Online Appendix

for

Poverty and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from Pakistan

Online Appendix A: Question Wordings

Policies for Endorsement Experiment

The World Health Organizations recently announced a plan to introduced universal Polio vaccination across Pakistan. How much do you support such a plan?

A great deal
A lot
A moderate amount
A little
Not at all

The newly-elected national government has proposed reforming the Frontier Crimes Regulation and making tribal areas equal to other provinces of the country. How much do you support such a plan?

A great deal
A lot
A moderate amount
A little
Not at all

Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan have explored using peace jirgas to resolve their disputes for example the location of the boundary [Durand line/Sarhad]. How much do you support such a plan?

A great deal
A lot
A moderate amount
A little
Not at all

In recent years the government of Pakistan has proposed curriculum reform for madaris to minimize sectarian discord. How much do you support such a plan?

A great deal
A lot
A moderate amount
A little
Not at all

Sociotropic Economic Assessment

Now thinking about the financial situation of your area, would you say that over the past year it has gotten much better, gotten a little better, stayed about the same, gotten a little worse, or gotten much worse?

Gotten much better

Gotten a little better
Stayed about the same
Gotten a little worse
Gotten much worse

Democratic Values

How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed by representatives elected by the people?

Extremely important
Very important
Moderately important
Slightly important
Not important at all

How important is it for you to live in a country where the decisions of the courts are independent from influence by political and military authorities?

Extremely important
Very important
Moderately important
Slightly important
Not important at all

How important is it that individuals be able to express their political views, even though other people may not agree with them?

Extremely important
Very important
Moderately important
Slightly important
Not important at all

How important is it that individuals be able to meet with others to work on political issues?

Extremely important
Very important
Moderately important
Slightly important
Not important at all

How important is it that individual property rights be secure? This means the state cannot take away their things without proper court proceedings?

Extremely important
Very important
Moderately important

Slightly important
Not important at all

The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan says civilians should control the military. This means the military cannot take action without orders from civilian leaders. In your opinion, how much control should civilians have over the military?

Complete control
A lot of control
A moderate amount of control
A little control
No control at all

Views of United States

Please tell us about the U.S. government's influence on the world, if it is: extremely positive, somewhat positive, neither positive nor negative, somewhat negative, or extremely negative?

Extremely positive
Somewhat positive
Neither positive nor negative
Somewhat negative
Extremely negative

Please tell us about the U.S. government's influence on Pakistan's politics, if it is: extremely positive, somewhat positive, neither positive nor negative, somewhat negative, or extremely negative?

Extremely positive
Somewhat positive
Neither positive nor negative
Somewhat negative
Extremely negative

Views of Shari'a

Here is a list of things some people say about Shari'a. Tell us which ones you agree with.
Shari'a government means:

Good governance, a government that provides services.
A government that does not have corruption.
A government that provides personal security.
A government that provides justice through functioning non-corrupt courts
A government that uses physical punishments (stoning, cutting off of hands, whipping) to make sure people obey the law

Demographics

Are you Sunni or Shi'ite?

Sunni
Shi'ite
Non-Muslim [WRITTEN IN BY INTERVIEWER IF NON-MUSLIM]

What is your age in years?

What was the highest class you completed?

Primary
Middle
Matriculant
Intermediate (F.A/F.Sc)
Graduate (B.A/B.Sc.)
Professionals (M.S.C., M.A., Ph.D. or other professional degree)
Illiterate

How much money in cash did you and your family earn in the last month?

Are you married?

Yes
No

Do you ever go online to access the Internet, do web site browsing, or to send and receive email?

Yes
No

Do you have a personal cell phone?

Yes
No

Can you read in any language with understanding?

Yes
No

Can you write in any language, more than signing your name?

Yes
No

Can you solve simple math (addition, subtraction) problems? Like 10 plus 7, or 30 divided by 5?

Yes
No

Perceptions of Groups Objectives and Activities

We're now going to ask you about a number of different groups. For each group, please answer to the best of your ability.

