NAVCO 1.3 Codebook

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Last updated March 17, 2020

Text adapted from earlier versions of the NAVCO codebook.

Introduction

The Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO) 1.3 Data Set[1]

The NAVCO 1.3 data set identifies 622 maximalist resistance campaigns using violent and nonviolent methods that set on worldwide from 1900-2019. The dataset brings together numerous cases of violent and nonviolent campaigns with the objectives of expelling foreign occupations, regime change (i.e. removing dictatorships or military juntas), self-determination or separatism, and in some cases, other major types of social change (i.e. anti-apartheid campaigns). Consisting of consensus data from experts on major armed and unarmed insurrections, the dataset identifies the levels of success each campaign achieved by the end of 2019 according to each campaign's stated objective.

This is the fourth iteration of the NAVCO 1 datasets and represents a significant increase in the number of cases under study. NAVCO 1.0 and 1.1 identified 250 campaigns in the period 1945-2006. NAVCO 1.2 increased that number to 389 campaigns that set on from 1945-2013. The increase is largely due to (a) the dramatic rise of maximalist nonviolent campaigns in the last fifteen years, and (b) the addition of new historical campaigns that were omitted from earlier versions of the dataset. NAVCO 1.3 covers the entire period 1900-2019, yielding a total of 622 campaigns.

[1] The data set builds on the NAVCO 1.0 data set, which was released along with the article by Maria Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict," *International Security* (Summer 2008), as well as the 1.1 version released in 2011 along with the book of the same title. Contact Erica Chenoweth directly for information on the changes to the data set, including added variables, added cases, and revised coding of several cases.

Defining Campaigns

A campaign is defined as a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective. Campaigns are observable, meaning that the tactics used are overt and documented. A campaign is continuous and lasts anywhere from days to years, distinguishing it from one-off events or revolts. Campaigns are purposive, meaning that groups and participants are consciously acting with a specific objective in mind, such as expelling a foreign occupier or overthrowing a regime. Campaigns have discernable leadership and often have names, distinguishing them from random riots or spontaneous mass acts. Other scholars often use campaigns as their units of analysis, such as Robert Pape's analysis of suicide bombing campaigns (2003), Horowitz and Reiter's analysis of aerial bombing campaigns (2001), and Ackerman and Kruegler's study of strategic nonviolent conflict (1995). In such studies, campaigns usually have distinguishable beginning and end points, as well as discernable events throughout the campaign. In the case of resistance campaigns, beginning and end points are very difficult to determine, as are the events throughout the campaign. In some cases, information on such events is readily available (i.e. Northern Ireland); however, in most cases, it is not. Therefore, our selection of campaigns and their beginning and end dates are based on consensus data produced by multiple sources.

There are some difficulties with this method. First, it is difficult to gather the strength of the campaign and its activities over time (i.e. escalation or de-escalation). Second, without specific events data, it is theoretically difficult to compare all campaigns as equal when we know that some are much more disruptive than others. However, there

are good reasons to analyze campaigns rather than events. First, events data are so difficult to gather—especially nonviolent events data—that making generalizations about nonviolent conflict is virtually impossible. By analyzing campaigns rather than individual events, we are able to make some general observations about campaigns that can be explored further through in-depth case studies. Moreover, resistance campaigns involve much more than just events; they involve planning, recruiting, training, intelligence, and other operations besides their most obvious disruptive activities. Using events as the main unit of analysis ignores these other operations, whereas analyzing campaigns allows us to consider the broader spectrum of activities as a whole.

Distinguishing Nonviolent and Violent Methods of Resistance

Some take issue with the practice of categorizing campaigns as either "violent" or "nonviolent." In many cases, both nonviolent and violent methods exist simultaneously within the same conflict, as with armed and unarmed factions among different Palestinian dissidents. Alternatively, campaigns often use both nonviolent and violent methods of resistance over the course of their existence, as with the ANC in South Africa. And occasionally, violent and nonviolent campaigns can exist in the same country at the same time when they have different goals (e.g. an anti-government campaign and a self-determination campaign). Characterizing a campaign as violent or nonviolent simplifies a very complex constellation of resistance methods.

However, applying binary "violent" and "nonviolent" categories should not be dismissed out of hand, particularly when one can reliably observe a preponderance of resistance methods employed. Standards of inclusion in each category are as follows.

Nonviolent resistance practices do not directly threaten or harm the physical well-being of the regime, its agents, or its citizens. Sharp (1973) has identified nearly 200 nonviolent resistance tactics, such as sit-ins, protests, boycotts, civil disobedience, and strikes, among many others; scholars have recognized many more since (correspondence with Stephen Zunes, August 28, 2009). When a campaign relies primarily on nonviolent methods such as these as opposed to violent or armed tactics, the campaign can be characterized as primarily nonviolent.

