique that VfD developed during its own programs as a way of empowering communities to resist election violence. Finally, the survey manager had a plan to refer people who were re-traumatized as a result of the interview for counseling services with a Harare-based provider of psychosocial support to survivors of political violence. The financial cost of the referrals (transportation and lodging in Harare for rural participants) was to be covered by the researcher and not the research firm to reduce the risk that they would under-report trauma to avoid financial costs. Referral to counseling was ultimately not judged to be necessary for any of the participants.

In addition to these risk-specific procedures, I also used more general management practices to ensure that the safety procotols were followed. Through my interactions with the team and

their manager, I tried to create a strong safety-first culture. First, I stressed to the team and their manager that we would modify the research rather than canceling the contract if something was too risky. I also demonstrated this to them during the preparatory period as we developed protocols and data collection tools together by cutting questions and modifying procedures to make them less risky. Second, I tried to create an open and risk-averse culture with lots of opportunities for communication. During piloting and surveying, we debriefed at the end of each day on risk-related information, among other things. These sessions allowed me to concretely set expectations about the level of risk that I wanted them to take on, and provided a forum for continual improvement of safety practices. To give one example, at one point during piloting one of the surveyors realized that he was interviewing a supporter of the ruling party. The protocol we developed for this scenario was that the surveyor would skip the sensitive questions on the survey, but the surveyor in this case doubted that the interviewee was truly a ruling party supporter and so continued on with the full survey. I sensed that he also wanted to show that he was committed to the research by taking a small risk. I discussed the event with the whole team, asking them to reflect on other possible outcomes to reinforce the idea that this behavior was risky even if it had gone well in this case. We also discussed why this risk was not necessary from a research perspective given the focus of the project. In this case and others, I tried to use open discussion with the surveyors to set a strong "safety-first" culture in which they unequivocally saw that it was in their interest to minimize risks to themselves and the respondents.

C.3 Processes for protecting surveyors

The surveyors faced higher risks than survey participants, and I tried to minimize these while maximizing potential benefits and providing surveyors with the information that they needed to make a decision of whether or not to participate, in the entire project and in specific steps. Ultimately, I found it harder to balance the principles of beneficence and respect for persons with the survey team than with the participants. Although the surveyors were paid for their time and received no "hazard pay" or other compensation for risk, the scarcity of paid work in Zimbabwe in 2015 raised concerns that almost any job offer was hard to refuse. One way that I dealt with this conflict was by stressing to the surveyors that their jobs on the survey were secure and that

they should provide input into the level of sensitivity of the survey questions so that they would face a reasonably low personal risk while doing them. I believe that by showing them that I was happy to modify questions based on their feedback on issues ranging from comprehension to safety made this credible.

I also determined that it was important to "micro-manage" the research in this context. This involved recruiting a relatively small team, forming individual relationships and channels of communication with the surveyors, and communicating frequently during data collection. Although the team had a local management structure, I wanted to make sure that communication did not have to pass through their manager. WhatsApp was a useful tool as it enabled me to communicate with all members of the team even when I was outside of Zimbabwe. I believe that forming personal relationships with the surveyors over lunches and more casual interactions during training, which was possible since the team included just eight people, also helped set up direct communication channels.

Finally, I sought to minimize risks to the surveyors after data collection ended. Although to my knowledge this has not happened in the past, I was concerned that at some point the government might decide to crack down on the local employees of firms involved in the collection of sensitive data. I therefore encoded the surveyors' names in the replication dataset, and have avoided thanking them by name or including pictures of them in any write-ups or presentations of the results. I also checked in with them on subsequent visits to Zimbabwe and via WhatsApp to monitor whether they might have faced any repercussions for their participation in the research. So far they have not.

D Sample characteristics

One concern in this analysis is that the sample of opposition supporters and activists who participated in this study may be different from the average Zimbabwean opposition supporter in ways that limit the generalizability of the study. To assess the extent to which this might be the case, I compare the participants in this study to two nationally representative samples of Zimbabweans. I subset the nationally representative samples to to only those who reveal that they support the opposition because this was a screening criteria for participation in the study.

