Appendices to "Victory without Peace: Conquest, Insurgency, and War Termination"

This document contains additional information about the quantitative analysis presented in "Victory without Peace: Conquest, Insurgency, and War Termination." Appendix A provides the coding rules (where pertinent) and coding decisions for data gathered for this project, and ends with a table listing all observations in the main dataset, whether or not they are used in the primary analysis, and the coding for whether post-conquest resistance occurred. Appendix B presents the robustness results necessary to validate specific claims made in the main text.

Appendix A: Coding Rules and Coding Decisions for New Variables

For coding decisions, I list all wars that are in the expanded war list, beginning with observations from the Correlates of War interstate war list and then turning to those added by Gleditsch. This approach means that this document contains many observations that do not appear in the dataset, as one of the coding decisions is whether or not conquest in conventional war occurred in the conflict. I include information beyond the conflict name about wars only if a plausible case could be made that conquest occurred in the course of the war, however. For those cases in which information from standard encyclopedias of war was insufficient to code relevant variables, I also include citations to the secondary sources that were consulted.

1 Coding Rules

Conquest

The first and most important coding decision concerns whether conventional conquest occurred in the course of a war. This variable determines whether an observation enters into the dataset. Conquest is coded as occurring if the military on one side of the war ceases to exist as a viable conventional force (typically because it has been dispersed as a consequence of fighting or has surrendered piecemeal). In practice, this definition overlaps heavily with a rule in which conquest is coded if the winning side is able to fully occupy the territory of the defeated power.

Given the inevitability of marginal cases, I include two additional variables, called conqflag and default, that facilitate robustness checks of the sort presented in Appendix B. Default is 1 for all observations used in the primary analysis and 0 for observations included for the purpose of robustness checks.

Conqflag is coded as follows:

- = 0 if the case clearly involved conquest in conventional war
- = 1 if the war resulted in the occupation of one side by the other, but that occupation occurred as a result of a negotiated capitulation that arguably preceded the final collapse of the defeated military (e.g. Italy or Japan in World War II)

= 2 if the war involved the occupation of one side by the other as a result of fighting, but reasonable observers might debate whether a true period of conventional resistance occurred prior to the occupation (e.g. the French conquest of Algeria in 1830)
= 3 if the war involved conquest of one side by the other in conventional war, but the victorious side withdrew after conquest sufficiently quickly that the full window for sufficient resistance to emerge had not elapsed (e.g. the Anglo-Ethiopian War)
= 4 if the government of the defeated side existed for less than a month prior to the invasion, as arises in some marginal cases identified from historical insurgencies (e.g. Formosa in 1895, East Timor in 1975)

Guerrilla Resistance after Conquest

As is noted in the paper, almost all conventional conquerors experience some degree of resistance following conquest. Thus, for example, the Germans in France—a clear case of a conqueror not experiencing guerrilla resistance—still encountered isolated incidents of potshots at soldiers, defacing of German posters, and occasional assassinations in the summer and fall of 1940. This variable thus captures not the existence of any violence in the post-conquest period but the emergence of a sustained insurgent force capable of challenging the conqueror's ability to impose its preferred policies on major political issues. Given that it frequently takes some time for guerrilla resistance to develop in full—there was a significant debate, for example, in the summer of 2003 about whether an anti-occupation insurgency was developing in Iraq—I allow six months for significant resistance to emerge, while viewing those few cases in which significant resistance emerged after the six month threshold (e.g. Poland in World War II) as experiencing a new bout of violence related to changing political conditions between the end of the prior war and the emergence of a new one.

Pre-Conquest Deaths

I rely primarily on estimates of deaths in Clodfelter (2007), focusing on deaths incurred prior to the date of conquest. In cases for which Clodfelter has only casualty data, I estimate deaths as one third of total casualties. There is missing data for several observations, concentrated more heavily among cases in which post-conquest resistance occurred; note that for these cases an approach of using Correlates of War death totals would be inappropriate given that many deaths occurred after conquest and thus could not influence the decision to mount guerrilla resistance. Based on this information, I code deaths on the conquered side (*losdeaths*); the resulting variable was then transformed in several ways (logging, adjustment to per capita values) in the final dataset.

Duration

Duration (*durat*) is recorded from the date on which the war begins (generally the onset of fighting) to the date on which conquest is recorded. For interstate wars, the onset of fighting is taken from the War Initiation and Termination project (Fazal et al. 2006). The date of conquest typically corresponds to events that demonstrate the inability of the defeated side to continue conventional resistance, such as the catastrophic defeat of the central armed forces in battle, the occupation of

the capital city (most common scenario), or the capitulation of the defeated army.[1]

Coordinating Leader

For this variable (*coord*), I identify the central political leader during the conventional phase of the war, who in general constitutes the most obvious focal leader for resistance. This variable captures whether that leader is available to lead the resistance. Leaders who are dead, imprisoned, or in exile are unavailable.

Conqueror War Aims

Two variables capture the extent of the conqueror's war aims. For territorial aims, the frequent impossibility of determining the extent of territorial claims in cases in which the conqueror intends to annex some but not all of the territory of the country forces me to adopt a trichotomous variable (*terraim*), which is 0 when the conqueror disavows all territorial claims, 1 when the conqueror intends to annex some but not all of the conquered state's territory, and 2 when the conqueror intends to annex the conquered state in its entirety (including as a colony). For political aims, the variable (*govtaim*) is 0 when the conqueror intends to leave the existing government in the defeated country in power, 1 when the conqueror intends to install a new but independent government, and 2 when the conqueror intends to govern the country itself (typically through annexation or colony status). Both variables are coded on the basis of contemporary claims about intentions rather than final policy, as decisions about whether to resist obviously were made without knowledge of the conqueror's eventual policy decisions. Note that these coding rules inevitably imply high multicollinearity between *terraim* and *govtaim*, given that any case that receives a coding of 2 for one variable will also receive a 2 for the other; as such, I do not include both variables simultaneously in any regression.

2 Coding Justifications

Below are explanations for coding decisions, concerning both codings of conquest (i.e. inclusion in the universe of cases for analysis) and for values of the dependent variable (sustained guerrilla resistance) and independent variables coded here (conqueror war aims and prior guerrilla experience). The explanations are organized by dataset, starting with COW interstate wars, turning next to COW extrastate wars included in Gleditsch's expanded war list, and then discussing marginal observations drawn from cases of foreign-imposed regime change and historical insurgencies. Cases that are not followed by any discussion clearly did not involve conquest.

[1]There is some inevitable imprecision here—one could, for example, code conquest in the Franco-German dyad in World War II as occurring with the fall of Paris on June 14 or with the surrender on June 22—but it typically involves a range of a few days or weeks in which reasonable codings might be identified, and as such should not affect results, especially given the absence of significant findings.

2.1 Interstate Wars

Franco-Spanish

The Franco-Spanish War was a clear case of conquest: the French defeated the Spanish army, with the war ending with the capture of Cadiz. The central Spanish leader was Rafael del Riego y Nuez; he was betrayed, captured by the French, and subsequently executed. Their goal was to restore the Spanish King Ferdinand to his throne, implying a coding for *govtaim* of 1. While French troops remained in the country until 1827 they did not face serious resistance. The French had no territorial claims against Spain. Clodfelter contains no estimate of the size of the Spanish army at the outset of the war, nor do secondary sources provide a useful estimate.

Sources: Hemingway, Joseph, The History of the Spanish Revolution Commencing with the Establishment of the Constitutional Government of the Cortes and Brought down to Its Overthrow by the French Arms (London: H. Fisher, 1824).

First Russo-Turkish

Mexican-American

American forces succeeded in taking Mexico City, but Mexican troops withdrew in relatively good order and continued to be capable of conventional operations (for example an attempt to retake Puebla). For this reason, the war is coded as not ending through conquest. That said, an expansive definition of conquest could include the American success here, meaning that this observation is included in the dataset, but with conqflag=1 and default=0. For robustness codings, the US is coded as having non-total territorial demands (the official position involved demands for California and New Mexico and also for recognition of the American interpretation of the Texan border; the movement for annexing all Mexico, while publicly significant, did not constitute official policy and was not part of war aims in draft treaties sent to facilitate negotiations). The Mexicans continued very limited military activity but did not seriously threaten the American hold on the capital, although there are indications that the American position would have gotten worse had the two sides not signed a treaty in February 1848.

Sources: Mahin, Dean B., Olive Branch and Sword: The United States and Mexico, 1845-1848 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1997).
Nelson, Anna Kasten, Secret Agents: President Polk and the Search for Peace with Mexico (New York: Garland Publish, Inc., 1988).

Austro-Sardinian

First Schleswig-Holstein

Roman Republic

In this war, French and Austrian forces combined to overrun the Papal States, which were under the control of a revolutionary government that had come to power after the pope had fled the previous year. The French occupation of Rome, precipitating the flight of Garibaldi's Italian forces, clearly fits the requirements for conquest. The remnants of Garibaldi's army was apparently harried on its way north to Piedmont, but as the Italians were attempting to escape rather than contest control of the Papal States, these skirmishes clearly do not constitute guerrilla fighting. As the French are the ones who conquered Rome (Austria's fighting occurred in the northern states), it is French aims that are considered relevant for coding purposes. The French denied any territorial aims, but did announce their intent to return Pope Pius to power. Clodfelter contains only casualty data, so following the coding rules reported death totals are 1/3 of those numbers. Mazzini, the political leader of the Roman Republic, remained in the city and was taken captive; with Garibaldi fleeing, no obvious leaders remained in the territory to organize resistance.

Sources: King, Bolton, A History of Italian Unity, Being a Political History of Italy, from 1814 to 1871 (vol. 1) (New York: Russell and Russell, 1967).
Trevelyan, George Macaulay, Garibaldi: Being, Garibaldi's Defense of the Roman Republic; Garibaldi and the Thousand; Garibaldi and the Making of Italy (New York: Longmans, Green, 1933).

La Plata

This case is marginal as an interstate war (as most of the fighting was carried out by Argentines under the command of Urquiza, governor of Entre Rios province), but it clearly ended in conquest. The allied forces, with Brazil's primary contribution being naval actions along the Argentine rivers, invaded, and the remaining Argentine forces, under the command of President Rosas, made their final stand outside Buenos Aires. Urquiza's forces won that battle decisively and occupied the city; Rosas's army dispersed and he fled into British protection and out of the country. There is no record of significant subsequent resistance. Brazil was a traditional rival of Argentina and had had territorial disputes in the past, but in this case the Brazilians were satisfied with the overthrow of Rosas (who fled to England), meaning that the invading forces, whether viewed as Urquiza or Brazil, made no territorial demands. Politically, the central demand was the replacement of Rosas with Urquiza. Data from Clodfelter covers only casualties, so reported deaths are 1/3 of those totals.

Sources: Lynch, John, Argentine Dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas, 1829-1852 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).
MacLean, David, War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire: Britain and the Republics of La Plata, 1836-1853 (London: British Academic Press, 1995).
Ferns, H.S., Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960).

Crimean

Anglo-Persian

Italian Unification (a.k.a. Franco-Austria or Second Austro-Sardinian)

First Spanish-Moroccan

Italo-Roman

This case is coded as ending with conquest, although it is in some respects more marginal than the Italo-Sicilian one in that the Pope was permitted to retain Rome (largely because the Italians could not afford a clash with the French, who had been garrisoning the city since the end of the Roman Republic War). Confident in the protection provided by the French, the Pope sent his entire army out of the city, where it suffered several defeats and surrendered in its entirety at Ancona on 9/29, the coded date of conquest. The Pope remained in Rome and thus could have served as a rallying point, but in practice he did not. There was no question that the Sardinians were pursuing the annexation of the Papal States.

Sources: King, Bolton, A History of Italian Unity, Being a History of Italy from 1814 to 1871 (vol. II) (New York: Russell & Russell, 1967).

Italo-Sicilian

This case clearly constitutes conquest. In practice, the brunt of the fighting was carried out by Garibaldi's army, with the army of Sardinia/Piedmont intervening only once Garibaldi had overrun Sicily and moved onto the mainland. The start date corresponds to Garibaldi's arrival on Sicily (this contrasts with COW's approach, in which the war begins only when official Sardinian troops arrive). The fall of Naples (the Neapolitan capital) did not end the conventional fighting in the war, as Francis and his remaining army retreated to Gaeta, where the final stand took place. Given his unpopularity, Francis could not resort to guerrilla tactics (as his troops would all desert); thus, the surrender of Gaeta ended both the conventional stage of fighting and the war. Francis was permitted to go into exile. The Sardinian aim was clearly to incorporate the Neapolitan territories into a unified Sicily.

Sources: King, Bolton, A History of Italian Unity, Being a History of Italy from 1814 to 1871 (vol. II) (New York: Russell & Russell, 1967).
Beales, Derek and Eugenio F. Biagini, The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy (London: Longman, 2002).
Trevelyan, George Macaulay, Garibaldi and the Making of Italy, June-November, 1860 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982).

Franco-Mexican

This case clearly constitutes conquest (after an initial minor defeat, the French repeatedly bested the Mexicans in conventional fighting and ultimately captured Mexico City, on 6/7/1863) as well as subsequent guerrilla resistance. Even with French help, the new government under Maximilian was unable to defeat the resistance, and when the French withdrew support (in part in response to an American threat to intervene) the conservatives were doomed. The French professed to have no territorial ambitions, but at the time of conquest they did reveal their intent to install Maximilian

as emperor. As there was no precedent for Maximilian to be emperor, this case is viewed as installation of an illegitimate ruler. Exact death totals at the point of conquest are unavailable, although Clodfelter provides numbers from the major incidents. The reported values thus come from those numbers.

Sources: Dawson, Daniel, The Mexican Adventure (London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., 1935).
Smart, Charles Allen, Viva Juarez! A Biography (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963).
Dabbs, Jack Autrey, The French Army in Mexico, 1861-1867: A Study in Military Government (Mouton: The Hague, 1963).

Ecuadorian-Colombian

Second Schleswig-Holstein

The war ended when successful Austro-Prussian advances revealed to the Danes that they could not prevent the Germans from occupying the Danish islands (the original plan had been to cede the mainland but hold out on the islands). Thus, the Danes capitulated on the major issues at stake when they realized that continued fighting would inevitably bring about conquest. That said, conquest did not in fact occur, as the Danish army remained capable of continuing conventional war (and Copenhagen remained in Danish hands) at the time of the armistice. For reference, it does not appear that the Germans faced substantial local resistance from the Danes in Schleswig (who were detached from Danish rule as a result of the war).

