Supplementary Material (SM)

Foreign Training, Course Content, and Political Militarization

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SM.1 Pull factors

Most governments have strong incentives to politically involve foreign-trained soldiers. There are three reasons for this:

First, civilian leaders involve foreign-trained soldiers to benefit from their strategic knowledge and managerial skills. Graduates of prestigious military academies and staff colleges abroad usually possess expert knowledge of international defense and security (Brooks 2008; Toronto 2017). Returning home, officers are familiar with foreign weapon systems and arms. Leaders can utilize this expertise to inform threat assessments, intelligence analyses, and defense acquisitions (Martinez Machain 2021). They might employ foreign-trained soldiers as advisors on national security. In addition, leaders may exploit the managerial and technical competences of foreign-trained officers to accomplish important non-military tasks such as, for example, disaster relief by placing them in state councils (Pion-Berlin 2016).

Second, governments pull foreign-trained officers into politics because of their esteemed reputation. In many countries, the military is among the most well-respected institutions (Johnson 2018). Leaders may thus attempt to benefit politically from the prestige of graduates of West Point, Saint-Cyr, or the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. To important elites or voters, including foreign-trained officers in committees, councils, or even the cabinet signals political competence (Golby, Peter and Kyle 2018). Especially in times of crisis, government leaders might hope to boost their popularity through the impeccable reputation of military professionals.

Finally, governments may provide foreign-trained soldiers with political influence to prevent out-right coups. Foreign-trained officers can use their key positions in the military hierarchy to recruit conspirators, and they possess advanced command and coordination skills that are helpful for successful takeovers (Atkinson 2014; Savage and Caverley 2017; Singh 2014). At the same time, most coup attempts actually fail, which risks rupturing the entire military organization and leaving the country defenseless (Bell and Sudduth 2017; Geddes 2004; Powell 2012; Singh 2014). Government leaders may therefore make foreign-trained soldiers a tempting offer. Lucrative posts in the state administration can defuse coup risks and benefit the government's political survival.

These pull factors are likely to be at work in many countries. However, to change the level of political militarization, soldiers must have a willingness to enter the political domain. If

soldiers lack such motivation, consider themselves unsuited for politics, or fear that their political involvement will undermine the military's well-being, they will turn down the offer to enter the civilian sphere. In the manuscript, we explain how different types of foreign training shapes soldiers' willingness to become politically involved.

SM.2 Descriptive statistics

1) Figure SM.2.1 shows the distribution of course topics. Information is based on course titles. For each course type, titles are sorted from the highest relative number of attendance to the lowest.

2) Table SM.2.1 offers summary statistics for the variables of the main analysis, the tests assessing potential threats to inference, the analyses that probe the theoretical mechanism, and the robustness checks.

3) Table SM.2.2 offers summary statistics for the variables of the difference-in-differences analyses used to assess the delayed temporal effects of SOA training.

Figure SM.2.1. Course topics.



Note: Graph shows share of course titles of all attended counterinsurgency courses and the equivalent number of conventional warfare courses.

Table SM.2.1. Summary statistics.

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Military involvement in politics (Kenwick dynamic measure)	Continuous	399	0.39	0.82	-1.89	2.69
Military involvement in politics (Kenwick static measure)	Continuous	399	0.29	0.92	-0.89	2.25
Military involvement in politics (Svolik measure)	Binary	377	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
Military involvement in politics (Svolik measure)	Categorical	377	0.47	0.72	0.00	2.00
Counterinsurgency courses (Annual sum)[a,b]	Count	399	0.87	1.26	0.00	5.38
Conventional warfare courses (Annual sum)[a,b]	Count	399	2.71	1.80	0.00	5.97
Counterinsurgency courses (Three-year sum)[b]	Count	399	1.29	1.66	0.00	5.86
Conventional warfare courses (Three-year sum)[b]	Count	399	3.75	1.91	0.00	6.81
Counterinsurgency courses (Cumulative sum)[b]	Count	399	1.75	1.98	0.00	6.60
Conventional warfare courses (Cumulative sum)[b]	Count	399	4.96	2.01	0.00	8.11
Counterinsurgency courses (Course share)[a]	Continuous	313	0.11	0.18	0.00	1.00
Conventional warfare courses (Course share)[a]	Continuous	313	0.87	0.20	0.00	1.00
Counterinsurgency students (Annual sum)[a,b]	Count	399	0.86	1.25	0.00	5.38
Conventional warfare students (Annual sum)[a,b]	Count	399	2.65	1.77	0.00	5.74
Counterinsurgency students (Three-year sum)[b]	Count	399	1.28	1.65	0.00	5.80
Conventional warfare students (Three-year sum)[b]	Count	399	3.63	1.94	0.00	6.55
Counterinsurgency students (Cumulative sum)[b]	Count	399	1.74	1.97	0.00	6.57
Conventional warfare students (Cumulative sum)[b]	Count	399	4.81	2.02	0.00	7.89
Counterinsurgency students (Course share)[a]	Continuous	313	0.12	0.19	0.00	1.00
Conventional warfare students (Course share)[a]	Continuous	313	0.89	0.19	0.00	1.00
Intelligence content[a,b]	Count	399	0.66	1.03	0.00	3.83
Irregular warfare content[a,b]	Count	399	0.49	0.96	0.00	5.30
State-building content[a,b]	Count	399	0.10	0.35	0.00	1.95
All courses[b]	Count	399	2.98	1.78	0.00	5.97
Counterinsurgency courses[b]	Count	399	0.98	1.31	0.00	5.38
Conventional warfare courses[b]	Count	399	2.84	1.76	0.00	5.97
Academies[a]	Count	399	1.99	1.14	0.00	4.00
Periodicals[a]	Count	399	2.24	2.71	0.00	15.00
Anti-regime activity[a]	Continuous	399	-0.20	1.14	-2.05	3.34
Left anti-regime activity[a]	Continuous	399	0.02	0.62	-0.89	2.23
Left neighbor regimes[a]	Continuous	399	0.11	0.22	-0.25	0.94
Country with low communist threats	Binary	399	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
Batista ally	Binary	399	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
Rightist head of government	Binary	399	0.66	0.47	0.00	1.00
Insurgency (Lyall & Wilson)[a]	Binary	399	0.07	0.25	0.00	1.00
Insurgency (Kalyvas & Balcells)[a]	Binary	399	0.01	0.10	0.00	1.00
Meritocratic military appointments[a]	Continuous	376	-0.31	1.24	-2.27	2.77
Economic aid[a,b]	Continuous	399	3.37	1.76	0.00	7.70
Military aid[a,b]	Continuous	399	1.65	1.72	0.00	6.23
Arms sales[a,b]	Continuous	361	1.55	1.59	0.00	6.10
GDP growth[a]	Continuous	342	4.83	5.33	-16.84	40.05
Military expenditure per soldier[a,b]	Continuous	344	7.35	0.93	4.31	10.95
Guerrilla attack[a]	Binary	399	0.21	0.40	0.00	1.00
Strike[a]	Binary	399	0.13	0.33	0.00	1.00
Demonstration[a]	Binary	399	0.17	0.37	0.00	1.00
Riot[a]	Binary	399	0.37	0.48	0.00	1.00
Militarized interstate dispute[a]	Binary	399	0.17	0.37	0.00	1.00
US affinity[a]	Continuous	399	4.05	0.43	3.06	4.88
Party regime[a]	Binary	399	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
Military regime[a]	Binary	399	0.13	0.34	0.00	1.00
Personalist regime[a]	Binary	399	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
Democratic regime[a]	Binary	399	0.42	0.49	0.00	1.00
Years since coup[b]	Count	380	1.30	0.93	0.00	3.00
Coup history	Count	380	2.25	2.82	0.00	13.00
Post-Cuban revolution period	Binary	399	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00

