# Autocratic Client Regimes Dataset, 1946-2010

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# 1 Definition, Operationalization, and Measurement

## 1.1 Definition

An **autocratic client regime** is an authoritarian political regime in a formally independent state whose tenure a foreign sponsor makes serious effort to protect from potential internal or external threats.

## 1.2 Definition of Case Universe

The universe of potential client regimes is based on authoritarian regimes identified by Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz (2018), which includes autocratic regimes in states with populations over one million in 2009. GWF (2018) include authoritarian regimes in office at least one day after January 1, 1946 until December 31, 2010, at which point the data is right censored.

## 1.3 Operationalization

Two main forms of sponsor support are taken as evidence of a "serious effort to protect from potential internal or external threats." In order to be considered a client regime, a foreign sponsor must provide *both* material and organizational support.

### 1.3.1 Material Support

A client regime must receive one of the following types of material support:

1. DIRECT BUDGETARY SUPPORT
    - Examples:
        - Financial assistance to pay state salaries
        - Emergency economic support during domestic unrest
    - Excludes:
        - Official development assistance
        - Anti-poverty programs
        - Private investments
        - Multilateral lending
2. MILITARY AID
    - Examples:
        - Full grant military aid
        - Below market military supplies with generous repayment terms
    - Excludes:
        - Excludes purely commercial arms transactions

### 1.3.2 Organizational Support

In addition to material support, a client regime must receive any of the following forms of organizational assistance from a foreign patron:

1. ORGANIZING AND/OR TRAINING THE COERCIVE APPARATUS
    - Examples:
        - Providing training programs for officers or enlisted soldiers in any military organization[1]
            - Includes training on the territory of the client, in the territory of the patron, or by patron forces in a third country
        - Directly assisting in the allocation of responsibilities and/or structure of any military organization
        - Stationing advisers on the territory of the client and/or embedded within a client military organization
    - Excludes:
        - Multilateral military missions (e.g., under UN authority)
2. INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION
    - Examples:
        - Intelligence sharing on potential internal or external threats, real or alleged
            - Examples:
                - Armed rebel groups
                - Organized domestic opposition groups
                - Foreign state military forces or intelligence networks
                - Plots by regime insiders
3. DIRECT ASSISTANCE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OR DOMESTIC REPRESSION
    - Examples:
        - Deployment of advisers
        - Tactical and strategic advice to regime security forces
4. DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF THE REGIME
    - Examples:
        - Troop deployment into combat positions
            - This includes defensive positions which enable regime forces to concentrate on offensive strikes
        - Air or naval operations against attacking forces

[1] Following convention, a military organization includes regular armed forces ('the army'), paramilitary groups (if regime-controlled), national police, security and intelligence services (Greitens 2016, 21; DeBruin 2018).

### 1.3.3 End of Sponsorship

In order to avoid confusing yearly changes in material deliveries or organizational support for an end of support to a client regime[2], a different criteria is used to identify the cessation of sponsorship than its onset. Sponsorship ceases when material transfers and organizational support cease *as well as* any of the following occurs:

1. The sponsor states that it will no longer support the client regime
2. The sponsor denounces the client regime, calls for its removal, or calls for regime change
3. The client announces a cessation of the relationship, expels any advisers, and rejects further material or organizational support

### 1.3.4 Sponsorship Measure

The autocratic client regimes dataset (ACRD) uses a binary measure of foreign sponsorship.[3] Measures specific for each patron are also included.

## 1.4 Identification Strategy

In order to identify all authoritarian client regimes, 1946-2010, over 500 primary and secondary sources in English and Russian were consulted to establish whether any of the 280 autocratic regimes identified by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018) met the criteria outlined above. Four main archival sources were consulted by the author. (1) The recent publication of the CREST system by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency was consulted extensively. This repository contains over 11 million pages of recently declassified CIA material made available in January 2017. In addition to CIA records, the ACRD dataset relies on information from (2) the Digital National Security Archive, hosted at George Washington University; (3) the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series produced by the Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State; and (4) the Digital Archive of the Cold War International History Project at the Wilson Center. Whenever possible, secondary sources which utilize information from newly available archival sources were used. Of particular interest were secondary sources which drew on materials from foreign archival sources, such as Soviet records or

[2]This is necessary as material transfers and organizational assistance change over the tenure of regimes for reasons unrelated to the depth of foreign support. For example, regimes may not need the high levels of military material necessary in earlier years, or have developed a domestic capacity to produce weaponry. Moreover, with sufficient foreign training military forces may develop a domestic capacity to continue sponsor-style training programs. These changes, however, do not necessarily reflect a decline in foreign support of the regime.

[3]While conceptually foreign support is continuous rather than binary, there are considerable difficulties constructing a cross-case, over-time continuous index. Most importantly, it is difficult to interpret the intensity of military aid to regimes facing drastically different domestic and regional security environments. Levels of military aid must be interpreted relative to the intensity of domestic and external security threats facing a given regime. Therefore, in order to be sensitive to the continuous nature of the phenomenon but avoid collapsing dissimilar international relationships into a binary measure, a high threshold to identify client regimes is used.

Eastern European records, which were consulted extensively.

An empirical approach was taken to identifying patrons. Rather than beginning with a set of patrons and identifying all regimes they supported, the dataset was generated by working from each autocratic regime to establish what, if any, foreign support was available. This generated the following patrons: the United States, the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, the People's Republic of China, Vietnam, Russia, Yugoslavia, and Egypt. In cases in which multiple foreign states supported the regime, the principal source of organizational and material support was identified as the patron. Once a regime was determined to have meet the criteria for the onset of sponsorship, the trajectory of the patron-client relationship was studied to identify when, if ever, sponsorship ceased. Transparency of coding decisions is treated with the utmost importance. Every case includes substantial justification and links to exact primary and secondary source identification. For any questions on the dataset, please contact the author at `aecasey@umich.edu`.

## 1.5 Variable Descriptions

The dataset is available in regime-year format as a .csv file on the *World Politics* section of the Harvard Dataverse. Below is a description of the variables included in the dataset in the order they appear in the .csv file.

- *cowcode*
  - Country identification code provided by the Correlates of War (COW). Accessed through Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014.
- *year*
  - Year. Dataset is in regime-year format and covers period 1946-2010. The data is right censored as of December 31, 2010, and is not left censored. Therefore, any regime in power after January 1, 1946 contains information on the start of the regime as well as pre-1946 sponsorship. Regime start and end date information is from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014.
- *gwf_casename*
  - Autocratic regime case name from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014.
- *startdate*
  - Autocratic regime start date (DD/MM/YYYY) from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014.
- *enddate*
  - Autocratic regime end date (DD/MM/YYYY) or right-censor from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014.

- *spell*
  - Autocratic regime spell (years of continuous autocratic rule) from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014.
- *duration*
  - Autocratic regime duration count variable from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014.
- *gwf_fail*
  - Binary measure of autocratic regime collapse in a given year from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014.
- *gwf_fail_subs*
  - Type of subsequent regime from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014. See their codebook for coding rules.
- *gwf_fail_type*
  - Type of regime failure from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014. See their codebook for coding rules.
- *gwf_fail_type*
  - Ordinal measure of violence during regime collapse from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014. See their codebook for coding rules.
- *jan1leader*
  - Autocratic regime leader as of January 1 in a given year from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014.
- *duration_ldr*
  - Autocratic regime leader duration count variable from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018.
- *ldr_fail*
  - Binary measure of autocratic regime leader collapse in a given year from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018.
- *ldr_fail_reg_fail*
  - Variable generated by author measuring whether a leader lost power along with the regime using information from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018.
- *ldr_fail_reg_survive*

  - Variable generated by author measuring whether a leader lost power but the regime survived using information from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018.

- *spons*
  - Binary measure of whether the regime received any foreign sponsorship in a given year. Sources for this variable are provided in the detailed case descriptions in this codebook.

- *any_spons*
  - Binary measure of whether the regime received any foreign sponsorship at any point in regime tenure. For example, if a regime received foreign sponsorship starting in 1955, but took power in 1952, this variable takes a value of 1 for the entire regime tenure beginning in 1952. If this same regime then lost sponsorship in 1960, this variable would continue to take a value of 1 for the entire course of regime tenure. Sources for this variable are provided in the detailed case descriptions in this codebook.

- *satellite*
  - Binary measure of whether regime is widely considered a 'satellite' of the Soviet Union. This list includes Bulgaria 44-90, Czechoslovakia 48-89, Germany, East 49-90, Hungary 47-90, Mongolia 21-93, Poland 44-89, and Romania 45-89.

- *spons_spell*
  - Sponsorship spell. This captures years of consecutive sponsorship for a given state (i.e., if multiple regimes sponsored consecutively this variable captures the entire period of sponsorship for these multiple consecutive regimes).

- *duration_spons*
  - Count variable for number of continuous years of foreign sponsorship for a given regime.

- *ptcoupsuccess*
  - Binary variable that captures whether an autocratic regime experienced a successful military coup in a given year (if multiple coups that year takes value of 1 for entire year). Source: Powell and Thyne 2011.

- *ptcoupfail*
  - Binary variable that captures whether an autocratic regime experienced a failed military coup in a given year (if multiple failed coups that year takes value of 1 for entire year). Source: Powell and Thyne 2011.

- *regfailcoup*

  - Author-generated binary variable that captures whether an autocratic regime experienced a regime-ending military coup in a given year using information from Powell and Thyne 2011 and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014.

- *ldrcoup*

  - Author-generated binary variable that captures whether an autocratic regime experienced a leader-removing military coup in a given year using information from Powell and Thyne 2011 and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014.

- *american*

  - Binary measure of whether the regime received American sponsorship in a given year. Sources for this variable are provided in the detailed case descriptions in Section 3.

- *russian*

  - Binary measure of whether the regime received Russian sponsorship in a given year (note that this does *not* include Soviet sponsorship). Sources for this variable are provided in the detailed case descriptions in Section 8.

- *soviet*

  - Binary measure of whether the regime received Soviet sponsorship in a given year. Sources for this variable are provided in the detailed case descriptions in Section 2.

- *prc_spons*

  - Binary measure of whether the regime received Chinese sponsorship in a given year. Sources for this variable are provided in the detailed case descriptions in Section 6.

- *british*

  - Binary measure of whether the regime received British sponsorship in a given year. Sources for this variable are provided in the detailed case descriptions in Section 5.

- *french*

  - Binary measure of whether the regime received French sponsorship in a given year. Sources for this variable are provided in the detailed case descriptions in Section 4.

- *viet_spons*

  - Binary measure of whether the regime received Vietnamese sponsorship in a given year. Sources for this variable are provided in the detailed case descriptions in Section 7.

- *yugo_spons*
  - Binary measure of whether the regime received Yugoslav sponsorship in a given year. Sources for this variable are provided in the detailed case descriptions in Section 9.

- *egy_spons*
  - Binary measure of whether the regime received Egyptian sponsorship in a given year. Sources for this variable are provided in the detailed case descriptions in Section 10.

- *comm_spons*
  - Binary measure of whether the regime received sponsorship from a communist sponsor in a given year. Communist sponsors include the Soviet Union, China, Yugoslavia, and Vietnam.

- *coldwar*
  - Binary measure of Cold War (1946-89).

- *ally*
  - Binary variable which codes clients who maintained formal mutual defense pacts with patrons in a given year by using information from Gibler 2009.

- *commissar*
  - Binary variable which takes a value of 1 if a regime "party imposes commissars, party advisors, or some kind of party committee on military units or garrisons" in a given year using information from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018.

- *cbcount*
  - Variable is a count of the number of security forces with the potential to counterbalance the military (e.g., independent of military control and deployed with access to the capital) in a given year from DeBruin 2018.

- *pcount*
  - Variable is a count of the total number of security forces a state employs outside the regular military in a given year from DeBruin 2018.

- *party*

  - Party-led regime measure from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014.

- *personalist*
  - Personalist regime measure from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014.
- *military*
  - Military-led regime measure from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014.
- *monarchy*
  - Monarchy-led regime measure from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014.
- *communist*
  - Communist regime measure from Svolik 2012.
- *gdcap*
  - GDP per capita from Vogt et al. 2015, accessed via Wright frth.
- *gdcapl*
  - GDP per capita lagged one year from Vogt et al. 2015, accessed via Wright frth.
- *logoill*
  - Oil revenue per capita from Vogt et al. 2015, accessed via Wright frth.
- *e_civil_war*
  - Civil war measure from Haber and Menaldo 2011, accessed via Coppedge et al. 2018. This variable captures whether a regime participated in at least one intra-state war with at least 1,000 battle deaths in a given year.
- *supportparty*
  - Variable which captures whether ruling regime maintained a support party in a given year from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018.
- *seizure_coup*
  - Variable which captures whether regime originally came to power through a military coup from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018.
- *seizure_rebel*
  - Variable which captures whether regime originally came to power through an armed insurgency/rebellion from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018.

- *seizure_rebel*
  - Variable which captures whether regime originally came to power through an elections from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018.
- *ldr_group_military*
  - Variable which captures whether regime directly led by military officers from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018.

# 2 Soviet Client Regimes

## 2.1 Afghanistan 1978-91

COW CODE: 700.
REGIME TENURE: 1978-92.
LEADERS: Taraki, Amin, Karmal, Najibullah.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP[4]: Yes.
END: Sponsorship until December 1991.

OVERVIEW: The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) had a longstanding relationship with the Soviet Union when its members seized power in a military coup détat in April 1978.[5] The Soviet Union quickly recognized the new regime and lent immediate economic and military support (Korgun 2004, 408; Khristoforov 2016, 217). As Moscow had already been providing some training to the Afghan army before the coup, advisers were immediately present and their numbers quickly expanded (Giustozzi 2015, 30, 104; Khristoforov 2016, 211). The regime also quickly received Soviet support in creating a variety of security services, including the secret police (KhAD) and the *Sarandoy* security forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Khristoforov 2009, 20-21; Oliker 2011, 25; Khristoforov 2016, 295-96). The Soviet Union embedded 5,000 or so advisers with the *Sarandoy* and KGB advisers were embedded in KhAD (Oliker 2011, 28; Khristoforov 2016, 21). The Soviet Union also helped the regime create a system of political commissars (Giustozzi 2015, 33, 104; Khristoforov 2016, 218). In response to growing instability, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 in the largest Soviet military engagement since WWII (Kalinovsky 2011, 24). In March 1980, the Red Army began offensive operations against armed opposition groups (Giustozzi 2015, 61). "All the military equipment utilized by the Afghan army was donated or sold by the Soviets and mostly paid with Soviet aid money" (Giustozzi 2015, 104). During the war, Soviet advisers penetrated units up to the regimental level (Giustozzi 2015, 105). The Soviets announced a decision to withdraw combat troops in 1988 which was completed February 1989. However, material assistance continued until August 1991, and diplomatic support until the formal collapse of the USSR in December 1991 (Kalinovsky 2011, 178-78).

## 2.2 Albania 1948-61

COW CODE: 339.
REGIME TENURE: 1944-91.

[4]This captures whether or not the organization that came to power received assistance from the patron prior to seizing power

[5]PDPA leaders Nur Muhammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal each established relationships with the KGB in the 1950s (Mitrokhin 2002, 17-18). The Soviet Union gave assistance to the party since its formation in 1965 (Mitrokhin 2002, 18,20; Khristoforov 2016, 55-56). However, Moscow did not organize the coup and was surprised when it occurred (Mitrokhin 2002, 26; Westad 2005, 302). See also National Intelligence Daily Cable; Central Intelligence Agency; 04/28/1978; Top Secret; Declassified 03/08/2007; CREST NO. CIA-RDP79T00975A030600010102-8; General CIA Records.

LEADERS: Hoxha.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: No.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: No (prior Yugoslav sponsorship).
END: Break in relations led by Albania in 1961.

OVERVIEW: After the 1948 Albania-Yugoslav split (see Section 9.1), Tirana sought an alliance with Moscow (Prifti 1978, 78). From 1948-60, "Albania's army was trained, equipped, and supplied by Moscow" (Prifti 1978, 201). In 1949, the USSR agreed to send KGB advisers to assist the Albanian secret police (*Sigurimi*) and in 1952 Albanian security forces began to travel to the Soviet Union for training (Mehilli 2017, 50). However, by 1960 tensions rose and in June 1960 the Soviet Union was accused of backing a coup attempt and by the spring of 1961 military agreements were annulled and relations were broken entirely in December (Prifti 1978, 79-80, 202-4).

## 2.3 Angola 1975-91

COW CODE: 540.
REGIME TENURE: 1975- .
LEADERS: Neto, Dos Santos.
INSTALLED: Assisted.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: Removal upon collapse of the Soviet Union.

OVERVIEW: Moscow's support of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) began in 1964 but was reduced in 1973 only to resume in large quantities of military aid in December 1974 (Somerville 1986, 33; Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005, 445, 447, 450; Zubok 2009, 252). The MPLA came to power with direct Soviet military assistance and intervention by Cuban troops (Albright 1980, 35; Somerville 1984, 294; Light 1992, 23; Gleijeses 2006; Schmidt 2013, 25). Moscow airlifted in over 12,000 Cuban soldiers to defend the regime from November 1975 to January 1976 (Schmidt 2013, 98). The MPLA received extensive assistance during its civil war after 1975 from the Soviet Union (Somerville 1984, 297; Blasier 1987, 115; Katz 1989, 32; Shariy 2008a, 67; Shariy 2008c, 21-22). "Soviet and East German advisers played a major role in the creation of Angola's police and intelligence forces."[6] Soviet military advisers were present as early as 1975, and the Soviet advisory presence penetrated "every aspect of the Angolan military."[7] Soviet aid in the post-1975 period rose to $400 million (Valenta 1980, 115). In May 1977, Cuban forces were instrumental in putting down

[6] "Supporting Allies Under Insurgent Challenge: The Soviet Experience in Africa." Research Paper; Office of Soviet Analysis and Office of Global Issues; Central Intelligence Agency; 02/01/1988; Secret; Declassified 08/31/2012; CREST No. CIA-RDP07C00121R001000530001-0; General CIA Records. This analysis is confirmed by evidence from Soviet archives. See Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005, 454.