Sources: Pflanze, Otto, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
Bucholz, Arden, Moltke and the German Wars, 1864-1871 (New York City: Palgrave, 2001).
Sybel, Heinrich von, The Founding of the German Empire by William I (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968).

Lopez (a.k.a. Triple Alliance or Paraguayan)

This case clearly involved conquest, as the Brazilians, with assistance from the Argentines and Uruguayans, destroyed the Paraguayan forces and occupied the country. Conquest is coded as occurring at the time of the fall of Asuncion, although in practice the capital was doomed once the allies broke through Paraguayan defenses at Humaitya in July 1868; actual conquest is coded as occurring with the fall of Asuncion on 1/1/1869, although several dates in this period might be viewed as appropriate. Lopez rallied a new army and resorted to guerrilla resistance, however, and the war ultimately ended only when the Brazilians caught up to the Paraguayan leader and killed him in battle. Both Brazil and Argentina had border disputes with Paraguay, and both countries claimed some territory that the Paraguayans viewed as theirs. They also planned to replace Lopez with a more acceptable leader, something the Brazilians ultimately did unilaterally (in part to lock in territorial gains while limiting Argentina's expansion). Reported death totals are for the war as a whole and thus involve slight exaggerations; that said, the vast majority of deaths occurred in major battles at Curupaity and Humaita. Paraguay's size is the current size, plus 140,000 square km. annexed by Brazil and Argentina, but minus territory gained in the Chaco War. (Ultimately,

given the lack of clearly defined borders, the specific value must be an estimate.)

Sources: Phelps, Gilbert, Tragedy of Paraguay (London: Charles Knight & Company Limited, 1975).
Leuchars, Chris, To the Bitter End: Paraguay and the War of the Triple Alliance (London: Greenwood Press, 2002).
Warren, Harris Gaylord, Paraguay and the Triple Alliance: The Postwar Decade, 1869-1878 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978).

Spanish-Chilean

Seven Weeks (a.k.a. Austro-Prussian)

In the first few days of the war, Prussia overran Saxony, Hannover, and Hesse-Electoral (a.k.a. Hesse-Kassel); the other small German states were apparently unaffected. Available details on the role of the minor German powers are very limited, but no source provides any indication that the Prussians faced any serious form of resistance. The other minor German powers, which were less of a direct threat to the Prussian rear, were basically left alone. (Confirm that the Prussians faced initial resistance.) Prussian intentions at the time were not clear. Decision. The literature provides no indication that subsequent resistance in conquered territory posed a real problem for the Prussians, indicating that serious guerrilla resistance did not exist. Separately, after Kniggrtz, the Prussians had a clear path to Vienna, although the Austrian army remained along the flank as a defeated but viable fighting force. As the two sides immediately reached an armistice, however, Austria was not conquered.

Sources: Wawro, Geoffrey, The Austro-Prussian War: Austria's War with Prussia and Italy in 1866 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Hozier, Henry Montague, The Seven Weeks' War (London: MacMillan and Company, 1867).

Franco-Prussian

The Franco-Prussian War is a somewhat difficult case, in that effective French conventional resistance was clearly in its final stages at the time of the armistice. Moreover, the rise of the Paris Commune after the surrender raises questions about guerrilla resistance. Ultimately, the case is coded as ending in conquest, as the French surrendered when defeat was inevitable, and no army remained in the field (the actual conquest date corresponds to the fall of Belfort, which ended resistance; Paris capitulated only shortly before). France's size is the current size. The capture of Napoleon III at Sedan deprived the French of their most obvious leader as a rallying point, although others did organize additional armies that went down to defeat in conventional fighting. The French did organize a guerrilla force intended to resist in German-occupied territory, but there is no indication that that force continued its resistance after the capitulation of main remaining forces. The fighting associated with the Paris Commune did not involve the Germans, nor did it significantly endanger their position; as such, it is viewed as a short civil war rather than as opposition of the sort relevant here for coding purposes. The Prussian intention to annex Alsace-Lorraine provides reason to code *terraim* as 1. The Prussians do not appear to have expressed any intentions

with respect to the government. As a result, although their victory and the capture of Napoleon III precipitated regime change in France, *govtaim* is coded 0.

Sources: Wawro, Geoffrey, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-71 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Howard, Michael, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871 (New York: MacMillan, 1962).

First Central American

Second Russo-Turkish

At the end of this war, Russian troops were at the gates of Constantinople, and the European powers feared that further fighting would result in the capture of that city, precipitating the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the potential for conquest was present; it clearly did not occur, however.

Sources: Hozier, H. M., The Russo-Turkish War (London: William Mackenzie, 1877-1879).

Pacific

Chile is coded as conquering Peru and encountering guerrilla resistance. The Chileans did not, however, conquer Bolivia, which effectively withdrew militarily (if not diplomatically) from the war at an early stage (this effective withdrawal is why the multilateral war variable is coded 0). The fall of Callao, the port of Lima, effectively doomed the Peruvian capital, which fell on 1/17/1881. The Peruvian military leaders elected to resort to guerrilla resistance rather than acquiesce to Chile's territorial demands (the Chileans believed that their victory had brought a forced end to the war, as in fact they had previously believed when they successfully overran the disputed territory; both times they were proven incorrect). The relevant forces as far as army size variables are concerned are the ones involved in the attack at Callao, which according to Clodfelter were roughly 26000 on both sides. The Chilean territorial claim was clearly articulated and involved the surrender of some but not all of Peru's pre-war territory (including all of the territory initially in dispute and more). The Chileans were willing to work with any government willing to work with them, and they thus supported a Peruvian government selected by the local aristocracy had put forward (which ultimately proved less amenable to cooperation than expected). Under these circumstances, the Chileans are coded as having no demands with respect to the Peruvian government. Given the length of resistance after the capture of Lima, using total deaths from the war is clearly inappropriate, and thus the listed deaths represent a sum from the major battles to that point, with Chilean figures for which there are only total casualty numbers calculated using the 1/3 rule.

Sources: Farcau, Bruce W., The Ten Cents War: Chile, Peru, and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000).

Sater, William F., Chile and the War of the Pacific (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986).

Anglo-Egyptian

This war clearly constituted conquest, which was not followed by significant guerrilla resistance. The British invaded at Alexandria and ultimately won a major victory at Tel-el-Kebir; the Egyptian army disintegrated, with General Urabi captured and sentenced to death before being permitted to go into exile. The British then occupied Cairo without resistance, and they do not appear to have faced significant threats to their control thereafter. The reported size for Egypt is the present size, which is somewhat problematic historically given Egypt's claims to the Sudan but is a relatively accurate indicator of the territory over which the British ultimately claimed control. Contemporary claims of benign intentions—quick withdrawal without retaining Egyptian territory—mean that the British are coded as having no territorial or political aims, despite the ultimate outcome in which Egypt became a de facto colony.

Sources: Vogt, Hermann, The Egyptian War of 1882 (Nashville: The Battery Press, 1992).

Hopkins, A. G., "The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882," Journal of African History 27 (1986), 363-391.

Featherstone, Donald, Tel el-Kebir 1882: Wolseley's Conquest of Egypt (London: Osprey, 1993).

Sino-French

Second Central American

Franco-Thai

An ultimately uncompelling argument could be made that the French conquered Siam in this case, given that two French gunboats forced their way to Bangkok and ultimately compelled the Siamese King to surrender territory at the point of a gun. That said, actual fighting in this "war" (which has been dropped from the most recent list of COW interstate wars) was limited to a single naval engagement in which fewer than 30 people died, indicating that it probably does not belong in the basic dataset. Moreover, the Thai army was unaffected by the naval engagement, meaning that it still existed as a fighting force (for whatever it was worth, which the Siamese government clearly did not think was very much).

Sources: Smyth, H. Warrington, Five Years in Siam, from 1891-1896 (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1994).
Tuck, Patrick, The French Wolf and the Siamese Lamb: The French Threat to Siamese Independence, 1858-1907 (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1995).
Tips, Walter E.J., Siam's Struggle for Survival: The Gunboat Incident at Paknam and the Franco-Siamese Treaty of October 1893 (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1996).

First Sino-Japanese

First Greco-Turkish

Spanish-American

While the two participants in this war clearly did not conquer each other, the Americans did occupy Spanish possessions in a manner that bore some similarities to conquest. The most obvious case in this regard was the Philippines, where local Filipinos, who initially aided the Americans in evicting the Spanish, turned to guerrilla resistance once it became clear that the Americans did not intend to leave. This case is substantively interesting from the perspective of this project, but it lies outside the universe of cases as identified by the coding rules (in that the Filipinos were not at war with the US prior to the American occupation) and is thus excluded from the dataset.

Boxer Rebellion

The Boxer Rebellion is coded as a marginal conquest with subsequent guerrilla resistance. The war ends in COW with the capture of Peking by the allied forces, compelling the flight of Dowager Empress with the Chinese Court. This victory is coded as marginal conquest because of the continued presence of Chinese conventional forces elsewhere in the country. As the Imperial family remained at large in China, a coordinating leader for further resistance is coded as being present. The Boxers had been officially incorporated into the Chinese army at the start of the conflict; with the fall of the capital, the pre-war army basically reverted to non-resistance, but the Boxers kept fighting, albeit without centralized command. The allies thus had to engage in a series of punitive raids over the next year to quell resistance, which they ultimately basically were able to do. The allies professed no new territorial demands and did not try to change the government of the country; their primary aim was to protect their existing interests, which the Boxers had been attacking.

Sources: Keown-Boyd, Henry, The First of Righteous Harmony: A History of the Boxer Uprising in China in the Year 1900 (London: Leo Cooper, 1991).
Martin, Christopher, The Boxer Rebellion (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1968).

Sino-Russian

The Sino-Russian War is basically a component of the Boxer Rebellion, and as such it is not viewed as a separate event for coding purposes here.

Russo-Japanese

Third Central American

Fourth Central American

While information about this case is limited, it appears that Nicaragua's victory over Honduras was sufficiently decisive to meet the requirements for a coding of conquest. Specifically, following repeated victories, most notably at Nacaome, the Nicaraguans forced President Bonilla of Honduras and his supporters to disperse and flee (Bonilla fled to American protection, meaning that he was in exile), allowing them to occupy Tegucigalpa. Nicaragua had no territorial claims against Honduras but did support Bonilla's opponents (Miguel Dvila, who ultimately took power over rival claimant Terencio Sierra, apparently was not the person whom Nicaraguan President Jos

Santos Zelaya would have preferred, but available sources do not indicate who he would have preferred over Dvila - both Dvila and Sierra were liberals, like Zelaya, whereas Bonilla was a conservative). Bonilla's supporters apparently continued to create at least some trouble, apparently with Salvadoran support (the Salvadorans had intervened in the war to protect Bonilla, and they continued to fight the Nicaraguans after the fall of Tegucigalpa). The trouble they created was sufficient to prompt Zelaya to complain to Theodore Roosevelt, who was helping to mediate, but it does not appear that they posed a significant threat to Dvila's hold on power at this point, meaning that Nicaragua is coded as not facing guerrilla resistance (see FRUS, pg. 630). The estimate of a 5000 man Nicaraguan army at Nacaome is based on the Salvadoran general's report cited in the New York Times, 3/21/1907, pg. 4, as other sources provide no information.

Sources: Scheina, Robert L., Latin America's Wars (vol. 1) (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2003).
United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1907, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1910).

Italo-Turkish (a.k.a. Tripolitanian)

First Balkan

Second Balkan

The Second Balkan War case is marginal for conquest, as the Romanians occupied the entire territory of Bulgaria while the Bulgarians continued effective resistance in the West against Serbia and Greece. (Specifically, the war started as a conflict between Serbia and Greece on the one hand and Bulgaria on the other; when Romania and the Ottoman Empire intervened after Bulgaria had devoted all its forces to the western front, there was little that the Bulgarians could do except surrender.) Because the Bulgarian armies could not prevent the Romanian advance, the case is coded as conquest, with no subsequent guerrilla resistance. That said, the observation is flagged (*conqflag*=1), given the unusual circumstances. All countries fighting Bulgaria sought territorial gains; none sought any changes in government. The Bulgarian King Ferdinand remained in the country and free.

Sources: Hall, Richard C., The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913: Prelude to the First World War (New York: Routledge, 2000).
Concise History of the Balkan Wars (Athens: Hellenic Army General Staff, Army History Directorate, 1998).

World War I

World War I had less wholesale conquest than World War II, and in fact only two countries ultimately are coded as definitively experiencing conquest. Those two were Serbia and Montenegro, which Austria-Hungary, with assistance from Germany, overran in late 1915 and early 1916. The two countries' armies did not cease to exist, but they retreated to the coast where they were ferried to Salonica in Greece, meaning that no centrally-organized local opposition to Austrian control

existed. The Austrians apparently intended to annex both countries in their entirety, meaning that the territorial and governmental aims variables both take on maximum values. In both cases, the heads of state were forced into exile and thus were not in the country to lead resistance.

In addition to those cases, there are others that merit discussion. Belgium was mostly overrun in the opening weeks of the war, although the Belgian army with British and French assistance managed to stabilize the front in the western part of the country, and the Belgians made a small but continuous contribution to Allied efforts in the trench war through to 1918. This case is thus coded as not experiencing conquest, despite the fall of Brussels. Because Belgium has been coded as suffering defeat and dropping out of the war in several studies (e.g. Reiter and Stam 2002), however, I include it as a marginal case for robustness purposes. While the Belgian army continued to fight conventionally in the trenches, no significant guerrilla resistance occurred in the German-occupied zone, so the case is coded as not experiencing resistance. Similarly, while King Leopold remained in the western part of the country, he was not active in the occupied zone, and I thus code coord as 0 to reflect the absence of a coordinating leader for occupied Belgians who might have been considering guerrilla resistance. The Germans aimed to acquire strategically valuable Belgian territory along the corridor of their main invasion, but claimed not to intend to annex the country as a whole and to prefer to leave the existing government in place. I have been unable to find estimates of Belgian deaths in the opening weeks of the war, so that variable is missing.

Similarly, Romania was unprepared for the war at the time of intervention, and repeated defeats force the Romanians to abandon Bucharest in late 1916. With Russian assistance, the Romanians stabilized a line that left them in control of roughly the eastern third of the country; Russian withdrawal from the war, however, endangered that line and forced the Romanians also to make a separate peace. Given the stabilization of the line, however, Romania is coded as not having experienced conquest; I include it, however, as a marginal case for robustness checks. Germany and its allies are coded as aiming to take some but not all Romanian territory; they did not aim to overthrow the Romanian monarchy, however. King Ferdinand remained at large in the eastern part of the country; as he was not active in the area occupied by the Germans, however, coord is coded 0. Romania continued to fight along the new front with Russian assistance until the Russian withdrawal from the war forced Romania to also negotiate a separate peace; in the area overrun by the Germans, however, no significant resistance emerged, so the country is coded as not carrying out guerrilla resistance. I have been unable to find reports of Romanian deaths for the period through late 1916, so the loser death variable is missing.

