Revolutionary Autocracies, 1900-2015

Codebook

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1 Case Universe: Authoritarian Regimes, 1900-2015

Our case universe is comprised of authoritarian regimes, 1900-2015. Our list of authoritarian regimes is compiled by using data from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014; 2018). Their data set identifies all authoritarian regimes, 1946-2010. We used their `coding criteria` to extend the data set back to include all regimes created on or after January 1, 1900. For the period 2011-15, we use the expanded GWF data found in Derpanopoulos et al. 2016. As our regime data set is based on the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz data set, please also cite their data set when using this regime-spell data.

1.1 Authoritarian Regimes, 1900-45

Using the `coding criteria` outlined in Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we identified all authoritarian regimes in independent states that were formed *after* 1900. We limit our sample to regimes established after 1900 because universal suffrage — a central feature of democracy — did not become widespread until the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Prior to the era of mass politics, both the nature of political regimes and the sources of regime stability and breakdown were very different, which renders comparisons to modern regimes problematic.

The following section provides the coding decisions for those case formed after 1900 that do not survive after January 1, 1946, and thus are not included in Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014).

Afghanistan 1919-1929

Start: 08/08/1919. Afghanistan became independent in August 1919 under the incumbent monarchy from the period of indirect rule. This monarchy was founded by Abdur Rahman who accepted British tutelage after defeating domestic rivals. Power was passed to his son Habibullah Khan, who was assassinated in February 1919. His son, Amanullah, took over and ruled at the time of independence (Barfield 2010, 142-43, 165-66, 174-75, 179-81).

End: 01/14/1929. The dynasty was overthrown by a rebellion led by Habibollah Ghazi that was joined by members of the Afghan armed forces (Lentz 1999, 11; Rubin 2002, 20; Barfield 2010, 169, 191).

Albania 1924-1939

Start: 12/24/1924. Ahmet Zog seized power after an armed rebellion backed by Yugoslavia in December 1924. Ahmet Zog had been the commander-in-chief of the armed forces until December 1921 and was subsequently made minister of the interior and prime minister the following year. He overthrew the government of Fan Noli on December 24, 1924 and was proclaimed president on January 31, 1925. On September 1, 1928, he was declared King

(Swire 1937, 92, 94-95; Lentz 1999, 13; Austin 2012, 146-47; Mehilli 2017, 17).

End: 04/08/1939. Albania was invaded and occupied by Italy beginning on April 8, 1939 and Zog fled to Greece (Mehilli 2017, 17).

Argentina 1930-1943

Start: 09/06/1930. Gen. Jose Felix Uriburu seized power in a coup on September 6, 1930. In November 1931, Gen. Agustin P. Justo created a new conservative party, the 'Concordancia' and succeeded Uriburu as head of the regime by the end of 1931. The regime utilized both direct and indirect military rule and fraudulent elections that barred many opposition candidates ensured regime candidates won each election (Rock 1993, 173-74, 177-81, 208; Lentz 1999, 21; Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013, 131; Finchelstein 2014, 26).

End: 06/04/1943. The 'conservative' regime was overthrown by ultra-nationalist officers in June 1943 (Rock 1993, 174-75, 221; Levitsky 2003, 38; Finchelstein 2014, 30).

Austria 1933-1938

Start: 05/27/1933. Engelberg Dollfuss, a cabinet minister, became prime minister through normal channels on May 20, 1932. In October, his government began to rule by emergency provisions and forced judges to resign. This purging of judges was completed by May 27, 1933. After Dollfuss was assassinated in 1934, his successor Kurt Shuschnigg continued the regime and maintained the rule of the Dollfuss-created Fatherland Front (Kitchen 1980, 5, 41, 110; Lentz 1999, 40-42).

End: 03/12/1938. On March 12, 1938, the German army entered and subsequently occupied Austria in cooperation with local fascists (Hochman 2016, 237).

Bolivia 1930-1931

Start: 05/28/1930. A military coup overthrew President Siles in May 1930 and placed Gen. Carlos Blanco Galindo in power (Whitehead 1991, 513; Lentz 1999, 52-53).

End: 03/05/1931. Blanco Galindo's regime ended in 1931 after an election resulted in Daniel Salamanca's victory (Lentz 1999, 53).

Bolivia 1931-1936

Start: 03/05/1931. Daniel Salamanca was elected and took office in March 1931. Despite his earlier championing of clean elections, Salamanca engaged in similar electoral fraud and manipulation as his predecessors. During the disastrous Chaco War (July 1932 - June 1935) the Bolivian army deposed Salamanca and handed power in November 1934 to Vice President Tejada Sorzano (Centeno 2002, 58; Klein 2011, 169, 171, 178-79, 181-82).

End: 05/17/1936. Tejada was himself ousted by Col. David Toro and Col. German Busch in May 1936 (Klein 2011, 181, 187).

Bolivia 1936-1940

Start: 05/20/1936. Mid-level officers seized power in a coup and shifted power to younger officers who were veterans of the Chaco War. The junta was initially led by Toro, until he was replaced in 1937 by Busch, who committed suicide in August 1939 (Klein 2011, 187-88, 194).

End: 04/15/1940. After Busch's suicide, the top brass of the Army led by Gen. Carlos Quintanilla, which had slowly removed the 'radical' officers, organized a return to civilian government (Klein 2011, 194-95).

Bolivia 1940-1943

Start: 04/15/1940. Supported by traditional parties (a Liberal-Republican alliance against the left), Gen. Enrique Penaranda won the 1940 elections. During his tenure, the government closed left-wing publications and repressed labor organizing (Klein 2011, 196, 199-200).

End: 12/20/1943. Penaranda was ousted in a coup by junior officers (Whitehead 1991, 526; Klein 2011, 201).

Brazil 1930-1945

Start: 11/3/1930. Getuilio Dornelles Vargas took power after a military coup led by senior officers deposed President Washington Luis and ended the First Brazilian Republic on October 24, 1930. Vargas took over as a provisional president on November 3 and ruled thereafter. Vargas quickly dissolved the legislature and abrogated the 1891 constitution (Fausto 1986, 811, 827-28; Bethell 2008, 3, 17-18).

End: 10/29/1945. Under pressure from the military, Vargas stepped down in October and elections were held which ushered in democratization (Bethell 2008, 71-72, 83-84

Chile 1927-1931

Start: 07/21/1927. Capt. Carlos Ibanez del Campo seized power in a coup in July 1927. (Drake 1991; Lentz 1999, 75).

End: 07/26/1931. The junta handed power to a civilian government after competitive elections in 1931 (Drake 1991, 269, 276; Lentz 1999, 76)

China 1912-1916

Start: 02/12/1912. In February 1912 the Qing dynasty was overthrown and power was

handed to Yuan Shih-kai, the president of the council of ministers and an imperial-era official. The new regime gave Yuan Shih-kai considerable powers as president. While the subnational elections in 1912 were reasonably competitive, suffrage was limited and vote buying was common. The regime also engaged in repression of political opposition. Political competition was even more severely restricted after a failed revolt in 1913 (Young 1983, 208-13, 222-24, 226, 231, 237-38; Sheridan 1983).

End: 06/06/1916. As opposition to Yuan's rule mounted from key military forces, Yuan announced reforms on March 22 and died in early June. After Yuan's fall from power and death, the central government quickly lost control over the provinces and there was no effective central government (Young 1983, 253-54; Sheridan 1983, 284, 287-91, 296-303, 307-9; Nathan 1983, 256, 266).

Costa Rica 1917-1919

Start: 01/27/1917. Minister of War Federico Tinoco Granados seized power in a coup (Lentz 1999, 108; Lehoucq and Molina 2002, 89).

End: 08/12/1919. After the assassination of his brother, Tinoco fled to exile and an interim government held elections which ushered in a return to democracy (Lentz 1999, 108; Lehoucq and Molina 2002, 89-90).

Cuba 1902-1906

Start: 05/20/1902. After the end of the U.S. military occupation of Cuba (1899-1902), Tomas Estrada Palma was elected without opposition in 1902 after the electoral commission was stacked with his supporters and his main opponent withdrew his candidacy (Aguilar 1993, 36, 39-40; Lentz 1999, 112; see also Suchlicki 2002, 33).

End: 09/28/1906. After Estrada Palma called on the U.S. to intervene against a Liberal Party-led revolt and Washington demurred, he resigned (though the U.S. did ultimately intervene and remained until 1909) (Aguilar 1993, 41; Lentz 1999, 112; Suchlicki 2002, 36; Maurer 2013, 64).

Cuba 1909-1933

Start: 01/28/1909. Liberal Party candidate Jose Miguel Gomez was elected as the U.S. began preparing to extricate itself from its second occupation of Cuba, and took office on January 28, 1909. The Miguel Gomez administration violated democratic institutions and engaged in repression. Conservative Party politicians continued to rule after Gomez stepped down in 1913. The 1916 election was marred by fraud. In 1924, incumbment president Zayas backed Gen. Gerardo Machado who won the election. In 1927, Machado pushed through the Constitutional Assembly the extension of presidential terms to six years and an invitation to accept a new term in power. In 1928, Congress passed an Emergency Law prohibiting opposition nominations of presidential candidates. Machado was reelected on November 1,

1928 unopposed (Aguilar 1993, 42-46, 50-51; Perez 1993, 60).

End: 08/12/1933. Machado was overthrown in a coup led by senior officers in August 1933 (Aguilar 1993, 53; Perez 1993, 66-67; Lentz 1999, 114).

Cuba 1933-1944

Start: 09/04/1933; While the first leader of the post-Machado government was Carlos M. Cespedes, on September 4, 1933, a second coup led by Fulgencio Batistia and sergeants in the army forced his resignation and appointed Ramon Grau San Martin as the formal head of government. From mid-September 1933 until 1940, Batista and his fellow officers did not rule directly and instead appointed and removed several formal heads of government. In 1940, Batista stood directly for election as president and won in competitive elections (Aguilar 1993, 54-55; Perez 1993, 66-77).

End: 10/10/1944. Elections were held again in 1944 and were won by (now) opposition candidate Grau San Martin (Perez 1993, 79; Dominguez 1998, 115)

Dominican Republic 1924-1930

Start: 07/24/1924. As the U.S. prepared to end its military occupation of the Dominican Republic, elections were held in July 1924 and Horacio Vasquez won the presidency. When in office, Vasquez pushed through changes which made it more difficult for opposition to mobilize and modified the constitution four times, extending his term in office (Hartlyn 1998, 90-91).

End: 02/23/1930. Vasquez was ousted in a military coup led by Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina (Pons 1990, 509; Hartlyn 1998, 85).

Ecuador 1906-1911

Start: 01/16/1906. Eloy Alfaro seized power in a coup (Stornaiolo 1999, 179-84).

End: 08/12/1911. After Alfaro refused to hand power to his successor, an armed revolt broke out and Alfaro was ousted (Stornaiolo 1999, 179-84).

Ecuador 1925-1931

Start: 07/09/1925. In July 1925, junior officers seized power in a coup. In 1926, the junta handed formal power to Dr. Isidro Ayora (Deas 1986, 663-68; Mora 1991, 690).

End: 10/15/1931. After Ayora handed power to Col. Luis Larrea Alba in August 1931, Larrea Alba himself was forced to resign and was replaced by Dr. Alfredo Baquerizo Moreno who called for general elections (Mora 1991, 693-94).

Ecuador 1934-1935

Start: 09/01/1934. After a period of considerable political instability[1] Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra won uncompetitive elections in December 1933 and took over as president in September 1934 (Mora 1991, 694).

End: 08/21/1935. Velasco was overthrown in a military coup in August 1935 (Mora 1991, 695).

Ecuador 1936-1937

Start: 09/26/1936. After the coup which ousted Velasco, Antonio Pons was named interim president. After he handed power back to the armed forces rather than hold elections, the junta named Federico Paez dictator who engaged in widespread repression (Mora 1991, 695-96).

End: 10/23/1937. Paez was overthrown in October in a military coup led by Gen. Alberto Enrqiuez Gallo (Mora 1991, 696).

Ecuador 1937-1938

Start: 10/23/1937. After overthrowing Paez in a coup, Gen. Alberto Enriquez Gallo took power (Mora 1991, 696).

End: 08/10/1938. In August 1938, Enriquez handed power to a Constituent Assembly he had created (Mora 1991, 696).

Ecuador 1938-1944

Start: 12/2/1938. The Constituent Assembly created by Enriquez selected Dr. Aurelio Mosquera Narvaez as president, who subsequently dissolved the Assembly and declared himself dictator and engaged in a campaign of repression. Mosquera suddenly died in November 1939, and power was handed to Carlos Arroyo del Rio, president of the Senate. Arroyo then used widespread fraud to win an election to the presidency in 1940 (Mora 1991, 696-97).

End: 05/28/1944. Junior officers removed the regime in a coup that coincided with mass protests (Mora 1991, 699; Geddes et al. 2014).

[1] After the resignation of Larrea Alba, the interim government of Dr. Alfredo Baquerizo Moreno held general elections which resulted in the victory of Conservative candidate Neftali Bonifaz. Yet in August the Congress disqualified Bonifaz which led the army to defend Bonifaz and Baquerizo to relinquish power. This crisis led to the Four Days' War (August 28-31, 1932) which resulted in Senate president Alberto Guerrero Martinez taking power and promising new elections. With fraud, the Liberals were able to get Juan de Dios Martinez Mera elected, but after clashes with Congress Martinez Mera handed power to his minister of the interior, Abelardo Montalvo. Elections took place in December 1933, and Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra won after the Liberal Party did not field a candidate (Mora 1991, 694).

Estonia 1934-1940

Start: 01/24/1934. Independent Estonia was initially governed democratically with full suffrage. After an October 1933 constitutional referendum, Konstantin Pats took over as acting president in January 1934, and with the help of Gen. Lohan Laidoner, Pats declared a state of emergency to prevent opposition candidate Gen. Andres Larka from winning the upcoming election and initiated a wave of repression against opposition figures (Taylor 2018, 38-39, 44, 48, 63-64).

End: 06/16/1940. Under threat of Soviet invasion, Estonia capitulated to Soviet demands and the Red Army soon occupied Estonia (Taylor 2018, 60, 88-89).

Germany 1933-1945

Start: 01/30/1933. In 1932 the Nazi Party (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*, NSDAP) led by Adolf Hitler won a plurality in competitive elections and Hitler was appointed chancellor on January 30, 1933 by President Hindenburg. After a fire burned the Reichstag, the new regime quickly pushed through enabling laws which dismantled civil liberties, declared a "permanent" state of emergency, and soon thereafter banned opposition. The new regime quickly set about creating and expanding large paramilitary organizations like the SA (*Sturmabteilung*) and the SS (*Shutzstaffel*) which launched a widespread campaign of political repression (Shirer 1960, 267-72; Benz 2006, 16, 20-22, 26, 50-58; Berman 2019, 250).

End: 05/08/1945. Nazi Germany was defeated by Allied forces and unconditionally surrendered on May 8, 1945 (Shirer 1960).

Greece 1936-1941

Start: 08/04/1936. Aside from a brief military regime (April 16-August 22, 1926), the period after the formation of the Greek Republic in 1924 was democratic. In April 1936, Gen. Ioannis Metaxas was appointed prime minister and on August 4 suspended the constitution and repressed opposition (Clogg 2013, 106-7, 115, 117-18).

End: 01/29/1941. Metaxas died in January 1941 shortly into the Greek participation in WWII. Greece was attacked by fascist Italy in the fall of 1940, and occupied by Axis powers in June 1941 (Clogg 2013, 118-21)

Guatemala 1921-1930

Start: 12/10/1921. Dictator Manuel Estrada Cabrera (1898-1920) was overthrown in a coup in 1920. Initially, Carlos Herrera y Luna was chosen to take over as interim president, but soon Gen. Jose Maria Orellana took over and ruled until 1926. He was succeeded by Gen. Lazaro Chacon in 1926 (Cardoso 1986, 220-21; Dunkerley 1990, 212;).

End: 12/17/1930. Lazaro Chacon suffered a stroke in 1930 and was succeed by cabinet member Baudilio Palma who was in turn ousted in a coup in December led by Gen. Manuel Maria Orellana Contreras (Dunkerley 1990, 213).

Guatemala 1931-44

Start: 02/14/1931. Under pressure from the U.S., coup leader Orellana was forced to step down and Gen. Jorge Ubico Castaneda was able to successfully force opposition candidates to refrain from running in February 1931 elections which he won unopposed. While in office Ubico continued to prevent opposition from running, rarely convened his cabinet meetings, rendered Congress a rubber stamp, and operated a large secret police force aimed at repressing opposition (Dunkerley 1990, 213-15; Yashar 1997, 42-49; Streeter 2000, 10-12).

End: 07/01/1944. In June 1944, student protests began, and ultimately led to Ubico's departure when it was clear junior officers and the middle classes supported the protestors (Dunkerley 1990, 218; Streeter 2000, 12).

Haiti 1902-1911

Start: 05/12/1902. Minister of War Gen. Pierre Nord Alexis ousted T. A. Simon Sam in a coup. Pierre Nord Alexis died in December 1908 and was succeeded by Gen. F. Antoine Simon (Nicholls 1986, 312).

End: 08/3/1911. Gen. F. Antoine Simon was ousted in a military coup (Lentz 1999, 218).

Haiti 1911-1914

Start: 08/15/1911. Michel Cinciannatus Leconte led the coup against Antoine Simon and took power (Lentz 1999, 218).

End: 10/29/1914. This junta was ousted by another group of officers on October 29, 1914 (Lentz 1999, 218).

Haiti 1914-1915

Start: 11/07/1914. Joseph Davilmar Theodore seized power in a coup (Lentz 1999, 219).

End: 07/28/1915. The U.S. invaded Haiti in July 1915 (Nicholls 1986, 311, 317; Nicholls 1998, 157).

Haiti 1934-1941

Start: 08/15/1934. Stenio Joseph Vincent, mayor of Port-au-Prince, was elected president in 1930 during the U.S. occupation. U.S. troops departed August 15, 1934. His administra-

tion engaged in repression of opposition and he introduced a new constitution which gave sweeping powers to the president. (Lentz 1999, 219-20; Nicholls 1990, 550).

End: 05/15/1941. Vincent stepped down after elections in May 1941 (Nicholls 1990, 550; Geddes et al. 2014).

Honduras 1903-1907

Start: 04/13/1903. Gen. Manuel Bonilla seized power in a coup and repressed political opposition (Stokes 1950, 47; Haggerty and Millet 1995, 19; Euraque 1996, chap. 3; Lentz 1999, 220-21).

End: 02/01/1907. Bonilla was ousted by a rebellion supported by Nicaragua and led by Gen. Davila in 1907 (Stokes 1950, 47-48; Haggerty and Millet 1995, 20; Lentz 1999, 221).

Honduras 1907-1911

Start: 04/18/1907. Gen. Miguel R. Davila seized power in a coup in 1907 (Stokes 1950, 48; Haggerty and Millet 1995, 20; Lentz 1999, 221).

End: 03/28/1911. A rebellion led by Gen. Manuel Bonilla lead the U.S. to push Davila to step down (Stokes 1950, 48-49; Haggerty and Millet 1995, 22; Euraque 1996, chap. 1).

Honduras 1912-1919

Start: 02/01/1912. With U.S mediation, Bonilla won uncompetitive 1912 elections and died just after a year in office. After his death, vice president Francisco Bertrand became president, and won 1916 elections (Stokes 1950, 49-50; Haggerty and Millet 1995, 22; Euraque 1996, chap. 1).

End: 09/09/1919. After Bertrand began preparing to manipulate the upcoming elections, Gen. Rafael Lopez Gutierrez began to organize his removal and under U.S. pressure Bertrand fled into exile (Stokes 1950, 50-51; Haggerty and Millet 1995, 24; Euraque 1996, chap. 3).

Honduras 1920-1924

Start: 02/01/1920. After Bertrand's ouster, Gen. Rafael Lopez Gutierrez manipulated the subsequent elections and took office in October 1920 (Stokes 1950, 51; Haggerty and Millet 1995, 24; Euraque 1996, chap. 3).

End: 03/10/1924. Under U.S. pressure, the regime held reasonably competitive elections in October 1923. With inconclusive results, and the legislature unable to obtain a quorum and declare a winner, Lopez Gutierrez announced in January 1924 he would remain in office. This led failed candidate Gen. Tiburcio Carias Andino to launch an armed rebellion and the U.S. to intervene. During the conflict Lopez Gutierrez died. A U.S.-brokered cease fire

put Gen. Vicente Tosta in office as interim president (Stokes 1950, 53; Haggerty and Millet 1995, 25-26; Morris 2018, 8).

Honduras 1924-1929

Start: 12/28/1924. Under U.S. pressure, interim president Tosta abided by the provision to not run for president, and after opposition dropped out of the race, Miguel Paz Barahona won the presidency on December 28, 1924 (Stokes 1950, 53-54; Haggerty and Millet 1995, 25-26; Morris 2018, 8).

End: 02/01/1929. In a surprise result, opposition candidate Vicente Mejia Colindres won 1928 elections and Paz Barahona agreed to leave office (Stokes 1950, 54-55; Haggerty and Millet 1995, 27-28).

Hungary 1918-1919

Start: 10/30/1918. Count Mihaly Karolyi and his Independence Party, along with the Radical Party and Social Democrats established a National Council which took power on October 30. After the abdication of King Karl on November 16, Hungary was declared a republic (Molnar 2001, 250-51).

End: 03/21/1919. After public outrage of Karolyi's granting significant territory to the Entente powers, Karolyi resigned and handed power to the Social Democrats who had formed a secret alliance with the Communist Party and declared a Soviet Republic on March 21 (Molnar 2001, 252-53).

Hungary 1919-1944

Start: 11/16/1919. A Romanian intervention ousted the Hungarian Soviet Republic in August 1919 and departed in November. After the Romanian departure, Admiral Miklos Horthy and his army entered Budapest on November 16. Horthy was crowned regent on March 1, 1920. The regime quickly set about a massive campaign of political repression (the "white terror") which executed thousands of suspected leftists as well as other political opposition and Jews (Molnar 2001, 261, 264-68; Berman 2019, 310-311).

End: 10/15/1944. An ally of Nazi Germany and a participant in the war against the Soviet Union on the eastern front, Hungary asked Moscow for an armistice after Soviet troops entered Hungary on October 15, 1944. This led German forces occupying Hungary to depose Horthy. Hungarian and German forces were ultimately defeated by the Soviet Red Army by April 4, 1945 (Molnar 2001, 281, 290-91, 294).

Italy 1922-1943

Start: 10/31/1922. Benito Mussolini, head of the Italian fascist movement, was appointed prime minster by King Victor Emmanuel III in 1922. Soon after taking office, Mussolini

pushed through an electoral law which made it nearly impossible for non-fascists to be elected, purged non-fascist ministers, and engaged in widespread electoral fraud and violence (Bosworth 2002, 145-70; Berman 2019, 220-37).

End: 07/25/1943. Under Allied invasion, Mussolini's regime fell and he fled Italy in July 1943. German troops fought on in Italy until their defeat and unconditional surrender in May 1945 (Collier 2003, 58).