[7] "Sub-Saharan Africa: A Growing Soviet Military Presence." Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 01/12/1985; Top Secret; Declassified 12/01/2010; CREST No. CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1; NGA Records.

a coup attempt (Somerville 1984, 289-99). Military aid increased under Gorbachev, from $775 million in 1975 to $1.5 billion in 1987 (Katz 1989, 47-48). Between 1,100 and 1,200 Soviet military advisers remained in Angola as late as July 1990.[8] Upon the collapse of the USSR sponsorship ceased as the Russian Federation did not continue support.

## 2.4 Bulgaria 1944-89

COW CODE: 335.
REGIME TENURE: 1944-90.
LEADERS: Dimitrov, Chervenkov, Zhivkov.
INSTALLED: Yes.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: 1989.

OVERVIEW: During WWII, members of Bulgarian Communist Party took part in armed resistance against the Nazi client regime in Sofia (Schopflin 1993, 55). When the Red Army entered Bulgaria in September 1944, Bulgarian communists and their allies in the Fatherland Front seized power (Brown 2009, 172). With control over the ministry of the interior (and thus the police) and with the help of Red Army soldiers in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Communist Party came to dominate the Front (Naimark 2010, 177; McAdams 2017, 256; Westad 2017, 80). In Bulgaria like elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Soviet military missions oversaw the reorganization of military forces, embedded commanders, advisers, and technicians within the armed forces and defense ministries, and purged pre-communist officer corps.[9] In the first few months of 1989, Gorbachev and the Politburo decided not to take military action in Eastern Europe if communist governments were to face collapse (Brown 2009, 523; Kramer 2011, 812; McAdams 2017, 446-47).[10] During the party coup which removed Todor Zhivokov and replaced him with Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov on November 10, 1989, Soviet President Gorbachev informed Mladenov that "This is entirely your business. You have to sort it out yourselves" (Quoted in Barany 2016, 118).

## 2.5 China 1949-60

COW CODE: 710.
REGIME TENURE: 1949- .
LEADER: Mao.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.

[8] "National Intelligence Daily." Director of Central Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 07/26/1990; Top Secret; Declassified 09/11/2009; FOIA No. 0005301308; FOIA Collection.

[9] "Soviet Control of the European Satellites and Their Contribution to Soviet Power." NIE-33; Central Intelligence Agency; 10/26/1951; Top Secret; Declassified 09/28/1998; CREST No. CIA-RDP79R01012A000900020004-5; General CIA Records. See also Johnson 1981, 2, 7-8.

[10] Barany notes that this was made official by July 1989 (2016, 102).

END: 1960.

OVERVIEW: The USSR provided aid to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since its formation (Jun 1998, 48). After the Soviet withdrawal from Manchuria in 1946, Mao and the CCP kept in close contact with Moscow "on all important questions of military or political strategy" but the CCP was "unable to secure any major long-term commitments from the Soviets to aid [the] revolution" (Westad 1998, 8). Soviet material assistance was "very limited" through the fall of 1948, though Soviet logistic support and air defense "did provide a critical edge to the PLA's [People's Liberation Army's] war effort" (Westad 1998, 8). In late 1949 after seizing national power the newly established PRC (People's Republic of China) held a summit with the USSR which provided Beijing with an explicit Soviet commitment to defend the PRC from Japan and its allies (Westad 1998, 11). In 1950, a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance was signed (Jersild 2014, 2). During the Korean War (1950-53) Moscow provided "substantial support for Chinese and North Korean operations" and the Soviet air force provided air cover for the PLA (Westad 1998, 13). After 1954, military, economic, and technical aid increased substantially (Westad 1998, 15-17; Jersild 2014). From 1946-60, total Soviet economic assistance may have been as high as $3.4 billion (Jersild 2014, 38). After escalating tensions, the Sino-Soviet split occurred by 1960, ending the close relationship and ushering in a period of considerable animosity and conflict (Freidman 2015).

## 2.6 Cuba 1960-91

COW CODE: 40.
REGIME TENURE: 1959- .
LEADER: Castro.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: No.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: No.
END: Sponsorship until collapse of USSR.

OVERVIEW: The Soviet Union did not aid Fidel Castro's 26th of July movement in its violent struggle against the Batista regime and the Soviet-backed Cuban Communist Party contributed "little or nothing" to the revolution (Blasier 1987, 103).[11] Sixteen months after seizing power, ties between Moscow and Havana began (Blasier 1987, 107). While first deliveries of Soviet aid were "quite modest" (Goldenberg 1975, 592; Daniel 1964, 345-46), on July 9, 1960, CPSU General Secretary Khrushchev indicated that Cuba would be defended by Soviet rocketry if challenged (Maurer 2013, 324). Soviet aid increased substantially, and contributed 15-20% of Cuban domestic product (Blasier 1991, 92; Wiarda 1989, 102). Soviet military aid resulted in Cuba's construction of the largest military in Latin America (Adams 1992, 102) and by 1989 Havana was received $11 million per day in military assistance alone (Starr 1991, 179).[12] The U.S. estimated that in the mid-1980s Soviet aid amounted to ap-

[11] See also Rabe 2016, 60.

[12] In 1984, the CIA estimated that the Soviet Union stationed between 7,000 and 9,000 military personnel in Cuba and provided around $500 million a year in military assistance since 1977. "The USSR and the Third World." National Intelligence Estimate; NIE 11-10/2-84; Director of Central Intelligence; Central Intelligence

proximately $5 billion annually (Blasier 1991, 94), "more than the United States provides in assistance to any other country in the world" (Wiarda 1989, 108).[13] Until the end of the Cold War the USSR stationed "Soviet troops as a bulwark against external attack by the United States" and Moscow trained and equipped the Cuban military (Rubinstein 1988, 215; Blasier 1987, 103, 113, 129-30; Zubok 2009, 308).

## 2.7 Czechoslovakia 1948-89

COW CODE: 315.
REGIME TENURE: 1948-89.
LEADERS: Gottwald, Novotny, Dubcek, Husak, Jakes.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: 1989.

OVERVIEW: In February 1948, led by Klement Gottwald, the Czechoslovak Communist Party seized power in a coup (Brown 2009, 155; Naimark 2010, 187; Haslam 2011, 100). The Soviet Union helped the regime create the Ministry of State Security which engaged in "counterintelligence" in the army (Shearer and Khaustov 2015, 283-84). In Czechoslovakia like elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Soviet military missions oversaw the reorganization of military forces, embedded commanders, advisers, and technicians within the armed forces and defense ministries, and purged pre-communist officer corps.[14] While Red Army troops had left in 1945, they returned in 1968 to quash the Prague uprising and remained until 1991 (Barany 2016, 101). In the first few months of 1989, Gorbachev and the Politburo decided not to take military action in Eastern Europe if communist governments were to face collapse (Brown 2009, 523; Kramer 2011, 812; McAdams 2017, 446-47).[15] Gorbachev did not involve himself in the collapse of Czechoslovak communism, "and the party leaders in Prague were clearly aware that there was no use asking for his support to save their rule" (Barany 2016, 120). All 75,000 Red Army soldiers ceased activities "to avoid even the appearance of partiality" (Barany 2016, 120).

## 2.8 East Germany 1949-89

COW CODE: 265.
REGIME TENURE: 1949-90.
LEADERS: Ulbricht, Honecker.
INSTALLED: Yes.

Agency; 09/19/1984; Secret; Declassified 08/05/2010; CREST NO. CIA-RDP87T00126R000600630007-8; General CIA Records.

[13] See also Blasier 1987, 123; Adams 1992, 80.

[14] "Soviet Control of the European Satellites and Their Contribution to Soviet Power." NIE-33; Central Intelligence Agency; 10/26/1951; Top Secret; Declassified 09/28/1998; CREST No. CIA-RDP79R01012A000900020004-5; General CIA Records. See also Johnson 1981, 2, 7-8.

[15] Barany notes that this was made official by July 1989 (2016, 102).

IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: 1989.

OVERVIEW: "The Soviets formed three German Communist 'initiative groups' in Moscow to follow the Red Army troops into occupied Germany in April and May of 1945" (Naimark 2010, 180). During Soviet occupation, Moscow helped create the Ministry for State Security (MfS, or *Stasi*) (Bruce 2003, 12-13, 16-17; Naimark 1995, 356, 362-63). The Soviets also helped create the ruling party, the Socialist Unity Party (SED) (Brown 2009, 175). In East Germany like elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Soviet military missions oversaw the reorganization of military forces, embedded commanders, advisers, and technicians within the armed forces and defense ministries, and purged pre-communist officer corps[16] Soviet troops were stationed in Germany from 1945 until 1993 (Barany 2016, 101). In June 1953, Soviet forces directly intervened to put down popular unrest over collectivization and poor living standards (Greitens 2016, 278). In the first few months of 1989, Gorbachev and the Politburo decided not to take military action in Eastern Europe if communist governments were to face collapse (Brown 2009, 523; Kramer 2011, 812; McAdams 2017, 446-47).[17] When Honecker and other East German communist elites sought Soviet support for "a full-scale crackdown" they received negative responses from their Soviet counterparts "'through all available channels" and all "380,000 Soviet troops in the GDR received orders to stay in their barracks" (Kramer 2011, 842).[18]

## 2.9 Egypt 1955-76

COW CODE: 651.
REGIME TENURE: 1952- .
LEADERS: Nasser, Sadat.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: No.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: No.
END: 1976 (by Egypt).

OVERVIEW: The USSR was not involved in the Free Officers coup of 1952 which deposed the British-backed monarchy (see Section 5.1) and initially dismissed the regime as reactionary and pro-U.S. (Golan 1990, 44).[19] However, by 1955 relations warmed and Egypt was the recipient of an early Soviet arms deal (through Czechoslovakia) worth $250 million (Golan 1990, 44-45).[20] During the Khrushchev era, Egypt received almost one quarter of all Soviet economic aid distributed abroad (Ferris 2008, 26). Moscow provided well over $1 billion in

[16] "Soviet Control of the European Satellites and Their Contribution to Soviet Power." NIE-33; Central Intelligence Agency; 10/26/1951; Top Secret; Declassified 09/28/1998; CREST No. CIA-RDP79R01012A000900020004-5; General CIA Records. See also Johnson 1981, 2, 7-8.

[17] Barany notes that this was made official by July 1989 (2016, 102).

[18] See also Barany 2016, 117.

[19] See also Belyakova 2017, 7.

[20] See also "*Podpisannoye m. Khrushchevim pis'mo poslano v Kair dlya vrucheniya adresatu 12.4.59 g.* [Letter from Khrushchev to Cairo on March 13, 1959]" *Rossiyskiy gosudarstvenniy arkhiv noveyshey istorii.*

military equipment between 1955-1964.[21] The USSR also provided strong diplomatic support to Egypt during the 1956 Suez crisis.[22] In 1966 Moscow was granted rights to Egyptian ports and airfields (Golan 1990, 56).[23] In March 1970, Soviet air units directly engaged Israeli jets in a defense of Egypt (Rubinstein 1988, 142-43). In 1971 Moscow and Cairo signed a Friendship Treaty (Golan 1990, 78). By the early 1970s there were over 20,000 Soviet advisers in Egypt and Soviet air personnel ran combat missions (Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005, 152).[24] However, in 1972 Sadat ordered the expulsion of most Soviet advisers.[25] Soviet support continued during the Yom Kippur War, despite the cool relations, and arms deliveries continued (Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005, 158). Finally, in 1976 Sadat unilaterally denounced the Friendship Treaty and ties ceased (Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005, 163).[26]

## 2.10 Ethiopia 1977-91

COW CODE: 530.
REGIME TENURE: 1974-91.
LEADER: Mengistu.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: No.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: No.
END: Sponsorship until collapse.

OVERVIEW: Moscow played no role in the coup following the mass mobilization against the Selassie regime in 1974 which installed the Derg[27] in power, a group that initially sought support from the United States (Armstrong 2013, 195). After relations with Washington

F. 52. H. S. Khrushchev. Op. 1. D. 635. L. 124-144. Text provided in Belyakova 2017, 93-108.

[21] "The Soviet Union and Egypt." Special Report; Office of Current Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; OCI No. 0330/64A; 05/08/1964; Secret; Declassified 04/27/2006; CREST No. CIA-RDP79-00927A004400110002-2. Importantly, much of this assistance was grant aid. See "Communist Military Deliveries to Egypt, 1955-1973." 07/25/1974; Secret; Declassified 08/17/2005; CREST No. CIA-RDP85T00875R001900030037-5; General CIA Records.

[22] "*Podpisannoye m. Khrushchevim pis'mo poslano v Kair dlya vrucheniya adresatu 12.4.59 g.* [Letter from Khrushchev to Cairo on March 13, 1959]" *Rossiyskiy gosudarstvenniy arkhiv noveyshey istorii.* F. 52. H. S. Khrushchev. Op. 1. D. 635. L. 124-144. Text provided in Belyakova 2017, 93-108.

[23] See also "The Soviet Military Presence in Egypt." Intelligence Report; Office of Political Research; Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 02/01/1975; Top Secret; Declassified 06/10/2004; CREST No. CIA-RDP86T00608R000600150002-9; General CIA Records.

[24] The CIA also noted a Soviet intervention in 1970 but assessed the Russian advisor level lower at 15,000 in 1971. See "The Soviet Military Presence in Egypt." Intelligence Report; Office of Political Research; Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 02/01/1975; Top Secret; Declassified 06/10/2004; CREST No. CIA-RDP86T00608R000600150002-9; General CIA Records.

[25] "The Soviet Military Presence in Egypt." Intelligence Report; Office of Political Research; Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 02/01/1975; Top Secret; Declassified 06/10/2004; CREST No. CIA-RDP86T00608R000600150002-9; General CIA Records.

[26] See also "Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East." Research Paper; Office of Soviet Analysis; Central Intelligence Agency; 12/05/1986; Secret; Declassified 09/02/2011; CREST No. CIA-RDP87T00787R000400440001-4; General CIA Records.

[27] "Committee" in Amharic, the Derg is short for the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army.

soured, and with Moscow's implicit[28] approval, Mengistu seized power in a bloody palace coup in February 1977 and Soviet aid increased substantially (Clapham, 1988, 61). The USSR ultimately provided the Derg with over $9.5 billion in arms (Lefebvre 1991, 32, 42).[29] In the 1977-78 Ogaden War against Somalia, the Soviets provided massive amounts of weapons and advisers, as well as logistical support for the deployment of tens of thousands of Cuban troops (Ottaway 1980, 123; Ottaway and Ottaway 1986, 155). With Soviet support, the Ethiopian army became sub-Saharan Africa's largest, with over 250,000 regular troops and advanced MiG-23 jets (Ottaway and Ottaway 1986, 173; Tiruneh 1993, 344; Ayele 2014).[30] The Soviet Union and its allies "extensively reshaped the Ethiopian intelligence apparatus"[31], including training the Ethiopian Ministry of National and Public Security (MNPS)[32], the Military Security Main Department (MSMD) (which "acted as a kind of secret police within the armed forces") (Mesfin 2010, 46) and the Military Intelligence Department (Mesfin 2010, 50-51). Moscow also provided assistance in creating the ruling party.[33] Soviet military advisers were "integrated into all elements of the Ethiopian Army from army down through brigade level."[34] During a July 1988 visit to Moscow, CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev informed Mengistu that the USSR's "unqualified economic and military commitment to Ethiopia could not continue much further" and that Ethiopia needed to liberalize (Tiruneh 1993, 358). Moscow also declined to grant additional military deliveries, though it maintained the existing agreements which expired in 1991 (Tiruneh 1993, 359). Military supplies continued to flow to the regime until it collapsed in May 1991 (Tiruneh 1993, 358, 365).

## 2.11 Hungary 1947-89

COW CODE: 310.
REGIME TENURE: 1947-90.
LEADERS: Rakosi, Kadar, Grosz.
INSTALLED: Yes.

[28] Some analysts ascribe a stronger role to the Soviets in the coup. Clapham writes that "[o]n the day after the killing of Teferi Banti, Mengistu held meetings with the Soviet and Cuban ambassadors, who expressed their support - a clear indication that they had already decided to back him against his rivals in the Derg" (1988, 61).

[29] Some estimates are higher, at $11 billion, or the total GDP of Ethiopia in 1990 (Lefebvre 1991, 32, 42).

[30] See also "Ethiopia: The Impact of Soviet Military Assistance." Research Paper; Office of African and Latin American Analysis; Central Intelligence Agency; 01/06/1983; Secret; Declassified 1999; FOIA No. 0000496797; The Princeton Collection.

[31] "The USSR and the Third World." National Intelligence Estimate; NIE 11-10/2-84; Director of Central Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 09/19/1984; Secret; Declassified 08/05/2010; CREST NO. CIA-RDP87T00126R000600630007-8; General CIA Records.