Separately, it is worth briefly discussing the situation in the Ottoman Empire, as the allies ultimately occupied most pre-war Ottoman territory (the British and French divided territory in the Middle East, Britain occupied Constantinople, France took Cilicia (in southern Anatolia), and Greece occupied the territory around Smyrna; the Italians were also supposed to obtain territory but never took it). These occupations ultimately precipitated guerrilla resistance (followed by conventional fighting) by Mustafa Kemal's nationalists, but as the occupations relevant for coding purposes happened after the Ottoman Empire signed an armistice, and as the government retained control over a limited portion of its prior holdings, the case is not viewed as conquest for coding purposes.

Finally, it is worth briefly discussing the German surrender. While Germany requested an armistice and was ultimately partially occupied by the Allies (if substantially later), German conventional forces withdrew in good order (if clearly defeated) and never surrendered; they were clearly capable of continuing conventional resistance at the time of the surrender, and the Allies did not occupy German territory. As such, the German surrender clearly does not even constitute a marginal case of conquest.

Sources: Gordon-Smith, Gordon, From Serbia to Jugoslavia: Serbia's Victories, Reverses, and Final Triumph, 1914-1918 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1920).
Devine, Alex, Montenegro in History, Politics, and War (London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd., 1918).
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Howard, Harry N., The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1931).
Torrey, Glenn E., Romania and World War I: A Collection of Studies (Oxford; The Center for Romanian Studies, 1998).
Treptow, Kurt W., ed., Romania during the World War I Era (Oxford: The Center for Romanian Studies, 1999).

Latvian Liberation

Estonian Liberation

Russo-Polish

Hungarian-Allies

The war ended with the Romanian occupation of Budapest; there was no significant subsequent resistance. The Romanians sought to revise their border with Hungary, specifically through the acquisition of Transylvania (the Czechoslovaks, who fought in the war but with less military success, also sought and gained border revisions). Although the allies do not appear to have explicitly stated an intention to replace the communist government under Béla Kun in Hungary, they were backed by countries like France because of a specific desire to see a non-communist government in place, a desire that the Romanians appear to have shared. As such, the allies are coded as pursuing regime change. In the event, Kun fled to Vienna just prior to the Romanian arrival in Budapest, permitting the establishment of a rightist government under Admiral Horthy.

Sources: Pastor, Peter, ed., Revolutions and Interventions in Hungary and its Neighbor States, 1918-1919 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).
Kiraly, Bela, et al., eds., Essays on World War I: Total War and Peacemaking, a Case Study of Trianon (New York: Social Science Monographs, Brooklyn College Press, 1982).

Second Greco-Turkish

Franco-Turkish

Although the French encountered primarily guerrilla resistance, there was no pre-existing conventional phase in which conquest occurred, as the French had occupied the disputed territory in Cilicia as a consequence of agreements with the Ottoman government following World War I. As such, this case does not enter the dataset.

Sources: Zeidner, Robert F, The Tricolor over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922 (Ankara: Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language and History, 2005).

Lithuanian-Polish

Sino-Soviet

Manchurian

Chaco

Saudi-Yemeni

Italo-Ethiopian

Italy conquered Ethiopia, but found itself bogged down in sustained guerrilla resistance that lasted until the Ethiopians, with significant British assistance, evicted the Italians during World War II. The Italians were explicit in their intent to make Ethiopia an Italian colony. The Ethiopians put up a significant fight, but the Italians ultimately succeeded in taking Addis Ababa on 5/5/1936, forcing Haile Selassie into exile. Reported Ethiopian battle deaths are the sum of figures from various incidents, adjusted where necessary when Clodfelter's data covered only casualties. The Ethiopian resistance continued for almost a year under various regional figures; the Italians succeeded in defeating the last of them only to precipitate a general uprising through harsh reprisals after an assassination attempt. This resistance continued for the duration of the Italian presence in Ethiopia, which ended in the course of World War II when British units from Sudan and Kenya worked with the Ethiopians to evict the Italians.

Sources: Mockler, Anthony, Haile Selassie's War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
Sbacchi, Alberto, Legacy of Bitterness: Ethiopia and Fascist Italy, 1935-1941 (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1997).

Sino-Japanese

The Chinese engaged in effective guerrilla resistance, much of it carried out by the communists, against the (tremendously overstretched) Japanese forces in this war. That said, the Japanese never managed to force a final battle against the Chinese forces, who instead kept retreating back into the interior (much as the Soviets did against the Germans); as a result, the case does not meet

the coding requirements for conquest.

Chankufeng

Nomonhan

World War II

World War II in Europe contained a significant amount of conquest, by Germany over Poland (with Soviet assistance), Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Yugoslavia, and Greece, and by the allies over Italy, Romania, Bulgaria (marginal case), Hungary, and Germany. The German occupations of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, and Luxembourg do not enter into the dataset because none of the countries involved undertook significant conventional opposition prior to occupation, meaning that they were cases of occupation without military conquest (although obviously conquest would have occurred in each case had resistance been attempted). This discussion considers each case in turn. In all cases of German conquest except Poland and France, the Germans aimed to completely incorporate the countries in question. In Poland, of course, the Germans divided the country with the Soviets; the conquerors are still coded as aiming at complete incorporation. With respect to France, German aims were less obvious initially, but the final armistice (which was signed during the last stages of French military collapse) called for direct German control over roughly half the country, with the remainder was under the Vichy government.[2] In Poland, the Germans (and Soviets) adopted brutal tactics that successfully undermined any attempt to form a viable resistance force immediately after conquest. While the Germans ultimately had to deal with significant uprisings in Warsaw and elsewhere, those came after the window necessary to consider a case as experiencing guerrilla war following conquest. With conquest assured, the Polish leadership and remaining army retreated into Romania, where it was interned; thus there was no obvious coordinating figure for resistance. The next countries to fall were Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France. In all these countries, the occupied populations resisted German policies and cooperated with the British and other allies, but none experienced sufficient violent resistance to pose a threat to German control. The Nazis executed a successful fait accompli in taking Copenhagen by surprise, meaning that resistance in Denmark was limited to a few hours of limited fighting in the south, in which only 13 (alternately 16) men died. For this reason, Denmark is not included in the main list of cases, although I do include it as a marginal case for robustness checks. The Germans disavowed any territorial or political interests in Denmark (instead claiming that they intended only to preempt British moves). It is coded as not experiencing guerrilla resistance, as resistance to German control was extremely limited. Norwegian resistance was never significant enough to endanger the German hold on the country: although a resistance movement developed and launched occasional attacks on infrastructure (among other things), they did not significantly tie down the Germans (although a significant force remained in Norway to guard against a potential Allied landing). The Norwegian government fled into exile. Belgium similarly lacked an effective guerrilla resistance, although as in other countries resistance at a lower level did exist. The Belgian king surrendered and went into German custody. The Netherlands experienced violent resistance at a limited level insufficient to seriously jeopardize the German ability to maintain their presence and policies in the country. Queen Wilhelmina and

[2]The case study in the paper reviews appropriate codings for independent variables in greater detail.

the Dutch government fled to Britain in advance of the German armies. In France, the French had tried to recover from the German breakthrough in the Ardennes but failed, and there is no indication that further fighting would have reversed matters. The head of state until a few days before the capitulation was Paul Reynaud; he was succeeded by Marshall Petain, who remained as head of the Vichy government. Reynaud was the most obvious figure to lead a resistance politically, but he was arrested and turned over to the Germans. Reported German deaths for the fighting against France, Belgium, and the Netherlands does not distinguish by participant, so I make the assumption that the share of German deaths each country inflicted corresponds to the share of the total that it suffered (implying that the French inflicted over 90% of the deaths). Luxembourg is too small to have mounted effective conventional or guerrilla resistance and is thus excluded from the dataset. Despite the extensive historical attention paid to the French resistance, it was not sufficiently effective to seriously challenge German control over the country, especially in the immediate aftermath of the German victory. In Greece, the Italians immediately encountered guerrilla resistance in addition to the conventional resistance that effectively bottled up their advance; resistance continued after the Germans intervened to rescue the Italians. In practice, Greek nationalists and communists were fighting each other as much as they were fighting the occupying forces, but they still succeeded in rendering the country quite unstable and provided stiff resistance to the Germans even prior to the final collapse of the conventional forces (see Heaton 2001, pp. 76-78). Thus, Greece is coded as experiencing guerrilla resistance. The Italian occupation of Albania in 1939 did face some resistance, but not enough for the conflict to be coded as a war; under these circumstances, Albania is not considered relevant for coding purposes here. (That said, guerrilla resistance in Albania, while initially relatively ineffective, ultimately created significant problems for the Italians.) The final country conquered by Germany was Yugoslavia, which was also the country in which the Germans faced the heaviest partisan resistance. For Yugoslavia, I am hampered by the absence of any estimate of Yugoslav deaths in the pre-conquest phase. Despite the availability of ethnic cleavages and ideological divisions that permitted the use of a divide and rule strategy, "the reality on the ground for the occupation forces was an unparalleled nightmare" (Heaton 2001, pg. 91). Leadership of Yugoslavia changed shortly before the German invasion with the anti-German coup; all reasonable leadership figures from the prior government had to flee into exile, however. Note that the Germans also faced some level of resistance in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria and also in occupied territories in the Soviet Union. The first three are not relevant here because their governments were allied to Germany; the last is not relevant because Germany never conquered the Soviet Union.

The next stage of conquest concerns the Axis powers that fell to the Allies. Italy fell in 1943, although this case is complicated by the infusion of large number of German troops, so that fighting continued along a front in northern Italy for the remainder of the war. Benito Mussolini was the obvious person who would lead resistance. He was arrested after a coup that preceded the Italian capitulation, but he was then rescued by the Germans and set up as a puppet head of state in northern Italy. For this reason, Italy is coded as having had a coordinating figure. Bulgaria was the first of the eastern European countries to fall, although it was a special case (*conqflag*= 1), as it never declared war on the Soviet Union and thus had experienced only aerial bombing by the western allies. The Bulgarian King had died in 1943, and the nominal head of state was his seven year old son; effective power apparently lay with the regents, who were taken into custody and eventually executed. Romania fell next. In the face of the Soviet advance, Prime Minister Ion

Antonescu was overthrown in a coup, arrested, and handed over to the Russians, removing the most obvious figure to lead any resistance. Hungary came next, only capitulating in early 1945 with the fall of Budapest. Admiral Horthy had run the country since 1920 and was the obvious figure to lead resistance. Because of his efforts to take Hungary out of its alliance with Germany, however, he was placed under house arrest in Bavaria late in 1944. Note that Finland was the only German ally never to be conquered or occupied, and as such does not enter into the dataset. Germany was the last. Hitler's suicide obviously removed him as a candidate for organizing resistance. Germany's coded size is the territory prior to the Anschluss; ultimately, multiple interpretations could be defended here; changing this coding unsurprisingly has no substantive effect on statistical results.

In the Pacific, the Japanese capitulation prior to the invasion of the Japanese homeland meant that the war ended prior to conventional conquest, as defined above. That said, given the total surrender of the Japanese armed forces, some readers might argue that it should be included. I thus include an observation for the Japanese case in the dataset, albeit flagged so that it is not used in the primary analyses. Emperor Hirohito was the obvious coordinating figure from the Japanese perspective. Coding for the presence of a coordinating leader is complicated here: the emperor remained in the country, indeed in a position of authority, but it is unlikely that he could have organized resistance to the American presence without coming under immediate arrest. Nonetheless, as he was not formally imprisoned, strict adherence to the coding rule implies that this case is coded as having a coordinating leader present. The size of the invading army is based on the report of 350000 Allied troops present in Japan by the end of 1945. The Americans made no claim to Japanese territory, but they did allow areas that had been under Japanese control to go to Chinese and Korean ownership. The coding rules focus on whether the conqueror intends to annex territory, however, so by that standard the US made no territorial claims; given the absence of resistance, changing this coding would bias against the hearts and minds prediction. The Americans did clearly intend to remake the Japanese government.

Sources: Heaton, Colin D., German Anti-Partisan Warfare in Europe, 1939-1945 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2001).
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of the Danish Resistance Movement, 1968).
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Hellenic Army General Staff, Army History Directorate, An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, 1940-1941 (Athens: Hellenic Army General Staff, 1997).

Russo-Finnish

Franco-Thai

First Kashmir

Palestine

Korean

The Korean War introduces some challenges, in that both the South Korean forces (initially) and the North Korean forces (after Inchon) largely collapsed, only to be bailed out by intervention by external allies. While it is highly likely that the North Koreans would have proceeded to conquer the South absent external intervention, the South Koreans were still maintaining conventional resistance (with UN assistance) in the Pusan pocket at the time of Inchon, thus militating against a coding of conquest in this case. The North Koreans were worse off prior to Chinese intervention, as they had no external ally to help stabilize a front. A stronger argument could thus be made for including North Korea as a case of conquest. Ultimately, however, no useful information can be gleaned from this case, as the UN forces were still in the process of completing the conquest when the Chinese intervention reversed the conventional tide (restoring the conventional war) and evicted the UN forces from the North (meaning that we in any event cannot determine whether guerrilla resistance would have emerged after conquest). The North thus also is not included in the dataset.

Sources: Whelan, Richard, Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1990).

Stueck, William, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

Offshore Islands

Russo-Hungarian

The Russo-Hungarian War ended with the conquest of Hungary by the Soviets. The Hungarian resistance took place primarily in Budapest, although other regions also fought. Given that the Soviets withdrew from Hungary following the initial protests, however, it is reasonable to consider the opening stages as conventional enough for conquest of the form of interest here to have occurred. The Russians quickly overran the Hungarian resistance, with the main resistance ending with the fall of Csepel Island on 11/9/1956. The historical literature contains occasional hints of subsequent guerrilla resistance, but it certainly was insufficient to seriously threaten the Soviet position. Imre Nagy was the coded leader; he fled to the Yugoslav Embassy and was ultimately taken by the Soviets, meaning that he was in no position to organize continued resistance.

Barber, Noel, Seven Days of Freedom: The Hungarian Uprising, 1956 (New York: Stein and Day, 1974).
Molnar, Miklos, Budapest 1956: A History of the Hungarian Revolution (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1971).