Japan 1932-1945

Start: 05/15/1932. After Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi attempted to reign in the military for its unauthorized Manchurian campaign, he was assassinated by naval officers on May 15 1932. After this, the military role in the government grew and eventually displaced civilians. After a failed February 1936 coup, the military faction led by Tojo Hideki increased its power. The regime operated a large security apparatus to target political opposition (Shillony 1981, 1; Worden 1992, 44-45, 56, 58; Tipton 2002, 116; Cullen 2003, 254, 261-69; Goto-Jones 2009, 77-80; James 2011, 169; Hofmann 2015, 63, 69-70; Ward 2019).

End: 08/15/1945. Japan was defeated by the United States and surrendered unconditionally in August 1945 and was subsequently occupied by U.S. forces (Walker 2015, 259, 262-63).

Latvia 1934-1940

Start: 03/17/1934. From independence (*de jure* November 18, 1918, *de facto* August 11, 1920) Latvia was a democracy. In May 1934, after the threat of a right-wing coup emerged, centrist Karlis Ulmanis seized power with the cooperation of Gen. Janis Balodis. Ulmanis banned all parties, shuttered most of the press, and arrested political opposition figures (Dreifelds 1996, 96-97).

End: 06/17/1940. Following the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in August 1939, Latvia was occupied by the Soviet Union after it was coerced into signing a treaty. In June 1940 the Soviets forced the government to step down (Dreifelds 1996, 97-98).

Lithuania 1926-1940

Start: 12/19/1926. A military coup placed Antanas Smetona in office and he subsequently banned political parties and censored the press (Vardys and Slaven 1996, 180).

End: 06/15/1940. Following the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in August 1939, Lithuania was occupied by the Soviet Union after it was coerced into signing a treaty in October. On June 15, 1940, the Soviet Red Army ousted the Smetona government and established a client regime (Vardys and Slaven 1996, 180-81).

Mexico 1913-1914

Start: 02/18/1913. Brig. Gen. Victoriano Huerta took power in a coup (Womack 1986, 93; Knight 2013, 122).

End: 07/15/1914. After a series of military defeats against Constitutionalist forces in the civil war, Huerta resigned and fled into exile (Womack 1986, 93, 105).

Nicaragua 1933-1936

Start: 01/02/1933. Under U.S. supervision, elections were held in November 1932 which resulted in the victory of Liberal Party candidate Juan Bautista Sacasa, a participant in the 1926 coup prior to the second U.S. intervention. U.S. military forces completely withdrew from Nicaragua on January 2, 1933, one day after Sacasa took office (Bulmer-Thomas 1990, 320-23, 329; Gobat 2005, 205; Puig 2013, 152-53).

End: 06/09/1936. Sacasa was ousted in a coup led by Anastasio Somoza Garcia (Booth 1998, 132).

Panama 1936-1941

Start: 03/02/1936. We exclude regimes in Panama 1904-36 as they were not sovereign. In this period, the United States effectively maintained a veto over the selection of presidents. On March 2, 1936 (ratified by the U.S. in July 1939), Panama signed a new treaty with the United States which ended the right of the U.S. to intervene in Panamanian politics and thus ended its status as a protectorate. The regime that ruled at this point was led by Harmodio Arias Madrid (1932-36). Harmodio had been declared a provisional president following a 1931 coup, but was replaced with Ricardo Alfaro until his return to the presidency following elections in 1932. In 1935, Harmodio attempted to amend the constitution to allow reelection, but this effort failed. Instead, Harmodio groomed a successor, his foreign minister Juan Demostenes Arosemena under the new *Partido National Revolucionario* (PNR). The election was marred by extensive fraud and violence. In July 1940, Harmodio's brother (and 1931 coup leader) Arnulfo Arias won fraudulent and violent elections. In January 1941, Arnulfo pushed through constitutional changes which extended his term and reduced the power of the legislature, curtailed suffrage for non-whites, and shuttered newspapers (Conniff 1990, 617, 619-22.

End: 10/09/1941. In October, Justice Minister Ricardo Adolfo de La Guardia launched a coup and overthrew Arnulfo (Conniff 1990, 623).

Panama 1941-1945

Start: 10/09/1941. Ricardo Adolfo de La Guardia took power after deposing Arnulfo Arias in a coup (Conniff 1990, 623).

End: 06/15/1945. In June 1945, de La Guardia agreed to led the Constituent Assembly appoint a replacement (Conniff 1990, 624).

Paraguay 1902-1904

Start: 01/09/1902. In January 1902, a coup led by Col. Juan Antonio Ezcurra overthrew President Emilio Aceval, returning Gen. Caballero and his allies to power (Lewis 1986, 484).

End: 12/19/1904. After a brief civil war (September-December 1904), Ezcurra signed a peace treaty and handed power to the combined Civic and Radical Liberal rebels led by Gen. Ferreira (Lewis 1986, 484).

Paraguay 1904-1908

Start: 12/19/1904. Civic Liberal forces led by Gen. Benigno Ferreira entered Asuncion in December. Cecilio Baez was made formal head of the new regime, but the real power rested with Ferreira. In 1906, Ferreira forced his own nomination for president and was elected unopposed. (Lewis 1986, 484-85).

End: 07/04/1908. In July 1908, Army commander-in-chief Col. Albino Jara ousted Ferreira in a coup (Lewis 1986, 485).

Paraguay 1908-1911

Start: 07/05/1908. After Col. Jara's coup ousted Ferreira, he placed civilian leader and Radical Liberal Emiliano Gonzalez Navarro in office as provisional president. In 1910, elections uncontested by both major opposition parties were held which gave power to Radical Liberal candidate Manuel Gondra (Lewis 1986, 584).

End: 01/11/1911. In January 1911, two months into the Gondra administration, Col. Jara led a coup which overthrew the Radical Liberal regime (Lewis 1986, 486).

Paraguay 1912-1936

Start: 02/28/1912. This regime was formed after a military rebellion. After a period of considerable instability[2], Radical Liberal forces led by Eduardo Schaerer invaded Paraguay from Argentina in November 1911 and captured Ascuncion after incumbent Liberato M. Rojas fled in February 1912. In elections uncontested by either the Civic Liberals or the Colorados, power was transferred to Radical Liberal candidate Manuel Franco. Franco died in 1919, and power was transferred to his Vice President Jose P. Montero. In 1920, Gondra was elected president in uncompetitive elections. After brief factional fighting between Gondra and Schaerer in October 1921, Gondra resigned but Schaerer abstained from seizing power and instead the two factions agreed on Eusebio Ayala as provisional president. After Schaerer and opposition Colorado Party members attempted to foment a coup, Ayala announced the

[2]From January-July 1911 Col. Jara ruled and was replaced by a brief Civic Liberal-Colorado coalition regime under Liberato M. Rojas (July 1911-February 1912).

postponement of elections which led to a 13-month civil war. During the war, Ayala resigned and Eligio Ayala (no relation) took over as president and was elected president in 1923. Ayala introduced electoral reforms which led the Colorado Party to contest the 1927 legislative elections and the 1928 presidential elections which were won by the Radical Liberal candidate Jose P. Guggiari. After 1932 elections, Ayala returned to the presidency (Lewis 1986, 486-95).

End: 02/17/1936. Ayala was ousted in a military coup in February 1936 (Lewis 1991, 234, 236).

Paraguay 1936-1937

Start: 02/19/1936. After a military coup deposed Ayala, exiled war hero Col. Rafael Franco returned to Paraguay on February 19 to take control of the new military government. Decree-Law 1952 authorized unlimited powers to a 'committee of civil mobilization' (Lewis 1991, 235-36).

End: 08/13/1937. In August 1937, Col. Ramon Paredes overthrew Franco in a military coup (Lewis 1991, 239).

Paraguay 1937-1939

Start: 08/13/1937. The coup which deposed Franco was led by Col. Ramon Paredes in the name of the Liberal Party. A civilian, Felix Paiva, was made president (Lewis 1991, 239-42).

End: In August 1939, Gen. Estigarribia took office after the New Liberal faction convinced the army to force rivals to conceded the race (Lewis 1991, 242; Geddes et al. 2014).

Peru 1914-1915

Start: 02/04/1914. Col. Oscar Raimundo Benavides ousted president Guillermo Billinghurst in a coup (Klaren 1993, 38).

End: 08/18/1915. Benavides oversaw elections and left office after Jose de Pardo y Barreda won (Klaren 1993, 38).

Peru 1919-1930

Start: 07/04/1919. Augusto B. Leguia was elected president in July 1919 and subsequently dissolved parliament with the aid of the *gendarmerie* and in subsequent elections engaged in substantial fraud, ultimately rendering the legislature a "rubber stamp for the president" (Klaren 1986, 588, 625, 631, 635; Klaren 1993, 39-40).

End: 08/25/1930. The regime was overthrown in a military coup in August 1930 (Klaren

1986, 638-39; Klaren 1993, 40).

Peru 1930-1945

Start: 08/27/1930. The leader of the coup was Col. Luis M. Sanchez Cerro. Sanchez Cerro was elected to the presidency in 1931. After his assassination, a constituent assembly named Gen. Oscar Benavides president in 1933. After elections in 1936 were unfavorable, Benavides annulled the results. Benavides was succeeded by Manuel Prado in 1939 (Klaren 1986, 639; Klaren 1993, 41, 44-45; Albertus 2015, 195, 197).

End: 07/28/1945. Jose Bustamante won competitive elections in 1945 and Prado stepped down (Klaren 1993, 44; Albertus 2015, 197).

Poland 1926-1939

Start: 05/12/1926. On May 12, 1926, Gen. Pilsudski led the Polish army into Warsaw and ousted the government in a coup. Pilsudski did not directly lead the government initially but indirectly controlled the regime. The regime engaged in repression of political opposition. After Pilsudksi died in 1935, his regime remained in power and he was succeeded by a compromise candidate between ruling factions (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2019, 307-18).

End: 09/27/1939. Poland was invaded by Nazi Germany and the regime surrendered on September 27, 1939 and was subsequently occupied by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2019, 327-28).

Portugal 1917-1918

Start: 12/08/1917. Sidonio Pais overthrew the government of Afonso Costa in a military coup (Birmingham 2018, 155-56).

End: 12/14/1918. Pais was assassinated in 1918 and Portugal saw a return to democracy until 1926 (Birmingham 2018, 156; Geddes et al. 2014).

Romania 1938-1940

Start: 02/11/1938. King Carol II established a dictatorship in 1938 which ended Romanian democracy after he dismissed the government, abolished the parliamentary system, and banned political parties (Hitchins 2014, 168, 174).

End: 09/06/1940. After Carol was coerced into lopsided treaties by Nazi Germany which gave up large swaths of Romanian territory, he put Gen. Antonescu in charge of the government. Antonescu, however, quickly consolidated power and forced Carol to abdicate (Hitchins 2014, 199-200, 202, 204).

Romania 1940-1944

Start: 09/06/1940. After forcing King Carol to abdicate and flee the country, Gen. Antonescu gained full power as Leader of the Romanian State and brought in the fascist Iron Guard as a coalition partner. Antonescu sought to eliminate political parties and engaged in repression of political opponents (Hitchins 2014, 204-5, 208).

End: 08/23/1944. On August 23, three days after a massive Soviet offensive into Romania began, King Mihai (the son of Carol II) ordered Antonescu arrested and appointed Gen. Constantin Sanatescu prime minister who immediately appointed a new government and sought peace with the Allied Powers (Hitchins 2014, 215).

Romania 1944-1945

Start: 08/23/1944. The Sanatescu regime had formally joined the Allied effort just as Soviet troops entered Romania. A Romanian delegation signed an armistice in Moscow on September 13 which required Romanian forces to join the Red Army offensive against Nazi Germany. On December 6, Sanatescu resigned and gave power to Gen. Nicolae Radescu. (Hitchins 2014, 216, 218).

End: 03/06/1945. Under intense Soviet pressure, King Mihai dismissed Radescu and appointed Petru Groza (an ally of the communists) prime minister (Hitchins 2014, 219).

Spain 1923-1930

Start: 09/15/1923. In September 1923, Gen. Miguel Primo de Rivera ousted the government in a coup and declared himself dictator (Berman 2019, 265-67).

End: 01/28/1930. After the military and the king indicated they no longer supported him, Primo de Rivera resigned and entered exile in Paris in January 1930. Soon thereafter Spain witnessed a return to democracy before the civil war in 1939 (Berman 2019, 267-68).

Thailand 1933-1944

Start: 06/02/1933. This regime began after a military coup. One year earlier (June 24, 1932), members of the People's Party (formed 1927 and largely recruited from the ranks of the army) overthrew the Thai monarchy in a military coup. However, the People's Party was ultimately pushed out over power within the transitional government and its leadership fled into exile in May 1933. One month later, young military officers from the People's Party launched a second coup which succeeded. After royalist forces launched a fail countercoup in October, the army was purged and jailed several members of the royal family. The regime leadership was initially split between Pridi Banomyong (a civilian) and Plaek Phibunsongkhram (a military leader usually referred to as Phibun), though the military came to dominate and Phibun became prime minister in 1938. The new regime engaged in press censorship and repression of political opposition. (Reynolds 2005, 1; Baker and Phongpaichit

2014, 104, 115-17, 119-20, 123-24).

End: 08/01/1944. Phibun was ousted by supporters of Pridi in July 1944 and Thailand witnessed a period of democratization until Phibun returned to power in a 1947 coup (Baker and Phongpaichit 2014, 136, 139-41).

Uruguay 1933-1938

Start: 03/31/1933. Gabriel Terra had been elected president in 1930, a position that did not offer much authority (which instead rested with the nine person *Consejo Nacional de Administracion*, CNA). On March 31, 1933, Terra carried out an *autogolpe* and dissolved the CNA. Terra's regime engaged in press censorship and the suppression of opposition groups (Finch 1991, 197-99).

End: 06/19/1938. Terra lost an election in 1938 and stepped down (Finch 1991, 200).

Venezuela 1908-1945

Start: 12/19/1908. After the departure of President Cipriano Castro (1899-1908) for a surgical operation overseas, Vice President Gen. Juan Vicente Gomez took over with U.S. support. After taking power, Gomez largely ruled indirectly until his death on December 17, 1935, overseeing repression of opposition and banning independent press. After his death, the Council of Ministers named Minister of War Eleazar Lopez Contreras provisional president, until his ratification by a pliant Congress in January 2, 1936. His inauguration was greeted by demonstrations which were repressed and all "open political activity" was banned in 1937. In 1941, Minister of War Gen. Isaias Medina Angarita succeeded Lopez to the presidency (Deas 1986, 676-78; Ewell 1991, 727, 732-33).

End: 10/18/1945. Angarita was ousted in a military coup led by junior officers (Ewell 1991, 742).

Yugoslavia 1929-1941

Start: 01/06/1929. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was initially governed as a constitutional monarchy with multiparty elections until King Aleksandar Karadjordjevic abrogated the constitution in January 1929 and dissolved parliament, declaring a royal dictatorship and engaging in repression of political opposition. Aleksandar reintroduced limited democracy in 1931 and allowed some political parties. Aleksandar was assassinated in 1934, and a three-man regency ruled on behalf of his young son (Sudetic 1992, 28-29, 32-35).

End: 03/27/1941. On March 27, 1941, young officers overthrew the government and declared a new government under Gen. Dusan Simovic. After anti-Tripartite demonstrations erupted (despite the new regime support for the German alliance), Germany invaded Yugoslavia on April 6 and the regime collapsed (Sudetic 1992, 37).

1.2 Authoritarian Regimes, 1946-2010

Information on regimes formed after 1945 and before December 31, 2010 is taken from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). We use their dataset as is, with three exceptions. First, we recode Algeria as one continuous regime since 1962. See section 4.3 for more information. Second, we recode Guinea Bissau as one continuous regime from 1974-99. See section 4.11 for more information. Third, we include the Republic of China (1927-49) as a regime.

China 1927-1949

Start: 09/1927. The Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT) led by Chiang Kai-shek embarked on a campaign to subdue the northern warlords in 1926. After splitting with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the April 1927, the KMT unleashed a wave of repression against leftist forces. The Nationalist regime capital was Nanking (Nanjing) and KMT forces captured Canton in July 1926 and Peking (Beijing) in June 1928. By 1929, the KMT controlled all of China and Manchuria. After a brief retirement, in February 1928, Chiang Kai-shek was named chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT and chairman of the State Council in October. The KMT regime engaged in substantial repression not only of suspected CCP members but also left-leaning members of the KMT (MacNair 1931, 96-98; Linebarger 1943, 262-64; Bianco 1971, 23-24, 56; Eastman 1986, 116-24, 138; Lary 2007, 76-77, 79).

End: 04/24/1949. The KMT lost control of their capital, Nanking, on April 24, 1949, and fled to Taiwan on December 9 (Pepper 1986, 783-84).

1.3 Authoritarian Regimes, 2011-15

For authoritarian regimes formed after December 31, 2010 or end before December 31, 2015 and thus are either not included in Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) or were right-censored in their dataset but collapsed before December 31, 2015, we use the updated GWF regime data from Derpanopoulos et al. 2016.

1.4 Complete List of Authoritarian Regimes, 1900-2015

1. Afghanistan 1919-1929
2. Afghanistan 1929-1973
3. Afghanistan 1973-1978
4. Afghanistan 1978-1992
5. Afghanistan 1996-2001
6. Afghanistan 2009-2014
7. Albania 1925-1939
8. Albania 1944-1991
9. Algeria 1962-
10. Angola 1975-
11. Argentina 1930-1943
12. Argentina 1943-1946
13. Argentina 1951-1955
14. Argentina 1955-1958

15. Argentina 1958-1966
16. Argentina 1966-1973
17. Argentina 1976-1983
18. Armenia 1994-1998
19. Armenia 1998-
20. Austria 1933-1938
21. Azerbaijan 1991-1992
22. Azerbaijan 1993-
23. Bangladesh 1971-1975
24. Bangladesh 1975-1982
25. Bangladesh 1982-1990
26. Bangladesh 2007-2008
27. Bangladesh 2014-
28. Belarus 1991-1994
29. Belarus 1994-
30. Benin 1960-1963
31. Benin 1963-1965
32. Benin 1965-1967
33. Benin 1967-1969
34. Benin 1969-1970
35. Benin 1972-1990
36. Bolivia 1930-1931
37. Bolivia 1931-1936
38. Bolivia 1936-1940
39. Bolivia 1940-1943
40. Bolivia 1943-1946
41. Bolivia 1946-1951
42. Bolivia 1951-1952
43. Bolivia 1952-1964
44. Bolivia 1964-1969
45. Bolivia 1969-1971
46. Bolivia 1971-1979
47. Bolivia 1980-1982
48. Botswana 1966-
49. Brazil 1930-1945
50. Brazil 1964-1985
51. Bulgaria 1944-1990
52. Burkina Faso 1960-1966
53. Burkina Faso 1966-1980
54. Burkina Faso 1980-1982
55. Burkina Faso 1982-1987
56. Burkina Faso 1987-2014
57. Burundi 1962-1966
58. Burundi 1966-1987
59. Burundi 1987-1993
60. Burundi 1996-2003
61. Burundi 2010-
62. Cambodia 1953-1970
63. Cambodia 1970-1975
64. Cambodia 1975-1979
65. Cambodia 1979-
66. Cameroon 1960-1983
67. Cameroon 1983-
68. CAR 1960-1965
69. CAR 1966-1979
70. CAR 1979-1981
71. CAR 1981-1993
72. CAR 2003-2013
73. CAR 2013-2014
74. Chad 1960-1975

75. Chad 1975-1979
76. Chad 1982-1990
77. Chad 1990-
78. Chile 1927-1931
79. Chile 1973-1989
80. China 1912-1916
81. China 1927-1949
82. China 1949-
83. Colombia 1949-1953
84. Colombia 1953-1958
85. Congo Republic 1960-1963
86. Congo Republic 1963-1968
87. Congo Republic 1968-1991
88. Congo Republic 1997-
89. Costa Rica 1917-1919
90. Costa Rica 1948-1949
91. Cuba 1902-1906
92. Cuba 1909-1933
93. Cuba 1933-1944
94. Cuba 1952-1959
95. Cuba 1959-
96. Czechoslovakia 1948-1989
97. Dem. Rep. Congo 1960-1997
98. Dem. Rep. Congo 1997-
99. Dominican Republic 1924-1930
100. Dominican Republic 1930-1962
101. Dominican Republic 1963-1965
102. Dominican Republic 1966-1978
103. Ecuador 1906-1911
104. Ecuador 1925-1931
105. Ecuador 1934-1935
106. Ecuador 1936-1937
107. Ecuador 1937-1938
108. Ecuador 1938-1944
109. Ecuador 1944-1947
110. Ecuador 1963-1966
111. Ecuador 1970-1972
112. Ecuador 1972-1979
113. Egypt 1922-1952
114. Egypt 1952-2011
115. Egypt 2011-2012
116. Egypt 2013-
117. El Salvador 1931-1948
118. El Salvador 1948-1982
119. El Salvador 1982-1994
120. Eritrea 1993-
121. Estonia 1934-1940
122. Ethiopia 1974-1991
123. Ethiopia 1991-
124. Gabon 1960-
125. Gambia 1965-1994
126. Gambia 1994-
127. Georgia 1991-1992
128. Georgia 1992-2003
129. Germany 1933-1945
130. Germany East 1949-1990
131. Ghana 1960-1966
132. Ghana 1966-1969
133. Ghana 1972-1979
134. Ghana 1981-2000

135. Greece 1936-1941
136. Greece 1967-1974
137. Guatemala 1921-1930
138. Guatemala 1931-1944
139. Guatemala 1954-1958
140. Guatemala 1958-1963
141. Guatemala 1963-1966
142. Guatemala 1966-1970
143. Guatemala 1970-1985
144. Guatemala 1985-1995
145. Guinea 1958-1984
146. Guinea 1984-2008
147. Guinea 2008-2010
148. Guinea-Bissau 1974-1999
149. Guinea-Bissau 2002-2003
150. Guinea-Bissau 2012-2014
151. Haiti 1902-1911
152. Haiti 1911-1914
153. Haiti 1914-1915
154. Haiti 1934-1941
155. Haiti 1941-1946
156. Haiti 1950-1956
157. Haiti 1957-1986
158. Haiti 1986-1988
159. Haiti 1988-1990
160. Haiti 1991-1994
161. Haiti 1999-2004
162. Honduras 1903-1907
163. Honduras 1907-1911
164. Honduras 1912-1919
165. Honduras 1920-1924
166. Honduras 1924-1929
167. Honduras 1933-1956
168. Honduras 1963-1971
169. Honduras 1972-1981
170. Hungary 1918-1919
171. Hungary 1919-1944
172. Hungary 1947-1990
173. Indonesia 1949-1966
174. Indonesia 1966-1999
175. Iran 1925-1979
176. Iran 1979-
177. Iraq 1932-1958
178. Iraq 1958-1963
179. Iraq 1963-1968
180. Iraq 1968-1979
181. Iraq 1979-2003
182. Iraq 2010-
183. Italy 1922-1943
184. Ivory Coast 1960-1999
185. Ivory Coast 1999-2000
186. Ivory Coast 2000-2011
187. Japan 1932-1945
188. Jordan 1946-
189. Kazakhstan 1991-
190. Kenya 1963-2002
191. Korea, North 1948-
192. Korea, South 1948-1960
193. Korea, South 1961-1987
194. Kuwait 1961-