Note: [a] Variable lagged by one year. [b] Variable logarithmized.

Table SM.2.2. Summary statistics (difference-in-differences analysis).

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Military involvement in politics (Kenwick dynamic measure)	Continous	399	0.39	0.82	-1.89	2.69
Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1960}$	Binary	399	0.48	0.50	0.00	1.00
Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1961}$	Binary	399	0.43	0.50	0.00	1.00
Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1962}$	Binary	399	0.38	0.49	0.00	1.00
Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1963}$	Binary	399	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1964}$	Binary	399	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00
Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1965}$	Binary	399	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
Revolution$_{t-5}$	Binary	399	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Revolution$_{t-4}$	Binary	399	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Revolution$_{t-3}$	Binary	399	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Revolution$_{t-2}$	Binary	399	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Revolution$_{t-1}$	Binary	399	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Revolution$_{t}$	Binary	399	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Revolution$_{t+1}$	Binary	399	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Revolution$_{t+2}$	Binary	399	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Revolution$_{t+3}$	Binary	399	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Revolution$_{t+4}$	Binary	399	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Revolution$_{t+5}$	Binary	399	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Revolution$_{t+6,\ldots,10}$	Binary	399	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
Batista ally	Binary	399	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00

SM.3 Addressing potential threats to inference

1) **Controlling for domestic and foreign communist threats.** This test relies on V-Dem data by Coppedge et al. (2021) to i) construct the variable *Left anti-regime activity* measuring the strength of leftist, socialist, and communist groups in each country in a given year, and ii) the variable *Left neighbor regimes* measuring for each country in a given year the average strength of leftist ideologies among geographic neighbor regimes. Results in Table SM.3.1 show that our results remain substantively unaffected when both variables are included.

2) **Controlling for Cuban-style guerrilla groups.** This test includes in the analysis the binary variable *Insurgency* identifying country-years with ongoing insurgent activity by Cuban-style guerrilla groups. Data on insurgencies stem from Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) and Lyall and Wilson (2009). Results in Table SM.3.2 remain unchanged. Coefficient estimates for *Counterinsurgency courses* are positive and statistically significant. Coefficient estimates for *Conventional warfare courses* are negative and statistically significant.

3) **Controlling for full spectrum of anti-regime threats.** This test includes the variable *Anti-regime activity* which captures the strength of any kind of anti-system movement in a given year. Data is based on Coppedge et al. (2021). Results, shown in Table SM.3.3, remain again substantively unchanged. Coefficient estimates for *Counterinsurgency courses* are positive and statistically significant. Coefficient estimates for *Conventional warfare courses* are negative and statistically significant.

4) **Sub-sample of countries with low communist threat.** This test re-runs the main analysis on a sub-sample of countries without significant risks of communist revolution. The idea is to hold the threat perception at a constant low level by design, and only exploit the temporal variation of SOA training. Statistically, this is a strong test since results need to withstand a significant drop in observations. The sample is reduced from 19 to 5 countries (Chile, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay). It only includes countries where the average strength of leftist movements was smaller than the 25th percentile between 1949 and 1958, i.e. before the Cuban revolution. As shown in Table SM.3.4, *Counterinsurgency courses* are positively and significantly correlated with the military's involvement in politics. *Conventional warfare courses* retains its negative sign across models, but three of the four coefficient estimates fall below conventional levels of statistical significance.

5) **Sub-sample of countries with right-wing heads of government.** This test re-runs the main analysis on a sub-sample of countries with right-wing government leaders. The idea is to hold the threat perception at a constant high level by design. Ring-wing leaders were presumably highly worried about a looming communist take-over and therefore particularly sensitive to communist subversion. We identify ring-wing government leaders using the data by Herre (2022). As shown in Table SM.3.5, *Counterinsurgency courses* are positively and significantly correlated with the military's involvement in politics. Coefficient estimates for *Conventional warfare courses* are negative and statistically significant.

6) **Controlling for appointment decisions in the military.** This test includes the variable *Meritocratic military appointments* to examine whether soldiers' personal connections or achievements confound the main results. Well-connected or high-performing soldiers might be selected for or self-select into raining abroad. The variable is based on data

from Coppedge et al. (2021), capturing how much "appointment decisions include hiring, firing and promotions in the armed forces" are de facto "based on personal or political connections" or "skills and merit." Table SM.3.6 shows that the coefficient estimates for *Meritocratic military appointments* are negatively correlated with military involvement in all models. The coefficient estimates for *Counterinsurgency courses* and *Conventional warfare courses* remain unchanged, suggesting that (self-)selection into training based on personal connections or individual achievements does not confound the original results.

7) **Comparing officer talent across course types.** This test checks whether talented and ambitious military personnel selected into or were selected for counterinsurgency training at the SOA. To assess whether this is the case, we draw on the case of Argentina, which is one of the countries with the highest proportion of counterinsurgency training, as shown in Figure 3. In addition, Argentina provides us with unique individual level-level data on officers (Scharpf and Gläßel 2020). By locating each SOA-trained officer in their respective cohort, we can compare whether officers who received counterinsurgency or conventional warfare training differed in their ambition and talent from officers who did not receive SOA training. We compare officers by class rank, which measures each officer's relative educational performance at military academy, i.e. the grades in the exams, thereby capturing the ambition and talent they showed during their professional education at home. Class rank ranges from 0 to 100, with smaller values indicating better relative performances, i.e. high-performing officers "who graduated at the top of their class receive a value of 0, whereas underachieving officers who graduated at the bottom of their class receive a value of 100" (Scharpf and Gläßel 2020, 798). The results in Figure SM.3.1 show that there is no difference in class rank between officers who attend counterinsurgency courses or conventional warfare courses compared to officers who do not receive training at the SOA. This suggests that the officers were very similar in terms of ambition and talent. Individual ambition or talent is unlikely to confound our results.