[32] "Supporting Allies Under Insurgent Challenge: The Soviet Experience in Africa." Research Paper; Office of Soviet Analysis and Office of Global Issues; Central Intelligence Agency; 02/01/1988; Secret; Declassified 08/31/2012; CREST No. CIA-RDP07C00121R001000530001-0; General CIA Records.

[33] "Ethiopia: Institutionalizing a Marxist-Leninist State." Intelligence Assessment; Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 04/01/1986; Secret; Declassified 04/04/2011; CREST No. CIA-RDP88T00768R000100110001-3; General CIA Records. See also Clapham 1988, 77.

[34] "Sub-Saharan Africa: A Growing Soviet Military Presence." Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 01/12/1985; Top Secret; Declassified 12/01/2010; CREST No. CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1; NGA Records.

IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: 1989.

OVERVIEW: "The Soviets created a provisional government that was to take power in the wake of the Red Army's advance into Hungary." (Naimark 2010, 180-81). In Hungary like elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Soviet military missions oversaw the reorganization of military forces, embedded commanders, advisers, and technicians within the armed forces and defense ministries, and purged pre-communist officer corps.[35] The new army was "controlled by Soviet military attaches. . .Russian advisers operated even at the regimental level" (Kovrig 1979, 264).[36] In the first few months of 1989, Gorbachev and the Politburo decided not to take military action in Eastern Europe if communist governments were to face collapse (Brown 2009, 523; Kramer 2011, 812; McAdams 2017, 446-47).[37]

## 2.12 Mongolia 1921-91

COW CODE: 712.
REGIME TENURE: 1921-93.
LEADERS: S. Danzan, Bodoo, Dambadorj, A. Danzan, Dambadorj, Badrakh, Choibalsan, Tsedenbal, Batmonh.
INSTALLED: Yes.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: Removal upon collapse of USSR.

OVERVIEW: After being initially rebuffed in its request for assistance from the nascent Bolshevik regime, the leaders of the newly formed Mongolian People's Party (MPP) began to receive assistance after the White Army general Baron von Ungern-Sternberg invaded Outer Mongolia (Sunderland 2014, 203-4). Starting February 1921, the Bolsheviks began to aid the MPP in its party operations as well as in creating a new army (Kaplonski 2014, 48).[38] In July 1921, with the help of some 8,000 Red Army soldiers, the MPP seized power in Urga (present day Ulaanbaatar) (Palmer 2008, 206).[39] Red Army troops left Mongolia in 1925 (Roshchin 1999, 106), but Soviet advisers remained stationed in Mongolia and Comintern representatives sat in on party and government meetings (Kaplonski 2014, 48). Soviet advisers also staffed the Mongolian secret police (Sandag and Kendall 2000, 3). A Soviet general was the chief of the Mongolian army general staff (Worden and Savada 1991, 230), and Soviet pilots trained Mongolian counterparts and even served in the Mongolian

[35] "Soviet Control of the European Satellites and Their Contribution to Soviet Power." NIE-33; Central Intelligence Agency; 10/26/1951; Top Secret; Declassified 09/28/1998; CREST No. CIA-RDP79R01012A000900020004-5; General CIA Records. See also Johnson 1981, 2, 7-8.
[36] See also Gitz 1992, 17.
[37] Barany notes that this was made official by July 1989 (2016, 102).
[38] See also Palmer 2008, 178.
[39] See also Roshchin 1999, 14; Rupen 1979, 29. Mendee puts the number of Red Army troops higher at around 13,000 (2013).

airforce.[40] After a large uprising in 1932 challenged the regime in response to its radical policies toward collectivization and violent assault on the Buddhist clergy, the Soviet Union intervened on behalf of the regime (Kuzmin and Oyuunchimeg 2015, 52-53). During the 1930s, Soviet officers served as unit advisers and commanders (Worden and Savada 1991, 230). Soviet troops left and reentered Mongolia periodically throughout the Cold War[41], but in July 1986 CPSU General Security Gorbachev announced the withdrawal of Some Soviet forces from Mongolia and made plans to withdraw most of its military contingent by 1990.[42]

## 2.13 Mozambique 1975-91

COW CODE: 541.
REGIME TENURE: 1975-.
LEADERS: Machel, Chissano.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: 1989.

OVERVIEW: Frelimo was founded in 1962 and began its guerrilla campaign against Portuguese colonial rule in 1964 (Derluguian 2012, 81-82)[43] The USSR did not provide very much assistance to Frelimo in its early insurgency, though it did begin to provide weapons and training by the early 1970s.[44] After Frelimo seized power in 1975, the U.S.S.R. provided almost all of the military equipment used by the regime, increasing support after the onset

[40] "Mongolian People's Republic: Military Information: Disposition of Troops; Ammunition Factories." Intelligence Report; Central intelligence Group; 01/28/1947; Secret; Declassified 12/16/1998; CREST No. CIA-RDP82-00457R000300200006-4; General CIA Records; "The Government, Politics, and Population of the Mongolian People's Republic." Translation; Information from Foreign Documents or Radio Broadcasts; Central Intelligence Agency; 05/18/1950; Confidential; Declassification 08/15/2011; CREST No. CIA-RDP80-00809A000600310264-4; General CIA Records.

[41] The size of the Soviet contingent varied, but in 1974 the CIA estimated it was between 30 and 50,000 Soviet combat troops. "Mongolia." Intelligence Memorandum; Central Intelligence Agency; 02/1974; Confidential; Declassified 08/08/2005; CREST No. CIA-RDP84-00825R000300260001-2; General CIA Records.

[42] "Soviet Troop Withdrawal from Mongolia." Report; Central Intelligence Agency; 04/20/1987; Secret; Declassified 11/28/2012; CREST No. CIA-RDP91B00874R000300190006-4; General CIA Records. See also Rossabi 2005, 10.

[43] See also "Short-Term Prospects for the African Nationalist Movements in Angola and Mozambique." Special National Intelligence Estimate; Central Intelligence Agency; 07/01/1964; Secret; Declassified 04/24/2014; CREST No. CIA-RDP79R01012A026200010006-6; General CIA Records.

[44] "Anti-Portuguese Campaign in Africa Shifts to Mozambique." Special Report; Office of Current Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 12/18/1964; Secret; Declassified 07/31/2008; CREST No. CIA-RDP79-00927A004700060002-5; General CIA Records; "Mozambique." Current Intelligence Country Handbook; Office of Current Intelligence; Directorate of Intelligence; 06/01/1966; Secret; Declassified 12/14/2001; CREST No. CIA-RDP79T00826A003200130001-6; General CIA Records; "Mozambique: Armed Forces." National Intelligence Survey; Central Intelligence Agency; 08/1973; Secret; Declassified 06/16/2009; CREST No. CIA-RDP01-00707R000200100009-6; NIS Records. See also Finnegan 1992, 30; Hall and Young 1997, 13, 139.

of the Renamo insurgency (Hoile 1994, 116; Finnegan 1992, 89).[45] Soviet military advisers were deployed in 1976, and train Frelimo forces as well as plan "operational duties down to the brigade level."[46] The Soviet Union also aided the regime in strengthening the party apparatus in the army (Shariy 2008b, 18-19). The Soviets, along with Cubans and East Germans, "trained, equipped, and advised the Mozambican security service (SNASP) since the mid-1970s."[47] KGB officials sit directly in the offices of SNASP.[48] Frelimo formally removed references to Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet bloc at its 5th party congress in 1989 (Finnegan 1992, 130; Hall and Young 1997, 202). In 1989, the USSR withdrew its large contingent of military advisers (between 750 and 1,500) and ended its supply of cheap oil (Finnegan 1992, 130; Hall and Young 1997, 139, 204).

## 2.14 North Korea 1948-91

COW CODE: 731.
REGIME TENURE: 1948- .
LEADERS: Il Sung.
INSTALLED: Yes.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: Sponsorship until collapse of the USSR.

OVERVIEW: Kim Il Sung had been leading a group of Korean partisans against Japanese forces in Manchuria since the 1930s, and under intense Japanese pressure fled to the Soviet Far East in 1941 (Scalapino and Lee 1992, 209; Smith 2015, 80-81). Kim joined the 88th Independent Brigade of the Red Army (a special force for former Manchurian guerrillas) at the rank of captain (Lankov 2002, 56; Armstrong 2003, 32). After the defeat of Japan, the 88th was disbanded and Kim went to Pyongyang with the Red Army, and after the Soviets dismissed Pak Hon-yong (a former Comintern cadre and leader of the Communist Party of Korea) the Soviet military occupation authorities decided on Kim Il Sung to rule the protostate (Lankov 2002, 18, 58). During the period of regime formation (1945-48), the Soviet

[45] See also "The Situation in Mozambique: Short-Term Prospects. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum; NI JIM 83-10003; 04/21/1983; Secret; Declassified 09/08/2010; CREST No. CIA-RDP86T00303R000100100001-1; General CIA Records; "Soviet Prospects in Mozambique." Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 04/19/1985; Secret; Declassified 04/28/2010; CREST No. CIA-RDP85T01058R000507480001-2; General CIA Records.

[46] "Sub-Saharan Africa: A Growing Soviet Military Presence." Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 01/12/1985; Top Secret; Declassified 12/01/2010; CREST No. CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1; NGA Records.

[47] "Supporting Allies Under Insurgent Challenge: The Soviet Experience in Africa." Research Paper; Office of Soviet Analysis and Office of Global Issues; Central Intelligence Agency; 02/01/1988; Secret; Declassified 08/31/2012; CREST No. CIA-RDP07C00121R001000530001-0; General CIA Records. See also "Mozambique: Short-Term Prospects." Special National Intelligence Estimate; Central Intelligence Agency; 06/01/1986; Secret; Declassified 04/22/2011; CREST No. CIA-RDP87T00573R000801050001-9; General CIA Records. See also Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005, 455

[48] "The Soviets in Mozambique: Is the Payoff Worth the Price?" Intelligence Assessment; Office of Soviet Analysis; Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 02/01/1988; Secret; Declassified 08/17/2012; CREST No. CIA-RDP07C00121R001000690001-3; General CIA Records.

Red Army and KGB directly committed themselves to domestic repression and police functions (Armstrong 2003, 63, 191). Soviet advisers were embedded in the Justice Bureau and "equipped and advised" the newly formed Korean People's Army (KPA) (Armstrong 2003, 200, 217). Even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1948, advisers remained embedded in the KPA "at east to the battalion level and possibly as far down as the company level" (Armstrong 2003, 233).During the Korean War (1950-53), Pyongyang was heavily dependent on Soviet military supplies (Armstrong, 2013, 19, 53, 135). After the war, Soviet aid was critical to reconstruction efforts, with external assistance (largely from Moscow) amounting to 80% of industrial reconstruction needs from 1954-56 (Armstrong 2013, 55, 58, 63).

## 2.15 Poland 1944-89

COW CODE: 290.
REGIME TENURE: 1944-89.
LEADERS: Beirut, Gomulka, Gierek, Kania, Jaruzelski.
INSTALLED: Yes.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: 1989.

OVERVIEW: The Polish National Liberation Committee (PKWN) "was secretly formed by Stalin from the ranks of former Polish Communists living in Moscow" (Naimark 2010, 178). The PKWN arrived with the Red Army and "the Soviets arranged for the PKWN to form a Polish national government in Lublin, which was formally recognized by Moscow" (Naimark 2010, 178). The Soviets played an active role in determining Central Committee membership of the party (Schopflin 1993, 52; Naimark 2010, 178). In Poland like elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Soviet military missions oversaw the reorganization of military forces, embedded commanders, advisers, and technicians within the armed forces and defense ministries, and purged pre-communist officer corps.[49] In the early 1950s, the defense minister, chief of the general staff, commander of the ground forces, heads of all service branches, and commanders of all four military districts were former Soviet officers (Johnson 1981, 8). Soviet troops remained in Poland throughout the entire communist regime's tenure (Barany 2016, 101). In the first few months of 1989, Gorbachev and the Politburo decided not to take military action in Eastern Europe if communist governments were to face collapse (Brown 2009, 523; Kramer 2011, 812; McAdams 2017, 446-47).[50] When the Polish communists "suffered a resounding defeat" in June 1989 elections, Moscow signaled its disappointment but acceptance fo the results, "giving the Polish Communist authorities no choice but to go along with their party's defeat, if only reluctantly" (Kramer 2011, 828). Despite its 30,000 or so troops in Poland, the U.S.S.R. made it clear that it "would be no more than an interested observer" to the domestic political transition (Barany 2016, 105).

[49] "Soviet Control of the European Satellites and Their Contribution to Soviet Power." NIE-33; Central Intelligence Agency; 10/26/1951; Top Secret; Declassified 09/28/1998; CREST No. CIA-RDP79R01012A000900020004-5; General CIA Records. See also Johnson 1981, 2, 7-8.

[50] Barany notes that this was made official by July 1989 (2016, 102).

## 2.16 Romania 1945-89

COW CODE: 360.
REGIME TENURE: 1945-89.
LEADERS: Gheorghiu-Dej, Ceausescu.
INSTALLED: Yes.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: 1989.

OVERVIEW: Red Army troops occupied Romania, and under the clear threat of violence the Romanian monarchy acquiesced to a communist-led coup under the guise of the National Democratic Front (FND) (Naimark 2010, 179-80). The Soviets "decided to install a coalition government, as in Bulgaria, with the Communist Party in control of the ministry of justice and therefore the police (Westad 2017, 81-82). In Romania like elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Soviet military missions oversaw the reorganization of military forces, embedded commanders, advisers, and technicians within the armed forces and defense ministries, and purged pre-communist officer corps.[51] However, Soviet troops left Romania in 1958 (Barany 2016, 101). From this period on, while remaining a Soviet ally and (somewhat inactive) member of the Warsaw Pact, the Romanian armed forces became "independent of Soviet military command" (Barany 2016, 124). In the first few months of 1989, Gorbachev and the Politburo decided not to take military action in Eastern Europe if communist governments were to face collapse (Brown 2009, 523; Kramer 2011, 812; McAdams 2017, 446-47).[52] As with elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Soviets refused to intervene during the bloody collapse of the regime in Romania (Kramer 2011, 851-52; Barany 2016, 126-27).

## 2.17 Somalia 1969-77

COW CODE: 520.
REGIME TENURE: 1969-91.
LEADERS: Barre.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Prior military aid.
END: 1977.

OVERVIEW: The Soviets were uninvolved in and surprised by the 1969 military coup in Somalia (Yordanov 2016, 91). Soviet military assistance continued at pre-coup levels, and technical and military advisers increased (Yordanov 2016, 93). Beginning around 1972 Soviet assistance increased more substantially, with a strong Soviet role in organizing the Somali

[51] "Soviet Control of the European Satellites and Their Contribution to Soviet Power." NIE-33; Central Intelligence Agency; 10/26/1951; Top Secret; Declassified 09/28/1998; CREST No. CIA-RDP79R01012A000900020004-5; General CIA Records. See also Johnson 1981, 2, 7-8.

[52] Barany notes that this was made official by July 1989 (2016, 102).

military (Brind 1984, 83; Samatar 1988, 126).[53] The KGB "took responsibility for overseeing the creation and expansion of the Somali National Security Service" (Yordanov 2016, 98).[54] The Soviets also assisted in the creation of the *Guulwadayaal* militia, modeled off the Soviet auxiliary police organization (Yordanov 2016, 98). In October 1977, Soviet military aid was cut off (Lefebvre 1991, 177; Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005, 449; Yordanov 2016, 181).[55] In November, Barre expelled Soviet military personnel from Somali facilities (Lefebvre 1991, 185; Yordanov 2016, 181).[56]

## 2.18 South Yemen 1972-89

COW CODE: 680.
REGIME TENURE: 1967-90.
LEADERS: Rubay Ali, Nasir, A-Baydh.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: No.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: No.
END: 1989.

OVERVIEW: While the USSR offered some military assistance to the regime starting in 1968 (Halliday 1990, 182), Moscow expanded its involvement starting in 1972 (Golan 1990, 229). The Soviets began to provide intelligence gathering equipment to the regime (Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005, 216). While economic aid was relatively minimal, the PDRY [People's Democratic Republic of Yemen] "became almost wholly reliant on arms from the USSR" (Halliday 1990, 202; 199-200). Approximately 1,000 Soviet and 500 Cuban advisers provided training for South Yemeni troops.[57] The KGB maintained strong links "with the PDRY intelligence service, which proudly called its officers 'Chekists' in honor of its Soviet allies" (Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005, 215).[58] The Soviet Union and Cuba also provide

[53] See also "East Africa: Outside Influence and Potential Conflict." DCI/NOI 1076-75; Central Intelligence Agency; 05/07/1975; Secret; Declassified 03/09/2006; CREST No. CIA-RDP79R01142A000500070002-5; General CIA Records; "Soviet Military Policy in the Third World." National Intelligence Estimate 11-10-76; Central Intelligence Agency; Secret; 10/21/1976; Declassified 09/11/2012; CREST No. CIA-RDP07S01968R000200450001-2; General CIA Records.

[54] See also Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005, 448.

[55] See also "Soviet Foreign Ministry and CPSU CC International Department Background Report on the Somali-Ethiopian Conflict," April 3, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1175, II. 13-23, translated by Mark Doctoroff; Patman 1990.

[56] "An Analysis of Cuban Military Intervention in Angola and Ethiopia." Executive Summary; National Foreign Assessment Center; Central Intelligence Agency; 10/31/1978; Top Secret; Declassified 04/21/2006; CREST No. CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010046-2; General CIA Records.

[57] "North and South Yemen: Comparative Military Capabilities." Research Paper; Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis; Central Intelligence Agency; 12/01/1987; Secret; Declassified 01/30/2014; CREST No. CIA-RDP88T00096R000800980002-6; General CIA Records.

