Supplementary Appendix

Information and Energy Policy Preferences: A Survey Experiment on Public Opinion about Electricity Pricing Reform in Rural India

Michaël Aklin — NYU

Patrick Bayer — Washington University

S.P. Harish — NYU

Johannes Urpelainen — Columbia University

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1 Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix

We complement the summary statistics and correlation matrix from the main text with summary statistics (Table 1) and a correlation matrix (Table 2) for the regression models with controls, which we present below. It is important to note that all covariates were collected during a household survey approximately one week *before* the treatment was administered.

Summary statistics

	count	mean	sd	min	max
Outcome 1 (no free provision)	593	3.31	1.21	0.00	4.00
Outcome 2 (higher prices)	593	2.62	1.36	0.00	4.00
Outcome 3 (privatization)	593	0.82	1.33	0.00	4.00
Outcome 4 (state responsibility)	593	3.93	0.40	0.00	4.00
Control group	593	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
Treatment 1 (pricing reform)	593	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
Treatment 2 (fundamental rights)	593	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
Electrification dummy	401	0.70	0.46	0.00	1.00
Preference for free markets	401	0.65	0.48	0.00	1.00
Education (school years)	401	4.61	4.57	0.00	22.00
Monthly income (household)	401	3.42	1.74	1.00	11.00

Table 1: Summary statistics.

Correlation matrix

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
(1) Outcome 1 (no free provision)	1.000										
(2) Outcome 2 (higher prices)	0.258***	1.000									
(3) Outcome 3 (privatization)	-0.027	-0.027	1.000								
(4) Outcome 4 (state responsibility)	0.076	0.019	-0.078	1.000							
(5) Control group	-0.025	-0.130**	-0.071	-0.053	1.000						
(6) Treatment 1 (pricing reform)	0.043	0.105*	0.064	0.027	-0.501***	1.000					
(7) Treatment 2 (fundamental rights)	-0.018	0.025	0.007	0.026	-0.499***	-0.499***	1.000				
(8) Electrification dummy	0.054	0.015	-0.041	0.022	-0.015	-0.012	0.028	1.000			
(9) Preference for free markets	0.061	-0.001	0.109*	0.070	-0.049	0.053	-0.004	0.010	1.000		
(10) Education (school years)	-0.023	-0.013	-0.002	0.063	-0.106*	0.029	0.078	0.158**	0.088	1.000	
(11) Monthly income (household)	-0.039	0.010	0.003	-0.036	0.042	-0.059	0.017	0.146**	-0.057	0.042	1.000

Table 2: Correlation matrix.

2 Regression Models for Subsample with Pre-Treatment Controls

The main text only presents the most parsimonious model specifications without control variables. Methodologically, this is consistent with the idea of a strictly experimental design. As we collected other covariates from a household survey as well, we present regression results with additional control variables as well. We do so to increase the power of our analysis and include the following variables in particular.

First, we include two dummy variables, one on whether the interviewed household is electrified and another one on whether the household member holds a generic preference in favor of free market solutions as opposed to governmental intervention. Controlling for these two factors is important as our outcome measures do directly ask about electricity provision and privatization. Clearly, a household's access to electricity and general attitude towards markets and privatization may bias our results.

To also account for socio-economic differences across households, we add controls for education and income levels, measured as the number of school years and monthly household income. Again, more educated households may be more susceptible to informational treatments *per se* as the information may not be new to them. In a similar vein, since richer households are likely to face less binding budget constraints, they may be less opposed to increase electricity tariffs. To improve our estimation, we include these additional control variables.

Importantly, we want to emphasize that all household controls were gathered as part of a survey one week *prior* to administering the treatment, so that all our control variables are strictly pre-treatment controls. Estimation results are shown in Tables 3 to 6 for a sample size of 401 households which were interviewed.

Outcome 1: UP Government should not provide electricity for free

	OLS models				Ordered probit models			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment 1 (pricing reform)	0.16	0.15	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.13
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Treatment 2 (fundamental rights)	-0.03	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04	-0.07	-0.08	-0.07
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Electrification dummy			0.14	0.17			0.08	0.08
			(0.14)	(0.15)			(0.14)	(0.14)
Preference for free markets			0.15	0.15			0.06	0.07
			(0.13)	(0.13)			(0.13)	(0.13)
Education (school years)				-0.01				-0.00
				(0.01)				(0.01)
Monthly income (household)				-0.02				-0.00
				(0.04)				(0.04)
Interviewer fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Village fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	401	401	401	401	401	401	401	401
R^2	0.005	0.010	0.016	0.019				
Pseudo R^2					0.002	0.010	0.011	0.011

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: Outcome 1.
Robust standard errors.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Estimation results for OLS and ordered probit regressions for outcome measure 1.

Outcome 2: UP Government should invest in electricity generation despite price increases

	OLS models				Ordered probit models			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment 1 (pricing reform)	0.39**	0.39**	0.39**	0.39**	0.27**	0.28**	0.28**	0.28**
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Treatment 2 (fundamental rights)	0.34*	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28**	0.25*	0.25*	0.25*
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Electrification dummy			0.02	0.03			0.02	0.02
			(0.15)	(0.15)			(0.12)	(0.12)
Preference for free markets			-0.01	-0.01			0.02	0.02
			(0.14)	(0.14)			(0.11)	(0.11)
Education (school years)				-0.00				0.00
				(0.01)				(0.01)
Monthly income (household)				-0.00				0.01
				(0.04)				(0.03)
Interviewer fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Village fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	401	401	401	401	401	401	401	401
R^2	0.017	0.065	0.065	0.065				
Pseudo R^2					0.005	0.025	0.025	0.025

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: Outcome 2.
Robust standard errors.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Estimation results for OLS and ordered probit regressions for outcome measure 2.

Outcome 3: Electricity markets should be privatized

	OLS models				Ordered probit models			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment 1 (pricing reform)	0.13	0.13	0.11	0.11	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Treatment 2 (fundamental rights)	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.20	0.20
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Electrification dummy			-0.15	-0.15			-0.15	-0.16
			(0.14)	(0.13)			(0.14)	(0.14)
Preference for free markets			0.28**	0.28**			0.30**	0.31**
			(0.12)	(0.12)			(0.14)	(0.14)
Education (school years)				0.00				-0.00
				(0.01)				(0.02)
Monthly income (household)				0.00				0.02
				(0.03)				(0.03)
Interviewer fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Village fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	401	401	401	401	401	401	401	401
R^2	0.004	0.090	0.103	0.104				
Pseudo R^2					0.002	0.059	0.067	0.067

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: Outcome 3.
Robust standard errors.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Estimation results for OLS and ordered probit regressions for outcome measure 3.

Outcome 4: Electricity is a commodity that should be provided by the state

	OLS models				Ordered probit models			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment 1 (pricing reform)	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.23	0.17	0.18	0.15
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.29)
Treatment 2 (fundamental rights)	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.25	0.24	0.29	0.27
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Electrification dummy			0.01	0.01			0.33	0.33
			(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.24)	(0.24)
Preference for free markets			0.05	0.04			0.42*	0.39
			(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.25)	(0.25)
Education (school years)				0.00				0.03
				(0.00)				(0.02)
Monthly income (household)				-0.01				-0.04
				(0.01)				(0.06)
Interviewer fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Village fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	401	401	401	401	401	401	401	401
R^2	0.003	0.036	0.040	0.041				
Pseudo R^2					0.007	0.111	0.139	0.145

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: Outcome 4.
Robust standard errors.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: Estimation results for OLS and ordered probit regressions for outcome measure 4.