8) **Controlling for other forms of foreign aid.** In this test, we control for three types of US aid that might have helped Latin American militaries accumulate political power. *Economic aid* measures the annual amount of development and humanitarian assistance to each country, and *Military aid* the amount of assistance to the countries' armed forces. Both variables are based on data from US Aid (2022). *Arms sales* is based on SIPRI (2022) data, measuring the value of all annual US transfers of major weapons to Latin American countries. As shown in Table SM.3.7, *Counterinsurgency courses* are positively and significantly correlated with the military's involvement in politics. Coefficient estimates for *Conventional warfare courses* are negative and statistically significant.

Figure SM.3.1. Officer talent and participation in training at the School of the Americas.



Note: The graphic shows the class ranks of Argentine officers with different foreign training at the SOA as well as officers without SOA training. Line elements give 95% confidence intervals. Lower class ranks indicate higher educational attainment at Argentina's officer academy.

Table SM.3.1. Fixed effects regressions with controls for communist threats.

	Annual sum	Three-year sum	Cumulative sum	Course share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Counterinsurgency courses	0.076^{*}	0.075^{**}	0.061^{*}	$0.477^{\dagger}$	
	(0.035)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.263)	
Conventional warfare courses	-0.059^{*}	-0.069^{*}	-0.026		$-0.453^{\dagger}$
	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.046)		(0.259)
Left anti-regime activity	-0.015	-0.048	-0.072	-0.025	-0.023
	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.082)	(0.082)
Left neighbor regimes	-0.634^{**}	-0.635^{***}	-0.687^{**}	-0.134	-0.129
	(0.193)	(0.189)	(0.228)	(0.303)	(0.303)
GDP growth	$0.012^{\dagger}$	$0.012^{\dagger}$	$0.011^{\dagger}$	0.008	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.326^{***}	0.350^{***}	0.353^{***}	0.372^{***}	0.370^{***}
	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.034	0.046	0.026	0.044	0.045
	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.111)	(0.112)
Years since coup	-0.015	-0.030	-0.019	-0.042	-0.041
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Constant	-1.984^{***}	-2.081^{***}	-2.133^{***}	-2.978^{***}	-2.519^{***}
	(0.480)	(0.465)	(0.461)	(0.573)	(0.585)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	509.34	505.46	510.35	430.74	431.13
Adjusted R^2	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.53
Observations	302	302	302	253	253

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SM.3.2. Fixed effects regressions with controls for insurgencies.

	Lyall & Wilson measure					Kalyvas & Balcells measure				
	(1) Annual sum	(2) Three-year sum	(3) Cumulative sum	(4) Course share	(5) Course share	(6) Annual sum	(7) Three-year sum	(8) Cumulative sum	(9) Course share	(10) Course share
Counterinsurgency courses	0.079*	0.073**	0.075**	0.515*		0.076*	0.073**	0.075**	0.516*	
	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.250)		(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.250)	
Conventional warfare courses	−0.073**	−0.091**	−0.091*		−0.491*	−0.075**	−0.095**	−0.094*		−0.493*
	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.044)		(0.246)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.045)		(0.246)
Insurgency	−0.336*	−0.298†	−0.283†	−0.239†	−0.236†	−0.535**	−0.538**	−0.485**	−0.389*	−0.385*
	(0.157)	(0.166)	(0.160)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.188)	(0.171)	(0.174)	(0.175)	(0.175)
GDP growth	0.013	0.013	0.011	0.010	0.010	0.013	0.013†	0.011	0.010	0.010
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.307***	0.333***	0.326***	0.371***	0.371***	0.323***	0.350***	0.342***	0.383***	0.383***
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Guerrilla attack	−0.121	−0.124	−0.121	0.003	0.005	−0.121	−0.122	−0.121	−0.003	−0.001
	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.096)	(0.096)
Strike	0.014	0.017	0.016	−0.017	−0.017	0.014	0.017	0.016	−0.017	−0.017
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.111)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.111)	(0.136)	(0.135)
Demonstration	0.175	0.179†	0.184†	0.241*	0.242*	0.181†	0.184†	0.188†	0.245*	0.246*
	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.112)
Riot	−0.096	−0.090	−0.084	−0.071	−0.070	−0.089	−0.086	−0.080	−0.065	−0.063
	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.081)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.034	0.052	0.041	0.052	0.053	0.039	0.058	0.046	0.055	0.056
	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Years since coup	−0.040	−0.058	−0.046	−0.045	−0.043	−0.036	−0.055	−0.042	−0.041	−0.039
	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Constant	−2.104***	−2.189***	−2.060***	−3.126***	−2.632***	−2.219***	−2.312***	−2.167***	−3.218***	−2.722***
	(0.495)	(0.483)	(0.481)	(0.592)	(0.607)	(0.515)	(0.506)	(0.500)	(0.605)	(0.611)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	514.89	510.95	516.05	427.95	428.36	514.50	509.89	515.39	427.93	428.34
Adjusted R^2	0.50	0.51	0.50	0.54	0.54	0.50	0.51	0.50	0.54	0.54
Observations	302	302	302	253	253	302	302	302	253	253

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SM.3.3. Fixed effects regressions with control for any anti-regime threat.

	Annual sum	Three-year sum	Cumulative sum	Course share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Counterinsurgency courses	0.061†	0.063*	0.065*	0.441†	
	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.251)	
Conventional warfare courses	−0.064*	−0.085*	−0.082†		−0.419†
	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.044)		(0.247)
Anti-regime activity	0.003	−0.003	−0.015	0.015	0.017
	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.046)
GDP growth	0.013†	0.012†	0.011	0.008	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.304***	0.327***	0.320***	0.361***	0.360***
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.030	0.048	0.036	0.046	0.047
	(0.098)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Years since coup	−0.042	−0.058	−0.045	−0.048	−0.047
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Constant	−2.109***	−2.180***	−2.051***	−2.975***	−2.551***
	(0.482)	(0.472)	(0.471)	(0.572)	(0.584)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	518.92	514.84	519.36	429.00	429.35
Adjusted R^2	0.49	0.50	0.49	0.53	0.53
Observations	302	302	302	253	253

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SM.3.4. Results for countries with low threats of communist subversion.

