Poverty and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from Pakistan

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Policy debates on strategies to end extremist violence frequently cite poverty as a root cause of support for the perpetrating groups. There is little evidence to support this contention, particularly in the Pakistani case. Pakistan's urban poor are more exposed to the negative externalities of militant violence and may in fact be less supportive of the groups. To test these hypotheses we conducted a 6,000-person, nationally representative survey of Pakistanis that measured affect toward four militant organizations. By applying a novel measurement strategy, we mitigate the item nonresponse and social desirability biases that plagued previous studies due to the sensitive nature of militancy. Contrary to expectations, poor Pakistanis dislike militants more than middle-class citizens. This dislike is strongest among the urban poor, particularly those in violent districts, suggesting that exposure to terrorist attacks reduces support for militants. Long-standing arguments tying support for violent organizations to income may require substantial revision.

Combating militant violence, particularly within South Asia and the Middle East, stands at the top of the international security agenda. Economic development aid has become a central tool in prosecuting this agenda on the belief that " . . . underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, religious conflict and ethnic strife create opportunities for terrorists to exploit . . . .Terrorists use these conditions to justify their actions and expand their support" (U.S. State Department 2003).[1] Beyond terrorism, there is a widespread expectation in the policy and academic literatures that poorer people are either more susceptible to the appeals of violent groups (DFID 2005) or are more likely to participate in violence (see, e.g., Aziz 2009).[2]

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[1] Similar arguments are made in policy documents by other donors. The UK Department for International Development's (DFID) "Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World" policy statement, for example, argues that "poverty and lack of access to basic services contribute to perceptions of injustice that can motivate people to violence" (DFID 2005).

[2] Sambanis (2004) reviews arguments about the link between poverty and participation in violent political organizations. In this article, we focus on the relationship between poverty and support for militant groups, not the act of committing violence.

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Drawing on this perception, policies intended to combat militant violence have focused on using aid to reduce poverty and move people into the middle class. Underlying this approach is the assumption that the correlation between poverty and support for militant politics is sufficiently strong that changes in income achieved through external aid will have a meaningful impact on support for violent groups. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, for example, linked increased economic assistance for Pakistan with efforts to combat violent extremism (House 2009; Senate 2009). In testimony on the bill before the U.S. House, then U.S. Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke argued that Washington should "target the economic and social roots of extremism in western Pakistan with more economic aid" (Holbrooke 2009). This view also played a pivotal role in the April 2009 donors' conference in Tokyo, where nearly 30 countries and international organizations pledged some $5 billion in development aid explicitly intended to "enable Pakistan to fight off Islamic extremism" (BBC 2009).[3] These policies reflect a belief that poverty is a root cause of support for militant groups, or at least that poorer and less-educated individuals are more prone to the appeals of militants.[4]

Despite the strong beliefs about links between poverty and support for militancy that these aggressive policy bets reveal, there is little solid evidence to support this contention, particularly for the case of Islamist militant organizations.[5] To evaluate these hypothesized relationships, we conducted a 6,000-person provincially representative survey in Pakistan, a country plagued by militant violence. Our April 2009 survey breaks important methodological ground in several respects (explained in more detail below). We apply a novel form of an "endorsement experiment" to assess support for specific groups without asking respondents directly how they feel about them. Doing so is critical because attitudes toward these groups can be highly sensitive and asking about them directly is dangerous in some areas. The conditions in Pakistan, even more than in other contexts, may cause respondents to offer what they believe to be the socially desirable response or to simply not respond to certain questions at all.

Using this approach, we find first that poor individuals hold militants in *lower* regard than middle-class Pakistanis, even after controlling for a wide range of potentially confounding factors. We further find no evidence that those living in poorer areas are more supportive of militants than others, and the relationship between support and individual-level poverty does not change when we control for community-level income measures. Rather, the contextual factor that matters appears to be exposure to the externalities of militant violence. Leveraging a new dataset of violent incidents, we find first that violence is heavily concentrated in urban areas and second that dislike of militant groups is nearly three times stronger among the urban poor living in districts that have experienced violence than among the poor living in nonviolent districts. It is not that people are vulnerable to militants' appeals because they are poor and dissatisfied. Instead, it appears that the urban poor suffer most from militants' violent activities and so most intensely dislike them.[6]

The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. The first section presents a theoretical overview of the relationship between poverty and support for militancy which summarizes the extant literature and constructs testable hypotheses. The following section describes our survey and measurement strategy. The final two sections present the results and discuss their implications.

Theoretical Overview

While some policy makers presume a positive relationship between popular support for terrorism and poverty, extant empirical scholarship is underdeveloped (Blattman and Miguel 2010) and offers little support for this belief (Fair and Shepherd 2006; Jo 2011; Shapiro and Fair 2010; Von Hippel 2008).[7] Poverty, at the individual level,

[3] See also Wood (2009).

[4] These arguments are reflected in both Pakistani and Western discourse. On the Pakistani side, officials called for a Pakistani version of the Marshall Plan (*Washington Times* 2009). On the Western side, see the 9/11 Commission's claim that "Pakistan's endemic poverty, widespread corruption, and often ineffective government create opportunities for Islamist recruitment" (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004). USAID (2009) discusses the thinking behind these arguments. A more nuanced argument is that Pakistan's derelict public schools and poverty compel Pakistani families to send their children to the madaris (religious schools), which then provide recruits for militant groups (Stern 2000). For an alternative view, see Fair, Ramsay, and Kull (2008).

[5] The poverty-militancy link has recently come under scrutiny in the policy community (e.g., USAID 2009).

[6] DFID (2005) argues there is a correlation between poverty and exposure to physical insecurity but does not posit a further link between that exposure and attitudes toward militant groups.

[7] In terms of violent behavior (not support for violent political organizations), the perpetrators of militant violence are predominantly from middle-class or wealthy families (Krueger and Malečková 2003). Selection of operatives by terrorist groups plays a role here, as predicted by Bueno de Mesquita (2005) and shown empirically by Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor (2010).

has long been thought to make people more susceptible to militants' political appeals, thereby predicting greater support for such groups (Esposito and Voll 1996). Individuals who feel powerless or unsatisfied by the performance of formal political institutions may be more likely to turn to extra-state organizations or be manipulated by groups who exploit individual political and economic frustrations (Abadie 2006; Esposito and Voll 1996; Piazza 2007; Tessler and Robins 2007). These arguments have roots in an older literature which proposed a range of psychological and sociological reasons for why poverty and inequality—most strongly felt by the poor—correlate with support for violent politics (see Gurr 1970 on dashed economic expectations; Nagel 1974 on inequality; and Snyder 1978 for a contemporaneous review).