Sinai (a.k.a. Suez)

Ifni

Taiwan Straits

Assam (a.k.a. Sino-Indian)

Vietnamese

The insurgency that bedeviled American forces for the entire period of their presence in Vietnam was not preceded by conventional conquest and hence is not pertinent here. The end of the war with the North Vietnamese conquest of South Vietnam is pertinent, however. After the American withdrawal under the Paris Peace Accords, the North Vietnamese transitioned to a conventional strategy and gradually moved south, ultimately overrunning the entire country. This victory brought a decisive end to the fighting, with the conquering army encountering almost no subsequent resistance. North Vietnam had consistently refused to recognize the legitimacy of South Vietnam, with the result that it was universally understood that defeat would extinguish South Vietnam's existence as a separate state, justifying a coding of maximal political and territorial aims. The most obvious focal political leader for resistance was President Thieu, who fled to exile in the United States and hence was not present. Even if we were to shift the focus to President Huong, who briefly succeeded Thieu and was placed under house arrest, the coding of this variable would not change.

Sources: Duiker, William J., The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder, CO: Westview

Press, 1996).
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Second Kashmir

Six Day

Laotian

Israeli-Egyptian (a.k.a. War of Attrition)

Football

Communist Coalition

Bangladesh

Although Indian forces overran Bangladesh, they did not accomplish the complete conquest of the Pakistani military, which remained an organized force in West Pakistan. This case thus does not constitute conquest.

Yom Kippur

Turco-Cypriot

Angola

Vietnamese-Cambodian

Vietnamese involvement in Cambodia increased dramatically in late 1978, and on January 7, 1979, the Vietnamese captured Phnom Penh, in the process forcing the Cambodian army to abandon conventional tactics. Cambodian resistance groups, some under previous president Pol Pot and some unaffiliated, reverted to guerrilla tactics in the Cambodian highlands, which the Vietnamese were never able to put down. This case is thus a clear example both of conquest and of subsequent guerrilla resistance. The Vietnamese openly planned to install a puppet government under Heng Samrin. Their territorial plans are more difficult to code, however, as they made no claims on Cambodian territory but had advocated the creation of an Indochinese federation (also encompassing Laos) under their control. Ultimately, however, the Vietnamese did not follow through on any plans with respect to the federation and made no attempt to annex Cambodian territory; as such, Vietnam is coded as having no territorial aims.

Sources: Morris, Stephen J., Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
Chen, King C., China's War with Vietnam, 1979; Issues, Decisions, and Implications (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987).

Ethiopian-Somalian (a.k.a. Ogaden)

Ugandan-Tanzanian

This case clearly constituted conquest. The Tanzanians responded to the Ugandan invasion that started the war by marching into Uganda, eventually proceeding all the way to Kampala, which was captured on 4/11/1979. Given Idi Amin's unpopularity, much of his army deserted, and with the fall of the capital inevitable he fled the country with his bodyguards. There is no evidence of guerrilla resistance to the Tanzanian force, which departed the country in a matter of months. The initial issue at stake in the war was the Kagera salient, which was Tanzanian territory prior to the war; as Tanzania's territorial goals were limited to reacquiring that region, the country is coded as having no territorial aims. The governmental aim was the overthrow of Amin; the Tanzanians did not greatly care who replaced him.

Smith, George Ivan, Ghosts of Kampala (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980).
Kasozi, A.B.K., The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 1964-1985 (Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994).
Tumusiime, James (ed.), Uganda 30 Years: 1962-1992 (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1992?).
Ingham, Kenneth, Obote: A Political Biography (New York: Routledge, 1994).

First Sino-Vietnamese

Iran-Iraq

Lebanon (a.k.a. Israel-Syria)

As Lebanon is not a participant in this war, the Israeli occupation of Beirut in no way constitutes conquest, which would have required an invasion of Syria.

Aouzou Strip

Second Sino-Vietnamese

Persian Gulf

The Persian Gulf War started with the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait. The surviving Kuwaiti army escaped into Saudi Arabia, but the Iraqis did encounter some local resistance. Savage Iraqi retaliation, however, convinced the emir of Kuwait to request an end to resistance, which subsequently died down. Because the Emir fled to Saudi Arabia, he was not present in the country to lead

resistance. Saddam Hussein made it quite clear that he intended to annex the whole of Kuwait.

Bosnian Independence

Azeri-Armenian

Cenepa Valley

Ethiopia-Eritrea (a.k.a. Badme Border War)

Kosovo (a.k.a. NATO-Serbia)

Kargil (India-Pakistan)

Afghanistan (a.k.a. US-Taliban)

Afghanistan is a debatable case, as the US did not so much conquer Afghanistan as back local rebels who were able to use that backing to overrun Kabul and Kandahar. As such, I omit it from the primary analysis, but include an observation in the dataset to permit robustness checks. Because of the limited American involvement prior to the fall of Kabul and Kandahar, determination of the size of the conquering force is difficult. I thus rely on the reported (by Clodfelter) 15000 men in the Northern Alliance as the primary measure of troop size. Conquest is coded as occurring as of the fall of Kandahar on 12/7/2001. The victorious forces quickly encountered sustained guerrilla resistance. The United States and its allies explicitly disavowed territorial gains, but did seek to supplant the Taliban government, justifying a coding for *govtaim* of 1. Mullah Omar was the obvious coordinating leader for resistance; under the coding rules, his withdrawal to Pakistan meant that he was not present, although this is obviously a marginal case given the significance of safe havens in Pakistan for the Afghan resistance. (An identical coding would obviously apply were Osama bin Laden identified as the focal leader for resistance.)

Sources: Maley, William, The Afghanistan Wars (Basingstroke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
Boaz, John (ed.), The US Attack on Afghanistan (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2005).

Iraq

Iraq is a clear case both of conquest and of guerrilla resistance. The war is coded as starting on 3/10/2003; conquest is coded as occurring with the 4/9/2003 occupation of Baghdad, although various dates in this period might be defended. As Saddam Hussein eluded capture initially, he is coded as being at large at the outset. American aims were clearly articulated, with no territorial demands but a demand for overthrow of the Iraqi government. The insurgency started within the relevant window and clearly imperiled the American ability to achieve their desiderata, and thus constitutes resistance under the coding rules.[3]

[3]For more details on coding decisions in this case, see the case study in the main article.

2.2 Extrastate Wars

The extrastate wars that Gleditsch argues are excluded from the interstate wars list because of overly restrictive requirements for system member status are typically less well known. For that reason, I discuss all cases briefly, including those in which conquest obviously did not occur. For many, the information below is available in the encyclopedias on war written by Kohn and Clodfelter.

Turko-Persian War

This was a border war; although the Persians won a significant victory, they never came anywhere near conquest.

Cisplatine

The war was fought over modern Uruguay; neither participant seriously threatened conquest.

Greek War of Independence

There was no conquest in this war, which ended when the Greeks, with help from some of the great powers, convinced the Ottomans that reconquest of Greece was impossible.

First Anglo-Burmese

The war began with Burmese provocations; although the British won overall, they did not threaten core Burmese territory and certainly did not conquer Burma.

Russo-Persian

The Russians were winning when the war ended, but they did not conquer Persia.

War of the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation

The Argentines and Chileans suffered a serious defeat in their initial invasion of the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation, but that defeat did not meet the conditions for conquest. Instead, the Chileans launched a second invasion that succeeded in taking Lima and forcing a breakup of the confederation. Ultimately, however, a negotiated settlement occurred prior to total military conquest.

Afghan-Persian

This conflict references the Persian invasion of Afghanistan to acquire Herat, which really was effectively independent. The Persians besieged the city but ultimately withdrew when threatened

with British intervention. Thus, no conquest occurred.

First British-Afghan

The British invaded Afghanistan in February of 1839 to bring about regime change; they successfully took the major cities (Kabul fell on August 7) and inserted their preferred leader into power, taking the old leader (Dost Mohammed Khan) back to India. The case thus clearly is an example of conquest. The new leader, Shah Shuja, had been deposed by Dost Mohammed, making this a case of restoration as far as government aims are concerned. When they arrived, the British intended only to effect a change in government, but as they stayed they began to contemplate a more permanent occupation. Under the coding rules, the relevant point is the time at which conquest occurs, meaning that the British are coded as having no territorial claims. The British withdrew much of their force from Afghanistan, but in 1841 the Afghans rose against the British and ultimately compelled their withdrawal, annihilating the force during the retreat. The British sent a new force to carry out a punitive invasion, capturing Kabul, but they decided that it was not worth the trouble of maintaining direct control over Afghanistan and thus allowed Dost Mohammed Khan to return to power, making this a case of successful resistance. (One could argue that Britain conquered Afghanistan a second time in the war, after being forcibly evicted after the first success. I do not take this approach, in part because the resistance in the second stage of the war involve guerrilla tactics.)

Sources: Durand, Henry Marion, The First Afghan War and Its Causes (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1879).

First Opium

The British succeeded in taking some coastal areas but certainly did not conquer China.

Franco-Algerian

This conflict was a war of conquest followed by an extended period of guerrilla resistance. The conflict was precipitated by an incident in 1827, but the real French invasion only came in June of 1830 and culminated with the occupation of Algiers on 7/5. Algerian deaths at this point are 1/3 of Clodfelter's reported casualties. Although there was dissent within France on the appropriate policy with respect to Algeria, the best available coding is that they intended to annex the region as a colony. They faced significant resistance organized by Abd al-Qadir, whom Clodfelter describes as "one of the most successful guerrilla chieftans in military history" (pg. 213). After a long campaign, he ultimately capitulated on 12/23/1847; although some low-level resistance apparently continued beyond that point, his capitulation appears to have ended the threat to French rule of Algeria. The Bey of Algiers was the coded leader; he was not in a position to organize resistance after the conquest.

Sources: Laurie, George Brenton, The French Conquest of Algeria (London: H Rees, ltd., 1909). Danziger, Raphael, Abd al-Qadir and the Algerians: Resistance to the French and Internal Con-

solidation, 1832-1839 (New York: Homes & Meier Publishers, 1977).

Peruvian-Bolivian

This war follows on the War of the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation, as the new president of Peru tried to recreate the union, but this time with Peru in charge. The war ended indecisively.

Franco-Moroccan

This war ended in a French victory that came nowhere near the definition of conquest, although it did give the French their desideratum (Moroccan recognition of French conquest of Algeria).

Uruguayan Dispute

This long war consisted mostly of the seven-year siege of Montevideo, which ended in failure. It thus does not meet the standards for conquest.

Second Anglo-Burmese

The British acquired a substantial stretch of Burmese territory, but they stopped short of marching on the capital, and the Burmese army survived intact, if damaged.

Haiti-Santo Domingo

This war consisted of an invasion by Haiti, whose leaders aimed to forestall American annexation of Santo Domingo; they were defeated (although the annexation never occurred). Neither side conquered the other.

Second Opium

This case ended without conquest, although it came closer than many. After a period of coastal fighting, the British and French launched an expedition against Beijing, ultimately sacking and destroying the Summer Palace. They did not enter Beijing, however, and the Chinese army was not completely defeated (especially as it was also involved elsewhere in the Taiping Rebellion).

French-Indochinese

This war was part of the gradual process by which the French acquired Cochin China, the first part of their Indochinese colonial possession. The French acquisitions proceeded piecemeal, and at this phase they did not even attempt conquest.

Spain-Santo Domingo

The government of Santo Domingo accepted Spanish overlordship in 1861, but they encountered

significant guerrilla resistance. The Spanish ultimately elected to withdraw. Under the coding rules, the initial occupation is not coded as conquest because it was invited rather than imposed.

British-Ethiopian

In this war, the British invaded Ethiopia to punish the emperor for arresting British representatives in response to a perceived slight. The British ultimately stormed the Ethiopian capital (Magdala), and the emperor committed suicide. The British were uninterested in acquiring the country as a colony, however, and thus departed after destroying Magdala. Given the emperor's eccentricities, he had become quite unpopular in his domains (several local leaders defected to the British when they arrived). The British departed almost immediately after achieving conquest, with the result that they did not face post-conquest resistance. The departure of the victorious army prior to the end of the six-month window for significant resistance to emerge raises questions about whether it is appropriate to code this case as an example of non-resistance, however. In these circumstances, this observation is flagged (*conqflag*=3) and is omitted from default analyses, although it is included in the dataset to facilitate robustness checks. The British do not appear to have had clear aims with respect to replacing the emperor; they certainly did not directly impose a preferred choice. They similarly disavowed any territorial aggrandizement. The start date for the war comes from COW, as Clodfelter does not provide one. Deaths data are also problematic: 547 British soldiers died from all causes, of which only 35 died in battle, but those numbers omit totals from the substantial Indian units. On the Ethiopian side, Clodfelter reports 700 dead at the Battle of Arogee, but does not provide data for other battles (including the taking of Magdala). Under the circumstances, I use COW's death data, which do not seem greatly out of line with the information available from Clodfelter.

Sources: Rubenson, Sven, The Survival of Ethiopian Independence (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1976).

Tonkin

It's not entirely clear what this war covers, as distinct from the Second Franco-Indochinese War below and the Sino-French War covered in the interstate war list (Gleditsch and Ward list overlapping dates for the wars). That said, the only event during this period that approximates conquest is the capture of Hue, which is covered in the entry on the Second Franco-Indochinese War.

Second British-Afghan

The British invaded Afghanistan on November 21, 1878, with a three-pronged attack that ultimately resulted in the capture of Kabul and Kandahar and an official Afghan capitulation on the grounds that further conventional resistance was impractical. The case is thus coded as one of conquest, with the date of conquest 5/26/1879 (the Afghan capitulation). Serious resistance emerged in September, and ultimately forced the British into a catastrophic withdrawal, after which they returned, inflicting significant punishment before finally withdrawing from the country in 1881. Coding deaths prior to conquest is difficult; Clodfelter reports an incomplete total of 5000 Afghan dead in seven major battles of the war, but no general total; I estimate 2000 Afghan dead prior

to conquest. For the British, battle losses totaled 1850 for the war as a whole, most of those in the latter stages; I estimate 250 prior to conquest. The Afghan leader was Sher Ali Khan, but he died of natural causes in February 1879 and was succeeded by his son Mohammed Yakub Khan. The Treaty of Gandamak that marked the initial Afghan capitulation involved territorial cessions to Britain, but the British appear to have intended to leave the Afghan government in place (while however taking control of Afghan foreign policy). Yakub Khan remained in Afghanistan; historical sources are not very clear on what his activities were during this period, although it is clear that he played little if any role in organizing the subsequent resistance. I code coord=0 in reflection both of the death of his father and his apparently limited role (this is also the conservative coding for coordination mattering).