[58] The Committee for State Security was modeled on the KGB and received training from East Germany as well. See "The Yemens: A Handbook." Reference Aid; Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis; Central Intelligence Agency; 04/01/1984; Secret; Declassified 04/06/2010; CREST No. CIA-RDP85T00314R000100010001-0; General CIA Records.

training for the party-controlled People's Militia.[59] In November 1979, Aden and Moscow signed a twenty year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (Halliday 1990, xv). In 1979-80 additional "substantial" economic and military agreements were signed (Halliday 1990, 194). Arms shipments increased sharply starting in the late 1970s.[60] During a party coup, "the Soviets provided strong, public political support, warning that the new regime in Aden would not stand alone should it find itself under threat" (Golan 1990, 233).[61] Soviet assistance continued after the bloody factional fighting in January 1986 and through 1989 (Brehony 2011, 151-55, 158-59, 165-66, 169). However, by 1988 the PDRY "was virtually bankrupt" and when YSP [Yemen Socialist Party] leadership approached Moscow in December 1989 the Kremlin informed Aden "that the PDRY should stand on its own feet and reminded [South Yemeni leaders] that its debt to the Soviet Union was $6 billion" (Brehony 2011, 168-69).

## 2.19 Syria 1966-91

COW CODE: 662.
REGIME TENURE: 1963-.
LEADERS: al-Hafiz, Jadid, Asad.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: No.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: No.
END: Sponsorship until collapse of USSR.[62]

OVERVIEW: While the first contacts between Moscow and Syria began with a 1954 arms deal, relations cooled after 1958 and Moscow stayed aloof of Syrian domestic politics into the early 1960s (Golan 1990, 140-42). Relations "underwent a qualitative leap in February 1966, following the rise to power of the left-wing faction of the Ba'th party" (Karsh 1988, 143-44).[63] After 1966 "Damascus was dependent on Moscow for arms supplies and for virtually half of its foreign aid" (Golan 1990, 144).[64] While the Soviets responded negatively to

[59] "The Yemens: A Handbook." Reference Aid; Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis; Central Intelligence Agency; 04/01/1984; Secret; Declassified 04/06/2010; CREST No. CIA-RDP85T00314R000100010001-0; General CIA Records.

[60] "The USSR and the Yemens: Moscow's Foothold on the Arabian Peninsula." Intelligence Assessment; USSR-EE Division, Office of Political Analysis; Central Intelligence Agency; 07/01/1981; Secret; Declassified 07/29/2008; CREST No. CIA-RDP06T00412R000200350001-0; General CIA Records.

[61] See also "The USSR and the Yemens: Moscow's Foothold on the Arabian Peninsula." Intelligence Assessment; USSR-EE Division, Office of Political Analysis; Central Intelligence Agency; 07/01/1981; Secret; Declassified 07/29/2008; CREST No. CIA-RDP06T00412R000200350001-0; General CIA Records.

[62] Establishing the timing of subsequent Russian sponsorship of the regime is difficult. On the one hand, Russia maintained its military facilities in Syria and ultimately intervened in the Syrian civil war on behalf of the regime in 2015 (and supplied weapons when the fighting began). However, the Russian Federation was largely aloof from Syria until the civil war and thus I do not code Syria a Russian client from 1991-2010 (as the sponsorship period arguably begins in 2011 (and certainly by 2015) this is excluded as the dataset ends December 31, 2010).

[63] See also Golan 1990, 143-44.

[64] In 1972, the CIA assessed total Soviet military assistance to Syria since 1956 at $580 million, making Syria the fourth largest recipient of Soviet military aid. "Soviet Arms to Syria." Cable; 09/30/1972; Secret; Declassified 03/04/2004; CREST No. CIA-RDP79B01737A002000010065-8; General CIA Records.

Asad's seizure of power in 1970, support continued (Karsh 1988, 5-6). The Soviet Union provided training for Syrian military officers and advisers were integrated within Syrian forces (Karsh 1988, 13; Stacher 2012, 71-72).[65] The Syrian army was modeled on the Soviet Red Army (Pollack 2019, 72). During the Yom Kippur War in 1973 Moscow provided emergency airlifts of military supplies to the regime and threatened to intervene as Israeli troops approached Damascus (Karsh 1988, 13-14; Ramet 1990, 97-98). The KGB also provided "some assistance" to the Syrian security services."[66] In 1980 a treaty of cooperation was signed, and military imports from Moscow exceed $3 billion that year (Golan 1990, 154; Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005, 208). Soviet support continued through the first part of 1991 (Zubok 2009, 308).

## 2.20 Vietnam 1978-91

COW CODE: 816.
REGIME TENURE: 1954- .
LEADERS: Le Duan, Van Linh.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: No (but prior Chinese sponsorship, see Section 6.2).
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: Sponsorship until collapse of the USSR.

OVERVIEW: During the war with the United States (the Second Indochina War), Moscow began to provide Vietnam with increased support, including advanced weaponry (Pike 1986, 260; Womack 2006, 117, 196).[67] However, Beijing remained the primary patron of Vietnam during this period (see Section 6.2). Hanoi moved away from Beijing toward Moscow in the second half of 1978 (Pao-Min 1985, 69). This pivot resulted in $2.6 billion in military upgrades for the Vietnamese and Soviet advisers and weapons began rapidly entering Vietnam (Pao-Min 1985, 69; Pike 1986, 260). In 1979, the Soviets were granted access to Vietnamese airbases and ports, and by May of that year around 7,000 Eastern Bloc advisers were in the country (Pao-Min 1985, 108; Womack 2006, 193). In the mid-1980s, Moscow gave Hanoi over $1 billion in weapons (Katz 1989, 45). "[V]irtually the entire Vietnamese military budget" since 1975 has been paid for by the U.S.S.R. (Pike 1986, 256; 76). In 1989, Vietnam received $1 billion in economic aid and over three quarters of a billion in military aid, and

[65] In 1986, the CIA estimated that there were between 2,500-3,000 Soviet and 300 Eastern European military advisers in Syria. "Soviet and East European Support for Syria and Libya." Memo from Office of Congressional Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency for Senator Merrill Kelly, Select Committee on Intelligence; United States Senate; 09/22/1986; Secret; Declassified 04/18/2011; CREST No. CIA-RDP90B01390R000600700037-7; General CIA Records. See also "Soviet Military Policy in the Third World." National Intelligence Estimate 11-10-76; Central Intelligence Agency; Secret; 10/21/1976; Declassified 09/11/2012; CREST No. CIA-RDP07S01968R000200450001-2; General CIA Records.

[66] "Potential for Soviet Intervention in Syria." Memo; Strategic Warning Staff; Central Intelligence Agency; 05/13/1980; Secret; Declassified 05/29/2007; CREST No. CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170009-1; General CIA Records.

[67] See also "Soviet Tactics Concerning Vietnam." Special Memo No. 18-65; Office of National Estimates; Central Intelligence Agency; 07/15/1965; Secret; Declassified 11/05/2010; FOIA No. 0001467194; FOIA Collection.

$350 million in direct budgetary support and support continued through part of 1991 (Starr 1991, 180; Zubok 2009, 308).

# 3 U.S. Client Regimes

## 3.1 Afghanistan 2009-

COW CODE: 700.
REGIME TENURE: 2009- .
LEADER: Karzai.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: Right censor.

OVERVIEW: Since the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and subsequent occupation, Washington has directly contributed its combat forces to counterinsurgency operations against the Taliban and other opposition groups. The U.S. created the Afghan National Army from scratch, providing massive financial support and embedding American advisers in every unit down to the battalion level (Giustozzi 2015, 127, 213, 223). As of May 2018, the United States provided nearly $900 billion in military and reconstruction operations, a sum larger than the total of U.S. aid committed to the Marshall Plan after WWII.[68]

## 3.2 Brazil 1964-85

COW CODE: 140.
REGIME TENURE: 1964-85.
LEADERS: Castelo Branco, Costa e Silva, Medici, Geisel, Figueiredo.
INSTALLED: Contested.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Prior military aid.
END: Sponsorship until collapse.

OVERVIEW: While direct participation by the U.S. in the 1964 coup which overthrew Goulart is contested, analysts agree the U.S. at a minimum sought to undermine the Goulart regime and promote a military coup (Stepan 1971, 124-25; Smith 2010, 131). Regardless, the U.S. provided immediate backing to the military seizure of power and provided emergency economic assistance (Stepan 1971, 126). Washington provided over $1.2 billion in economic assistance, making Brazil the third largest recipient of U.S. aid from 1964-70 (Crandall 2011, 104; Rabe 2016, 112). The U.S. also provided $10 million in material support and training to the Brazilian police after the coup (Rabe 2016, 112). Distrustful of the Carter administration, in 1977 Brazil preemptively cancelled the military agreement with the U.S. but at that point Brasilia had become a net exporter of military equipment (Smith 2010, 178). U.S. support for Brazil remained until democratization in 1985.

[68] John F. Spoko. "Oversight of U.S. Spending in Afghanistan." Testimony before the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Subcommittee on Federal Spending Oversight and Emergency Management, U.S. Senate. May 9, 2018. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

## 3.3 Cambodia 1970-75

COW CODE: 811.
REGIME TENURE: 1970-75.
LEADER: Lon Nol.
INSTALLED: Contested.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: No.[69]
END:.

OVERVIEW: An American role in the March 18, 1970 coup against Sihanouk has never been proven (Deac 1997, 66; c.f. Corfield 1994, 53). However, the U.S. did respond favorably to the coup.[70] Just under a month after the coup Lon Nol requested American military support and soon thereafter deliveries began.[71] U.S. military assistance arrived in large quantities beginning later that year (Becker 1998, 14, 16) and in 1973 the U.S. began a "massive" bombing campaign in Cambodia as the Khmer Rouge insurgency escalated (Becker 1998, 16). While aerial bombardments ceased in August 1973, U.S. military and economic aid continued (Becker 1998, 155). U.S. aid reached $1.85 billion in direct assistance to the Cambodia government and another $7 billion for the multiyear bombardment of communist insurgent positions (Deac 1997, 221). American support continued until the very last days of the regime (Becker 1998, 18-19.[72]

## 3.4 Chile 1973-85

COW CODE: 155.
REGIME TENURE: 1973-89.
LEADER: Pinochet.
INSTALLED: Contested.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Prior military aid.
END: Material aid ends 1974, resumes, sponsorship ends 1985.

OVERVIEW: While the exact role of the United States in the September 11, 1973 coup remains contested (Gaddis 2005, 178; Schmitz 2006, 101), Washington nevertheless quickly backed the coup and lent its support to the Chilean generals (Maurer 2013, 381; Westad

[69] While the U.S. had an economic and military aid program to Cambodia beginning in 1950 under the last four years of French rule, this program was ended by Sihanouk in 1963 after suspecting American complicity in several coup plots (Corfield 1994, 24; Chandler 2008, 234).

[70] *Foreign Relations of the United States, January 1969-July 1970, Vietnam, Volume X*, eds. Edward C. Keefer and Carolyn Yee (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office): Docs. 208, 205, 250.

[71] U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh. "Aid to Cambodia." Cable; 04/30/1970; Top Secret; National Archives; Nixon Presidential Materials Staff; National Security Council Files; Cambodian Operations; Box 589; Doc. No. 000678; DNSA Collection: Vietnam War II, 1969-1975.

[72] See also *Foreign Relations of the United States, January 1973-July 1975, Vietnam, Volume X*, ed. Bradley Lynn Coleman (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office): Doc. 23.

2017, 357).[73] The U.S. provided immediate economic support and military equipment to be used against domestic opponents (Westad 2005, 201; Schmitz 2006, 103; Morley and McGillion 2015, 5; Rabe 2016, 142). U.S. Congress suspended military aid a year after the coup, and despite a brief lifting, the ban remained until the Reagan administration in the early 1980s (Schmitz 2006, 105, 110). Despite the lack of military deliveries, Washington did not attempt "to undermine Pinochet in any substantive fasion" (Morley and McGillion 2015, 11). By 1985 the U.S. began to call for democratization and pushed the regime to liberalize (Morley and McGillion 2015, 319).

## 3.5 Cuba 1952-58

COW CODE: 40.
REGIME TENURE: 1952-59.
LEADER: Batista.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Prior military aid.
END: U.S. removal in 1958.

OVERVIEW: The U.S. reacted ambivalently to the 1952 coup which brought Batista directly into power (Schoultz 2009, 54-55). Soon after, however, Washington and Havana signed a mutual defense treaty (intended for hemispheric defense) and the U.S. provided military assistance intended for the repression of alleged communists (Schoultz 2009, 59, 75). American assistance was so extensive that in the 1950s U.S. Admiral Arleigh Burke stated that "the U.S. Naval mission runs the entire supply operation of the Cuban Navy" (Quoted in Schoultz 2009, 60). The FBI helped organize the coercive apparatus in its mission to monitor and repress suspected communists, and Washington helped organize the *Buro de Represion Anti-Communista* (BRAC) (Schoultz 2009, 61). In March 1958, "the [U.S.] administration cut off arms shipments to its long-term client, Fulgencio Batista, after his U.S.-supplied air force inflicted heavy civilian casualties while bombing rebel positions" (Rabe 2016, 69). On December 14, 1958, "U.S. ambassador Earl Smith met with Cuban foreign minister Gonzalo Guell to inform him that 'the United States will no longer support the present government of Cuba'" (Maurer 2013, 315-16).

## 3.6 Egypt 1980-

COW CODE: 651.
REGIME TENURE: 1952- .
LEADERS: Sadat, Mubarak.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: No.

[73]Morley and McGillion write that "[t]he President and his NSC Adviser were euphoric over Allende's demise, congratulating themselves on their overt role in 'help[ing] [to] create the conditions as great as possible' for the coup to succeed" (2015, 5).

PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: No.[74]
END: Right censor.

OVERVIEW: After the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1980, the U.S. began to supply the Egyptian regime with military equipment in March of that year (Brownlee 2012, 7).[75] The U.S. provided around $1.3 billion annually in military funding (Brownlee 2012, 45, 68, 98-99).[76] The United States sent advisers to provide weapons and operational training (Pollack 2019, 63).[77] Washington also shared intelligence and cooperated extensively with the Egyptian General Intelligence Service (GIS, commonly known as the *Mukhabarat*) (Brownlee 2012, 4, 44, 60-63, 68, 71). Despite occasional pressure for liberalization, U.S. support for the regime was maintained after the end of the Cold War (Brownlee 2007, 211; Brownlee 2012, 68, 75-76, 81).

## 3.7 El Salvador 1980-92

COW CODE: 92.
REGIME TENURES: 1948-82; 1982-94.
LEADERS: Majano, Gutierrez; Vides Casanova, Larios, Ponce.
INSTALLED: No; no.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: No; yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Military aid; yes.
END: Sponsorship ends 1992.

OVERVIEW: While the U.S. began giving military assistance to El Salvador in the 1930s, until 1979 the amount of aid given was "not especially significant," and totaled less than $17 million from 1946-79 (Crandall 2016, 43). From March 1977 until autumn 1979 the Carter administration even sought to impose sanctions on military aid to El Salvador which was preemptively cancelled by the Romero government (Schmitz 2006, 204; Crandall 2016, 43). The October 15, 1979 coup[78] "marked the beginning of deep U.S. involvement in El Salvador (LaFeber 1993, 247-48). By 1980 the Carter administration quickly increased the amount of unconditional military assistance granted to San Salvador (Coatsworth 1994, 152-53; Peceny

[74]Soviet client from 1955-76.

[75]See also "Prospects for US-Egyptian Relations." Special National Intelligence Estimate; SNIE 36.1-2-82; Director of Central Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 10/21/1982; Secret; Declassified 06/27/2006; CREST No. CIA-RDP84B00049R001202840002-8; General CIA Records.

[76]See also "Developments in the Egyptian Armed Forces." Interagency Intelligence Assessment; IIA 84-10002; Central Intelligence Agency; 04/06/1984; Secret; Declassified 08/16/2010; CREST No. CIA-RDP87T00413R000100090004-7; General CIA Records. In fiscal year 1986, U.S. military and foreign military sales grants "accounted for some 69 percent of all Egyptian defense expenditures." "The Egyptian Military: Its Role and Missions under Mubarak." Intelligence Assessment; Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis; Central Intelligence Agency; 07/08/1987; Secret; Declassified 05/31/2011; CREST No. CIA-RDP88T00096R000700820001-5; General CIA Records.

[77]See also "Prospects for US-Egyptian Relations." Special National Intelligence Estimate; SNIE 36.1-2-82; Director of Central Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 10/21/1982; Secret; Declassified 06/27/2006; CREST No. CIA-RDP84B00049R001202840002-8; General CIA Records.

[78]Note that according to Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018) this coup was leader-removing rather than regime-ending.

and Stanley 2010, 75). Assistance did cease for a month in 1980 after the November massacre of four U.S. nuns but quickly resumed (Coatsworth 1994, 155). In the 1980s El Salvador was the third largest recipient of U.S. aid (after Israel and Egypt) and Washington gave more aid in 1981 to El Salvador than the rest of Latin America combined with a total of $6 billion in assistance granted (Crandall 2016, 1; Rabe 2016, 176; Ladwig 2017, 237). The U.S. poured billions of military supplies and other resources into the counterinsurgency against the *Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front* (FMLN) and the CIA conducted operations against the insurgents (Leonard 1991, 182; Coatsworth 1994, 173; Booth 1998, 152; Schmitz 2006, 195). U.S. aid was cut in half in 1990 after the murder of six Jesuit priests by military forces and after the end of the war in 1992 U.S. involvement ceased (Peceny and Stanley 2010, 84; Crandall 2014, 334).