The first/second/third/fourth group is Pakistani militant groups fighting in Kashmir/Militant groups fighting in Afghanistan/Al-Qa'ida/Firqavarana Tanzeem

What do you think is the group's objectives? Please tell us all that apply. [GET ANSWER FOR EACH LINE BEFORE READING THE NEXT LINE.]

Justice
Democracy
Protecting muslims
Ridding the Muslim umma of people who have moved away from their religion
Freeing Occupied Kashmir [Option only given for Pakistani militant groups fighting in Kashmir]

How is the group advancing these objectives? Please tell us all that apply. [GET ANSWER FOR EACH LINE BEFORE READING THE NEXT LINE.]

Providing social services such as schools, hospitals, and medical clinics
Raising social awareness
Providing religious education
Providing worldly education
Fighting jihad

Online Appendix B: Randomization Protocol

Since our enumerators were not able to bring computers into the field—doing so was culturally inappropriate, physically risky, and complicated by severe and sustained power outages—we developed a procedure that allowed our field team to conduct the randomization with printed survey forms. There were 25 experimental conditions: 1 control questionnaire form, and 4! = 24 possible treatment forms. We assigned the control form number 1 and the remaining forms numbers 2 to 25. Using a random number generator we randomized the order of these forms, repeating the control form 24 times. SEDCO's team then laid out the 48 boxes with these forms in randomized order and proceeded to staple them one-at-a-time onto the serialized base forms. This procedure effectively randomized across treatment and control as well as within treatment. We then randomly ordered the 500 PSUs and assigned the serialized forms to PSU in order, so form 1 went to PSU 1, form 2 went to PSU 2, etc. This added another layer of randomization. We audited every survey form in 10% of PSUs before they went into the field and found that SEDCO carried out the randomization perfectly, as the balance tests in Table 1 attest.

Online Appendix C: Overview of Militancy in Pakistan

As is well known, Pakistan has employed Islamist militancy in India and Afghanistan as a tool of foreign policy since the early weeks of statehood and has continued to date (Swami 2007; Rubin 2002; Hussain 2005; Jamal 2009). Consistent with this history, the militant landscape in Pakistan is extremely complex and populated by groups that vary in their sectarian commitments, targeting choices, theatre of operations, ethnicity of operatives, and political objectives. To understand patterns of popular support for these groups, a fairly nuanced picture of Pakistani militant organizations is in order and so this section summarizes the main active groups.

While we did not assess support for the Pakistani Taliban in the survey, we provide background on them here as the difference between them and the Afghan Taliban is important for understanding the landscape of militancy in Pakistan. Within our budget for the survey we could only interview 6,000 respondents (twice as large as any other extant survey of Pakistani public opinion). This meant we could only study four groups (i.e., divide the sample into four cells) while getting reasonable precision at the provincial level. Given this constraint, we omitted an endorsement experiment on the Pakistan Taliban because: (1) at the time the survey was designed, the group was not as prominent as it has since become; and (2) there were safety concerns of asking about this group for enumerators.

Militants Fighting in Kashmir

There are several organizations Pakistanis group under the title of "Kashmiri tanzeems" (Kashmiri groups). Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM), Harkat-ul-Ansar/Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUA/HUM), and their splinter groups have traditionally focused upon Kashmir and while they recruit within Pakistan, their recruitment materials describe their mission as "liberating" Indian-administered Kashmir from India's dominion. In recent years, JM has become intimately involved with the Pakistan Taliban and has provided suicide attackers for assaults on Pakistani and international targets within Pakistan.

There are also several Kashmiri groups tied to the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) (a religious political party with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood), which include Hizbol Mujahideen, al Badr, and related factions. They tend to recruit Kashmiris and operate mostly in Kashmir with the goal of wresting Kashmir from India (Fair 2011).