Boer War (1880)

In this war, the Boers succeeded in forcing the British to acknowledge their independence; the war clearly ends in settlement.

Franco-Indochinese

Conflict in Indochina during this period involved the French and the Vietnamese and ultimately dragged in China. The French took forts outside the capital of Hue in August 1883, and the defeated Vietnamese government signed a settlement that gave the French a protectorate over Vietnam. However, much of the resistance to the French had been carried out by the so-called "Black Flags" a bandit army that was more effective than the formal Vietnamese force, and that was undefeated at Hue. Given the continued involvement of the Black Flags, who were bolstered by a Chinese intervention that ultimately led to the Sino-French War, I argue that it is inappropriate to code this case as one of conquest. For robustness purposes, however, I include the case in the dataset, while flagging it with a coding of 1 (to reference the fact that the occupation occurred as a result of negotiations that preceded conquest). Resistance to the French presence clearly emerged within six months, although it was carried out by the Black Flags and (later) by China. France clearly intended to turn Vietnam into a colony. For the presence of a coordinating leader, a reasonable debate concerns who the coordinating leader should be; following convention, I use the Vietnamese head of state (rather than the leader of the Black Flags), who remained in French-controlled Hue under close watch and hence could not serve as the basis for subsequent resistance.

First Franco-Madagascan

In this war, the French acquired some territory in Madagascar, although their refrained from overrunning the entire island; their victory does not appear to have met the grounds for conquest.

Russo-Afghan

In this war, the Russians seized northern territory claimed by Afghanistan; the British intervened quickly to ensure that the Russian claims did not spread, and the two powers defined a border, of which they then informed the Afghans. The Russian victory clearly does not meet the standards

for conquest.

Serbo-Bulgarian

This war ended when the Bulgarians, having beaten back a Serbian attack and invaded Serbia, withdrew in response to an Austro-Hungarian intervention threat. The war thus clearly does not meet the requirements for conquest.

Third Anglo-Burmese

The British advanced up the river to the Burmese capital and took it, effecting conquest. The British claimed (untruthfully) to desire only to replace the king with his half-brother. The capital was surrendered without a fight, with some but far from all soldiers laying down their arms, while others dispersed; the king was taken prisoner. When the deceit became apparent, the British had to face fierce rebellions by local groups and soldiers from the former army. The British announced their annexation on 1/1/1886, only a month after taking the capital. The British sent a large army into the region and eventually succeeded in quelling the insurgency. The British forced the king into exile in India upon taking the country. Once British intentions to fully colonize Burma became clear (and within the time period required by the coding rules), they encountered significant resistance. Clodfelter reports that it took ten years and a much larger force for the British to fully pacify the country.

Sources: Nisbet, John, Burma under British Rule—and Before (Westminster: A. Constable & Co., Ltd, 1909).

First Italo-Ethiopian

This war, which frequently is not included in the regular count, was a low-intensity conflict arising from Italian attempts to expand their control of Eritrea into the interior. It ended without conquest (although the Italians claimed a protectorate based on the treaty ending the war).

Second Franco-Madagascan

With the British no longer serving as a counterweight to the French (part of a general deal on colonial spheres of influence), the French were free to do what they wished. Their capture of the capital and annexation of the island clearly meets the standards of conquest. Clodfelter's deaths data cover only French deaths from disease, and thus I use COW's data. Note that the start date corresponds to Hova attacks on the French; the French invasion began only in February 1895. It does not appear that the French had formally announced plans at the time of the conquest: the French Parliament voted to annex Madagascar only in 1896, and the Madagascan queen was not deposed until August of that year. That said, there is no available evidence that the French downplayed their aims initially, meaning that I code them as having fully annexationist goals. Clodfelter reports that the main resistance had been quelled by 1899, although isolated holdouts remained until 1905. Given the interest in resistance that seriously threatens the conqueror's hold

on the territory, I code the end of resistance as occurring in 1899. As the queen initially remained on the throne, she was a potential rallying point for resistance.

Sources: Brown, Mervyn, A History of Madagascar (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2000).

Second Italo-Ethiopian

This war, which generally is referred to as the First Italo-Ethiopian War, occurred in 1895 and culminated in disaster for the Italians, whose army of invasion was embarrassingly rebuffed. Thus, no conquest occurred.

Costa Rica-Nicaragua

Information on exactly what happened in this dispute (which centered on control over the route of a possible Nicaraguan canal) is not readily available, but it is clear that neither country conquered the other.

Boer

After initial difficulties, the British invaded the two Boer Republics and captured their capitals. Bloemfontain, the capital of the Orange Free State, fell on 3/13/1900, while Pretoria, the capital of Transvaal, fell on 6/5/1900. The Boers continued a guerrilla campaign, however, operating out of a new capital in the Orange Free State, and set-piece battles gave way to guerrilla war. The British had approximately 250,000 troops during this period. The British used aggressive strategies, including a scorched earth policy and the use of concentration camps, and the guerrillas ultimately were forced to surrender. In the Orange Free State, President de Steyn went into hiding after the conquest and played a major role in organizing the resistance. Likewise, President Kruger in Transvaal remained free and helped to organize the resistance. The coded territory sizes are for the present-day Free State for the Orange Free State and for the combined territories of the four states that overlap with the historical South African Republic for Transvaal; the latter approach slightly overstates the Transvaal's size. Absent better data about the costs of conquest, the coded British deaths at the time of conquest are split evenly between the two republics. The goals of key British government figures in the region provided good reason to believe that the British were looking to annex the republics. With no real prospect of driving the British out, the leaders of the two republics agreed to capitulate on 5/31/1902; that decision ended the major threat to British rule.

Sources: Pakenham, Thomas, The Boer War, 1899-1902 (New York: Random House, 1994).

First Sino-Tibetan

This dispute, frequently referred to as a revolt, involved clashes between Tibetans and Chinese forces, who claimed sovereignty over Tibet but exerted little effectual control. The conflict ended without conquest.

Sino-Tibetan

In this conflict, China conquered Tibet, which had been effectively independent for several decades. The Tibetan army posed little obstacle to their advance, but tribal irregulars (and also the altitude and weather) created more problems. Information on the course of the invasion is limited, but Clodfelter reports 2000 Chinese soldiers dead in combat, as opposed to 180 Tibetan soldiers and thousands of irregulars. Lacking a better option, I estimate 3000 Tibetan battle dead. Five years after the conquest, the Tibetans attempted to launch guerrilla resistance against the Chinese, but that effort failed. Given the time between conquest and rebellion, the rebellion is viewed as a separate conflict. The Dalai Lama remained in Tibet, although he was under fairly tight control (and also was only a teenager).

Sources: McKay, Alex, History of Tibet (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

Yugoslavia-Croatia

This war references the conflict between Croatia and rump Yugoslavia in the early nineties; it ended without conquest.

2.3 Marginal Observations from the Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Dataset

I examined cases listed in Alexander Downes's unpublished paper on foreign-imposed regime change (cited in the main article); I use this list rather than one generated for published articles because it provides temporal coverage for the entire period of interest to me. From his list of 100 cases of foreign-imposed regime change, I identified those in which regime change occurred as a consequence of a foreign invasion in which fighting producing at least some deaths occurred, and in which the invader achieved success sufficient to constitute conquest under the coding rules here. I thus omit cases (e.g. the American entry into the Dominican Republic in 1915) in which the initial invasion was not militarily opposed, cases (e.g. the First Central American War) in which regime change was negotiated to end a war in which the militarily victorious side had not yet conquered its opponent, and cases (e.g. Pinochet's seizure of power in Chile) in which regime change occurred with external support but without external invasion. I discuss those cases that met the criteria for inclusion below, as well as some that come close but do not meet the criteria for inclusion. for cases in which fighting is described as minimal but having definitely occurred, I estimate the loser's deaths as 50 to avoid dropping cases unnecessarily.

Austria-Two Sicilies

Austria invaded the Two Sicilies in 1821 to restore King Ferdinand as absolute monarch, rolling back a liberal government that had been established. The primary incident of the war was a battle at Rieti in which the Austrians lost 50 casualties, with higher losses on the Neapolitan side, although some other fighting occurred. Information about this conflict is limited. The MIDs dataset codes the conflict as running from some point in January 1821 until March 24; I estimate

January 15 as the start date for purposes of calculating duration. MIDs also puts Austrian losses at 1-25 dead, with Neapolitan losses between 26 and 100 dead. I estimate totals as 10 Austrian and 75 Neapolitan dead. Gugliemo Pepe was the most obvious leader for further resistance, and he appears to have gone into exile immediately after the war. The Gentleman's Magazine, vol. 129, pg. 268 reports 10000 Neapolitan soldiers at Rieti; General Pepe in his memoirs (pg. 156) reports that the Austrians attacked with a force of 52000 men (both these totals may be incomplete).

Austria-Modena and Austria-Parma

Details on these cases are limited, but in each case the central developments were revolts against the monarchical powers of Modena and of Parma in February 1831, which were put down by those powers with the assistance of the Austrians. As the rebels never gained control of the relevant states, these cases do not meet the standard for conquest.

Austria-Tuscany

The Austrians invaded Tuscany in May 1849 to restore the Grand Duke to his throne, which he had vacated in response to liberal unrest. The invasion began about May 6, and Florence was occupied on May 25. Trolloppe, Tuscany in 1849 and 1859, pg. 212 reports a 30,000 man invasion force available; other sources report 10,000 men in the actual invasion, and minimal fighting. Coord is coded 0, as the Austrians appear to have arrested all those organizing resistance against them. The Austrians made no territorial demands on Tuscany.

Prussia-Baden

In the context of the Revolutions of 1848, Baden established a liberal government, which was ultimately forcefully overthrown by Prussia. Byron Farwell, The Encyclopedia of Nineteenth-Century Land Warfare: An Illustrated View, pg. 350 reports that the government of Baden, under the leadership of Ludwig Mieroslawski, assembled an army of 20000 men to face a "much larger Prussian force"; after several battles, Mieroslawski is defeated and forced to flee into exile. In Marx's commentary on the campaign for the Germany Imperial Constitution[4], footnote 160 to the Karlsruhe section notes that the most significant Battle of Murg, fought 6/29-30, pitted 13000 Baden soldiers against 60000 Prussians, and ended with the retreat of the Badeners over the Swiss border. This case is oddly absent from the Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset, and I have been unable to find any information on battle deaths, although no source indicates that they were particularly high. The Grand Duke flees late in the first half of May (around 5/12), the Prussian invasion begins in mid-June (roughly 6/15), and the last Baden soldiers depart for Swiss territory on July 12. No sources provide usable information on deaths on either side, although they were clearly significant—I would guess at least several hundred.

Tuscany, Parma, and Modena vs. Piedmont/France

[4]Available online at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1850/german-imperial/ch02.htm#160; the discussion of the actual campaign is available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1850/german-imperial/ch04.htm, both accessed 2/9/2012.

These incidents occurred in the context of the Franco-Austrian War of 1859, in which France aided Sardinia-Piedmont in pushing back Austrian influence in Italy. The three duchies were never overrun militarily, however; instead, the transfer of government occurred as a consequence of popular uprisings. As such, I do not include these cases in the dataset.

Honduras and Guatemala

This case in 1855 involved a brief war that ended with the deposition of Honduran President Jose Trinidad Cabanas, who fled into exile. The main incident of the conflict was the Battle of Masaguara on 10/6/1855. Very little information on this conflict is available; in particular, it is impossible to determine whether the Guatemalans (and their allies) actually conquered Honduras. Given this difficulty and the fact that most explanatory variables would be coded missing, I simply omit this case from the dataset.

For all Central American cases, a primary source (given limited secondary literature) is Robert L. Scheina, Latin America's Wars (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2003).

El Salvador and Honduras vs. Nicaragua and Guatemala

Downes lists incidents of foreign-imposed regime change in both El Salvador and Honduras in 1863. Further research, however, reveals that only the change in El Salvador was precipitated by a decisive military victory: a Guatemalan invasion beginning June 19, 1863 culminated in the fall of San Salvador on October 26. The goal of the invaders was to overthrow Salvadoran president Gerardo Barrios, who escaped to San Miguel (in El Salvador). I have been unable to find any information on force sizes or deaths prior to conquest. There is no indication of subsequent insurgent resistance, in part because it appears that the victorious forces did not stay long enough for significant resistance to emerge.

El Salvador and Honduras

This conflict in 1871 ended with the overthrow of Francisco Duenas in El Salvador. The war began on 3/5/1871; the major battle of the war was fought 4/7-11, after which Salvadoran rebels (allied to the Hondurans) advanced to capture San Salvador on 4/15. Scheina (pg. 255) reports that the Salvadorans had a 5000 man army, but gives no information on the size of the invading force, nor is there ready information available on losses. I have been unable to determine what happened to Duenas after the conquest. It seems unlikely that Honduran troops remained to occupy El Salvador for long.

Honduras vs. Guatemala and El Salvador

This conflict in 1872 reversed the course of the previous one, with the Salvadorans (with Guatemalan backing) overthrowing Jose Maria Medina of Honduras. The war began around 3/25/1872, and the invaders occupied Tegucigalpa on 5/9. The war continued until the end of July, when Medina was captured. The new government (under Celeo Arias) faced a serious challenge from Guatemalan

and Salvadorian conservatives who were operating out of Honduras with the goal of overthrowing their home governments; ultimately Arias was forcibly replaced by Ponciano Leiva (although force in this case stopped short of conquest). I code this case as experiencing significant resistance given the inability of the new government to control conservative factions operating in Honduras. As with all the Central American cases, information on force sizes and battle deaths is unavailable, and it is likely that the outside conqueror did not stick around long after conquest.

First Central American War

Although this conflict did result in leadership change, that change was negotiated rather than a consequence of conquest.

Nicaragua-Honduras

This conflict in 1894 ended with the conquest of Honduras by Nicaragua. The Nicaraguans invaded (alongside Honduran dissidents) on 12/23/1893, won a series of battles, and ultimately captured Tegucigalpa on 2/22/1894, forcing Honduran president Vasquez to flee to El Salvador. Scheina reports that a total of 700 soldiers died in the fighting. Although the new government ultimately (temporarily) agreed to join a new Central American Union, it appears that this decision was taken after the events under discussion here, so terraim is coded 0. There is no evidence of significant further resistance. As with all the Central American cases, it is unlikely that the Nicaraguans stuck around long after the regime change was effected.

