Better to Trust in the Lord?

Religious Salience, Regime Religiosity, and Interstate Dispute Resolution

Supplementary Appendix

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Religious Salience Coding

As detailed in the primary text, this article's analyses rely upon three primary measures of religious territorial salience: contested sacred sites, non-contested sacred sites, and coreligionists.

We define **coreligionists** as populations that reside within a disputed territory that belong to the same faith as a claimant country's dominant religion. We define **sacred sites** as spaces and/or built structures in which religious actors claim the right to perform regularized ritual acts. These may include natural landmarks (e.g. Bear Lodge/Devil's Tower, Wyoming and Uluru/Ayres Rock, Australia) as well as artificial edifices (churches, monasteries, mosques, shrines, synagogues, temples, etc), whose very religious functions may deny the possibility of physical or temporal partition. We code these sacred sites as present when they are associated with a claimant country's dominant religion. Finally, we define **contested sacred sites** as sacred sites that are simultaneously claimed by two or more religious groups or religiously-aligned states as their exclusive entitlement.

Each of these measures are scaled from 0 to 2, wherein 0 indicates the absence or non-salience of a given indicator, 1 limited salience, and 2 high salience, according to the coding rubric provided below. Primary tests in this paper use a dichotomous version of this variable

with high salience coded as 1 and limited or absent salience as 0. A full description of identified salient sacred sites in each dispute under analysis in this article are also provided in Table A18 at the conclusion of the Appendix.

Contested Sacred Sites – Challenger and Target State

0: Territory not home to any sacred sites whose religious ownership appears to be contested between challenger and target claimant states

1: Territory home to at least one sacred sites of elevated salience to local religious actors, whose religious ownership is contested between them, even if not necessarily salient to broader members of claimant states' dominant religion(s)

2: Territory home to at least one sacred site of deep salience to the religion(s) of the claimant states and whose religious ownership is significantly contested between the dominant religion(s) of the claimant states, or which contains a particularly high concentration of salient sacred sites whose ownership is generally contested between local religious actors.

Non-Contested Sacred Sites – Challenger State

0: Territory not home to any sacred sites of note relevant to the dominant religion of the challenger state

1: Territory home to at least one sacred site of elevated salience to local coreligionists of the dominant religion of the challenger state, even if not to broader members of the challenger state's dominant religion

2: Territory home to at least one sacred site of deep salience to the dominant religion of the challenger state or a particularly high concentration of less deeply salient sites thereof

**When a significant sacred site cannot be identified as exclusively associated with the dominant religion of only one state, as is often true for shared-religion dyads, and is not explicitly contested between them, the site is coded as salient for both parties (e.g. the Great Mosque located on Kamaran Island, control of which was disputed between North and South Yemen).*

**When a territory contained so high a number and/or concentration of significant sacred sites to render their individual identification pointless, sacred sites are coded as present and highly salient. This abnormal situation is also noted in the case list provided in this Appendix (e.g. Khuzestan, Taiwan, West Bank and East Jerusalem).*

Coreligionists – Challenger State

0: Territory not home to any appreciable challenger state coreligionists

1: Territory home to challenger state coreligionists, but not necessarily in high/significant numbers

2: Territory home to a very significant population of challenger coreligionists, either in absolute terms or relative to other religious groups

Regime Religiosity Thresholds

This article relies upon a conceptual and empirical distinction between three kinds of religious regimes: *secular regimes*, which provide minimal support to the state's dominant religion, *moderately religious regimes*, whose support for religion observably influences their

politics and institutions, and *highly religious regimes*, whose politics are inseparable from and deeply constituted by religious interests. The empirical thresholds for these regime types are derived from annual quartile measures of state support for religion taken from the Religion and State Project, round 3. The upper quartile corresponds to highly religious regimes, the second-highest quartile to moderately religious regimes, and the bottom two quartiles to secular regimes.

As discussed in the main text of the article, this threshold approach is entirely consistent with much of the religion and politics literature, both those that rely upon RAS3 and similar academic projects[1] as well as public facing research like the Pew Research Center's "International Religious Freedom & Restrictions" project.[2] These quartile measures are further empirically validated by their reliance upon event-coded data measuring the specific policies that states actually enact and enforce in each given year under analysis. Drawing again upon our main text, our religious regime codings follow RAS3's religious legislation index (LXX), which additively measures state laws and governmental policies legislating or otherwise supporting their dominant religion. These include legislation of religious precepts, funding religious institutions, establishing religious monopolies on aspects of policy or law, and granting clergy or religious institutions official state powers or political influence in 52 distinct categories.

Our thresholds based upon this data are therefore also more directly empirically valid (and validatable) than approaches that measure state-religious political alignments that rely either upon dichotomous measures (a state is religious or not) or expert coding on a single dimension. To further validate this approach, we offer robustness checks that employ data coded using each of these principles drawn from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI)[3]

[1] Brown, Davis. 2016. "The Influence of Religion on Interstate Armed Conflict: Government Religious Preference and First Use of Force, 1946–2002." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religio*n 55 (4): 800–820; Grim, Brian, and Roger Finke. 2006. "International Religion Indexes: Government Regulation, Government Favoritism, and Social Regulation of Religion." *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion* 2 (1).

[2] Pew Research Center. 2022. "Religious Restrictions around the World." https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/interactives/religious-restrictions-around-the-world/.

[3] Cruz, Cesi, Philip Keefer, and Carlos Scartascini (2021). Database of Political Institutions 2020. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank Research Department.

and the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project[4] accordingly, none of which meaningfully correlate with, replicate, or in any way influence the substantive or statistical significance of our primary results.

DPI's most relevant measure is its coding for "religious executives" (execrel), which identifies whether a state's executive is, generally according to its "platform and constituency", religious; being either Christian, Catholic, Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, or otherwise. This measure cannot approximate the conceptual clarity of our measure, not only because it accounts for no specific policies, but in that it is internally inconsistent. For instance, all Christian-Democratic parties are listed as Christian despite few European states governed by Christian Democrats offering significantly high levels of support for Christian institutions (e.g. Germany). "Islamic" executives in turn are only coded as such if they are also a "religious leader", so while Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey since the rise of the AKP (Erdoğan's party) are considered religious, curiously neither are Jordan, whose Hashemite Monarchy is legitimated by its lineage from the Prophet Mohammad and deeply supports Sunni Muslim institutions, nor Oman, a sultanate that is the only contemporary state-patron of Ibadi Islam.

