ArkPSA
Arkansas Political Science Association

Third-Party Peacekeeping in Intrastate Disputes, 1946-2012: A New Data Set
Author(s): Mark J. Mullenbach
Source: *The Midsouth Political Science Review*, Volume 14 (December 2013), pp. 103-133
ISSN: 2330-6882 [print]; 2330-6890 [online]
Published by: Arkansas Political Science Association
Website: http://uca.edu/politicalscience/midsouth-political-science-review-mpsr/

Third-Party Peacekeeping in Intrastate Disputes, 1946-2012: A New Data Set

Mark J. Mullenbach
University of Central Arkansas

One of the most significant developments in the management of international disputes since the end of the Second World War has been third-party peacekeeping. However, the accumulation of knowledge regarding third-party peacekeeping is arguably less developed compared to other important phenomena in this area of study. Most of what we know about third-party peacekeeping, including motivations for establishing peacekeeping missions and factors impacting the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions, largely comes from descriptive case studies of particular peacekeeping missions in particular regions of the world. This article seeks to advance scholarly understanding of third-party peacekeeping missions by introducing a new set of quantitative data on third-party peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes from 1946 to 2012. Specifically, this article contributes by examining changes in fundamental principles guiding third-party peacekeeping missions from the Cold War period to the post-Cold War period, as well as by describing basic patterns of third-party peacekeeping in intrastate disputes in the post-World War II period. The article concludes that, in addition to significant changes in the basic principles underlying third-party peacekeeping, there have been significant changes in the frequency, duration, type, and effectiveness of peacekeeping missions from the Cold War period to the post-Cold War period.

Introduction

One of the most significant developments in the management of international disputes since the end of the Second World War has been third-party peacekeeping (Fortna 2003). Peacekeeping personnel have been deployed in international disputes under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), regional inter-governmental organizations (regional IGOs), and states acting individually or collectively outside of the control of the UN or a regional IGO (Bellamy and Williams 2005). Although used only infrequently by third-party actors during the Cold War period, there has been a proliferation of third-party peacekeeping missions during the post-Cold War period. One scholar recently suggested that "international peace-keeping has already proven one of the most important tools of the international community for dealing with violent conflicts" (Pushkina 2004, 393). Similarly, Fred Tanner stated that following the end of the Cold War, "peacekeeping became a necessary and ubiquitous tool for conflict management" (2010, 209). Although not alone in establishing such missions,

the UN in particular has taken the lead in promoting the use of peacekeeping as a tool of dispute management. However, it has been suggested that "[m]uch of what has been written about UN peacekeeping has been idiosyncratic and atheoretical" (Neack 1995, 184). Indeed, while peacekeeping has been characterized as "one of the most visible forms of third-party intervention in violent conflicts at the international level" (Yilmaz 2005, 13), the accumulation of knowledge regarding third-party peacekeeping is arguably less developed compared to other important phenomena in the area of dispute management.

Most of what we know about third-party peacekeeping, including motivations for establishing peacekeeping missions and factors impacting the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions, largely comes from descriptive case studies of particular peacekeeping missions in particular regions of the world (Bellamy et al. 2004; Ryan 2000).[1] While these case studies have provided valuable insights and important findings regarding third-party peacekeeping in particular situations, it has been difficult to generalize these insights and findings beyond those particular cases of peacekeeping. Indeed, one of the major limitations of previous scholarly studies of third-party peacekeeping is the relative lack of quantitative analyses of a large number of peacekeeping missions (Fortna 2003).

Another significant limitation of previous studies of third-party peacekeeping is the tendency not to make a distinction between peacekeeping missions in interstate disputes and peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes. While it is true that third-party peacekeeping was initially developed for disputes between states, most peacekeeping missions in the past two decades have primarily involved disputes between parties within states. In fact, most violent crises and armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War have been intrastate rather than interstate (Jett 1999; Weiss 1994). Alan James remarked in the mid-1990s that "the current trend in peacekeeping has a marked internal emphasis" (1995, 242). Given the increasing number of third-party peacekeeping missions established in intrastate disputes since the end of the Second World War, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, it is important for scholars to separately examine the motivations and effectiveness of peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes.

[1] For example, see Adeleke 1995, Agoagye 2004, Alden 1995, Curtis 1964, Farris 1994, Olonisakin 1996, Pushkina 2004, Schmidl 1999, Sesay 1991, Thakur 1984, Thakur 1994, Wainhouse 1973.

A third limitation of previous research on third-party peacekeeping missions is the tendency of many scholars to focus solely on one particular form of third-party peacekeeping, particularly UN peacekeeping missions (e.g. Aksu 2003; Bariagaber 2006; Boulden 2005; Bratt 1999; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Johansen 1996; Karns and Mingst 2001; MacQueen 1999; Malaquias 2002; Malone and Wermester 2000; Stover 2002; Thakur 1994; Yilmaz 2005).[2] This recent emphasis on studies of UN peacekeeping probably reflects the fact that of the approximately 70 UN peacekeeping missions established since 1945, some three-fourths of these missions have been established since 1990. While other scholars have focused on peacekeeping missions established by regional IGOs or sub-regional IGOs (e.g. Berman and Sams 2000; Diehl 1993), there have only been a small number of studies that have examined the full range of third-party peacekeeping missions (e.g. Diehl 1994; Fortna 2003; 2004a; Mackinlay 1989; Mullenbach 2005; Weinberger 1995).

To address the limitations of previous peacekeeping studies, this article introduces a new source of quantitative data on third-party peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes. Unlike some compilations of peacekeeping missions, the new data set includes UN, regional IGO, and state peacekeeping missions established between January 1, 1946 and December 31, 2012. The data set may be used by international relations scholars and practitioners to analyze the occurrence, characteristics, and effectiveness of peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes in the post-World War II period. The remainder of this article is divided into three sections. First, a definition of third-party peacekeeping is provided, including a discussion of the basic criteria that are common to most scholarly definitions of peacekeeping. Second, several fundamental principles of third-party peacekeeping during the post-World War II period are discussed, including an explanation of how these principles have changed since the end of the Cold War. Lastly, the new data set containing 36 different variables is used to describe some basic patterns of third-party peacekeeping in intrastate disputes between 1946 and 2012.[3]

---

[2] The first "peacekeeping" mission authorized by the United Nations Security Council, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), was established in the Middle East in 1948. One year earlier, the UN General Assembly established a "peace observation" mission, UN Special Committee in the Balkans (UNSCOB), in Greece in 1947 (Ballamy et al., 2004, 47). However, the term "peacekeeping" was first used when the UN General Assembly established the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) following the Suez War in 1956 (Aksu 2003, 21-22; Rikhye 1983, 6).

[3] The coding manual for the data set is located at: http://uca.edu/politicalscience/files/2013/09/Third-Party-PKMs-version-3.0-Codebook.pdf.