For the data covering 1900-2006, the nonviolent campaigns were initially gathered from an extensive review of the literature on nonviolent conflict and social movements. The primary sources were Karatnacky and Ackerman (2005), Carter, Clark, and Randle (2007), and Schock (2005). Then we corroborated these data with multiple sources, including encyclopedias, case studies, and sources from a comprehensive bibliography on nonviolent civil resistance by Carter, Clarke, and Randle (2007). Finally, the cases were circulated among approximately a dozen experts in nonviolent conflict. These experts were asked to assess whether the cases were appropriately characterized as major nonviolent conflicts, whether their outcomes had been appropriately characterized, and whether any notable conflicts had been omitted. Where the experts suggested additional cases, the same corroboration method was used.

We repeated this method for campaigns identified for NAVCO 1.2, which added numerous campaigns from the 1946-2013 period. These campaigns were identified through a detailed literature search, which included a more robust review of news articles and existing protest and contentious databases. A group of five experts then reviewed the list of candidate cases and marked them for inclusion or exclusion across the relevant

dimensions. Campaigns that were excluded typically fell short of the maximalist campaign inclusion criteria, and/or contentious events were not sufficiently coordinated to warrant inclusion in a campaign-level database.

We repeated this approach to identify candidates for NAVCO 1.3. We drew primarily on published databases, news articles, and corroboration with the ongoing Major Episodes of Contention data project (Chenoweth, Kang, and Moore 2020) to devise the candidate list. We then assessed their inclusion or exclusion from NAVCO as a team, again excluding several candidate cases because their claims did not rise to the level of maximalist claims.

Violent resistance, on the other hand, involves the use of force to physically harm or threaten to harm the opponent. Campaigns where a significant amount of violence occurred are characterized as primarily violent. Violent campaign data are primarily derived from the UCDP Armed Conflict Database, the Correlates of War database on intra-state wars (COW), Clodfelter's encyclopedia of armed conflict (2002), and Kalev Sepp's list of major counterinsurgency operations (2005) for information on conflicts after 2002. Our inclusion criteria require the campaigns to have maximalist objectives and at least 1,000 observed participants actively confronting the opponent during the course of the conflict.

For primarily nonviolent campaigns in which some degree of fringe violence occurred among the dissidents, we identify the presence of a violent flank. However, the preliminary list of data does not yet include completed coding of violent flanks.

In practice, differentiating violent and nonviolent methodologies entails careful consideration of campaign practices, the actors carrying out those practices, and the

actors targeted by those practices. Campaigns are primarily nonviolent when the vast majority of participants are unarmed, and when they use mostly nonviolent practices to confound, impede, and challenge the regime and its supporters. Campaigns are primarily violent when most participants use force, especially armed force, to target regimes and their supporters.

These behaviors derive from fundamentally different strategic logics. Violent campaigns rely on armed force to confront the regime and its security apparatus. Militarily defeating the security apparatus tends to become the key means of defeating the state. Activists are recruited to bear arms against the regime or support those who do. Nonviolent campaigns, on the other hand, recruit participants to join in nonviolent direct action, disobey official rules, undermine the legitimacy of the status quo, and evade violence from security forces.

Different contingents fighting for the same goal in the same place and time can use different methods. When this occurs, coders judge the relative prevalence of violent and nonviolent practices. For instance, a campaign that primarily resists a regime by occupying public spaces may rely on thousands of participants who peacefully stand their ground. A small minority of participants may engage in rock-throwing and fighting with police, but those violent efforts do not necessarily (or commonly) outweigh the efforts of participants who remain peaceful. Yet when such activities become routine in an otherwise nonviolent campaign, we code the campaign as primarily nonviolent with a violent flank (see coding notes on violent flanks below). Similarly, groups may form with the express purpose of using violence against the regime, sometimes with the (perhaps counter-productive) aim of protecting other participants who remain peaceful from state

violence. The armed contingents may conduct violent operations throughout the course of a campaign, but the campaign remains primarily nonviolent if the balance of its efforts are nonviolent.

In some cases, campaigns shift phases, such that the preponderance of their activities shifts from nonviolent to violent or vice versa. This happened with the Palestine Liberation Organization/First Intifada/Second Intifada; FREITILIN/the East Timorese Independence movement; and the Syrian Uprising/Syrian Civil War, to name a few). In such cases, we code separate campaigns—primarily nonviolent or violent—with each campaign ending in failure when the next one sets on.

The Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis is the campaign. In some cases, where campaigns entered into different phases (e.g. from nonviolent to violent or the reverse), they were split into two campaigns. The outcomes are categorized as "Success," "Limited," or "Failure," with the purpose of describing the number of successful campaigns of each type (violent or nonviolent), to test whether the rate of success varies on the purposes of the campaigns, support from third parties, and campaign participation, among other factors. When a campaign is ongoing, the campaign observation is noted for 2019 and the case is coded as "ongoing" in the outcome variable.