V-Dem's measure for government religiosity is based upon a Bayesian item response theory measurement model, aggregating individual expert responses to two questions. The first asks the extent to which a state's current government promotes a specific ideology or societal model ("an officially codified set of beliefs used to justify a particular set of social, political, and economic relations; for example, socialism, nationalism, religious traditionalism, etc.") to justify the regime in place, coupled with a second question as to whether that characterized ideology is nationalist, socialist/communist, restorative/conservative, separatist/autonomist, or religious. The resulting government religiosity variable, v2exl_legitideolcr_4, is coded on a continuous scale from 0 to 1, wherein 1 is the most religious government possible and 0 the least. Like the DPI measure, V-Dem's is uni-dimensional with the added challenge of offering no conceptual or empirical distinction

[4] Pemstein, Daniel, Kyle Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-Ting Wang, Juraj Medzihorsky, Joshua Krusell, Farhad Miri, and Johannes von Römer. (2019). "The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data." 21. V-Dem Working Paper. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.

between ranges of values other than expert agreement (or lack thereof) that a given government is religious but without offering a systematic explanation as to how this evaluation was made. While likely reasonably capturing the ideological alignments of regime leadership, it cannot provide any information on the religious aspects of its domestic policies. And indeed, we argue that it is policy rather than ideological posturing which most clearly establishes religious legitimacy, as the key "resource" determining a religious regime's domestic latitude to pursue different resolution strategies.

We further validate our chosen thresholds via basic descriptive statistics in Table A1 below, distinguishing between major types of regime policy supporting the dominant religion. In general terms, RAS3 collects data on twenty-one different kinds of *laws that states enact supporting religion*, which can be further divided into three subcategories: a) seven kinds regulating relationships, sex, and reproduction, b) four restricting women, and c) ten others that are comparatively rarer outside of highly religious states. As is evident in the table, secular states enact few if any of these laws, whereas highly religious states enact far more, especially restricting interpersonal relationships and "other" religious laws that include legislating economic activities (sale of alcohol, food restrictions, usury, holiday/sabbath business closures), public dress and music, and conversion away from the dominant religion.

RAS also collects data on five kinds of laws *enforcing* religious practice including blasphemy laws, censorship of antireligious press, religious police, and religious courts with a range of jurisdiction. Secular regimes almost never legislate any of these laws and moderately religious regimes very few, whereas highly religious regimes on average enforce about three. More common across all religious regime types, including secular ones, are provisions for *funding* religious institutions in eleven distinct categories. Of these, secular regimes average about 2, moderately religious regimes about 4, and highly religious regimes over 6. Also fairly common are various forms of state-religion *entanglements* which include 6 distinct forms such as religious leaders receiving diplomatic status, being granted some official political office (seats in legislature, cabinet) or vice versa (the King of England as the head of the Anglican church), having an official government ministry responsible for religious affairs, or much less

commonly religious requirements to hold elected or appointed office. Here secular regimes average about 0.5, moderately religious regimes just over 1, and highly religious regimes 2.

Finally, RAS3's catch-all "other" category includes nine further types of state religion support including provision of public religious education, public religious prayer, listing of individual religious affiliation on national identity cards, religious symbols appearing on the national flag, distinct registration processes for religious organizations, religious control of burials, and blasphemy laws protecting even minority religions or figures. Here secular regimes average about 1, moderately religious states about 2.5 and highly religious states nearly 4.5.

It is clear that the 52 forms of state-religion support coded by RAS3 capture a wide range of laws. The above discussion also makes clear that our percentile thresholds regarding regime legislation of these policies indeed identifies specific categories of religious behaviors that validate their separation into distinct religious regime types. They also offer a much more systematic basis to categorize this range of regime behaviors versus uni-dimensional alternatives.

Table A1. Challenger Regime Religiosity Thresholds, 1990-2011.

Religious Support Category	***N***	***Mean***	***SD***	***Min***	***Max***
Religious Support Index	**1686**	**11.44**	**9.58**	**1**	**46**
– *Secular*	909	5.24	1.83	1	8
– *Moderately Religious*	373	10.42	2.18	8	18
– *Highly Religious*	404	26.34	7.87	14	46
Religious Laws	**1686**	**3.6**	**4.61**	**0**	**20**
– *Secular*	909	1.21	0.88	0	3
– *Moderately Religious*	373	1.95	2	0	12
– *Highly Religious*	404	10.51	4.5	0	20
*** Relationships, Sex, Reproduction**	**1686**	**1.95**	**1.91**	**0**	**6**
– *Secular*	909	1	0.83	0	3
– *Moderately Religious*	373	1.2	1.07	0	5
– *Highly Religious*	404	4.77	1.46	0	6

*** Restrictions on Women**	**1686**	**0.38**	**0.88**	**0**	**4**
– *Secular*	909	0.05	0.22	0	1
– *Moderately Religious*	373	0.16	0.53	0	4
– *Highly Religious*	404	1.34	1.28	0	4
*** Other Laws**	**1686**	**1.27**	**2.21**	**0**	**10**
– *Secular*	909	0.16	0.43	0	2
– *Moderately Religious*	373	0.59	0.88	0	5
– *Highly Religious*	404	4.39	2.52	0	10
Religious Enforcement	**1686**	**0.88**	**1.41**	**0**	**5**
– *Secular*	909	0.02	0.12	0	1
– *Moderately Religious*	373	0.54	0.7	0	2
– *Highly Religious*	404	3.12	1.01	1	5
Religious Funding	**1686**	**3.61**	**2.54**	**0**	**11**
– *Secular*	909	2.17	1.89	0	6
– *Moderately Religious*	373	4.12	1.65	0	9
– *Highly Religious*	404	6.39	1.95	0	11
Religious Entanglement	**1686**	**1.01**	**0.92**	**0**	**4**
– *Secular*	909	0.52	0.53	0	2
– *Moderately Religious*	373	1.18	0.56	0	2
– *Highly Religious*	404	1.98	1.06	0	4
Other Forms of Support	**1686**	**2.35**	**1.65**	**0**	**7**
– *Secular*	909	1.34	0.85	0	3
– *Moderately Religious*	373	2.63	1.08	0	6
– *Highly Religious*	404	4.34	1.52	1	7