Defining Third-Party Peacekeeping

One of the obstacles facing scholars who analyze the motivations and effectiveness of third-party peacekeeping is the lack of a common definition of peacekeeping (Goulding 1993; MacQueen 2006). Indeed, scholars have defined third-party peacekeeping in a number of different ways, although most definitions of third-party peacekeeping specify a set of basic criteria. First, most definitions indicate the specific types of personnel that may be deployed as peacekeepers. Some scholars limit their definition of peacekeeping to military personnel, while others include both military and civilian personnel.[4] Second, most definitions of third-party peacekeeping specify who has "command and control" over the peacekeeping personnel, such as the UN, regional organizations, and states. Some scholars limit their definition of third-party peacekeeping to missions established by the UN, although most scholars acknowledge that non-UN actors may also initiate peacekeeping operations (e.g. Bellamy et al. 2004).[5] Finally, most definitions of third-party peacekeeping specify the types of activities or functions that peacekeeping personnel will undertake. These activities generally include traditional (or "first generation") functions such as monitoring ceasefire agreements, as well as contemporary (or "second generation") functions such as protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance (Shaw 1995).

On the other hand, very few definitions of third-party peacekeeping include criteria related to the size of the peacekeeping mission and the length of the peacekeeping mission. In fact, third-party peacekeeping missions range from very small sizes (e.g. five military or civilian observers) to very large sizes (e.g. 50,000 military personnel). In addition, third-party peacekeeping missions range from short time periods (e.g. one month) to long time periods (e.g. several decades). Therefore, peacekeeping is not

[4] See Heldt and Wallensteen (2005, 11) for an example of a definition of peacekeeping missions involving military troops, military observers, and/or civilian police. Also, see Diehl (1988, 487) and Yilmaz (2005, 15) for examples of definitions of peacekeeping that include military personnel, civilian police, and civilian personnel. On the other hand, Beardsley (2011, 1057) provides a definition that limits peacekeeping to the "deployment of military personnel to a foreign state."

[5] For example, Goulding (1993, 455) defined peacekeeping as "[f]ield operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties, and using force to the minimum extent necessary."

defined based on the size or length of the mission, although this information regarding peacekeeping missions is included in the data set.

Using the three criteria (type of personnel, command and control, and functions) discussed above, third-party peacekeeping is defined as the following: *the deployment of military and/or civilian personnel by one or more third-party states, frequently but not necessarily under the auspices of an international organization, into a crisis, conflict, or post-conflict situation for one or more of the following security-related functions: (1) maintaining law and order (military personnel or civilian police); (2) monitoring a ceasefire agreement (military or civilian personnel); (3) verifying the disarmament, demobilization, or disengagement of combatants (military personnel); (4) protecting the delivering of humanitarian assistance (military personnel); (5) providing security for specific groups, events, or locations, such as refugee camps, government officials, elections, or major airports (military personnel or civilian police); and (6) maintaining a buffer zone (military personnel).*[6]

This definition intentionally excludes missions that are primarily "peace enforcement" efforts such as the US-led military forces deployed in Korea in the 1950s or the US-led military forces deployed in the Persian Gulf region in 1990-1991. Peace enforcement refers to the deployment of military forces "to separate warring sides in order to impose peace on at least one combatant" (Shimizu and Sandler 2002, 653). However, peacekeeping missions that were subsequently authorized by the UN Security Council, a regional organization, or a state to use military force in support of the peacekeeping mission, as was the case during the 1990s in Somalia, Liberia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Haiti, are included among the cases of third-party peacekeeping in this data set. This definition of peacekeeping also excludes what are essentially "peacebuilding" activities undertaken primarily by civilian personnel, such as election monitoring, human rights monitoring, civilian police training/monitoring, refugee repatriation, and temporary administration.[7]

---

[6] Third-party peacekeeping generally involves military personnel, not civilian personnel. However, in a limited number of situations, the monitoring of ceasefire agreements or other security-related functions is performed by civilian personnel.

[7] Paris (1997, 55) defined peacebuilding as a "broad range of activities, from disarming former belligerents to providing financial and humanitarian assistance, monitoring and conducting elections, repatriating refugees, rebuilding physical infrastructure, advising and training security personnel and judicial officials, and even temporarily taking over the administration of an entire country."

Principles of Third-Party Peacekeeping

The fundamental principles guiding the establishment, deployment, and conduct of third-party peacekeeping have evolved considerably during the more than sixty-five years since the end of the Second World War (see Table 1). Since the UN Charter does not contain any specific references to peacekeeping, the original principles of third-party peacekeeping in general - and UN peacekeeping in particular - were initially developed on an *ad hoc* basis in the late 1950s. In fact, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold circulated a proposed set of peacekeeping principles to the UN General Assembly in October 1958 (Boulden 2005; MacQueen 1999). The proposals were based on the experiences of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in Egypt in 1956.[8] These proposals by Secretary-General Hammarskjöld laid the foundation for the basic principles that would guide third-party peacekeeping during the next thirty years.

Table 1: Principles of Third-Party Peacekeeping, 1946-2012

Cold War Period (1946-1989)	Post-Cold War Period (1990-2012
Interstate Disputes	*Intrastate Disputes*
Consent Required	*Consent Not Required*
Non-Coercive	*Coercive*
Neutrality	*Complexity*
One-Dimensional	*Multi-Dimensional*

Cold War Principles of Peacekeeping

During the Cold War period, there were at least five broadly accepted principles of third-party peacekeeping. First, third-party peacekeeping was essentially a tool or mechanism of conflict management to be used by the UN for disputes primarily between states (Bellamy et al. 2004; Goulding 1993). In fact, David Malone and Karin Wermester suggested that because a "permanent standing UN army" did not come about as some expected during the early Cold War period "peacekeeping emerged as an instrument for the UN to manage inter-state conflict" (2000, 37). This aspect of peacekeeping was derived from widespread adherence to the principles of

[8] The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was established by the UN General Assembly on November 4, 1956 following the Israeli invasion of the Suez on October 29, 1956. The UN General Assembly took up the matter after two permanent members of the UN Security Council, Britain and France, intervened in support of Israel. The mandate of UNEF was to secure and supervise a ceasefire agreement, as well as the withdrawal of Israeli, British, and French armed forces from Egypt. UNEF was withdrawn from the Suez area after Egypt formally requested its removal in May 1967.

state sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states. With respect to the principle of state sovereignty, Peter Arthur wrote that "the Westphalian perspective of peacekeeping sees the role of peacekeepers in global politics as merely one of assisting states to peacefully settle disputes between them" (2010, 5). According to the related principle of non-intervention, third party actors, including states and the UN, were generally prohibited from interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states (Semb 2000).[9]

Second, third party actors were required to obtain the consent of the parties to the dispute before deploying peacekeeping personnel (Boulden 2005; Child 1980; Cottey 2008; Diehl 1988; Goulding 1993; Rikhye et al. 1974; Thakur and Schnabel 2001). This consent was necessary in order to avoid violating the sovereignty of one or more states involved in a conflict (Karns and Mingst 2001). In fact, peacekeeping personnel were required to withdraw from any state that later decided it no longer consented to the deployment of such personnel on its territory (Bloomfield 1970; Goulding 1993). For example, the UN peacekeeping mission (UN Emergency Force-UNEF I) was completely withdrawn from Egyptian territory in June 1967 following a formal request from the Egyptian government about one month earlier (Ghali 1993).