Table D.1 presents a breakdown of how the sample compares on key demographic measures to 1) opposition supporters in the nationally representative Afrobarometer survey conducted in Nov 2014 and 2) opposition supporters in a nationally representative survey conducted by the World Bank in 2018 as part of a political economy analysis for which I was an advising consultant. Both comparison samples have advantages and disadvantages: the Afrobarometer sample was conducted at around the same time as the present study (6 months prior) under the same general political conditions, but does not ask questions about self efficacy. The World Bank survey was conducted in November 2018 after both of the main parties' founding leaders died or were removed from power, and after a number of elite defections.

Table D.1: Comparison of sample to a nationally representative sample of opposition supporters

	Author's Sample			Afrobarometer Sample[1]			World Bank Sample[2]		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Age	38.22	13.65	533	37.74	13.40	857	38.14	14.55	414
Education	1.73	0.67	532	1.66	0.90	857	1.54	0.69	414
Female	0.51	0.50	534	0.46	0.50	857	0.44	0.50	414
Subjective Poverty: Food	3.58	0.85	532	2.20	1.20	857	1.79	0.99	413
Subjective Poverty: Income	4.16	0.64	532	3.20	1.38	856	3.10	1.15	413
Urban	0.46	0.50	534	0.36	0.48	857			
Closeness to Party	2.47	0.78	527				2.59	0.56	409
SEF: Means	0.25	1.07	532				0.97	1.05	414
SEF: Coping	0.65	0.95	532				1.21	0.98	414
SEF: Resources	-0.02	1.06	532				1.15	1.03	414
SEF: Problems	0.47	1.00	532				1.11	1.00	414

[1] Analysis is based on Round 5 of the nationwide Afrobarometer survey. Respondents who reported supporting the ruling party ZANU-PF or not supporting any party are excluded to recreate a similar screening criteria.
[2] Analysis based on a survey conducted in November 2018 by the World Bank.

Table D.1 shows that the sample for the current study is similar on important demographic features to opposition supporters in both nationally representative samples. The average age and

education level of this sample is quite comparable to the average in both samples, with an average age of 38 and an average education level of just under 2 on a 4-point scale (0=no formal education, 1=completed primary school, 2=completed high school, 3=completed university and/or other post-secondary education). However, this sample has 5-7 percentage points more women (51%) than the national samples (46% in the Afrobarometer and 44% in the World Bank survey), and is somewhat more urban (46% from urban areas vs. 36% in the Afrobarometer).

The most striking difference between this sample and opposition supporters in representative samples is in their responses to the lived or subjective poverty questions. This sample scores considerably higher on measures of subjective poverty that ask about how frequently the respondent has gone without sufficient food or a cash income in the past month. This is particularly obvious from the comparison with the World Bank sample, which was carried out during a currency crisis. In the sample for this study, the mean response on the five-point subjective food poverty scale was 3.6, where a 3 on this scale represents 'several times' having gone without food over the past year, and the mean response on the cash poverty scale was 4.2, where 4 represents having gone without a cash income over the past year 'many times.' By contrast, in the 2014 Afrobarometer and 2018 World Bank survey the averages are 2.2 and 1.8 for food (closest to 'just once or twice') and 3.2 and 3.1 for income (closest to 'several times'). Thus, the sample recruited for this study seems to be substantially poorer than the pool of opposition supporters recruited through a nationally representative survey. This may be driven by the fact that the six neighborhoods selected for the study were quite poor, or by the fact that the winnings from incentivized games offered through another experiment run during the survey were more attractive to poorer individuals.

