Web Appendix for:

Singer, Matthew M. 2011. "Economic Voting and Welfare Programs: Evidence from the U.S. States" European Journal of Political Research 50 (March): 479-503.

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Per Capita GDP Growth	2.2	2.5	-2.9	6.3
Index of Welfare Benefits	1.9	0.7	0.0	3.7
AFDC Benefits	478.6	211.8	0.0	1042.0
UI Benefits	48.1	8.6	24.5	68.4
Previous Election Was Contested	0.8	0.4	0.0	1.0
Previous Electoral Margin	0.2	0.3	0.0	1.0
Own Party Controlled Redistricting	0.1	0.2	0.0	1.0
Opposition Party Controlled Redistricting	0.0	0.2	0.0	1.0
Legislative Professionalism	0.1	0.1	0.0	1.0
2 Year Term	0.9	0.2	0.0	1.0
SMD	0.7	0.4	0.0	1.0
MMD Post	0.1	0.2	0.0	1.0
Presidential Vote	22.6	24.9	0.0	64.1
Gubernatorial Vote	28.7	26.2	0.0	81.1
Senatorial Vote	32.5	25.8	0.0	94.0
Gubernatorial Election Year	0.6	0.5	0.0	1.0
Senate Election Year	0.6	0.5	0.0	1.0
Presidential Election Year	0.3	0.4	0.0	1.0
Republican	0.4	0.5	0.0	1.0

Web Appendix: Other Potential Mediating Variables

To probe the robustness of the findings regarding welfare's effect on economic voting, I have rerun the models in Table 2 with controls for the institution that should distort clarity of responsibility in the United States (divided government at either the state or national level) and legislative professionalism, which Berry et al (2000) argue enables legislators to insulate themselves from economic sanctions. As noted in the text, these interaction terms are all insignificantly different from 0 and also do not change the overall effect of AFDC benefits.

	[1]	(SE)	[2]	(SE)	[3]	(SE)
Per Capita GDP Growth	0.245**	(0.066)	0.239**	(0.065)	0.288*	(0.133)
AFDC Benefits	-0.001	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.001)
AFDC*Growth	-0.001**	(0.001)	-0.001**	(0.001)	-0.001**	(0.001)
Previous Election Was Contested	-2.277***	(0.150)	-2.277***	(0.150)	-2.278***	(0.150)
Previous Electoral Margin	4.826***	(0.240)	4.823***	(0.240)	4.823***	(0.240)
Own Party Controlled Redistricting	0.047	(0.652)	0.046	(0.651)	0.046	(0.651)
Opposition Party Controlled Redistricting	-0.925	(0.751)	-0.924	(0.750)	-0.924	(0.750)
Legislative Professionalism	2.451***	(0.539)	2.253***	(0.659)	2.468***	(0.538)
Professionalism*Growth			0.105	(0.193)		
2 Year Term	1.066**	(0.328)	1.054**	(0.328)	1.049**	(0.328)
SMD	0.226	(0.145)	0.229	(0.146)	0.226	(0.146)
MMD Post	0.025	(0.277)	0.024	(0.277)	0.015	(0.277)
Presidential Vote	-0.030	(0.020)	-0.030	(0.020)	-0.030	(0.020)
Gubernatorial Vote	0.038*	(0.016)	0.036*	(0.015)	0.036*	(0.015)
Senatorial Vote	0.014	(0.013)	0.016	(0.013)	0.015	(0.013)
Gubernatorial Election Year	-1.697*	(0.800)	-1.602*	(0.798)	-1.604*	(0.797)
Senate Election Year	-0.745	(0.682)	-0.809	(0.680)	-0.809	(0.680)
Presidential Election Year	1.916	(1.052)	1.933	(1.050)	2.056	(1.085)
Republican	0.221	(0.332)	0.243	(0.331)	0.237	(0.334)
Divided National Government	-0.435	(0.285)	-0.438	(0.281)	-0.304	(0.423)
National Divided*Growth					-0.069	(0.160)
State Divided Government	0.223	(0.117)	0.178	(0.105)	0.177	(0.105)
State Divided*Growth	-0.030	(0.035)				
Constant	1.323**	(0.432)	1.338**	(0.429)	1.221	(0.518)
Level 1 Variance Component	1.398***		1.395***		1.395***	
Level 2 Variance Component	0.499***		0.503***		0.502***	
Level 3 Variance Component	0.159***		0.151***		0.157***	
N Incumbents Seeking Reelection	19070		19070		19070	
N State Elections	423		423		423	
N Years	20		20		20	
Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses; * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001						

I also have rerun the models adding controls for manufacturing wages in the state and the average income in the state to ensure that I am not capturing the difference between wealthy states and poor ones. Again, this does not change the results.

	[1]	(SE)	[2]	(SE)
Per Capita GDP Growth	0.227**	(0.063)	0.035	(0.206)
AFDC Benefits	-0.001	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.001)
AFDC*Growth	-0.001**	(0.001)	-0.001**	(0.001)
Previous Election Was Contested	0.040	(0.655)	0.042	(0.658)
Previous Electoral Margin	-0.942	(0.758)	-0.949	(0.762)
Own Party Controlled Redistricting	-2.289***	(0.151)	-2.289***	(0.152)
Opposition Party Controlled Redistricting	4.838***	(0.242)	4.836***	(0.242)
Legislative Professionalism	2.368***	(0.531)	2.380***	(0.531)
2 Year Term	1.056**	(0.331)	1.029**	(0.331)
SMD	0.323*	(0.148)	0.320*	(0.148)
MMD Post	0.103	(0.279)	0.110	(0.279)
Presidential Vote	-0.025	(0.020)	-0.025	(0.020)
Gubernatorial Vote	0.032*	(0.015)	0.034*	(0.015)
Senatorial Vote	0.015	(0.013)	0.014	(0.013)
Gubernatorial Election Year	-1.477	(0.788)	-1.568*	(0.789)
Senate Election Year	-0.806	(0.678)	-0.749	(0.682)
Presidential Election Year	1.668	(1.038)	1.695	(1.033)
Republican	0.220	(0.331)	0.224	(0.335)
Manufacturing Wages	0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)
Wages*Growth			-0.001	(0.000)
Average Income	0.001**	(0.001)	0.001	(0.000)
Income*Growth			0.001	(0.000)
Divided National Government	-0.423	(0.259)	-0.426	(0.246)
Constant	0.023	(0.715)	0.273	(0.755)
Level 1 Variance Component	1.411***		1.417***	
Level 2 Variance Component	0.493***		0.491***	
Level 3 Variance Component	0.121***		0.103***	
N Incumbents Seeking Reelection	19070		19070	
N State Elections	423		423	
N Years	20		20	
Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses; * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001				