Third, third-party peacekeeping personnel were normally prohibited from using coercive military force during a peacekeeping mission, except in self-defense (Boulden 2005; Child 1980; Cottey 2008; Fortna 2004b; Goulding 1993; Thakur and Schnabel 2001). Indar Jit Rikhye referred to peacekeeping as the "use of non-enforcement military measures for the continuation of diplomacy" (1983, 7). In fact, peacekeeping personnel deployed during the Cold War were often unarmed or lightly armed, so the option of using military force for one reason or another was largely unavailable. Peacekeeping personnel were only allowed to use military force when the third-party actor specifically authorized such personnel to use military force, as was the case of the United Nations Operation in Congo (ONUC) in the 1960s (Aksu 2003; Cottey 2008; Rikhye 1974).

[9] Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the [UN] to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."

Fourth, third-party peacekeeping personnel were required to maintain absolute neutrality during the peacekeeping mission (Boulden 2005; Child 1980; Goulding 1993; Rikhye et al. 1974; Shaw 1995). In other words, the peacekeeping personnel could not take actions in support of or in opposition to one of the parties to the dispute. According to Laura Neack, the "UN would take no sides but establish a neutral military presence to facilitate the peaceful resolution of conflict" (1995, 182). This principle normally precluded major global powers, particularly the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, from contributing troops to peacekeeping missions since it was expected that such countries had national interests in the region of the target state, or in the target state itself, that made neutrality or impartiality difficult (Diehl 1988; Mackinlay 1989). In fact, the principle of neutrality meant that any state with a national interest in the dispute would not contribute troops to a peacekeeping mission for that dispute (Boulden 2005).

Finally, the scope of most third-party peacekeeping missions was generally limited to one specific security-related function such as monitoring a ceasefire agreement between the parties or verifying the demobilization of the military forces of the parties (Cottey 2008). This type of peacekeeping is generally referred to as "traditional peacekeeping" or "one-dimensional peacekeeping."[10] According to Jane Boulden, "[t]raditional peacekeeping operations tended to be the product of mandates that did not stray beyond the observance and maintenance of those [cease-fire or peace] agreements" (2005, 150). As an example, the International Commission for Supervision and Control in South Vietnam (ICSC-South Vietnam), which consisted of some 1,500 civilian and military personnel from Canada, India and Poland, was primarily responsible for maintaining the truce that had ended military hostilities between French forces and the Viet Minh in Indo-China in July 1954 (James 1990). Likewise, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which was established by the UN Security Council in May 1948, initially was tasked with the responsibility of monitoring a ceasefire agreement between Israel and several Arab countries, but later was given the responsibility of supervising the terms of the General Armistice Agreements of 1949 (Cockayne and Malone 2005).

[10] Assis Malaquias referred to such missions as "classic peacekeeping missions", involving "the deployment of small and lightly armed multinational forces to help observe and maintain ceasefire agreements among former combatants" (2002, 415).

Post-Cold War Principles of Peacekeeping

Beginning in the late 1980s, the principles of third-party peacekeeping began to change in response to significant developments in the international political system, including the end of the superpower rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, there are at least five different principles characterizing third-party peacekeeping. To some extent, these post-Cold War principles are contradictory to the principles that guided third-party peacekeeping during the Cold War.

First, third-party actors are not constrained from establishing peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes in the post-Cold War period (Bellamy et al. 2004; MacQueen 2006; Perkins and Neumayer 2008). In fact, third party actors, including the UN, are increasingly motivated to deploy peacekeeping personnel during or following conflicts between parties within states, partly at least reflecting the increasing cooperation and consensus among the permanent members of the UN Security Council during the post-Cold War period (Cockayne and Malone 2005; Malone and Wermester 2000). Perhaps more importantly, states and international organizations increasingly perceive civil conflicts as significant threats to international peace and security after the end of the Cold War, just as they had previously perceived conflicts between states as significant threats to international peace and security during the Cold War. Also, some scholars have argued that the principle of non-intervention in intrastate disputes, particularly those disputes involving humanitarian crises or gross violations of human rights, has been diminished or changed since the end of the Cold War (Karns and Mingst 2001; Semb 2000). According to Peter Arthur, the "end of the cold war has led to a basic shift in international relations among states, heralding an international humanitarian order that promises to hold state sovereignty accountable to human-rights standards" (2010, 5).

Second, third-party peacekeeping missions may be established and sustained in conflict situations, particularly in civil conflicts, without the consent of one or more of the parties to the dispute (Cottey 2008; James 1995; Jeong 2004; MacQueen 2006). In some rare cases, peacekeeping personnel may even be deployed without the consent of any of the parties to the dispute due to the complete collapse of the government of a state. For example, in the case of Somalia in the early 1990s the UN peacekeeping mission "could neither seek nor achieve consent of the parties to the local conflict" because Somalia "did not possess even the meager trappings of central government authority" (Weinberger, 1995, 173). According to

Andrew Cottey, "[o]ne central implication of the absence of consent was that intervening forces faced the risk of armed resistance from the government of the country concerned and/or from opposition groups" (2008, 433).

Third, third-party peacekeeping missions may be authorized to use coercive military force in order to enforce the terms of a ceasefire or peace agreement, to disarm combatants, or to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance (Cottey 2008; James 1995; Shaw 1995). Indeed, Norrie MacQueen suggested that since the end of the Cold War, the trend "has been towards a greater acceptance of the use of force" by peacekeeping personnel (2006, 10). Examples of third-party peacekeeping missions that were authorized to use military force include missions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti in the early 1990s (Jakobsen 1996; Thakur 1994).

Fourth, third-party peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War period are often linked to other third-party peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts. Third-party peacemaking generally refers to facilitating or mediating negotiations between the parties to a dispute, while third-party peacebuilding generally refers to efforts to "deal with the underlying problems or basic needs of the parties to the dispute," including such activities as election monitoring, human rights promotion, civilian police training, humanitarian assistance, and refugee repatriation (Mullenbach, 2006, 56-59). According to Ho-Won Jeong, peacekeeping operations "can have an impact on identifying and supporting structures that will strengthen and solidify stable relations between former adversaries" and given that "fear of recurrent violence prolongs international presence, successful peacebuilding is moreover part of an exit strategy for peacekeeping" (2004, 21-22). Frequently, these inter-connected conflict management activities, sometimes called "complex peacekeeping," are coordinated by the UN or a particular regional IGO. In the case of UN-coordinated "peace" missions, the UN secretary-general will often appoint a special representative to supervise the various military and civilian components (Malone and Wermester 2000). In other cases, the UN and a regional IGO will jointly undertake and coordinate "peace" missions such as the current United Nations/African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).[11]

Finally, third-party peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War period increasingly involve two or more security-related functions such as maintaining law and order, monitoring a ceasefire agreement, and verifying

[11] See information about UNAMID at: http://unamid.unmissions.org/.

the demobilization of combatants. This type of peacekeeping is referred to as "contemporary peacekeeping" or "multidimensional peacekeeping." For example, a "multidimensional" UN peacekeeping mission established by the UN Security Council in 1999 – UN Mission in Sierra Leone-UNAMSIL - was responsible for at least four different security-related functions, including assisting the government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament and demobilization of RUF rebels; monitoring the terms of the ceasefire agreement; facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and providing security at key locations, government buildings, and major airports.[12]