Table A2. Dispute Resolution Proposals and State Religiosity, 1990-2011*

	Secular States	***Moderately Religious States***	***Highly Religious States***	***All States***
None Proposed	543 / 59.74%	196 / 52.55%	230 / 56.93%	969 / 57.47%
Bilateral Negotiations	241 / 26.51%	144 / 38.61%	93 / 23.02%	478 / 28.35%
Third Party Non-Binding	51 / 5.61%	23 / 6.17%	22 / 5.45%	96 / 5.69%
Third-Party Legally Binding	74 / 8.14%	10 / 2.68%	59 / 14.6%	143 / 8.48%
Total	909	373	404	1686

* This table addresses issue of "selection into conflict resolution"; religiosity does not appear to determine dispute resolution forum, although "moderately religious states" may have a greater likelihood to bilateral negotiations than other state types. Evidence elsewhere strongly suggests state religiosity does not determine propensity to initiate territorial disputes.[5]

Table A3. Religious Salience Measures, 117 claims 1990-2011 (1,869 claim years)

Salience Measure	**Claim Years**		**Duration** ***(in data)***		**Duration** ***(onset)***	
	N	**%**	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Contested Sacred Sites	124	6.6	17.9	9.0	27.9	16.9
- Low Salience	25	1.3	25	-	58	-
- High Salience	99	5.3	16.7	9.2	22.8	11.4
Chal Coreligionists	833	44.6	14.2	8.9	35.1	34.0
- Low Salience	446	23.9	13.2	8.7	33.0	30.6
- High Salience	387	20.7	15.4	9.3	37.8	38.4
Chal Non-Contested Sacred	527	28.2	15.3	8.9	37.9	37.5
- Low Salience	325	17.4	15.3	8.8	41.3	44.4
- High Salience	202	10.8	15.1	9.4	32.4	23.2

[5] Zellman, Ariel and Davis Brown. 2022. Uneasy Lies the Crown: External Threats to Religious Legitimacy and Interstate Dispute Militarization. *Security Studies*, 31(1), 152-182.

Table A4. Spearman's Rho Rank Correlation Coefficients.

	Contested Sacred Sites	Challenger Coreligionists	Challenger Non-Contested Sites
Contested Sacred Sites	1.000		
Challenger Coreligionists	0.253**	1.000	
Challenger Non-Contested Sites	0.283**	0.360***	1.000

* = p ≤ 0.05, ** = p ≤ 0.01, *** = p ≤ 0.001

Table A5. Religious Salience & Challenger Dispute Resolution Proposals (Base Model)

	Bilateral Negotiations	Third Party Non-Binding	Third Party Legally Binding
1. Challenger Moderately Religious	0.208 (0.208)	-0.726 (0.576)	-0.266 (0.630)
2. Challenger Highly Religious	0.029 (0.246)	1.097 (0.516)*	0.994 (0.414)*
Contested Sacred Sites	-0.677 (0.567)	0.414 (0.712)	0.059 (0.963)
Challenger Coreligionists	0.026 (0.200)	0.789 (0.519)	-1.189 (0.521)*
Challenger Non-Contested Sacred Sites	0.505 (0.384)	1.196 (0.748)	-0.518 (1.005)
Challenger Historical Sovereignty	0.297 (0.168)†	-0.030 (0.453)	-0.179 (0.331)
Strategic Value	0.056 (0.185)	1.613 (0.568)**	0.101 (0.371)
Economic Value	-0.298 (0.173)†	0.476 (0.540)	-0.481 (0.346)
Entire Territory Claim	-0.479 (0.335)	-1.922 (0.839)*	0.581 (0.822)
Shared Dominant Religion	0.009 (0.195)	-0.010 (0.547)	0.573 (0.388)
Challenger Polyarchy Score	0.340 (0.363)	3.883 (0.911)***	1.077 (0.785)
Challenger CINC Share	0.285 (0.261)	0.994 (0.599)†	-0.750 (0.607)
Alliance Portfolio Similarity	0.610 (0.388)	2.746 (0.757)***	3.318 (1.407)*
Mutual Trade	0.000 (0.000)*	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Pacific Settlement Commitments	-0.098 (0.056)†	-0.324 (0.176)†	0.020 (0.109)
Territorial Integrity Commitments	0.079 (0.096)	0.367 (0.242)	0.053 (0.205)
Years since last MID	0.002 (0.018)	-0.087 (0.044)*	0.000 (0.052)
Claim Duration	0.043 (0.017)**	0.149 (0.055)**	0.146 (0.059)*
t (years since last relevant settlement proposal)	-1.816 (0.211)***	-3.433 (0.645)***	-1.625 (0.237)***
t^2	0.233 (0.052)***	0.564 (0.142)***	0.134 (0.029)***
t^3	-0.009 (0.003)**	-0.026 (0.008)***	-0.003 (0.001)***
Constant	0.651 (0.419)	-4.787 (1.253)***	-2.772 (0.951)**
Number of Observations		1,532	
Log-Likelihood		-770.247	
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by dispute dyad.			
† = p ≤ 0.10, * = p ≤ 0.05, ** = p ≤ 0.01, *** = p ≤ 0.001			

Table A6. Religious Salience and Challenger Dispute Resolution Proposals (Interactive Model)