Underreporting Bias

Especially among the nonviolent campaigns, there is concern that the campaigns included are biased toward success, since it is the large, mature campaigns that are most

commonly reported. Other would-be nonviolent campaigns that are crushed in their infancy (and therefore fail) will not be included in this dataset. This is a major limitation in the NAVCO dataset, and it is difficult to avoid. However, we attempt to mitigate the effects of underreporting bias in several ways.

First, we only investigate the outcomes of *major* nonviolent and violent campaigns—those that are already "mature" in terms of objectives and membership. Practically, this means that we only include nonviolent and violent campaigns where we were certain that more than 1,000 people were actively participating in the struggle, based on various reports. For the nonviolent campaigns, we gleaned this information from the sources mentioned above. For NAVCO 1.2, we added numerous cases from the Uppsala Armed Conflict Database where it was clear that at least 1,000 people were waging armed hostilities against the opponent. Using this strict criterion and comparing major campaigns allows us to address questions of the relative effectiveness of resistance type among comparably developed mass movements. In NAVCO 1.3, we primarily relied on international news reporting to generate the new list of cases.

Second, we compare nonviolent campaigns with their comparable counterparts in violent campaigns rather than to view nonviolent campaigns in isolation. We did this because there are many "non-starters" among violent campaigns as well as nonviolent ones, and the same underreporting bias exists within the study of violent insurgencies as with nonviolent insurrections.

Third, we only included cases where the objective was maximalist (i.e. regime change, secession, or self-determination) as opposed to limited (i.e. greater civil liberties or economic rights).

Critics may still be skeptical of the case selection, especially in the case of nonviolent conflict. Most concerning is the potential omission of failed nonviolent campaigns, which may not be captured in the dataset due to extreme repression or poor news sources. To address this concern, we made certain that the dataset reflects a consensus sample, which was circulated among the world's leading authorities on nonviolent conflict to make sure we accounted for known failed campaigns. Unknown, failed, nonviolent campaigns are necessarily omitted from the dataset, just like unknown, failed, violent campaigns.

NAVCO 1.3 Variables and Descriptions

The table below identifies the variables in the dataset and their descriptions. Note that additional variables will be added to the dataset as they become available.

NAVCO 1.3 Variables

Variable Name	*Source*	*Variable Description*
NAVCO ID	Random numbers assigned.	Unique identifier.
CAMPAIGN	Various news articles; encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Name of campaign.
LOCATION	Various news articles; encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Geographic base of campaign (contemporary sovereign country name).
TARGET	Various new articles; encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Target of the campaign.
BYEAR	Various news articles; encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Year in which campaign begins.
EYEAR	Various news articles; encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Year at which the campaign reaches its peak; i.e. the most members or watershed events. If data is unavailable for membership or events, this peak is considered to be the year in which the campaign ended (i.e. if the regime changed in 2002, the peak is 2002).
NONVIOL	Various news articles; encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts; UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset; Gleditsch 2004; Lyall and Wilson 2009; Sepp 2005	Binary classification of whether campaign was primarily nonviolent. (1=yes; 0=no)
VIOL	Various news articles;	Binary classification of whether

	encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts; UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset; Gleditsch 2004; Lyall and Wilson 2009; Sepp 2005	campaign was primarily violent. (1=yes; 0=no)
SUCCESS	Various news articles; encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Outcome classification. 1=the campaign achieved 100% of its stated goals within a year of the peak of activities & the success was a direct result of campaign activities), 0=otherwise.
LIMITED	Various news articles; encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Outcome classification. 1=the campaign achieved some of its stated goals within a year of the peak of activities; the target makes concessions to the campaign or significant reforms short of complete campaign success), 0=otherwise.
FAILURE	Various news articles; encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Outcome classification. 1=the campaign achieved none of its stated goals and/or has been suppressed. 0=otherwise
ONGOING	Various news articles; encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Outcome classification. 1=campaign was ongoing as of 12/31/2019, 0=otherwise. Campaigns coded as ongoing are also coded as failures.
FSELFDET	Various news articles; encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Binary classification identifying purpose of campaign. 1=self-determination or independence from a foreign occupier or colonial power, 0=otherwise.
REGCHANGE	Various news articles; encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Binary classification identifying purpose of campaign. 1=removal of incumbent national leader, 0=otherwise.
SECESSION	Various news articles; encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Binary classification identifying purpose of campaign. 1=territorial secession/separatism from an existing state in a territory internationally recognized as part of the target state, 0=otherwise.

OTHER	Various news articles; encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Binary classification identifying purpose of campaign. 1=other system-changing domestic issues, e.g., anti-apartheid short of the removal of the incumbent national leader.

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