195. Kyrgyzstan 1991-2005
196. Kyrgyzstan 2005-2010
197. Laos 1959-1960
198. Laos 1960-1962
199. Laos 1975-
200. Latvia 1934-1940
201. Lesotho 1970-1986
202. Lesotho 1986-1993
203. Liberia 1944-1980
204. Liberia 1980-1990
205. Liberia 1997-2003
206. Libya 1951-1969
207. Libya 1969-2011
208. Lithuania 1926-1940
209. Madagascar 1960-1972
210. Madagascar 1972-1975
211. Madagascar 1975-1993
212. Madagascar 2009-2013
213. Malawi 1964-1994
214. Malaysia 1957-
215. Mali 1960-1968
216. Mali 1968-1991
217. Mali 2012-2013
218. Mauritania 1960-1978
219. Mauritania 1978-2005
220. Mauritania 2005-2007
221. Mauritania 2008-
222. Mexico 1913-1914
223. Mexico 1915-2000
224. Mongolia 1921-1993
225. Morocco 1956-
226. Mozambique 1975-
227. Myanmar 1958-1960
228. Myanmar 1962-1988
229. Myanmar 1988-
230. Namibia 1990-
231. Nepal 1951-1991
232. Nepal 2002-2006
233. Nicaragua 1933-1936
234. Nicaragua 1936-1979
235. Nicaragua 1979-1990
236. Niger 1960-1974
237. Niger 1974-1991
238. Niger 1996-1999
239. Niger 2009-2010
240. Niger 2010-2011
241. Nigeria 1966-1979
242. Nigeria 1983-1993
243. Nigeria 1993-1999
244. Oman 1920-
245. Pakistan 1947-1958
246. Pakistan 1958-1971
247. Pakistan 1975-1977
248. Pakistan 1977-1988
249. Pakistan 1999-2008
250. Panama 1936-1941
251. Panama 1941-1945
252. Panama 1949-1951
253. Panama 1953-1955
254. Panama 1968-1982

255. Panama 1982-1989
256. Paraguay 1902-1904
257. Paraguay 1908-1911
258. Paraguay 1912-1936
259. Paraguay 1936-1937
260. Paraguay 1937-1939
261. Paraguay 1940-1948
262. Paraguay 1948-1954
263. Paraguay 1954-1993
264. Peru 1914-1915
265. Peru 1919-1930
266. Peru 1930-1945
267. Peru 1948-1956
268. Peru 1962-1963
269. Peru 1968-1980
270. Peru 1992-2000
271. Philippines 1972-1986
272. Poland 1926-1939
273. Poland 1944-1989
274. Portugal 1917-1918
275. Portugal 1926-1974
276. Romania 1938-1940
277. Romania 1940-1944
278. Romania 1944-1945
279. Romania 1945-1989
280. Russia 1917-1991
281. Russia 1993-
282. Rwanda 1962-1973
283. Rwanda 1973-1994
284. Rwanda 1994-
285. Saudi Arabia 1927-
286. Senegal 1960-2000
287. Sierra Leone 1967-1968
288. Sierra Leone 1968-1992
289. Sierra Leone 1992-1996
290. Sierra Leone 1997-1998
291. Singapore 1965-
292. Somalia 1969-1991
293. South Africa 1910-1994
294. South Sudan 2011-
295. Spain 1923-1930
296. Spain 1939-1976
297. Sri Lanka 1978-1994
298. Sri Lanka 2010-
299. Sudan 1958-1964
300. Sudan 1969-1985
301. Sudan 1985-1986
302. Sudan 1989-
303. Swaziland 1968-
304. Syria 1946-1947
305. Syria 1949-1951
306. Syria 1951-1954
307. Syria 1957-1958
308. Syria 1962-1963
309. Syria 1963-
310. Taiwan 1949-2000
311. Tajikistan 1991-
312. Tanzania 1964-
313. Thailand 1933-1944
314. Thailand 1944-1947

315. Thailand 1947-1957
316. Thailand 1957-1973
317. Thailand 1976-1988
318. Thailand 1991-1992
319. Thailand 2006-2007
320. Thailand 2014-
321. Togo 1960-1963
322. Togo 1963-
323. Tunisia 1956-2011
324. Turkey 1923-1950
325. Turkey 1957-1960
326. Turkey 1960-1961
327. Turkey 1980-1983
328. Turkmenistan 1991-
329. UAE 1971-
330. Uganda 1966-1971
331. Uganda 1971-1979
332. Uganda 1980-1985
333. Uganda 1986-
334. Ukraine 2012-2014
335. Uruguay 1933-1938
336. Uruguay 1973-1984
337. Uzbekistan 1991-
338. Venezuela 1908-1945
339. Venezuela 1948-1958
340. Venezuela 2005-
341. Vietnam 1954-
342. Vietnam, South 1954-1963
343. Vietnam, South 1963-1975
344. Yemen 1918-1962
345. Yemen 1962-1967
346. Yemen 1967-1974
347. Yemen 1974-1978
348. Yemen 1978-2012
349. Yemen, South 1967-1990
350. Yugoslavia 1929-1941
351. Yugoslavia 1945-1990
352. Yugoslavia 1991-2000
353. Zambia 1967-1991
354. Zambia 1996-2011
355. Zimbabwe 1980-

2 Identifying Revolutionary Autocracies

2.1 Definition

Revolutionary autocracies are political regimes that emerge out of social revolutions. We define a social revolution as the violent overthrow of an existing regime from below, accompanied by mass mobilization and state collapse, which triggers a rapid transformation of the state and the existing social order. Our case universe includes the list of authoritarian regimes identified in section 1.[3]

2.2 Observable indicators

2.2.1 Violent, irregular seizure of power

- Transfer of power that occurs outside of existing formal or informal institutions accompanied by violence
- Includes cases of negotiated transition following successful armed struggle

2.2.2 Regime ruled by a mass-based movement that emerges outside the state

- Examples:
  1. Guerrilla movement
  2. Mass-based party or movement
- Excludes:
  1. All military factions
  2. Regimes led by groups or individuals with high positions in the old regime

2.2.3 State transformation: collapse of pre-existing coercive apparatus and creation of new armed forces

- Armed forces are dissolved or severely crippled. The military is considered crippled when disruption of the chain of command, largescale mutiny, and/or widespread rank-and-file desertion prevent it from operating as a coherent body
- Creation of new security forces that come to play a central role in the coercive apparatus or far-reaching reconstruction of existing security apparatus
  - Examples:
    1. Largescale purge of military command and replacement with revolutionary veterans
    2. Creation of new security forces that dominate preexisting forces

[3] We also apply a slightly more stringent definition of sovereignty. We measure sovereignty by both international recognition and control over the armed forces. Therefore, we exclude cases where the coercive apparatus is controlled by a foreign power upon regime formation.

2.2.4 Attempted transformation of existing social and/or geopolitical order

- By the end of the first year in power, top government officials embark on a radical transformation of the existing social and/or geopolitical order that seriously threatens the interests or way of life of powerful domestic actors (e.g., landowners) or large societal groups (e.g., peasants, women)
  - Examples:
    1. Transformation of property rights (e.g., largescale expropriation; largescale land reform)
    2. Radical change in the racial/ethnic order
    3. Radical cultural transformation, including efforts to weaken/destroy dominant religious institutions or impose radical change in laws governing social behavior (e.g., introduction of Sharia law)
    4. Serious challenge to regional and/or geopolitical order

2.3 Regimes in power less than one year

Eighteen of the 355 regimes listed in section 1 meet our criteria and are coded as revolutionary regimes (see below for detail). To ensure that we did not omit revolutionary regimes that may have lost power too quickly to enter our regime data set, we also examined all remaining cases of irregular transfers of power as provided by the Archigos data set (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2016). These short-lived governments corresponded to leaders who did not stay in power long enough to qualify as a regime according the criteria set out by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) (i.e., these leaders lost power before December 31 of the year in which they seized power). This analysis generated two revolutionary governments: Finland 1918 (see section 4.10) and Hungary 1919 (see section 4.12), which we discuss below. In the robustness section of Lachapelle, Levitsky, Way, and Casey 2020, we test the sensitivity of our results to adding these two governments to the regime list. In the following section we explain the coding decisions in detail.

3 Excluded Cases

To identify revolutionary regimes we proceeded by elimination. First we examined cases of regular transfer of power (criterion 2.2.1) using information from Archigos and GWF. Then, we eliminated the regimes that emerged from within the state (and violate criterion 2.2.2), those that did not engage in a transformation of the state after seizing power (criterion 2.2.3), and those that did not engage in attempted radical social transformation (criterion 2.2.4), using secondary and primary sources.

3.1 Regular transfers of power

We exclude regimes which came to power through elections or established formal and informal rules for selecting leaders (section 2.2.1). While we include cases of negotiated transition following a successful armed struggle, we include only transfers of power which occur outside the existing formal or informal institutions that are accompanied by the use or threat of violence. The following cases are thus excluded.

1. Afghanistan 2009-14[4]
2. Argentina 1951-55[5]
3. Argentina 1958-66[6]
4. Armenia 1994-98[7]
5. Austria 1933-38[8]
6. Belarus 1991-94[9]
7. Belarus 1994- [10]
8. Benin 1960-63[11]
9. Bolivia 1931-36[12]
10. Bolivia 1940-43[13]
11. Botswana 1966- [14]
12. Burkina Faso 1960-66[15]
13. Cameroon 1983- [16]
14. Chad 1960-75[17]
15. Colombia 1949-53[18]
16. Cuba 1902-06[19]

[4]Hamid Karzai was voted into office by the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002 and won re-election in 2009 in a vote marred by fraud (Suhrke 2011, 164, 179-80; Derpanopoulos et al. 2016).
[5]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[6]Succession (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[7]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[8]Dollfuss was a cabinent minister and was called to form a government through regular procedure (see section 1.1).
[9]Succession (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[10]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[11]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[12]Election (see section 1.1).
[13]Election (see section 1.1).
[14]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[15]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[16]Succession (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[17]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[18]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[19]Election. (see section 1.1).
[20]Election. (see section 1.1).

17. Cuba 1909-33[20]
18. Dominican Republic 1924-30[21]
19. Dominican Republic 1966-78[22]
20. Ecuador 1934-35[23]
21. Ecuador 1938-44[24]
22. Ecuador 1970-72[25]
23. El Salvador 1982-94[26]
24. Estonia 1934-40 (Pats)[27]
25. Gambia 1965-94[28]
26. Georgia 1991-92[29]
27. Germany 1933-45[30]
28. Ghana 1960-66[31]
29. Greece 1936-41 (Metaxas)[32]
30. Guatemala 1920-21[33]
31. Guatemala 1958-63[34]
32. Guatemala 1966-70[35]
33. Guatemala 1970-85[36]
34. Guatemala 1985-95[37]
35. Guinea 1958-84[38]
36. Guinea-Bissau 2002-03[39]
37. Haiti 1934-41[40]
38. Haiti 1941-46[41]
39. Haiti 1999-2004[42]
40. Honduras 1912-19[43]

[21]Election (see section 1.1).
[22]Joaquin Balaguer was elected (Gleijeses 1978, 281).
[23]Election (see section 1.1).
[24]The Constituent Assembly created by the outgoing regime selected Dr. Aurelio Mosquera Narvaez as president, who subsequently dissolved the Assembly and declared himself dictator (see section 1.1).
[25]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[26]Election (under heavy U.S. pressure) (Crandall 2016, 270, 284).
[27]After an October 1933 constitutional referendum, Konstantin Pats took over as acting president in January 1934, and with the help of Gen. Lohan Laidoner, Pats declared a state of emergency to prevent opposition candidate Gen. Andres Larka from winning the upcoming election (see section 1.1).
[28]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[29]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[30]In 1932 the Nazi Party (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*, NSDAP) led by Adolf Hitler won a plurality in competitive elections and Hitler was appointed chancellor on January 30, 1933 by President Hindenburg (see section 1.1).
[31]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[32]Ioannis Metaxas was appointed prime minister in April 1936 and on August 4 suspended the constitution (see section 1.1).
[33]Carlos Herrera y Luna (1920-21) was chosen by the national assembly (Lentz 1999, 214).
[34]Succession (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[35]Succession (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[36]Succession (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[37]Succession (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[38]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[39]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[40]Election (Lentz 1999, 219-20).
[41]Succession (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[42]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[43]Election (see section 1.1).
[44]Election (see section 1.1).
[45]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

41. Honduras 1924-29[44]
42. Honduras 1933-56[45]
43. Hungary 1918-19[46]
44. Ivory Coast 1960-99[47]
45. Ivory Coast 2000-11[48]
46. Iraq 1979-2003[49]
47. Italy 1922-43[50]
48. Kenya 1963-2002[51]
49. Lesotho 1970-86[52]
50. Liberia 1944-80[53]
51. Madagascar 1960-72[54]
52. Madagascar 1975-93[55]
53. Malawi 1964-94[56]
54. Mali 1960-68[57]
55. Nepal 2002-06[58]
56. Niger 2009-10[59]
57. Nicaragua 1933-36[60]
58. Pakistan 1975-77[61]
59. Panama 1936-41[62]
60. Panama 1941-45[63]
61. Panama 1953-55[64]
62. Paraguay 1940-48[65]
63. Peru 1919-30 (Leguia)[66]
64. Peru 1992-2000[67]
65. Philippines 1972-86[68]
66. Russia 1993- [69]
67. Rwanda 1962-73[70]

[46]King Karl appointed Count Mihaly Karolyi to head a new government and shortly thereafter the king abdicated (Sudetic 1990, 35).
[47]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[48]Laurent Gbagbo was elected president in 2000 and was ousted by a rebellion led by former Vice President Ouattara in 2011 (Okosun 2018, 9, 26, 42).
[49]Succession within the regime (palace coup) (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[50]Elected (see section 1.1).
[51]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[52]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[53]Succession (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[54]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[55]Succession (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[56]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[57]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[58]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[59]Mamadou Tandja was the incumbent president (elected 1999) when he pushed through a constitutional referendum in August 2009 which enabled him to remain in power longer than his term (ARB 2010, 18280-81).
[60]Election (see section 1.1).
[61]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[62]Election (see section 1.1).
[63]Election (Lentz 1999, 334-35).
[64]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[65]Succession (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[66]Election (see section 1.1).
[67]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[68]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[69]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[70]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

68. Senegal 1960-2000[71]
69. Sierra Leone 1968-92[72]
70. Singapore 1965- [73]
71. South Africa 1910-94[74]
72. Sri Lanka 1978-94[75]
73. Syria 1957-58[76]
74. Tanzania 1964- [77]
75. Thailand 1944-47[78]
76. Togo 1960-63[79]
77. Turkey 1957-60[80]
78. Uganda 1966-71[81]
79. Uganda 1980-85[82]
80. Ukraine 2012-14[83]
81. Uruguay 1933-38[84]
82. Venezuela 2005- [85]
83. Yemen 1978-2012[86]
84. Yugoslavia 1929-41[87]
85. Yugoslavia 1991-2000[88]
86. Zambia 1967-91[89]
87. Zambia 1996-11 [90]

3.2 Emerging within the state

We exclude all regimes led by military factions or groups or individuals with high positions in the old regime (criteria 2.2.2). The most frequent means by which these regimes seized power is through a military coup, though some are cases in which leaders held office before and after decolonization. The following regimes and short lived governments can be eliminated for failing to emerge outside the state.

[71]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[72]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[73]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[74]The ruling Het Volk party was formed in 1905, and after independence and the declaration of the Union of South Africa was declared white South Africans were ensured of political participation rights and Botha became prime minister (Clark and Worger 2016, 19-20).
[75]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[76]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[77]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[78]Succession (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[79]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[80]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[81]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[82]Election (Otunnu 2017, 65).
[83]Election (Way 2015, 78).
[84]Elected in 1930 (autogolpe in 1933) (see section 1.1).
[85]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[86]Succession (Kareem Fahim and Laura Kasinof. "Yemen's Leader Agrees to End 3-Decade Rule." November 23, 2011. *New York Times*; Derpanopoulos et al. 2016; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[87]he Kingdom of Yugoslavia was initially governed as a constitutional monarchy with multiparty elections until King Aleksandar Karadjordjevic abrogated the constitution in January 1929 and dissolved parliament, declaring a royal dictatorship (see section 1.1).
[88]Succession (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[89]Election (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[90]Election (Derpanopoulos et al. 2016; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

1. Afghanistan 1919-29 (A. Rahman et al.)[91]
2. Afghanistan 1929 (Habibollah Ghazi)[92]
3. Afghanistan 1973-78 (Daoud)[93]
4. Afghanistan 1978-92 (PDPA)[94]
5. Albania 1925-39 (Zog I)[95]
6. Argentina 1930-43 (Uriburu et al.)[96]
7. Argentina 1943-46 (Farrell)[97]
8. Argentina 1955 (Lonardi)[98]
9. Argentina 1955-58 (Aramburu)[99]
10. Argentina 1966-73 (Ongania et al.)[100]
11. Argentina 1976-83 (Videla et al.)[101]
12. Armenia 1998- (Kocharian et al.)[102]
13. Azerbaijan 1991-92 (Mutalibov)[103]
14. Azerbaijan 1993- (Aliyev et al.)[104]
15. Bangladesh 1975-82 (Rahman et al.)[105]
16. Bangladesh 1982-90 (Ershad)[106]
17. Bangladesh 2007-8 (Ahmed, M.)[107]
18. Benin 1963-65 (Soglo et al.)[108]
19. Benin 1965 (Congacou)[109]
20. Benin 1965-67 (Soglo)[110]
21. Benin 1967-69 (Kouandete et al.)[111]
22. Benin 1969-70 (de Souza)[112]
23. Benin 1972-90 (Kerekou)[113]

[91]The monarchy that ruled Afghanistan during indirect British rule (since 1880) maintained control after independence in 1919, and power was passed from father to son until Inayatullah in 1929 (Lentz 1999, 10-11; Barfield 2010, 91, 114-15).

[92]Habibiollah was in the Afghan army (Lentz 1999, 11).

[93]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

[94]Coup (Khristoforov 2016, 62; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

[95]Hamed Zogu (King Zog I) was the former commander in chief of the armed forces and minister of the interior (See section 1.1).

[96]Jose Felix Uriburu (1930-32), a general in the army, seized power in a coup. Augustin P. Justo (1932-38) was commander-in-chief of the army and was elected president. Roberto M. Ortiz (1938-42), the minister of finance, was the handpicked successor to Justo and was elected in a fraudulent election (See section 1.1).

[97]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

[98]Coup (1955/9/20 - 1955/11/13).

[99]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

[100]Coup. Ongania 1966-70; Levingston 1971; Lanusse 1972-73 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

[101]Coup. Videla 1976-81; Galtieri 1982; Bignone 1983 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

[102]Prime Minister Robert Kocharian took over the presidency after Levon Ter-Petrosian resigned and Kocharian won fraudulent elections in 1998 (Hale 2015, 228-29; Way 2015, 151).

[103]Ayaz Mutalibov was the first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party and Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic and took office as the president of independent Azerbaijan after an uncontested, snap presidential election (Way 2015, 151-52).

[104]Heydar Aliyev, the former head of the Communist Party in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, was invited on as acting president following a military coup in June 1993. His son, Ilham Aliyev, took over in 2003 (Way 2015, 152-53; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

[105]Coup. Ziaur Rahman 1975-81; Sattar 1982 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

[106]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

[107]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

[108]Coup. Soglo 1963-64, Apithy 1965 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

[109]Coup (1965/11/29 - 1965/12/22).

[110]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

[111]Coup. Kouandete 1967-68; Zinsou 1969 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

[112]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

[113]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

24. Bolivia 1930-31 (Blanco Galindo)[114]
25. Bolivia 1936-40 (Toro et al.)[115]
26. Bolivia 1939-40 (Quintanila)[116]
27. Bolivia 1943-46 (Villarroel)[117]
28. Bolivia 1951-52 (Rojas)[118]
29. Bolivia 1951-52 (Ballivian)[119]
30. Bolivia 1964-69 (Barrientos)[120]
31. Bolivia 1969-71 (Ovando et al.)[121]
32. Bolivia 1971-79 (Banzer et al.)[122]
33. Bolivia 1979 (Busch)[123]
34. Bolivia 1980-82 (G. Meza et al.)[124]
35. Bolivia 1982 (V. Calderon)[125]
36. Brazil 1930-45 (Vargas)[126]
37. Brazil 1964-85 (Castelo Branco et al.)[127]
38. Burkina Faso 1966-80 (Lamizana)[128]
39. Burkina Faso 1980-82 (Zerbo)[129]
40. Burkina Faso 1982-87 (Sankara)[130]
41. Burkina Faso 1987-2014 (Compaore)[131]
42. Burkina Faso 2014 (Traore)[132]
43. Burkina Faso 2014 (Zida)[133]
44. Burkina Faso 2015 (Diendere)[134]
45. Burundi 1962-66 (Mwambutsa IV)[135]
46. Burundi 1966 (Ntare)[136]
47. Burundi 1966-87 (Micombero et al.)[137]

[114]Coup (See section 1.1).
[115]Coup (See section 1.1).
[116]Coup (1939/8/23 - 1940/4/15).
[117]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[118]Coup (1951/5/16 - 1952/4/11).
[119]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[120]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[121]Coup. Ovando 1969-70; Torres 1971 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[122]Coup. Banzer 1971-78; Padilla 1979 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[123]Coup (1979/11/1 - 1979/11/16).
[124]Coup. Garcia Meza 1980-81; Torrelio Villa 1982 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[125]Coup (1982/7/21 - 1982/10/10).
[126]Coup (see section 1.1).
[127]Coup. Castelo Branco 1964-67; Costa e Silva 1968-69; Medici 1970-74; Geisel 1975-79; Figueiredo 1980-85 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[128]Military takeover after mass protests (Harsch 2017, 25).
[129]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[130]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[131]Coup. Frere and Englebert 2015, 295; Derpanopoulos et al. 2016; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018.
[132]Coup (2014/10/31 - 2014/11/1).
[133]Coup (2014/11/1 - 2014/11/18).
[134]Coup (2015/09/17-2015/09/23). In September 2015, chief military intelligence officer under Compaore, Gen. Gilbert Diendere seized power in a coup. Nadoun Coulibaly and Mathieu Bonkoungou. "Burkina Faso Military Spy Chief Seizes Power, Dissolves Government." September 17, 2015. *Reuters*; "Burkina Faso Charges General Who Led Failed Coup." October 7, 2015. *New York Times.*
[135]The colonial-era king, Mwambutsa IV retained office after independence and his son, Prince Louis Rwagasore won elected office (Watt 2008, 30).
[136]Palace coup (1966/7/8 - 1966/11/28).
[137]Coup. Micombero 1966-76; Bagaza 1977-87 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[138]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[139]Coup (1993/10/21 - 1993/10/27).