## 3.8 Ethiopia 1954-74

COW CODE: 530.
REGIME TENURE: 1889-1974.
LEADER: Haile Selassie.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: No.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: No.
END: Sponsorship until collapse.

OVERVIEW: In 1943, the U.S. army established Kagnew Station, a long-range radio communication facility in Ethiopia (present day Eritrea).[79] In 1954, the U.S. agreed to begin providing military aid and training to Ethiopia (Lefebvre 1991, 25, 55, 93-95; Tiruneh 1993, 19).[80] The regime would ultimately become the largest recipient of U.S. military and economic aid in sub-Saharan Africa (David 1991, 38). In 1960, a "secret" and ambiguous military commitment was made to defend Ethiopia from internal or external attack (Lefebvre 1991, 95). That same year, the U.S. assisted in suppressing a coup attempt against Selassie (David 1991, 40; Lefebvre 1991, 90, 124, 131-32). By 1973 the U.S. began phasing out its operations at Kagnew and the U.S. did not react to the 1974 coup (Lefebvre 1991, 140, 164; Schmidt 2013, 147).

## 3.9 Guatemala 1954-77

COW CODE: 90.
REGIME TENURES: 1954-58; 1958-63; 1963-66; 1966-70; 1970-85.

[79]Despite the establishment of the base, the U.S. did not immediately provide military aid in return. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V*, eds. Fredrick Aandahl and William Z. Slany (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office): Doc. 919.

[80]See also *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1*, ed. John P. Glennon (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office): Docs. 180-81, 183, 216; "Brief on Ethiopia." Office of Research and Reports; Central Intelligence Agency; 09/01/1960; Secret; Declassified 10/23/1998; CREST No. CIA-RDP63-00314R000200160030-2; General CIA Records; "Ethiopia-US Relations." Memorandum for Mr. Harold Horan, NSC Staff; Central Intelligence Agency; 11/01/1973; Secret; Declassified 08/22/2006; CREST No. CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160069-4; General CIA Records.

LEADERS: Castillo Armas, Flores Avendano; Ydigoras; Peralta Azurdia, Arriaga Bosquie; Chinchilla Aguilar, Reyes Santacruz; Arana Osorio, Laugerud Garcia.
INSTALLED: Yes; no; no; no; no.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes; yes; yes; yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Prior military aid (all).
END: Involvement declined mid-1970s, Guatemala ends relationship 1977.

OVERVIEW: The United States funded, planned, and carried out a coup against President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman (1951-54) led by Castillo Armas (McAllister 2010, 276; Rabe 2016, 50). After the coup, the Armas regime received a large increase in U.S. assistance, with Washington granting millions in military aid (Rabe 2016, 55, 57; Crandall 2016, 82). The CIA "helped Castillo Armas's regime compile a register of those who allegedly participate in Communist activities" (Rabe, 2016, 54).[81] Military aid began in May, 1955, and in the next month a mutual defense treaty was signed (Streeter 2000, 44). The U.S. also provided training for the police force in (Streeter 2000, 44). Washington directly assisted in subduing the MR-13 Rebellion in November 1960 (David 1991, 35; Rabe 2016, 56). The U.S. funded the national police and increased their surveillance capabilities (Weld 2014, 105-09). The U.S. sent special forces to train the Guatemalan military from 1966-68 (Rabe 2016, 55, 57; Crandall 2016, 82). By 1966, the U.S. was involved in a rapidly escalating counterinsurgency (Weld 2014, 112, 115). However, by the 1970s the U.S began to scale back its involvement in Guatemala's counterinsurgency operations as its brutal behavior "was becoming an embarrassment for American policymakers" (Crandall 2016, 83). Thereafter U.S. involvement waned and Guatemala's civil war "took place largely without U.S. involvement" and the Guatemalan military cancelled its military aid agreement with the U.S. in 1977 (Crandall 2016, 79). While some U.S. aid resumed in 1981, American involvement remained low (McAllister 2010, 297-98; Crandall 2016, 88).

## 3.10 Indonesia 1966-99

COW CODE: 850.
REGIME TENURE: 1966-99
LEADER: Suharto.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Military aid.
END: 1989.

OVERVIEW: Beginning in the late 1940s until his ouster in 1965, "the US government had worked assiduously to undermine the PKI [Communist Party of Indonesia] and weaken or remove President Sukarno" (Robinson 2018, 10; 104-13). "From 1958 to 1965 the United States trained, funded, advised, and supplied the army precisely so that it could turn itself into a state within a state" (Roosa 2006, 177; 183).[82] While there had been plans to execute

[81] See also Streeter 2000, 38-39.
[82] See also Robinson 2018, 95-96.

a coup against Sukarno developing among the high command of the Indonesian military with U.S. knowledge and support, a pro-communist group in the army launched its own attempted coup on October 1, 1965 and executed six Indonesian generals, providing the pretext for a successful coup by Suharto and other members of the high command (Roosa 2006, 177, 191). "Washington was nothing short of joyous as Suharto's army defeated the [30 September] movement and rampaged against the Communists" (Roosa 2006, 15-16). The U.S. provided immediate economic, military, and logistical support to the army leadership (Robinson 2018, 22, 178-80, 196-97). Washington also provided intelligence to the junta and lists of suspected communists to the Indonesian army (Roosa 2006, 195; Schmitz 2006, 48; Maurer 2013, 343; Robinson 2018, 203). The U.S. also "transferred a large sum of money to the army-created civilian front," the Kap-Gestapu (Roosa 2006, 196). U.S. assistance was initially somewhat cautious, however, fearing that largescale aid could not be "kept secret and kept solely in the army's hands" (Roosa 2006, 197). Aid increased under Nixon, and the U.S. continued to supply economic and food aid (Schmitz 2006, 77). The U.S. provided military advisers and military aid.[83] "Over the next few decades, the United States and its allies remained stalwart supporters of Major General Suharto's New Order regime, lavishing it with economic and military assistance, and loyally defending it in the face of domestic and international criticism of its abysmal human rights record" (Robinson 2018, 10-11). While the United States supported liberalization, it did not seriously denounce or undermine the Suharto regime after the end of the Cold War.

## 3.11 Iran 1953-79

COW CODE: 630.
REGIME TENURE: 1925-79[84].
LEADER: Mohammad Reza Shah.
INSTALLED: Yes.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: No.
END: Sponsorship until collapse.

OVERVIEW: After U.S. and British intelligence agencies carried out a coup against the Mossadeq government, the United States provided extensive assistance to the reinstalled Pahlavi regime (Gasioworski 1991, 80; Katouzian 1998, 187-89; Westad 2005, 122; Smith 2007, 70; Root 2008, 123). The U.S provided immediate diplomatic assistance, financial aid, and helped construct domestic intelligence and coercive agencies to go after domestic opposition, in particular the communist party, Tudeh (Gasioworski 1991, 17-19, 90-91, 118, 167; Smith 2007, 70; Yom 2011, 218). U.S. budgetary support made up to 60% of government revenue in 1954, and oil revenues only reached the level of U.S. aid by 1957-58 (Gasioworski 1991, 102-3, 112). U.S. military aid constituted 50% of Iranian military expenditures from

[83] "Downturn in Indonesian-US Relations: Perceptions and Implications." Intelligence Memo; East Asia-Pacific Division; Office of Political Analysis; Central Intelligence Agency; 08/14/1980; Secret; Declassified 03/30/2007; CREST No. CIA-RDP83B00551R000100200007-0; General CIA Records.

[84] Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018) code the Pahlavi dynasty a continuous regime 1925-79, declining to consider the Mossadeq interregnum 1950-53 to be a regime change.

1953-54, and remained high until 1967 (Gasioworski 1991, 112). While the intensity of the relationship declined somewhat starting in 1967, the U.S. continued to provide extensive military equipment until the regime collapsed (Gasioworski 1991, 113, 208, 224). While the Carter administration had an "oft-declared interest in human rights," the U.S. president "continued to assure the Shah of its backing - even after Black Friday [the September 8, 1978 massacre in Jaleh Square] and the installation of the military government [on November 6, 1978]" (Barany 2016, 63). The Shah fled Iran on January 16, 1979 (Barany 2016, 60).

## 3.12 Jordan 1957-

COW CODE: 663.
REGIME TENURE: 1946- .
LEADERS: Hussein, Abdullah II.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: No.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: No (U.K. client 1946-57).
END: Right censor.

OVERVIEW: The British were the first patrons of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (see Section 5.3), but by 1957 this relationship had become a political liability for Amman and in 1957 the U.S. began providing assistance (Peters and Moore 2009, 268). Days after the declaration of martial law in 1957, the U.S. provided emergency budgetary support (Yom 2016, 167). From 1957-67 Jordan received $55 million in economic and military aid annually (Peters and Moore 2009, 269). The CIA provided the regime with intelligence about suspected coup plots such as the Zerqa mutiny (Yom 2016, 168). The U.S. also helped in the creation of the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) (Yom 2016, 175). From 1973-80, foreign aid made up a large percentage of government revenue, reaching 86% in 1979 (Peters and Moore 2009, 270). The U.S. provided even more assistance to the regime after the 1994 peace agreement with Israel, and aid increased again after September 11, 2001 (Peters and Moore 2009, 275). From 2008-12, the U.S. provided $4 billion in military and economic aid (Yom 2013, 129).

## 3.13 Laos 1959-62

COW CODE: 437.
REGIME TENURES: 1959-60; 1960-62.
LEADER: Phoumi.
INSTALLED: Contested; assisted.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Prior military aid.
END: U.S. aid cased late 1961, advisers removed July 1962.

OVERVIEW: The 1954 Geneva resulted in Laotian independence and replaced France with the United States as the primary contributor to the Laotian budget (Toye 1968, 96-97, 106). In 1955, the U.S. began training the Royal Lao Army (RLA) and providing direct budgetary

support to the military (Brown and Zasloff 1986, 58). By 1959, the U.S. was paying "the entire cost of the Royal Lao Army's salaries" (Auclair 1994, 266).[85] When General Phoumi Nosavan seized power in a December 1959 coup, the exact role of the U.S. is unclear, but it appears Phoumi acted with the expectation of U.S. support if he were to succeed (Rust 2012, 154). Phoumi had longstanding ties to the CIA and his political organization, the Committee for the Defense of National Interests (CDNI) was funded and organized by the CIA (Toye 1968, 104; Brown and Zasloff 1986, 66, 72; Jacobs 2012, 4, 86; Rust 2012, 94, 101-2, 156). In August 1960, the U.S.-trained paratroop commander Kong Le seized power in another coup which placed Souvanna Phouma in power and the U.S. pushed Phoumi to compromise with the new government, but to Washington's displeasure Phoumi began an armed insurrection agains the new regime (Rust 2012, 175-202). The U.S. ultimately backed Phoumi's forces with direct military aid and the CIA provided his forces with food and pay (Rust 2012, 213-14, 239-40). The U.S. also facilitated the deployment of Thai special forces into Laos on behalf of Phoumi's forces as they began their assault on Vientiane (Rust 2012, 240-41). In December 1960 with Thai and American logistical support forces loyal to Phoumi sized power in Vientiane (Rust 2012, 243-46). The U.S. then increased its sharing of intelligence to the regime on the status of Kong Le's forces and the Pathet Lao opposition (Rust 2012, 248, 259). However, the government announced a power sharing coalition with the Pathet Lao which prompted Washington to cease all military assistance and ultimately remove its military advisers after the Declaration of Neutrality of Laos in July 1962 (Brown and Zasloff 1986, 85; Rust 2012, 264-65).[86]

## 3.14 Liberia 1951-89

COW CODE: 450.
REGIME TENURES: 1944-80; 1980-90.
LEADERS: Tubman, Tolbert; Doe.
INSTALLED: No; no.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: No; yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: No; yes.
END: Sponsorship ends 1989.

OVERVIEW: U.S.-Liberian relations were historically close, and a U.S. Army mission agreement began in January 1951 for the purposes of training the army "to maintain internal security" (Dunn 2009, 51).[87] A Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed on November 19, 1951 provided support for the training and organization of the Liberian armed forces (Dunn 2009, 53). Liberia had become a "vital U.S. Cold War ally" (Schmidt 2013, 198).[88]

[85] See also Kurlantzick 2017, 31.

[86] It is worth noting of course that U.S. involvement in Laos quickly resumed and continued in earnest until 1973 and in reduced form through 1975 (Kurlantzick, 2017, 5, 8), but Laos is considered by most datasets to lose sovereignty or become a failed state in this period (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

[87] See also "Postcoup Prospects in Liberia." Interagency Intelligence Memo; Director of Central Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 12/22/1980; Secret; Declassified 03/09/2012; CREST No. CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190007-2; General CIA Records.

[88] See also "Liberia: Stability of Current Political Regime/Relations with Other West African Countries." Information Report; Central Intelligence Agency; 12/15/1954; Confidential; Declassified 05/08/2002;

In 1973 the U.S. established the Omega Navigation Station and Liberia became the principal African base of the CIA around the same time (Kieh 1992, 116, 123-23). The 1980 coup by Doe against the Tolbert regime was met with explicit displeasure from the U.S., but Washington maintained full diplomatic relations with Monrovia (Liebenow 1987, 208).[89] After a brief period of distancing itself from the new regime, the U.S. resumed paying government payrolls and providing other economic assistance totaling nearly $500 million in the first half of the 1980s (Liebenow 1987, 303; Waugh 2011, 92).[90] In 1985, U.S. intelligence informed Doe about a coup plot[91] which allowed the regime to put down the insurrection (Waugh 2011, 107). Support continued from the Reagan administration even after Congress sought to cut off aid after fraudulent elections (Waugh 2011, 104-5).[92] In 1988, the U.S. began to distance itself from the Doe regime and military and security assistance was cut off in 1989 (Dunn 2009, 155). The U.S. ultimately stood aside as the growing insurgency threatened to overthrow Doe and did not intervene when he was killed in 1990 (Clough 1992, 194; Waugh 2011, 131).

## 3.15 Nicaragua 1961-78

COW CODE: 93.
REGIME TENURE: 1936-79.
LEADERS: L. Somoza, A. Somoza.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: No.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Military aid.
END: Sponsorship until January 1978.

OVERVIEW: As U.S. occupation forces prepared to leave Nicaragua in the early 1930s, Anastasio Somoza Garcia was put in charge of the American-trained Nicaraguan National Guard in 1932 (Booth 1998, 132; Pezzullo and Pezzullo 1993, 25). While the U.S. did not facilitate Somoza's seizure of power after the departure of American forces, it did nothing to prevent his coup (Solaun 2005, 31). Relations were icy after WWII, and from 1947-48 the U.S. withdrew official recognition of the Somoza government (Gambone 1997, 88; Schmitz 1999, 155). Ties warmed and military sales resumed in 1950 (Gambone 1997, 88; Solaun 2005, 49). In 1954, Managua began to receive modest levels of military aid under the Mutual Security Program which allowed the Nicaraguan National Guard access to modern American weaponry (Gambone 1997, 90-91, 219-20). During the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. provided increasing military assistance (Morley 1994, 37, 48). U.S. military assistance increased *sevenfold* in

CREST No. CIA-RDP80-00926A007600900001-0; General CIA Records; "Liberia: Short-Term Prospects." Special National Intelligence Estimate; SNIE 67-85; Director of Central Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 09/10/1985; Secret; Declassified 03/11/2009; FOIA No. 0005281829; FOIA Collection.

[89] See also "Postcoup Prospects in Liberia." Interagency Intelligence Memo; Director of Central Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 12/22/1980; Secret; Declassified 03/09/2012; CREST No. CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190007-2; General CIA Records.

[90] During the 1980s the U.S. provided "roughly one-third of the annual revenues needed to keep the Liberian government operative" (Liebenow 1987, 304).

[91] To be led by former officer Quiwonkpa and launched from Sierra Leone.

[92] See also Dunn 2009, 149, 155.

1961 and included counterinsurgency assistance and police training (Pezzullo and Pezzullo 1993, 65-66; Coatsworth 1994, 137). U.S. support was now "total" (LaFeber 1993, 225). Initially unconcerned by the FSLN (*Sandinista*) threat to the regime, only a few dozen U.S. military advisers were deployed in the 1960s and Washington provided approximately 13% of the defense budget (Crandall 2016, 116). By 1976 Somoza "was receiving mixed signals from Washington," but the U.S. continued to supply assistance to the regime (Theberge 1991, 118). In 1977, the U.S. made military aid conditional on liberalization in an attempt to force Anastasio Somoza Debayle to negotiate a transition away from his rule (Booth 1998, 148). Once it was clear that the Sandinistas were gaining ground on the regime and popular support had turned against Somoza, "the Carter administration cut off military aid in January 1978 and imposed sanctions in February 1979" (Crandall 2016, 118).

## 3.16 Pakistan 1954-77, 1979-88, 2001-

COW CODE: 770.
REGIME TENURES: 1947-58; 1958-71; 1975-77; 1977-88; 1999-2008.
LEADERS: G. Mohammad; Mirza; A. Khan, Y. Khan; Bhutto; Zia; Musharraf.
INSTALLED: No; no; no; no; no.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: No; yes; yes; yes; yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: No; yes; yes; yes; yes.
END: Sponsorship until regime end (democratization).