	Annual sum	Three-year sum	Cumulative sum	Course share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Counterinsurgency courses	0.349***	0.247***	0.217***	1.337***	
	(0.059)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.365)	
Conventional warfare courses	0.011	−0.052	−0.065		−1.292***
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.051)		(0.361)
GDP growth	−0.013	−0.011	−0.008	−0.011	−0.011
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.245*	0.226†	0.256†	0.300†	0.310*
	(0.112)	(0.121)	(0.130)	(0.153)	(0.154)
Guerrilla attack	−0.035	0.080	0.163	−0.146	−0.146
	(0.200)	(0.189)	(0.167)	(0.308)	(0.300)
Strike	−0.124	−0.144	−0.152	−0.165	−0.163
	(0.133)	(0.139)	(0.152)	(0.184)	(0.183)
Demonstration	0.418**	0.418**	0.457**	0.539**	0.541**
	(0.141)	(0.143)	(0.153)	(0.198)	(0.200)
Riot	−0.174	−0.182	−0.181	−0.117	−0.099
	(0.119)	(0.122)	(0.126)	(0.142)	(0.145)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.280*	0.260	0.229	0.299	0.311
	(0.129)	(0.163)	(0.179)	(0.195)	(0.198)
Years since coup	−0.409***	−0.413**	−0.456**	−0.376**	−0.363*
	(0.100)	(0.121)	(0.135)	(0.139)	(0.142)
Constant	−0.700	−0.481	−0.563	−1.182	−0.002
	(0.888)	(0.985)	(1.040)	(1.377)	(1.386)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	116.68	128.48	134.87	128.33	129.81
Adjusted R^2	0.57	0.50	0.47	0.46	0.45
Observations	86	86	86	73	73

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SM.3.5. Results for heads of government with rightist ideology.

	Annual sum	Three-year sum	Cumulative sum	Course share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Counterinsurgency courses	0.156**	0.143***	0.139***	1.183***	
	(0.053)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.347)	
Conventional warfare courses	−0.095*	−0.113**	−0.126**		−1.142**
	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.044)		(0.346)
GDP growth	0.006	0.005	0.006	−0.003	−0.003
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.260***	0.272***	0.257***	0.228**	0.228**
	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Guerrilla attack	−0.105	−0.135	−0.112	0.040	0.044
	(0.138)	(0.135)	(0.133)	(0.147)	(0.148)
Strike	0.032	−0.010	−0.032	0.128	0.125
	(0.193)	(0.186)	(0.186)	(0.231)	(0.227)
Demonstration	0.068	0.044	0.077	0.100	0.102
	(0.153)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.157)	(0.157)
Riot	−0.032	−0.027	−0.013	−0.005	−0.001
	(0.114)	(0.111)	(0.116)	(0.123)	(0.124)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.031	0.071	0.050	0.058	0.060
	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.193)	(0.193)
Years since coup	−0.130*	−0.159**	−0.149*	−0.134*	−0.127†
	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.066)	(0.068)
Constant	−1.129*	−1.052†	−0.815	−1.147†	−0.020
	(0.553)	(0.551)	(0.563)	(0.629)	(0.643)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	434.56	428.28	431.20	371.24	371.88
Adjusted R^2	0.34	0.36	0.35	0.36	0.36
Observations	205	205	205	176	176

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SM.3.6. Fixed effects regressions with control for de facto appointment decisions in military.

	Annual sum	Three-year sum	Cumulative sum	Course share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Counterinsurgency courses	0.103**	0.092***	0.099***	0.547*	
	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.254)	
Conventional warfare courses	−0.061*	−0.086**	−0.106*		−0.521*
	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.046)		(0.250)
Meritocratic military appointments	−0.448**	−0.462**	−0.483**	−0.319*	−0.315*
	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.147)	(0.143)	(0.143)
GDP growth	0.011	0.011	0.010	0.008	0.009
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.275***	0.293***	0.287***	0.350***	0.350***
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Guerrilla attack	−0.112	−0.102	−0.097	0.038	0.040
	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.098)	(0.098)
Strike	−0.014	−0.009	−0.008	−0.051	−0.051
	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.117)	(0.151)	(0.150)
Demonstration	0.182†	0.190†	0.198†	0.257*	0.258*
	(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.106)	(0.110)	(0.110)
Riot	−0.084	−0.082	−0.076	−0.057	−0.055
	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.087)
Militarized interstate dispute	−0.056	−0.039	−0.047	−0.046	−0.045
	(0.099)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.120)	(0.121)
Years since coup	−0.027	−0.046	−0.034	−0.033	−0.030
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Constant	−2.086***	−2.132***	−1.979***	−3.127***	−2.605***
	(0.479)	(0.470)	(0.465)	(0.599)	(0.614)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	479.67	474.62	477.66	401.32	401.76
Adjusted R^2	0.53	0.54	0.53	0.56	0.56
Observations	282	282	282	235	235

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SM.3.7. Controlling for different types of US aid.

	Economic aid			Military aid			Arms sales		
	(1) Annual sum	(2) Three-year sum	(3) Cumulative sum	(4) Annual sum	(5) Three-year sum	(6) Cumulative sum	(7) Annual sum	(8) Three-year sum	(9) Cumulative sum
Counterinsurgency courses	0.082*	0.081**	0.073*	0.079†	0.078*	0.120**	0.070*	0.077*	0.069†
	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.039)
Conventional warfare courses	−0.064*	−0.081*	−0.086†	−0.065*	−0.083*	−0.058	−0.071**	−0.066*	−0.068*
	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.049)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Economic aid	−0.016	−0.020	−0.004	−0.018	−0.022	0.015			
	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.044)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.046)			
Military aid				0.010	0.006	−0.099*			
				(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.045)			
Arms sales							0.057*	−0.037	0.008
							(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.048)
GDP growth	0.012	0.012	0.011	0.012	0.012	0.011	0.012	0.012	0.012
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.298***	0.315***	0.322***	0.297***	0.315***	0.323***	0.295***	0.318***	0.305***
	(0.066)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.068)	(0.067)
Guerrilla attack	−0.147	−0.148	−0.144	−0.147	−0.149	−0.145	−0.151	−0.147	−0.146
	(0.093)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.093)
Strike	0.011	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.014	0.004	0.008	0.011	0.010
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.111)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.111)	(0.114)	(0.114)
Demonstration	0.181†	0.185†	0.191†	0.181†	0.185†	0.185†	0.174†	0.183†	0.182†
	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.106)
Riot	−0.072	−0.067	−0.065	−0.073	−0.067	−0.075	−0.084	−0.068	−0.074
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.080)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.039	0.057	0.045	0.039	0.057	0.062	0.057	0.020	0.039
	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.095)
Years since coup	−0.048	−0.066	−0.051	−0.048	−0.066	−0.045	−0.046	−0.044	−0.046
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.055)
Constant	−1.981***	−1.985***	−2.012***	−1.972***	−1.981***	−1.994***	−2.024***	−2.128***	−2.101***
	(0.517)	(0.571)	(0.600)	(0.526)	(0.581)	(0.583)	(0.493)	(0.511)	(0.502)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	517.45	512.94	518.15	519.37	514.90	513.11	513.13	516.57	517.79
Adjusted R^2	0.50	0.51	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.51	0.51	0.50	0.50
Observations	302	302	302	302	302	302	302	302	302

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

SM.4 Probing the mechanism

1) **Course content.** This test probes which part of counterinsurgency training at the SOA drove militarization. We replace the original counterinsurgency variables with three thematically disaggregated variables: *Intelligence course*, *Irregular warfare course*, and *State-building course*. The variables are based on hand-coded course titles.