United States and Haiti

The American occupation of Haiti in 1914 is a clearly marginal case. The Americans sent a small contingent of marines and sailors (330 men total) in response to violence in Haiti to restore order in Port-au-Prince. The occupation force slowly grew in size; it is impossible to describe the initial action as conquest, however, given the absence of organized resistance to the initial landing. As a result, I do not include this case in the dataset, even for robustness checks.

United States and Dominican Republic

As in Haiti, the American occupation started with a forcible but unopposed incursion. Given the absence of resistance, this case too is omitted from the dataset.

Germany-Czechoslovakia

The German invasion of rump Czechoslovakia in 1939 was effectively unopposed, as Hitler browbeat Czech President Hacha into ordering Czech forces not to fight back. That said, some minimal resistance did occur at Mistek, justifying the case's inclusion under the coding rules. Hacha remained under German control, meaning that coord is coded 0. The Germans clearly intended to annex Czechoslovakia. I have been unable to find specific information on the size of the German invasion force (which is missing) and the total number of Czech deaths (coded as 50, the value I use in cases

of minimal resistance). No significant guerrilla resistance emerged.

Italy-Albania

Italy invaded Albania on 4/7/1939, and had fully overrun the country by April 12 in the face of limited resistance. A total of 160 Albanians died in the fighting. Various sources report different totals for the Italian invasion force; I use Clodfelter's report of 22000 men. The Italians immediately annexed Albania. King Zog of Albania fled to Greece, so coord is coded 0. Unlike the Italian experience in Yugoslavia and Greece, in Albania no significant resistance emerged.

Prague Spring

The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968—with a total of 600000 men, mostly Soviet but also from the other Eastern Bloc countries—put an end to a period of reform and experimentation and replaced the existing government under Alexander Dubcek with a more reliably communist one. The invasion began on August 20, and was complete by the next day with relatively limited fighting in which 70 Czechs died. The victorious forces made no claim on Czech territory, although they clearly planned to replace the government. Dubcek was taken into Soviet custody, meaning that coord is coded 0. Although Czechoslovakia experienced significant nonviolent resistance, violent opposition to the Warsaw Pact forces and the new government was quite limited.

Grenada

The United States invaded Grenada on October 25, 1983 following a coup by the military, which the American government claimed endangered the lives of American citizens on the island. The invasion force consisted of 7600 men, who quickly overcame resistance by a small Grenadan force and their Cuban allies, who together suffered about 70 deaths. The invaders had no territorial demands, but did seek to restore the constitutional government. Military leaders were taken into captivity, so coord is coded 0. No significant resistance emerged.

Panama

The American invasion of Panama on December 20, 1989, was undertaken to overthrow Manuel Noriega, whom the Bush adminstration accused of being complicit in the drug trade. The invasion force was significant, totalling 27684 men, and the Panamanians fought back in several places but were quickly overwhelmed. In total, Panamian forces lost 205 men. Noriega fled to the Vatican mission in Panama City, and then surrendered to American forces after a couple weeks and was taken to the United States. The Americans had no territorial aims in Panama, seeking only to replace Noriega. Although limited fighting continued in the days after the initial invasion, it quickly died down, so that the case is coded as experiencing no resistance.

2.4 Marginal Observations from Historical Insurgencies

The second set of marginal observations comes from Lyall and Wilson's list of historical insurgencies, which includes several cases in which entities that did not meet even Gleditsch and Ward's less restrictive requirements for state system membership fought. Most of these cases began as insurgencies, and hence are not relevant here, but a few began with a conventional stage. The observations that do get included take one of two forms: state-like entities like the Sultinate of Acheh or Dahomey that did not quite meet Gleditsch and Ward's requirements, or cases like Bosnia, Formosa, and East Timor in which political developments led to a well-defined area becoming independent of its former sovereign (allowing the establishment of a new government) only to face almost immediate invasion by a different actor. As with the cases of foreign-imposed regime change, I also discuss wars that might initially appear to meet the coding requirements but that are excluded.

British-Sindh War

The British conquest of Sindh in 1843 constitutes a marginal case. Sindh operated as an independent princely state, with certain ties to the Mughal Empire. The British invaded in 1843, capturing Hyderabad with an army of about 8000 men, defeating a force of about the same size (although the government of Sindh had more soldiers at its disposal who were not involved in the central battle). In the Battle of Miani, the British suffered 256 dead, against 5000-6000 Baloch dead; further significant losses occurred at Dubba on 3/24/43. The main emirs were either killed in the war or exiled, but significant Sindhi resistance nonetheless quickly emerged and continued for years. For distance, I use the distance between Hyderabad in Sindh and Calcutta in India (rather than London), given the responsibility of the British Raj for dealing with the dispute; this approach biases against finding support for the distance hypothesis.

War of the Dominican Restoration

Although the conflict began following the restoration of Spanish colonial rule over the Dominican Republic, that rule was established at the request of the Dominican government, rather than through military action. This case is thus not included in the dataset.

Dutch-Achinese War

The Dutch conquest of the Sultanate of Acheh in 1873 precipitated an extended guerrilla rebellion. The Dutch invaded on 3/26/1873 and, after initial setbacks, managed to take the capital in January 1874. The Sultan died of cholera, but his son assumed control of forces that mounted a guerrilla campaign that lasted for years, before the Dutch finally pacified the area in 1904, although even then limited resistance continued. Because of the sultan's death, the coding rules imply that coord should be coded 0, although a case could be made for a coding of 1. The Dutch incorporated Aceh as a colony. Available death data constitutes estimates for the entire period of the war, rather than for the period prior to conquest, so death data is missing here.

Conquest of Bosnia

After the Ottoman Empire ceded official control over Bosnia to Austria-Hungary in the Treaty of Berlin, the Austrians invaded in 1878, facing significant resistance; it is not clear from standard sources whether this resistance took a conventional or irregular form, so it is possible that this observation should not be included even for robustness checks. 198930 men participated in the invasion, although on average the Austrians had only 91260 in Bosnia and Herzegovina at any time. Lyall and Wilson code the conflict as running from 1/1 to 3/1/78; COW by contrast codes it as running from 7/29-10/1/78, ending with the fall of Sarajevo on October 1. It is difficult to identify a clear Bosnian leader during this war, so coord is coded as missing. While Clodfelter reports 1205 Austrian dead, I have been unable to find estimates for Bosnian losses. The Austrians intended to establish complete control over Bosnia. After taking Sarajevo, the Austrians did not face significant subsequent resistance.

Franco-Tunisian

The French invaded Tunisia with a 28000 man force in late April 1881, quickly moving to the capital of Tunis, which they entered on May 12. Historical sources are ambiguous as to whether any real fighting occurred during the initial advance; if it did, it was minimal. There is thus reason to question whether this case should be included in the dataset; given a best guess that some fighting occurred prior to conquest, however, I include it for robustness purposes. Once in Tunis, the French compelled the Bey of Tunis to agree to a treaty establishing Tunis as a protectorate of France. A rebellion broke out shortly thereafter in the South, however, requiring fighting over several months to put down. The Bey remained in Tunis, but under close French control; he was thus not in a position to coordinate resistance. The French are coded as having maximalist aims.

Second Dahomey

In this war, the French invaded the Kingdom of Dahomey in present-day Benin, killing some 2000-4000 Dahomean soldiers while suffering 85 combat dead. The war began on 7/4/1892 and ran until the capture of the capital of Abomey on 11/17/1892. King Behanzin fled north and attempted over several months to organize further resistance, but was unsuccessful, and ultimately no serious resistance emerged. The French invaded with a force of 2164 men plus an additional 2600 porters; no records of the size of the Dahomean force appear to exist, although it was clearly larger.

Franco-Thai War

This conflict in 1893 does not constitute a war (hardly anyone died), and does not constitute conquest (although the Siamese government capitulated after the French sent two gunboats up the river to Bangkok, their conventional forces were never defeated in battle; instead they recognized the futility of resistance once it became clear that the British would not back them). As such, the case in not included in the dataset.

Japanese Invasion of Taiwan

Japan used its victory in the First Sino-Japanese War to lay claim to Taiwan, which proclaimed

itself the independent Republic of Formosa in an attempt to forestall Japanese occupation. The Japanese invaded in 1895 and encountered a mix of conventional and guerrilla resistance. The Japanese landed on 5/29/1895 with 70049 men, who fought some 100000 Taiwanese defenders, capturing the capital in the opening days but needing until the October 21 capture of T'ainan to overcome conventional resistance. Clodfelter reports 6760 Taiwanese dead, as well as two wildly divergent totals for the Japanese. Republican leaders repeatedly fled to the mainland as Formosa's military plight worsened, justifying a coding of coord = 0. Low-level but not insignificant resistance continued until at least 1902, justifying a coding of continued resistance.

Mahdist War

The British-Egyptian invasion of effectively independent Sudan in 1896 ultimately ended in 1898 with the total defeat of the Mahdist government. The British had an 18000 man army; they invaded on 3/18/1896, although the first fighting didn't occur until 6/7. After a methodical advance, the British crushed the main Sudanese force at Omdurman on 9/2/1898, precipitating conquest, although the Khalifa escaped and continued guerrilla resistance throughout 1899 before finally being killed on November 23, at which point resistance ends. There were roughly 15000 Sudanese dead in specific pre-conquest incidents referenced by Clodfelter, which is certainly not an exhaustive total.

Forest Brothers

Sustained guerrilla resistance to the Soviet presence in the Baltic states after World War II would be sufficient for inclusion in the supplemental dataset, were it not for the fact that none of the Baltics had established governments prior to the Soviet reestablishment of control. (There was no significant guerrilla resistance following the initial Soviet occupations in 1940.)

East Timor

East Timor was granted independence from Portugal in 1974-1975, precipitating a short civil war between Fretilin and the UDT that the former won in August 1975. Starting December 7, an Indonesian force of about 10,000 men invaded, quickly capturing the main cities but failing to pacify the country, as Fretilin forces withdrew into the mountains to continue resistance. Clodfelter reports the death of 500 Timorese in the capture of Dili, while more obviously died elsewhere in the initial stages. I estimate 2500 Timorese dead in the initial stages; subsequent deaths were much higher. This case clearly constitutes continued guerrilla resistance following conquest, although precisely specifying the date of conquest is difficult. I adopt 3/1/1976, the rough date on which the Indonesians announced their conquest. The Indonesian aim was to incorporate East Timor into Indonesia. The Fretilin political leader was Nicolau dos Reis Lobato; after the Indonesian invasion, he fled into the interior with the rest of the leadership to continue the resistance (although he was killed by the Indonesians in 1978).

Second Chechen War

The First Chechen War ended with Russia's withdrawal from Chechnya, allowing the establish-

ment of a de facto independent government. In the Second Chechen War, Russia reestablished control over the breakaway province. The second round of fighting began with an unsuccessful Chechen invasion of Dagestan in August 1999, to which the Russians responded first with aerial bombardment and then a land invasion beginning on 10/1. Grozny fell on 2/2/2000; by the end of April, Russian forces had overrun the whole of Chechnya. A separatist insurgency then developed that lasted several years and required significant Russian efforts to ultimately quell. Clodfelter reports 100000 Russian soldiers present during the siege of Grozny, and reports that the Russians admitted to 2036 KIA through 4/1/2000, while Chechen losses are unknown. Chechen President Aslan Mashkadov remained at large after the Russian conquest and led the guerrilla resistance.

Table 1: Cases of Conquest since 1815

Case	Year	Loser	Resistance?	Marginal Case?†
Austria-Two Sicilies	1821	Two Sicilies	No	FIRC
Franco-Spanish	1823	Spain	No	No
Franco-Algerian	1830	Algeria	Yes	No
Anglo-Afghan	1839	Afghanistan	Yes	No
British-Sindh	1843	Sindh	Yes	Non-Gleditsch State
Mexican-American	1847	Mexico	Yes	Marginal Conquest
Prussia-Baden	1848	Baden	No	No
Roman Republic	1849	Roman Republic	No	No
Austria-Tuscany	1849	Tuscany	No	FIRC
La Plata	1852	Argentina	No	No
Italo-Roman	1860	Papal States	No	No
Italo-Sicilian	1860	Two Sicilies	No	No
Franco-Mexican	1863	Mexico	Yes	No
Guatemalan-Salvadoran	1863	El Salvador	No	FIRC
Seven Weeks	1866	Saxony	No	No
Seven Weeks	1866	Hesse-Electoral	No	No
Seven Weeks	1866	Hannover	No	No
Anglo-Ethiopian	1868	Ethiopia	No	Quick Departure
Triple Alliance	1869	Paraguay	Yes	No
Franco-Prussian	1871	France	No	No
Honduran-Salvadoran	1871	El Salvador	No	FIRC
Honduran-Salvadoran	1872	Honduras	No	FIRC
Dutch-Acheh	1874	Acheh	Yes	Non-Gleditsch State
Conquest of Bosnia	1878	Bosnia	No	Non-Gleditsch State
Second Anglo-Afghan	1879	Afghanistan	Yes	No
Pacific	1881	Peru	Yes	No
Franco-Tunisian	1881	Tunisia	No	Non-Gleditsch State
Anglo-Egyptian	1882	Egypt	No	No
Anglo-Burmese	1885	Burma	Yes	No
French-Dahomey	1892	Dahomey	No	Non-Gleditsch State
Nicaraguan-Honduran	1894	Honduras	No	FIRC
Franco-Madagascan	1895	Madagascar	Yes	No
Formosa	1895	Formosa	Yes	Non-Gleditsch State
Mahdist War	1898	Mahdists	Yes	Non-Gleditsch State
Boxer Rebellion	1900	China	Yes	Marginal Conquest
Second Boer	1900	Orange Free State	Yes	No
Second Boer	1900	Transvaal	Yes	No
Central American	1907	Honduras	No	No
Second Balkan	1913	Bulgaria	No	No
World War I	1914	Belgium	No	Marginal Conquest
World War I	1915	Serbia	No	No
World War I	1915	Montenegro	No	No
World War I	1916	Romania	No	Marginal Conquest

†Cases labeled "No" and "Non-Gleditsch State" are used in the main analyses; others are used in robustness checks.