Patterns of Third-Party Peacekeeping

In this section, the newly-compiled data on third-party peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes, including some of the procedures that were used to compile the data, are described.[13] A total of 202 third-party peacekeeping missions, including 37 missions (18%) established during the Cold War period (1946-1989) and 165 missions (82%) established during the post-Cold War period (1990-2012), are included in the data set. One of the first steps in developing this data set was to identify the distinct "opportunities" for the establishment of third-party peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes. Using information from hundreds of different published sources, more than 280 intrastate disputes throughout the world were identified.[14] Each of the intrastate disputes was disaggregated into one or more of five different disputes phases (pre-crisis, crisis, conflict, post-conflict, and post-crisis). Since 1946, there have been 237 conflicts (i.e. conflict phases) involving military hostilities between governments and opposition groups within states. In addition, there have been 400 crises (i.e. crisis phases) involving political unrest or violence within states short of military hostilities.[15] Both crises and conflicts in intrastate disputes represent opportunities for third-party peacekeeping missions.

---

[12] See information about UNAMSIL at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/.

[13] The data set on Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions (1946-2012) is located at: http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/dadm-data-sets/.

[14] See Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) – Intrastate Dispute Narratives located at:: http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/dadm-intratstate-dispute-narratives/.

[15] The complete list of conflicts and crises in the intrastate disputes, including beginning dates and ending dates, that occurred between 1946 and 2012 is located at: http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/list-of-intrastate-conflicts-and-crises-1946-2012/.

The next step in the process was to examine each of the 237 conflict phases and 400 crisis phases in order to identify the presence of third-party peacekeeping missions established during or immediately following these phases. As noted above, a total of 202 third-party peacekeeping missions were identified as having been established in intrastate disputes between 1946 and 2012. As shown in Table 2, the UN established a total of 70 peacekeeping missions, including 15 missions (21%) during the Cold War period and 55 missions (79%) during the post-Cold War period.[16] Regional IGOs established a total of 87 peacekeeping missions, including 10 missions (11%) during the Cold War period and 77 missions (89%) during the post-Cold War period. Lastly, states or coalitions of states established a total of 45 peacekeeping missions, including 12 missions (27%) during the Cold War period and 33 missions (73%) during the post-Cold War period.

Table 2: Summary of Peacekeeping Missions in Intrastate Disputes, 1946-2012

Third-Party Actor	Number of Missions* (established)	Average Duration* (months)	Average Size* (personnel)
United Nations			
Cold War	15	58 (including UNFICYP) 21 (excluding UNFICYP)	2,233
Post-Cold War	55	49	5,734
Totals	70	51	5,044
Regional IGOs			
Cold War	10	23	5,154
Post-Cold War	77	48	5,275
Totals	87	45	5,453
States			
Cold War	12	60	8,343
Post-Cold War	33	25	9,462
Totals	45	35	9,163
Overall	202	45	6,035

* Includes both completed and ongoing peacekeeping missions.
UNFICYP - United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.

Consistent with the change in peacekeeping principles since the end of the Cold War, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of third-party peacekeeping missions established in intrastate disputes in the past

[16] The United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation – UNAMID in Darfur, Sudan is counted as a UN peacekeeping mission.

two decades or so. As shown in Figure 1, less than one peacekeeping mission on average was established per year during the Cold War period, while more than seven peacekeeping missions on average have been established per year during the post-Cold War period. With the exceptions of the early-1960s and late-1980s, there were fewer than five third-party peacekeeping missions established during each of the five-year periods between 1946 and 1990. From 1991 to 1995, an astonishing 47 peacekeeping missions – including 22 UN missions - were established by third-party actors. This was more than the total number of third-party peacekeeping missions established during the previous 45 years combined. While the number of peacekeeping missions established by the UN has decreased by more than 50% since the early 1990s, the number of regional IGO peacekeeping missions has remained at or above 15 missions during each of the five-year periods since 1991.

Figure 1: Number of Peacekeeping Missions Established in Intrastate Disputes, 1946-2012



Although the UN has been at the forefront of establishing peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes since the end of the Second World War, some two-thirds of all third-party peacekeeping missions established during this period have been non-UN missions, including missions established by regional IGOs and missions established by states (including informal coalitions of states). Accounting for more than three-fourths of the 87

regional IGO peacekeeping missions were six regional organizations - European Community-EC/European Union-EU (21 missions), Organization of African Union-OAU/African Union-AU (20 missions), North Atlantic Treaty Organization-NATO (nine missions), Economic Community of West African States-ECOWAS (seven missions), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe-OSCE (five missions), and League of Arab States-LAS (five missions).[17] Furthermore, six countries have been responsible for leading more than two-thirds of the 45 state peacekeeping missions since the end of World War II – U.S. (eight missions), Australia (seven missions), India (five missions), France (four missions), Italy (four missions), and Nigeria (three missions).[18]

As shown in Table 2, the average duration of all completed and ongoing third-party peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes during the post-World War II period is 45 months, although there are significant variations in the average durations of the different categories of peacekeeping missions between the Cold War period and post-Cold War period. For example, the duration of completed and ongoing UN peacekeeping missions established during the Cold War period averaged 21 months (excluding UNFICYP), compared to an average duration of 49 months for completed and ongoing UN peacekeeping missions established during the post-Cold War period. Similarly, completed and ongoing regional IGO peacekeeping missions established during the Cold War period had an average duration of 23 months, while completed and ongoing regional IGO peacekeeping missions established during the post-Cold War period had an average duration of 48 months. On the other hand, the duration of completed and ongoing state peacekeeping missions established during the Cold War averaged 60 months, while the duration of completed and ongoing state peacekeeping missions established during the post-Cold War period averaged 25 months.

[17] Twelve regional organizations accounted for the remaining regional IGO peacekeeping missions: Commonwealth of Independent States-CIS (four missions); Commonwealth of Nations-CON (three missions); Organization of American States-OAS (three missions); Western European Union-WEU (two missions); Organization of the Islamic Conference-OIC (one mission); Organization of Eastern Caribbean States-OECS (one mission); Inter-Governmental Authority for Development-IGAD (one mission); Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa-CEMAC (one mission); Community of Sahel-Saharan States-CEN-SAD (one mission); Economic Community of Central African States-ECCAS (one mission); Pacific Islands Forum (one mission); and Southern African Development Community-SADC (one mission).

[18] Eleven countries have been the lead country in the remaining state peacekeeping missions – New Zealand (two missions), Britain (two missions), Malaysia (two missions), Gabon (one mission), Indonesia (one mission), Norway (one mission), Russia (one mission), South Africa (one mission), Sweden (one mission), Thailand (one mission), and Turkey (one mission).

These patterns reflect the increasing and deepening involvement of international organizations (i.e. UN and regional IGOs) in keeping the peace in intrastate disputes after the end of the Cold War.