   - *Intelligence courses* include courses on: (Counter) (military) intelligence (operations) (orientation) (Phase II-III).
   - *Irregular warfare courses* include courses on: Counter resistance, counter insurrection (operations) (orientation), (cadet) irregular warfare (operations) (orientation), (basic) internal security (operations), jungle warfare (operations) (training), special tactics, and small unit warfare.
   - *State-building courses* include courses on: Civic action and (military) civic action planning.

   As expected based on our theoretical argument, results in Table SM.4.1 show that the coefficient estimates for *Irregular warfare course* and *state-building courses* are positive and statistically significant across all models with latter being visibly larger than the former. The estimates for *Intelligence* fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

2) **Course dissemination.** This test probes how the ideas and outlook of foreign training were transmitted within Latin American military organizations. Graduates of foreign academies or training programs often become instructors at domestic academies or staff colleges where they can share new ideas with peers and subordinates through personal interactions. Alternatively, foreign-trained officers may disseminate their acquired knowledge through publications in military periodicals. The test assesses the relative importance of these two channels of information dissemination using data from Toronto (2017). We interact the two main course variables with the number of domestic military *Academies* and the number of military *Periodicals*, respectively.

   Results in Table SM.4.2 show that the interaction term between *Counterinsurgency courses* and *Academies* is positive and statistically significant. In contrast, neither the interaction term between *Conventional warfare courses* and *Academies* nor the interaction terms between the two course type variables and *Periodicals* reach any conventional level of statistical significance. The effect of counterinsurgency training on military involvement in politics only increases at as the number of domestic military academies increases. Periodicals do not moderate the effect of counterinsurgency and conventional warfare courses. Together, this suggests that the ideas and notions of political involvement, acquired through US counterinsurgency training, spread through face-to-face education at domestic military institutions.

3) **Temporal development.** This test set probes how the militarization effect of foreign training at the SOA unfolded over time. We have argued that trainees become exposed to counterinsurgency training abroad and disseminate their knowledge in the military once they are back home, which subsequently motivates soldiers to become politically involved. This suggests that the effect of SOA training should build up over time.

   The two tests we undertake rely on difference-in-differences designs. The treatment group consists of Latin American governments that were allied to the Batista regime before the Revolution. For each country, we identify the average affiliation score between 1949

and 1958, i.e. in the pre-treatment window. Countries with average scores equal to or higher than the 75th percentile are cases in the treatment group, while the other countries serve as the control group. In addition to the parallel trends shown in Figure 9 in the manuscript, Figure SM.4.1 shows that treatment and control group are very similar with respect to possible changes in military priorities. The number of insurgencies remained constant before and after the Cuban Revolution. Activities by leftist groups increased in both groups after 1959 but were more pronounced in the control group, making it less likely that our results are simply due to changing political realities among Batista allies.

The first difference-in-differences analysis interacts the group variable, which is 1 for Batista allies (treatment group) and 0 otherwise (control group), with the treatment variable, which is 0 before the Cuban Revolution (pre-treatment period) and 1 after the Revolution (post-treatment period). To be sensitive to the changes of the SOA curriculum and the availability of counterinsurgency courses, we estimate different models with different versions of the treatment variable, i.e. in which year after the Cuban Revolution the treatment variable is coded 1. Results in Table SM.4.3 show that military involvement in politics significantly increased after the Cuban Revolution. The coefficient estimate of *Batista ally X Post-revolution*$_{t\geq 1964}$ is particularly robust for the period after 1964—six years after Latin American soldiers had participated in the first counterinsurgency courses at the SOA and four years after the school offered courses on irregular warfare.

The second difference-in-differences analysis relies on saturated models. The models include several interaction effects between the group variable (1=Batista ally, 0=otherwise) and different treatment variables, which slice up the pre- and post-treatment periods to triangulate anticipatory and lagged effects. The reference category for Models 1 and 2 is the years before 1958 and for Model 3 the years before 1954. Results in Table SM.4.4 show that across the Models only the interaction term between *Batista ally* (treatment group) and *Revolution*$_{t+6,\ldots,10}$ is positive and statistically significant. This is supported by Figure SM.4.2, which visualizes the results of Model 3. The statistically insignificant estimates for the years between 1954 and 1959 underscore that political militarization in countries allied to the former Cuban dictator Batista (treatment group) and other countries (control group) followed similar trends. Overall, the results again show a delayed effect of SOA counterinsurgency training on militarization. Soldiers' military involvement on politics increased six years after the SOA had started to teach counterinsurgency topics.

Figure SM.4.1. Checking for broader changes in military priorities.



Note: Graph shows trends in the number of insurgencies and activities of leftist groups among Batista allies (treatment group) and other countries (control group) before and after the Cuban Revolution. Data on insurgencies stem from Lyall and Wilson (2009) and data on leftist groups from Coppedge et al. (2021).

Figure SM.4.2. Delayed militarization effect after Cuban Revolution among Batista allies with parallel trends test.



Note: Results based on Model 3, Table SM.4.4. Vertical lines give 95% confidence intervals. Reference category is the years before 1954.

Table SM.4.1. Counterinsurgency course content and military involvement in politics (dynamic measure).