OVERVIEW: Pakistan sought American aid immediately after independence but was rebuffed as it was "peripheral" to U.S. interests at the time (Ahmed 2013, 89; 88). However, after sustained Pakistani overtures and shifting geostrategic priorities by the U.S., in May 1954 Washington and Islamabad signed a Mutual Aid and Assistance Agreement and in September Pakistan joined SEATO (Ahmed 2013, 94-95; Paul 2014, 45). After 1954, the U.S. "promised considerable economic aid and military assistance, all in the name of strengthening Pakistan to fight the Soviets" (Paul 2014, 117).[93] "The US helped Pakistan build a very special elite commando force, the SSG [Special Services Group]" (Ahmed 2013, 97). There is no evidence that the U.S. played a role in organizing the 1958 Mirza-Ayub coup, though the U.S. knew of the plot and "made not attempt to dissuade Mirza or the military from this planned authoritarian intervention" (Shah 2014, 91). The Eisenhower administration quickly supported the new military regime (Shah 2014, 91). In 1959, the U.S. signed an agreement of cooperation which pledged the United States to "'appropriate action, including the use of armed force in case of aggression against Pakistan,' a clear assurance to the military government the United States would come it is aid in case of an Indian attack" (Shah 2014, 92). Relations cooled under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and assistance was suspended in September 1965 as a result of the Kashmir War (Kux 2001, 118; Paul 2014, 118). Military aid resumed 1967 (Kux 2001, 171-72). "The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 drastically shifted US foreign policy goals in the region and catapulted Pakistan from a virtual pariah state to a frontline American ally" (Shah 2014, 156). The U.S. quickly abandoned its concerns over nuclear proliferation and offered $400 million in

[93] See also Shah 2014, 17; Jaffrelot 2016b, 221.

economic and military assistance, and by 1981 that figure rose to $3.2 billion over six years (Shah 2014, 156).[94] After the Soviet withdrawal and the end of the Cold War saw a period of democratic rule in Pakistan. In May 1998, successful nuclear tests by Islamabad resulted in U.S. and international sanctions and the 1999 coup by Musharraf triggered additional U.S. sanctions (Shah 2014, 187). The military regime was international isolated "until the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001" (Shah 2014, 189). After 9/11, Pakistan "once again became a critical frontline ally in the US fight against al-Qaeda" (Shah 2014, 189). From 2002-2015 Pakistan received around $30 billion from the U.S. (Jaffrelot 2016a, 4). In 2008, Pakistan again saw a return to civilian, democratic rule.

## 3.17 Saudi Arabia 1950-

COW CODE: 770.
REGIME TENURE: 1927- .
LEADERS: al Aziz, Saud, Faisal, Khalid, Fahd, Abdullah.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: No.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: No (prior U.K.).
END: Right censor.

OVERVIEW: The House of Saud had been a British client since WWI (see Section 5.6). In 1950 the U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed military agreements which established U.S. basing rights in the Dhahran airfield in exchange for an American pledge to train a military force for the Kingdom (Bronson 2006, 25, 34, 40). In 1951 Riyadh and Washington signed a five year Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement which later led to the establishment of the United States Military and Training Mission (USMTM) which provided American assistance in the training and organization of Saudi forces (Bronson 2006, 58). The CIA intervened against the recently deposed King Saud in 1964 on behalf of the newly crowned King Faisal, alerting the new leadership of his plot to return to power in a coup (Bronson 2006, 92). During the civil war in Yemen (1962-67), the U.S. sent fighter jets into Saudi Arabia after repeated Egyptian air attacks on border towns (Riedel 2018, 43).

## 3.18 South Korea 1948-87

COW CODE: 732.
REGIME TENURES: 1948-60; 1961-87.
LEADERS: Rhee; Park, Chun.
INSTALLED: Yes; no.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes.
END: Sponsorship until regime end (democratization).

OVERVIEW: During the U.S. occupation of southern Korea following the defeat of Japan

[94] Paul states that in the 1980s direct military aid reached over $7.2 billion (2014, 56).

in WWII, Washington facilitated the inauguration of Syngman Rhee as president of South Korea in 1948 (Brazinsky 2007, 2-3). Even after the Korean War (1950-53), the U.S. retained command authority over the military of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and American soldiers remained stationed in Korea (Greitens 2016, 142-43). Washington trained some 7,000 ROK officers from 1950-57 (Greitens 2016, 145). During Rhee's tenure, American aid made up as much as 87% of the defense budget (Greitens 2016, 145). For the first 20 years of South Korean independence, U.S. military and economic aid comprised 10% of Korean GNP (McKoy and Miller 2012, 921). The U.S. ultimately supported democratization in 1987 (McKoy and Miller 2012, 922-23).

## 3.19 South Vietnam 1954-75

COW CODE: 817.
REGIME TENURES: 1954-63; 1963-75.
LEADERS: Diem; Minh, Khanh, Ky, Thieu.
INSTALLED: No; facilitated.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: No; yes.
END: Sponsorship until collapse.

OVERVIEW: After initial ambivalence toward the French war in Indochina, starting in the 1950s American involvement increased substantially (Toye 1968, 82). When the United States decided against attacking the Viet Minh or invading China in the early 1950s, the U.S. instead decided to support South Vietnam in hopes it could form a stable, non-communist government (Burchett 1970, 285; Womack 2006, 73; Kort 2018, 98). South Vietnam was "the object of a monumental U.S. effort at nation building. It was a U.S. foreign policy priority for nearly two decades and the largest recipient of U.S. aid from 1954-73" (Root 2008, 103).[95] From 1955-63, U.S. aid made up between 38-73% of the budget of the South Vietnamese government (Root 2008, 114).[96] Increasing dissatisfaction with Diem's rule by both the South Vietnamese military and the U.S. led to an American-approved coup d'état in 1963 (Womack 2006, 172).[97] After the coup, the U.S. "directly engaged its forces in eliminating internal subversion" (Root 2008, 109). Ultimately, the U.S. would commit hundreds of thousands of its own forces to the regime in one of the largest and longest American military campaigns since WWII.[98] With the drawdown of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam aid decreased though it continued to flow to Saigon until the collapse of the regime (Dacy 1986, 205).

[95] See also Miller 2013, 6-7. "By one modest measure, U.S. economic assistance to Vietnam was $8.5 billion over the twenty year period, with an additional $17 billion in military aid" (Dacy, 1986, 20).

[96] See also Dacy 1986, 27.

[97] In the lead up to the coup "[t]he United States told the potential coup makers that it would not suppress a coup, that it would review the plans of the coup makers in order to ensure their success, and that it would support any successor regime. In addition, economic aid was halted to South Vietnam, both in order to destabilize the regime and demonstrate the lack of American support for Diem" (David 1991, 48-49).

[98] Stephen Daggett. "Costs of Major U.S. Wars." June 29, 2010. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. See also Kort 2018, 1-2.

## 3.20 Taiwan 1950-2000

COW CODE: 713.
REGIME TENURE: 1949-2000.
LEADERS: Kai-shek, Ching-kuo, Teng-hui.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: No.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: Sponsorship until 1972.

OVERVIEW: When Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT) forces fled to Taiwan in 1949, it initially appeared Chinese communist forces would defeat the KMT and the U.S. "refused to assist the ROC [Republic of China] in its efforts to repel Communist aggression" (Hickey 1994, 17[99]). Washington ceased its assistance to the KMT after its loss of power in mainland China but reversed this decision in June 1950 after the onset of the Korean War, going so far as to station the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straights to to defend the regime from any potential Chinese communist aggression (Hickey 1994, 20; Greitens 2016, 87; Cha 2016, 65, 67-68; ting Lin 2016, 9-10). The U.S. also quickly concluded arms sales to Taipei and sent a Military Advisory Assistance Group to advise the KMT on strategy and to train personnel (Cha 2016, 68-69, 72, 88). From 1949-1963, Taiwain received $3.7 billion in economic aid and $1.3 billion in military aid, making Taiwan the third largest recipient of U.S. military assistance (Cha 2016, 86). In 1954, the U.S. and Taiwan signed a mutual defense pact (Hickey 1994, 20-21; Cha 2016, 83; ting Lin 2016, 11). In January 1955, U.S. Congress passed the Formosa Resolution, authorizing military force to defend Taiwan (Cha 2016, 69). Washington continued to provide arms to Taiwan even after the normalization in relations with Beijing (Chen et al. 2017, 221).[100]

## 3.21 Thailand 1950-88

COW CODE: 800.
REGIME TENURES 1947-57; 1957-73; 1976-88.
LEADERS: Phibun; Sarit, Thanom; Chalayu, Kriangsak, Tinsulanonda.
INSTALLED: No; no; no.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: No; yes; yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: No; yes; yes.
END: Sponsorship until collapse (1988).

OVERVIEW: While Washington responded coolly to the seizer of power by the Thai military in 1947, by 1950 relations improved and the U.S. began to supply weapons to the

[99]See also Cha 2016, 66-67. In January 1950, President Truman made it clear "that he would not send troops or substantial military aid" to defend Taiwan" (Cha 2016, 67).

[100]The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, following the normalization of relations with Beijing and the formal cessation of governmental relations with Taipei, made clear that the U.S. would view any non-peaceful means to determine the future of Taiwan "a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States'" and that Washington would "provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character."

Phibun regime (Fineman 1997, 7, 106, 116, 118, 132).[101] A permanent Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) was dispatched to Thailand in 1950 (Fineman 1997, 132). Deliveries increased after Thailand sent troops to aid the U.S. in Korea, and by 1951 $44.8 million in military aid had been delivered to Bangkok (Fineman 1997, 118, 132). By 1954 Washington formalized the relationship through the Manilla Pact and committed itself to Thailand's security (Fineman 1997, 128, 197). The CIA provided extensive assistance to Thai police forces beginning in 1951, especially in the anticommunist Criminal Investigation Department and the elite police paratroopers (Fineman 1997, 134-35, 181-82; Kurlantzick 2017, 30-31). In 1951, evidence suggests the CIA may have intervened directly against a navy-led coup attempt (Fineman 1997, 151).[102]The CIA also helped establish a new intelligence organization, the *Krom Pramuan Ratchakan Phaen-din*, an agency which "followed communist (and noncommunist) dissident activities in Thailand and neighboring countries" (Fineman 1997, 181). While the 1957 coup took the U.S. by surprise[103] and resulted in increased tension in the relationship, the post-1957 leader, Sarit, assured Washington "that Thailand would remain firmly in the U.S. camp" (Fineman 1997, 244). The U.S. also helped establish the Thai counterinsurgency program against the Communist Party of Thailand insurgency in the late 1960s.[104] After another coup in 1976, strong relations continued and Carter's human rights policy "had little impact on either Thailand or U.S.-Thai relations" (Randolph 1986, 206). With the North Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979, Thailand's security situation again rose to prominence and arms transfers rose significantly (Randolph 1986, 214-15). However, as the Cold War ended and the threat posed by communist insurgency declined[105], the U.S. began to pressure liberalization and supported democratization (Wong 2019, 369).

## 3.22 Zaire 1960-91

COW CODE: 490.
REGIME TENURE: 1960-97.
LEADERS: Mobutu.

[101] See also Ferrara 2015, 134.

[102] It is worth noting there is no mention of a CIA role in recently declassified materials. See "Analysis of the Recent Coup D'Etat Attempt in Thailand." Intelligence Memo; Office of Current Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 07/12/1951; Secret; Declassified 02/22/2007; CREST No. CIA-RDP91T01172R000300290021-2; General CIA Records. However, the CIA was aware of a coup plot prior to the attempt. See "Coup Plans by Thai Navy Group." Information Report; Central Intelligence Agency; 10/17/1950; Confidential; Declassified 05/18/2000; CREST No. CIA-RDP82-00457R006100010001-6; General CIA Records.

[103] "Post-Mortem on NIE 62-57: Probable Developments in Thailand" Central Intelligence Agency; 06/25/1957; Secret; Declassified 04/13/1999; CREST No. CIA-RDP61-00549R000100160046-8; General CIA Records; "Terms of Reference: NIE 62-58: Thailand." Staff Memo 51-57; Office of National Estimates; Central Intelligence Agency; 11/19/1957; Secret; Declassified 02/12/1999; CREST No. CIA-RDP79T00937A000500030004-1; General CIA Records.

[104] "Insurgencies in Thailand: A Declining Threat." Intelligence Assessment; Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 09/01/1982; Top Secret; Declassified 05/09/2007; CREST No. CIA-RDP03T02547R000101030001-7; General CIA Records

[105] "Insurgencies in Thailand: A Declining Threat." Intelligence Assessment; Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 09/01/1982; Top Secret; Declassified 05/09/2007; CREST No. CIA-RDP03T02547R000101030001-7; General CIA Records.

INSTALLED: Assisted.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: No.
END: Removal by U.S. in 1991.

OVERVIEW: Mobutu was a CIA asset starting in 1960, the year he seized power in a coup against Patrice Lumumba (Schmitz 2006, 10).[106] The U.S. provided intelligence to Mobutu in order to assist him in overcoming potential plots to oust his nascent regime (Kelly 1993, 178). The U.S. began to train Congolese soldiers and provided air support (using Cuban exile pilots) "to quell rebellions and dissent" (Schmidt 2013, 68). Especially after 1964, "the United States stepped up its aid to the Congolese government, helping Mobutu to establish a sophisticated, well-equipped army" (Schmidt 2013, 73). In 1964, U.S. aircraft delivered Belgian paratroopers to quell a regional rebellion in Stanleyville (Kisangani) (Schmitz 2006, 26). Washington also provided direct budgetary support to Kinshasa, providing $60 million during a budget crisis in 1975 (Young and Turner 1985, 378). "As the Cold War waned, Mobutu and his collapsing state were abandoned by important foreign sponsors" (Schmidt 2013, 208). U.S. support ceased in 1991 (Clough 1992, 195; Prunier 2009, 138).

[106] "Days before Mobutu's coup d'etat, the UN used American funds to pay Mobutu's restless troops, thus ensuring their loyalty. It intervened again when UN soldiers prevented Lumumba from using the national radio to rally support for the central government or the Leopoldville airport to ferry troops" (Schmidt 2013, 63).

# 4 French Client Regimes

## 4.1 Cameroon 1960-

COW CODE: 471.
REGIME TENURES: 1960-83; 1983-
LEADERS: Ahidjo; Biya.
INSTALLED: No; no.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes.
END: Right censor.

OVERVIEW: In the period preceding independence, the French intervened against an insurgency led by the Union of People's of Cameroon (UPC) beginning in 1959 (Joseph 1977, 209-28; McNamara 1989, 164; Somerville 1990, 10-11; Porch 1995, 441-42). This military intervention carried over after decolonization, lasting until 1964 (McNamara 1989, 164).[107] During this period, Paris helped Yaounde establish an "extensive domestic security apparatus" (Schmidt 2013, 182).[108] After independence the Cameroonian budget "relied heavily on external assistance and France was its major source of aid throughout the period" (Torrent 2012, 10). In March-August 1980, French forces also intervened on behalf of the regime in Operation Maroua (Charbounneau 2008, 68), and French personnel "integrated in a variety of posts in the military" utilized their extensive intelligence networks to help put down a coup attempt in 1984 (Decalo 2012, 119). While other regimes in sub-Saharan Africa faced pressure to democratize after the end of the Cold War, "France dramatically increased its aid in an effort to shield the regime of President Paul Biya and to protect it from this combined international and domestic pressure for change" (Emmanuel 2012, 146). When the regime engaged in repression in the spring of 1991 against protestors calling for liberalization, France maintained its support (Emmanuel 2012, 150). After U.S. and German aid was suspended following fraudulent 1992 elections, France substantially increased economic support, giving $1.4 billion from 1992-95 (Emmanuel 2012, 157; 147). France's commitment to Cameroon's "internal and external security" continued thereafter and France still deploys military and intelligence advisers (Decalo 2012, 118-19).[109]

## 4.2 Central African Republic 1960-

COW CODE: 482.
REGIMES: 1960-65; 1966-79; 1979-81; 1981-93; 2003- .
LEADERS: Dacko; Bokassa; Dacko; Kolingba; Bozize.
INSTALLED: No; no; yes; no; no.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes; yes; yes; yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes; yes; yes; yes.
END: Right censor.

[107] Somerville puts cessation of armed hostilities at 1972 (1990, 11).
[108] See also Chipman 1989, 123; Vine 2004, 215.
[109] See also Charbounneau 2008, 71.

OVERVIEW: The Central African Republic (CAR) signed a mutual defense accord with Paris at independence which remained in place (Crocker 1968, 22; Moose 1985, 62). When Bokassa seized power in a 1966 coup against Dacko, France "remained deliberately inactive and favored a wait-and-see strategy" (Vallin 2015, 82). France ultimately supported Bokassa, deploying paratroopers from 1967-70 to Bangui to guard against possible coup attempts and providing direct budgetary support (Vine 2004, 380-81).[110] France removed support in 1979 in an intervention against his regime in support of Dacko after a massacre of schoolchildren by security forces in April 1979 and Bokasso's overtures to Libya (Moose 1985, 80-84; Chipman 1989, 124; Gildea 1996, 219; Titley 1997, 66-68; Vallin 2015, 83). Dacko himself acknowledged "the French role in planning and executing the coup" and when the formerly deposed president returned to Bangui around 400 French paratroopers arrived simultaneously (Moose 1985, 82).[111] After Dacko's second regime faced rising opposition, the French more than doubled their military forces to 1,000 and France initiated "a seemingly open-ended commitment to the support of Dacko's regime (Moose 1985, 82; 83). In 1980, French forces rebuilt and trained the CAR army.[112] In 1981, Dacko fell to a coup "with the apparent approval of the French"[113] French budgetary support remained essential in the early 1980s.[114] French troops remained through 1999, and returned in 2003 when Bozize seized power in a coup with French support (Foltz and Bienen 1985, 198; Charbounneau 2008, 69-72; Debos 2008, 228-29).