Regarding the size of third-party peacekeeping missions (i.e. number of personnel), the overall average for all types of third-party actors has been 6,035 personnel during the post-World War II period. However, post-Cold War peacekeeping missions have generally been larger than Cold War peacekeeping missions in terms of number of peacekeeping personnel. UN peacekeeping missions have on average been more than twice as large during the post-Cold War period (5,734 personnel) compared to the Cold War period (2,233 personnel). Regional IGO peacekeeping missions have on average been only somewhat larger during the post-Cold War period (5,275 personnel) compared to the Cold War period (5,154 personnel). Likewise, state peacekeeping missions have on average been somewhat larger during the post-Cold War period (9,462 personnel) compared to the Cold War period (8,343 personnel).

Distribution of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions by Region

Which regions of the world have seen the most peacekeeping missions since the end of the Second World War? As indicated in Table 3, one-third of all third-party peacekeeping missions (68) were established in the Sub-Saharan African region during this period, including 24 UN missions, 33 regional IGO missions, and 11 state missions. There were also substantial numbers of third-party peacekeeping missions established in the Europe/Central Asia[19] (50) and Asia/Pacific regions (42), but there were significantly fewer third-party peacekeeping missions established in the Middle East/North Africa (28) and Western Hemisphere (14) regions. From 1946 to 2012, the UN was relatively more active in keeping the peace in the Sub-Saharan Africa region, although the organization was also reasonably active in keeping the peace in the Europe/Central Asia and Asia/Pacific regions. Regional IGOs established nearly three-fourths of their peacekeeping missions in the Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe/Central Asia regions, reflecting the development of several security-related regional and sub-regional IGOs in these regions since the end of World War II. Lastly, states (including informal coalitions of states) were the most active third-party actors in keeping the peace in the Asia/Pacific region, but were the

[19] The Europe/Central Asia region includes Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Russia, and all other republics of the former Soviet Union.

least active third-party actors in keeping the peace in each of the other four regions. This pattern might reflect the relative strength of regional IGOs in some of the other regions of the world, as well as the relative weakness of regional IGOs in the Asia/Pacific region.[20]

Table 3: Distribution of Peacekeeping Missions by Region, 1946-2012

Region	United Nations	Regional IGOs	States	All
Asia/Pacific	14	8	20	42 (21%)
Europe/Central Asia	15	31	4	50 (25%)
Middle East/North Africa	9	11	8	28 (14%)
Sub-Saharan Africa	24	33	11	68 (33%)
Western Hemisphere	8	4	2	14 (7%)
Totals	70 (35%)	87 (43%)	45 (22%)	202 (100%)

Distribution of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions by Primary Function

Which of the primary functions of third-party peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes have been the most prevalent since the end of the Second World War? As shown in Table 4, the primary function of more than 40% of all third-party peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes was *monitoring ceasefire agreements*. More than three-fourths of this particular type of peacekeeping was evenly divided between the UN and regional IGOs. In addition, 20% of all third-party peacekeeping missions during the post-war

Table 4: Distribution of Peacekeeping Missions by Primary Function, 1946-2012

Primary Function	United Nations	Regional IGOs	States	All
Maintaining Law and Order	11	15	14	40 (20%)
Monitoring Ceasefire	32	32	18	82 (41%)
Verifying Disarmament	14	12	3	29 (14%)
Protecting Humanitarian Assistance	0	2	5	7 (3%)
Providing Security	8	22	5	35 (17%)
Maintaining Buffer Zone	3	1	0	4 (2%)
Other	2	3	0	5 (3%)
Totals	70 (35%)	87 (43%)	45 (22%)	202 (100%)

[20] Seven of the eight regional IGO peacekeeping missions established in the Asia/Pacific region from 1946 to 2012 were established by regional IGOs based outside of the Asia/Pacific region, including the EU and NATO.

period involved *maintaining law and order* as the primary function. Nearly three-fourths of this particular type of peacekeeping was divided between regional IGOs and states. Seventeen percent of all third-party peacekeeping missions during the post-war period involved *providing security* as the primary function, mostly through regional IGOs. Another 14% of all third-party peacekeeping missions during the post-war period involved *verifying disarmament, demobilization, and disengagement agreements* as the primary function, and most of these peacekeeping missions were established by the UN and regional IGOs.

Tables 5 and 6 provide the distributions of third-party peacekeeping missions by peacekeeping function during the Cold War period (1946-1989) and the post-Cold War period (1990-2012). During both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, *monitoring ceasefire agreements* was the most prevalent primary function of third-party peacekeeping missions. In fact, *monitoring ceasefire agreements* was the primary function of some 54% of peacekeeping missions established during the Cold War period and 37% of peacekeeping missions during post-Cold War period. The second most prevalent primary function during the Cold War period was *verifying disarmament, demobilization, and disengagement agreements* (some 27% of peacekeeping missions), although the second most prevalent primary function of peacekeeping missions during the post-Cold War period was *maintaining law and order* (21%). The changing patterns seem to be evidence of a transformation in the emphasis of third-party peacekeeping in intrastate disputes from the Cold War period to the post-Cold War period.

Table 5: Distribution of Peacekeeping Missions by Primary Function, 1946-1989

Primary Function	United Nations	Regional IGOs	States	All
Maintaining Law and Order	0	2	3	5 (13%)
Monitoring Ceasefire	7	5	8	20 (54%)
Verifying Disarmament	7	2	1	10 (27%)
Protecting Humanitarian Assistance	0	0	0	0 (0%)
Providing Security	0	1	0	1 (3%)
Maintaining Buffer Zone	1	0	0	1 (3%)
Other	0	0	0	0 (0%)
Totals	15 (41%)	10 (27%)	12 (32%)	37 (100%)

Table 6: Distribution of Peacekeeping Missions by Primary Function, 1990-2012

Primary Function	United Nations	Regional IGOs	States	All
Maintaining Law and Order	11	13	11	35 (21%)
Monitoring Ceasefire	25	27	10	62 (37%)
Verifying Disarmament	7	10	2	19 (12%)
Protecting Humanitarian Assistance	0	2	5	7 (4%)
Providing Security	8	21	5	34 (21%)
Maintaining Buffer Zone	2	1	0	3 (2%)
Other	2	3	0	5 (3%)
Totals	55 (33%)	77 (47%)	33 (20%)	165 (100%)

Frequency of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions

How has the frequency of third-party peacekeeping missions changed since the end of the Second World War? The frequencies of both newly-established third-party peacekeeping missions and ongoing peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes between 1946 and 2012 are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Number of Peacekeeping Missions Established and Ongoing, 1946-2012



The figure illustrates that (except for a brief period in the mid-1960s) both the number of newly-established peacekeeping missions and the number of ongoing peacekeeping missions ranged from between zero and five during the entire Cold War period (1946-1989). In contrast, the number of newly-established peacekeeping missions has generally ranged between five and fifteen per year during the post-Cold War period. However, the number of newly-established peacekeeping missions has fallen to less than five per year since 2009. As shown in Figure 2, the number of ongoing peacekeeping missions increased sharply in the early 1990s from less than 10 missions at any one time to more than 25 missions, largely as a result of the explosion in new peacekeeping missions following the end of the Cold War period. Another factor has been the increasing duration of most types of third-party peacekeeping missions since the end of the Cold War period. As shown in Figure 2, the number of ongoing peacekeeping missions has ranged between 25 and 45 missions since the mid-1990s.