Several recent studies using survey data to examine the relationship between individual economic characteristics and support for militancy yield contradictory findings. Tessler and Robbins (2007) find that "neither personal nor societal economic circumstances, by themselves, are important determinants of attitudes toward terrorism directed at the United States" (323). Using Pew's Global Attitudes Survey (GATS) data from 2005, Shafiq and Sinno (2010) show that the relationship between income (as well as education) and support for suicide bombings varies across countries and targets. Chiozza (2011), also using the GATS data, finds that individual-level income and support for suicide bombing varies across countries. Mousseau (2011), using GATS data for 2002 from 14 Muslim nations, finds that support for Islamist terrorism is highest among the urban poor.[8] This produces a first hypothesis, which is the dominant view in existing policy debates: *Low-income individuals support violent militant groups more than higher-income individuals.*

Support for violent organizations need not correlate with poverty at an individual level, but it may instead be more sociotropic in nature, covarying with community- or nationwide economic characteristics such as income or inequality (Burgoon 2006; Crenshaw 1990; Esposito and Voll 1996; Huband 1998). Piazza (2011)suggests that economic discrimination against minority groups may explain support for domestic terrorist groups. Such sociotropic effects may make persons more supportive of militant groups either because the groups' rhetoric is more likely to resonate with those disappointed by traditional politics or because they offer an alternative method for achieving valued policy goals when the state cannot.[9] In other words, even if a person is not personally burdened with economic hardship, observing poverty may be sufficient. Thus, our second testable hypothesis is: *Individuals living in low-income areas support violent militant groups more than people living in higher-income areas.*

Unfortunately, scholarship tends not to account for the actual level of violence in explaining the relationship between support for violent political organizations and other explanatory variables such as poverty at the individual or community levels. Doing so is important for two reasons. First, the literature paints a mixed picture of the relationship between overall poverty and violence.[10] While some scholars observe a positive correlation between poverty and violence (see review by Burgoon 2006), others have found a mixed or negative relationship between indicators of poverty, such as unemployment, and rates of militant violence within countries (e.g., Berman et al. 2011; Dube and Vargas 2011). Within countries, scholars have found that political violence is increasing in short-term poverty (Miguel, Satayanth, and Serengeti 2004), dashed expectations for material gain (Gurr 1970), and income inequality (Muller 1985; Sigelman and Simpson 1977). Yet a broad consensus on links between income and violence remains elusive (Blattman and Miguel 2010). Second, the negative externalities of militant violence fall unevenly across income categories. The direct health impact of civil wars and insurgency falls disproportionately on the poor (Collier 2009; Ghorbarah, Huth, and Russett 2003), while terrorism reduces economic growth for a host of reasons (see, e.g., review in Gaibulloev and Sandler 2011) and distorts domestic spending (Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides 2004).[11] Militant violence may be particularly damaging to those living at the bottom of the income spectrum.

This general pattern is likely to be particularly strong in Pakistani society, particularly with respect to the interaction between urbanity and violence. Most of the violence occurs in urbanized areas, and while the disruptions

[8]Mousseau's approach differs from ours in that (1) he does not ask about specific groups; (2) 9 of 14 countries in his data have little experience with Islamist militancy, and only one has seen it at the levels Pakistan has suffered; and (3) item nonresponse on the dependent variable was 39%.

[9]Gurr (1970) also discusses how poor social economic performance increases the likelihood of individuals looking outside the system for solutions.

[10]Bueno de Mesquita (2011) provides one possible explanation with a model of rebel tactical choice in which the correlation between economic activity and terrorism is positive for countries with active insurgencies because rebel leaders substitute out of symmetric tactics and into terrorism when an improved economy reduces their ability to get recruits.

[11]The impact of terrorism on foreign aid is an open question. Recent evidence suggests countries experiencing terrorism receive more total aid, but terrorism's impact on the type of aid, and thus whether this shift is a net benefit to the poor, is ambiguous (Dreher and Fuchs 2011).

to economic activity that inevitably result from attacks are small (leaving aside the potential long-term deterrent of foreign direct investment), they can be expected to most acutely affect poor urban Pakistanis who have little in the way of an effective social safety net. Many of the recent attacks have taken place in locations such as Saddar Bazaar in Peshawar, for example, or in the traditional markets in and around Pakistan's Mughal-era "walled cities" such as Lahore and Rawalpindi. Saddar Bazaar is populated by poor vendors and serves mostly poor and middle-class customers. With the formation of modern suburbs in Pakistan, the wealthy and middle class have moved out of the "old cities" where violence has been concentrated and into these newer conurbations with their various amenities.[12] The burden of militant violence thus falls unevenly on the poor living in urban areas, where the negative externalities of violence are greatest. Rural areas are relatively more insulated from the negative economic effects of attacks because they are more sparsely populated. Thus, our third hypothesis is: *Low-income individuals living in urban, violent areas are the least supportive of violent militant groups*.

The Survey

Many organizations have conducted surveys on Pakistani attitudes toward extremism since 2001, including Gallup, Zogby, the Pew Foundation, WorldPublicOpinion.org (WPO), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and Terror Free Tomorrow, among others. None of these surveys, however, provide solid leverage on the empirical questions we address.

Three specific limitations stand out. First, respondent-level data are not available for most of the extant surveys.[13] Second, the existing surveys generally do not measure attitudes toward specific Pakistani militant organizations, but rather the tactics used by these groups or violence more generally. This does not get at the political question of which constituencies the groups rely on to effectively function. Surveys that do so tend to focus upon al-Qa'ida, the Afghan Taliban, and increasingly on the Pakistan Taliban. However, these surveys ask directly about groups and obtain high don't know/no opinion rates in the range of 40% (Pew 2009; Terror Free Tomorrow 2008). Surveys that indirectly measure attitudes by asking whether groups "operating in Pakistan are a problem" (IRI 2009) or pose "a threat to the vital interests of Pakistan" (WPO 2009) are also hard to interpret and still suffer high item nonresponse.[14] Third, existing surveys are not designed to identify subnational variation and are not representative of several areas of the country. Most either exclusively or disproportionately include urban respondents and all include too few respondents to make reliable inferences about subnational variation in support, let alone identifying subnational variation in the correlates of support.

We therefore fielded a 6,000-person survey designed to achieve three goals. First, we wanted a representative sample of the rural and urban areas of each of Pakistan's four main provinces. Second, we sought to measure attitudes toward specific militant organizations, which is distinct from support for violence generally but is the more policy-relevant dependent variable since each of the groups relies on mass-level support to function. Third, we wanted to minimize item nonresponse and social desirability bias in measuring affect toward militants.

As is well known, respondents in many survey settings anticipate the views of the enumerator and thus answer in particular ways to please him or her, or in other ways seem high status (Krosnick 1999; Marlowe and Crowne 1964). These tendencies may be exacerbated on sensitive issues where fear and the desire to avoid embarrassment are operating. In the Pakistani setting, respondents can determine significant information about class, ethnicity, and sectarian orientation based on the name and accent of the enumerators. This makes social desirability concerns even stronger for surveys studying the politics of militancy in Pakistan, since respondents may be wary to signal promilitant views to high-status enumerators.