	Bilateral Negotiations	Third Party Non-Binding	Third Party Legally Binding
1. Challenger Moderately Religious	0.263 (0.251)	-1.117 (0.733)	-0.077 (0.656)
2. Challenger Highly Religious	-0.048 (0.305)	1.130 (0.604)†	1.235 (0.449)**
Contested Sacred Sites	-0.431 (0.625)	0.408 (1.277)	1.167 (1.093)
Challenger Coreligionists	0.191 (0.304)	0.724 (0.665)	-0.431 (0.624)
Challenger Non-Contested Sacred Sites	-0.318 (0.471)	0.814 (1.123)	-1.510 (1.097)
Mod. Religious*Contested Sacred	-15.686 (0.789)***	-0.610 (1.373)	-2.360 (0.963)*
High. Religious*Contested Sacred	1.731 (0.788)*	-13.493 (1.639)***	-15.826 (1.752)***
Mod. Religious*Coreligionists	-0.317 (0.519)	0.785 (1.016)	-13.625 (0.953)***
High. Religious*Coreligionists	-0.436 (0.521)	-0.235 (1.036)	-1.644 (1.092)
Mod. Religious*Non-Contested Sacred	1.402 (0.864)	2.370 (1.344)†	-11.478 (1.409)***
High. Religious*Non-Contested Sacred	2.160 (0.595)***	0.519 (1.485)	-11.206 (1.633)***
Challenger Historical Sovereignty	0.350 (0.178)*	0.099 (0.499)	-0.100 (0.345)
Strategic Value	-0.026 (0.196)	1.536 (0.546)**	0.078 (0.373)
Economic Value	-0.324 (0.188)†	0.405 (0.631)	-0.558 (0.358)
Entire Territory Claim	0.007 (0.437)	-1.745 (0.908)†	0.282 (0.898)
Shared Dominant Religion	-0.022 (0.209)	-0.075 (0.563)	0.521 (0.410)
Challenger Polyarchy Score	0.522 (0.384)	3.862 (0.889)***	1.375 (0.798)†
Challenger CINC Share	0.302 (0.271)	1.098 (0.669)	-0.640 (0.607)
Alliance Portfolio Similarity	0.579 (0.400)	2.606 (0.725)***	2.924 (1.437)*
Mutual Trade	0.000 (0.000)*	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Pacific Settlement Commitments	-0.142 (0.059)*	-0.267 (0.190)	0.011 (0.114)
Territorial Integrity Commitments	0.110 (0.100)	0.285 (0.262)	0.106 (0.214)
Years since last MID	0.012 (0.022)	-0.092 (0.049)†	-0.005 (0.054)
Claim Duration	0.036 (0.019)†	0.161 (0.057)**	0.137 (0.062)*
t (years since last relevant settlement proposal)	-1.801 (0.218)***	-3.439 (0.668)***	-1.620 (0.240)***
t^2	0.234 (0.054)***	0.567 (0.148)***	0.134 (0.029)***
t^3	-0.009 (0.003)**	-0.027 (0.009)**	-0.003 (0.001)***
Constant	0.671 (0.432)	-4.639 (1.181)***	-2.757 (0.955)**
Number of Observations		1,532	
Log-Likelihood		-759.679	
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by dispute dyad.			
† = p ≤ 0.10, * = p ≤ 0.05, ** = p ≤ 0.01, *** = p ≤ 0.001			

Robustness Checks

In order to assess the robustness of our statistical results, we estimated a number of additional models. Results are summarized below.

- **Robustness Check 1:** On the potential concern that our results in Model 1 may reflect multicollinearity between our indicators of regime religiosity and religious salience of disputed territories, therefore misrepresenting the significance of our findings, we estimated two alternative models. The first, in Model R1 (below), we re-estimate Model 1 omitting our trichotomous measure for regime religiosity. Results are substantively similar to Model 1 in nearly all respects, except that the presence of salient challenger coreligionists and challenger non-contested sacred sites are each associated with a significant likelihood of proposing third-party non-binding dispute resolution. That these effects cease to be significant once moving to the interacted model, however, confirm our assertion that state's preferred negotiation strategies over religiously salient territory are closely linked to regime religiosity. In the second, Model R2, we re-estimate Model 1 omitting our three measures for religious territorial salience. None of the relevant coefficients nor their significance in this second alternative model differs substantially from those presented in Model 1.

- **Robustness Check 2**: Previous research by Powell (2015)[6] shows that certain religious features of countries have important impacts on conflict management choices in territorial disputes. Most notably, the author finds that Islamic Law states that incorporate holy oaths in their constitutions are significantly less likely to pursue binding third party methods than other actors. In Model R3 (below), we re-estimate Model 2 in the manuscript with an additional control variable. The latter is coded as "1" if a given state's constitution requires public officials to take a holy oath. Information on this variable is obtained from Powell (2015). We find that the inclusion of this additional control variable does not alter the substantive findings obtained in our analysis.

- **Robustness Check 3**: Many scholars in the religion and foreign policy literature explore the extent to which states associated with *particular* religions engage in different and/or distinct patterns of international relations. So too, skeptical approaches have often argued that ostensibly observed "religious" behaviors in fact conflate state religious demographics with conditions that better explain such patterns, particularly colonial legacies, levels of economic development, and democratic governance. The following robustness check therefore serves to confirm our argument that the distinct dispute resolution preferences we observe are indeed best explained by

[6] Powell, E. J. (2015). Islamic law states and peaceful resolution of territorial disputes. International Organization, 69(4), 777-807.

state institutionalization of religion (and the political costs and incentives this engenders) and are *not* reducible to either particular religions or conditions that commonly correlate with them. We do this in Model R4 (below), re-estimating Model 2 including separate controls for those challenger state majority religions that appear most frequently in our data: Buddhist, Christian, or Muslim regardless of denomination. This robustness check generates findings that are near-identical to the ones presented in the paper. The only notable difference is that contested sacred sites now cease to have any effect on the probability that highly religious regimes refrain from binding third party conflict management more so than secular regimes (p=0.57). Otherwise, the findings from these models are substantively similar to the results presented in our main analysis.

- **Robustness Check 4**: In Model R5, we re-estimate Model 2, replacing our three-level religious support variable with a binary measure that captures whether a given challenger state's executive is "nationalist" or "non-nationalist." These data are obtained from the Dataset on Political Institutions (DPI).[7] We conduct this test on the presumption that the effects we observe and discuss regarding regime religiosity are either better explained by or non-differentiable from the influence of challenger regime nationalism. We indeed find, confirming our theoretical intuitions, that the results from Model R5 look very different from the main statistical analysis reported in the manuscript. Taken as a whole, this suggests that the empirical patterns reported in our results section are driven by a challenger regime's degree of religiosity and *not* by the level of nationalism in a given political leadership.