Turning to the more political and psychological characteristics, there is some evidence that this sample is equally politically active and if anything somewhat lower in self-efficacy than opposition supporters in a representative sample. Here we are restricted to a comparison with the World Bank survey because the Afrobarometer did not ask the same questions. The average participation in this study feels between 'somewhat' and 'very close' to her preferred opposition party (2.5) on a three-point scale where 1 is 'not very close', 2 is 'somewhat close', and 3 is 'very close.' In the World Bank sample, the average is 2.6. This suggests that this sample is in fact not

capturing particularly hard core opposition supporters. On four of the self-efficacy measures that were repeated in the World Bank survey, respondents in this sample score between -0.02 and 0.65 (where responses range from -2 to 2, with higher values representing higher self-efficacy), while on the same four measures in the World Bank survey responses range between 0.97 and 1.21. Given the expectation that poverty should be linked to lower self-efficacy, this difference might be explained by the lower socioeconomic status in the sample for this study.

E Measure validation

E.1 Self-efficacy

1. I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough.
2. If someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I want.
3. I am certain that I can accomplish my goals.
4. I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events.
5. Thanks to my resourcefulness, I can handle unforeseen situations.
6. I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort.
7. I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my coping abilities.
8. When I am confronted with a problem, I can find several solutions.
9. If I am in trouble, I can think of a good solution.
10. I can handle whatever comes my way.

Figure E.1: Correlations between measures in the self-efficacy index



E.2 Political participation

Table E.1: Validation of the propensity to attend an opposition rally

	Dependent variable:					
	Rally Propensity (Scenario)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Opposition Propensity (Hypothetical)	0.72**	0.71**				
	(0.03)	(0.03)				
Past Activism (Self Reported)			0.28**	0.26**		
			(0.04)	(0.04)		
Wristband (Behavioral)					0.59**	0.54**
					(0.10)	(0.10)
Closeness to Party		0.01		0.09*		0.12*
		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.06)
Female		0.01		0.03		0.05
		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.05)
Age		−0.05		−0.22**		−0.17
		(0.06)		(0.07)		(0.09)
Education		0.003		0.03		0.07
		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.05)
Urban Assets		−0.02		−0.07		−0.02
		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.07)
Rural Assets		0.01		0.02		−0.03
		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.06)
Community FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Surveyor FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Emotion Induction FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.26	0.23	0.18	0.19	−0.30	−0.16
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Observations	1,058	1,042	1,062	1,048	714	704
R^2	0.48	0.49	0.25	0.27	0.27	0.29

Standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01
Coefficients are estimated using OLS. The unit of analysis is the scenario, such that each respondent appears twice in the dataset. The outcome variable is the respondent's self-reported propensity to attend an opposition rally after a state-sponsored election violence event described in a hypothetical scenario.

F Correlates of self-efficacy

Table F.1 presents the analysis of the correlates of self-efficacy among this sample of Zimbabwean opposition supporters (Columns 1-4), and in a sample of opposition supporters taken from a nationally representative survey of Zimbabwean adults in November 2018 (Columns 5-8).

Table F.1: Correlates of self-efficacy

	Dependent variable:							
	Self-Efficacy							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Sample	**Author's (2015)**				**World Bank (2018)**			
Female	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.10	−0.09	−0.09	−0.11	−0.15
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Age	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education	0.11*	0.10*	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Urban Assets	−0.09	−0.10	−0.08	−0.07	0.15**	0.18**	0.18**	0.19**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Rural Assets	−0.03	0.002	0.01	−0.02	0.21**	0.21**	0.22**	0.21**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Closeness to Party		0.22**	0.20**	0.17**		0.11	0.10	0.09
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Activism Experience			0.13**	0.09*			−0.04	−0.04
			(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.05)	(0.05)
Violence Exposure				0.18**				0.02
				(0.04)				(0.04)
Membership: Womens Group						0.27	0.27	0.26
						(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Membership: Union						0.16	0.08	0.06
						(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Membership: Savings Group						−0.21	−0.21	−0.23
						(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Membership: Farming Group						−0.001	0.02	0.05
						(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Membership: Religious Group						−0.18	−0.17	−0.16
						(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Membership: Residents Assoc.						0.09	0.10	0.09
						(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Membership: Other Group						1.04*	1.08*	1.02*
						(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.44)
Emotion Induction FE	✓	✓	✓	✓				
Community FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	−0.37*	−0.43*	−0.41*	−0.35*	0.28*	0.24	0.27	0.27
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Observations	526	521	521	520	414	397	395	385
R^2	0.17	0.21	0.23	0.26	0.08	0.11	0.11	0.12

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Coefficients are estimated using OLS. The unit of analysis is the respondent. The outcome is the standardized self efficacy score of the respondent. All continuous independent variables are also standardized. Models include fixed effects by community (in the World Bank data, by province) and the emotion induction treatment from the previous experiment.