## 4.3 Chad 1960-

COW CODE: 483.
REGIME TENURES: 1960-75; 1975-79; 1982-90; 1990- .
LEADERS: Tombalbaye; Malloum; Habre; Deby.
INSTALLED: No; no; no; no.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes; yes; yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes; yes; yes.
END: Right censor.

OVERVIEW: Paris provided critical intelligence and military assistance for the first postcolo-

[110] "Central African Republic: On a Tightrope." Memo; Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 12/05/1983; Secret; Declassified 08/09/2010; CREST No. CIA-RDP85T00287R000500160001-1; General CIA Records.
[111] See also "Central African Republic: On a Tightrope." Memo; Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 12/05/1983; Secret; Declassified 08/09/2010; CREST No. CIA-RDP85T00287R000500160001-1; General CIA Records.
[112] Valentin German. 2016. "50 Years of Overseas Operations in Africa, 1964-2014." (Paris: Cahier du RETEX; Forces Employment Doctrine Center, French Army Staff): 31.
[113] "Central African Republic: On a Tightrope." Memo; Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 12/05/1983; Secret; Declassified 08/09/2010; CREST No. CIA-RDP85T00287R000500160001-1; General CIA Records.
[114] "Central African Republic: On a Tightrope." Memo; Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 12/05/1983; Secret; Declassified 08/09/2010; CREST No. CIA-RDP85T00287R000500160001-1; General CIA Records.

nial regime led by Tombalbaye and France provided direct budgetary support to each regime (Nolutshungu 1996, 68, 305). France intervened on behalf of the Tombalbaye regime in 1965 and dispatched troops on a more permanent basis in 1968 (Thompson and Adloff 1981, 39-40; Moose 1985, 73). After each regime fell, France led its support to every subsequent regime (Nolutshungu 1996, 10-11, 94-95, 109, 111, 188-89, 191, 246-47). France intervened directly in three successive operations on behalf of regimes from 1978-86 (Vallin 2015, 84). Since 1986, Chad has hosted around 1,200 French troops based largely in N'Djamena and Abece (Charbounneau 2008, 69; Styan 2013, 233). French support for Deby continued after the end of the Cold War and Paris continued to train train Chadian forces (Hansen 2013, 588-89).

## 4.4 Congo (Brazz.) 1960-

COW CODE: 484.
REGIME TENURES: 1960-63; 1963-68; 1968-91; 1997- .
LEADERS: Youlou; Massemba-Debat; Ngouabi; Yhombi-Opango/Sassou-Nguesso, Sassou-Nguesso; Sassou-Nguesso.
INSTALLED: No; no; no; no.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes; yes; yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes; yes; yes.
END: Right censor.

OVERVIEW: France and Congo signed a defense agreement upon independence (Somerville 1990, 22). From 1960-62 French forces intervened to suppress anti-regime riots (Chipman 1989, 124). However, the French did not intervene to save Youlou in 1963 (McNamara 1989, 165; Somerville 1990, 23). France "maintained close relations with Congo under all regimes in power there since independence" (Clark 2008, 212). Even from 1968-91 under the ostensibly Marxist-Leninist regime which initiated warmer relations with communist powers, France sustained its support (Clark 2008, 212). Despite allegedly supporting democratization in 1990, "France did nothing to undermine the regime of Sassou during its final months" (Clark 2008, 214). During the civil war, evidence suggests that weapons transfers through Gabon to Sassou were authorized by France (Clark 2008, 220). Sassou received French support immediately after retaking power in Brazzaville in 1997 (Clark 2008, 221).

## 4.5 Gabon 1960-

COW CODE: 481.
REGIME TENURE: 1960- .
LEADERS: M'Ba, O. Bongo, A. Bongo.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: Right censor.

OVERVIEW: The French maintained a military base in Gabon since 1960 and signed a mil-

itary agreement "that permitted the French to intervene militarily" at the government's request (Moose 1985, 62; Boulanin 2014, 48). Paris intervened in 1960 and 1962 to suppress riots (Chipman 1989, 124). During an attempted military coup in 1964, France intervened to defend President M'Ba (Crocker 1968, 24; Somerville 1990, 165; Porch 1995, 442; Gildea 1996, 219; Boulanin 2014, 49).[115] France began to permanently base troops in Gabon after the 1964 coup attempt (Somerville, 1990, 23). From November 1980-July 1981, May-June 1990, in 1992, and 1998-2003 French troops directly intervened on behalf of the regime (Charbounneau, 2008, 68-71). France maintains military and intelligence advisers in Gabon and the regime benefits from an "ongoing French commitment to maintain both [its] internal and external security" (Decalo, 2012, 118; 119).

## 4.6 Ivory Coast 1960-

COW CODE: 437.
REGIME TENURES: 1960-99; 1999-2000; 2000-.
LEADERS: Houphouet-Boigny, Konan-Bedie; Guei; Gbagbo.
INSTALLED: No; no; no.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes; yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes; yes.
END: Right censor.

OVERVIEW: After independence, French forces remained in Ivory Coast and trained and equipped a new national army.[116] Paris provided security guarantees to the regime (Somerville 2015, 57). In 1978 France deployed troops to defend the regime from potential domestic opposition at the regime's request (Moose 1985, 92). French forces were deployed in Operation Comoe in 1984 on behalf of the regime (Charbounneau 2008, 69). Paris also maintained some 500 troops outside Abidjan.[117] Throughout the 1990s France maintained its support (Emmanuel 2012, 155). France deployed troops again on in 1999 and from 2002 onwards during the civil war (Charbounneau 2008, 72). France maintains military and intelligence advisers in the Ivory Coast and the regime benefits from an "ongoing French commitment to maintain both [its] internal and external security" (Decalo 2012, 118; 119).

## 4.7 Madagascar 1960-72

COW CODE: 580.
REGIME TENURE: 1960-72.
LEADER: Tsiranana.

[115] For an overview of the coup events, see "Gabon: 'Putsch' or Coup d'État?'" *Africa Report* 9, no. 3: 12-16.

[116] "France's Military Role in Africa from 'West Africa.'" *Africa Report* 9, no. 1: 11. See also "Ivory Coast: Looking Toward the Post-Houphouet Era." Intelligence Assessment; Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency. 04/14/1982; Secret; Declassified 07/15/2008; CREST No. CIA-RDP83B00225R000100280001-0; General CIA Records.

[117] "Ivory Coast: Looking Toward the Post-Houphouet Era." Intelligence Assessment; Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency. 04/14/1982; Secret; Declassified 07/15/2008; CREST No. CIA-RDP83B00225R000100280001-0; General CIA Records.

INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: 1975.

OVERVIEW: Prior to independence, the French colonial authorities sponsored the creation of the Party of the Disinherited (PADESM), out of which Philibert Tsiranana formed the Social Democratic Party (PSD) in 1956 (Allen 1995, 45, 48). Tsiranana was elected president in 1959 and in 1960 Madagascar negotiated independence from France (Allen 1995, 50-51). Upon independence, Antananarivo signed a mutual defense accord with Paris (Crocker 1968, 22). Approximately 8,000 French forces remained after independence, largely concentrated at the naval base Diego Suarez.[118] France also stationed a paratroop battalion just outside Antananarivo and a Foreign Legion infantry regiment outside the naval base (Allen 1995, 57). Paris provided $70 million annually in direct budgetary support (Allen 1995, 57-58). Paris also paid 85% of the military budget (Covell 1987, 42). Under the 1960 military agreement, French forces provided intelligence and training services and "conducted regular maneuvers against a spectral communist enemy" (Allen 1995, 225). When the regime faced mass protests in 1972, France did not remove support from the regime but also did not intervene directly (Allen 1995, 67-68, 92; Covell 1987, 48). The collapse of the regime resulted in the cessation of pro-French alignment and France lost access to all military facilities in Madagascar (Covell 1987, 148, 152; Allen 1995, 81, 92, 229).

## 4.8 Mauritania 1960-80

COW CODE: 435.
REGIME TENURES: 1960-78; 1978-2005.
LEADERS: Daddah; Salek, Haidalla.
INSTALLED: No; no.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes.
END: 1980.

OVERVIEW: In the initial pre- and post-independence period (1956-63) the French military intervened on behalf of the Daddah regime (McNamara 1989, 164-65; Chipman 1989, 124; Somerville 1990, 22). France provided training to the Mauritanian military and French troops remained stationed in the country.[119] Paris intervened in 1977-78 against the Polisario insurgency and in 1980 after signing an additional military agreement (Moose 1985, 78; Chipman 1989, 124; McNamara 1989, 165). In 1978, a military coup ousted Ould Daddah and was not resisted by the French (Moose 1985, 77-78). As Paris tried to extricate itself from the conflict, Noukachott switched alignment to Polisario and Algeria and "much to French dismay" insisted Paris remove its remaining troops (Moose 1985, 78). After 1979 Mauritania was 'openly hostile' to France (Moose 1985, 65).

[118] "France's Military Role in Africa from 'West Africa.'" *Africa Report* 9, no. 1: 13.
[119] "France's Military Role in Africa from 'West Africa.'" *Africa Report* 9, no. 1: 14.

## 4.9 Niger 1960-

COW CODE: 436.
REGIME TENURES: 1960-74; 1974-91; 1996-99.
LEADERS: Diori; Kountche, Saibou, Mainasarra.
INSTALLED: No; no; no.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes; yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes; yes.
END: Sponsorship until authoritarian regime end (democratization).

OVERVIEW: The Nigerien army was created by the consolidation of three companies of former French military units and French soldiers remained stationed in the country after decolonization (Somerville 1990, 22).[120] With the aid of French police forces, the ruling PPN repressed its major nationalist political opponents, particularly the Sawaba party (Charlick 1991, 51). Niger signed a mutual defense accord with France at independence (Crocker 1968, 22). During a coup attempt in 1963, French troops intervened on behalf of Diori and did so again against Sawaba insurgents (Schmidt 2013, 182-83). French troops were stationed in the capital and major towns throughout the 1960s (Charlick 1991, 55). In 1973 French troops were dispatched again to help Diori "maintain power at a time of severe drought and internal unrest. Diori feared a military coup and used French support to stave it off" (Somerville 1990, 105). However, Paris stood aside as Diori's regime fell to a coup in 1974 (Charlick 1991, 61-62; Decalo 2012, 119). Despite replacing many French advisers and demanding the withdrawal of the French garrison, the new regime "remained close to France" and in 1976 renewed the Franco-Nigerien Defense Cooperation Agreement and Paris sent around 100 military advisers the following year (Somerville 1990, 105).[121] Despite removing permanent troops in 1980, France "remained Niger's major source of military equipment and training and there was implicit in the relationship a French guarantee in the case of external aggression" (Somerville 1990, 106). In 1981 during tensions with Libya, Paris dispatched the Rapid Deployment Force to Niger (Charlick 1991, 130). Paris continued to provide direct budgetary support as well as military advisers attached directly to Nigerien units.[122]

## 4.10 Senegal 1960-

COW CODE: 433.
REGIME TENURE: 1960-2000.
LEADERS: Senghor, Diouf.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: Sponsorship until regime end (democratization).

[120] "France's Military Role in Africa from 'West Africa.'" *Africa Report* 9, no. 1: 14-15.
[121] See also Charlick 1991, 62, 134.
[122] "Niger: Near Term Prospects." Memo; Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 10/02/1986; Secret; Declassified 03/17/2011; CREST No. CIA-RDP86T01017R000707360001-7; General CIA Records.

OVERVIEW: In 1960, France and Senegal signed a defense agreement which assured internal security (though the treaty was amended in 1974 to remove explicit mention of the internal security guarantee) (Chipman 1989, 129). In 1962, France stopped a coup attempt by mobilizing its soldiers based in Dakar to defend the regime (Vallin 2015, 82). Paris kept a sizable contingent of troops in Dakar to assist in internal security (Skurnik 1972, 179-80). French advisers were embedded directly in the Senegalese armed forces, from the general staff to the infantry.[123] French intelligence also helped the regime uncover alleged subversive internal groups (Skurnik 1972, 182). France intervened militarily on behalf of the regime in 1982, 1989, and 1991 (Charbounneau 2008, 69). Throughout the 1990s France continued to support Senegal (Emmanuel 2012, 155). France maintains military and intelligence advisers in the Senegal and the regime benefits from an "ongoing French commitment to maintain both [its] internal and external security" (Decalo 2012, 118; 119).

## 4.11 Togo 1960-2005

COW CODE: 461.
REGIME TENURES: 1960-63; 1963- .
LEADERS: Olympio; Eyadema, Gnassingbe.
INSTALLED: No; no.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes; yes.
END: Right censor.

OVERVIEW: In 1960, Togo and France signed an agreement outlining French protection against external threats and signed an additional agreement for military training and supplies in 1961 (Crocker 1968, 21) and continued in the postindependence period (Moose 1985, 62). The Olympio regime had been in the process of a full cooperation accord when Olympio was assassinated in a coup led by Sergeant Etienne Eyadema Gnassingbe (Crocker 1968, 21 Okonofua 2015, 86). Eyadema had been part of the French army, and his coup was "welcomed" by Paris (Houngnikpo 2001, 158; Okonofua 2015, 86). The French quickly recognized the regime (McNamara 1989, 165; Somerville 1990, 23). France intervened in 1994 for operation Tatou (Charbounneau 2008, 70). France did not pressure Togo to democratize after the Cold War (Houngnikpo 2001, 157, 159), though the international isolation of the regime rose after 2005 with Paris supporting sanctions (Heilbrunn 2007, 233; Okonofua 2015, 88).

[123] "Senegal: Prospects for Stability." Memo; Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 02/03/1984; Secret; Declassified 08/12/2010; CREST No. CIA-RDP85T00287R000901020001-1; General CIA Records.

# 5 British Client Regimes

## 5.1 Egypt 1922-52

COW CODE: 651.
REGIME TENURE: 1922-52.
LEADERS: Faruk.
INSTALLED: Yes.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: Sponsorship until collapse.

OVERVIEW: The U.K. occupied Egypt beginning in 1882 in what was intended to be a short term occupation but continued until WWI, ultimately resulting in a protectorate established in 1914 (Gordon 1992, 15). After a pro-independence uprising in 1919, the U.K. granted Egypt formal independence in 1922 "but reserved the right to intervene in its internal affairs in four areas: the rights of foreign interests and minorities; the defense of Egypt against foreign aggression or interference; the Suez Canal; and the Sudan" (Gordon 1992, 16). London also retained control of the Egyptian army "and maintained its own standing force in the country" (Gordon 1992, 16). The Egyptian monarch was "put in power by the British army." (Riedel 2018, 7). During WWII, Britain reoccupied Egypt and built up the Egyptian armed forces (Gordon 1992, 18; Pollack 2019, 62). The Free Officers coup in 1952 took London by surprise and resulted in the end of British sponsorship (Gerolymatos 2010, 110-11).

## 5.2 Iraq 1932-58

COW CODE: 645.
REGIME TENURE: 1932-58.
LEADERS: Faisal, Abd al-Ilah.
INSTALLED: Yes.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: Sponsorship until collapse.

OVERVIEW: After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the U.K. "gave [Faisal] the newly constructed state of Iraq" (Gerolymatos 2010, 56) and Faisal "was duly enthroned King in Baghdad, and became King as a British puppet" (Fieldhouse 2008, 91).[124] The independence agreement granted Britain access to airfields as well as transit rights in times of war (Fieldhouse 2008, 96). For several years prior to WWII the monarchy lost control over Iraq and after the war the U.K. again rebuilt the coercive apparatus (Eppel 2004, 49; Sluglett 2007, 211; Fieldhouse 2008, 109). Bilateral treaties (1930, 1955) committed Britain to defend Iraq if attacked as well as train the Iraqi army (Fieldhouse 2008, 112). The military

[124] See also Eppel 2004, 32.

coup in 1958 and the new Free Officers regime severed ties with Britain (Newsom 2001, 75; Fieldhouse 2008, 113-15).

## 5.3 Jordan 1946-57

COW CODE: 663.
REGIME TENURE: 1946- .
LEADERS: Abdullah, Talal, Hashim, Hussein.
INSTALLED: Yes.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: 1957.

OVERVIEW: Great Britain had given military advisers and weapons to Hussein beginning in 1916 (Kostiner 1993, 9). The U.K. ultimately "awarded" Transjordan (Jordan) to Abdullah after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Gerolymatos 2010, 56; Eppel 2004, 34). From 1946 onward the U.K. provided an annual subsidy to the Hashemite regime, and Abdullah "depended almost entirely on the British, not only for money but also for security" (Fieldhouse 2008, 228). The British formed the Arab Legion (the first national army for the Kingdom) and the internal security force (Fieldhouse 2008, 227; Yom 2016, 158; Pollack 2019, 39). The Legion depended "almost entirely on the British subsidy" (Fieldhouse 2008, 239). British (and UN) aid comprised over half of all state revenues from 1949-56 (Yom 2016, 159-60). In 1957, under pressure from nationalists, King Hussein "had little choice but to annul the Anglo-Jordanian" treaty and expel British troops (Yom 2016, 164; Pollack 2019, 39). Thereafter, Amman received sponsorship from the United States (see Section 3.12). The connection remained close, however, and in 1958 British troops landed in Amman to counter a coup threat (leaving later that year) (Fieldhouse 2008, 241, 244).

