Appendix: "Acting under Chapter 7"

Item1: Correlation Matrix of Selected Terms

The independent variables in this study are words spoken by UN diplomats, or policymakers at the UNSC. To estimate independent effects, we need to make sure that these words do not co-occur to a significant extent to avoid multicollinearity. **Figure A1** shows that our independent variables do not co-occur frequently. On the contrary, given that we deal with natural language, the estimates are surprisingly low. This further gives evidence to the idea that speakers at the UNSC use these terms strategically.

Figure A1. Correlogram of Independent Variables and Authorization of Force



Item2: Additional Logistical Regression Model Specifications

Figure A2. 8 Logit Models of Authorization

	Authorization of Force							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Genocide	0.051							0.012
	(0.202)							(0.017)
R2P		-0.972*						-0.081**
		(0.589)						(0.032)
Humanitarian Crisis			0.171					0.018
			(0.259)					(0.023)
Human Rights				0.159*				0.020**
				(0.091)				(0.008)
Terrorism					-1.393***			-0.082***
					(0.210)			(0.010)
Democracy						0.257*		0.030**
						(0.147)		(0.014)
Regional Stability							0.537	0.058
							(0.384)	(0.039)
Year								293.822**
								(146.110)
Year²								-0.146**
								(0.073)
Year³								0.00002**
								(0.00001)
Constant	-2.306***	-2.299***	-2.307***	-2.330***	-2.231***	-2.318***	-2.308***	-197,015.700**
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(97,696.200)
N	10,435	10,435	10,435	10,435	10,435	10,435	10,435	10,435
Log Likelihood	-3,175.077	-3,173.251	-3,174.900	-3,173.635	-3,141.034	-3,173.680	-3,174.245	-1,724.444
AIC	6,354.154	6,350.501	6,353.800	6,351.270	6,286.068	6,351.359	6,352.491	3,470.887

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Item 4: Replication of this Study using Security Council resolution-debates as the unit of analysis

The analyses in the main text were modeled on a Security Council *country-speech level* of observation. I chose this level of observation because rhetorical entrapment and rhetorical hollowing assume a connection between individual rhetoric and action. I have used authorization of force in UNSC resolutions as a form of 'action' since this measure shows significant variance and is substantially interesting. Hence, I appended a resolution value for each country speech in the dataset. Inevitably, this led to an inflation of values on the dependent variable. However, as an additional robustness measure, **Table A4** shows that this choice of unit of analysis has had no serious impact on the validity of the findings of the main text. In the table below, I replicate the models of the main text by aggregating the presence of each of the mentioned words *from speeches* to *resolution-debates*. I do this by taking the share of speeches that mention our selected words as independent variables. Further, I take the mean of authorization of force (a mean of one will always be one, a mean of zero always be zero) across speeches. Then, I run three specific models to show that results are stable and similar to those in the main text.

The first model replicates the baseline logit model of the main text. Crucially, human rights maintain (same as in the main text) a positive relationship towards authorization. Significance levels are the same, but effect size varies (as is expected). Terrorism has a negative relationship (same as in the main text) with the use of force, indicating normative backfiring. Significance levels are slightly lower but still very significant. One difference in the main text model concerns regional security. While regional security only bordered on significance in the main text, here, it is robustly associated with the use of force. Apart from this, the relationship of genocide with authorization changed towards a negative sign, but the finding is statistically insignificant. R2P loses its significance for all models. I voiced caution regarding this finding in the main text. With the added benefit of this analysis, we should refrain from reading too much into this finding once again.

The second model replicates the logit time-fixed-effects model of the main text. Again, the results are remarkably similar to the ones in the main text. Human rights are associated with an increase in the use of force, and terrorism is associated with a decrease in the odds to authorize the use of force. Significance levels are the same, but effect sizes vary (as expected).

The third and final model uses the same specifications as discussed before and adds a lagged-dependent variable (lagged authorization) as another independent variable on the righthand side

of the equation. The reasoning behind this is that strategic states may learn from a past authorization and expect debates concerning the next authorization to go in a specific direction. While this specification cannot fully model *anticipated results*, it could be the first step towards it. As expected, the results mirror the findings of the main text. Human rights are statistically significant associated with increased odds for authorization, and terrorism is significantly associated with a decrease in the odds for intervention. Significance levels are the same, but effects sizes vary again. Interestingly, the lagged authorization is significant, suggesting that there is an element of anticipation towards resolution outcomes. P5 and country-fixed effects are not part of these models' specifications because the resolution-debate level effectively disposes of them.

Table A4. Replication of Main Text Models on a Security-Council Resolution-Debate Level of Analysis

	Authorization of Force		
	Baseline Logit	Logit Year-fixed Model	Linear Probability Model Year-fixed and lagged Authorization
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Share of Genocide	-1.511	-0.056	-0.148
	(1.726)	(0.142)	(0.142)
Share of Human Rights	2.032***	0.217***	0.247***
	(0.539)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Share of Humanitarian Crisis	1.422	0.144	0.069
	(2.313)	(0.239)	(0.240)
Share of R2P	0.146	-0.294	-0.081
	(4.139)	(0.394)	(0.394)
Share of Regional Security	6.960**	0.916**	1.057***
	(3.249)	(0.402)	(0.404)
Share of Democracy	0.978	0.194	0.113
	(1.079)	(0.120)	(0.120)
Share of Terrorism	-2.889**	-0.253***	-0.197***
	(1.352)	(0.074)	(0.073)
Lagged Authorization			0.060**
			(0.027)
Constant	-2.329***		0.082***
	(0.105)		(0.009)
N	1,397	1,397	1,396
R^2		0.023	0.025
Adjusted R^2		0.002	0.019
Log Likelihood	-440.441		
Residual Std. Error			0.297 (df = 1387)
F Statistic		4.568*** (df = 7; 1367)	4.363*** (df = 8; 1387)
AIC	896.882		

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01