G Self-efficacy and reactions to repression

G.1 Disaggregating anger and fear

Table G.1: Anger and fear after repression events

		Anger			Fear		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Scenario Characteristics	Time to Election	−0.04	−0.04	−0.05	0.01	0.01	−0.001
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
	Non-Activist Victim	−0.04	−0.05	−0.04	−0.01	−0.03	−0.02
		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
	Same Province	0.07	0.06	0.08	−0.01	0.001	0.02
		(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
	Violence Severity	0.10**	0.10**	0.10**	0.10**	0.11**	0.11**
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
	Source Credibility	0.01	0.01	0.01	−0.004	0.0003	−0.002
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Respondent Characteristics	Self Efficacy	−0.05	−0.11*	−0.07	−0.16**	−0.21**	−0.18**
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
	Closeness to Party		−0.01	0.03		−0.11*	−0.07
			(0.05)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
	Female		0.04	0.01		0.22**	0.18*
			(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.08)	(0.08)
	Age		−0.02	0.01		−0.09*	−0.06
			(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
	Education		−0.01	0.04		−0.08	−0.04
			(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.04)
	Urban Assets		0.06	0.03		0.04	0.02
			(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)
	Rural Assets		0.03	0.02		0.06	0.05
			(0.06)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)
	Past Activism			−0.31**			−0.29**
				(0.06)			(0.05)
	Past Trauma			−0.01			0.002
				(0.03)			(0.03)
Interactions	Self Efficacy X Time to Election		−0.01	−0.02		−0.01	−0.02
			(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.02)
	Self Efficacy X Non-Activism Victim		0.15*	0.13*		0.19**	0.16**
			(0.06)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)
	Self Efficacy X Same Province		0.02	0.02		0.03	0.03
			(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)
	Self Efficacy X Violence Severity		−0.07*	−0.08*		−0.04	−0.05
			(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
	Self Efficacy X Source Credibility		−0.05*	−0.03		−0.08**	−0.06**
			(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)
	Community Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Surveyor Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Emotion Induction	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Constant	−0.06	−0.02	−0.05	−0.30*	−0.38*	−0.40*
		(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.16)
	Observations	1,057	1,041	1,039	1,057	1,041	1,039
	R^2	0.17	0.19	0.27	0.19	0.23	0.30

Standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01
Coefficients are estimated using OLS. The unit of analysis is the scenario, such that each respondent appears twice in the dataset. The outcome is the respondent's propensity to feel anger (Columns 1-3) and fear (Columns 4-6) after repression events. All continuous independent variables are also standardized.

G.2 Sensitivity to social desirability bias

One concern in this analysis is that the correlation between self-efficacy and hypothetical political participation may be driven by correlated response bias. It is possible that respondents who systematically exaggerate on socially desirable questions would both respond more positively to the self-efficacy battery and exaggerate their propensity to attend an opposition rally after a violent event.

To assess whether this bias is plausible, I use a behavioral measure of pro-opposition action from the same survey to identify people who might be exaggerating their propensity to take risky political action. During the survey, as part of a separate experiment, the interviewers offered respondents a wristband with a non-partisan pro-democracy slogan on it that they were told would 'show their political beliefs.'[3] Table E.1 shows that taking this wristband is strongly related to the hypothetical measures of rally attendance used as outcomes in this article, but there are some respondents who refuse the wristband and yet say that they would attend the rally after state-sponsored violence. Table G.2 presents a cross-tabulation of whether or not a respondent took the wristband, and her responses to the hypothetical violence scenario.