48. Burundi 1987-93 (Buyoya)[138]
49. Burundi 1993 (Ngueze)[139]
50. Burundi 1996-2003 (Buyoya)[140]
51. Cambodia 1953-70 (Sihanouk) [141]
52. Cambodia 1970-75 (Lon Nol)[142]
53. Cameroon 1960-83 (Ahidjo)[143]
54. Cen. African Rep. 1960-66 (Dacko)[144]
55. Cen. African Rep. 1966-79 (Bokassa)[145]
56. Cen. African Rep. 1981-93 (Kolingba)[146]
57. Cen. African Rep. 2003-13 (Bozize)[147]
58. Cen. African Rep. 2013-14 (Djotodia)[148]
59. Chad 1975-79 (Malloum)[149]
60. Chile 1924-25 (Altamirano)[150]
61. Chile 1925 (del Campo)[151]
62. Chile 1927-31 (del Campo et al.)[152]
63. Chile 1932 (Davila)[153]
64. Chile 1932 (Grove Vallejo)[154]
65. Chile 1932 (Blanche)[155]
66. Chile 1973-89 (Pinochet)[156]
67. China 1912-16 (Yuan Shih-kai)[157]
68. Colombia 1953-58 (Rojas Pinilla et al.)[158]
69. Congo (Brazz.) 1960-63 (Youlou)[159]
70. Congo (Brazz.) 1963-68 (Massemba-Debat)[160]

[140]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[141]Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the first leader of independent Cambodia and heir to the monarchy that had ruled Cambodia since 1860, was named regent by the French in 1941 and retained control after decolonization (Becker 1998, 32, 43, 73, 76-77).
[142]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[143]Shortly before decolonization, France haded power to Ahidjo and his Cameroonian Union (UC), a moderate party created in 1958 (Joseph 1977, 209-28, 342-45; DeLancey 1986, 193-94; Takougang and Krieger 1998, 35-39; Atangana 2010, 90).
[144]David Dacko was the leader of the Central African Republic during French colonial rule and maintained his position upon independence (Frank J. Prial. "Army Topples Leader of Central African Republic." September 2, 1981. *New York Times*).
[145]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[146]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[147]Francois Bozize was chief of staff of the army under Patasse and launched a successful rebellion after his dismissal in 2001 after a failed coup attempt (Debos 2008, 228-29; Lydia Polgreen. "Leader of Central African Republic Fled to Cameroon, Official Says." March 23, 2013. *New York Times*).
[148]Coup (Vlavonou 2014, 319-21).
[149]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[150]Coup (1924/9/8 - 1925/1/23).
[151]Coup (1925/1/23 - 1925/3/21).
[152]Coup (See section 1.1).
[153]Coups (1932/6/5 - 1932/6/12; 1932/6/17 - 1932/9/13).
[154]Coup (1932/6/12 - 1932/6/17) (Drake 1991, 278)
[155]Coup (1932/9/13 - 1932/10/2).
[156]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[157]Yuan Shih-kai was the president of the council of ministers and an imperial-era official. See section 1.1.
[158]Coup. Rojas Pinilla 1953-57; Paris Gordillo 1958 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[159]Abbe Fulbert Youlou was elected mayor of Brazzaville in 1957 and took control of the government while under French rule, retaining his position and emerging as Congo's first president after independence (Decalo 1990, 53).
[160]After mass protests against Youlou in August 1963, the military withdrew support for the regime and handed power to civilian Alphonse Massemba-Debat (Decalo 1990, 54).

71. Congo (Brazz.) 1968-91 (Ngouabi et al.)[161]
72. Costa Rica 1917-19 (Tinoco)[162]
73. Cuba 1933-44 (Batista)[163]
74. Cuba 1952-59 (Batista)[164]
75. Dem. Rep. Congo 1960-97 (Mobutu)[165]
76. Dom. Rep. 1902-03 (Vasquez)[166]
77. Dom. Rep. 1903 (Woss y Gil)[167]
78. Dom. Rep. 1911-12 (Victoria)[168]
79. Dom. Rep. 1930-62 (Trujillo et al.)[169]
80. Dom. Rep. 1962 (Echavarria)[170]
81. Dom. Rep. 1963-65 (Wessin y Wessin)[171]
82. Dom. Rep. 1965 (Benoit)[172]
83. Dom. Rep. 1965 (Berreras)[173]
84. Ecuador 1906-11 (Alfaro)[174]
85. Ecuador 1925-31 (Ayora, L. Alba, Moreno)[175]
86. Ecuador 1936-37 (Paez)[176]
87. Ecuador 1937-38 (E. Gallo)[177]
88. Ecuador 1944-47 (V. Ibarra)[178]
89. Ecuador 1947 (Mancheno)[179]
90. Ecuador 1963-66 (Castro Jijon)[180]
91. Ecuador 1972-79 (R. Lara et al.)[181]
92. Egypt 1922-52 (Fuad et al.)[182]
93. Egypt 1952-2011 (Naguib et al.)[183]
94. Egypt 2011-12 (Tantawi/SCAF)[184]

[161]Coup. Ngouabi 1968-77; Yhombi-Opango/Sassou-Nguesso 1978-79; Sassou-Nguesso 1980-91 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[162]Coup See section 1.1.
[163]Coup (See section 1.1).
[164]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[165]Mobutu was commander of the armed forces and took full control of the government in 1965 (Young and Turner 1985, 51-52).
[166]Coup (1902/5/2 - 1903/4/18).
[167]Coup (1903/4/18 - 1903/11/4).
[168]Coup (1911/12/2 - 1912/11/28).
[169]Coup. Trujillo 1930-61; Balaguer 1962 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[170]Coup (1962/1/17 - 1962/1/19).
[171]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[172]Coup (1965/4/27 - 1965/5/7).
[173]Army officer (1965/5/7 - 1965/8/30).
[174]Coup (See section 1.1).
[175]Coup (see section 1.1).
[176]Coup (see section 1.1).
[177]Coup (see section 1.1).
[178]Coup (Fitch 1977, 19).
[179]Coup (1947/8/24 - 1947/9/3).
[180]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[181]Coup. Rodriguez Lara 1972-76; Poveda Burbano 1977-79 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[182]The colonial-era Egyptian monarchy retained its position upon independence from the U.K. in 1922 (Tignor 2011, 183).
[183]Coup. Naguib 1952-54; Nasser 1955-70; Sadat 1971-81; Mubarak 1982-2011 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[184]After Mubarak's resignation in February 2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) led by Minister of Defense Muhammad Hussayn al-Tantawi dissolved power and assumed control under an interim capacity before presidential elections were held in 2012 (Brownlee et al. 2015, 104, 118).

95. Egypt 2013- (Sisi)[185]
96. El Salvador 1931-48 (M. Hernandez et al.)[186]
97. El Salvador 1948-82 (Osorio et al.)[187]
98. Ethiopia 1974-91 (Mengistu)[188]
99. Gabon 1960- [189]
100. Gambia 1994- (Jammeh)[190]
101. Georgia 1992-2003 (Shevarnadze)[191]
102. Ghana 1966-69 (Ankrah)[192]
103. Ghana 1972-79 (Acheampong et al.)[193]
104. Ghana 1979 (Rawlings)[194]
105. Ghana 1981-2000 (Rawlings)[195]
106. Greece 1922 (Plastiras)[196]
107. Greece 1925-26 (Konduriotis)[197]
108. Greece 1926 (Pangalos)[198]
109. Greece 1926 (Kondilis)[199]
110. Greece 1933 (Plastiras)[200]
111. Greece 1936 (Kondilis)[201]
112. Greece 1967-74 (Papadopoulos et al.)[202]
113. Greece 1992 (Ioseliani)[203]
114. Guatemala 1921-30 (Orellana et al.)[204]
115. Guatemala 1931-44 (Ubico)[205]
116. Guatemala 1944 (Ponce Valdez)[206]

[185]Coup (David D. Kirkpatrick. "Army Ousts Egypt's President; Morsi is Taken into Military Custody." July 3, 2013. *New York Times*; Brownlee et al. 2015, 124).
[186]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[187]Coup. Osorio 1948-56; Lemus 1957-60; Yanes Urias 1961; Riveria 1962-67; Sanchez Hernandez 1968-72; Molina 1973-77; Romero 1978-78; Majano 1980; Gutierrez 1981-82 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[188]The 1974 'Ethiopian revolution' that overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie began as an army mutiny in southern Ethiopia in January which quickly spread to other military units and coincided with mass protests. High ranking members of the military formed the Derg (committee) which then deposed Selassie (Ayele 2014, 205-8).
[189]In July 1958, Leon M'Ba, mayor of Libreville was made president of the council of government in colonial Gabon, a position which became head of state after independence (de Saint-Paul 1989, 21). There was a brief coup, led by Aubaume (February 17-19, 1964) which was reversed after a French intervention. See Casey 2020.
[190]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[191]Shevarnadze was invited to the presidency after Zviad Gamsakhurdia was ousted in a coup (Jones 1997).
[192]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[193]Coup. Acheampong 1973-78; Akuffo 1979 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[194]Coup (1979/6/5 - 1979/9/24).
[195]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[196]Coup (1922/9/27 - 1922/11/27).
[197]Paul Konduriotis was an admiral in the Greek navy (Lentz 1999, 198-99).
[198]Coup (1926/04/16-1926/08/22) (Clogg 2013, 106).
[199]Coup (1926/8/23 - 1926/12/4).
[200]Coup (1933/3/6 - 1933/3/10).
[201]Coup (1935/10/10 - 1935/11/30).
[202]Coup. Papadopoulos 1967-73; Ioannidis 1974 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[203]Coup (1992/1/6 - 1992/3/10).
[204]Coup (see section 1.1).
[205]Coup (see section 1.1).
[206]Coup (1944/7/1 - 1944/10/21).
[207]Coup (1944/10/21 - 1945/3/15).
[208]Coup (1954/6/27 - 1954/6/29).
[209]Coup (1954/6/29 - 1954/7/8).

117. Guatemala 1944-45 (Arbenz)[207]
118. Guatemala 1954 (Dias)[208]
119. Guatemala 1954 (Monzon)[209]
120. Guatemala 1957 (M. Azurdia)[210]
121. Guatemala 1957 (F. Avendano)[211]
122. Guatemala 1963-66 (P. Azurdia)[212]
123. Guinea-Bissau 1999 (Mane)[213]
124. Guinea-Bissau 1999-00 (Sanha)[214]
125. Guinea-Bissau 2003 (C. Seabra)[215]
126. Guinea-Bissau 2012-14 (Mamadu)[216]
127. Guinea 2008-09 (D. Camara)[217]
128. Guinea 1984-2008 (Conte)[218]
129. Guinea 2008-10 (Camara et al.)[219]
130. Haiti 1902-11(Nord, Simon)[220]
131. Haiti 1911-14 (Leconte et al.)[221]
132. Haiti 1914 (O. Zamor)[222]
133. Haiti 1914-15 (Theodore)[223]
134. Haiti 1915 (V.-Guillaume)[224]
135. Haiti 1946 (Lavaud)[225]
136. Haiti 1950-56 (Magloire)[226]
137. Haiti 1957 (Cantave)[227]
138. Haiti 1957 (Kebreau)[228]
139. Haiti 1957-86 (Duvalier et al.)[229]
140. Haiti 1986-88 (Namphy)[230]
141. Haiti 1988-90 (Avril)[231]
142. Haiti 1991-94 (Cedras)[232]
143. Honduras 1903-07 (Bonilla)[233]
144. Honduras 1907-11 (Davila)[234]
145. Honduras 1920-24 (Lopez Gutierrez)[235]

[210]Coup (1957/10/24 - 1957/10/27).
[211]Coup (1957/10/28 - 1958/3/2).
[212]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[213]Coup (1999/5/7 - 1999/5/14).
[214]Coup (1999/5/14 - 2000/2/17).
[215]Coup (2003/9/14 - 2003/9/28).
[216]Coup (Adam Nossiter, "Guinea-Bissau Premier, Election Front-Runner, Is Deposed in Coup." April 13, 2012, *New York Times*; Derpanopoulos et al. 2016).
[217]Coup (2008/12/23 - 2009/12/5).
[218]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[219]Coup. Camara 2008-09; Konate 2010 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[220]Coup (see section 1.1).
[221]Coup (see section 1.1).
[222]Coup (1914/2/8 - 1914/10/19).
[223]Coup (see section 1.1).
[224]Coup (1915/3/4 - 1915/7/26).
[225]Coup (1946/1/11 - 1946/8/16).
[226]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[227]Coups (4/2-4/6/1957; 5/20-5/26/1957).
[228]Coup (1957/6/14 - 1957/10/15).
[229]Coup. Francois Duvalier 1957-71; Jean-Claude Duvalier 1972-86 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[230]Coup (Gros 2012, 136).
[231]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[232]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[233]Coup (see section 1.1).
[234]Coup (see section 1.1).
[235]Coup (see section 1.1).

146. Honduras 1963-71 (Lopez Arrellano)[236]
147. Honduras 1972-81 (Lopez Arellano et al.)[237]
148. Honduras 2009-10 (Micheletti)[238]
149. Hungary 1919-44 (Horthy)[239]
150. Indonesia 1966-99 (Suharto et al.)[240]
151. Iran 1925-79 (M. Reza Pahlavi)[241]
152. Iraq 1932-58 (Faysal et al.)[242]
153. Iraq 1958-63 (Kassem)[243]
154. Iraq 1963-68 (Abd al-Salam Aref et al.)[244]
155. Iraq 1968-79 (Bakr)[245]
156. Ivory Coast 1999-2000 (Guei)[246]
157. Japan 1932-45[247]
158. Jordan 1946- (Abdullah et al.)[248]
159. Kazakhstan 1991- (Nazarbayev)[249]
160. Kuwait 1961- (al-Sabah et al.)[250]
161. Kyrgyzstan 1991-2005 (Akayev)[251]
162. Kyrgyzstan 2005-10 (Baikyev)[252]
163. Laos 1959-60 (Phoumi Nosavan)[253]
164. Laos 1960 (Kong Le)[254]
165. Laos 1960-62 (Phoumi Nosavan)[255]
166. Latvia 1934-40 (Ulmanis)[256]

[236]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[237]Coup. Lopez Arrellano 1972-75; Melgar Castro 1976-78; Paz Garcia 1979-81 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[238]Coup (2009/6/28 - 2010/1/27).
[239]Adm. Miklos Horthy was an admiral (see section 1.1).
[240]Coup. Suharto 1966-98; Habibie 1999 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[241]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[242]The Hashemite monarchy of Faysal was established by the United Kingdom under direct British military rule and maintained control upon independence from the U.K. (Dawisha 2009, 15, 25, 34; Eppel 2004, 34; Sluglett 2007, 211; Fieldhouse 2008, 91).
[243]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[244]Coup. Abd al Salam Aref 1963-66; Abd al-Rahman Aref 1967-68 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[245]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[246]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[247]After Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi attempted to reign in the military for its unauthorized Manchurian campaign, he was assassinated by naval officers on May 15 1932. After this, the military role in the government grew and eventually displaced civilians (see section 1.1).
[248]The Hashemite monarchy in Jordan was established with British support after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and retained control upon independence from the United Kingdom in 1946 (Yom 2016, 155, 158-59).
[249]Nursultan Nazarbayev was the first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party and the leader of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic and retained his position after independence (Collins 2006, 160; Schatz 2004).
[250]Mubarak al-Sabah, of the ruling House of Al-Sabah which ruled modern Kuwait since around 1752, retained control after independence from the United Kingdom in 1961 (Yom 2016, 46, 75).
[251]Askar Akayev was elected to lead the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic September 1990 (Collins 2006, 144-45).
[252]Kurmanbek Bakiyev was the prime minister of Kyrgyzstan from 2000-02. After his dismissal, he became a member of parliament and leader of an emerging opposition bloc (Radnitz 2010, 66). After mass protests and defections led to the collapse of Akayev's regime in March 2005, Bakiyev took power (Radnitz 2010, 131, 204; Hale 2015, 197-99).
[253]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[254]Coup (1960/8/9 - 1960/8/15).
[255]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[256]Coup (see section 1.1).

167. Lesotho 1986-93 (Lekhanya et al.)[257]
168. Liberia 1980-90 (Doe)[258]
169. Libya 1969-2011 (Qadaffi)[259]
170. Lithuania 1926-40 (Smetona)[260]
171. Madagascar 1972-75 (Ramanantsoa)[261]
172. Madagascar 1975 (Ratsimandrava)[262]
173. Malaysia 1957- (UMNO)[263]
174. Mali 1968-91 (Traore)[264]
175. Mali 2012-13 (A. Sanogo)[265]
176. Mauritania 1960-78 (Daddah)[266]
177. Mauritania 1978-2005 (Salek et al.)[267]
178. Mauritania 2005-07 (Vall)[268]
179. Mauritania 2008- (Abdel Aziz)[269]
180. Mexico 1913-14 (Huerta)[270]
181. Myanmar 1958-60 (Ne Win)[271]
182. Myanmar 1962-88 (Ne Win)[272]
183. Myanmar 1988- (Saw Maung et al.)[273]
184. Nicaragua 1909-10 (Madriz)[274]
185. Nicaragua 1910 (J. D. Estrada)[275]
186. Nicaragua 1910 (J. J. Estrada)[276]
187. Nicaragua 1926 (C. Vargas)[277]
188. Nicaragua 1936-79 (Somoza et al.)[278]

[257]Coup. Lekhanya 1987-91; Ramaema 1992-93 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[258]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[259]Coup. Kareem Fahim, Anthony Shadid and Rick Gladstone. "Violent End to an Era as Qaddafi Dies in Libya." October 20, 2011. *New York Times*; Pargeter 2012; Derpanopoulos et al. 2016; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018.
[260]Coup (see section 1.1).
[261]Student protests in May 1927 led President Tsiranana to give power to General Gabriel Ramanantsoa who remained in office and won elections in October 1972 (Allen 1995, 68-69).
[262]Coup (1975/2/5 - 1975/2/11).
[263]The colonial-era ruling Malay elite formed the United Malays National Organization in 1946 and was granted power peacefully by the United Kingdom in 1957 (Crouch 1996, 17; Slater 2010, 77-78, 116).
[264]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[265]Coup (Adam Nossiter, "Leaders of Mali's Military Coup Seem to Have Uncertain Grasp on Power." March 23, 2012. *New York Times*; Derpanopoulos et al. 2016).
[266]After the *Loi-Cadre* reforms in 1956, Moktar Ould Daddah became vice president of the council of government and subsequently president upon decolonization (Warner 1990, 22-23).
[267]Coup. Salek 1978-79; Haidalla 1980-84; Taya 1985-2005 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[268]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[269]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[270]Coup (see section 1.1).
[271]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[272]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[273]Coup. Saw Maung 1988-92; Than Shwe 1993-2011; Thein Sein (2011-2016) (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018). It is arguably too soon to consider the Myanmar 2015 elections and partial liberalization to have ended the military regime. See Barany 2018, 5-6; Derpanopoulos et al. 2016.
[274](1909/12/16 - 1910/8/20).
[275]Coup (1910/8/20 - 1910/8/29).
[276]Coup (1910/8/29 - 1911/5/9).
[277]Coup (1926/1/17 - 1926/10/30).
[278]Coup. Somoza Garcia 1936-56; Luis Somoza Debayle 1957-67; Anastasio Somoza Debayle 1968-1979 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

189. Niger 1960-74 (Diori)[279]
190. Niger 1974-91 (Kountche et al.)[280]
191. Niger 1996-99 (Mainasarra)[281]
192. Niger 1999 (Wanke)[282]
193. Niger 2010-11 (Djibo)[283]
194. Nigeria 1966 (Ironsi)[284]
195. Nigeria 1966-79 (Gowon et al.)[285]
196. Nigeria 1983-93 (Buhari et al.)[286]
197. Nigeria 1993-99 (Abacha et al.)[287]
198. Oman 1920- (bin Faisal, bin Taimur, Qaboos)[288]
199. Pakistan 1947-58 (Jinnah et al.)[289]
200. Pakistan 1958-71 (Ayub Khan et al.)[290]
201. Pakistan 1977-88 (Zia-ul-Haq)[291]
202. Pakistan 1999-2008 (Musharraf)[292]
203. Panama 1949-51 (Arias)[293]
204. Panama 1968-82 (Torrijos et al.)[294]
205. Panama 1982-89 (Noriega)[295]
206. Paraguay 1902-04 (Ezcurra)[296]
207. Paraguay 1904-08 (Ferreira)[297]
208. Paraguay 1908-11 (Jara)[298]
209. Paraguay 1912-36 (Schaerer et al.)[299]
210. Paraguay 1936-37 (Franco)[300]

[279]Hamani Diori was a leader of the Parti Progressiste Nigerien (PPN), an originally somewhat radical though increasingly moderate party that had a traditional elite support base and was pro-France (Charlick 1991, 40-45, 49). Diori was appointed to the Niamey Municipal Council in 1952, and the PPN joined the colonial-era government in 1958 and Diori and his party retained power upon decolonization (Charlick 1991, 51, 55).
[280]Coup. Kountche 1974-87; Saibou 1988-91 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[281]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[282]Coup (1999/4/11 - 1999/12/22).
[283]Coup (Adam Nossiter. "Niger Capital Is Calm After Coup." February 19, 2010, *New York Times*; Derpanopoulos et al. 2016).
[284]Coup (1966/1/15 - 1966/7/29).
[285]Coup. Gowon 1966-75; Muhammad 1976; Obasanjo 1977-79 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[286]Coup. Buhari 1983-85; Bobangida 1986-93 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[287]Coup. Abacha 1993-98; Abubakar 1999 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[288]The recoded GWF (2018) data for Oman dates the start of the regime to the Treaty of Seeb in 1920 (the establishment of Omani autonomy within Muscat and Oman). The ruling coalition at this time retained control upon this achievement of sovereignty. See Takriti 2013, 15, 20.
[289]The Muslim League was the governing party in what was to become independence Pakistan and maintained its position after Partition and independence (Tudor 2013, 173-74).
[290]Coup. Ayub Khan 1958-69; Yahya Khan 1970-71 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[291]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[292]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[293]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[294]Coup. Torrijos 1968-81; Flores 1982 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[295]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[296]Coup (see section 1.1).
[297]Coup (see section 1.1).
[298]Coup (see section 1.1).
[299]Coup (see section 1.1).
[300]Coup (see section 1.1).
[301]Coup (see section 1.1).
[302]Coup. N. Gonzalez 1948-49; Chavez 1950-54 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[303]Coup. Stroessner 1954-90; Rodriguez 1991-93 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

211. Paraguay 1937-39 (Paredes)[301]
212. Paraguay 1948-54 (Gonzalez et al.)[302]
213. Paraguay 1954-93 (Stroessner et al.)[303]
214. Peru 1914-15 (Benavides)[304]
215. Peru 1930-45 (Sanchez Cerro et al.)[305]
216. Peru 1948-56 (Odria)[306]
217. Peru 1962-63 (Perez Godoy)[307]
218. Peru 1963 (Lindley Lopez)[308]
219. Peru 1968-80 (Velasco et al.)[309]
220. Poland 1926-39 (Pildsudski)[310]
221. Portugal 1910-11 (Braga)[311]
222. Portugal 1917-18 (de Silva)[312]
223. Portugal 1926-74 (Salazar et al.)[313]
224. Portugal 1974 (Spinola)[314]
225. Romania 1938-40 (Carol II)[315]
226. Romania 1940-44 (Antonescu)[316]
227. Romania 1944-45 (Sanatescu)[317]
228. Rwanda 1973-94 (Habyarimana)[318]
229. Sierra Leone 1967 (Lansana)[319]
230. Sierra Leone 1967-68 (Juxon-Smith)[320]
231. Sierra Leone 1992-96 (Strasser)[321]
232. Sierra Leone 1996 (Bio)[322]
233. Sierra Leone 1997-98 (Koroma)[323]
234. Somalia 1969-91 (Barre)[324]
235. South Korea 1961 (Chang)[325]
236. South Korea 1961-87 (Park et al.)[326]