Working with our Pakistani partners, Socio-Economic Development Consultants (SEDCO), we drew a random sample of 6,000 adult Pakistani men and women from the four "normal" provinces[15] of the country (Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [KP], and Balochistan) using the Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics sample frame. The respondents were selected

[12] Author fieldwork in Pakistan provides the qualitative assessment of the nature of the targets and victims. Details of the hundreds of attacks in recent years can be found in the various monthly and annual "Security Reports," published by the Pak Institute of Peace Studies, http://san-pips.com/index.php?action=reports&id=psr_1.

[13] Gallup and Zogby are proprietary without any prepurchase means to assess the quality of the data and limit access to top-line results. IRI and Terror Free Tomorrow do not release respondent-level data. Pew and WPO do provide access to respondent-level data, but their samples are limited in important ways.

[14] Item nonresponse rates on indirect measures of support on IRI's 2009 survey were as high as 31%.

[15] Pakistan is comprised of four provinces enumerated in its constitution. These are the "normal" provinces. In addition, Pakistan has several territories that have extraconstitutional status, including the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies, Gilgit-Baltistan, and Azad Kashmir.

randomly within 500 primary sampling units (PSUs), 332 in rural areas, and 168 in urban ones (following the rural-urban breakdown in the Pakistan census). We substantially oversampled in Balochistan and KP to ensure we could generate valid estimates in these provinces, which have small populations in spatially concentrated ethnic enclaves owing to their rugged terrain. We calculated post-stratification survey weights based on population figures from the 1998 census, the most recent available. Following procedures outlined by Lee and Forthofer (2006), all analyses reported below were weighted and clustered to account for survey design effects.

The face-to-face questionnaire was fielded by six mixed-gender teams between April 21, 2009, and May 25, 2009. Females surveyed females and males surveyed males, consistent with Pakistani norms. The AAPOR RR1 response rate was 71.8%, exceeding the response rates achieved by high-quality academic studies such as the American National Election Study. Online Appendix Table 1 reports the sample demographics and randomization checks for the endorsement experiment described below. Question wordings are provided in Online Appendix A. All variables were coded to lie between 0 and 1, so that we can easily interpret a regression coefficient as representing a $100^{*}\beta$ percentage-point change in the dependent variable associated with moving from the lowest possible value to the highest possible value of the independent variable.

Measuring Support for Islamist Militant Organizations: The Endorsement Experiment

Asking respondents directly whether they support militant organizations leads to numerous problems in places suffering from political violence. First, and perhaps most importantly, it can be unsafe for enumerators and respondents to discuss these issues. Second, as noted above, item nonresponse rates to such sensitive questions are often quite high given that respondents fear that providing the "wrong" answer will threaten his or her personal or family's safety. We therefore used an endorsement experiment to measure support for specific Islamist militant organizations.

The experiment involves assessing support for real policies which are relatively well known but about which Pakistanis do not have strong feelings (each confirmed during pretest surveys). The experiment works as follows:

- Respondents are randomly assigned to treatment or control groups (one-half of the sample is assigned to each group).
- Respondents in the control group were asked their level of support for four policies, measured on a 5-point scale, recoded to lie between 0 and 1 for analysis.
- Respondents in the treatment group were asked identical questions but were then told that one of four militant organizations supports the policy in question. Which organization was associated with which of the four policies was randomized within the treatment group.
- The difference in means between treatment and control groups provides a measure of affect toward the militant groups, since the only difference between the treatment and control conditions is the group endorsement.

Figure 1 provides a sample question, showing the treatment and control questions, and illustrates the randomization procedure visually.[16]

The core idea behind the endorsement experiment is that because we randomize both assignment to the group endorsement and the pairing of issues with groups, any difference in policy support can be attributed solely to the group. When the object of evaluation is a policy (as opposed to a group), social desirability concerns are lessened because respondents (particularly those of lower class, ethnicity, or social status) are not asked to explicitly and directly divulge their beliefs about militants. For this approach to improve on direct questioning, respondents cannot view being asked about a policy endorsed by a group as substantially more sensitive than if they were asked about the policy alone, or at least that the difference in sensitivity is much less than for direct questions. We assess these assumptions empirically below by examining nonresponse rates.[17]

This approach draws on extensive research on persuasion in social psychology (see Petty and Wegener 1998 for a review).[18] Individuals are more likely to be persuaded and influenced by likeable sources (Cialdini 1984; Petty and Cacioppo 1986). Endorsements of policies and positions are much more effective when an individual

[16]Online Appendix A includes the four endorsement questions. Online Appendix B describes the procedure for carrying out the design on paper forms to ensure proper random assignment.

[17]One concern is whether poor or illiterate respondents were able to understand some of the issues in the questionnaire. Both poor/illiterate respondents and wealthier/literate respondents produced highly reliable responses as measured by Cronbach's alpha (see Online Appendix Table 2) and did not exhibit substantially higher nonresponse rates (see Online Appendix Table 3).

[18]In a political science application, Lupia and McCubbins (1998) also employ an endorsement experiment to explore how citizens can use cues to approximate full information.

FIGURE 1 Illustration of the Endorsement Experiment

Control

[POLICY DESCRIPTION]. How much do you support such a plan?

Treatment

[POLICY DESCRIPTION]. [GROUP NAME] have voiced support for this program. How much do you support such a plan?

Randomization Procedure



has positive affect toward the source of the endorsement (Chaiken 1980; Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann 1983; Wood and Kallgren 1988). As O'Keefe (1990) summarizes: "Liked sources should prove more persuasive than disliked sources" (107). Accordingly, the effectiveness of an endorsement in shifting views on a policy indicates the level of support for the endorser.[19]

We see a clear reduction in sensitivity in our survey when we examine the difference in item nonresponse rates between the endorsement questions and direct ones about the groups (i.e., those without an endorsement experiment) such as "What is the effect of group X's actions on their cause?" Nonresponse on the direct items ranged from 22% for al-Qa'ida to 6% for the Kashmir Tanzeem. Item nonresponse on the endorsement experiment questions, by contrast, ranged from a high of 7.6% for al-Qa'ida endorsing Frontier Crimes Regulation reform to a meager 0.6% for the *firqavarana tanzeems* endorsing polio vaccinations. While this approach is not perfect, the low item nonresponse rate in our survey provides prima facie evidence that this technique reduced respondents' concerns about reporting sensitive information.[20] That the

[19]One potential concern with the endorsement experiment is how to interpret why respondents dislike the groups. For example, it could be that low-income respondents dislike the groups because of activities the group undertakes besides violence or because of greater distrust in political organizations more generally. To assess this, we asked respondents five questions about what the groups' objectives are—justice, democracy, fighting jihad, ridding society of apostates, and freeing Kashmir—and five questions about what they are actually doing—providing social services, enhancing social awareness, providing religious education, providing secular education, and fighting jihad. Average responses on these items differed only very slightly between the poor and other respondents, and the differences are never statistically significant (see Online Appendix Figure 1).