The most prominent of the so-called "Kashmiri groups" is the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which was formed in 1986 to fight in the Kunar province of Afghanistan (Zahab 2007). After 1990, LeT shifted operational focus to Indian-administered Kashmir and subsequently expanded operations throughout India. LeT is responsible for the November 2008 Mumbai hotel attacks. Since 2004, LeT has attacked U.S. and allied forces fighting in Afghanistan. In contrast to the Deobandi groups, LeT has not targeted the Pakistani state, nor has it pursued western targets within Pakistan, and it remains generally under the control of the Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI) (Fair 2011).

Afghan Taliban

The Taliban government achieved dominance over most of Afghanistan by 1996 with the assistance of the ISI (Rubin 2002). The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks made it impossible for Islamabad to continue supporting the Taliban (Musharraf 2006) and when the United States-led coalition routed the Taliban in late-2001 many fled to Pakistan's tribal areas to regroup. In 2005, the Afghan Taliban launched a renewed insurgent campaign run by leadership *shuras* in Quetta, Peshawar, and Karachi (Levin 2009). The Afghan Taliban, despite considerable organizational changes since 2001, remain focused on ousting foreign forces, aid workers, and other foreign civilians from Afghanistan, overthrowing the Karzai regime, and restoring their role in governing Afghanistan (Giustozzi 2009).

Pakistan Taliban

Since circa 2004 clusters of Pakistani militant groups began describing themselves as "Pakistani Taliban." In the fall of 2007, Baitullah Mehsood announced the formation of the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP, Pakistani Taliban), which is a confederation of several militant commanders then

operating under his leadership.[1] While we were unable to measure support for these groups due to the combination of sample size limitations and the high level of political sensitivity surrounding them when our survey was fielded, understanding the differences between them and the Afghan Taliban is important for interpreting our results.

The goals of the militants grouped by Pakistanis as the "Pakistan Taliban" are focused on undermining the Pakistani state in select areas and establishing their own parallel governance structures organized around commanders' particular understanding of shari'a. At the time our survey was in the field these groups had conducted few operations outside of attacking police forces in the FATA and parts of the Khyber Paktunkhwa (KP), formerly the Northwest Frontier Province or NWFP). This has unfortunately changed in subsequent months as TTP-affiliated militants have conducted attacks across Pakistan in response to government offensives against them in the FATA.

Al Qa'ida

The most important militant group operating in Pakistan to Western policy makers and politicians is al-Qa'ida, the group responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown summed up these concerns when he reported that "three quarters of the most serious plots investigated by the British authorities have links to al Qa'ida in Pakistan" (Coates and Page 2008). Important al Qa'ida leaders remain in the FATA and many al Qa'ida operatives—Abu Zubaidah, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, and others—have been arrested in Pakistani cities (Negroponte 2007).

Al-Qa'ida operatives in Pakistan have targeted the Pakistani state and executed terrorist plots targeting the West and allies. The July 7, 2005, bombings in London have been linked to al-Qa'ida in Pakistan, for example, as have numerous foiled plots since 2004 (Jones and Fair 2010). Importantly,

[1] Militant commanders and their cadres began operating under the moniker "Pakistan Taliban" as early as 2004 when the Pakistan military began military operations in South Waziristan. The so-called Talibanization of the tribal areas began in North and South Waziristan, but quickly spread to parts of the other tribal agencies as well as parts of KP. After Baitulah Mehsood's death in August 2009, Hakimullah Mehsood leads the network of militants (Jones and Fair 2010).

few Pakistanis link al-Qa'ida to its most important actions: the 9/11 attacks on the United States. In 2009, only 4% of Pakistanis said al-Qaida was responsible those attacks while 29% blamed the United States, and 4% blamed Israel (Kull et al. 2009). Many Pakistanis are also dubious about the existence of al-Qa'ida *per se*. Perhaps part of the confusion stems from the fact that Pakistanis regularly understand "Qa'ida" to mean a "grammar book." All focus group participants in our pre-testing, however, understood what we were referring to when we explained that al-Qa'ida was "Osama bin Laden's militia." For this reason, our enumerators *always* explained this to respondents.