Figure 3 shows a comparison of the frequencies of ongoing third-party peacekeeping missions and ongoing intrastate conflicts between 1946 and 2012. As noted earlier, there have been a total of 237 intrastate conflicts

Figure 3: Number of Ongoing Peacekeeping Missions and Ongoing Intrastate Conflicts, 1946-2012



during the post-World War II period. Most third-party peacekeeping missions have been established during or following conflicts, although some missions have been established during crises. According to Figure 3, the number of ongoing peacekeeping missions ranged between one and ten (mostly less than five) between 1946 and 1990, while the number of ongoing intrastate conflicts ranged from 10 to 40 during the same period. Although the opportunities to intervene in intrastate disputes generally increased during the Cold War period, there was an apparent unwillingness or inability on the part of the international community, including the UN and regional IGOs, to establish peacekeeping missions during or following most intrastate conflicts. These patterns, however, changed significantly during the post-Cold War period. The numbers of ongoing peacekeeping missions have ranged between 10 and 45 during the post-Cold War period. In fact, there have been more than 25 ongoing peacekeeping missions each year since 1993. During the same period, the number of ongoing intrastate conflicts has fallen from a high of 46 in 1991 to a low of 17 in 2010. Clearly, there has been a significant increase in the willingness and ability of the international community to establish peacekeeping missions during or following intrastate conflicts during the post-Cold War period. In fact, it is possible that third-party peacekeeping efforts have contributed to the declining number of ongoing intrastate conflicts.

Figure 4 illustrates the ratio of ongoing third-party peacekeeping missions to ongoing intrastate conflicts. Based on the data, there have been three discernible phases of third-party peacekeeping since the end of the Second World War. During the early-Cold War period (1946-1965), there was on average nearly one ongoing third-party peacekeeping mission for every four ongoing intrastate conflicts. During this period third-party actors, particularly the UN and states, made modest efforts to respond to the occurrence of intrastate conflicts. During the late-Cold War period (1966-1989), there was on average approximately one ongoing third-party peacekeeping mission for every ten ongoing intrastate conflicts. The decline in the ratio represented a substantial decline in peacekeeping efforts on the part of third-party actors during the late-Cold War period. This was particularly true for the UN which did not establish even one peacekeeping mission in an intrastate dispute from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. Finally, during the post-Cold War period (1990-2012), there has on average been more than one ongoing peacekeeping mission for every one ongoing intrastate conflict, representing a sharp increase in third-party peacekeeping efforts following the end of the Cold War.

Figure 4: Ratio of Ongoing Peacekeeping Missions to Ongoing Intrastate Conflicts, 1946-2012



Distribution of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions by Number of Functions

To what extent have third-party peacekeeping missions been mandated to accomplish one or more security-related functions since the end of the Second World War? Table 7 shows that 106 out of a total of 202 third-party peacekeeping missions (53%) involved only one security-related function (one-dimensional peacekeeping), while 96 third-party peacekeeping missions (47%) involved two or more security-related functions (multi-dimensional peacekeeping).[21] Table 7 shows that the UN was significantly more likely than regional IGOs or states to establish multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions. In fact, the UN established 26 peacekeeping missions with one security-related function during this period, representing 37% of all UN missions. However, the remaining 44 UN missions (63%) were established with two or more security-related functions. By comparison, regional IGOs established 55 one-dimensional missions (63%) and 32 multi-

[21] The types and numbers of functions of UN peacekeeping missions were determined by examining UN Security Council resolutions and other official documents pertaining to the mandates of the peacekeeping missions. In the case of regional IGO and state peacekeeping missions, the functions were determined by examining a variety of official documents and/or press reports pertaining to the peacekeeping missions.

dimensional missions (37%), and state actors established 25 one-dimensional peacekeeping missions (56%) and 20 multi-dimensional missions (44%).

Table 7: Distribution of Peacekeeping Missions by Number of Functions, 1946-2012

Number of Functions	United Nations	Regional IGOs	States	All
1	26	55	25	106 (53%)
2	26	18	15	59 (29%)
3	12	7	4	23 (11%)
4	6	7	1	14 (7%)
Totals	70 (35%)	87 (43%)	45 (22%)	202 (100%)

To what extent has there been a shift from one-dimensional missions to multi-dimensional missions since the end of the Cold War? Table 8 shows that during the Cold War period, 22 out of 37 third-party peacekeeping missions (60%) were one-dimensional, and most of the remaining peacekeeping missions were two-dimensional (32%). A similar percentage of UN and regional IGO peacekeeping missions – 27% of UN missions and 30% of regional IGO missions – were multi-dimensional. On the other hand, most state peacekeeping missions were two-dimensional (67%), perhaps reflecting the greater peacekeeping capacity of states (and informal coalitions of states) compared to international organizations during the Cold War period.

Table 8: Distribution of Peacekeeping Missions by Number of Functions, 1946-1989

Number of Functions	United Nations	Regional IGOs	States	All
1	11	7	4	22 (60%)
2	3	1	8	12 (32%)
3	1	2	0	3 (8%)
4	0	0	0	0 (0%)
Totals	15 (41%)	10 (27%)	12 (32%)	37 (100%)

During the post-Cold War period, 84 out of 165 third-party peacekeeping missions (51%) involved one security-related function, while 81 peacekeeping missions (49%) involved two or more security-related functions (see Table 9). Although both the UN and regional IGOs established relatively more multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions during the post-Cold War period, the transformation was more significant for the UN. In fact, 40 out of 55 UN peacekeeping missions (73%) involved two or more security-related functions during this period, including 17 missions (31%) with three or more security-related functions. In comparison, only 29 out of

Table 9: Distribution of Peacekeeping Missions by Number of Functions, 1990-2012

Number of Functions	United Nations	Regional IGOs	States	All
1	15	48	21	84 (51%)
2	23	17	7	47 (29%)
3	11	5	4	20 (12%)
4	6	7	1	14 (8%)
Totals	55 (33%)	77 (47%)	33 (20%)	165 (100%)

77 regional IGO peacekeeping missions (38%) have been multi-dimensional during the post-Cold War period. Similarly, only 12 out of 33 state peacekeeping missions (36%) have been multi-dimensional during the post-Cold War period. Nevertheless, consistent with a change in peacekeeping principles since the end of the Cold War, third-party actors have been more likely to established multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions during the post-Cold War period compared to the Cold War period.