[20]Compared to other surveys, the contrast between direct questions and this approach is even starker. The WorldPublicOpinon.org 2007 survey of urban Pakistanis, for example, had a DK/NR rate of around 20% on most of the questions, but for questions about

endorsement experiment drives down item nonresponse is not necessarily evidence that it also ameliorates social desirability bias. Nonetheless, a fairly contorted story would be required to explain why a technique that drives down item nonresponse so dramatically would fail to address social desirability biases that stem from respondents' concerns about how enumerators will react to their answers.

We used this method to measure support for four groups: the Kashmiri tanzeems, the Afghan Taliban, al-Qa'ida, and the sectarian tanzeems.[21] This required asking about four policy issues: polio vaccinations, reforming the frontier crimes regulation (the colonial-era legal code governing the FATA), redefining the Durand line (the border separating Pakistan from Afghanistan, which the latter contests), and requiring madrassas to teach math and science.[22] By randomizing which group is associated with which policy within the treatment group, we control for question order effects.[23] This allows us to identify treatment effects for multiple groups that are unlikely to be biased by the details of any specific policy.

For an endorsement experiment like this to work the policies need to have two characteristics (Bullock et al. 2011). First, they must be ones about which respondents do not have overly strong prior opinions so that a group's endorsement can affect their evaluation of the policy. This method would not work in the United States, for example, if one asked about banning abortion, a policy about which prior attitudes are strong. Second, the policies must be somewhat familiar to respondents for the group endorsement to be meaningful and salient. In the United States, for instance, asking about an obscure mining regulation would not work because respondents might not provide meaningful responses and endorsements might have a limited impact. While the policies we studied may seem high valence to professional students of politics, they do not appear to be so for most Pakistanis based on intensive pretesting with 200 residents of Islamabad, Peshawar, and Rawalpindi between March 20 and 26, 2009.[24]

To construct our dependent variable of support for militant political organizations, we measure the average support the respondent reports for the four policies. Recall that one of the four militant groups was randomly assigned to be associated with each policy in the treatment group. We leverage random assignment into treatment (endorsement) and control to measure differential support for militancy, as proxied for by support for the policies. The main dependent variable, therefore, is a 20-point scale, recoded to lie between 0 (no support for all four policies) and 1 (a great deal of support for all four policies). In the control group, the policy scale had a mean value of .79 (s.d. = .15). As described below, we also examined support for each of the groups individually.

Independent Variables

Based on the hypotheses presented in the first section, our three key independent variables are (1) individual-level economic status, (2) district-level economic status, and (3) district-level violence.

Measuring economic status is complicated. In Pakistan, as in most countries, both wages and the cost of living vary widely across regions as well as between urban and rural areas. A useful way to see this variation is to look at how the income distribution varies across provinces. The mean household income for the third quintile of the income distribution (40th–60th percentile) in urban areas of Sindh in 2007–2008 was Rs 12,664 (Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics 2009).[25] The same income would

the activities of Pakistan-based militant groups, the DK/NR rate was sometimes in excess of 50%. When they asked different samples of Pakistanis "How do you feel about al-Qaeda?" in 2007, 2008, and 2009, DK/NR rates were 68%, 47%, and 13%, respectively. When Pakistanis were asked who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks, DK/NR rates were 63% and 72% in 2007 and 2008, respectively (Fair, Ramsay, and Kull 2008). The Pew Global Attitudes Survey encountered similar problems when they asked (predominantly urban) Pakistanis whether they have "a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion" of al-Qa'ida. In 2008 and 2009, the DK/NR rates were 41% and 30%, respectively. When the same question was posed about the Taliban in 2008 and 2009, the DK/NR rates were 40% and 20%, respectively (Pew 2009).

[21] Additional details about the groups as well as a background of militancy in Pakistan are provided in Online Appendix C.

[22] All four of these policies exhibit a certain degree of controversy in Pakistan. This includes the issue of polio vaccinations. The religious scholars (*ulema*) in Pakistan have long maintained that polio vaccines are a conspiracy by the West to diminish Muslim fertility (Nazir 2011). Moreover, as explained below, our results are not dependent on the inclusion of any particular policy.

[23] In this context, order effects refer to people systematically giving a higher rating to the first policy or their support for a given policy being affected by which other policy came before it.

[24] There is empirical evidence in the survey that attests to the validity of the policies as well. Online Appendix Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of support for policies in the control group. The policies exhibit sufficient variation such that responses are meaningful but attitudes may not be hardened.

[25] 2007–2008 is the most recent year for which provincial income and expenditure data are available. Similar variation across provinces and regions is found in the expenditure data and in the cost of key commodities, the cost of housing, and the like. Although the sample design for the Pakistan Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) was not designed to provide district-level inference, we have run key regressions using district-level estimates based on

place a household well above the mean for the fourth-income quintile (60th–80th percentile) in urban Punjab or rural Sindh, but below the mean for the second-income quintile (20th–40th percentile) in urban Balochistan.

Given this variation, using a measure of nominal income to measure economic status seems misguided due to the inconsistent relationship between nominal and relative income. Instead, we code individual income as a trichotomous variable, placing respondents into high-, middle-, or low-income categories given their province and strata (urban or rural). Those in the top quintile for their province-strata are coded as high income, those in the bottom quintile for their province-strata are coded as low income, and all others are coded as middle income.[26] In the analysis we use dummy variables representing high- and low-income respondents to capture a potentially non-monotonic relationship (i.e., middle-income respondents may view groups more or less favorably than others).

We employ a similar strategy to construct a trichotomous measure of community-level income at the district level using data from the 2007–2008 Government of Pakistan Labor Force Survey (LFS). The 2007–2008 LFS sampled 36,272 households in four quarterly waves, each of which was nationally representative. Districts whose average monthly household income places them in the top quintile of all districts in their province are coded as high-income districts and those in the bottom quintile for their province are coded as low-income districts.[27] As an additional test of the sociotropic hypothesis, we used a question from our survey measuring respondents' subjective assessments of how their area had performed economically.[28]

In order to assess levels of violence by district and province in Pakistan, we collected data on 27,570 incidents of political violence in Pakistan from January 1, 1988, through December 31, 2010.[29] We coded both the number of incidents of militant violence per district and the number of casualties from militant violence the year before our survey was fielded (April 1, 2008, through March 31, 2009). Militant violence here is defined as any incident which (1) is perpetrated by organized armed groups that use violence against civilians or the state in pursuit of predefined political goals; and (2) employs terrorist tactics (e.g., suicide bombings) or those associated with conventional or guerilla warfare (e.g., rocket fire and ambushes). During the survey administration period, sampled districts suffered 787 incidents of militant violence causing 4,525 casualties.