	Annual sum			Three-year sum			Cumulative sum			Course share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Intelligence content	0.039			0.050†			0.065*			−0.652		
	(0.040)			(0.029)			(0.030)			(0.446)		
Irregular warfare content		0.110**			0.122***			0.133***			0.837†	
		(0.042)			(0.032)			(0.030)			(0.465)	
State-building content			0.284**			0.286***			0.278***			3.441*
			(0.105)			(0.072)			(0.063)			(1.350)
Conventional warfare courses	−0.052†	−0.063*	−0.062*	−0.074*	−0.087**	−0.084**	−0.071	−0.112**	−0.069*	−0.849*	−0.142	−0.379
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.046)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.346)	(0.291)	(0.246)
GDP growth	0.013†	0.012	0.014†	0.013†	0.012	0.016*	0.011	0.011	0.013†	0.009	0.009	0.010
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.302***	0.297***	0.274***	0.327***	0.311***	0.293***	0.324***	0.299***	0.276***	0.374***	0.372***	0.361***
	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.072)
Guerrilla attack	−0.127	−0.142	−0.129	−0.134	−0.157†	−0.127	−0.139	−0.165†	−0.140	0.006	0.009	−0.010
	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.089)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.084)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.086)	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.094)
Strike	0.011	0.024	0.027	0.012	0.036	0.032	0.015	0.021	0.030	0.005	0.011	0.015
	(0.113)	(0.111)	(0.107)	(0.114)	(0.110)	(0.101)	(0.110)	(0.107)	(0.101)	(0.129)	(0.130)	(0.130)
Demonstration	0.184†	0.177†	0.177	0.189†	0.169	0.176†	0.189†	0.166	0.149	0.245*	0.256*	0.230*
	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.109)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.114)
Riot	−0.072	−0.063	−0.084	−0.072	−0.046	−0.053	−0.069	−0.044	−0.032	−0.054	−0.053	−0.050
	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.086)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.025	0.024	0.002	0.041	0.054	0.020	0.037	0.043	0.020	0.063	0.051	0.073
	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.091)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.091)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.092)	(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.107)
Years since coup	−0.038	−0.050	−0.072	−0.048	−0.079	−0.093†	−0.044	−0.061	−0.093†	−0.050	−0.057	−0.065
	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.064)
Constant	−2.087***	−2.020***	−1.836***	−2.186***	−1.998***	−1.869***	−2.094***	−1.731***	−1.662***	−2.269**	−2.950***	−2.637***
	(0.503)	(0.507)	(0.506)	(0.495)	(0.496)	(0.489)	(0.488)	(0.499)	(0.484)	(0.690)	(0.610)	(0.608)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	521.31	511.85	510.93	518.05	500.17	496.88	519.53	499.87	495.78	425.94	424.69	423.22
Adjusted R^2	0.49	0.51	0.51	0.50	0.53	0.53	0.49	0.53	0.53	0.54	0.55	0.55
Observations	302	302	302	302	302	302	302	302	302	253	253	253

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SM.4.2. Domestic dissemination channels of foreign training content.

	Military academies						Military periodicals					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Counterinsurgency courses X Academies	0.050*	0.083**			0.054*	0.086**						
	(0.022)	(0.027)			(0.023)	(0.027)						
Conventional warfare courses X Academies			0.010	0.014	−0.009	−0.011						
			(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.016)	(0.029)						
Counterinsurgency courses X Periodicals							0.010	0.008			0.010	0.008
							(0.014)	(0.016)			(0.015)	(0.017)
Conventional warfare courses X Periodicals									0.002	0.002	−0.001	−0.001
									(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Counterinsurgency courses	−0.070*	−0.120*	0.029	0.074*	−0.077*	−0.127*	0.019	0.065	0.039	0.086*	0.017	0.065
	(0.032)	(0.059)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.058)	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.047)
Conventional warfare courses	−0.038†	−0.061*	−0.057	−0.097	−0.020	−0.037	−0.055**	−0.082**	−0.059*	−0.088*	−0.052*	−0.081*
	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.075)	(0.033)	(0.074)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.040)	(0.025)	(0.041)
Academies	−0.187	−0.158	−0.158	−0.113	−0.173	−0.135						
	(0.139)	(0.153)	(0.146)	(0.161)	(0.143)	(0.160)						
Periodicals							0.186***	0.206**	0.201***	0.217**	0.190**	0.207*
							(0.054)	(0.069)	(0.058)	(0.077)	(0.060)	(0.080)
GDP growth		0.015†		0.013		0.015†		0.012		0.012		0.013
		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)
Military expenditure per soldier		0.347***		0.309***		0.347***		0.298***		0.291***		0.298***
		(0.072)		(0.068)		(0.071)		(0.066)		(0.064)		(0.066)
Guerrilla attack		−0.135		−0.143		−0.135		−0.097		−0.103		−0.097
		(0.092)		(0.094)		(0.092)		(0.088)		(0.089)		(0.088)
Strike		0.038		0.014		0.037		0.067		0.073		0.067
		(0.114)		(0.114)		(0.114)		(0.106)		(0.106)		(0.106)
Demonstration		0.177†		0.180†		0.178†		0.169†		0.162		0.170†
		(0.101)		(0.106)		(0.101)		(0.100)		(0.101)		(0.100)
Riot		−0.060		−0.070		−0.063		−0.071		−0.072		−0.071
		(0.076)		(0.080)		(0.076)		(0.075)		(0.075)		(0.075)
Militarized interstate dispute		0.028		0.035		0.030		−0.019		−0.021		−0.019
		(0.092)		(0.094)		(0.093)		(0.090)		(0.090)		(0.090)
Years since coup		−0.030		−0.049		−0.027		−0.033		−0.038		−0.033
		(0.051)		(0.054)		(0.052)		(0.052)		(0.053)		(0.052)
Constant	0.229	−2.241***	0.201	−1.983***	0.209	−2.281***	0.049	−2.058***	0.050	−2.003***	0.047	−2.061***
	(0.217)	(0.533)	(0.224)	(0.507)	(0.222)	(0.526)	(0.168)	(0.507)	(0.168)	(0.491)	(0.168)	(0.505)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	639.04	507.67	647.13	519.35	640.78	509.49	624.45	500.46	625.82	501.14	626.42	502.45
Adjusted R^2	0.59	0.52	0.58	0.50	0.59	0.51	0.60	0.53	0.60	0.53	0.60	0.53
Observations	399	302	399	302	399	302	399	302	399	302	399	302

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SM.4.3. Difference-in-Differences for military involvement in politics (dynamic measure).

	Without controls						With controls					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Batista ally X Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1960}$	0.250						0.470**					
	(0.195)						(0.178)					
Batista ally X Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1961}$		0.294						0.493**				
		(0.200)						(0.183)				
Batista ally X Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1962}$			0.349†						0.551**			
			(0.207)						(0.193)			
Batista ally X Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1963}$				0.419†						0.649**		
				(0.217)						(0.206)		
Batista ally X Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1964}$					0.498*						0.744***	
					(0.230)						(0.222)	
Batista ally X Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1965}$						0.547*						0.750**
						(0.254)						(0.248)
Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1960,\ldots,1965}$	−0.154†	−0.118	−0.077	−0.031	0.032	0.042	−0.276**	−0.234*	−0.207*	−0.182†	−0.152	−0.136
	(0.093)	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.104)	(0.110)	(0.118)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.097)	(0.103)	(0.110)	(0.119)
Batista ally	0.040	0.033	0.026	0.020	0.017	0.029	−0.460***	−0.447***	−0.443***	−0.449***	−0.442***	−0.395***
	(0.124)	(0.118)	(0.112)	(0.107)	(0.103)	(0.099)	(0.119)	(0.113)	(0.107)	(0.101)	(0.098)	(0.098)
Constant	0.417***	0.395***	0.373***	0.354***	0.335***	0.334***	−1.202***	−1.260***	−1.307***	−1.361***	−1.393***	−1.366***
	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.316)	(0.315)	(0.315)	(0.313)	(0.310)	(0.315)
Time varying controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	972.82	973.10	972.42	970.39	966.53	965.59	703.75	704.36	703.46	700.97	697.63	698.54
Adjusted R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.12
Observations	399	399	399	399	399	399	318	318	318	318	318	318

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Post-revolution dummies assume value of one for years equal to or greater than the indicated one.