Case	Year	Loser	Resistance?	Marginal Case?[†]
Hungarian-Allies	1919	Hungary	No	No
Italo-Ethiopian	1936	Ethiopia	Yes	No
Italo-Albanian	1939	Albania	No	FIRC
World War II	1939	Poland	No	No
World War II	1940	Denmark	No	FIRC
World War II	1940	Norway	No	No
World War II	1940	Netherlands	No	No
World War II	1940	Belgium	No	No
World War II	1940	France	No	No
World War II	1941	Yugoslavia	Yes	No
World War II	1941	Greece	Yes	No
World War II	1943	Italy	No	No
World War II	1944	Romania	No	No
World War II	1944	Bulgaria	No	No
World War II	1945	Hungary	No	No
World War II	1945	Germany	No	No
World War II	1945	Japan	No	Marginal Conquest
Sino-Tibetan	1951	Tibet	No	No
Russo-Hungarian	1956	Hungary	No	No
Prague Spring	1968	Czechoslovakia	No	FIRC
Vietnam	1975	South Vietnam	No	No
East Timor	1976	East Timor	Yes	Non-Gleditsch State
Vietnamese-Cambodian	1979	Cambodia	Yes	No
Uganda-Tanzania	1979	Uganda	No	No
Grenada	1983	Grenada	No	FIRC
Panama	1989	Panama	No	FIRC
Persian Gulf	1990	Kuwait	No	No
Second Chechen War	1999	Chechnya	Yes	Non-Gleditsch State
Afghanistan	2001	Afghanistan	Yes	Marginal Conquest
Iraq	2003	Iraq	Yes	No
Ethiopia-Somalia	2007	Somalia	Yes	No

[†]Cases labeled "No" and "Non-Gleditsch State" are used in the main analyses; others are used in robustness checks.

Appendix B: Statistical Robustness Checks

This appendix contains additional information about the statistical results and robustness checks presented or alluded to in the main article. The first section presents crosstabs for categorical variables, which provide a slightly more nuanced picture of the empirical landscape than do the probit regressions presented in the paper. The second section presents results from a range of robustness checks that take advantage of the marginal observations in the dataset.

2 Crosstabs

Crosstabs provide a better descriptive sense of how data are distributed, at least for categorical variables, than do the probit regressions presented in the main paper; they were not used there to economize space. This section thus contains crosstabs for categorical variables; I also report the p-value from a two-sided Fisher's exact test. For the regime type of the conqueror and the losing state, I collapse variables into more easily interpretable dummies capturing whether the relevant government either was or was not democratic, with the standard Polity threshold for democracy of 7. I do not report crosstabs for continuous variables, except that I include one for contiguity (coded 1 if states share a border and 0 otherwise), which captures many of the same effects as distance. The findings in the crosstabs are quite similar to those reached through probit regressions.

	Territorial War Aims			
Resistance	None	Partial	Annexation	Total
No	9	9	13	31
Yes	5	3	8	16
Total	16	12	21	47

Fisher's exact = 0.80

	Political War Aims			
Resistance	None	Regime Change	Annexation	Total
No	5	13	13	31
Yes	2	6	8	16
Total	7	19	21	47

Fisher's exact = 0.92

	Cultural Clash		
Resistance	No	Yes	Total
No	24	7	31
Yes	5	11	16
Total	29	18	47

Fisher's exact = 0.004

	Common Threat		
Resistance	No	Yes	Total
No	29	2	31
Yes	15	1	16
Total	44	3	47

Fisher's exact = 1.00

	Nationalism		
Resistance	No	Yes	Total
No	7	24	31
Yes	6	10	16
Total	13	34	47

Fisher's exact = 0.32

	Defeated State Democratic?		
Resistance	No	Yes	Total
No	20	5	25
Yes	12	0	12
Total	32	5	37

Fisher's exact = 0.15

	Conqueror Democratic?		
Resistance	No	Yes	Total
No	29	2	31
Yes	11	5	16
Total	40	7	47

Fisher's exact = 0.04

	Contiguity		
Resistance	Non-Contiguous	Contiguous	Total
No	5	26	31
Yes	11	5	16
Total	16	31	47

Fisher's exact = 0.001

	Coordinating Leader		
Resistance	Not Present	Present	Total
No	26	4	31
Yes	7	9	16
Total	33	13	47

Fisher's exact = 0.005

3 Robustness Checks

To enumerate, I conduct the following robustness checks:

1. Including marginal cases of conquest from wars in Gleditsch's war list that are not included in primary analyses
2. Omitting marginal cases of conquest from wars in Gleditsch's war list that are included in primary analyses
3. Omitting cases in which the conventional phase of the war lasts less than a month
4. Including marginal cases from the foreign-imposed regime change dataset
5. Including marginal cases from the dataset of historical insurgencies
6. Omitting cases in which a reasonable observer might doubt that a conventional phase to the war occurred
7. Standard list of cases, introducing a control capturing whether conquest occurred in the context of a multilateral war that continued after conquest
8. Standard list of cases, coding Poland in World War II as experiencing resistance
9. Additional robustness checks related to the coding and interpretation of results for the regime variables

The first two robustness checks evaluate the robustness of findings to including or excluding marginal cases of conquest from the primary list of wars. These marginal cases include observations like China in the Boxer Rebellion, Belgium in World War I, Italy or Japan in World War II, or Afghanistan in 2001—Appendix A contains individual justifications for all marginal cases. Some of these observations are included in the main dataset and some are excluded, thus necessitating two sets of robustness checks to determine whether those inclusion or exclusion decisions affected statistical results.

A second concern is that in some cases the conventional fighting may have been sufficiently limited as to not constitute a conventional war. Two sets of robustness checks address this concern. One approach is simply to omit all observations in which conquest occurred within the first month of fighting; this approach excludes cases like the French invasion of Algeria in 1830, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, or several of Germany's lightning victories over small neighbors in 1940. The alternate approach is to focus specifically on observations in which the conventional phase was relatively limited or otherwise unusual, again including the French invasion of Algeria, but also including cases like the French conquest of Madagascar, in which the Madagascan government allowed the French to advance into the center of the country before fighting (and losing) a battle outside the capital.

A third concern is that the list of wars used here may be incomplete in some manner. One possibility is that truly overwhelming conventional victories may be achieved so quickly that the war ends with relatively few battle deaths, as for example in the German invasion of Denmark or the American invasion of Panama. These sorts of cases raise potential concerns about whether a conventional phase to the war truly occurred, but we would like to know that their exclusion from the dataset does not unduly influence results. Second, even Gleditsch's expanded list of wars (based on a less restrictive set of requirements for state system membership) may omit some relevant cases of conquest in conventional war because the defeated side does not meet even relatively relaxed requirements for state membership. Observations identified in this manner include effectively independent entities like Sindh, which retained a degree of feasance to the dying Mughal Empire but operated effectively independently, as well as governments that came into existence immediately before the war began, as with Formosa (which declared independence in 1895 after being ceded to Japan in the First Sino-Japanese War) or East Timor (which gained independence from the Netherlands in 1975, established a provisional government, and was immediately invaded by Indonesia). While concerns about the appropriateness of these cases led me to exclude them from the primary analysis, it would be preferable to ensure that this decision is not driving my results.

Two further concerns are more limited. The first is that conquest frequently occurs in the context of a multilateral war that may continue after the defeat of the conquered country: Serbia's exit from World War I and France's exit from World War II provide relevant examples. This situation could plausibly both encourage resistance (because the defeated population believes that resistance need only tie down the conqueror to significantly affect the ultimate outcome of the war) or discourage it (because the conquered population can free ride on the continued effort of those allies who are still fighting). There is thus no clear prediction for this variable from the hearts and mind or ease of resistance perspectives, but we would like to know that failure to control for this concern is not producing omitted variable bias for results for variables of interest.[5] Second, there exists one case—the German conquest of Poland in World War II—in which significant resistance did not emerge within six months, but it did emerge relatively shortly thereafter. Given the limited number of cases of resistance in the dataset, it is not implausible that changing the coding for this case would affect results; the last set of robustness checks thus evaluates this possibility.[6]

Finally, the paper makes two claims about analyses involving the regime variables that I substantiate here. First, I note in the paper that results are effectively identical when substituting Polity scores from the year that war began for the score from the year of conquest. Second, footnote 38 notes

[5]By itself, a dummy variable for conquest within an ongoing war is associated with a statistically significant reduction in the probability of post-conquest resistance. This effect, however, appears to arise because most cases of conquest within ongoing wars occurred in relatively developed Europe—in a regression of ongoing war and GDP per capita on resistance, GDP per capita is significant while ongoing war is nowhere near so. The same result holds using level of urbanization.

[6]This list of robustness checks does not address two of the categories for the conquest flag variable introduced in appendix A. Specifically, I do not present robustness checks altering the inclusion or exclusion of cases in which the conqueror departed from the conquered country before the six month window for resistance had elapsed, nor do I present robustness checks for cases in which the government on the defeated side existed for less than a month prior to the war. Both of these flags arise almost exclusively among the marginal cases, and thus would be pertinent for robustness checks to robustness checks. Indeed, the only case from the Gleditsch list of wars to receive either of these flag codings is the Anglo-Ethiopian War, in which the British departed precipitously after conquest; including this observation has no substantive bearing on the results.

and dismisses the possibility of an interactive effect between conqueror regime type and war aims. I thus present two sets of additional results at the very end of this appendix. Specifically, table 13 presents the results from probits without controls (models 1 and 2) and for multivariate linear probability models (models 3, 4, and 5, which correspond to models 1, 3, and 4 in other tables of multivariate results). The variables perform effectively identically to how they do in the main regressions. As for the interactive effect, table 14 presents results from probit regressions including an interaction between the conqueror's war aims and Polity score. In each case, the interaction is positive, as would be expected if democracies are less likely to experience resistance only when their aims are limited, but small and statistically insignificant. Figure 17 (on page 52) plots this effect graphically, showing predicted values (calculated using Clarify) at each level of territorial war aims for fully democratic, partially democratic (Polity=0), and fully autocratic conquerors. Consistent with the claim in the paper, for any sized war aim, democratic conquerors are predicted to have a higher probability of facing post-conquest resistance.

For the regressions without controls, I present the results in the same manner as in the paper, via figures that plot point estimates and confidence intervals for each variable. After those regressions, I then present tables analogous to those in the paper for the multivariate tests. Broadly, the robustness checks reveal results that are quite consistent with those presented in the paper. There are, however, some marginal differences, which I discuss below.

For the hearts and minds variables, figure 5 reveals that higher per capita pre-conquest deaths are associated with an increased probability of resistance when including marginal cases drawn from the list of cases of foreign-imposed regime change (which involve low deaths totals and rarely are followed by significant resistance); this finding, however, does not hold for absolute death totals, nor does it hold for other robustness checks. Otherwise, the only change in statistical significance is that the cultural clash variable barely misses conventional significance levels in an analysis omitting observations in which the conventional stage lasted less than one month.

In multivariate analysis, tables 10, 11, and 12 demonstrate that the finding that cultural clashes appear to be proxying for distance holds up under the various robustness checks: in every case, cultural difference ceases to be a significant predictor of resistance once I control for distance between the conqueror and the conquered state, while distance is significant. The remaining tables replicate the multivariate analysis using the linear probability specification. In models 1 and 2, which include variables for all the hearts and minds hypotheses, results are effectively identical to those presented in the paper. Specifically, cultural difference is consistently significant in model 1, but become insignificant in model 2 once I control for distance, while distance is significant. Pre-conquest deaths and the conqueror's regime type are both occasionally statistically significant, but in each case always in the opposite direction from that predicted by theory. In model 4, which includes variables for all the hypotheses tested in the quantitative analysis, the results from the paper for the hearts and minds variables are again consistently replicated, except that cultural difference is statistically significant in roughly half of specifications.

Turning to the ease of resistance hypotheses, the fact that these variables were consistently significant implies greater opportunity for changes in significance levels, and it is thus not surprising that several variables drop slightly out of significance in a number of robustness checks. Specifically,

the modernization variables (GDP per capita and level of urbanization) are occasionally significant only at the .1 level (including marginal conquest cases or omitting cases with a duration under one month). Similarly, the absolute size of the occupying army is occasionally marginally statistically insignificant, although the theoretically more appropriate density of the occupying army is more robust.

Turning to the multivariate analysis, tables 2 to 9 tell a similar story to that seen in the main paper. The variable for the presence or absence of a coordinating leader is almost always statistically significant, failing to reach that threshold only in one model when including marginal cases from historical insurgencies. The distance between the conqueror and the conquered state is also typically significant, albeit less robust. Other variables are typically, but not always, statistically insignificant, but in model 3 they are consistently in the predicted direction with the exception of the conqueror's Polity score, which has the unexpected sign but is insignificant. In model 4, where the number of variables is at times roughly half the number of observations, results are unsurprisingly less robust. Distance has the unexpected sign once, and GDP per capita twice; both times the coefficient is substantively small and statistically insignificant, however. The coefficient for terrain has an unexpected negative sign in roughly half of robustness checks, again however always substantively small and statistically insignificant. Finally, as in the paper, the coefficient for the conqueror's regime type consistently has the opposite sign from that predicted, but is statistically insignificant. Broadly, I interpret these results as suggesting that we should be extremely cautious of reading too much into multivariate analyses, especially with the number of variables seen in model 4; given these concerns, however, the results are broadly consistent with the picture emerging from regressions without controls.