We measured several additional covariates, which we include in our models both additively and multiplicatively: gender; marital status; age; access to the Internet; whether respondents possessed a cell phone; ability to read, write, and do math; education level; and sectarian affiliation (Sunni or Shi'a). These variables have all been cited as potential correlates of support for violent politics, including age (Russell and Miller 1977), marriage (Berrebi 2007), media access (Bell 1978; Dowling 2006), education (Becker 1968), and religion (Juergensmeyer 2003). We also controlled for attitudinal variables which could impact support for militancy, including attitudes toward democracy, views on the U.S. government's influence on the world, views on the U.S. government's influence on Pakistan, and belief that sharia law is about physical punishment.

All variables are balanced between treatment and control groups in the endorsement experiment (see Online Appendix Table 1). We include province fixed effects to account for regional differences not captured by our controls. Online Appendix A includes question wordings for all the variables. Online Appendix D describes codings of variables that combine multiple items.

Methods of Analysis

Our measure of support for the militant organizations is the treatment effect of the endorsement, which we estimate for a given militant organization j by comparing the overall policy support (P_i) in the control group (i.e., the average support across all four policies) to policy support in the treatment group for those responses associated with group j.[30] We estimate the following regression via ordinary least squares (OLS) separately for each group, j,

the microdata. Because those estimates are so noisy (some districts are missing or have only one PSU), we do not report them here.

[26] As explained below, we assess the robustness of our results to various cutoffs and definitions of poverty.

[27] The 2007–2008 LFS did not survey five districts in Balochistan province that were included in our survey, representing 8.2% of the sample. Further, the LFS data do not differentiate between districts in Karachi as we do in our survey, so the LFS-based income estimate for the city was attributed to all five Karachi districts.

[28] The question read: "Now thinking about the financial situation of your area, would you say that over the past year it has gotten much better, gotten a little better, stayed about the same, gotten a little worse, or gotten much worse?"

[29] A team at the Lahore University of Management Sciences collected the data by reviewing each day of the major English-language daily in Pakistan, *The Dawn*. Codebook available upon request.

[30] We only include respondents who provided responses to all four policy questions; 10.1% of respondents did not provide complete data.

and for the pooled average across groups:

$$P_i = \beta T_i + \alpha_p + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where T_i is a dummy variable indicating that respondent i is in the treatment condition, α_p are province fixed effects, and ε_i represents random error. The coefficient estimate on β represents overall support for group j.

Some policies will exhibit greater treatment effects than others because prior attitudes are less well formed. We use the variance of the responses in the control group to proxy looseness of pretreatment attitudes and weight each policy response by this variance. Accordingly, we place greater weight on policies where we expect there to be a greater likelihood that attitudes will be shifted in response to the endorsements.[31]

To assess which individual-level characteristics drive support for militancy, we estimate various versions of the following regression specification via OLS:

$$P_i = \beta T_i + \boldsymbol{\eta}\mathbf{x}_i + \gamma T_i \mathbf{x}_i + \alpha_p + T_i\alpha_p + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where $\mathbf{x}_i$ represents a vector of the individual-level characteristics mentioned above (including income), $\boldsymbol{\eta}$ represents how these characteristics impact support for policies in the control group, and $T_i\alpha_p$ accounts for the possibility that there are province-specific treatment effects.[32] The parameters of interest are represented by the vector $\boldsymbol{\gamma}$, which captures how the treatment effects vary by the individual-level characteristics. This is simply the standard difference-in-differences estimator for identifying heterogeneous treatment effects controlling for potentially confounding factors. To simplify interpretation, all tables report total treatment effects for key groups (e.g., low-income respondents) along with their standard errors and significance levels.

Results

Support for Militant Organizations

Before testing our three main hypotheses, we briefly review the top-line findings of the survey, which is arguably the first valid, national measurement of attitudes toward militant groups in Pakistan. Due to the hypothesized treatment heterogeneity, the overall treatment effects from the endorsement experiment are substantively small relative to the variation in support for policies in the control group. Nonetheless, they provide useful benchmarks for assessing the effect of poverty on views toward militant groups.

We find that Pakistanis in general are weakly negative toward Islamist militant organizations, as shown in Table 1. β in Panel A shows the unconditional difference in means between treatment and control groups. Each column presents the results for a particular militant group. The coefficients are negative and statistically significant at the 10% level for all but the sectarian tanzeems, suggesting that Pakistanis hold militant groups in low regard. The effect is statistically and substantively strongest for the Afghan Taliban, where the treatment reduces support by 1.5%, roughly 10% of a standard deviation in support for policies in the control group. Although this is a substantively small effect, there is meaningful heterogeneity by poverty level as discussed below. Moreover, consistent with random assignment, the treatment effects are substantively unchanged and statistically stronger once we control for differences in demographic factors (e.g., gender, age, marital status, education, media exposure, and sectarian affiliation) and attitudinal variables (views of the United States, beliefs about sharia law, and attitudes toward democracy; see Panel B). As the results of the basic endorsement experiment are consistently negative across all four groups, for simplicity the subsequent analyses analyze average support across groups.

Individual-Level Poverty and Support for Militant Organizations

The poor in Pakistan hold militant groups in much lower regard than do middle-class Pakistanis, challenging the conventional wisdom that expanding the size of the middle class via economic development will decrease the viability of violent groups. The treatment effect of the endorsement cue—our measurement of mean affect toward militant groups—is much more strongly negative for the poor, leading us to reject our first hypothesis. Table 2 presents several model specifications based on equation (2). The treatment effect for the middle class across all four groups (β) is close to zero and statistically insignificant, ranging between −0.6% and 0.1% across specifications. However, low-income respondents exhibit

[31] The results are substantively similar without this weighting, and so we report weighted results throughout as we believe they more accurately capture the impact of cues on attitudes. The weight vector **w** for the four policies (vaccination plan, FCR reforms, Durand line, curriculum reform) was (.983, 1.15, 1.28, 1.18), meaning that the weight for the control group was the average of these four individual weights (1.15). The poststratification weight was multiplied by **w** to produce the overall sampling weight.

[32] In estimating some versions of equation (2), we lose an additional 5.0% of the sample who did not provide complete data on the individual-level characteristics.