Sectarian Tanzeems

Pakistan is also home to a number of militant groups seeking to advance a sectarian agenda. These *firqavarana tanzeems* ("sectarian groups") include the anti-Shi'a Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).[2] The Sunni sectarian groups grew to prominence in the 1980s and are now a well-established part of Pakistan's political landscape (Nasr 2000). In the past, Shi'a sectarian groups targeted Sunni Muslims, although these groups have largely disappeared.

The anti-Shi'a groups all claim to be fighting for a Sunni Deobandi Pakistan by purging the country of Shi'a, whom they view as apostates.[3] Their actions typically take the form of attacks on Shi'ite mosques and community gatherings and they have increasingly attacked Christian, Sufi and Ahmediya places of worship and even individuals as well. In reality, a great deal of the anti-Shi'a violence is motivated by class issues and urbanization. The large land-holding families in Pakistan have historically been Shi'a and have not treated their tenant farmers well. Thus a class agenda has been executed through a narrative of apostasy (Nasr 2000; Zaman 1988).

[2] Many of these groups have been proscribed numerous times only to re-emerge. Many now operate under new names. We use the names that are likely to be most familiar to readers.

[3] While an exact accounting of Shi'a in Pakistan is impossible because the Pakistani census is not fielded in areas where Shi'a are populous (e.g. the Northern Areas), they are believed to comprise 20% of the population (CIA 2011).

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Online Appendix D: Covariate Definitions

Income. We measured nominal income by asking "How much money in cash did you and your family earn in the last month?" using the same question wording in Urdu as the Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics does in its surveys. We divided responses into three levels (low, middle, and high) and used dummy variables for each level to capture possible non-linearities in the relationship between attitudes and income. Respondents from households making below the 20th percentile of monthly household case income in their province (e.g. KP/urban) were coded as 1 on the variable *lowincome*. Respondents making above the 75th percentile of monthly case income in their province/strata were coded as 1 on the variable *highincome*. We take this approach because theories relating income to political attitudes are usually based on relative income and so our measure should account for the fact that purchasing power and the proportion of household income in cash vary systematically across provinces and across urban and rural areas.

Educational Attainment. We measure education as a continuous indicator of the highest education level completed by the respondent, scaled to range between zero (no education) and one (master's degree).

Support for Democratic Values. To measure support for democratic values we created an index based on the extent to which six core principles were considered important features of society to respondents: property rights, free speech, independent courts, being governed by elected representatives, having civilian control over the military, and freedom of assembly. For each aspect of liberal democratic governance we asked respondents to rate on a five-point scale how important it was to live in a country where that right was respected. All respondents who stated it was "extremely important" for a given right were assigned a 1 for that right and then we simply created an additive index of their scores across the rights (rescaled to lie between 0 and 1) to create our measure *democraticvalues*.

Views of sharia law. We include an indicator for whether the respondent believes that "sharia is a

government uses physical punishments."

All other variables are measured straightforwardly.

Description of Online Appendix Figures and Tables

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Table 10. Individual-Level Income, Urban Residence, and Support for Militant Groups (Varying Definition of Poverty)

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Table 12. Individual-Level Income, Exposure to Violence, and Support for Militant Groups (Varying Model Selection)

Online Appendix Figure 1: Beliefs About Groups' Objectives and Activities



Note: Mean and 95% confidence interval for responses on questions about group objectives and activities. All responses scaled to lie in [0,1].