Table G.2: Cross-tabulation of behavioral and hypothetical measures of participation

		Behavioral: Wristband					
		Refused		Accepted		Missing	
		Number	Proportion	Number	Proportion	Number	Proportion
Hypothetical: Rally	Not at all	68	0.34	113	0.22	121	0.34
	A little bit	64	0.32	90	0.17	62	0.18
	Somewhat	31	0.16	44	0.09	41	0.12
	Very	17	0.09	125	0.24	58	0.16
	Sure	18	0.09	144	0.28	68	0.19
	Missing	0	0.00	0	0.00	4	0.01

Table G.2 shows that although there is a clear correlation between the hypothetical rally measure and the behavioral wristband measure, there are some people who refused the wristband but say that they are likely to attend a rally after state-sponsored violence. Given that taking a pro-democracy wristband was a pretty innocuous form of dissent at the time of this survey, we

[3]This outcome is missing for 177 respondents because we ran out of pro-democracy wristbands before the end of the study.

might be skeptical that these respondents are exaggerating their propensity to take action on the hypothetical measure. Thus, we can create a proxy for a respondent's propensity to exaggerate that takes a value of 1 if the respondent refused the wristband but also said that they would attend the rally.

Is self-efficacy correlated with this exaggeration indicator? Table G.3 presents the correlates of exaggerating, with exaggeration defined as reporting that you are at least 'somewhat likely' (Columns 1-3), at least 'very likely' (Columns 4-6), or 'sure' (Columns 7-9). There is no evidence that respondents who score higher on the self-efficacy index are more likely to say that they would attend the rally but refuse to take the wristband.

Table G.3: Correlates of reporting dissent on the hypothetical measure but not taking the wristband

	Dependent variable:								
	Exaggeration Indicator								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Self-Efficacy	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Closeness to Party		−0.02	−0.01		−0.02	−0.02		−0.01	−0.01
		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		−0.02	−0.02		−0.01	−0.01		−0.004	−0.003
		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Female		−0.05	−0.06		−0.01	−0.01		0.001	−0.0001
		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Age		−0.01	−0.01		0.001	0.002		−0.003	−0.002
		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Urban Assets		−0.01	−0.01		0.001	0.001		0.002	0.002
		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Rural Assets		−0.01	−0.01		−0.02	−0.02		−0.02*	−0.02*
		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Activism Experience			−0.02			−0.004			−0.003
			(0.01)			(0.01)			(0.01)
Violence Exposure			−0.02			−0.01			−0.01
			(0.03)			(0.02)			(0.01)
Community Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Surveyor Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Emotion Induction	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.12	0.11	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Observations	710	700	700	710	700	700	710	700	700
R^2	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05

Standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01
Coefficients are estimated using OLS. The unit of analysis is the scenario, such that each respondent appears twice in the dataset. All continuous independent variables are also standardized.

G.3 Disaggregated by party affiliation

Table G.4: Propensity to dissent and emotions after repression events - Interacted with Party ID

		Rally Propensity			Anger-Fear		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Scenario Characteristics	Time to Election	0.03	0.02	0.03	−0.05	−0.04	−0.04
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
	Non-Activist Victim	0.001	0.02	0.02	−0.02	−0.01	−0.01
		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
	Same Province	−0.03	−0.09	−0.11	0.07	0.05	0.05
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
	Violence Severity	−0.12**	−0.13**	−0.13**	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
	Source Credibility	−0.001	−0.005	−0.004	0.01	0.01	0.01
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Respondent Characteristics	Self Efficacy	0.15**	0.13*	0.11*	0.14*	0.14*	0.14*
		(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
	MDC Supporter	−0.01	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.07	0.06
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
	Self Efficacy X MDC Supporter	−0.03	0.02	0.01	−0.05	−0.02	−0.02
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
	Closeness to Party		0.13**	0.09*		0.11*	0.10*
			(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.05)
	Female		−0.25**	−0.23**		−0.19*	−0.18*
			(0.08)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.08)
	Age		0.05	0.03		0.07	0.07
			(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.05)	(0.05)
	Education		0.07	0.04		0.08	0.07
			(0.05)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
	Urban Assets		−0.07	−0.05		−0.002	0.003
			(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)
	Rural Assets		0.002	0.01		−0.03	−0.03
			(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)
	Past Activism			0.25**			0.06
				(0.05)			(0.05)
	Past Trauma			−0.02			−0.01
				(0.04)			(0.03)
Interactions	Self Efficacy X Time to Election		−0.03	−0.02		0.01	0.01
			(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
	Self Efficacy X Non-Activist Victim		−0.02	−0.01		−0.08	−0.07
			(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)
	Self Efficacy X Same Province		−0.08	−0.08		−0.01	−0.01
			(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.08)	(0.08)
	Self Efficacy X Violence Severity		0.01	0.01		−0.01	−0.01
			(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
	Self Efficacy X Source Credibility		0.02	0.01		0.05	0.05
			(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
	Community Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Surveyor Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Emotion Induction	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Constant	0.27	0.30	0.32	0.27	0.38*	0.38*
		(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.19)
	Observations	1,058	1,042	1,040	1,056	1,040	1,038
	R^2	0.20	0.24	0.29	0.06	0.09	0.09

Standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01
Coefficients are estimated using OLS. The unit of analysis is the scenario, such that each respondent appears twice in the dataset. The outcome is the respondent's propensity to attend an opposition rally after a given scenario on a standardized five-point likelihood scale (Columns 1-3) or the amount of anger minus the amount of fear that they say they would feel, where both emotions are measured on four-point scales (Columns 4-6). All continuous independent variables are also standardized.

G.4 All scenario characteristics

Figure G.1: Effects of all categories of scenario characteristics on anger, fear, and post-repression rally attendance



H Deviations from the pre-analysis plan

This research was pre-registered with the EGAP experimental registry on September 29, 2015.

Deviations from the pre-registered protocol are reported here.

Pre-analysis plan	**Deviations**
H1: Subjects will interpret events that occur closer to elections as signaling higher personal risk.	Results presented in Table II. Hypothesis in Theoretical implications section rewritten around interaction of scenario characteristics and self-efficacy.
H2A: Subjects will interpret events in which the victim is more similar or familiar as signaling higher personal risk. This hypothesis implies that events against "a voter" or "a voter you know" will signal higher risk than activists or candidates.	Results presented in Table II. Hypothesis in Theoretical implications section rewritten around interaction of scenario characteristics and self-efficacy.
H2B: Subjects will interpret events in which the victim is a publicly visible figure as costlier for the regime and thus signaling a higher personal risk. If the costliness of the signal is more important than the similarity of the target, then repression of public figures like MP candidates will signal the most risk.	Results presented in Table II. Hypothesis in Theoretical implications section rewritten around interaction of scenario characteristics and self-efficacy.
H3: Subjects will interpret events against people in their own province as signaling higher personal risk than events in other provinces.	Results presented in Table II. Hypothesis in Theoretical implications section rewritten around interaction of scenario characteristics and self-efficacy.
H4: Subjects will interpret more severe events (murder > abduction > beating > threatened) as signaling higher personal risk.	Results presented in Table II. Hypothesis in Theoretical implications section rewritten around interaction of scenario characteristics and self-efficacy.
H5: Subjects will interpret events as signaling higher personal risk if they come from more credible sources (friend > opposition activist > ruling party activist).	Results presented in Table II. Hypothesis in Theoretical implications section rewritten around interaction of scenario characteristics and self-efficacy.
H6: Subjects will not interpret events differently if they are in a state of experimentally-induced fear.	Results presented in Appendix I.
H7: The same characteristics of events that make subjects worried for their own safety will make them angrier.	This hypothesis is tested in Columns 4-6 of Table II and Table G.1.
H8A: Women will be more likely to feel fear and less likely to report anger after repressive events.	Results presented in Table II.
H8B: Women will be less likely to report that they would engage in pro-opposition action after repressive events.	Results presented in Table II. Hypothesis presented as Alternative 3.
H9A: People with lower socioeconomic status will be more likely to feel fear and less likely to report anger after repressive events.	Results presented in Table II.
H9B: People with lower socioeconomic status will be less likely to report that they would engage in pro-opposition action after repressive events.	Results presented in Table II. Hypothesis presented as Alternative 2.
H10A: People with low self-efficacy will be more likely to feel fear and less likely to report anger after repressive events.	Results presented in Table II. Hypothesis presented as Prediction 2.
H10B: People with low self-efficacy will be less likely to report that they would engage in pro-opposition action after repressive events.	Results presented in Table II. Hypothesis presented as Prediction 1.
	The article tests a third alternative hypothesis implied by the literature on electoral violence: voters who are more closely affiliated with the opposition should be less likely to stop supporting the opposition the face of election violence (Alternative 1).
Specifications: Hypotheses will be tested using regression analysis. The first specification will only include the treatment variables and the second will include individual-level covariates including gender, age, an assets index, and education. All will include community fixed effects.	Specifications 1 and 2 include all control variables that were registered plus surveyor fixed effects. Specification 3 adds two additional controls for past exposure to repression and past activism as an additional test of whether demographic characteristics (self-efficacy, gender, SES, party ID) .