TABLE 1 Support for Militant Groups

Panel A. Unconditional mean support levels

	(1) Kashmeer Tanzeem	(2) Afghan Taliban	(3) Al-Qaeda	(4) Sectarian Tanzeem
β: Group Cue	−0.011^{+}	−0.015**	−0.010^{+}	−0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	0.796***	0.796***	0.796***	0.796***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000
N	5358	5358	5358	5358

Panel B. Conditional mean support levels

	(1) Kashmeer Tanzeem	(2) Afghan Taliban	(3) Al-Qaeda	(4) Sectarian Tanzeem
β : Group Cue	−0.010*	−0.015**	−0.009*	−0.008^{+}
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	0.798***	0.783***	0.791***	0.808***
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)
R^2	0.150	0.137	0.142	0.148
N	5243	5243	5243	5243
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group Cue–Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N
Group Cue–Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	N
Group Cue–Region Interactions	N	N	N	N

$^{***}p < .001$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{+}p < .10$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic controls include gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, and religious sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, attitudes toward democracy, and views of sharia law.

a treatment effect ($\beta+\gamma_1$) of between −1.9 to −2.6 percentage points across specifications, up to one-fifth the standard deviation of the dependent variable in the control group. To put this effect in perspective, the poor are up to 23 times more negative about militants than their middle-class counterparts.

Accordingly, the difference between the treatment effect for the middle class and for the poor (represented by γ_1) is large and statistically strong (see shaded row of Table 2). Low-income Pakistanis are roughly 2 percentage points less supportive of policies endorsed by militant groups than are middle-class respondents. The leftmost part of Figure 2 depicts the treatment effects for the poor and for the middle class in the full sample and shows that mean support for militant groups is much lower among the poor than among the middle class in Pakistan as a whole.

This finding is consistent in magnitude and statistical significance across a wide range of model specifications and is robust to controls for differences across provinces and demographic factors. Column (1) of Table 2 presents the simple difference-in-differences estimates including provincial fixed effects. The other specifications presented in Table 2 include additional covariates: demographic controls (column 2), attitudinal controls (column 3), and all main and interactive effects

TABLE 2 Individual-Level Income and Support for Militant Groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
β: Group Cue	−0.001	−0.002	0.001	−0.006
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.028)
η_1: Low Income	0.039***	0.042***	0.047***	0.045***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
η_2: High Income	0.007	−0.000	−0.006	−0.007
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
γ_1: Group Cue x Low Income	−0.018+	−0.020*	−0.023*	−0.020*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
γ_2: Group Cue x High Income	−0.002	−0.005	−0.009	−0.007
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Constant	0.813***	0.886***	0.770***	0.773***
	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.032)
R^2	0.058	0.184	0.249	0.257
N	5067	5067	4978	4978
Low-Income Treatment Effect (β+γ_1)	−0.019*	−0.022**	−0.022**	–[1]
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	
Middle-Income Treatment Effect (β)	−0.001	−0.002	0.001	–[1]
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	
High-Income Treatment Effect (β+γ_2)	−0.003	−0.007	−0.008	–[1]
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)	
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue–Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue–Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue–Region Interactions	N	N	N	Y

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .10 (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Table 1. Individuals below the 20th percentile within an individual's province-urban/rural strata group are classified as "low income." Individuals above the 80th percentile are classified as "high income." 1. Inclusion of multiple interaction terms precludes calculation of treatment effect for income groups.

for these factors as well as region-specific treatment effects (column 4). Note that the key parameter of interest (γ_1)—the difference in the treatment effect between poor and middle-class respondents—is significant and stable across all specifications.

Several other robustness checks confirm that lower-income individuals are least supportive of the groups. First, our results are not sensitive to the particular cutoffs used in defining poor respondents (see Online Appendix Table 4). As we move the relative income threshold that defines low-income individuals downward, the negative interaction between low-income status and the treatment dummy becomes stronger, as one would expect. The effect becomes a bit weaker above the 20% threshold, but the total treatment effect for the poor remains negative and statistically significant. Second, the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of any particular policy. The key interaction term of interest remains statistically significant in specifications iteratively dropping each of the four policies used in the endorsement experiment (see Online Appendix Table 5).

Community-Level Poverty and Support for Militancy

Our second hypothesis suggests it may not be individual-level poverty that influences support for violent groups but instead sociotropic poverty that is the relevant variable. However, we observe no meaningful difference between Pakistanis living in poor districts and those living in richer districts when we substitute average community-level income for the individual-level measure (see shaded

TABLE 3 District-Level Income and Support for Militant Groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
β: Group Cue	–0.000	–0.002	–0.002	–0.017
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.028)
η_1: Low Income (District)	–0.028+	–0.021	–0.018	–0.016
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)
η_2: High Income (District)	–0.013	–0.005	–0.015	–0.022
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.017)
γ_1: Group Cue x Low Income (District)	–0.015	–0.010	–0.007	–0.013
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
γ_2: Group Cue x High Income (District)	–0.014	–0.018	–0.017	–0.005
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Constant	0.834***	0.909***	0.799***	0.806***
	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.031)
r2	0.057	0.175	0.235	0.244
N	4925	4925	4837	4837
Low Income Treatment Effect ($\beta+\gamma_1$)	–0.015+	–0.012	–0.009	—
	0.009	0.009	0.009	
Middle Income Treatment Effect (β)	–0.000	–0.002	–0.002	—
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	
High Income Treatment Effect ($\beta+\gamma_2$)	–0.015	–0.020	–0.019+	—
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue–Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue–Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue–Region Interactions	N	N	N	Y

row of Table 3). Pakistanis from both poor and wealthy districts are less supportive of militants on average than those from middle-income districts, but the differences are not statistically significant in any specification. Even controlling for district-level poverty, the negative treatment effect among low-income individuals remains significant, confirming that our key results on individual-level income are not confounded by sociotropic variables (see Online Appendix Table 6).

Given that community-level poverty is measured at the district level, we also tested various specifications to deal with complexities in estimating standard errors: (1) clustering standard errors at the district level (to conservatively allow for correlated errors at the highest level of geographic aggregation for which we measure income); (2) multistage clustering of standard errors (to allow for both district- and PSU-level clustering); and (3) a hierarchical-linear model (HLM) that explicitly models the impact of violence at the district level as distinct from the impact of poverty at the individual level. In all three models, the interaction between district-level poverty (measured using data from the 2007–2008 Pakistan Labor Force Survey) and the treatment effect is statistically insignificant (see Online Appendix Table 7).

As an additional measure of sociotropic poverty, we asked respondents to report how they perceived their community's economic conditions to have changed over the past year. Substituting this measure for individual-level poverty, we again find no evidence that individuals who perceived that the economy was worsening exhibit statistically different treatment effects from those who perceived an improving local economy (see Online Appendix Table 8). Hence, we find no evidence in these data that poverty is correlated with support for militant groups as a sociotropic phenomenon. Further, the results we report suggesting a negative relationship between individual-level income and support for militancy

FIGURE 2 Treatment Effects by Income and Strata



Notes: Difference-in-means estimates averaged across groups for the endorsement experiment, controlling for demographic and attitudinal characteristics. Demographic controls include gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, and religious sect. Attitudinal controls include measures of attitudes toward United States, views of sharia law, and attitudes toward democracy. Individuals below the 20th percentile within an individual's province-urban/rural strata group are classified as "low income." Individuals above the 80th percentile are classified as "high income."

are similar when controlling for sociotropic perceptions of economic well-being (see Online Appendix Table 9).