- **Robustness Checks 5 and 6:** To further address anticipated criticism that dispute resolution preferences may be determined more by the ideological alignment of regime leadership than the religious aspects of its domestic policies, we re-estimate Model 2, adding V-Dem's continuous measure for government "nationalism" and "religiosity" as controls in Models R6 and R7 respectively. As explored in detail previously in this appendix, although these measures are formally continuous, ranging from 0 to 1, thresholds within these measures lack the substantive, policy-specific meanings we are able to attribute to our religious regime thresholds based upon RAS3's state religious support index. As such, employing interactive models substituting tiered versions (at any threshold) of these variables as we do for our religious regime measures, or even for DPI's dichotomous nationalist executive measure in Robustness Check 4, would be both conceptually and empirically invalid. Analysis of Models R6 and R7 illustrate that not only are V-Dem's measures for government nationalism and religiosity by and large not statistically significant, excepting an apparent aversion by nationalist governments to pursue third party non-binding settlements per Model R6, but neither does their inclusion influence the validity of our primary results.

[7] Cruz, Cesi, Philip Keefer, and Carlos Scartascini (2021). Database of Political Institutions 2020. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank Research Department.

- **Robustness Checks 7 and 8**: To address concerns that our results may owe to the particular variable selected to measure regime democracy, in Model R8 we reestimate Model 2, substituting V-Dem's polyarchy index for the polity2 score taken from the Polity project.[8] This model introduces no meaningful changes of any kind. As a further check to ensure that the dynamics we observe in our interactive Model 2 are not being driven by autocratic versus democratic states, we substitute the V-Dem polyarchy index for a dichotomous measure, with a threshold for "democracy" at 0.8. This proportionally corresponds to the more commonly used democracy threshold from Polity at a score of 6 or higher. The results of this test, found in Model R9, substantially deviate and in no way replicate those of our main interactive Model 2. This robustness check therefore gives us further confidence that the patterns we observe are due to regime religiosity and not regime democracy.

- **Robustness Check 9:** On the common observation that most territorial disputes take place between proximate and more often neighboring states, and that this may meaningfully influence dispute resolution preferences, in Model R10, we reestimate Model 2 including a measure for the natural log kilometer distance between state claimants. The only small change this model introduces is the apparent finding that secular regimes are less likely to engage in third-party legally binding dispute resolution involving non-contested sacred sites. This finding, however, has no substantive effect on the remainder of our theoretically central findings.

- **Robustness Check 10:** It may be argued that challenger state preferences for different dispute resolution forums should be linked to their relative strength versus the targeted state during the period of dispute. This might take the form of being more likely to propose some form of dispute resolution when the challenger is weak, in hopes of resolving the conflict potentially in their favor without exercise of military force. Consideration of this point is *already* included in the paper's primary models via the inclusion of the challenger state's share of material capabilities within each dispute dyad, derived from the Composite Index of National Capacity. As both our base model in Table A5 and our interactive model in Table A6 clearly demonstrate, this factor has no statistically significant influence on our results for any dispute resolution forum proposal.

  Alternatively, domestic weakness may pull in the opposite direction, namely that weaker regimes should be *more* reticent to engage in dispute resolution, particularly over highly salient spaces, because any such compromise might make them more vulnerable to domestic challengers. For this, we introduce Model R11 in Table A17 by the inclusion of coup risk, a measure of the maximum likelihood of a coup occurring in a given year in a given country, as calculated using monthly estimations of percentage

[8] Marshall, Monty & Keith Jaggers (2009). Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002. Center for Systemic Peace and Colorado State University (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm).

coup likelihood by the CoupCast project.[9] Here we notably find that increased coup risk is indeed significantly associated with diminished likelihood of proposing bilateral negotiations ($p<0.05$) and weakly significantly associated with diminished likelihood of proposing binding third party dispute mechanisms ($p<0.10$). Be that as it may, the inclusion of this control has no effect, substantive or otherwise, on the observed significant correlations between regime religiosity and dispute resolution forum preferences for any of the three religious salience measures considered.

[9] Curtis Bell, Clayton Besaw, and Matthew Frank, "The Rulers, Elections, and Irregular Governance Dataset (REIGN)" (Broomfield, CO: One Earth Future, 2021), https://oefdatascience.github.io/REIGN.github.io/.

Table A7. Religious Salience & Challenger Dispute Resolution Proposals (Model R1), Challenger Regime Religiosity Omitted

	Bilateral Negotiations	Third Party Non-Binding	Third Party Legally Binding
Contested Sacred Sites	-0.708 (0.559)	-0.197 (0.742)	0.197 (0.923)
Challenger Coreligionists	0.035 (0.200)	0.862 (0.430)*	-1.250 (0.552)*
Challenger Non-Contested Sacred Sites	0.490 (0.386)	1.537 (0.664)*	-0.571 (1.023)
Challenger Historical Sovereignty	0.296 (0.171)†	0.175 (0.420)	-0.007 (0.327)
Strategic Value	0.080 (0.191)	1.326 (0.515)**	0.020 (0.360)
Economic Value	-0.302 (0.178)†	0.159 (0.533)	-0.482 (0.340)
Entire Territory Claim	-0.548 (0.345)	-1.398 (0.778)†	0.451 (0.868)
Shared Dominant Religion	-0.007 (0.198)	-0.237 (0.476)	0.460 (0.376)
Challenger Polyarchy Score	0.413 (0.335)	2.226 (0.922)*	-0.022 (0.637)
Challenger CINC Share	0.293 (0.264)	0.923 (0.589)	-0.563 (0.604)
Alliance Portfolio Similarity	0.706 (0.356)*	2.655 (0.830)***	3.447 (1.383)*
Mutual Trade	0.000 (0.000)*	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Pacific Settlement Commitments	-0.102 (0.058)†	-0.216 (0.168)	0.027 (0.102)
Territorial Integrity Commitments	0.078 (0.099)	0.231 (0.217)	0.022 (0.199)
Years since last MID	0.001 (0.018)	-0.055 (0.045)	-0.015 (0.052)
Claim Duration	0.043 (0.016)**	0.135 (0.051)**	0.167 (0.058)**
t (years since last relevant settlement proposal)	-1.825 (0.212)***	-3.409 (0.632)***	-1.659 (0.237)***
t^2	0.234 (0.052)***	0.558 (0.139)***	0.137 (0.029)***
t^3	-0.009 (0.003)**	-0.026 (0.008)***	-0.003 (0.001)***
Constant	0.636 (0.419)	-3.563 (1.248)**	-2.168 (0.879)*
Number of Observations		1,534	
Log-Likelihood		-778.289	
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by dispute dyad.			
† = p ≤ 0.10, * = p ≤ 0.05, ** = p ≤ 0.01, *** = p ≤ 0.001			