Online Appendix Figure 2: Distribution of Support for Policies in Control Group



Online Appendix Table 1:
Sample Demographics and Randomization Checks

	Full Sample	Control	Treatment
Gender (*F*: p=.99, N = 6000)			
Male	53.1%	53.1%	53.1%
Female	46.9	46.9	46.9
Strata (*F*: p=.78, N = 6000)			
Urban	32.5%	32.6%	32.3%
Rural	67.6	67.4	67.7
Province (*F*: p=.72, N = 6000)			
Punjab	55.6%	55.8%	55.3%
Sindh	24.3	24.4	24.1
NWFP	13.9	13.5	14.3
Balochistan	6.3	6.3	6.2
Religious Sect (*F*: p=.51, N = 6000)			
Sunni	96.2%	96.3%	96.0%
Shi'ite	3.9	3.7	4.0
Age (*F*: p=.63, N = 6000)			
18-24	22.9%	23.2%	22.5%
25-29	18.7	19.3	18.2
30-39	29.1	28.2	29.9
40-49	17.5	17.5	17.4
50-59	7.8	7.9	7.6
60+	4.1	3.9	4.3
Education (*F*: p=.21, N = 6000)			
Illiterate	32.2%	32.4%	31.9%
Primary	13.1	13.7	12.6
Middle	14.9	13.8	15.9
Matriculant	19.3	19.6	19.0
Intermediate	12.3	12.8	11.9
Graduate	6.4	6.1	6.7
Professional	1.9	1.7	2.1
Monthly Income (*F*: p=.31, N = 5779)			
Less than 3000 PKR	9.7%	9.7%	9.6%
3,000-10,000 PKR	54.7	55.8	53.6
10,001-15,000 PKR	24.3	23.9	24.7
15,001-25,000 PKR	9.3	8.8	9.8
More than 25,000 PKR	2.0	1.8	2.2
Categorical Individual-Level Income (*F: p*=.16, N = 5636)			
Low income	23.7%	23.9%	23.4%
Middle income	62.9	63.5	62.9
High income	13.5	12.6	14.3
Categorical District-Level Income (*F: p*=.91, N = 4944)			
Low income district	29.1%	28.8%	29.3%
Middle income district	62.7	62.9	62.6
High income district	8.2	8.3	8.2

Note: Balance tests calculated on all respondents who provided data on the variable. F-stats are joint tests of equality across treatment and control conditions.

Online Appendix Table 2: Reliability of Responses by Literacy and Poverty

	Illiterate	Literate	Low Income	Not Low Income
Group Objectives				
Kashmeer Tanzeem	.84	.84	.81	.86
Afghan Taliban	.87	.84	.80	.87
Al Qaeda	.89	.86	.84	.88
Sectarian Tanzeem	.90	.89	.86	.91
Group Activities				
Kashmeer Tanzeem	.88	.85	.84	.86
Afghan Taliban	.88	.85	.82	.87
Al Qaeda	.91	.84	.84	.86
Sectarian Tanzeem	.92	.89	.87	.91
Democratic Values	.68	.73	.75	.69
N	1715	4285	1350	4286

Note: Cronbach's alpha scale reliability coefficients presented in table. Illiterate respondents defined as those who cannot read or write. Individuals below the 20th percentile within an individual's province-urban/rural strata group are classified as "low income." Respondents were asked whether the groups were pursing three objectives with positive connotations: justice, democracy, and protecting Muslims. Respondents were asked whether the groups engaged in four activities with positive connotations: providing social services, raising social awareness, providing religious education, and providing worldly education. Respondents were asked about how important it was to live in a country with six democratic values: free speech, freedom of assembly, independent courts, being governed by elected representatives, civilian control of the military, and property rights.

Online Appendix Table 3: Non-Response Rates by Literacy and Poverty

	Illiterate	Literate	p-value	Low Income	Not Low Income	p-value
Full Sample						
Polio Vaccinations	1.3%	1.4%	.78	1.8%	1.0%	.02
FCR Reforms	6.4	4.8	.02	4.1	5.1	.12
Peace Jirga	4.5	3.2	.01	3.6	2.9	.19
Madrassa Reform	3.2	3.0	.73	4.0	2.2	<.001
N	1715	4285		1350	4286	
Control						
Polio Vaccinations	1.6%	1.4%	.69	1.9%	1.0%	.06
FCR Reforms	4.8	3.9	.25	3.5	3.7	.81
Peace Jirga	3.6	2.7	.18	3.6	2.2	.03
Madrassa Reform	2.8	2.9	.85	3.9	1.9	.002
N	854	2146		694	2137	
Treatment						
Polio Vaccinations	0.9%	1.3%	.39	1.7%	1.0%	.17
FCR Reforms	7.9	5.8	.03	4.7	6.6	.08
Peace Jirga	5.3	3.7	.03	3.7	3.7	.98
Madrassa Reform	3.6	3.1	.51	4.1	2.6	.04
N	861	2139		656	2149	

Note: Percentages indicate percent of respondents not answering policy question in full sample, control condition of the endorsement experiment, and treatment condition of the endorsement experiment. Classification of illiterate and low-income respondents same as in Online Appendix 2. P-values from difference-in-proportions tests.