Distribution of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions by Effectiveness

How successful have third-party peacekeeping missions been in terms of both preventing the occurrence or recurrence of military hostilities (conflict management) and facilitating the signing of peace agreements or the fulfillment of previously-signed peace agreements (dispute resolution)? Is one category of third-party peacekeeping more effective on average than the other categories? As shown in Table 10, third-party actors have been successful in managing conflicts (i.e. preventing the occurrence or recurrence of military hostilities) in 107 out of 202 peacekeeping missions (53%) during the post-World War II period. The rates of success have varied from 49% for the UN to 62% for states. In terms of dispute resolution (i.e. facilitating the

Table 10: Distribution of Peacekeeping Missions by Effectiveness, 1946-2012

	United Nations	Regional IGOs	States	All
Conflict Management	34 (49%)	45 (52%)	28 (62%)	107 (53%)
Dispute Resolution	34 (49%)	37 (43%)	17 (38%)	88 (44%)
Total PKMs	70 (35%)	87 (43%)	45 (22%)	202 (100%)

Note: The "conflict management" row refers to the number and percentage of peacekeeping missions during which there was not a resumption or continuation of military hostilities between the parties during the deployment of the peacekeeping personnel; the "dispute resolution" row refers to the number and percentage of peacekeeping missions during which the parties signed a formal peace agreement or fulfilled the terms of a previously-signed peace agreement during the deployment of the peacekeeping personnel.

signing of peace agreements or the fulfillment of previously-signed peace agreements), third-party actors were successful in 88 out of 202 peacekeeping missions (44%), with success rates ranging from 49% for the UN to 38% for states. Interestingly, state peacekeeping missions are relatively more successful than UN and regional IGO peacekeeping missions in terms of conflict management, but relatively less successful than UN and regional IGO peacekeeping missions in terms of dispute resolution.

Have there been any significant differences in the effectiveness of third-party peacekeeping missions from the Cold War period to the post-Cold War period? Table 11 indicates that during the Cold War period, the overall rate of success of third-party peacekeeping missions in managing conflicts was only 35%. The success rate for the UN and regional IGO peacekeeping missions was 40%, while the success rate for state peacekeeping mission was 25%. Similarly, the overall success rate of third-party peacekeeping missions in facilitating the resolution of disputes during the Cold War period was 32%. The success rate for the UN and state peacekeeping missions was 33%, while the success rate for regional IGOs was 30%.

Table 11: Distribution of Peacekeeping Missions by Effectiveness, 1946-1989

	United Nations	Regional IGOs	States	All
Conflict Management	6 (40%)	4 (40%)	3 (25%)	13 (35%)
Dispute Resolution	5 (33%)	3 (30%)	4 (33%)	12 (32%)
Total PKMs	15 (41%)	10 (27%)	12 (32%)	37 (100%)

Note: The "conflict management" row refers to the number and percentage of peacekeeping missions during which there was not a resumption or continuation of military hostilities between the parties during the deployment of the peacekeeping personnel; the "dispute resolution" row refers to the number and percentage of peacekeeping missions during which the parties signed a formal peace agreement or fulfilled the terms of a previously-signed peace agreement during the deployment of the peacekeeping personnel.

The evidence suggests that third-party peacekeeping missions were significantly more effective on average in both conflict management and dispute resolution during the post-Cold War period. As shown in Table 12, the overall rate of success of third-party peacekeeping missions in preventing the occurrence or recurrence of military hostilities in intrastate disputes during the post-Cold War period was 57%. The success rates ranged from 76% for state peacekeeping missions, 53% for regional IGO peacekeeping missions, and 51% for UN peacekeeping missions. The lower rate of success for the UN may reflect that it has deployed peacekeeping personnel in more difficult situations compared to states and regional IGOs. Regarding dispute resolution, the overall success rate for third-party

Table 12: Distribution of Peacekeeping Missions by Effectiveness, 1990-2012

	United Nations	Regional IGOs	States	All
Conflict Management	28 (51%)	41 (53%)	25 (76%)	94 (57%)
Dispute Resolution	26 (47%)	34 (44%)	13 (39%)	73 (44%)
Total PKMs	55 (33%)	77 (47%)	33 (20%)	165 (100%)

Note: The "conflict management" row refers to the number and percentage of peacekeeping missions during which there was not a resumption or continuation of military hostilities between the parties during the deployment of the peacekeeping personnel; the "dispute resolution" row refers to the number and percentage of peacekeeping missions during which the parties signed a formal peace agreement or fulfilled the terms of a previously-signed peace agreement during the deployment of the peacekeeping personnel.

peacekeeping missions during the post-Cold War period was 44%. In this case, the rates of success ranged from 47% for UN peacekeeping missions, 44% for regional IGO peacekeeping missions, and 39% for state peacekeeping missions.

Conclusion

Since the end of the Second World War, the UN, regional IGOs, and other third-party actors have deployed peacekeeping personnel in numerous intrastate disputes across all regions of the world. Along with changes in the basic principles guiding third-party peacekeeping missions from the Cold War period to the post-Cold War period, there have been significant shifts in the basic patterns of third-party peacekeeping in intrastate disputes. These changes point to several important questions regarding third-party peacekeeping, including why was there a significant increase in peacekeeping missions beginning in the early 1990s; what factors influence the average durations of UN, regional IGO, and state peacekeeping missions; and what accounts for the relative effectiveness of some types of third-party peacekeeping missions compared to other types? Using newly-compiled data, quantitative analyses of these and other questions will undoubtedly contribute to a greater understanding of the occurrence and effectiveness of third-party peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes.

References

Adeleke, Ademola. 1995. "The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The ECOWAS Operation in Liberia," *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 33, 569-593.

Agoagye, Festus. 2004. "The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learned from the First African Union Peacekeeping Operation," *African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes* (ACCRD), Mount Edgecombe, South Africa.

Aksu, Esref. 2003. "*The United Nations, Intra-State Peacekeeping, and Normative Change,*" Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

Alden, Chris. 1995. "The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique." *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 33, 103-128.

Arthur, Peter. 2010. "ECOWAS and Regional Peacekeeping Integration in West Africa: Lessons for the Future," *Africa Today,* vol. 57 (2), 3-24.

Bariagaber, Assefaw. 2006. "United Nations Peace Operations in Africa: A Cookie-Cutter Approach," *Journal of Third World Studies,* vol. 23, 11-29.

Beardsley, Kyle. 2011. "Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Armed Conflict," *The Journal of Politics,* vol. 73 (4), 1051-1064.

Bellamy, Alex J., Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin. 2004. *Understanding Peacekeeping*. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.

Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams. 2005. "Who's Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations," *International Security,* vol. 29, 157-195.

Berman, Eric G. and Katie E. Sams. 2000. "Keeping the Peace in Africa," *Disarmament Fourm,* No. 3, 21-31.

Bloomfield, Lincoln P. 1970. "The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Prospects for Peacekeeping," *International Organization,* vol. 24, 548-565.

Boulden, Jane. 2005. "Mandates Matter: An Exploration of Impartiality in United Nations Operations." *Global Governance,* vol. 11, 147-160.

Bratt, Duane. 1999. "Peace over Justice: Developing a Framework for UN Peacekeeping Operations in Internal Conflicts," *Global Governance,* vol. 5, 63-81.

Child, John. 1980. "Peacekeeping and the Inter-American System," *Military Review,* vol. 60, 40-54.

Cockayne, James and David M. Malone. 2005. "The Ralph Bunche Centennial: Peace Operations Then and Now," *Global Governance,* vol. 11, 331-350.

Cottey, Andrew. 2008. "Beyond Humanitarian Intervention: The New Politics of Peacekeeping and Intervention," *Contemporary Politics,* vol. 14 (4), 429-446.

Curtis, Gerald L. 1964. "The United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon," *International Organization,* vol. 18, 738-765.