Table A8. Religious Salience & Challenger Dispute Resolution Proposals (Model R2), Religious Salience Variables Omitted

	Bilateral Negotiations	Third Party Non-Binding	Third Party Legally Binding
1. Challenger Moderately Religious	0.216 (0.201)	-0.667 (0.552)	-0.280 (0.648)
2. Challenger Highly Religious	0.075 (0.242)	1.168 (0.513)*	1.007 (0.431)*
Challenger Historical Sovereignty	0.221 (0.169)	0.046 (0.476)	-0.040 (0.310)
Strategic Value	0.050 (0.181)	1.497 (0.552)**	0.087 (0.370)
Economic Value	-0.268 (0.168)	0.047 (0.482)	-0.342 (0.345)
Entire Territory Claim	-0.199 (0.238)	-1.068 (0.727)	-0.281 (0.787)
Shared Dominant Religion	-0.049 (0.191)	-0.176 (0.521)	0.529 (0.383)
Challenger Polyarchy Score	0.374 (0.348)	4.314 (0.900)***	1.103 (0.823)
Challenger CINC Share	0.211 (0.270)	0.625 (0.610)	-0.284 (0.519)
Alliance Portfolio Similarity	0.499 (0.385)	1.944 (0.778)*	3.222 (1.353)*
Mutual Trade	0.000 (0.000)*	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Pacific Settlement Commitments	-0.091 (0.058)	-0.413 (0.187)*	0.031 (0.114)
Territorial Integrity Commitments	0.083 (0.098)	0.640 (0.287)*	0.042 (0.199)
Years since last MID	-0.001 (0.020)	-0.130 (0.040)***	0.032 (0.045)
Claim Duration	0.044 (0.017)**	0.170 (0.050)***	0.107 (0.053)*
t (years since last relevant settlement proposal)	-1.818 (0.209)***	-3.445 (0.606)***	-1.699 (0.245)***
t^2	0.232 (0.051)***	0.566 (0.136)***	0.143 (0.030)***
t^3	-0.009 (0.003)**	-0.027 (0.008)***	-0.004 (0.001)***
Constant	0.789 (0.415)†	-3.828 (1.208)**	-3.096 (0.891)***
Number of Observations		1,532	
Log-Likelihood		-777.366	
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by dispute dyad.			
† = p ≤ 0.10, * = p ≤ 0.05, ** = p ≤ 0.01, *** = p ≤ 0.001			

Table A9. Religious Salience and Challenger Dispute Resolution Proposals (Model R3), Holy Oaths Control Included

	Bilateral Negotiations	Third Party Non-Binding	Third Party Legally Binding
1. Challenger Moderately Religious	0.280 (0.251)	-1.091 (0.716)	-0.171 (0.638)
2. Challenger Highly Religious	0.250 (0.370)	0.623 (0.702)	1.023 (0.636)
Contested Sacred Sites	-0.463 (0.633)	0.479 (1.244)	1.047 (1.093)
Challenger Coreligionists	0.223 (0.302)	0.732 (0.644)	-0.365 (0.605)
Challenger Non-Contested Sacred Sites	-0.289 (0.471)	0.836 (1.137)	-1.425 (1.092)
Mod. Religious*Contested Sacred	-15.763 (0.794)***	-0.757 (1.366)	-2.327 (0.945)*
High. Religious*Contested Sacred	1.535 (0.825)†	-13.437 (1.672)***	-15.685 (1.799)***
Mod. Religious*Coreligionists	-0.278 (0.523)	0.677 (0.966)	-13.774 (0.918)***
High. Religious*Coreligionists	-0.478 (0.550)	-0.177 (1.025)	-1.792 (1.079)†
Mod. Religious*Non-Contested Sacred	1.330 (0.867)	2.493 (1.342)†	-11.499 (1.398)***
High. Religious*Non-Contested Sacred	2.553 (0.679)***	0.196 (1.505)	-11.503 (1.637)***
Challenger Historical Sovereignty	0.410 (0.183)*	0.038 (0.521)	-0.130 (0.358)
Strategic Value	-0.015 (0.200)	1.524 (0.546)**	0.122 (0.366)
Economic Value	-0.291 (0.189)	0.351 (0.684)	-0.588 (0.358)†
Entire Territory Claim	0.110 (0.455)	-1.897 (0.889)*	0.104 (0.888)
Shared Dominant Religion	-0.137 (0.211)	0.091 (0.559)	0.630 (0.435)
Challenger Polyarchy Score	0.324 (0.385)	4.213 (1.032)***	1.531 (0.753)*
Challenger CINC Share	0.173 (0.278)	1.406 (0.773)†	-0.526 (0.613)
Alliance Portfolio Similarity	0.776 (0.415)†	2.319 (0.758)**	2.688 (1.409)†
Mutual Trade	0.000 (0.000)*	0.000 (0.000)†	0.000 (0.000)
Pacific Settlement Commitments	-0.126 (0.057)*	-0.292 (0.193)	-0.014 (0.110)
Territorial Integrity Commitments	0.090 (0.100)	0.325 (0.276)	0.151 (0.207)
Years since last MID	0.010 (0.021)	-0.086 (0.050)†	-0.005 (0.054)
Claim Duration	0.033 (0.019)†	0.156 (0.059)**	0.135 (0.062)*
Holy Oaths	-0.738 (0.339)*	0.941 (0.909)	0.400 (0.700)
t (years since last relevant settlement proposal)	-1.786 (0.217)***	-3.421 (0.666)***	-1.623 (0.243)***
t^2	0.233 (0.053)***	0.565 (0.148)***	0.134 (0.029)***
t^3	-0.009 (0.003)**	-0.027 (0.009)**	-0.003 (0.001)***
Constant	0.680 (0.435)	-4.857 (1.220)***	-2.751 (0.919)**
Number of Observations		1,532	
Log-Likelihood		-756.488	
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by dispute dyad.			
† = p ≤ 0.10, * = p ≤ 0.05, ** = p ≤ 0.01, *** = p ≤ 0.001			