Online Appendix Table 4:
Individual-Level Income and Support for Militant Groups (Varying Definition of Poverty)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	10% cutoff	*15% cutoff*	*20% cutoff*	*25% cutoff*	*30% cutoff*
Group Cue	-0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Low Income	0.039***	0.046***	0.047***	0.043***	0.045***
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
High Income	-0.011	-0.008	-0.006	-0.005	-0.002
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Group Cue x Low Income	-0.026*	-0.026*	-0.023*	-0.010	-0.013
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Group Cue x High Income	-0.007	-0.008	-0.009	-0.006	-0.008
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Constant	0.781***	0.774***	0.770***	0.768***	0.763***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
R^2	0.243	0.246	0.249	0.251	0.251
N	4978	4978	4978	4978	4978
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N	N
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	N	N
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N	N	N

*** p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10 (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic controls include: gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, and religious sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, attitudes towards democracy, and views of sharia law. The table shows cutoffs for the "low income" group ranging from the 10th-30th percentiles, with analogous cutoffs for the "high income" group ranging from the 70th-90th percentiles.

Online Appendix Table 5:
Individual-Level Income and Support for Militant Groups (Dropping Individual Policies)

		Policy Dropped			
	None Dropped	Polio Vaccinations	FCR Reform	Redefining Durand Line	Madrassas Curriculum Reform
Group Cue	0.001	-0.186***	-0.200***	-0.203***	-0.196***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Low Income	0.047***	0.062***	0.038***	0.029***	0.053***
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)
High Income	-0.006	-0.004	-0.007	-0.006	-0.002
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Group Cue x Low Income	-0.023*	-0.038***	-0.022**	-0.022**	-0.026**
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Group Cue x High Income	-0.009	-0.006	-0.007	-0.010	-0.008
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Constant	0.770***	0.755***	0.782***	0.788***	0.765***
	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)
R^2	0.249	0.424	0.535	0.556	0.480
N	4978	4978	4978	4978	4978
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N	N
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	N	N
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N	N	N

*** p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10 (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Online Appendix Table 4. Individuals below the 20th percentile within an individual's province-urban/rural strata group are classified as "low income." Individuals above the 80th percentile are classified as "high income."

Online Appendix Table 6:
Individual-Level Income and Support for Militant Groups (Controlling for District Wealth)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Group Cue	0.006	0.004	0.005	-0.002
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.028)
Low Income (Individual)	0.042***	0.045***	0.049***	0.047***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
High Income (Individual)	0.002	-0.004	-0.008	-0.009
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Low Income (District)	-0.031+	-0.026+	-0.022+	-0.021
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)
High Income (District)	-0.007	0.004	-0.008	-0.012
	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Group Cue x Low Income (Individual)	-0.020+	-0.022*	-0.025**	-0.022*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Group Cue x High Income (Individual)	-0.002	-0.003	-0.005	-0.004
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Group Cue x Low Income (District)	-0.016	-0.010	-0.007	-0.011
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Group Cue x High Income (District)	-0.015	-0.018	-0.018	-0.009
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Constant	0.823***	0.892***	0.777***	0.781***
	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.032)
R^2	0.062	0.186	0.248	0.256
N	4675	4675	4595	4595
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N	Y

*** p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10 (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Online Appendix Table 4. Classification of "low income" and "high income" individuals same as in Online Appendix Table 5. Individuals in districts below the 20th percentile of district median incomes are classified as "low income." Individuals in districts above the 80th percentile of district median incomes are classified as "high income."