Batista ally variable assumes value of one for all countries with pre-treatment affinity score equal to or larger than 75th percentile.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SM.4.4. Probing anticipatory and lagged effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Batista ally X Revolution$_{t-5}$			-0.244
			(0.372)
Batista ally X Revolution$_{t-4}$			-0.364
			(0.336)
Batista ally X Revolution$_{t-3}$			-0.214
			(0.361)
Batista ally X Revolution$_{t-2}$			-0.375
			(0.353)
Batista ally X Revolution$_{t-1}$	0.177	0.191	0.023
	(0.497)	(0.374)	(0.396)
Batista ally X Revolution$_{t}$	-0.080	0.080	-0.084
	(0.359)	(0.305)	(0.336)
Batista ally X Revolution$_{t+1}$	-0.072	0.148	-0.008
	(0.355)	(0.298)	(0.329)
Batista ally X Revolution$_{t+2}$	-0.089	0.089	-0.076
	(0.346)	(0.303)	(0.334)
Batista ally X Revolution$_{t+3}$	-0.097	0.008	-0.156
	(0.343)	(0.278)	(0.309)
Batista ally X Revolution$_{t+4}$	-0.052	0.125	-0.044
	(0.347)	(0.309)	(0.338)
Batista ally X Revolution$_{t+5}$	0.180	0.550	0.382
	(0.391)	(0.399)	(0.422)
Batista ally X Revolution$_{t+6,\ldots,10}$	0.544^{*}	0.855^{**}	0.685^{*}
	(0.276)	(0.268)	(0.300)
Revolution$_{t-5}$			0.048
			(0.197)
Revolution$_{t-4}$			$0.298^{\dagger}$
			(0.156)
Revolution$_{t-3}$			$0.273^{\dagger}$
			(0.148)
Revolution$_{t-2}$			0.331^{*}
			(0.151)
Revolution$_{t-1}$	-0.133	-0.216	-0.083
	(0.231)	(0.203)	(0.223)
Revolution$_{t}$	-0.262	-0.268	-0.134
	(0.221)	(0.198)	(0.217)
Revolution$_{t+1}$	-0.308	$-0.371^{\dagger}$	-0.237
	(0.221)	(0.202)	(0.224)
Revolution$_{t+2}$	-0.337	$-0.353^{\dagger}$	-0.213
	(0.220)	(0.197)	(0.217)
Revolution$_{t+3}$	-0.347	$-0.363^{\dagger}$	-0.230
	(0.219)	(0.191)	(0.213)
Revolution$_{t+4}$	$-0.390^{\dagger}$	$-0.392^{\dagger}$	-0.255
	(0.221)	(0.205)	(0.224)
Revolution$_{t+5}$	-0.132	-0.330	-0.194
	(0.247)	(0.238)	(0.256)
Revolution$_{t+6,\ldots,10}$	-0.077	-0.320^{*}	-0.185
	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.154)
Batista ally	0.031	-0.492^{***}	$-0.331^{\dagger}$
	(0.139)	(0.133)	(0.186)
Constant	0.453^{***}	-1.101^{***}	-1.273^{***}
	(0.065)	(0.312)	(0.322)
Time varying controls	No	Yes	Yes
AIC	980.97	714.48	727.15
Adjusted R^2	0.02	0.11	0.09
Observations	399	318	318

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

SM.5 Additional robustness checks

1) **Additional controls on pull factors: US affinity, regime types, coup history.** This check accounts for varying "pull" factors, i.e. how much and how often politicians invite the military into politics. The analysis includes the continuous variable *US affinity*, which measures a country's political proximity to the US based on UN voting patterns using data from Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten (2017). It also contains binary regime variables identifying *Party regimes*, *Military regimes*, *Personalist regimes*, and *Democratic regimes* based on data by (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014). Foreign-occupied and provisional regimes serve as reference category. We omit US affinity and the regime variables from the main analysis presented in the manuscript as they may introduce post-treatment bias. Third, the analysis includes *Coup history* measuring the number of past coup attempts based on data from Powell and Thyne (2011).

   Table SM.5.1 shows that the coefficient estimates of *Counterinsurgency courses* and *Conventional warfare courses* remain substantively unaffected by the inclusion of the additional variables. The estimates of *Military regime* and *Personalist regime* are positive and statistically significant. The other added control variables fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. In comparison to soldiers' motivation to become politically involved ("push" factors), the opportunity to become involved ("pull" factors) seems to be less relevant for the subsequent political militarization. This underlines our argument that training content, through the motivations of soldiers, shapes the military's influence over politics and policies.

2) **Student numbers.** This check tests whether the results hold when using student numbers instead of the number of courses attended. We draw on our original course attendance data to manually identify the number of students that attended counterinsurgency courses and courses in conventional warfare. Results in Table SM.5.2 show that *Counterinsurgency trained students* are positively and significantly correlated with military involvement in politics across all statistical models, whereas *Conventional warfare trained students* are negatively correlated with militarization.

3) **Alternate measure of dependent variable.** This test analyzes how course types influence the likelihood of soldiers holding high government posts. Following Eibl, Hertog and Slater (2019), the analysis uses two measures of militarization built of the data by Svolik (2012). The data identifies regimes with civilian rule (value=0), regimes where military involvement in politics is indirect (value=1), i.e. the head of the executive is a civilian but officers intervene in policies unrelated to national security, and regimes where military involvement is direct (value=2), i.e. where the head of the executive is a professional soldier.

   We employ two different measures of the dependent variable. The first measure is binary. It is 1 if military involvement in politics is either direct or indirect, and 0 otherwise. The second measure is categorical, ranging from civilian rule, over indirect military involvement, to direct military involvement (values=0,1,2). Results in Table SM.5.3 and Table SM.5.4 show that our main results replicate for both dependent variables. The only exception is the cumulative sum of courses (Model 3 in Table SM.5.4). Overall, *Counterinsurgency courses* increase the likelihood of officers holding high government posts, whereas *Conventional warfare courses* decrease it. The findings support our expectation that SOA counterinsurgency training motivated soldiers to hold high executive positions.

Table SM.5.1. Additional control variables.