Table A10. Religious Salience and Challenger Dispute Resolution Proposals (Model R4), Religious Majorities Controls Included

	Bilateral Negotiations	Third Party Non-Binding	Third Party Legally Binding
1. Challenger Moderately Religious	0.462 (0.281)†	-1.207 (0.869)	-0.135 (0.686)
2. Challenger Highly Religious	0.341 (0.322)	2.548 (1.050)*	1.057 (0.711)
Contested Sacred Sites	-0.527 (0.607)	-0.103 (1.123)	1.063 (1.152)
Challenger Coreligionists	0.399 (0.332)	0.131 (0.723)	-0.608 (0.740)
Challenger Non-Contested Sacred Sites	-0.162 (0.447)	0.553 (1.112)	-1.710 (1.203)
Mod. Religious*Contested Sacred	-17.080 (0.809)***	-1.234 (1.274)	-2.437 (0.990)*
High. Religious*Contested Sacred	1.473 (0.808)†	-11.578 (2.181)***	-1.056 (1.849)
Mod. Religious*Coreligionists	-0.364 (0.555)	1.465 (0.970)	-15.193 (0.982)***
High. Religious*Coreligionists	-0.656 (0.550)	-0.037 (1.092)	-1.964 (1.290)
Mod. Religious*Non-Contested Sacred	1.246 (0.895)	2.195 (1.332)†	-12.666 (1.529)***
High. Religious*Non-Contested Sacred	2.364 (0.589)***	-0.200 (1.379)	-12.879 (1.721)***
Challenger Historical Sovereignty	0.435 (0.173)*	-0.043 (0.503)	-0.223 (0.337)
Strategic Value	-0.051 (0.195)	1.745 (0.671)**	0.133 (0.366)
Economic Value	-0.224 (0.194)	-0.125 (0.628)	-0.845 (0.346)*
Entire Territory Claim	-0.053 (0.414)	-1.156 (0.928)	0.202 (0.931)
Shared Dominant Religion	-0.141 (0.264)	-0.610 (0.838)	0.953 (0.442)*
Challenger Polyarchy Score	0.318 (0.377)	3.851 (1.210)***	1.034 (0.835)
Challenger CINC Share	0.095 (0.249)	1.575 (0.956)†	-0.686 (0.686)
Alliance Portfolio Similarity	1.069 (0.426)*	0.761 (1.079)	2.393 (1.503)
Mutual Trade	0.000 (0.000)**	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Pacific Settlement Commitments	-0.140 (0.062)*	-0.315 (0.191)†	-0.023 (0.115)
Territorial Integrity Commitments	0.147 (0.111)	0.517 (0.338)	0.076 (0.243)
Years since last MID	0.009 (0.023)	-0.108 (0.052)*	-0.031 (0.055)
Claim Duration	0.031 (0.021)	0.145 (0.058)*	0.160 (0.064)*
Majority Christian	-0.454 (0.267)†	3.352 (1.705)*	0.285 (0.766)
Majority Muslim	-0.956 (0.348)**	1.344 (1.383)	0.587 (0.746)
Majority Buddhist	-0.258 (0.404)	-11.697 (1.726)***	-16.196 (0.993)***
t (years since last relevant settlement proposal)	-1.803 (0.215)***	-3.336 (0.706)***	-1.590 (0.242)***
t^2	0.235 (0.053)***	0.557 (0.154)***	0.132 (0.029)***
t^3	-0.009 (0.003)**	-0.026 (0.009)**	-0.003 (0.001)***
Constant	0.705 (0.435)	-6.089 (2.722)*	-2.202 (0.901)*
Number of Observations		1,532	
Log-Likelihood		-746.390	
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by dispute dyad.			
† = p ≤ 0.10, * = p ≤ 0.05, ** = p ≤ 0.01, *** = p ≤ 0.001			

Table A11. Religious Salience and Challenger Dispute Resolution Proposals (Model R5),

	Bilateral Negotiations	Third Party Non-Binding	Third Party Legally Binding
Nationalist Executive	0.252 (0.439)	0.778 (0.708)	1.229 (0.673)†
Contested Sacred Sites	-0.544 (0.526)	-0.131 (0.745)	0.711 (0.810)
Challenger Coreligionists	-0.116 (0.209)	0.200 (0.517)	-1.571 (0.571)**
Challenger Non-Contested Sacred Sites	0.796 (0.363)*	2.204 (0.704)**	0.541 (1.160)
Nationalist Exec*Contested Sacred	-19.176 (1.335)***	11.673 (1.454)***	-8.852 (1.303)***
Nationalist Exec*Coreligionists	0.308 (0.496)	2.866 (1.029)**	0.438 (0.978)
Nationalist Exec*Non-Contested Sacred	-1.301 (0.869)	-12.970 (1.194)***	-13.738 (1.468)***
Challenger Historical Sovereignty	0.269 (0.178)	-0.425 (0.487)	-0.207 (0.318)
Strategic Value	0.113 (0.197)	1.329 (0.504)**	0.023 (0.351)
Economic Value	-0.360 (0.178)*	0.334 (0.615)	-0.611 (0.358)†
Entire Territory Claim	-0.709 (0.386)†	-2.649 (0.850)**	0.471 (0.908)
Shared Dominant Religion	0.089 (0.207)	0.586 (0.556)	0.743 (0.419)†
Challenger Polyarchy Score	0.536 (0.337)	2.827 (1.014)**	0.023 (0.688)
Challenger CINC Share	0.365 (0.272)	1.715 (0.790)*	-0.605 (0.626)
Alliance Portfolio Similarity	0.669 (0.376)†	1.620 (0.902)†	3.421 (1.529)*
Mutual Trade	0.000 (0.000)*	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Pacific Settlement Commitments	-0.100 (0.059)†	-0.212 (0.175)	0.050 (0.105)
Territorial Integrity Commitments	0.092 (0.103)	0.231 (0.223)	0.088 (0.197)
Years since last MID	-0.004 (0.018)	-0.071 (0.046)	-0.007 (0.055)
Claim Duration	0.045 (0.016)**	0.164 (0.046)***	0.174 (0.060)**
t (years since last relevant settlement proposal)	-2.042 (0.249)***	-3.248 (0.643)***	-1.628 (0.229)***
t^2	0.295 (0.067)***	0.531 (0.139)***	0.134 (0.028)***
t^3	-0.013 (0.004)**	-0.025 (0.008)**	-0.003 (0.001)***
Constant	0.624 (0.423)	-3.906 (1.297)**	-2.667 (1.031)**
Number of Observations		1,499	
Log-Likelihood		-748.0855	
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by dispute dyad.			
† = p ≤ 0.10, * = p ≤ 0.05, ** = p ≤ 0.01, *** = p ≤ 0.001			