Online Appendix Table 7:
District-Level Income and Support for Militant Groups (Varying Model Selection)

	(1) Clustering by District	(2) Multistage Clustering	(3) Hierarchical Model
Group Cue	-0.002	-0.005	-0.009**
	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.003)
Low Income (District)	-0.018	-0.012	-0.014
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.018)
High Income (District)	-0.015	-0.019*	-0.011
	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.029)
Group Cue x Low Income (District)	-0.008	-0.007	0.002
	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Group Cue x High Income (District)	-0.017	-0.013	-0.013
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.008)
Constant	0.799***	0.779***	0.819***
	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.019)
R^2	0.235	0.240	———
N	4837	4837	4837
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	Y	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N

*** p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10 (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Online Appendix Table 4. Classification of "low income" and "high income" individuals same as in Online Appendix Table 5. Classification of "low income" and "high income" districts same as in Online Appendix Table 6.

Online Appendix Table 8:
Sociotropic Economic Perceptions and Support for Militant Groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Group Cue	-0.007	-0.007	-0.004	-0.026
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.031)
Sociotropic Perception	0.013***	0.014***	0.012***	0.011**
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Group Cue x Sociotropic Perception	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	0.785***	0.858***	0.759***	0.771***
	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.034)
R^2	0.064	0.186	0.238	0.245
N	5186	5186	5080	5080
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N	Y

*** p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10 (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Online Appendix Table 4. Sociotropic perception measured on five-point scale ranging from "gotten much worse" to "gotten much better."

Online Appendix Table 9:
Individual-Level Income and Support for Militant Groups (Controlling for Sociotropic Perceptions)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Group Cue	-0.002	-0.004	0.000	-0.012
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.031)
Low Income	0.038***	0.040***	0.046***	0.044***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
High Income	0.006	-0.003	-0.008	-0.009
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Sociotropic Perception	0.013***	0.014***	0.011**	0.011**
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Group Cue x Low Income	-0.017+	-0.019+	-0.022*	-0.019*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Group Cue x High Income	-0.005	-0.007	-0.011	-0.010
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Group Cue x Sociotropic Perception	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.774***	0.843***	0.738***	0.744***
	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.035)
R^2	0.066	0.194	0.250	0.258
N	4913	4913	4828	4828
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N	Y

*** p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10 (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Online Appendix Table 4. Classification of "low income" and "high income" individuals same as in Online Appendix Table 5. Sociotropic perception measured on five-point scale ranging from "gotten much worse" to "gotten much better."

Online Appendix Table 10:
Individual-Level Income, Urban Residence, and Support for Militant Groups
(Varying Definition of Poverty)

	(1) *10% cutoff*	(2) *15% cutoff*	(3) *20% cutoff*	(4) *25% cutoff*	(5) *30% cutoff*
Group Cue	-0.008	-0.006	-0.007	-0.010	-0.007
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Low Income	0.019	0.025*	0.032**	0.029**	0.032***
	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
High Income	-0.002	-0.000	0.003	0.003	0.005
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Urban	-0.028*	-0.033*	-0.033*	-0.036*	-0.038*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Low Income x Urban	0.070***	0.073***	0.053**	0.051**	0.048**
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)
High Income x Urban	-0.018	-0.014	-0.015	-0.012	-0.011
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Group Cue x Low Income	-0.001	-0.010	-0.006	0.005	-0.002
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Group Cue x High Income	-0.013	-0.015	-0.015	-0.012	-0.014
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Group Cue x Urban	0.024*	0.022*	0.026*	0.026*	0.022
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Group Cue x Low Income x Urban	-0.081**	-0.054*	-0.055**	-0.047*	-0.033+
	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Group Cue x High Income x Urban	0.005	0.007	0.003	0.003	0.007
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Constant	0.782***	0.778***	0.773***	0.770***	0.766***
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
R^2	0.248	0.253	0.254	0.256	0.257
N	4978	4978	4978	4978	4978
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N	N
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	N	N
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N	N	N

*** p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10 (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Online Appendix Table 4. Classification of "low income" and "high income" individuals same as in Online Appendix Table 5.