Violent Externalities and Support for Militancy

Our third hypothesis was that the urban poor are less supportive of militant groups because they are more heavily impacted by the negative externalities associated with militant violence. If terrorist attacks suppress commercial activity in urban areas (for example, in street markets) for the short or medium term, it is the poor selling wares in those markets who will be most affected. Middle-class Pakistanis, whose incomes are more likely to be dependent on salaries from firms or the government (and who do not need to do much shopping for themselves, since most middle-class households in Pakistan have domestic employees who run such errands), may not be directly or at least immediately affected by these localized economic shocks.

In order to test this hypothesis, we need to determine where violence in Pakistan was concentrated during the year before our survey was fielded. Unfortunately, the precise geographic locations of Pakistani militant attacks in relation to urban and rural areas within districts are often unreported. Only 32% of the incidents in the year before our survey was fielded could be reliably coded to the *tehsils* level, the next level of administrative subdivision below the district, and 24% of reported incidents contain no subdistrict information whatsoever.[33] The imprecise nature of press reporting makes directly attributing attacks to urban or rural areas impossible, but we can identify the district of each attack.

That identification allows us to conduct two tests. First, we leverage the stratified nature of our survey

[33]The same problem exists with other potential data sources as well (e.g., the Worldwide Incident Tracking System).

TABLE 4 Individual-Level Income, Urban Residence, and Support for Militant Groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
β: Group Cue	−0.010	−0.008	−0.007	−0.012
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.029)
η_1: Low Income	0.021^{+}	0.025*	0.032**	0.030**
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)
η_2: High Income	0.023^{+}	0.009	0.003	0.000
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
η_3: Urban	−0.048**	−0.038**	−0.033*	−0.030*
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
γ_1: Low Income x Urban	0.061**	0.059**	0.053**	0.053**
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)
γ_2: High Income x Urban	−0.025	−0.015	−0.015	−0.013
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)
γ_3: Group Cue x Low Income	0.001	−0.004	−0.006	−0.003
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
γ_4: Group Cue x High Income	−0.014	−0.015	−0.015	−0.009
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
γ_5: Group Cue x Urban	0.029*	0.021^{+}	0.026*	0.023*
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)
γ_6: Group Cue x Low Income x Urban	−0.060**	−0.051**	−0.055**	−0.059**
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
γ_7: Group Cue x High Income x Urban	0.015	0.018	0.003	−0.005
	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Constant	0.827***	0.887***	0.773***	0.775***
	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.032)
R^2	0.071	0.191	0.254	0.262
N	5067	5067	4978	4978
Low-Income Treatment Effect (Urban)	−0.039**	−0.042**	−0.042**	—
$(\beta + \gamma_3 + \gamma_5 + \gamma_6)$	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
Middle-Income Treatment Effect (Urban)	0.020^{+}	0.013	0.019*	—
$(\beta + \gamma_5)$	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	
High-Income Treatment Effect (Urban)	0.020	0.015	0.007	—
$(\beta + \gamma_4 + \gamma_5 + \gamma_7)$	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)	
Low-Income Treatment Effect (Rural)	−0.009	−0.012	−0.013	—
$(\beta + \gamma_3)$	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	
Middle-Income Treatment Effect (Rural)	−0.010	−0.008	−0.007	—
(β)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	
High-Income Treatment Effect (Rural)	−0.024^{+}	−0.024^{+}	−0.021	—
$(\beta + \gamma_4)$	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Region Interactions	N	N	N	Y

$^{***}p < .001$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{+}p < .10$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

Notes: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Table 1. Classification of "low-income" and "high-income" individuals same as in Table 2.

TABLE 5 Individual-Level Income, Exposure to Violence, and Support for Militant Groups

	Incidents			Casualties		
	(1) Urban PSU, Violent District	(2) Rural PSU, Violent District	(3) Non-Violent District	(4) Urban PSU, Violent District	(5) Rural PSU, Violent District	(6) Non-Violent District
β: Group Cue	0.016^{+}	−0.009	−0.001	0.013	−0.006	−0.003
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
η_1: Low Income	0.075***	0.034**	0.045**	0.055***	0.018	0.053***
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.013)
η_2: High Income	−0.009	0.004	−0.007	−0.006	0.008	−0.009
	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.015)
γ_1: Group Cue x Low Income	−0.052**	−0.011	−0.015	−0.061***	−0.009	−0.014
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.013)
γ_2: Group Cue x High Income	−0.008	−0.001	−0.014	0.002	−0.010	−0.010
	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.019)
Constant	0.794***	0.760***	0.787***	0.810***	0.740***	0.745***
	(0.047)	(0.033)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.035)	(0.041)
R^2	0.290	0.321	0.206	0.356	0.359	0.199
N	1265	1810	1903	1117	1359	2502
Low-Income Treatment Effect ($\beta+\gamma_1$)	−0.036**	−0.019	−0.016	−0.048***	−0.015	−0.017
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.010)
Middle-Income Treatment Effect (β)	0.016^{+}	−0.009	−0.001	0.013	−0.006	−0.003
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
High-Income Treatment Effect ($\beta+\gamma_2$)	0.007	−0.009	−0.016	0.015	−0.016	−0.013
	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.016)
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Attitudinal Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group Cue–Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N	N	N
Group Cue–Attitudinal Interactions	N	N	N	N	N	N
Group Cue–Region Interactions	N	N	N	N	N	N

$^{***}p < .001$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{+}p < .10$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic and attitudinal controls same as in Table 1. Classification of "low-income" and "high-income" individuals same as in Table 2. "Violent district" indicates presence of at least one incident or casualty in the year preceding the administration of the survey.

design to learn about the distribution of violence across urban and rural areas of Pakistan. Second, we directly test whether the relationship between poverty and attitudes toward militant groups differs between violent and nonviolent areas.

The first test takes advantage of the fact that our survey is stratified by province and urbanity, which means that we have eight random samples of respondent clusters, one for rural areas and one for urban areas within each of the four "normal" Pakistani provinces. We can therefore compare the proportion of urban versus rural PSUs that are in violent districts. Although this approach does not provide direct evidence about whether violence occurs more frequently in specific PSUs in our survey, it does provide evidence as to whether urban residents are more likely to be exposed to violent militant attacks than are rural residents.