[304]Coup (see section 1.1).
[305]Coup (see section 1.1).
[306]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[307]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[308]Coup (1963/3/3 - 1963/7/28).
[309]Coup. Velasco Alvarado 1968-75; Morales Bermudez 1976-80; (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[310]Coup (see section 1.1).
[311]Coup (1910/10/5 - 1911/8/24).
[312]Coup (see section 1.1).
[313]Coup. Salazar 1926-68; Caetano 1969-74 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[314]Coup (1974/4/25 - 1974/9/30).
[315]Incumbent monarch King Carol II dismissed the government, abolished parliament, and banned political parties (see section 1.1).
[316]Coup (see section 1.1).
[317]Coup (see section 1.1).
[318]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[319]Coup (1967/3/21 - 1967/3/23).
[320]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[321]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[322]Coup (1996/1/17 - 1996/3/29).
[323]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[324]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[325]Coup (1961/5/18 - 1961/7/3).
[326]Coup. Park Chung Hee 1962-79; Chun Doo-hwan (1980-87 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[327]The South Vietnamese regime was based on unreformed state institutions from the Bao Dai French Protectorate and independence saw no major state transformations other than changes in bureaucratic patronage networks (Duncanson 1968, 228; Slater 2010, 257-58).
[328]Coup. Duong Van Minh 1963-64; Nguyen Khanh 1965; Nguyen Cao Ky 1966-67; Nguyen Van Thieu 1968-75 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

237. South Vietnam 1954-63 (Diem)[327]
238. South Vietnam 1963-75 (Van Minh et al.)[328]
239. Spain 1923-30 (de Rivera)[329]
240. Spain 1939-76 (Franco)[330]
241. Sudan 1958-64 (Abboud)[331]
242. Sudan 1969-85 (Numeiri)[332]
243. Sudan 1985-86 (Dhahab)[333]
244. Sudan 1989- (al-Turabi et al.)[334]
245. Swaziland 1968- (Sobhuza II et al.)[335]
246. Syria 1946-47 (Quwatli)[336]
247. Syria 1949 (Al-Zaim)[337]
248. Syria 1949 (Hinnawi)[338]
249. Syria 1949-51 (Shishakli)[339]
250. Syria 1951-54 (Shishakli)[340]
251. Syria 1961 (Al-Kuzbari)[341]
252. Syria 1962-63 (Zahr al-Din)[342]
253. Syria 1963 (Atassi)[343]
254. Syria 1963- (al-Hafiz et al.)[344]
255. Taiwan 1949-2000 (Kai-shek et al.)[345]
256. Tajikistan 1991- (Nabiyev et al.)[346]
257. Thailand 1932-33 (Phraya Mano)[347]
258. Thailand 1933-44[348]
259. Thailand 1947-57 (L. Phibun Songkhram)[349]

[329]Coup (see section 1.1).
[330]General Franciso Franco was the chief of the Spanish army's general staff when the civil war began in 1936 (Payne 2012, 33, 120). Franco had been in Morocco in command of an elite section of the Spanish army when the civil war began, and used his base in the Spanish Moroccan Protectorate to launch his attacks on the Republican forces (Payne 2012, 82).
[331]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[332]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[333]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[334]Coup. al-Turabi 1990-99; al-Bashir 2000- (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[335]The ruling Swazi monarchy led by Sobhuza II maintained its position after independence from the United Kingdom (Potholm 1972, 1-2, 129).
[336]Shukri al-Quwatli was the pre-independence president of Syria and maintained control upon decolonization from France (McHugo 2014, 122, 114).
[337]Coup (1949/3/30 - 1949/8/13).
[338]Coup (1949/8/13 - 1949/12/19).
[339]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[340]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[341]Coup (1961/9/28 - 1961/12/1).
[342]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[343]Coup (1963/3/9 - 1963/7/27).
[344]Coup. al-Hafiz 1963-66; Jadid 1967-70; Hafez Asad 1971-2000; Bashir Asad 2001- (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[345]The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) who ruled mainland China since 1927, reasserted control over Taiwan (Formosa) in 1945 after the defeat of occupying Japanese forces. After the defeat of the KMT on the mainland in 1949, the party established Taiwan as its remaining stronghold (ting Lin 2016, 39, 119-20).
[346]Rahmon Nabiyev was the former first secretary of Tajik Communist Party and the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic (from 1982-85) (Collins 2006, 155). After first secretary Makhkamov was forced to step down under pressure from opposition in parliament, and acting President Aslonov declared Tajik independence, Nabiyev, who took over as head of the Supreme Soviet after Aslonov, took power after a declaration of a state of emergency (Collins 2006, 164).
[347]Coup (Lentz 1999, 433).
[348]Coup (see section 1.1).
[349]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

260. Thailand 1957-73 (Sarit et al.)[350]
261. Thailand 1976-88 (Sangad et al.)[351]
262. Thailand 1991-92 (S. Kraprayoon)[352]
263. Thailand 2006-07 (Sonthi)[353]
264. Thailand 2014- (Prayut Chan-o-cha)[354]
265. Togo 1963- (Eyadema et al.)[355]
266. Turkey 1923-50 (Ataturk)[356]
267. Turkey 1960-61 (Gursel)[357]
268. Turkey 1980-83 (Evren)[358]
269. Turkmenistan 1991- (Niyazov)[359]
270. Uganda 1971-79 (Amin)[360]
271. Uganda 1980 (P. Muwanga)[361]
272. Uganda 1985-86 (Okello)[362]
273. United Arab Emirates 1971- [363]
274. Uruguay 1973-84 (Chiappe Posse et al.)[364]
275. Uzbekistan 1991- (Karimov)[365]
276. Venezuela 1908-45 (Gomez et al.)[366]
277. Venezuela 1948-58 (Delgado et al.)[367]
278. Venezuela 1958 (Larrazabal)[368]
279. Yemen 1948 (Ibn Ahmed Alwazir)[369]
280. Yemen 1962-67 (Sallal et al.)[370]
281. Yemen 1967-74 (Iryani)[371]
282. Yemen 1974-78 (Hamdi et al.)[372]
283. Yugoslavia 1941 (Peter II)[373]

[350]Coup. Sarit 1957-63; Thanom 1964-73 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[351]Coup. Sangad Chalayu 1976-77; Kriangsak 1978-80; Prem Tinsulanonda 1981-88 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[352]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[353]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[354]Coup. (Pepinsky 2017, 125).
[355]Coup. Eyadema 1963-2005; Gnassingbe 2006- (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[356]Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was a brigadier general (*pasha*) in the Ottoman army (Rustow 1968, 809; Lewis 2002, 245; Hanioglu 2011, 80).
[357]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[358]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[359]Saparmurat Niyazov was the first secretary of the Turkmenistan Communist Party and leader of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic (Way 2015, 156).
[360]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[361]Coup (1980/5/18 - 1980/12/17).
[362]Coup (1985/7/29 - 1986/1/29).
[363]The ruling sheikdoms maintained their positions after independence from the United Kingdom (Ulrichsen 2017, 44-45, 52, 54).
[364]Coup. Chiappe Posse 1973-74; Vadora 1975-78; Alvarez 1979; Queriolo 1980-82; Hontou 1983-84 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[365]Islam Karimov was the first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party and leader of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (Collins 2006, 148).
[366]Coup (see section 1.1).
[367]Coup. Delgado Chalbaud 1948-50; Perez Jimenez 1951-58 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[368]Coup (1958/1/23 - 1958/11/14).
[369]Coup (1948/2/17 - 1948/3/13).
[370]Coup. Sallal 1962-65; Amri 1966; Sallal 1967 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[371]Coup (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[372]Coup. Hamdi 1974-77; Ghashmi 1978 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
[373]Coup (1941/3/27 - 1941/4/20).

3.3 Controlled by a foreign power

We exclude regimes controlled by a foreign power upon regime formation (see section 2.1). By foreign controlled, we mean regimes where the coercive apparatus is controlled by a foreign power upon regime formation. The following cases can be excluded for foreign control over the coercive apparatus.

Bulgaria 1944-89

The Bulgarian Communist Party seized power under the protection of the Red Army with Soviet control of the coercive apparatus (Naimark 2010, 177; McAdams 2017, 256; Westad 2017, 80). In Bulgaria like elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Soviet military missions oversaw the reorganization of military forces, embedded commanders, advisers, and technicians within the armed forces and defense ministries and purged pre-communist officer corps (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1951, 3).[374]

Cambodia 1979-

Responding to conflicts with the Khmer Rouge regime in Phnom Penh (which had been launching attacks on the Vietnamese), Hanoi organized a Cambodian government-in-exile from Khmer Rouge defectors[375] and Cambodians living in Vietnam, and invaded Cambodia and installed this group in power (Becker 1998, 434-55; Brown and Zasloff 1998, 5-6; Gottesman 2003, 48; Womack 2006, 195; Chandler 2008, 276). After the invasion, 100,000-150,000 Vietnamese troops occupied Cambodia to defend the regime from a variety of armed opposition groups (Becker 1998, 431, 435; Brown and Zasloff 1998, 22; Chandler 2008, 285).

Czechoslovakia 1948-89

The Czechoslovak Communist Party seized power while the Soviet Union organized and controlled the coercive apparatus (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1951, 3; Kaplan 1986, 13-14). Stalin handpicked Ludwick Svoboda as the head of the Czechoslovak army (Kaplan 1986, 13-14), and in Czechoslovakia like elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Soviet military missions oversaw the reorganization of military forces, embedded commanders, advisers, and technicians within the armed forces and defense ministries and purged pre-communist officer corps (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1951, 3; Johnson 1981, 2, 7-8). Moscow also helped Prague create the Ministry of State Security which engaged in "counterintelligence" in the army (Shearer and Khaustov 2015, 283-84).

Democratic Republic of the Congo 1997-

[374]The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency noted that as of September 1951, "[t]he secret police and security forces in each of the Satellites are large, carefully selected, and well trained. They are infiltrated and often dominated by experienced Soviet personnel" (1951, 3). See also Johnson 1981, 2, 7-8.

[375]The organization was named The Khmer People's Revolutionary Party, KPRP. It would later be renamed the Cambodian People's Party.

The Alliances des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) seized power after a Rwandan-led invasion ousted Mobutu from power in Kinshasa and installed Kabila and the recently created AFDL into office (Prunier 2009, 107, 116; Roessler and Verhoeven 2016, 238). After the invasion, Rwandan military forces[376] maintained order in Kinshasa (Roessler and Verhoeven 2016, 236). As Kabila "lacked an army" he "invited [Rwandan General] Kabarebe and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to stay on to form an integrated new army" (Roessler and Verhoeven 2016, 238). General Kabarebe became the chief of staff of the Congolese armed forces (Roessler and Verhoeven 2016, 238). The RPF controlled the military, security forces, and even the presidential guard unit (Roessler and Verhoeven 2016, 239).[377]

East Germany 1949-90

The German communists seized power under the protection of the Red Army with Soviet control of the coercive apparatus (Brown 2009, 174-75; Naimark 2010, 180; Barany 2016, 101). The Soviets did the bulk of the work creating the governing apparatus of the new administration, helping to form both the ruling party (the Socialist Unity Party, SED) and the Ministry for State Security (MfS, or Stasi) (Bruce 2003, 12-13, 16-17; Brown 2009, 174-75; Naimark 2010, 180). In East Germany like elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Soviet military missions oversaw the reorganization of military forces, embedded commanders, advisers, and technicians within the armed forces and defense ministries and purged pre-communist officer corps (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1951, 3; Johnson 1981, 2, 7-8). Soviet troops were stationed in Germany from 1945 until 1993 (Barany 2016, 101).

Hungary 1947-90

The Hungarian Communist Party seized power under the protection of the Red Army with Soviet control of the coercive apparatus (Kovrig 1979, 264; Naimark 2010, 180-81). The new armed forces were "controlled by Soviet military attaches. . . . Russian advisers operated even at the regimental level" (Kovrig 1979, 264).[378]

Laos 1975-

The Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) seized power in 1975 under the protection of Vietnamese forces that suppressed armed opposition groups in Laos in the years that followed (Auclair 1994, 271; Brown and Zasloff 1994, 244, 254). Vietnamese advisers and soldiers "constituted a pervasive, inescapable influence" and logistics and training assistance continued through the 1970s and 1980s (Brown and Zasloff 1986, 245).[379] During the war,

[376]The Rwandan Patriotic Army, the armed wing of the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front. See section 4.17

[377]Kabila slowly removed Rwandan forces from his presidential guard and shifted to Tanzanian's and Tanzanian-trained Katangese forces and created a new Congolese National Police staffed largely by Katangese on which Kabila relied when he expelled RPF forces from the DRC in 1998 (Roessler and Verhoeven 2016, 269-71, 293).

[378]See also Johnson 1981, 7-8; Gitz 1992, 17.

[379]See also Langer and Zasloff 1969, 141.

Laotian battalions were assigned one North Vietnamese military and one political advisor each and these advisers helped make battle decisions (Langer and Zasloff 1969, 141, 147). North Vietnamese troops were stationed in Laos and "hundreds of Vietnamese advisers. . . . mentored their Laotian counterparts in virtually all the ministries" (Brown and Zasloff 1994, 245). 50,000 Vietnamese soldiers were stationed in Laos after the war, "advising and working side by side with their Laotian counterparts to suppress the remaining opposition forces" (Auclair 1994, 271).

Libya 1951-69

The Libyan Sanusi monarchy led by Sayyid Idris was established with substantial British assistance and attained independence in 1951. Britain formed the nucleus of the Royal Libyan Army, and British forces remained in Libya after independence (Khadduri 1963, 227-30; Tartter 1989, 241; Pargeter 2012, 45).

Mongolia 1921-93

While the Mongolian People's Party (MPP) seized power in 1921 from below and engaged in radical social transformation beginning around 1924, the coercive apparatus was controlled by the Soviet Red Army (Worden and Savada 1991, 230; Sandag and Kendall 2000, 3; Roshchin 1999, 102, 113-15; Kaplonski 2014, 56, 88; Khalid 2017, 633). Soviet troops remained in Mongolia until 1925 and returned multiple times in the subsequent years (Roshchin 1999, 106; Kuzmin and Oyuunchimeg 2015). Soviet advisers were stationed in Mongolia, and Comintern representatives sat in on party and government meetings (Kaplonski 2014, 48). Soviet advisers also staffed the Mongolian secret police (Sandag and Kendall 2000, 3). A Soviet general was the chief of the Mongolian army general staff (Worden and Savada 1991, 230).

North Korea 1948-

The Kim Il Sung regime came to power with Soviet control over the coercive apparatus (Lankov 2002, 18, 21-29, 56-57; Armstrong 2003, 63, 191, 200, 217, 233). Kim Il Sung had led a group of partisans fighting the Japanese in Manchuria (Scalapino and Lee 1992, 209).[380] The Soviet Union occupied the area after WWII and picked Kim Il Sung to rule the protostate in northern Korea (Lankov 2002, 18).[381] During the period of regime formation (1945-48), the Soviet Red Army and KGB directly committed themselves to domestic repression and police functions (Armstrong 2003, 63, 191). Soviet advisers were embedded in the Justice Bureau and "equipped and advised" the newly formed Korean People's Army (KPA) (Armstrong 2003, 200, 217). Even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1948,

[380]Estimates range for the number of partisans fighting alongside Kim in Manchuria, from 200 during the worst periods of Japanese counterinsurgency pressure to around 1,000 on a few occasions (Scalapino and Lee 1992, 225, 228).

[381]The Soviets aided in the creation of the predecessor to the Korean Worker's Party, the North Korean Bureau of the Communist Party of North Korea, and by the spring of 1946 they established the Communist Party of North Korea and Kim Il Sung became the head of the new party (Lankov 2002, 21-29).

advisers remained embedded in the KPA "at east to the battalion level and possibly as far down as the company level" (Armstrong 2003, 233).

Poland 1944-89

The communist regime in Poland took power with Soviet control over the coercive apparatus (Johnson 1981, 8; Naimark 2010, 178). The Polish National Liberation Committee (PKWN) "was secretly formed by Stalin from the ranks of former Polish Communists living in Moscow" (Naimark 2010, 178). In Poland as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Soviet military missions oversaw the reorganization of military forces, embedded commanders, advisers, and technicians within the armed forces and defense ministries and purged pre-communist officer corps (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1951, 3; Johnson 1981, 2, 7-8). In the early 1950s, the defense minister, chief of the general staff, commander of the ground forces, heads of all service branches, and commanders of all four military districts were former Soviet officers (Johnson 1981, 8). Soviet troops remained in Poland throughout the entire communist regime's tenure (Barany 2016, 101).

Romania 1945-89

The Romanian Communist Party came to power under the protection of the Red Army with Soviet control over the coercive apparatus (Johnson 1981, 2, 7-8; Naimark 2010, 179-80). Red Army units occupied Romania, and under the very clear threat of violence the Romanian monarchy acquiesced to a communist-led coup under the guise of the National Democratic Front (FND) (Naimark 2010, 179-80). Soviet military missions oversaw the reorganization of military forces, embedded commanders, advisers, and technicians within the armed forces and defense ministries and purged pre-communist officer corps (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1951, 3; Johnson 1981, 2, 7-8). However, Soviet troops left Romania in 1958 (Barany 2016, 101).

South Korea 1948-60

During the U.S. occupation of southern Korea following the defeat of Japan in WWII, Washington facilitated the inauguration of Syngman Rhee as president of South Korea in 1948 (Brazinsky 2007, 2-3). Even after the Korean War (1950-53), the U.S. retained command authority over the military of the Republic of Korea (Greitens 2016, 142).

3.4 No state transformation

The following cases can be excluded for failing to engage in transformation of the existing state apparatus (section 2.2.3).

Bangladesh 1971-75

Prior to independence, Bangladesh (then called East Pakistan) was controlled by Sheikh Mujibur (Mujib) Rahman's Awami League (AL) that won the 1970 elections on a platform of subnational autonomy (Riaz 2016, 16-17, 21, 24). AL support was broad-based and nationalist (Riaz 2016, 33). After the uprising that led to a brief war for independence, members of the East Pakistani state pledged loyalty to Mujib (Riaz 2016, 27). The coercive forces were largely formed out of locally based Pakistani army units, especially the East Bengal Regiment of the Army and the local police (Riaz 2016, 35, 41). New volunteer 'freedom fighters' who joined during the war were not included in government reconstruction efforts (Riaz 2016, 42). "The war of liberation was not initiated to overthrow the [Pakistani] colonial state structure or to bring about a radical change in the social order, therefore during and after the war there was no plan or effort to undermine the extant civilian administration. The government-in-exile, in its first proclamation, accepted the continuance of the structures it inherited and at no time attempted to build a parallel administration" (Riaz 2016, 40).

Bolivia 1946-51

In July 1946, a popular revolt led by civilians led to the ouster of the regime "without the defection of any army or police officers" (Klein 2011, 203). The army remained intact and the subsequent government did not engage in any attempts at radical social transformation (Wagner 1991, 34). While there were some trials of junior officers for earlier political activities proscribed by the constitution, these were done through normal legal channels (Hudson 1991, 225).

Guatemala, 1954-57

On June 17, 1954, with extensive support from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Colonel Castillo Armas led an invasion of Guatemala from Honduras to oust the Jacobo Arbenz government in Guatemala City (Rabe 2016, 50). When Col. Castillo Armas and his Liberacionista forces took power in Guatemala City, they did not oversee a change in state administration as the military remained intact (Streeter 2000, 43).

Madagascar 2009-13

After violent street protests from January-March 2009, President Marc Ravalomanana handed power to a Military Directorate, which in turn gave power to opposition leader Rajoelina who made no changes to the military (Ratsimbaharison 2017, 1-3). Madagascar witnessed a return to democracy in 2013 (Derpanopoulos et al. 2016).

Morocco 1956-

Morocco's relatively brief colonial period (1912-56) was characterized by indirect rule under a French protectorate which left the Sultanate and its coercive structures intact and the monarchy was able to retain power during decolonization (Willis 2012, 20-22, 42).

Nepal 1951-91

The regime change in 1951 which led to the rule of King Tribhuvan left the army intact and did not alter the position of pre-1951 social elites (the ruling Rana family) (Brown 1996, 18-23).

South Yemen 1967-90

When the National Liberation Front (NLF)[382] achieved independence in 1967, it inherited the British-trained military and civil service "virtually intact."[383]

Zimbabwe 1980-

While the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) came to power after waging a successful insurgency against the White-ruled Smith regime in Rhodesia, there was no state transformation (Herbst 1990, 30-31; Wietzer 1990, 139; Toit 1995, 119; Sachikonye 1995, 136). The war forced a negotiated agreement in 1979 after which ZANU won the 1980 elections (Kriger 2003, 46-7). However, the Rhodesian state did not collapse[384], and instead ZANU inherited and maintained the powerful coercive apparatus developed during the counterinsurgency (Wietzer 1984a; Wietzer 1984b; Wietzer 1990). The civil service remained intact, and many of the coercive apparatus personnel remained (Herbst 1990, 30-31).[385]

[382]The NLF was founded in North Yemen in 1963 (Halliday 1990, 9).

[383]"The Yemens: A Handbook." Reference Aid; Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis; Central Intelligence Agency; 04/01/1984; Secret; Declassified 04/06/2010; CREST No. CIA-RDP85T00314R000100010001-0 [pdf]; General CIA Records. See also Halliday 1990, 23; Brehony 2017, 429, 434.

[384]The 1978-90 transition "did not. . . smash the institutional framework of the Rhodesian state. The state's major instruments of legal control - most notably those that controlled the economy and the security apparatus - remained intact (Toit 1995, 119). See also Sachikonye 1995, 136. Thus, there was "a basic continuity in the core of state power in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe" (Wietzer 1990, 139).

[385]Many "whites with experience in repressive governance" remained in "key positions in contemporary repressive apparatuses" (Wietzer 1984a, 85). See also Wietzer 1990, 110.

3.5 No radical social and/or geopolitical transformation

The following cases can be excluded for failing to engage in an immediate attempt at radical social and/or geopolitical transformation (section 2.2.4).

Afghanistan 1929-73

Tribal forces led by Nadir Shah overthrew Habibollah Ghazi (see section 3.2) and seized power in Kabul in October 1929 (Rubin 2002, 58; Barfield 2010, 195). However, once in power the regime disbanded the tribal army and sought "compromise with rural power holders" (Rubin 2002, 59; Barfield 2010, 200).