Figure 1: Robustness Checks for Hearts and Minds Hypotheses, Including Marginal Conquest Cases



Figure 2: Robustness Checks for Ease of Resistance Hypotheses, Including Marginal Conquest Cases



Figure 3: Robustness Checks for Hearts and Minds Hypotheses, Omitting Cases with a Conventional Stage Shorter than One Month



Figure 4: Robustness Checks for Ease of Resistance Hypotheses, Omitting Cases with a Conventional Stage Shorter than One Month



Figure 5: Robustness Checks for Hearts and Minds Hypotheses, Including Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Cases



Figure 6: Robustness Checks for Ease of Resistance Hypotheses, Including Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Cases



Figure 7: Robustness Checks for Hearts and Minds Hypotheses, Including Cases from Historical Insurgencies



Figure 8: Robustness Checks for Ease of Resistance Hypotheses, Including Cases from Historical Insurgencies



Figure 9: Robustness Checks for Hearts and Minds Hypotheses, Omitting Marginal Conquest Cases



Figure 10: Robustness Checks for Ease of Resistance Hypotheses, Omitting Marginal Conquest Cases



Figure 11: Robustness Checks for Hearts and Minds Hypotheses, Omitting Marginal Conventional War Cases



Figure 12: Robustness Checks for Ease of Resistance Hypotheses, Omitting Marginal Conventional War Cases



Figure 13: Robustness Checks for Hearts and Minds Hypotheses, Including a Control for Conquest in an Ongoing War



Figure 14: Robustness Checks for Ease of Resistance Hypotheses, Including a Control for Conquest in an Ongoing War



Figure 15: Robustness Checks for Hearts and Minds Hypotheses, Coding Poland in World War II as Experiencing Resistance



Figure 16: Robustness Checks for Ease of Resistance Hypotheses, Coding Poland in World War II as Experiencing Resistance



Figure 17: Graphing the Interactive Effect of Conqueror Regime and War Aims

Table 2: Including Marginal Conquest Cases from COW Wars

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Cultural Clash	0.40*	0.20		0.25
	(0.17)	(0.17)		(0.14)
Territorial War Aims	0.081	0.12		0.22
	(0.088)	(0.080)		(0.11)
log(Pre-Conquest Deaths)	-0.030	-0.054		-0.022
	(0.028)	(0.026)		(0.029)
Conqueror's Polity Score	0.023	0.0037	-0.022	-0.018
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Loser's Polity Score	-0.011	-0.014		-0.0062
	(0.0093)	(0.0099)		(0.0073)
National Identity	0.045	0.065		-0.022
	(0.17)	(0.16)		(0.22)
Common Threat	-0.15	-0.054		-0.089
	(0.49)	(0.42)		(0.26)
log(Intercapital Distance)		0.24**	0.23**	0.19
		(0.071)	(0.057)	(0.10)
Terrain			0.24	-0.055
			(0.40)	(0.50)
Occupying Force Density			-0.030	-0.057
			(0.030)	(0.048)
Coordinating Leader			0.48**	0.61**
			(0.13)	(0.16)
Per Capita GDP			-0.038	-0.028
			(0.037)	(0.028)
Constant	0.40	-1.22*	-1.46**	-1.38
	(0.28)	(0.52)	(0.45)	(0.86)
Observations	40	40	41	32

Standard errors clustered by war. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Excluding Wars with Conventional Phase under One Month

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Cultural Clash	0.40*	0.23		0.31*
	(0.19)	(0.18)		(0.14)
Territorial War Aims	0.13	0.16		0.19
	(0.11)	(0.080)		(0.12)
log(Pre-Conquest Deaths)	-0.072	-0.076*		0.0090
	(0.041)	(0.036)		(0.046)
Conqueror's Polity Score	0.015	-0.0010	-0.024	-0.022
	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Loser's Polity Score	-0.016	-0.018		-0.012
	(0.011)	(0.011)		(0.015)
National Identity	0.013	0.098		0.068
	(0.22)	(0.19)		(0.26)
Common Threat	0.037	0.020		-0.11
	(0.56)	(0.48)		(0.37)
log(Intercapital Distance)		0.23**	0.23**	0.12
		(0.080)	(0.072)	(0.15)
Terrain			0.41	0.22
			(0.41)	(0.63)
Occupying Force Density			-0.016	-0.088
			(0.032)	(0.074)
Coordinating Leader			0.58**	0.55*
			(0.14)	(0.21)
Per Capita GDP			-0.068*	-0.020
			(0.032)	(0.066)
Constant	0.74	-1.04	-1.57**	-1.33
	(0.41)	(0.71)	(0.54)	(0.95)
Observations	33	33	32	27

Standard errors clustered by war. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Including Marginal Cases from Foreign-Imposed Regime Change

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Cultural Clash	0.35*	0.16		0.26*
	(0.16)	(0.15)		(0.11)
Territorial War Aims	-0.034	0.034		0.083
	(0.081)	(0.073)		(0.085)
log(Pre-Conquest Deaths)	0.022	-0.0054		0.011
	(0.020)	(0.022)		(0.024)
Conqueror's Polity Score	0.023	0.0044	-0.023	-0.019
	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Loser's Polity Score	0.0068	0.0061		0.0029
	(0.0089)	(0.0083)		(0.0058)
National Identity	-0.19	-0.14		-0.27
	(0.15)	(0.11)		(0.30)
Common Threat	-0.033	0.077		-0.16
	(0.51)	(0.41)		(0.29)
log(Intercapital Distance)		0.27**	0.24**	0.18
		(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.097)
Terrain			0.53	0.098
			(0.26)	(0.51)
Occupying Force Density			-0.029	-0.065
			(0.029)	(0.036)
Coordinating Leader			0.45**	0.67**
			(0.15)	(0.16)
Per Capita GDP			-0.036	0.015
			(0.028)	(0.030)
Constant	0.29	-1.53**	-1.61**	-1.30
	(0.18)	(0.42)	(0.46)	(0.83)
Observations	43	43	39	33

Standard errors clustered by war. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Including Marginal Cases from Historical Insurgencies

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Cultural Clash	0.45*	0.23		0.32*
	(0.18)	(0.16)		(0.14)
Territorial War Aims	0.019	0.069		0.16
	(0.084)	(0.074)		(0.097)
log(Pre-Conquest Deaths)	-0.011	-0.036		-0.0072
	(0.024)	(0.021)		(0.028)
Conqueror's Polity Score	0.030*	0.0097	-0.010	-0.015
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Loser's Polity Score	0.0028	0.000032		0.00023
	(0.010)	(0.0096)		(0.0065)
National Identity	-0.087	-0.043		-0.22
	(0.15)	(0.11)		(0.32)
Common Threat	0.015	0.11		-0.090
	(0.58)	(0.49)		(0.30)
log(Intercapital Distance)		0.27**	0.19**	0.16
		(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.10)
Terrain			0.60	-0.049
			(0.34)	(0.52)
Occupying Force Density			-0.022	-0.076
			(0.037)	(0.047)
Coordinating Leader			0.27	0.62**
			(0.18)	(0.19)
Per Capita GDP			-0.051	-0.0041
			(0.049)	(0.041)
Constant	0.45	-1.35*	-1.11*	-1.10
	(0.24)	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.87)
Observations	36	36	39	29

Standard errors clustered by war. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: Omitting Marginal Cases in the Main Dataset

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Cultural Clash	0.40*	0.20		0.14
	(0.19)	(0.16)		(0.12)
Territorial War Aims	0.056	0.076		0.057
	(0.091)	(0.079)		(0.077)
log(Pre-Conquest Deaths)	-0.018	-0.042*		-0.058
	(0.023)	(0.020)		(0.030)
Conqueror's Polity Score	0.043**	0.017	-0.0047	-0.0013
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.0100)
Loser's Polity Score	0.0012	0.0017		-0.0099
	(0.011)	(0.011)		(0.0049)
National Identity	-0.063	-0.052		-0.14
	(0.17)	(0.12)		(0.25)
Common Threat	0.35	0.38		0.21
	(0.60)	(0.54)		(0.27)
log(Intercapital Distance)		0.27**	0.13	-0.0036
		(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.068)
Terrain			0.89*	1.25*
			(0.32)	(0.53)
Occupying Force Density			0.0098	0.064
			(0.046)	(0.054)
Coordinating Leader			0.61**	0.97**
			(0.16)	(0.10)
Per Capita GDP			-0.035	-0.019
			(0.040)	(0.030)
Constant	0.53*	-1.24*	-0.79	0.52
	(0.24)	(0.52)	(0.48)	(0.63)
Observations	33	33	33	27

Standard errors clustered by war. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Omitting Default Cases in which Conquest May Not Have Occurred

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Cultural Clash	0.45*	0.23		0.32*
	(0.18)	(0.16)		(0.14)
Territorial War Aims	0.019	0.069		0.16
	(0.084)	(0.074)		(0.097)
log(Pre-Conquest Deaths)	-0.011	-0.036		-0.0072
	(0.024)	(0.021)		(0.028)
Conqueror's Polity Score	0.030*	0.0097	-0.024	-0.015
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Loser's Polity Score	0.0028	0.000032		0.00023
	(0.010)	(0.0096)		(0.0065)
National Identity	-0.087	-0.043		-0.22
	(0.15)	(0.11)		(0.32)
Common Threat	0.015	0.11		-0.090
	(0.58)	(0.49)		(0.30)
log(Intercapital Distance)		0.27**	0.24**	0.16
		(0.064)	(0.074)	(0.10)
Terrain			0.68*	-0.049
			(0.26)	(0.52)
Occupying Force Density			-0.00045	-0.076
			(0.035)	(0.047)
Coordinating Leader			0.54**	0.62**
			(0.16)	(0.19)
Per Capita GDP			-0.034	-0.0041
			(0.046)	(0.041)
Constant	0.45	-1.35*	-1.66**	-1.10
	(0.24)	(0.49)	(0.55)	(0.87)
Observations	36	36	32	29

Standard errors clustered by war. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 8: Including a Control for Ongoing War

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Cultural Clash	0.43*	0.23		0.33*
	(0.18)	(0.16)		(0.15)
Territorial War Aims	0.064	0.089		0.14
	(0.082)	(0.069)		(0.097)
log(Pre-Conquest Deaths)	-0.017	-0.038		-0.0057
	(0.029)	(0.023)		(0.033)
Conqueror's Polity Score	0.030*	0.010	-0.023	-0.018
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Loser's Polity Score	0.0086	0.0029		-0.0048
	(0.015)	(0.012)		(0.0055)
National Identity	-0.068	-0.035		-0.33
	(0.16)	(0.13)		(0.33)
Common Threat	0.061	0.13		-0.12
	(0.64)	(0.52)		(0.31)
ongoing	-0.18	-0.088	0.062	0.13
	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.080)	(0.12)
log(Intercapital Distance)		0.26**	0.25**	0.16
		(0.066)	(0.070)	(0.099)
Terrain			0.50	-0.15
			(0.27)	(0.53)
Occupying Force Density			-0.030	-0.088
			(0.038)	(0.047)
Coordinating Leader			0.45**	0.66**
			(0.16)	(0.19)
Per Capita GDP			-0.039	0.0048
			(0.046)	(0.042)
Constant	0.54	-1.26*	-1.71**	-1.07
	(0.34)	(0.56)	(0.55)	(0.84)
Observations	36	36	35	29

Standard errors clustered by war. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 9: Coding Poland in WWII as Experiencing Resistance

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Cultural Clash	0.41*	0.20		0.30
	(0.18)	(0.16)		(0.18)
Territorial War Aims	0.059	0.11		0.27
	(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.17)
log(Pre-Conquest Deaths)	0.0044	-0.020		0.014
	(0.028)	(0.025)		(0.035)
Conqueror's Polity Score	0.029	0.0091	-0.023	-0.012
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Loser's Polity Score	-0.0032	-0.0058		-0.0079
	(0.015)	(0.015)		(0.011)
National Identity	-0.0039	0.038		-0.16
	(0.20)	(0.16)		(0.43)
Common Threat	-0.13	-0.042		-0.24
	(0.65)	(0.56)		(0.35)
log(Intercapital Distance)		0.25**	0.22**	0.14
		(0.070)	(0.063)	(0.11)
Terrain			0.43	-0.32
			(0.31)	(0.79)
Occupying Force Density			-0.018	-0.11
			(0.039)	(0.056)
Coordinating Leader			0.41*	0.54*
			(0.16)	(0.21)
Per Capita GDP			-0.053	-0.018
			(0.057)	(0.044)
Constant	0.24	-1.48*	-1.38*	-1.17
	(0.33)	(0.53)	(0.52)	(0.88)
Observations	36	36	35	29

Standard errors clustered by war. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 10: Robustness Checks for Cultural Clash/Distance Results

	+ Marginal Cases		No Quick Conquests		+ FIRC Cases	
Cultural Clash	1.22**	0.60	0.87	0.31	1.08**	0.47
	(0.42)	(0.45)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.41)	(0.45)
log(Intercapital Distance)		0.84**		0.88**		0.75**
		(0.26)		(0.25)		(0.27)
Constant	-0.97**	-6.96**	-0.75	-7.19**	-1.02**	-6.21**
	(0.36)	(1.77)	(0.39)	(1.80)	(0.32)	(1.97)
Observations	55	55	42	42	60	60

Standard errors clustered by war. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 11: Robustness Checks for Cultural Clash/Distance Results

	+ Insurgency Cases		No Marginal Conquests		No Marginal Wars	
Cultural Clash	1.24**	0.77	1.15*	0.66	1.03*	0.61
	(0.41)	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.49)	(0.48)	(0.54)
log(Intercapital Distance)		1.10**		1.22**		1.22**
		(0.25)		(0.25)		(0.26)
Constant	-0.84*	-8.77**	-0.87*	-9.65**	-0.94*	-9.75**
	(0.35)	(1.81)	(0.37)	(1.81)	(0.37)	(1.89)
Observations	56	56	44	44	44	44

Standard errors clustered by war. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 12: Robustness Checks for Cultural Clash/Distance Results

	Ongoing War Control		Poland Resists	
Cultural Clash	1.15**	0.78	1.10**	0.59
	(0.45)	(0.50)	(0.41)	(0.39)
log(Intercapital Distance)		1.17**		0.96**
		(0.26)		(0.27)
Ongoing War	-0.80**	-0.26		
	(0.37)	(0.35)		
Constant	-0.94*	-9.68**	-0.82**	-7.62**
	(0.37)	(1.84)	(0.29)	(1.90)
Observations	47	47	47	47

Standard errors clustered by war. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 13: Robustness Checks Using Polity Scores from Year of War Onset

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Conqueror's Polity Score	0.090**		0.031*	-0.021	-0.013
	(0.034)		(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Loser's Polity Score		-0.015	0.0028		-0.00065
		(0.026)	(0.011)		(0.0066)
Cultural Clash			0.42*		0.30*
			(0.16)		(0.12)
Territorial War Aims			0.024		0.18
			(0.090)		(0.096)
log(Pre-Conquest Deaths)			-0.022		-0.018
			(0.026)		(0.029)
National Identity			-0.11		-0.22
			(0.15)		(0.31)
Common Threat			0.075		-0.045
			(0.54)		(0.26)
log(Intercapital Distance)				0.24**	0.16
				(0.064)	(0.10)
Terrain				0.52	-0.022
				(0.27)	(0.51)
Occupying Force Density				-0.025	-0.072
				(0.037)	(0.048)
Coordinating Leader				0.43*	0.61**
				(0.16)	(0.19)
Per Capita GDP				-0.037	-0.0091
				(0.044)	(0.042)
Constant	-0.11	-0.53*	0.56*	-1.58**	-0.99
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.21)	(0.48)	(0.81)
Observations	47	38	37	35	30

Standard errors clustered by war. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 14: Alternate Polity Scores

	Territorial Aims	Political Aims
Conqueror's Polity Score	0.059	0.076
	(0.051)	(0.063)
Territorial War Aims	0.33	
	(0.25)	
Polity∗Territorial Aims	0.038	
	(0.042)	
Political War Aims		0.42
		(0.31)
Polity∗Political Aims		0.022
		(0.045)
Constant	-0.40	-0.59
	(0.38)	(0.49)
Observations	47	47

Standard errors clustered by war. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$