## 5.4 Libya 1951-69

COW CODE: 620.
REGIME TENURE: 1951-69.
LEADER: Idris.
INSTALLED: Yes.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: Sponsorship until collapse.

OVERVIEW: The modern Libyan state was created by the leading global powers after WWII (primarily the U.K. and U.S.) out of three former Italian colonies (Ahmida 2009, 153; Vandewalle 2012, 24, 38, 40). Having backed the U.K. in the war against the Axis powers, Sayyid Idris was crowned King of Libya (a position created for the occasion) (Khadduri 1963, 180, 189; Vandewalle 1998, 45; Vandewalle 2012, 42). Upon independence, the Idris regime was dependent on revenue from the U.K. (and the U.S.) as oil was not discovered until 1959 (Newsom 2001, 82; Vandewalle 1998, 48; Pargeter 2012, 36; Vandewalle 2012,

44).[125] London trained Libyan troops and kept forces stationed in Libya (Khadduri 1963, 227-3; Pargeter 2012, 49).[126] The U.K. deployed its military forces in 1958 against a coup attempt to keep "King Idris alive and in power" (Blackwell 2003, 2). The U.K. was taken surprise[127] by the 1969 coup and lost its position in Libya thereafter.[128]

## 5.5 Oman 1861-1985

COW CODE: 698.
REGIME TENURE: 1741- [129]
LEADERS: Said, Qabus.
INSTALLED: No, yes.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: No.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: No.
END: Realignment to U.S. in mid-1980s.

OVERVIEW: British-Omani cooperation dates back to 1798, followed by an annual subsidy beginning in 1861 (Takriti 2013, 14). The financial subsidy only ceased in 1967 with the beginning of Omani oil export (Takriti 2013, 88-89). While initially focusing on the defense of Oman from external threats, in 1921 the U.K. began to establish a Muscati army (Takriti 2013, 20). In response to a growing insurgency led by the Oman Liberation Army (OLA) in 1957 the British sought to reorganize the Sultan's forces and establish a more professional and permanent military fore (Takriti 2013, 24; Jones and Ridout 2015, 127). British officers served in leading positions in the Sultanate's intelligence apparatus and military (Takriti 2013, 4). The U.K. directly committed its soldiers to an attack on a Saudi garrison on October 26, 1955 on behalf of the Sultan and again in 1957 against the OLA and in 1959 against a rebellion in Jebel Akhdar (Takriti 2013, 22-24; Jones and Ridout 2015, 130). In 1970, the British backed a palace coup by Sayyid Qaboos (Jones and Ridout 2015, 144). However, British influence in Oman declined in the mid-1970s and the U.S. role increased by the mid-1980s (Worrall 2014, 219-20).

[125] The U.S. provided a large amount of economic assistance to the Libyan state along with its British partners. By the end of 1959, Washington had provided Libya with $100 million, rendering Libya with its small population the largest per capital aid recipient in the world (Vandewalle 2012, 45).

[126] See also "Report on Libyan Coup." Memo for President Nixon from Henry A. Kissinger. 10/01/1969; Secret; Declassified 08/11/2010; CREST No. LOC-HAK-287-1-4-8; Library of Congress.

[127] "Report on Libyan Coup." Memo for President Nixon from Henry A. Kissinger. 10/01/1969; Secret; Declassified 08/11/2010; CREST No. LOC-HAK-287-1-4-8; Library of Congress.

[128] "US Negotiations on Wheelus Air Base." Memo for CIA Director; Office of National Estimates; Central Intelligence Agency; 12/11/1969; Secret; Declassified 07/22/2005; CREST No. CIA-RDP79R00904A001500010002-5; General CIA Records.

[129] In their most recent release of the data on autocratic regimes, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018) encourage recoding Oman to begin in 1920 to coincide with the Treaty of Seeb which established Omani autonomy within Muscat and Oman.

## 5.6 Saudi Arabia 1927-50

COW CODE: 670.
REGIME TENURE: 1927- .
LEADERS: Abd al Aziz.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: Realignment to U.S. in 1950.

OVERVIEW: During WWI, the U.K. allied with 'Abd al-'Aziz against Ottoman forces in the Hijaz, though relations remained relatively minimal until around 1926 (Niblock 2006, 27). London began to provide the House of Saud a mont subsidy as well as weaponry (Bronson 2006, 31; Niblock 2006, 27). The U.K. directly aided the monarchy in its fight against its erstwhile coalition partners, the Wahhabi *Ikhwan* militias, with aerial assaults and logistical support in 1929 (Gerolymatos 2010, 57; Riedel 2018, 23). Saudi Arabia realigned to the U.S. starting in 1950 (see Section 3.17).

# 6 Chinese Client Regimes

## 6.1 Cambodia 1975-79

COW CODE: 811.
REGIME TENURE: 1975-79.
LEADER: Pol Pot.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.[130]
END: Sponsorship until collapse.

OVERVIEW: China began to provide the Khmer Rouge (Communist Party of Kampuchea, CPK) with military assistance during its insurgency against the U.S.-backed Lon Nol regime (1970-75).[131] Upon seizing power, China continued to provide substantial military and economic aid to the CPK regime (Womack 2006, 26; Mertha 2014, 79.[132] Beijing had "intensive involvement in the Kampuchean [Cambodian] war" and its support for the CPK continued after its seizure of national power (Pao-Min 1985, 119). After the regime took power in Phnom Penh, Beijing pledged $1 billion in military and economic aid, the largest such pledge in Chinese history (Ciorciari 2014, 220). Beijing also provided training for Cambodian soldiers (Mertha 2014, 79-85). China supported the KR regime until it was ousted from power by a Vietnamese invasion (Mertha 2014, 16).

## 6.2 Vietnam, 1954-75

COW CODE: 816.
REGIME TENURE: 1954- .
LEADERS: Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: 1975.

OVERVIEW: In the anticolonial struggle between the Viet Minh and France, China provided extensive military and economic assistance to the Viet Minh (Womack 2006, 162-63,

[130] Though most aid to the Khmer Rouge was through North Vietnam.
[131] "How Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow View the New Situation in Southeast Asia." Memo; Central Intelligence Agency; 07/15/1975; Top Secret; Declassified 08/05/2010; CREST No. LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4; Library of Congress.
[132] See also "'Democratic Cambodia': An Experiment in Radicalism." Research Study; Office of Political Research; Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 12/01/1976; Secret; Declassified 03/02/2004; CREST No. CIA-RDP79T00889A000900110001-8; General CIA Records; "Indochina Briefings." Telegram; Central Intelligence Agency; 11/21/1978; Secret; Declassified 04/23/2002; CREST No. CIA-RDP83B00100R000100070009-0; General CIA Records.

182).[133] Support in this period "remained relatively constant" (Womack 2006, 163). Chinese advisers trained thousands of Viet Minh soldiers in southern China starting in 1950 and training continued into the Second Indochina War.[134] Chinese aid continued after the defeat of French forces and the seizure of power in Hanoi (Womack 2006, 170). During the Second Indochina War, China provided Vietnam with $10 billion in aid (Pao-Min 1985, 162, fn. 2).[135] Beginning in 1973 and accelerating after defeating South Vietnam in 1975, the DRV began to align more strongly toward Moscow (Pao-Min 1985, 162).[136] Relations deteriorated significantly after 1975, and Vietnam and China even fought a border war in 1979 (Womack 2006, 192, 200; Brautigam 2009, 51).

[133] See also "Activities of Chinese Communist Group Organized to Aid Democratic Republic of Vietnam." Information Report; Central Intelligence Agency; 06/07/1951; Confidential; Declassified 12/06/2005; CREST No. CIA-RDP82-00457R007900340001-1; General CIA Records; "Joint Chinese Communist-Democratic Republic of Vietnam Military Conference." Information Report; Central Intelligence Agency; 07/14/1952; Secret; Declassified 04/18/2001; CREST No. CIA-RDP82-00457R012900350001-4; General CIA Records; "Movement of Chinese Communist Supplies to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam." Information Report; Central Intelligence Agency; 07/27/1953; Secret; Declassified 11/24/2003; CREST No. CIA-RDP80-00810A001800630001-2; General CIA Records

[134] "Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956." National Intelligence Estimate; NIE 63.1-55; Director of Central Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 07/19/1955; Secret; Declassified 07/08/2013; CREST No. CIA-RDP79R01012A005900050001-3; General CIA Records; "The Outlook for North Vietnam." Special National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 14.3-64; Director of Central Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 03/04/1964; Secret; Declassified 02/07/2006; CREST No. CIA-RDP80R01720R000200010006-9; General CIA Records.

[135] While the Soviet Union also began to provide assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam during the Second Indochina War, China was the primary source of support for the DRV especially from 1950-1965. See "The Chinese Position in North Vietnam." Intelligence Memo No. 1686/66; Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 08/05/1966; Secret; Declassified 01/12/2000; CREST No. CIA-RDP79T00827A000400030004-7; General CIA Records. On aid levels, see "The Outlook for North Vietnam." Special National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 14.3-64; Director of Central Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 03/04/1964; Secret; Declassified 02/07/2006; CREST No. CIA-RDP80R01720R000200010006-9; General CIA Records.

[136] See subsection 2.20.

# 7 Vietnamese Client Regimes

## 7.1 Cambodia 1979-89

COW CODE: 811.
REGIME TENURE: 1979-.
LEADERS: Heng Samrin, Hun Sen.
INSTALLED: Yes.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: 1989.

OVERVIEW: After an increasing series of clashes with the Khmer Rouge (KR) regime, Hanoi organized a Cambodian government-in-exile from KR defectors and Cambodians living in southern Vietnam (Khmer Krom) and invaded Cambodia and installed this new coalition (Becker 1998, 434-35; Brown and Zasloff 1998, 5-6; Gottesman 2003, 5; Womack 2006, 195; Chandler 2008, 276). After the invasion, 150,000 Vietnamese soldiers occupied Cambodia and engaged in substantial counterinsurgency operations against what remained of the KR (Becker 1998, 431, 435).[137] Most "major decisions" are made by Vietnamese military advisers.[138] Economic assistance came primarily from the Soviet Union "that was estimated at some $80 million a year" in addition to some $20 million from other Soviet bloc countries (including Vietnam which was itself dependent on Soviet aid) (Becker 1998, 449). Upon the drawdown of Soviet aid to Vietnam, Hanoi removed its troops from Cambodia in 1989 (Chandler 2008, 285). Soviet aid to Phnom Penh ceased in 1990 (Thayer 1992, 250).

## 7.2 Laos 1975-89

COW CODE: 812.
REGIME TENURE: 1975- .
LEADER: Kaysone Phomvihane.
INSTALLED: Yes.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: 1989.

OVERVIEW: North Vietnamese cadres had been giving extensive advice and assistance long before the seizure of power and Vietnamese forces accompanied the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) into Vientiane (Brown and Zasloff 1986, 57-58; Brown and Zasloff

[137] In 1986, the CIA estimated between 130,000 to 140,000 Vietnamese soldiers were in Cambodia. "Cambodia: How Viable the Heng Samrin Regime?" Intelligence Assessment; Office of East Asian Analysis; Central Intelligence Agency; 06/01/1986; Secret; Declassified 05/16/2011; CREST No. CIA-RDP04T00794R000200740001-6; General CIA Records.

[138] "Cambodia: Vietnamese Strategy and the New Realities." National Intelligence Estimate; NIE 14.3-85; Director of Central Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 10/01/1985; Secret; Declassified 09/08/2010; CREST No. CIA-RDP87T00495R001001040001-4; General CIA Records.

1994, 244-45; Kurlantzick 2017, 59).[139] During the war, Vietnamese political and military advisers were embedded throughout the LPRP political, administrative, and military system (Langer and Zasloff 1969, 141, 147, 154). After taking power in the capital, around 50,000 Vietnamese forces remained "for [the regime's] protection against hostile or counterrevolutionary neighbors" (Brown and Zasloff 1994, 245) as well as "to suppress the remaining opposition forces" (Auclair 1994, 271).[140] Vietnamese and Soviet instructors founded a police academy which "trained a Laotian secret police organization similar to the Vietnamese internal security apparatus" (Auclair 1994, 288). While in 1978 there were "reportedly" 800 Vietnamese secret police advisers in Laos, by the late 1980s that number was reduced to "a few senior advisers" (Auclair 1994, 288). In 1982, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) received 80% of its annual revenue from foreign assistance, 60% of which came from the USSR (Brown and Zasloff 1986, 123). Vietnamese forces began to withdraw in the mid-1980s, announcing a complete withdrawal in November 1988 which was completed the following year (Auclair 1994, 271, 283).

[139]See also "How Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow View the New Situation in Southeast Asia." Memo; Central Intelligence Agency; 07/15/1975; Top Secret; Declassified 08/05/2010; CREST No. LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4; Library of Congress.

[140]The CIA estimated that in 1986 between 40 and 50,000 Vietnamese troops remained in Laos. "Cambodia: How Viable the Heng Samrin Regime?" Intelligence Assessment; Office of East Asian Analysis; Central Intelligence Agency; 06/01/1986; Secret; Declassified 05/16/2011; CREST No. CIA-RDP04T00794R000200740001-6; General CIA Records.

# 8 Russian Client Regime

## 8.1 Tajikistan 1992-

COW CODE: 702.
REGIME TENURE: 1991-.
LEADER: Rakhmon(ov).
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: No.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: No.
END: Right censor.

OVERVIEW: Early in the Tajik Civil War (1992-97), Russian border guards gave support to the faction which would later seize power in Dushanbe (Collins 2006, 204). In 1993, Moscow and Dushanbe signed the Russian-Tajik Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance which "made Tajikistan a Russian military outpost" (Driscoll 2015, 149).[141] Russia also provided assistance to the organization of the Tajik military and security services (Collins 2006, 293). In 1994, Moscow provided R15 billion which "paid government salaries for the first time since independence" (Driscoll 2015, 120). Russia's armed forces and intelligence services have been used "to support the Rakhmonov regime against domestic challengers" and Moscow intervened directly against the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) (Driscoll 2015, 127; 148). Russian intelligence services shared information on UTO positions starting in 1993 and the Russian FSB helped put down an armed uprising by General Mamajanov (Driscoll 2015, 152-53).

[141] See also Markowitz 2013, 78.

# 9 Yugoslav Client Regime

## 9.1 Albania, 1944-48

COW CODE: 339.
REGIME TENURE: 1944-89.
LEADER: Hoxha.
INSTALLED: Assisted.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: 1948.

OVERVIEW: The Albanian Communist Party (ACP) seized power after a successful partisan struggle against Axis occupation armies and domestic pro-fascist organizations in WWII (Prifti 1978, 9, 19). The ACP received "considerable help from the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP)" in the formation of a unified ACP in 1941 (Prifti 1978, 10-11).[142] During the guerrilla war the YCP provided the ACP with material aid as well as training, and YCP penetration of the Albanian forces continued after the war (Prifti 1978, 14, 196). Belgrade provided Tirana with economic assistance after the war (Prifti 1978, 77). "Tito's Yugoslavia was the most important foreign partner of the new government" (Fevziu 2016, 128) such that Albania was "practically a satellite of Yugoslavia during 1944-1948" (Prifti 1978, 201). In July 1946, a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance was signed with Belgrade (Mehilli 2017, 39). Yugoslavia also agreed to provide economic aid (Mehilli 2017, 39). In 1948 Albania and Yugoslavia split and Tirana realigned toward Moscow (Prifti 1978, 78).[143]

[142] See also Fevziu 2016, 43; Mehilli 2017, 18, 20.
[143] See subsection 2.2.

# 10 Egyptian Client Regime

## 10.1 Yemen 1962-67

COW CODE: 678.
REGIME TENURE: 1962-67.
LEADERS: Sallal, Amri, Sallal.
INSTALLED: No.
IMMEDIATE SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
PRIOR SPONSORSHIP: Yes.
END: Sponsorship until collapse

OVERVIEW: One week after the natural death of Imam Ahmad on September 19, 1962, Yemeni army officers led by Col. 'Abdallah al-Sallal sized power and established the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) (Rabi 2015, 38-39). For months prior to the coup, the officers had received aid from Nasser's Egypt and after the coup Egyptian military aid arrived so quickly that "many observes reached the not unreasonable conclusion that an Egyptian hand had guided the Yemeni revolutionaries" (Ferris 2008, 12). Egypt's Soviet patron quickly recognized the regime and began airlifting Egyptian troops into Sanaa within a week of the coup (Ferris 2008, 20-21). By the end of the following year, the YAR was hosting 30,000 soldiers which doubled by 1965 (Rabi 2015, 42, 54). Soviet pilots conducted bombing raids on behalf of the YAR regime in northern Yemen (Ferris 2008, 6).[144] Egyptian advisers penetrated "every important post of the administration and military command" (Rabi 2015, 42). Egyptian advisers also staffed the presidential guard (Rabi 2015, 53). After members of the ancien regime ("the Royalists") and northern tribesmen launched an insurgency starting shortly after the coup (Rabi 2015, 43-44), Egyptian military units directly participated in the counterinsurgency and other acts of repression of opposition (Rabi 2015, 57). An August 1965 ceasefire brokered between Cairo and Riyadh collapsed after Sanaa refused to abide by the terms of the disagreement (Rabi 2015, 55-56). Egypt decided to withdraw from the YAR by the end of 1967 after its defeat in the 1967 war against Israel, and the Sallal regime was deposed in a coup on November 5, 1967 (Rabi 2015, 59, 67).

[144] Radical policies by the new regime, such as executing clerics and tribesmen resulted in a growing insurgency by members of the Zaydi tribes in the north (Rabi 2015, 42-43).

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