Cen. African Rep. 1979-81

Former President David Dacko (1960-66) returned to power with the aid of a bloodless French intervention against Jean-Bedel Bokassa in 1979 (Moose 1985, 80-84; Chipman 1989, 124; Gildea 1996, 219; Titley 1997, 66-68, 131-32; Schmidt 2013, 185; Vallin 2015, 83). Bokassa-era security forces had "largely vanished with the collapse of the regime" and the army was reconstituted under Dacko (Titley 1997, 152, 160). The new regime was protected by some 300 French troops and largely left Bokassa-era elites in place (Titley 1997, 152, 154).[386]

Chad 1982-90

While the Forces Armees du Nord (FAN)[387] led by Hissene Habre seized power and took over the functions of a national army, the regime immediately sought accommodation with southern elites and did not attempt radical social transformation (Nolutshungu 1996, 168, 179, 183, 195-96). Immediately upon taking power in N'Djamena, Habre sought ethnic and factional accommodation and to incorporate as many southern elites as possible into the regime and southern bureaucrats retained their positions (Nolutshungu 1996, 179, 183, 195-96). The regime also maintained good relations with France and the United States (Debos 2016, 58).

Chad 1990-

While the Popular Movement for Salvation (MPS) led by Idriss Deby ousted Habre's regime from power in 1990, Deby had been a general in the Chadian military under Habre as late as 1989 and the new regime did not engage in any attempts at radical social transformation and instead sought accommodation with domestic elites and international allies (Nolutshungu 1996, 235-37, 242, 253, 301, 317; Azevedo and Nnadozie 1998, 62; Roessler 2016,

[386] There were, however, some executions of senior officials (Titley 1997, 154). On the French presence, see also "Central African Republic: On a Tightrope." Memo; Directorate of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; 12/05/1983; Secret; Declassified 08/09/2010; CREST No. CIA-RDP85T00287R000500160001-1 [pdf]; General CIA Records.

[387] The FAN had been the Second Liberation Army of FROLINAT which had waged an insurgency against the Tombalbaye regime until its collapse to a coup in 1975 (Thompson and Adloff 1981, 148).

132, 236-37). The seizure of power in December 1990 was met largely without resistance after Habre's forces collapsed and France made it clear it would not intervene (Nolutshungu 1996, 237, 242, 246; Young 2012, 167). The regime did not engage in radical social transformation upon taking power and instead sought to appease domestic elites and maintained friendly relations with both Paris and neighboring states (Nolutshungu 1996, 242, 253, 301, 317; Skutsch 2012, 388).

China 1927-1949

The Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT) led by Chiang Kai-shek embarked on a campaign to subdue the northern warlords in 1926 which succeeded in capturing all of China by 1929. The KMT regime did engage in largescale repression of the Chinese Communist Party and suspected leftists within the KMT, especially in April 1927 (MacNair 1931, 96-98; Linebarger 1943, 262-64; Bianco 1971, 23-24, 56; Eastman 1986, 116-24, 138; Lary 2007, 76-77, 79). However, the KMT "made no real effort to transform China" and instead coopted existing warlord networks and left the upper classes largely in place (Bianco 1971, 119; 122-23, 125).

Costa Rica 1948

In 1948, Jose Figueres Ferrer and his National Liberation army seized power and governed through an "anticommunist revolutionary" junta which did not engage in radical reforms and stepped down to hand power to the winner of the 1948 election (Booth 1998, 22, 49; Yashar 1997, 184-85, 188-89). In 1948, the government of President Teodoro Picado had sought to nullify the results of elections (Yashar 1997, 144, 179-81; Booth 1998, 20, 47), triggering a six-week civil war in which the opposition National Liberation Army, led by Jose Figueres, defeated pro-government forces.[388] The victorious forces set up a National Liberation Junta, which oversaw the drafting of a new constitution and abolished the standing army (Yashar 1997, 184-89). The Junta adopted a moderate strategy and "failed to implement many of its revolutionary goals" (Booth 1998, 49), and in 1949, it handed power to the winner of the contested 1948 presidential election, who was a conservative (Yashar 1997, 184-85). Figueres and his National Liberation Party returned to power via competitive elections in 1953. Scholars have characterized both the 1948-49 junta and subsequent governments as reformist, rather than radical (Yashar 1997; Booth 1998). Notwithstanding a modest land reform and some bank nationalizations, neither the economic elite nor property rights were seriously threatened (Yashar 1997, 188-89).

Congo (Brazz.) 1997-

Denis Sassou-Nguesso, the former military dictator of the Republic of Congo (1979-91), after being forced to cede power in 1991, led a brief insurgency which captured national power in 1997 but did not attempt any radical social transformation and instead sought accommodation with existing elites (Clark 2008, 2, 251, 253, 271; Roessler and Verhoeven 2016, 379).

[388] This war cost an estimated 1,000-1,300 lives (Yashar 1997, 183).

As he approached the end of his first tenure, Sassou-Nguesso transformed his ethnically-based Presidential Guard into a milita named the Cobras (Clark 2008, 158). By 1997, the Cobras had reached 3,000 members (Clark 2008, 165). With the assistance of an Angolan intervention, the Cobra's seized power in Brazzaville in 1997 and fought a civil war until 1999 (Roessler and Verhoeven 2016, 378-79). The regime did not engage in social transformation, instead relying on existing elites and operated under "no ideology of development", maintaining friendly relations with neighboring states (Clark 2008, 251, 253, 271).

Ethiopia 1991-

While the Tigray People's Revolutionary Front (TPLF) launched a sustained armed struggle against the Derg regime (1974-91) which culminated in the seizure of power, the TPLF did not engage in any attempts at radical social transformation after taking power (Tiruneh 1993, 104; Young 1997, 65, 68, 106, 114, 174, 185, 209; Tareke 2009, 84). Upon seizing power the regime decentralized government control to ethnic-based administrations and engaged in market liberalization (Young 1997, 167, 209; Prendergas and Duffield 1999, 49; Hagmann and Abbink 2011, 582; Clapham 2017, 70-71). While the regime fought a war with its erstwhile allies in Eritrea 1998-2000[389] and a 2006 intervention in Somalia, the regime maintained friendly relations with the U.S. and other neighbors and major powers (Reid 2011b, 217; Clapham 2017, 69).

Hungary 1918-19

In October 1918 Count Mihaly Karolyi took over newly independent in the "Chrysanthemum revolution" and ruled until March 1919. Karolyi was a "moderate" who led a coalition of "middle of the road parties." The government did not make any serious efforts at land or other radical social reforms before it was overthrown by the much more radical communists under the leadership of Bela Kun (McAdams 2017, 118-19).

Indonesia 1949-66

While the Nationalist Party of Indonesia (PNI) fought a war for independence against returning Dutch colonial forces, after the war the PNI did not engage in attempts at radical social transformation (Anderson 1972, 10; Slater 2010, 106, 108; Reid 2011a, 26-27, 179-80). The PNI was formed in 1927 and "rapidly became the strongest nationalist organization" (Bertrand 2004, 30). The PNI was a big-tent organization which sought to unit all Muslims, Marxists, and nationalists under an anti-imperial banner (Reid 2011a, 19). During the war with the Dutch, the national leadership of the independence struggle strongly resisted demands for radical social transformation (Reid 2011a, 179). Instead, PNI leader Sukarno established a broad (albeit quite fragmented) coalition in favor of independence that initially sidelined the more radical Communist Party (PKI) (Bertrand 2004, 31).

[389]The conflict began with mutual exchanges of fire and an Eritrean invasion (Reid 2011b, 220; Clapham 2017, 83).

Liberia 1997-2003

After the Liberian Civil War, Charles Taylor won competitive elections in 1997 after a peace agreement. His regime remained embedded in the global capitalist system, did not engage in any attempts at radical social transformation, and incorporated former opponents into the regime. Taylor also maintained good relations with France and the United States (Moran 2006, 21; Waugh 2011, 229, 240, 247; Kaihko 2017, 53).

Mongolia 1920-21

When White Russian General Baron Freiherr Roman Nikolai Maximilian von Ungern-Sternberg overthrew a Chinese warlord regime in Mongolia, he did not engage in any attempts at radical social transformation during his brief rule (Palmer 2008, 169). In October of 1920, Ungern's forces[390] entered Outer Mongolian territory and seized power in Urga[391] in February 1921. Upon taking power, Ungern restored the Mongolian monarch under the Bogd Khan (although also declaring himself ruler) and began a period of "counterrevolutionary" violence against suspected Bolsheviks (Palmer 2008, 147-55, 172). Ungern was fanatically pro-monarchy and left the Chinese merchant class largely intact (Roshchin 1999, 9-13; Palmer 2008, 169).

Myanmar 1948-58

While the nationalist Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) maintained an armed wing and forced the British to grant independence after mass demonstrations, the regime did not engage any attempts at radical social transformation (Silverstein 1980, 61, 149). The League was an umbrella nationalist organization that "maintained sufficient cohesion to apply pressure on the British to depart" after the war (Taylor 1987, 230).[392] After the AFPFL negotiated a transition to independence, the U Nu government engaged in no radical social transformation as it instead sought to keep together its large and disparate coalition after independence by not challenging major societal groups (Silverstein 1980, 149). The movement had appealed to domestic elites precisely because it called for national independence rather than redistribution (Slater 2010, 266-67).[393]

Namibia 1990-

Despite taking power after waging guerrilla struggle against South African rule from 1966-1988, the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) did not engage in any attempted radical social transformation after taking power (Lindeke 1995, 17-18; Melber 2003, 16; Kaapama 2007). SWAPO was formed in 1960 to challenge Apartheid South African rule over

[390] Ungern led a force of soldiers fighting the Bolshevik Red Army in the Russian Civil War in an attempt to reestablish Tsarist rule. Estimates of the size of Ungern's army in this period vary, from 1,500 to 2,000. See Roshchin 1999, 12.

[391] Present day Ulaanbaatar.

[392] See also Silverstein 1977, 62.

[393] It is also worth noting that GWF do not consider this to be an authoritarian regime (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

South-West Africa and its military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) carried out a guerrilla struggle against South African rule from 1966 until 1988.[394] The negotiated agreement for independence enshrined private property rights and prevented any largescale land reform (Lindeke 1995, 17-18; Melber 2003, 16; Kaapama 2007). Namibia made no effort to challenge the regional order and maintained friendly relations with South Africa.

Saudi Arabia 1927-

During the consolidation of the modern Saudi state, Ibn Saud did utilize groups of religious zealot warriors (the *Ikhwan*) but they were only one part of a larger army and were violently purged in 1929. Moreover, the Saudi state grew by coopting existing elites and did not engage in radical social transformation (Kostiner 1993, 16, 42, 74, 101-2; Smyth 1993, 21, 23-24, 26; Tartter 1993, 235-36; Riedel 2018, 23). During the fight for control over the Arabian peninsula, the Saudis in part relied on a group of religious tribal warriors, the *Ikhwan*. The *Ikwhan* acted as important shock troops in the emerging Saudi armed forces, playing a critical role in defeating the rulers of the Hijaz and other chieftancies (Kostiner 1993, 16, 42, 74, 101-2; Smyth 1993, 23-24; Tartter 1993, 235). However, as the Saudi state expanded, it remained based on a "chieftancy structure" of tribal alliances and existing elites were largely left in their place (Kostiner 1993, 42, 101; Smyth 1993, 26). The ulama "appear to have maintained the position of importance they had attained in the postwar era" and "the Ikhwan chieftans were allotted no administrative or governmental positions" (Kostiner 1993, 105; 106). Ibn Saud appeased the Muslim world in July 1925 declaring that while *sharia* would remain the system of law in Hijaz, holy shrines would not be damaged (Kostiner 1993, 103). Thus, the Hijaz "did not turn into a staunch Wahhabi center; [and] the gradual approach to religious change did not satisfy [*Ikhwan*] desires" (Kostiner 1993, 109). These moderate policies resulted in a growing rift with the *Ikhwan*, and after they attacked tribes in the British protectorate of Iraq and ignored Saud's authority, he fought the *Ikwhan* and defeated them with British help in 1929 (Smyth 1993, 25-26; Tartter 1993, 236; Riedel 2018, 23).

South Sudan 2011-

Despite the professed socialist leanings of the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), the rebel group did not engage in attempted radical social transformation either in liberated areas during the civil war, as the de facto southern government after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, or after independence in July 2011. The SPLA/M was founded in May 1983 (LeRiche and Arnold 2012, 32) and during its long insurgency against the Khartoum government, the movement "resurrected the colonial-era policy of placing land tenure under customary law, giving exclusive power of interpretation to a tribally defined chief and further enriching the power of the traditional chiefs" (Mampilly 2011, 157). The SPLA/M absorbed (and occasionally eliminated) rival southern groups and brought back into the fold the commanders who had defected and fought the movement

[394]The insurgency cost between 10,000 and 25,000 lives (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

(Rolandsen and Daly 2016, 133-35). This process was particularly accelerated after the 2005 death of the movement's longtime leader, John Garang. His deputy and successor, Salva Kiir, pursued a strategy of accommodation and sought to "reconcile with many of the armed groups and political factions throughout South Sudan" and prop up existing leadership networks (LeRiche and Arnold 2012, 145). After independence, the social-system maintaining policies were continued (Rolandsen and Daly 2016, 158-59).

Tunisia 1956-2011

The nationalist Neo-Destour party negotiated decolonization from France in 1956 (Willis 2012, 30, 40). While Neo-Destour did engage in some small-scale attacks on French colonial authorities, the party did not engage in any radical social transformation upon achieving independence (Willis 2012, 30, 39-40). The Bourguiba regime did redistribute some land after independence, but it did so "without infringing on private ownership rights" (Perkins 2014, 150). Tunisia also maintained friendly relations with the United States (Perkins 2014, 145).

Uganda 1986-

Despite an ostensibly revolutionary left wing orientation, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) did not engage in attempted radial social transformation upon seizing national power in an armed struggle in 1986 (Mamdani 1996, 216; Kasfir 2005, 275). In 1982, Yoweri Museveni and his People's Resistance Army merged with the Ugandan Freedom Fighter's (UFF) to form the NRM and the National Resistance Army (NRA) (Kiyaga-Nsubuga 1999, 19; Katamba-Wamala 2000, 161-63; Kasfir 2005, 276). After a coup against Obote in 1985, the Ugandan state largely collapsed as the 15,000-strong NRA seized power in Kampala (Kiyaga-Nsubuga 1999, 20; Carbone 2008, 29; Rwengabo 2013, 541; Sjorgen 2013, 100). The NRA/NRM took over state functions in Kampala and the NRA became the armed forces (Mwenda 2007, 27). However, despite engaging in some administrative reforms during the civil war (Mamdani 1996, 215), the NRM "acted pragmatically by choosing reformist over revolutionary goals" (Kasfir 2005, 275) and sought to establish a very broad-based government upon taking power (Mamdani 1996, 216). The regime became an "exemplar of the Washington consensus" (Young 2001, 209) and engaged in fiscal decentralization and maintained friendly relations with neighboring states (Mwenda 2007, 29-30; Lindemann 2011, 407).

Vietnam 1945-46

In its brief tenure 1945-46, the Viet Minh did not engage in attempted radical social transformation (Post 1989, 130, 132, 140; Duiker 1995, 55; Marr 1995, 4, 502, 505-6). On August 19, 1945, the Viet Minh (the Vietnamese nationalist front dominated by the Indochinese Communist Party and led by Ho Chi Minh) seized power in Hanoi and declared independence on September 2 as the occupying Japanese departed and the Allied forces had yet to arrive (Kort 2018, 61-62). While the Viet Minh made modest attempts to reduce rent and redistribute some French-held lands, it did not destroy the economic or political power of

the landlords (Kolko 1985, 40) The new constitution was modeled on the French constitution (Marr 2013, 106), and preexisting social elites remained largely intact. "In most placed former colonial employees continued to function, landlords still collected rents, owners of enterprises still told workers what to do" (Marr 1995, 4). The government was moderate in both domestic and foreign policy (Duiker 1995, 55) and did not nationalize key economic assets (Post 1989, 130, 132, 140). By mid-1946 the Viet Minh lost most territorial control and in December the war between the Viet Minh and the French began (Kort 2018, 85).[395]

Yemen 1918-62

Yahya Muhammad Hamid al-Din inherited the Zaydi Imamate in northern Yemen from his father. After WWI and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Yahya expanded his influence southward to traditionally Shafi'i areas (Dresch 2000, 5, 9). Yahya and his tribal forces took control of Sana'a in December 1918 (Dresch 2000, 28). While Yahya did construct a new full-time army (he had previously relied on tribal levies) in 1919, the regime depended on existing elites and did not engage in any attempts at radical social transformation (Dresch 2000, 30-32).

[395]The Viet Minh would later return to national power in 1954. See section 4.19.

4 Revolutionary Autocracies

4.1 Afghanistan 1996-2001

1. VIOLENT, IRREGULAR SEIZURE OF POWER

   The Taliban seized power after defeating a variety of warlords and the Rabbani government in Kabul (Sinno 2008, 222; Giustozzi 2015, 113).

2. REGIME RULED BY A MASS-BASED MOVEMENT THAT EMERGES OUTSIDE THE STATE

   The Taliban was formed in Kandahar in 1994 by a local mullah who mobilized madrassa students opposed to warlord rule in the country and seized control of Kabul in the fall of 1996, consolidating control of most of the national territory by 1998 (Rashid 2000, 53-54; Barfield 2010, 257-60; Abbas 2014, 62). The armed forces of the Taliban numbered approximately 25,000 troops when they seized national power (Barfield 2010, 257-60). Talibs were primarily young men from madrasas (religious schools) in southern Afghanistan and among the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan (Rashid 2000, 32-33; Barfield 2010, 257-58; Abbas 2014, 62, 67). "The Taliban was unlike other Afghan political movements not only in the exclusively clerical origin of its leaders but in the refugee origins of its followers" (Barfield 2010, 255-56).

3. STATE TRANSFORMATION: COLLAPSE OF PRE-EXISTING COERCIVE APPARATUS AND CREATION OF NEW ARMED FORCES

   The Army of the Afghan communist regime (the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan) disintegrated after the collapse of the regime in 1992 (Giustozzi 2015, 113). The military force of the new state was the same the Taliban had created in their fight for national power which was "essentially an irregular militia under the orders of charismatic warrior mullahs, with the addition of specialized artillery and armed units, staffed by professionals left over from the Soviet period" (Giustozzi 2015, 120). Administratively, the new Taliban 'state' was characterized by clerical rule (Abbas 2014, 69).[396]

4. ATTEMPTED TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL AND/OR GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

   - *Attack on domestic economic/political elite*

     After seizing national power, the Taliban set out to reform "Afghanistan's religious and cultural practices by creating a pure Islamic state along Salafist lines" (Barfield 2010, 255). The Taliban immediately introduced a series of radical reforms including banning "all forms of entertainment," driving women "from all public arenas," banning their education and forcing veiling, punishing infractions of their interpretation of Islamic law with amputations and "stadium-style public executions" (Barfield 2010, 261-62; see also Coll 2019, 67-68). The Taliban conducted "pogroms against the Shia Hazaras" and forcibly removed Tajiks from the Shomali Plain (Barfield 2010, 263).[397] These attempts at social transformation

[396] "[T]he Taliban proved unwilling to make the transition from a social movement to a government" (Barfield 2010, 261).

[397] See also Rashid 2000, 105-6; Abbas 2014, 69-71.

and clerical rule "marked a sharp break with Afghan political tradition" (Barfield 2010, 263). These measures engendered intense opposition, particularly from the urban populations of Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif (Barfield 2010, 262).

- *Attack on regional balance of power*

  The Taliban's international isolation was "extreme" (Barfield 2010, 264; see also Coll 2019, 68-70). The Taliban not only gained only the diplomatic recognition of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (the later two quickly downgraded diplomatic relations) but they "demonstrated a talent for alienating possible allies while creating even more new enemies. They had no friends in the region, with the exception of Pakistan" (Barfield 2010, 265). The Taliban murdered Iranian consular staff in Mazar-i-Sharif "which almost provoked a war with Iran," they "frightened Uzbekistan and Tajikistan with loose talk of spreading Islamic revolution north and providing sanctuary for groups seeking to overthrow their secular governments" (Barfield 2010, 265). They angered Russia by recognizing the sovereignty of the Chechen government and harbored Uighur separatists (Barfield 2010, 266). The Taliban also hosted al Qaeda despite intense U.S. opposition after the embassy bombings in 1998 and after the al Qaeda terror attacks on America on September 11, 2001, the Taliban refused to expel Osama bin Laden (Barfield 2010, 265, 269).

4.2 Albania 1944-91

1. VIOLENT, IRREGULAR SEIZURE OF POWER

   The Albanian Communist Party (ACP) dominated front led by Hoxha took over Tirana from German forces on November 17, 1944 after fighting first occupying Italian forces (1942-43) and then Germans (1943-44) (Fischer 1999, 129-32, 203-7, 227-37; Vickers 2011, 147-61). 28,000 died during the fighting (Vickers 2011, 166). In December 1945, a "People's Republic" was declared in Albania after the ACP dominated Democratic Front won 93% of the vote in elections (Vickers 2011, 164).

2. REGIME RULED BY A MASS-BASED MOVEMENT THAT EMERGES OUTSIDE THE STATE

   The ACP was founded in June 1941. It was first led by Enver Hoxha who had backing from Yugoslavia (Vickers 2011, 164; Mehilli 2017, 18, 20).

3. STATE TRANSFORMATION: COLLAPSE OF PRE-EXISTING COERCIVE APPARATUS AND CREATION OF NEW ARMED FORCES

   The Albanian National Liberation Army (ANLA) was formed in March 1943 (Fischer 1999, 129-32; Vickers 2011, 150). While the ACP received "considerable help from the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP)" in forming a unified party in 1941 (Prifti 1978, 10-11; also Fevziu 2016, 43; Mehilli 2017, 18, 20), Yugoslavia did not control the Albanian army during or after the war (Prifti 1978, 77-78, 200; Fevziu 2016, 128; Mehilli 2017, 39). A new security organization, the *Sigurimi*, was created immediately after the war (Fevziu 2016, 109).

4. ATTEMPTED TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL AND/OR GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

   - *Attack on domestic economic/political elite*

     "Within less than a year" of gaining power, the regime began largescale collectivization of land through the country. Buying and selling land was prohibited (Fevziu 2016, 108).[398] The old ruling class (*beys*) "lost their predominant economic power and found themselves politically isolated and heavily taxed" (Vickers 2011, 166).[399] "Mind boggling taxes" were levied on "merchants and other rich people" and those that did not pay were jailed and saw their "cars, houses, and property" nationalized (Fevziu 2016, 108).

   - *Attack on regional balance of power*

     "One of Hoxha's first actions as the new Prime Minister" was ordering out "anyone known to have close ties with the British and American missions" (Fevziu 2016, 123; 124-25). In October 1946, Albanian destroyed a British warship off the coast of Albania (Vickers 2011, 170).

4.3 Algeria 1962-

1. VIOLENT, IRREGULAR SEIZURE OF POWER

   The National Liberation Front (FLN) fought an independence war against France (1954-62) and seized power among a chaotic transition (and near civil war) in the aftermath of the 1962 Evian Accord (Jackson, 1977, 55-56, 70-73, 104).[400]

2. REGIME RULED BY A MASS-BASED MOVEMENT THAT EMERGES OUTSIDE THE STATE

   The FLN[401] was founded in November 1954 by members of the opposition party Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD) and especially the banned Special Organization (OS) (Tlemcani, 1986, 61). The FLN gained a mass base with nearly 100,000 members and supporters across the country by 1956 (O'Ballance, 1967, 44, 67, 108).