Online Appendix Table 11:
Individual-Level Income, Exposure to Violence, and Support for Militant Groups

	Incidents			Casualties		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Group Cue	-0.006	-0.002	-0.007	-0.006	-0.002	-0.007
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.029)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.028)
Low Income	0.027*	0.037***	0.035**	0.032**	0.043***	0.042***
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)
High Income	0.015	-0.002	-0.004	0.013	-0.004	-0.006
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Violence	-0.025	-0.011	-0.009	-0.039*	-0.028*	-0.025+
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Low Income x Violence	0.051*	0.044*	0.044*	0.032	0.023	0.020
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.018)
High Income x Violence	-0.025	-0.014	-0.012	-0.015	-0.006	-0.004
	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Group Cue x Low Income	-0.008	-0.015	-0.012	-0.009	-0.015	-0.013
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Group Cue x High Income	-0.007	-0.012	-0.008	-0.006	-0.012	-0.008
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Group Cue x Violence	0.023+	0.015	0.014	0.023*	0.016	0.014
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Group Cue x Low Income x Violence	-0.040+	-0.034+	-0.036+	-0.044*	-0.040*	-0.039+
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Group Cue x High Income x Violence	0.013	0.011	0.000	0.010	0.010	-0.001
	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Constant	0.818***	0.774***	0.776***	0.820***	0.768***	0.769***
	(0.010)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.010)	(0.030)	(0.032)
R^2	0.062	0.251	0.259	0.065	0.252	0.259
N	5067	4978	4978	5067	4978	4978
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	Y	N	N	Y

*** p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10 (two-tailed).Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Online Appendix Table 4. Classification of "low income" and "high income" individuals same as in Online Appendix Table 5. "Violence" indicates district in urban PSUs with at least one incident or causality in the year preceding administration of the survey.

Online Appendix Table 12:
Individual-Level Income, Exposure to Violence, and Support for Militant Groups
(Varying Model Selection)

	Incidents			Casualties		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Group Cue	-0.002	-0.007	-0.012**	-0.002	-0.007	-0.013**
	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.004)
Low Income	0.037**	0.027	0.004	0.043**	0.033+	0.004
	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.006)
High Income	-0.002	0.002	0.003	-0.004	-0.001	0.003
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.007)
Violence	-0.011	-0.010	0.003	-0.028*	-0.026+	-0.022
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Low Income x Violence	0.044	0.038***	0.008	0.023	0.018	0.013
	(0.027)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.012)
High Income x Violence	-0.014	-0.010	-0.007	-0.006	-0.002	-0.006
	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Group Cue x Low Income	-0.015	-0.011	0.001	-0.015	-0.010	0.003
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.007)
Group Cue x High Income	-0.012	-0.018	-0.011	-0.012	-0.018	-0.012
	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.009)
Group Cue x Violence	0.015	0.015**	0.015+	0.016+	0.017+	0.018*
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Group Cue x Low Income x Violence	-0.034	-0.026*	-0.022	-0.040*	-0.033**	-0.034*
	(0.022)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.016)
Group Cue x High Income x Violence	0.011	0.007	0.002	0.010	0.006	0.006
	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Constant	0.774***	0.763***	0.819***	0.768***	0.757***	0.821***
	(0.040)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.041)	(0.018)	(0.019)
R^2	0.251	0.259	———	0.252	0.260	———
N	4978	4978	4978	4978	4978	4978
Model	Dist. Clust.	Multi-Way	HLM	Dist. Clust.	Multi-Way	HLM
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N	N	N
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	N	N	N
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N	N	N	N

*** p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10 (two-tailed).Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Online Appendix Table 4. Classification of "low income" and "high income" individuals same as in Online Appendix Table 5. "Violence" indicates district in urban PSUs with at least one incident or causality in the year preceding administration of the survey.