I Additional pre-registered analyses

Table I.5 presents a formal test of the pre-registered hypothesis that the fear treatment conducted before these scenarios as part of a separate experiment would not cause participants to interpret the scenario characteristics differently. There is no evidence that the treatment effects of the scenario characteristics varied based on whether participants were assigned to the fear treatment or the control group.

Table I.5: Propensity to dissent and emotions after repression events - Interacted with fear treatment

		Rally Propensity			Anger-Fear		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Scenario Characteristics	Time to Election	0.03	0.03	0.04	−0.05	−0.07	−0.07
		(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
	Non-Activist Victim	0.004	−0.05	−0.07	−0.03	−0.07	−0.08
		(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.10)
	Same Province	−0.03	−0.08	−0.10	0.07	0.20	0.19
		(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.15)
	Violence Severity	−0.12**	−0.13*	−0.12*	−0.03	−0.02	−0.02
		(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
	Source Credibility	0.001	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.03
		(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Respondent Characteristics	Self Efficacy	0.14**	0.12*	0.10*	0.12*	0.11*	0.10
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
	Closeness to Party		0.12**	0.08*		0.10*	0.09*
			(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
	Female		−0.25**	−0.22**		−0.19*	−0.18*
			(0.08)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.08)
	Age		0.04	0.02		0.07	0.07
			(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.05)	(0.05)
	Education		0.07	0.04		0.08	0.07
			(0.05)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
	Urban Assets		−0.07	−0.05		0.001	0.01
			(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)
	Rural Assets		0.01	0.02		−0.04	−0.03
			(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)
	Past Activism			0.25**			0.07
				(0.05)			(0.05)
	Past Trauma			−0.02			−0.02
				(0.05)			(0.03)
Interactions	Fear Treatment X Time to Election		−0.002	−0.002		0.04	0.04
			(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)
	Fear Treatment X Non-Activism Victim		0.14	0.17		0.09	0.09
			(0.12)	(0.11)		(0.12)	(0.12)
	Fear Treatment X Same Province		0.02	0.02		−0.26	−0.26
			(0.15)	(0.14)		(0.17)	(0.17)
	Fear Treatment X Violence Severity		0.01	0.002		−0.02	−0.02
			(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)
	Fear Treatment X Source Credibility		−0.10	−0.07		−0.04	−0.03
			(0.06)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)
	Community Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Surveyor Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Emotion Induction	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Constant	0.26	0.34	0.36	0.28	0.40*	0.39*
		(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.18)
	Observations	1,058	1,042	1,040	1,056	1,040	1,038
	R^2	0.20	0.24	0.29	0.06	0.09	0.09

Standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01
Coefficients are estimated using OLS. The unit of analysis is the scenario, such that each respondent appears twice in the dataset. The outcome is the respondent's propensity to attend an opposition rally after a given scenario on a standardized five-point likelihood scale (Columns 1-3) or the amount of anger minus the amount of fear that they say they would feel, where both emotions are measured on four-point scales (Columns 4-6). All continuous independent variables are also standardized.

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