3. STATE TRANSFORMATION: COLLAPSE OF PRE-EXISTING COERCIVE APPARATUS AND CREATION OF NEW ARMED FORCES

   The French army withdrew and was replaced by the FLN military force, the National Liberation Army (ALN) (Jackson, 1977, 70-74, 192). The ALN (renamed the National People's Party, ANP) became the sole military force in the new state (McDougall, 2017, 195, 199, 202-14, 237).

[398] See also Vickers 2011, 166, 168.

[399] See also Fevziu 2016, 108.

[400] Estimates of deaths in the 1954-62 war vary between 150,000 and one million deaths. See O'Ballance (1967, 200-201); Ottaway and Ottaway (1970, 31); Jackson (1977, 56); Stone (1997, 41).

[401] While GWF code the regime as ending in 1992 and a new regime beginning that same year, there is a near-consensus among country experts (Addi 1998, 47; Roberts 2003, 348; McDougall 2017, 289) that the regime and ruling clique remained intact from 1962 to the present. Cook (2007, 39-40) writes that it remains a stable army-based regime throughout as power has "continuously rested in the hands of the military."

4. ATTEMPTED TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL AND/OR GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

- *Largescale transformation of property relations*

  After many Europeans fled Algeria in 1962 the FLN regime engaged in largescale seizure of property (farms, homes, and businesses) (Ruedy, 2005, 198-99). The regime also legalized and adopted a system of autogestion (modeled on Yugoslav worker-run enterprises) but these gradually evolved into state-run enterprises (Ottaway and Ottaway, 1970, 50-67).[402]

- *Attack on geopolitical order*

  The FLN government adopted a policy of "radical anti-imperialism" which quickly led to conflict with the U.S. (Mortimer, 1970, 371).[403] In 1962, Ben Bella traveled to Cuba and embraced Castro during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which was widely seen as "unnecessarily provocative" (Gallagher, 1963, 242).[404] FLN foreign policy was seen as ideologically-driven (Ottaway and Ottaway, 1970, 155-56)[405] and the regime gave asylum to American Black Panthers and made Algeria a "haven for African liberation movements" (Mortimer, 2015, 468-69) as well as provided armed and training to armed liberation movements in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Congo, Niger, South Africa, and elsewhere (Humbaraci, 1966, 263).[406]

4.4 Angola 1975-

1. VIOLENT, IRREGULAR SEIZURE OF POWER

   After the 1974 coup in Portugal, leaders of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) together with competing rebel movements (the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, FNLA, and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA) agreed to a transitional government with equal representation. However, fighting soon restarted between the three groups and by November 11, 1975 the MPLA successfully gained control of Luanda. As a result, the MPLA was widely recognized as the government of Angola.[407]

[402] See also Clegg (1971). In 1968-69 the regime engaged in largescale nationalization of foreign and particularly French firms, leading to conflict with Paris (Ottaway and Ottaway, 1970, 273-77). The regime also nationalized mineral extraction, banks, insurance, manufacturing, and, in 1971, oil (Stone, 1997, 55). In 1971 "socialist" land reform led to the redistribution of more than 600,000 hectares of land to the landless and the creation of 1,000 "socialist villages" (Smith, 1975, 271-79); see also Ruedy (2005, 222-23). However, the overall level of land reform through the expropriation of private land was modest Knauss (1977); Pfiefer (1985).

[403] See also Mortimer (2015); Ottaway and Ottaway (1970, 155-56); Byrne (2016).

[404] See also Mortimer (2015, 468).

[405] See also Mortimer (1970, 2015)

[406] See also Ottaway and Ottaway (1970, 147); Jackson (1977, 203); Byrne (2016).

[407] The MPLA led an armed struggle against the Portuguese, as well as with competing rebel movements FNLA and UNITA from February 1961 until November 1975. This was followed by a civil war between the MPLA and U.S.-backed UNITA which lasted until 1991. The wars to consolidate control over Angola by the MPLA cost around 79,000 lives (Gleditsch et al., 2002).

2. REGIME RULED BY A MASS-BASED MOVEMENT THAT EMERGES OUTSIDE THE STATE

   The MPLA was founded in December 1956 (MacQueen, 1997, 19).

3. STATE TRANSFORMATION: COLLAPSE OF PRE-EXISTING COERCIVE APPARATUS AND CREATION OF NEW ARMED FORCES

   The independent Angolan state emerged out of the near total collapse of the Portuguese colonial administration in Angola (Kapuscinski, 2001). The People's Armed Forces of the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA), the armed wing of the MPLA, became the military.

4. ATTEMPTED TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL AND/OR GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

   After taking power, the MPLA set out to radically transform Angolan agriculture through villagization and collectivization of peasant farmers. Nationalization of property and companies began in 1976 within a year of taking power (Heywood, 2000, 205-7).[408]

4.5 Bolivia 1952-1964

1. VIOLENT, IRREGULAR SEIZURE OF POWER

   In April 1952, "[a]n attempted coup by the [Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, MNR] and a group of carabineros [police] had turned into a mass insurrection" (Field 2014, 5). In a "lightning urban insurrection" the MNR seized national power (Blasier 1967, 41). The fighting lasted approximately three days with army resistance, after which the army "collapsed" and officers either disbanded or defected to the rebels (Malloy 1971, 112; Russell 1974, 100; Mitchell 1977, 33; Grindle 2003, 4).[409]

2. REGIME RULED BY A MASS-BASED MOVEMENT THAT EMERGES OUTSIDE THE STATE

   The MNR was created in 1941 and after briefly entering government after a 1943 coup, from 1946-52 the MNR was repressed and its leaders exiled (Alexander 1958, 30-31, 34, 38-39; Patch 1961, 127; Mitchell 1977, 22, 25). While in opposition, the MNR built a mass base through an alliance with unions (Malloy 1971, 116-17; Klein 1971b, 39; Klein 1971a, 384).

3. STATE TRANSFORMATION: COLLAPSE OF PRE-EXISTING COERCIVE APPARATUS AND CREATION OF NEW ARMED FORCES

   During the fighting, the Bolivian army collapsed (Malloy 1971, 112). The *carabineros* had little influence in the new government which was entirely comprised of the MNR and the police were quickly reduced in size (Alexander 1958, 47; Mitchell 1977, 33). 80% of the officer corps of the army was forced out and most enlisted men were sent home (Alexander 1958, 146), and while the MNR did not create a new revolutionary army, it did thoroughly purge and reorganize the old Bolivian army (Blasier 1971, 93; Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 3; Knight 2003, 69).

[408] See also Young (1988, 171, 174).
[409] The revolution led to around 600 deaths (Knight 2003, 67; Burrier 2012, 8).

4. ATTEMPTED TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL AND/OR GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

   - *Attack on domestic economic/political elite*

     The MNR regime set about radical transformations in land tenure and mine nationalization (Blasier 1971, 54; Knight 2003, 70-71; Whitehead 2003, 27). The revolution "created a truly overwhelming change in the economic and social structure of the nation" (Klein 1968, 103). Reforms sought to destroy the economic and political power of the landowning class and mining and financial elites (Blasier 1971, 54). The regime enfranchised the indigenous population, which "had a profound impact on the distribution of power in Bolivian society" as they had previously existed in a state of "semi-serfdom" (Malloy 1971, 119; Field 2014, 4). Land reform wiped out most of the old elite's wealth and many landowners fled the country (Patch 1961, 130; Eckstein 1983, 105; Garcia 1992, 50). Before 1952, Bolivia had one of the most unequal distributions of land in Latin America with four percent of landowners controlling 82 percent of land, but by 1954 49 percent of farm families received land (Eckstein 1983, 108; Alexander 1958, 66).

   - *Attack on regional balance of power*

     While the MNR regime did not radically alter its foreign policy and maintained largely warm relations with the U.S. (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 5; Garcia 1992, 55; Field 2014, 6) it did nationalize mines owned by powerful Western companies (Lehman 2003, 108).

4.6 Cambodia 1975-1979

1. VIOLENT, IRREGULAR SEIZURE OF POWER

   The Khmer Rouge took power on April 18, 1975 after militarily defeating the Lon Nol regime.[410]

2. REGIME RULED BY A MASS-BASED MOVEMENT THAT EMERGES OUTSIDE THE STATE

   The Communist Party of Cambodia (CPK, or Khmer Rouge) emerged as an independent organization in 1960 following a break with the Vietnamese-controlled Indochinese Communist Party (ICP).

3. STATE TRANSFORMATION: COLLAPSE OF PRE-EXISTING COERCIVE APPARATUS AND CREATION OF NEW ARMED FORCES

   Cambodia witnessed a total breakdown of the Khmer Republic by 1975 that was entirely replaced by the CPK. The military wing of the CPK became the army of Cambodia after April 1975.[411]

[410] The CPK began a guerrilla struggle against the Sihanouk regime in 1967 and after the military coup which brought Lon Nol to power in 1970 the CPK continued their insurgency until defeating the Khmer Republic (Etcheson, 1984, 82-134); Becker (1998); Kiernan (2004).

[411] During the war the CPK built proto-state institutions in areas under its territorial control (Mertha, 2014, 22).

4. ATTEMPTED TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL AND/OR GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

   - *Attack on domestic economic/political elite*

     The CPK abolished all private property and emptied the population of all major cities - completely destroying the urban commercial class and intelligentsia (Becker 1998).

   - *Attack on the regional balance of power*

     After taking power, the CPK broke off all diplomatic ties with Western powers. In 1978, it initiated attacks on Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand (Etcheson, 1984, 193-94).[412] The regime also carried out largescale massacres against Chinese in Cambodia despite the fact that China was one of Cambodia's only allies (Kiernan, 2008, 431).

4.7 China 1949-

1. VIOLENT, IRREGULAR SEIZURE OF POWER

   The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gained power after a military victory against the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) government in 1949.[413]

2. REGIME RULED BY A MASS-BASED MOVEMENT THAT EMERGES OUTSIDE THE STATE[414]

   The CCP was founded in Shanghai in 1921 (Bianco, 1971, 55).[415]

3. STATE TRANSFORMATION: COLLAPSE OF PRE-EXISTING COERCIVE APPARATUS AND CREATION OF NEW ARMED FORCES

   The revolution and civil war (1946-49) led to largescale breakdown of KMT state institutions (Pepper, 1999; Westad, 2003). The Red Army/PLA founded by the CCP in 1927 became the military of China after 1949 (Li, 2007).

4. ATTEMPTED TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL AND/OR GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

   - *Attack on domestic economic/political elite*

     The CCP carried out largescale confiscation of land in Communist-controlled areas during the civil war (1946-1949) and in the first years after gaining power (Hinton 1966; Harrison 1972, 435; Pepper 1999; Westad 2003).

   - *Attack on regional balance of power*

     Upon taking power, the CCP refused diplomatic relations with the United States and Great Britain and held a U.S. diplomat and 21 staff members under house

[412] See also Kiernan (2008, chapter 9, 366-69).
[413] The Red Army/People's Liberation Army (PLA) fought for power between 1927 and 1949. Total deaths from 1945-1949 are estimated at 120,000. See Gleditsch et al. (2002).
[414] Population: 543.9 million in 1949 (Maddison Project Database, version 2018).
[415] See also Harrison (1972, 31).

arrest for a year on charges of espionage (Jian, 1994, 33-38). A year after gaining power, China invaded Korea to defend North Korea against U.S.-led forces (Jian, 1994).

4.8 Cuba 1959-

1. VIOLENT, IRREGULAR SEIZURE OF POWER

   The July 26 Movement (M-26 July) fought an armed guerrilla war from December 1956 and forced Batista to flee December 31, 1958. M-26 July seized power across the country in the early days of 1959 (Farber, 1976, 203).[416]

2. REGIME RULED BY A MASS-BASED MOVEMENT THAT EMERGES OUTSIDE THE STATE

   M-26 July was created by Fidel Castro and a group of Orthodox Party dissidents in 1953 (Thomas, 1977, 15, 40).[417] Armed rebellion was launched in December 1956, which was initially small but grew to 3,000 rebels by late 1958 (Thomas, 1977, 191, 260).[418] The rebellion expanded to an urban insurrection in late 1958 (Bonachea and Martin, 1974, 264).[419]

3. STATE TRANSFORMATION: COLLAPSE OF PRE-EXISTING COERCIVE APPARATUS AND CREATION OF NEW ARMED FORCES

   The Batista state collapsed. After Batista fled "the armed forces disintegrated" (Dominguez, 1998, 131). The army, police, and intelligence agencies were dissolved, and new army, police, and secret police forces were created from scratch and staffed with rebels (LeoGrande, 1978, 262-63).[420]

4. ATTEMPTED TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL AND/OR GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

   - *Largescale transformation of property relations*

     Just over five months after seizing power, on May 17, 1959 Castro's government announced its initially modest land reform policy which drew a "quite moderate reaction" from the United States (Maurer, 2013, 317). However, by July 1960 (about a year and a half after seizing power) Castro signed Law 851 which authorized (but did not order) the expropriation of all American property in Cuba (Maurer, 2013, 324). From August-October 1960 the regime nationalized dozens of U.S. enterprises (Maurer, 2013, 326) and by 1968 all private industry was

[416] See also Dominguez (1998, 131). Between 2,000 and 2,500 were killed in the guerilla war, and a roughly equal number in the postrevolutionary counterinsurgency (Dominguez, 1978, 346).
[417] See also Sweig (2002, 6-15).
[418] See also Klepak (2012, 3-4).
[419] See also Sweig (2002).
[420] See also Perez-Stable (2011, 78); Klepak (2015, 74).

nationalized (Fagen, 1969, 94). Increasingly radical land reform led to the expropriation of all private holdings over 167 hectares and the nationalization of 11,000 farms leaving 70% of land in state hands (Thomas, 1977, 661).[421]

- *Attack on geopolitical order*

  The Castro government openly challenged the United States and viewed conflict as inevitable (Thomas 1977, 278, 494). Castro was "pathologically hostile to the United States" (Latell 2005, 205) and opted for international revolution over improved relations with Washington. The government actively supported revolutionary movements across Latin America as early as 1959, backing failed revolutionary uprisings in Panama and the Dominican Republic (Halperin 1972, 22). The Castro regime seized more than $1 billion in U.S. property (Meyer and Szulc 1962, 57).[422] The Cuban Missile Crisis also was a huge risk (Szulc 1986, 582) in which Castro "almost brought about the destruction of his country" (Matthews 1969, 224).

4.9 Eritrea 1993-

1. VIOLENT, IRREGULAR SEIZURE OF POWER

   The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) seized control of Asmara and Eritrean territory after winning a war against the Ethiopian Derg regime (Iyob, 1995, 136).[423]

2. REGIME RULED BY A MASS-BASED MOVEMENT THAT EMERGES OUTSIDE THE STATE

   In 1973 the EPLF was formed by splinter groups of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) which had been the dominant faction in the war for national liberation which began in 1961 (Pool, 2001, 55, 63).[424]

3. STATE TRANSFORMATION: COLLAPSE OF PRE-EXISTING COERCIVE APPARATUS AND CREATION OF NEW ARMED FORCES

   The Eritrean People's Liberation Army (EPLA), the armed wing of the EPLF formed in 1977, became the armed forces of independent Eritrea (Reid, 2011b, 212).[425] The Derg's coercive apparatus was completely destroyed in the seizure of power and the Front took control after the complete disintegration of the state apparatus (Pool, 2001,

[421] See also Szulc (1986, 592). Attempts were also made to build an economy based on moral incentives (Yaffe, 2009, 63-67, 201-32).

[422] See also Maurer (2013, 326).

[423] The EPLF agreed to wait to vote on independence until 1993 due to an agreement with the TPLF in Ethiopia (Pool, 1993, 391-92). An estimated 60,000-65,000 EPLF fighters were killed in the war for independence (Iyob, 1995, 136). See also Makki (1996, 491). Upon seizing power, the EPLF regime faced insurgencies in western Eritrea from the Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) Pool (2001, 192). Also see Lefebvre (1995).

[424] See also Tareke (2009, 60, 63). Most EPLF fighters came from the peasantry, the small Eritrean industrial class, and revolutionary intellectuals (Gebre-Medhin, 1984, 50, 53). See also Pool (1993, 394); Pool (2001, 88).

[425] See also Makki (1996, 479-80); Pool (2001, 163). "[T]he EPLF, with its fighters and command structure, simply *became* the Eritrean state, operating from behind a desk rather than from a dugout" (Clapham, 2017, 113).

161).[426] The EPLF also replaced all the Ethiopian bureaucrats (Riggan, 2016, 45) and expelled around 120,000 Ethiopians from Eritrea (Plaut, 2016, 25).[427]

4. ATTEMPTED TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL AND/OR GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

- *Largescale transformation of property relations*

  During the war, the EPLF began land reform as early as 1976 which promoted "radical egalitarian policies" in rural areas followed by similar redistributive policies in liberated towns (Tareke, 2009, 68).[428] The EPLF created a "people's militia" which was used "to terrorize the feudalists and suppress them if necessary" (Gebre-Medhin, 1984, 54-55). The EPLF also sought to abolish the *enda* or extended family unit based on common descent from a shared ancestor and replace it with class solidarities (Pool, 2001, 109). In 1994, the regime issued a land proclamation "which fundamentally changed rights to land and traditional tenure systems by proclaiming that all land was government-owned and that all Eritreans should have equal access to land, regardless of gender" (Pool, 2001, 188).[429]

- *Attack on regional geopolitical order*

  The regime has "been in conflict with every state with which it had a land border" including a "full-scale war" with Ethiopia from 1998-2000 (Pool, 2001, 192).[430]

4.10 Finland 1918

1. VIOLENT, IRREGULAR SEIZURE OF POWER

   The Finnish People's Deputation (January 28-April 13, 1918)[431] took control of Helsinki in a revolution launched on January 27-28, 1918 (Tikka 2014, 95; Engelstein 2018, 290) and was ousted from Helsinki by White counterrevolutionary forces and German troops on April 13 and fully defeated by May 15 (Singleton 1998, 110; Smele 2015, 58). The revolution was spurred by an attempt by the Finnish government under Svinhufvud to authorize the paramilitary White Guards as the official state security force (Haapala 2014, 49). This led to the revolution which quickly assumed control over the major cities and the southern territory of Finland (Rood 1990, 29-30; Smele 2015, 59; Alapuro 2019, 157).

2. REGIME RULED BY A MASS-BASED MOVEMENT THAT EMERGES OUTSIDE THE STATE

[426] "The EPLF inherited no bureaucracy or set of state institutions" (Clapham, 2017, 113).
[427] See also Iyob (1995, 136); Gilkes and Plaut (1999, 11).
[428] See also Pool (2001, 59). The land reform was "seen as a springboard to social revolution" (Connell, 2001, 357). See also Riggan (2016, 45).
[429] See also Joireman (1996, 273); Tronvoll (1998, 471); Rock (2000, 224); Kibreab (2009a, 288); Kibreab (2009b, 40-41).
[430] See also Gilkes and Plaut (1999); Tareke (2009, 344); Reid (2011b, 232-33, 253); Plaut (2016, 51-52). The Eritrean-Ethiopian war cost an estimated 70,000-100,000 soldiers (Tareke, 2009, 346).
[431] Alternatively referred to as the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic

The revolutionary workers and members of the Social Democratic Party were not rulers of the earlier Tsarist-ruled Grand Duchy of Finland or the brief republic (December 6, 1917-January 28, 1918) (Rood 1990, 29; Smele 2015, 59). At the onset, the Red Guards had some 12-15,000 troops, growing to between 75,000 and 140,000 forces by the end of the civil war (Rood 1990, 30; Alapuro 2019, 158).

3. STATE TRANSFORMATION: COLLAPSE OF PRE-EXISTING COERCIVE APPARATUS AND CREATION OF NEW ARMED FORCES

   The People's Deputation coercive apparatus was comprised of the Red Guards, an armed force comprised of workers created form scratch by the revolutionaries (Upton 1980, 365; Rood 1990, 25; Tikka 2014, 117; Engelstein 2018, 283-84; Alapuro 2019, 155, 157, 177). On January 28, 1918, the revolutionary government was officially formed as the Delegation of People's Commissars of Finland (Tikka 2014, 95) and the Red Guards were made the coercive force of the new regime (Alapuro 2019, 157). The regime replaced existing institutions and the revolutionaries created a new court system and built new municipal police forces and parallel workers councils (Upton 1980, 353, 359, 361; Tikka 2014, 97).[432]

4. ATTEMPTED TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL AND/OR GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

   - *Largescale transformation of property relations*

     The Red government instituted a land reform which "freed the sharecroppers" (Tikka 2014, 98; 97).[433] This land reform expropriated property from landowners without compensation (Upton 1980, 390). The regime also announced a policy transferring all accounts in private banks to the government in mid-March (Upton 1980, 359). The regime also nationalized factories and put them under the direct control of workers' councils and encouraged "industrial democracy" to "raise the structure of the new society" (Upton 1980, 354; 361-63). The Red Guards engaged in a 'red terror' campaign starting especially in February 1918 which involved the execution of suspected counterrevolutionaries (Upton 1980, 376-78; Rood 1990, 31; Tikka 2014, 97, 107-8). The Finnish revolution has been called "Europe's most clear-cut class war in the twentieth century." (Martin 1970, 412; quoted in Alapuro 2019, 177).

4.11 Guinea-Bissau 1974-1999

1. VIOLENT, IRREGULAR SEIZURE OF POWER

   The Party for African Independence in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) took control over Guinea-Bissau after fighting a guerrilla war against the Portuguese (1963-74) culminating in independence by Portugal on September 10, 1974.[434]

[432] As early as March 1917, the Finnish police had "disintegrated" (Alapuro 2019, 138).
[433] See also Kirby 2006, 162; Alapuro 2019, 159, 165.
[434] The war cost an estimated 15,000 lives (Gleditsch et al., 2002).

2. REGIME RULED BY A MASS-BASED MOVEMENT THAT EMERGES OUTSIDE THE STATE

   The PAIGC.[435] was founded in 1956 to push for the independence of Portuguese-controlled Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.[436]

3. STATE TRANSFORMATION: COLLAPSE OF PRE-EXISTING COERCIVE APPARATUS AND CREATION OF NEW ARMED FORCES

   Guinea-Bissau's military upon independence was the military wing of the PAIGC formed during the independence struggle (Dhada, 1993).

4. ATTEMPTED TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL AND/OR GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

   - *Attack on domestic economic/political elite*

     Before taking power, the PAIGC sought to collectivize agriculture in the territories under its control (Dhada 1993, 73, 75). After gaining power, the PAIGC nationalized extensive land-holdings, as well as trading companies, banks, and other property (Aaby, 1978, 19).[437] It undertook an economic program that was "strictly socialist in nature" (International Crisis Group 2008, 7).

4.12 Hungary 1919

1. VIOLENT, IRREGULAR SEIZURE OF POWER

   The Hungarian Communist Party (HCP) seized power on March 21, 1919 after the incumbent government resigned (McAdams, 2017, 120).[438]

2. REGIME RULED BY A MASS-BASED MOVEMENT THAT EMERGES OUTSIDE THE STATE

   The HCP was founded on November 24, 1918 by former POWs recently returned from Moscow and the left-wing faction of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) (Borsanyi 1993, 92; McAdams 2017, 117).