Diehl, Paul F. 1988. "Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace," *Political Science Quarterly,* vol. 103, 485-507.

Diehl, Paul F. 1993. "Institutional Alternatives to Traditional U.N. Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Regional and Multinational Options," *Armed Forces & Society,* vol. 19, 209-230.

Diehl, Paul F. 1994. *International Peacekeeping*. Baltimore, MD and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Durch, William J., editor. 1993. *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Farris, Karl. 1994. "UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balance, A Success," *Parameters,* vol. 24, 38-50.

Fetherston, A. B. 1994. *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*. London: MacMillan,Ltd.

Forsythe, David P. 1972. "UN Peacekeeping and Domestic Instability," *Orbis,* vol. 15, 1064-1084.

Fortna, Virginia Page. 2003. "Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil And Interstate War," *International Studies Review,* vol. 5, 97-114.

Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004a. "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War," *International Studies Quarterly,* vol. 48, 269-292.

Fortna, Virgina Page. 2004b. "Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects," *World Politics,* vol. 56, 481-519.

Ghali, Mona. 1993. "United Nations Emergency Force I: 1956-1967," In *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, ed. William J. Durch, New York: St. Martin's Press, 104-130.

Gilligan, Michael and Stephen John Stedman. 2003. "Where do the Peacekeepers Go?" *International Studies Review,* vol. 5, 37-54.

Gilligan, Michael J. and Ernest J. Sergenti. 2008. "Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science,* vol. 3, 89-122.

Goulding, Marrack. 1993. "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping," *International Affairs,* vol. 69, 451-464.

Heldt, Birger and Peter Wallensteen. 2005. *Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948-2004.* Sandöverken, Sweden: Folke Bernadotte Academy.

Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. 1996. "National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War?" *Journal of Peace Research,* vol. 33, 205-215.

James, Alan. 1990. *Peacekeeping in International Politics*. London: MacMillan, Ltd.

James, Alan. 1995. "Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era," *International Journal,* vol. 50, 241-265.

Jeong, Ho-Won. 2004. "Expanding Peacekeeping Functions for Peace Operations," *Security and Peace,* vol. 22, 19-24.

Jett, Dennis C. 1999. *Why Peacekeeping Fails*. New York: Palgrave Publishers.

Johansen, Robert. 1996. "The Future of United Nations Peacekeeping and Enforcement: A Framework for Policymaking," *Global Governance,* vol. 2, 299-333.

Karns, Margaret P. and Karen A. Mingst. 2001. "Peacekeeping and the Changing Role of the United Nations: Four Dilemmas," In *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement*, eds. Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, Tokyo, New York, and Paris: United Nations University Press, 215-237.

Mackinlay, John. 1989. "The Characteristics of Success and Failure in Modern Peacekeeping Forces," In *The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israel Interface,* London: Unwin Hyman, Ltd., 213-230.

MacQueen, Norrie. 1999. *The United Nations Since 1945: Peacekeeping and the Cold War*. London and New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Ltd.

MacQueen, Norrie. 2006. *Peacekeeping and the International System*. London and New York: Routledge.

Malaquias, Assis. 2002. "Peace Observations in Africa: Preserving the Brittle State?" *Journal of International Affairs,* vol. 55 (2), 415-440.

Malone, David M. and Karin Wermester. 2000. "Boom and Bust? The Changing Nature of UN Peacekeeping," *International Peacekeeping,* vol. 7, 37-54.

Mullenbach, Mark J. 2005. "Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions," *International Studies,* vol. 49,529-555.

Mullenbach, Mark J. 2006. "Reconstructing Strife-Torn Societies: Third-Party Peacebuilding in Intrastate Disputes," In *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies*, eds. T. David Mason and James D. Meernik, London and New York: Routledge, 53-80.

Neack, Laura. 1995. "UN Peace-keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?" *Journal of Peace Research,* vol. 32, 181-196.

Olonisakin, Funmi. 1996. UN Co-operation with Regional Organizations in Peacekeeping: The Experience of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia. *International Peacekeeping,* vol. 3, 33-51.

Paris, Roland. 1997. "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," *International Security,* vol. 22, 54-89.

Perkins, Richard and Eric Neumayer. 2008. "Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces: Explaining the Geographies of Post-Cold War Peacekeeping," *Political Geography,* vol. 27, 895-914.

Pushkina, Darya. 2004. "Toward Successful Peace-keeping: Remembering Croatia," *Cooperation and Conflict,* vol. 39, 393-415.

Rikhye, Indar Jit, Michael Harbottle, and Bjorn Egge. 1974. *The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Rikhye, Indar Jit. 1983. "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking," In *Peacekeeping: Appraisals & Proposals,* ed. Henry Wiseman, New York and Oxford: Pergamon Press, 5-18.

Ryan, Stephen. 2000. "United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles?" *International Peacekeeping,* vol. 7, 27-47.

Schmidl, Erwin A. 1999. "The International Operation in Albania, 1913-1914," *International Peacekeeping,* vol. 6, 1-10.

Semb, Anne Julie. 2000. "The New Practice of UN-Authorized Interventions: A Slippery Slope of Forcible Interference," *Journal of Peace Research,* vol. 37 (4), 469-488.

Sesay, Amadu. 1991. "The Limits of Peace-Keeping by a Regional Organization: The OAU Peace-Keeping Force in Chad," *Conflict Quarterly,* vol. 11, 7-26.

Shaw, Carolyn M. 1995. "Regional Peacekeeping: An Alternative to United Nations Operations?" *The Journal of Conflict Studies,* vol. 15, 59-81.

Shimizu, Hirofumi and Todd Sandler. 2002. "Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994-2000,"*Journal of Peace Research,* vol. 39 (6), 651-668.

Stover, Mark. 2002. "Cultivating Ripeness Through UN Peacekeeping Operations," *Journal of International Affairs,* vol. 55, 509-522.

Tanner, Fred. 2010. "Addressing the Perils of Peace Operations: Toward a Global Peacekeeping System," *Global Governance,* vol. 16, 209-217.

Thakur, Ramesh. 1984. *Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland, and the International Commission*, Edmonton, Alberta: The University of Alberto Press.

Thakur, Ramesh. 1994. "From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The UN Operation in Somalia," *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 32, 387-410.

Thakur, Ramesh and Albrecht Schnabel. 2001. "Cascading Generations of Peacekeeping: Across the Mogadishu Line to Kosovo and Timor," In *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement*, eds. Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, Tokyo, New York, and Paris: United Nations University Press, 3-25.

Wainhouse, David W. 1973. "The Inter-American Peace Force in the Dominican Crisis of 1965," In *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads,* Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 459-501.

Weinberger, Naomi. 1995. "How Peace Keeping Becomes Intervention: Lessons from the Lebanese Experience," In *International Organizations and Ethnic Conflict,* eds. Milton J Esman and Shibley Telhami, Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 148-175.

Weiss, Thomas G. 1994. "The United Nations and Civil Wars," *The Washington Quarterly,* vol.17 (4), 139-159.

Yilmaz, Muzaffer Ercan. 2005. "UN Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era," *International Journal of World Peace,* vol. 22, 13-28.