As anecdotal accounts suggest, militant violence in Pakistan appears to be disproportionately concentrated in urban areas. In Punjab Province, only 8.6% of rural PSUs are in violent districts, whereas 37.7% of urban PSUs are. A two-group difference-in-proportions test confirms that these proportions are statistically significantly different ($p < 0.001$), suggesting that urban PSUs (and therefore

urban respondents) are much more likely to live in violent districts than are rural PSUs and respondents. No rural PSUs in Sindh Province are in violent districts, while 17.5% of urban PSUs are, a significant difference ($p < 0.001$). Though we fail to reject the null hypothesis that urban and rural PSUs are equally likely to be in violent districts in KP and Balochistan, these provinces are very small compared to Punjab and Sindh (17 million and 6 million, respectively, as compared with 74 million and 30 million, respectively, according to the 1998 Pakistan census). For the entire country only 22.6% of rural PSUs are in violent districts, compared to 35.5% of urban PSUs, a statistically significant difference ($p = 0.002$).

Given these patterns, if the externalities of violence are driving the attitudes of the poor, we should expect attitudes toward militant groups to be much more negative among the urban poor than the rural poor, which is exactly what we find (see Table 4). Here we extend our earlier results by allowing the treatment effect to vary across both income groups and by urban or rural residence. The results show that the relationship between poverty and dislike of militant groups is driven in large part by the disdain of the urban poor toward these groups. These results are illustrated in Figure 2, which shows a large gap in the treatment effect between low-income and middle-income respondents in urban areas but not in rural areas. The point estimate on the three-way interaction between urbanity, low income, and the treatment dummy is $-.059$ ($p < .02$) in the model including a full set of controls and their interactions with the treatment dummy (column 4).[34] This means that the difference-in-differences estimate described above (i.e., the difference in the endorsement treatment effect between low-income and middle-income Pakistanis) is 5.9 percentage points larger in urban areas as compared to rural areas. The gap in support between low-income and middle-income respondents is about 20 times larger in urban areas than rural areas. Among the urban poor, the total treatment effect ($\beta + \gamma_3 + \gamma_5 + \gamma_6$) also looks quite large at 4.2% ($p < 0.01$; see third column), roughly two-thirds of the standard deviation in support for policies in the control group.

Turning to a more direct test of the third hypothesis, we find that the negative relationship between poverty and support for the groups is much stronger in urban areas that experienced violence in the year before our survey was fielded compared to other areas (see Table 5). Here we divide respondents into three categories according to how much militant violence their district suffered: (1) those from urban areas of districts with at least one incident of militant violence; (2) those from rural areas of districts with at least one incident of militant violence; and (3) those from districts with no violent incidents.[35] We also examine models of the effect of casualties in addition to incidents. All models employ the specification from Table 2, column (3), which includes provincial fixed effects as well as a broad range of controls. The total treatment effect among the poor living in urban PSUs ($\beta+\gamma_1$) within violent districts is -3.6% if we categorize districts according to rates of attacks and -4.8% if we categorize them by casualties from militant attacks. Both treatment effects are large and statistically significant, and the latter is almost three times the total treatment effect for the poor in nonviolent districts. These effects are stronger when we use casualties to categorize districts, as we should expect if casualties more accurately capture the size of the externalities from violence than does the simple number of attacks, which does not account for severity. The three-way interaction term between district-level violence (i.e., a dummy for the presence of an urban violent incident), the endorsement cue, and individual-level poverty is negative and statistically significant (-0.40, $p = .054$; see Online Appendix Table 11). Using casualties instead of incidents, the three-way interaction is stronger (-0.44, $p = .034$).[36] These results are consistent with the poor disliking militant groups because they bear the brunt of the consequences of militancy. The presence of violence caused by militant organizations is a key contextual factor that moderates the relationship between individual-level poverty and support for groups that employ violence.

Conclusion

To better understand the relationship between economic status and support for militancy in Pakistan, and to shed light on larger theories about political attitudes, we designed and conducted a 6,000-person nationally

[34] This result is also robust to various cutoffs in the definition of low-income respondents (see Online Appendix Table 10).

[35] Unfortunately, too few districts in our sample experienced no violence for us to divide them between rural and urban respondents. The cell sizes in the interactions we are studying become too small.

[36] Given that community-level violence is measured at the district level (in which respondents are embedded), we also tested various specifications to deal with complexities in estimating correct standard errors: (1) clustering standard errors at the district level; (2) multistage clustering of standard errors; and (3) a hierarchical-linear model (HLM). In all three models, the three-way interaction between district-level violence (incidents and casualties), individual-level poverty, and the treatment is negative. In four of our six cases, the interaction term achieves statistical significance at conventional levels, and in the other two cases, it is close ($p < .15$; see Online Appendix Table 12).

representative survey of Pakistani adults, measuring affect toward four specific militant organizations. We applied a novel measurement strategy within a groundbreaking survey to mitigate social desirability bias and nonresponse given the sensitive nature of militancy.

Using this approach, we uncover three important empirical patterns. First, Pakistanis are weakly negative toward a range of militant groups. Second, poor Pakistanis dislike militant groups more than their middle-class counterparts. Third, this effect is likely driven by exposure to the externalities of militant violence, as it is (1) stronger among the urban poor, who are most exposed to the negative externalities of terrorist violence; and (2) stronger among the poor living in urban areas that suffered militant violence in the year before our survey. These results call into question conventional views about the perceived correlation between economic status and militant attitudes in Pakistan and other countries.

Several implications follow from these results. First, efforts to study the correlates of support for terrorism and militancy should aim to shed light both on how support varies with individuals' characteristics and how it varies depending on prior experiences of violence. Identifying causal relationships in this arena will be challenging, but our results suggest that studies which do not account for the influence of past violence on attitudes risk making serious mistakes. If our results hold true in other countries, they suggest that it is the poor who may be the most natural allies in campaigns to delegitimize militant groups. More broadly, our analysis shows the value of studying the interaction of contextual and individual variables, while much of the extant literature studies them separately.

Second, it is unlikely that improving the material well-being of individuals will reduce support for violent political organizations. The poorest respondents in our survey are already less supportive of militant groups than others (at least those living in urban areas). While this is not direct evidence of a causal effect, it begs the question of why past changes in socioeconomic status, which are reflected in current incomes, did not have those effects.

More generally, this research shows that nuanced studies of sensitive political attitudes are possible in even the hardest contexts. Scholars are aware of the pitfalls of measuring such attitudes in developed countries, mostly in the United States. However, they know far less about issues involved in studying such attitudes in the developing world, especially in countries ravaged by enduring violence. The fields of security studies and political behavior would be well served by focusing more attention in this area.

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Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article:

Online Appendix A: Question Wordings
Online Appendix B: Randomization Protocol
Online Appendix C: Overview of Militancy in Pakistan
Online Appendix D: Covariate Definitions

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