3. STATE TRANSFORMATION: COLLAPSE OF PRE-EXISTING COERCIVE APPARATUS AND CREATION OF NEW ARMED FORCES

   Following Hungary's defeat in WWI, the army was fundamentally crippled and "existed in name only" (Borsanyi 1993, 154). During Bela Kun's seizure of power, "the whole of the armed forces - national guard, police, army - were under Socialist and Communist control" (Jaszi 1969, 96). After seizing power the regime formed a secret police force in response to growing fears of counterrevolution (Borsanyi 1993, 165).

[435] The PAIGC regime is coded by GWF as ending in 1980 with the military coup led by Joao Bernardo Vieira. However, Vieira was a leader of the PAIGC (albeit from a different faction within the party) and maintained PAIGC power until he was ousted in a coup in 1999. Thus, the PAIGC is more accurately coded as ending in 1999 when both Vieira and the party were forced from power. See MacQueen 1997, 221).

[436] Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde would subsequently separate after independence from Portugal.

[437] See also Davidson (1981, 170-72); Lopes (1987, 98-101).

[438] See Borsanyi (1993, 136).

4. ATTEMPTED TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL AND/OR GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

   - *Attack on domestic economic/political elite*

     The Party pledged "to combat 'the bandits of counter-revolution and the brigands of plunder' and to create a new social order by nationalizing major industrial corporations, confiscating landed property, and instituting the dictatorship of the proletariat" (McAdams, 2017, 120).[439] The Soviet Republic seized land from large landholders for the state and did not redistribute to the peasants, thereby alienating the peasantry (Jaszi 1969, 125-27; Molnar 1990, 19; McAdams 2017, 121).

   - *Attack on geopolitical order*

     The regime invaded Czechoslovakia shortly and set up a new socialist state, the Slovak Soviet Republic and attempted to organize an insurrection in Vienna. The regime also declared war on Romania which counterattacked and overthrew the regime (McAdams, 2017, 122-23).[440]

4.13 Iran 1979-

1. VIOLENT, IRREGULAR SEIZURE OF POWER

   Khomeini took power in February 1979 following mass protests and violent clashes between security forces and demonstrators (January 1978-February 1979) which led to the departure of the Shah from Iran.[441]

2. REGIME RULED BY A MASS-BASED MOVEMENT THAT EMERGES OUTSIDE THE STATE

   The Islamic Republic of Iran arose out of a movement of militant clerics, mosques, and Islamic associations, including the "Society of Militant Clergy" that emerged following the exile of Ayatollah Khomeini from Iran in 1964 (Arjomand, 1988, 94-100).[442]

3. STATE TRANSFORMATION: COLLAPSE OF PRE-EXISTING COERCIVE APPARATUS AND CREATION OF NEW ARMED FORCES

   Following the Shah's departure from Iran in early 1979, the army split and suffered mass defections and a "breakdown of discipline" (Arjomand 1988, 123; Entessar 1988, 62). It became "no more than a shadow of its former self" (Razoux 2015, 6). The new regime arrested "almost the entire high command of the armed forces" and executed many of them within the first months of the revolution (Menashri 1990, 68). Purges shrank the officer corps by an estimated 30 to 60 percent (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 19; Ward 2009,

[439] See also Molnar (1990, 18-19).

[440] See also Borsanyi (1993, 25, 154, 181); Molnar (1990, 28).

[441] The violent clashes resulted in approximately 3,000 deaths. After seizing power, the regime confronted a largescale rebellion in Tabriz as well as among the Kurdish population, and serious armed challenges from two guerrilla movements: Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MK) and the Fedayeen-e-Khalq (Arjomand, 1988, 93-94, 139-41, 154-55). See also Bakhash (1990, 89). The counterinsurgency cost between 2,050 and 12,000 lives (Gleditsch et al., 2002).

[442] See also Moin (1999, 180).

229; Cann and Donopoulos 1997, 275). 12,000 military members were fired within the first year of the revolution (Arjomand 1988, 164; Entessar 1988, 63; Zabih 1988, 123; Ward 2009, 229). Simultaneously, the new regime created the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) "almost totally from revolutionary elements" (Katzman 1993, 16) that rapidly became the "most powerful political and military organization in Iran" (Schahgaldian 1987, 73).[443]

4. ATTEMPTED TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL AND/OR GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

- *Radical change in laws governing social behavior*

  Shortly after the seizure of power, discos and bars were shut down, alcohol was forbidden, women working in government or public offices were forced to wear the veil, divorce was made significantly more difficult for women, efforts were made to Islamicize education, and rules were introduced enforcing the segregation of men and women at social gatherings (Arjomand, 1988, 142-43).[444]

- *Attack on regional balance of power*

  Within a year of taking power, the new regime backed students who seized hostages in the American embassy in Tehran. 52 American diplomats and citizens were held hostage for 444 days. The new regime also made a concerted effort to export revolution to nearby Muslim states (Sinkaya, 2016, 110).[445]

4.14 Mexico 1917-2000

1. VIOLENT, IRREGULAR SEIZURE OF POWER

   After a civil war erupts (1913-17) the Constitutionalist army largely won the civil war and Carranza was declared president (Knight, 1986b, 261-65, 436-37, 477).[446]

2. REGIME RULED BY A MASS-BASED MOVEMENT THAT EMERGES OUTSIDE THE STATE

   Multiple mass-based armies emerged outside the state between 1910 and 1913, including the Zapatista army in the south (Womack, 1968, 165-73), Pancho Villa's army in the north (Katz, 1998, 290, 305), and Carranza's Constitutionalist army (Knight, 1986b, 22-26). All three armies had large mass-bases by 1915 (Womack, 1991, 160-61).[447]

3. STATE TRANSFORMATION: COLLAPSE OF PRE-EXISTING COERCIVE APPARATUS AND CREATION OF NEW ARMED FORCES

[443] See also Ostovar 2016.
[444] See also Menashri (1990, 137); Milani (1994, 201-2).
[445] See also Byman (2005, 91-2).
[446] Revolutionary war lasted from 1910 to 1920, with violence peaking 1913-15. Estimates range up to one million dead (Smith, 1979, 36). See also Gilbert and Buchenau (2013, 74). However, Rugeley and Fallaw (2012, 7-8) say this figure is probably overstated, but the 1914-15 civil war alone cost 200,000 lives (Knight, 1986b, 302).
[447] See also Knight (1986a).

The 1910-17 war led to the collapse of the Mexican state (Knight, 1986b, 215, 236-37, 442-45).[448] After winning the war, Carranza dismantled the Federal Army (dissolving it formally in August 1914) and the old state bureaucracy (Brandenburg, 1964, 54).[449] Thus, after 1914 the prerevolutionary "judges, policemen, jefes politicos, and Porfirian army. . . were gone for good" (Katz, 1998, 730). After the collapse of the Federal Army, Carranza created a new army from scratch, spurning old Federal Army officers and including mostly ex-Constitutionalist fighters (Knight, 1986b, 208-9).

4. ATTEMPTED TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL AND/OR GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

- *Attack on domestic economic/political elite*

  The "extreme anti-clericalism"[450] of the 1917 Constitution included provisions that empowered the state to radically curtail Catholic Church activities and expropriate property from the Church, landowners, and foreign oil firms (Camp, 1997, 27). The constitution ultimately "drove the church into open rebellion" (Quirk, 1973, 98) and assaults on the Church such as the largescale expulsion of priests led to the Cristero rebellion and civil war of 1926-29 (Meyer, 1976).[451] The Constitution also facilitated the realization of largescale land reform as promised in 1915 which was finally launched in the 1920s and peaked in 1934-40 under Cardenas with the ultimate redistribution of 83 million hectares to 2.89 million peasants (Basanez, 1981, 177). By 1940 nearly half the rural population worked on *ejidos* (communal farms) and the landowning class was destroyed (Hansen, 1971, 32, 39-40, 91).[452]

4.15 Mozambique 1975-

1. VIOLENT, IRREGULAR SEIZURE OF POWER

   The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) took power from the Portuguese when Mozambique became independent on June 25, 1975 after Lisbon conceded independence to its colonies. Frelimo had fought a guerrilla struggle against the Portuguese from September 1964 until a ceasefire on September 8, 1974.[453]

2. REGIME RULED BY A MASS-BASED MOVEMENT THAT EMERGES OUTSIDE THE STATE

[448] See also Aguila and Bortz (2012, 185).
[449] See also Garrido (1982, 34).
[450] Constitutional provisions passed that "so severely curtailed the spiritual activities of the clergy that no religious body anywhere in the world would have accommodated itself to them" (Quirk, 1973, 96) as they "eliminated the Church as an entity even nominally independent from the state" (Reich, 1995, 11). The Church was "deprived of the resources to maintain vital social functions" (Ard, 2003, 35) and the goal of the reforms was to secure the "disappearance of religious power in the new society" (Blancarte, 2014, 70).
[451] In 1926, the Calles government's effort to enforce the 1917 constitutional provisions "threatened the church with death" (Meyer, 1976, 45). This brought a definitive "rupture" with the Church (Meyer, 1976, 42), which triggered the 1926-29 Cristero rebellion, leading to 90-100,000 deaths (Meyer, 1976, 64, 178).
[452] Land reform "crushed the power of the remaining. . . hacendados" (Hansen, 1971, 91).
[453] The fighting cost somewhere between 13,500 and 43,500 lives (Gleditsch et al., 2002).

Frelimo was founded in 1962 by uniting three regionally based groups, the Mozambican African Union (MANU), the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO) and the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI).

3. STATE TRANSFORMATION: COLLAPSE OF PRE-EXISTING COERCIVE APPARATUS AND CREATION OF NEW ARMED FORCES

   Independence was accompanied by the near total breakdown of the colonial state structure. The armed wing of Frelimo became the new military in Mozambique (MacQueen, 1997; Newitt, 2002).

4. ATTEMPTED TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL AND/OR GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

   - *Attack on domestic economic/political elite*

     Although Frelimo was initially a broad-based nationalist movement, it was taken over by the radical wing of the movement following the assassination of the founder, Eduardo Mondlane in 1968 (Westfall 1984). Upon taking power, Frelimo engaged in rapid nationalization and sought to impose central planning. Frelimo also sought to undermine and replace the traditional chiefs and religious institutions that were perceived to be tied to colonial rule (Newitt, 2002, 190, 194-97). In February 1977, Frelimo began a program of villagization to concentrate and "urbanize" the peasants (Simpson 1993, 325; Lorgen 1999, 15-16; Malache et al. 2005, 174, 175).

   - *Attack on regional balance of power*

     In early 1976, Frelimo directly challenged the regional power of white-controlled Rhodesia by supporting sanctions. The regime also provided support for liberation movements in both Rhodesia and Apartheid South Africa (Newitt 2002, 195; Malache et al. 2005, 163; Reno 2011, 59-60).

4.16 Nicaragua 1979-1990

1. VIOLENT, IRREGULAR SEIZURE OF POWER

   The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) guerrilla war (1961-79) and mass urban insurrection (1977-79), culminating in the May-July 1979 "final offensive," forced Anastasio Somoza to flee on July 17, 1979 and in the next three days the Sandinistas occupied Managua and established national power (Black, 1981, 155-81).[454]

2. REGIME RULED BY A MASS-BASED MOVEMENT THAT EMERGES OUTSIDE THE STATE

   The FSLN was founded a small guerrilla organization in 1961 (Booth, 1985, 138-39). The FSLN remained small through 1961-79, but grew rapidly during mass urban unrest

[454] See also Booth (1985, 157-82); Miranda and Ratliff (1993, 1-2). Estimates range for the numbers killed in the fighting. Foran (2005, 73) states that 50,000 died in the 1977-79 conflict. Booth (1985, 183) claims 15,000 were killed in the "final offensive" and 40-50,000 in the 1977-79 insurrection.

from 1977-79 (Black, 1981, 120-81).[455] By the time of the "final offensive" of May-July 1979, the FSLN had around 5,000 members (Booth, 1985, 149-50).

3. STATE TRANSFORMATION: COLLAPSE OF PRE-EXISTING COERCIVE APPARATUS AND CREATION OF NEW ARMED FORCES

   Somoza's security force, the National Guard, collapsed and was formally dissolved in 1979 (Booth, 1985, 225). The FSLN dissolved all Somoza-era coercive organizations and created an entirely new army, the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS) and police force (Cajina, 1997, 82).[456]

4. ATTEMPTED TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL AND/OR GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

   - *Attack on domestic economic/political elite*

     In 1979, the FSLN nationalized the banking sector and all the properties of the Somoza family and its allies[457], including roughly half of the agricultural holdings over 500 hectares, a quarter of industrial enterprises, the largest construction companies, and the main supermarket chain (Irvin, 1983, 127). A "far-reaching agrarian reform" (Harris, 1987, 4) was launched in July 1981, allowing state confiscation of idle or under-utilized private lands over 350 hectares in the Pacific and 700 hectares in the rest of the country (Deere and Marchetti, 1985, 92).[458]

4.17 Rwanda 1994-

1. VIOLENT, IRREGULAR SEIZURE OF POWER

   1990-94 the armed wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), fought a war against the Hutu-dominated Habyarimana regime and in the midst of the Rwandan genocide the RPF took power in Kigali (Lemarchand, 1994, 583).[459] Upon taking power, the regime faced a an insurgency in northwestern Rwanda and violently clashed with suspected perpetrators of the genocide (Des-Forges, 1999, 13).[460]

2. REGIME RULED BY A MASS-BASED MOVEMENT THAT EMERGES OUTSIDE THE STATE

   In 1979, the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (RANU) was formed by Rwandan Tutsi exiles in Uganda and renamed the Rwandan Patriotic Front in December 1987

[455] See also Booth (1985, 142, 144-46).
[456] See also Farhi (1990, 117); Barbosa (2010, 342-65).
[457] Somoza and his associates had previously controlled around 20% of farmland which was expropriated by the FSLN (Deere and Marchetti, 1985, 77).
[458] 1.4 million hectares of land were made available for expropriation (Deere and Marchetti, 1985, 92), and by 1984 nearly one million hectares were redistributed, providing land for 45,000 households (32% of the rural population). Over 600,000 acres were redistributed in 1981-83 and nearly 80% took the form of cooperatives (Booth, 1985, 243). Redistribution overall was substantial: farms larger than 356 hectares fell from 41% of land in 1978 to 11.5% in 1984 (Deere and Marchetti, 1985, 79).
[459] See also Straus (2006).
[460] See also Reyntjens (2013, 8, 104-6, 116); Eide (2012, 269-70).

(Waugh, 2004, 16).[461] When it invaded Rwanda in 1990, the RPF had 7,000 armed fighters (Des-Forges, 1999, 52-53).

3. STATE TRANSFORMATION: COLLAPSE OF PRE-EXISTING COERCIVE APPARATUS AND CREATION OF NEW ARMED FORCES

   As much of the state collapsed, the RPF formed the new state, leading some analysts to remark that "Rwanda is an army with a state" (Reyntjens, 2013, 71).[462] The RPA became the army of the new state (the Rwandan Defense Forces, RDF) and while the RDF did bring on some Hutu members, the officer corps remained dominated by RPA veterans and predominately Tutsi (Jowell, 2014, 279-80).

4. ATTEMPTED TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL AND/OR GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

   - *Attack on domestic economic/political elite*

     When the RPF took power in Kigali it launched a radical transformation of the existing racial order. the RPF undertook an "ambitious, radical, and rapid legal, cultural, social, and economic engineering" project aimed at creating a "new Rwanda and a new Rwandan" (Reyntjens 2013, 253). Social engineering focused on ethnic identity. Thus, the RPF government imposed a "comprehensive recategorization" of ethnic identities, effectively outlawing Hutu and Tutsi identities in favor of "Rwandinity" (Moss 2014, 436-41). Beginning in 1995, the government halted all history instruction in public schools on the grounds that Rwandans had been taught a false history (Kelley 2017, 123). Beginning in 1996, tens of thousands of Rwandans were forced into re-education camps (*ingando*) (Mgbako 2005, 205; Samset 2011, 273; Turner 2014). A 2001 Genocide Ideology Law criminalized ethnic identification and effectively banned any public discussion of ethnic identity (Moss 2014, 441; Kelley 2017, 113-14). The banning of ethnic identity was incorporated into the 2003 constitution (Moss 2014). In addition, the RPF undertook a largescale process of "villagization," in which tens of thousands of rural families were forcibly moved into centrally planned villages (Pottier 2002, 183). Despite intense criticism from international donors, the government relocated some 700,000 villagers in 1998 (Higgins 2009, 206; Kelley 2017, 127-28). By 1999, most of the population in the southeast and northeast was forced to move into the new villages (Newbury 2011, 231).

4.18 Soviet Union 1917-1991

1. VIOLENT, IRREGULAR SEIZURE OF POWER

   The Bolsheviks seized power from the Provisional Government in Petrograd in October 1971. After the seizure of power, the Bolsheviks fought a three year civil war in order to gain effective control over their territory which cost over seven million lives (Lincoln, 1999; Mawdsley, 2005).

[461] See also Lemarchand (1970); Reed (1996, 480-81); Boone (2014, 235-36).
[462] See also Stys (2012, 711-12).

2. REGIME RULED BY A MASS-BASED MOVEMENT THAT EMERGES OUTSIDE THE STATE

   The Bolshevik Party was formed in 1902 as a breakaway faction from the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party.

3. STATE TRANSFORMATION: COLLAPSE OF PRE-EXISTING COERCIVE APPARATUS AND CREATION OF NEW ARMED FORCES

   The Tsarist military command and control systems disintegrated and the army collapsed (Taylor, 2003, 78, 96-99, 117, 132) and was replaced by new forces - the Cheka (later renamed the KGB) and the Red Army.

4. ATTEMPTED TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL AND/OR GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

   - *Attack on domestic economic/political elite*

     Upon taking power, the Bolsheviks declared an end to private property - issuing decrees confiscating all landed property of the gentry, church, and royal family and closed all press deemed inimical to the new political order (Chuev, 9991, 98).[463] The new government halted all bond payments and stock dividends (Kotkin, 2014, 239). Lenin called on workers to "loot the looters" by spontaneously taking over factories and imposing workers' control (Mawdsley, 2005, 72). Within months, the Bolsheviks had nationalized all banks, creating "powerful enemies among foreign lenders" (Mawdsley, 2005, 73).

   - *Attack on regional balance of power*

     Upon taking power, the Bolsheviks withdrew from alliances with Western powers and repudiated Russia's international debts (Kotkin, 2014, 239).[464] The new government nationalized British- and French-owned factories and sought to promote revolution abroad (Mawdsley, 2005, 46).

4.19 Vietnam 1954-

1. VIOLENT, IRREGULAR SEIZURE OF POWER

   The Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) launched a guerrilla movement starting in 1944 (Turley, 1972, 76). After the French returned, the Communist-led Viet Minh fight a successful guerrilla war 1946-54, eventually forcing the French to cede power to an internationally-sponsored Geneva Accord (Post, 1989, 214-20).[465] The war resulted in between 440,000 and one million deaths (Pike, 1966, 49).[466]

[463] See also Service (1991, 269).
[464] See also Mawdsley (2005, 73).
[465] See also Duiker (1995, 170-71). Before the Accord, the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) guerrillas controlled 75% of territory (Lockhart, 1989, 264) and quickly took over all state agencies (including the police) after the French left (Murti, 1964, 34-35) and Communist party cadres quickly penetrated all areas of North Vietnam (Post, 1989, 260).
[466] See also Fall (1968, 129); Harrison (1982, 129).

2. REGIME RULED BY A MASS-BASED MOVEMENT THAT EMERGES OUTSIDE THE STATE

   The ICP was formed in 1930 (a precursor organization beginning in 1925). The party was small but well organized in the 1930s (Pike, 1978, 2-17). When the ICP briefly came to power in 1945 the organization had around 5,000 under arms (Giap, 1975, 20)[467], but quickly became mass-based in the struggle against the returning French, reaching 100,000 under arms in late 1946 (Turley, 1972, 79) and over 300,000 by 1953 (Hammer, 1954, 387).[468]

3. STATE TRANSFORMATION: COLLAPSE OF PRE-EXISTING COERCIVE APPARATUS AND CREATION OF NEW ARMED FORCES

   The preexisting French-backed "Associated State" and its armed forces disintegrated in 1954 (O'Ballance, 1964, 243). The PAVN became the armed forces of the new state (Fall, 1954, 72).[469]

4. ATTEMPTED TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL AND/OR GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

   - *Attack on domestic economic/political elite*

     Prior to and immediately after seizing power (1953-56) the Viet Minh engaged in largescale land reform modeled on Maoist China in a successful attempt to destroy the landowning class (Pike, 1978, 108).[470] Village hierarchies were restructured with the poorest peasants put in charge of land reform committees (Pike, 1978, 109). The use of "terror" in the post-seizure reform period resulted in 50-100,000 deaths (Pike, 1978, 108-9) with 5-15,000 killed during land reform alone, and 20,000 imprisoned (Kolko, 1985, 66).[471]

4.20 Yugoslavia 1945-1990

1. VIOLENT, IRREGULAR SEIZURE OF POWER

   In 1945, the Communist-dominated Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was founded after the defeat of occupying German forces in May 1945 after waging a successful guerrilla struggle against German and Italian occupiers from September 1941 until May 15, 1945 (Benson, 2001, 80-85).

2. REGIME THAT EXISTS AFTER 1900 RULED BY A MASS-BASED MOVEMENT THAT EMERGES OUTSIDE THE STATE

[467] See also McAlister (1971, 316-17)
[468] See also O'Ballance (1964, 195).
[469] See also Murti (1964, 34-45).
[470] See also Moise (1983, 4). These reforms destroyed a village structure "that had existed for thousands of years" and Viet Minh cadres 'eliminated' the social order (Pike, 1978, 108). 810,000 hectares were redistributed to 2.1 million peasants and by 1960 85% of families worked in cooperatives (Woodwide, 1976, 251).
[471] See also Duiker (2000, 477-80).

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (League of Communists of Yugoslavia) was founded in April 1919 at a Congress of Unification bringing together various social democratic parties on the territory of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Josep Broz Tito took control of the party in 1937.

3. STATE TRANSFORMATION: COLLAPSE OF PRE-EXISTING COERCIVE APPARATUS AND CREATION OF NEW ARMED FORCES

   The Royal Yugoslav army was disbanded in 1945 at the end of WWII. The new Yugoslav Army (1945-2000) was created out of the Communist-controlled National Liberation Army ("partisans") founded in June 1941. A new security service, the Department for the Protection of the People (OZNA) was founded in May 1944 and was later renamed the UDBA (Barnett, 2006, 78).

4. ATTEMPTED TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL AND/OR GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

   - *Attack on domestic economic/political elite*

     After taking power, the Communists carried out "wholesale nationalization of the economy" including banks and the wealth of the Catholic church, and expropriated 1.57 million hectares of land, much of which was distributed to previously landless peasants. Measures also included the forced delivery of grain at fixed prices. See Benson (2001, 90-91); Barnett (2006, 79, 82).

   - *Attack on regional balance of power*

     Tito seized Trieste from the Italians in April 1945 (though he was later forced to return the land). Yugoslavia provided support for Communist guerrillas in Greece (Barnett, 2006, 84). In 1946, the regime shot down two American fighter planes allegedly violating Yugoslav airspace (Barnett, 2006, 84).

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