	US ally			Regime types			Coup history		
	(1) Annual sum	(2) Three-year sum	(3) Cumulative sum	(4) Annual sum	(5) Three-year sum	(6) Cumulative sum	(7) Annual sum	(8) Three-year sum	(9) Cumulative sum
Counterinsurgency courses	0.064†	0.070*	0.069*	0.077**	0.069**	0.089***	0.056	0.052†	0.071**
	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.038)	(0.028)	(0.026)
Conventional warfare courses	−0.065*	−0.089*	−0.087†	−0.048†	−0.054†	−0.101*	−0.050†	−0.055†	−0.111**
	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.041)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.041)
US affinity	−0.055	0.005	−0.017						
	(0.085)	(0.090)	(0.088)						
Party regime				0.227	0.240	0.246	0.248	0.234	0.238
				(0.278)	(0.274)	(0.277)	(0.279)	(0.278)	(0.281)
Military regime				0.682**	0.699**	0.724**	0.664**	0.670**	0.694**
				(0.218)	(0.216)	(0.218)	(0.216)	(0.215)	(0.218)
Personalist regime				0.534*	0.526*	0.546*	0.517*	0.486*	0.511*
				(0.218)	(0.219)	(0.217)	(0.213)	(0.215)	(0.215)
Democratic regime				−0.286	−0.263	−0.283	−0.281	−0.268	−0.286
				(0.225)	(0.222)	(0.224)	(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.229)
GDP growth	0.013	0.012	0.011	0.006	0.006	0.005	0.006	0.006	0.005
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.308***	0.330***	0.325***	0.134*	0.153**	0.144**	0.163**	0.182**	0.173**
	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.057)
Guerrilla attack	−0.146	−0.147	−0.143	−0.155†	−0.156*	−0.153†	−0.152†	−0.152†	−0.147†
	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.081)	(0.079)	(0.078)
Strike	0.015	0.013	0.014	0.021	0.021	0.025	0.034	0.033	0.035
	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.110)	(0.106)	(0.109)	(0.110)	(0.107)
Demonstration	0.183†	0.187†	0.190†	0.102	0.104	0.114	0.102	0.105	0.116
	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.108)	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.081)	(0.084)
Riot	−0.072	−0.070	−0.065	−0.044	−0.042	−0.033	−0.037	−0.037	−0.025
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.037	0.056	0.044	−0.027	−0.017	−0.012	−0.031	−0.018	−0.013
	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.086)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.092)
Years since coup	−0.052	−0.062	−0.052	−0.081	−0.094†	−0.093†			
	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)			
Coup history							0.020	0.016	0.022
							(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Constant	−1.888**	−2.183***	−1.982***	−1.348**	−1.420**	−1.210**	−1.727***	−1.784***	−1.562**
	(0.599)	(0.598)	(0.575)	(0.453)	(0.448)	(0.444)	(0.504)	(0.499)	(0.491)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	517.41	513.33	518.12	439.41	436.32	432.00	441.99	440.67	435.91
Adjusted R^2	0.50	0.51	0.50	0.62	0.62	0.63	0.61	0.61	0.62
Observations	302	302	302	302	302	302	302	302	302

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Reference category for regime types: Foreign-occupied and provisional regimes.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SM.5.2. Student numbers and military involvement in politics (dynamic measure).

	Annual number	Three-year number	Cumulative number	Student share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Counterinsurgency trained students	0.073*	0.072**	0.074**	0.462*	
	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.234)	
Conventional warfare trained students	−0.069*	−0.090**	−0.090*		−0.412
	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.044)		(0.256)
GDP growth	0.012	0.012	0.011	0.010	0.010
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.307***	0.332***	0.326***	0.375***	0.376***
	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Guerrilla attack	−0.142	−0.147	−0.143	−0.009	−0.007
	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Strike	0.009	0.013	0.013	−0.017	−0.021
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.110)	(0.135)	(0.134)
Demonstration	0.183†	0.187†	0.191†	0.252*	0.250*
	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.113)
Riot	−0.072	−0.070	−0.066	−0.053	−0.052
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.037	0.055	0.044	0.057	0.054
	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.109)	(0.111)
Years since coup	−0.043	−0.061	−0.051	−0.053	−0.043
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.063)	(0.064)
Constant	−2.098***	−2.185***	−2.054***	−3.142***	−2.741***
	(0.504)	(0.494)	(0.490)	(0.595)	(0.608)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	516.03	511.56	515.96	427.56	429.53
Adjusted R^2	0.50	0.51	0.50	0.54	0.54
Observations	302	302	302	253	253

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SM.5.3. Training content and military involvement in politics (Binary Svolik measure).

	Annual sum	Three-year sum	Cumulative sum	Course share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Counterinsurgency courses	0.051*	0.045**	0.042*	0.358*	
	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.148)	
Conventional warfare courses	−0.050*	−0.063**	−0.055†		−0.354*
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.033)		(0.144)
GDP growth	0.015*	0.015*	0.014*	0.013†	0.013†
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.213***	0.229***	0.223***	0.272***	0.272***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Guerrilla attack	−0.112	−0.111	−0.107	0.012	0.013
	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Strike	0.075	0.079	0.074	0.070	0.069
	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Demonstration	0.099	0.103	0.102	0.148*	0.148*
	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Riot	−0.023	−0.020	−0.017	−0.008	−0.007
	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.135†	0.143†	0.134†	0.154†	0.156†
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Years since coup	−0.001	−0.012	−0.004	−0.010	−0.009
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Constant	−1.173**	−1.226***	−1.139**	−2.087***	−1.736***
	(0.357)	(0.351)	(0.346)	(0.354)	(0.379)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	279.75	277.04	283.25	207.76	207.63
Adjusted R^2	0.38	0.38	0.37	0.44	0.44
Observations	284	284	284	236	236

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SM.5.4. Training content and military involvement in politics (Categorical Svolik measure).

	Annual sum	Three-year sum	Cumulative sum	Course share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Counterinsurgency courses	0.090*	0.075*	0.046	0.612*	
	(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.265)	
Conventional warfare courses	−0.089*	−0.074*	−0.006		−0.607*
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.045)		(0.258)
GDP growth	0.021*	0.020*	0.020*	0.018*	0.018*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.368***	0.394***	0.389***	0.478***	0.479***
	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.082)
Guerrilla attack	−0.195†	−0.200†	−0.205†	−0.045	−0.044
	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.117)
Strike	0.076	0.078	0.077	0.046	0.045
	(0.123)	(0.120)	(0.118)	(0.139)	(0.138)
Demonstration	0.129	0.129	0.119	0.194	0.195
	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.121)	(0.127)	(0.126)
Riot	−0.059	−0.054	−0.056	−0.050	−0.048
	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.133	0.134	0.108	0.160	0.164
	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.114)	(0.128)	(0.128)
Years since coup	0.021	0.002	0.009	0.031	0.033
	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Constant	−2.231***	−2.347***	−2.416***	−3.639***	−3.039***
	(0.608)	(0.595)	(0.588)	(0.617)	(0.660)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	567.13	568.58	573.53	464.90	464.70
Adjusted R^2	0.34	0.33	0.32	0.38	0.38
Observations	284	284	284	236	236

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

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