Figure A1: Effect of Religious Salience on CM Preference

Non-Nationalist Executives



Figure A2: Effect of Religious Salience on CM Preference

Nationalist Executives



Table A12. Religious Salience and Challenger Dispute Resolution Proposals (Model R6), V-Dem Nationalist Government Control Included

	Bilateral Negotiations	Third Party Non-Binding	Third Party Legally Binding
Chal V-Dem Nationalist Government	-0.567 (0.347)	-2.835 (0.721)***	0.491 (0.633)
1. Challenger Moderately Religious	0.310 (0.255)	-1.282 (0.861)	-0.075 (0.654)
2. Challenger Highly Religious	0.073 (0.315)	1.315 (0.642)*	1.145 (0.475)*
Contested Sacred Sites	-0.163 (0.694)	2.048 (1.359)	1.430 (1.136)
Challenger Coreligionists	0.174 (0.318)	0.320 (0.657)	-0.624 (0.648)
Challenger Non-Contested Sacred Sites	-0.347 (0.434)	0.101 (1.238)	-1.787 (1.137)
Mod. Religious*Contested Sacred	-15.961 (0.787)***	-1.870 (1.400)	-2.522 (0.911)**
High. Religious*Contested Sacred	1.454 (0.831)†	-15.941 (2.428)***	-16.223 (1.755)***
Mod. Religious*Coreligionists	-0.320 (0.537)	1.287 (1.254)	-13.480 (1.003)***
High. Religious*Coreligionists	-0.441 (0.543)	0.155 (1.128)	-1.507 (1.045)
Mod. Religious*Non-Contested Sacred	1.514 (0.805)†	3.672 (1.535)*	-11.510 (1.396)***
High. Religious*Non-Contested Sacred	2.261 (0.574)***	2.383 (1.885)	-11.059 (1.635)***
Challenger Historical Sovereignty	0.317 (0.181)†	0.377 (0.533)	-0.108 (0.354)
Strategic Value	-0.070 (0.194)	1.403 (0.592)*	0.116 (0.373)
Economic Value	-0.254 (0.195)	0.651 (0.733)	-0.590 (0.368)
Entire Territory Claim	-0.007 (0.435)	-1.133 (0.921)	0.482 (0.922)
Shared Dominant Religion	0.018 (0.212)	-0.030 (0.613)	0.545 (0.416)
Challenger Polyarchy Score	0.591 (0.382)	4.111 (1.035)***	1.237 (0.829)
Challenger CINC Share	0.254 (0.264)	1.078 (0.698)	-0.781 (0.618)
Alliance Portfolio Similarity	0.600 (0.407)	2.970 (0.904)***	3.011 (1.434)*
Mutual Trade	0.000 (0.000)*	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Pacific Settlement Commitments	-0.167 (0.062)**	-0.368 (0.202)†	0.032 (0.120)
Territorial Integrity Commitments	0.148 (0.104)	0.382 (0.277)	0.080 (0.212)
Years since last MID	0.014 (0.022)	-0.067 (0.060)	-0.009 (0.056)
Claim Duration	0.034 (0.019)†	0.134 (0.058)*	0.143 (0.066)*
t (years since last relevant settlement proposal)	-1.792 (0.218)***	-3.485 (0.638)***	-1.624 (0.236)***
t^2	0.233 (0.053)***	0.579 (0.143)***	0.133 (0.029)***
t^3	-0.009 (0.003)**	-0.027 (0.008)***	-0.003 (0.001)***
Constant	0.883 (0.445)*	-3.842 (1.294)**	-2.964 (1.017)**
Number of Observations		1,532	
Log-Likelihood		-755.139	
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by dispute dyad.			
† = p ≤ 0.10, * = p ≤ 0.05, ** = p ≤ 0.01, *** = p ≤ 0.001			

Table A13. Religious Salience and Challenger Dispute Resolution Proposals (Model R7), V-Dem Religious Government Control Included

	Bilateral Negotiations	Third Party Non-Binding	Third Party Legally Binding
Chal V-Dem Religious Government	0.107 (0.593)	1.421 (1.140)	1.695 (0.990)†
1. Challenger Moderately Religious	0.261 (0.252)	-1.128 (0.744)	-0.020 (0.656)
2. Challenger Highly Religious	-0.068 (0.348)	0.727 (0.805)	0.960 (0.520)†
Contested Sacred Sites	-0.435 (0.629)	0.453 (1.321)	1.144 (1.114)
Challenger Coreligionists	0.191 (0.306)	0.697 (0.722)	-0.331 (0.642)
Challenger Non-Contested Sacred Sites	-0.325 (0.480)	0.668 (1.139)	-1.864 (1.223)
Mod. Religious*Contested Sacred	-15.932 (0.788)***	-0.434 (1.392)	-2.277 (1.001)*
High. Religious*Contested Sacred	1.749 (0.809)*	-13.411 (1.591)***	-15.946 (1.769)***
Mod. Religious*Coreligionists	-0.321 (0.523)	0.824 (1.065)	-14.222 (0.962)***
High. Religious*Coreligionists	-0.454 (0.520)	-0.203 (1.094)	-1.944 (1.037)†
Mod. Religious*Non-Contested Sacred	1.380 (0.863)	1.980 (1.349)	-11.848 (1.431)***
High. Religious*Non-Contested Sacred	2.166 (0.604)***	0.612 (1.456)	-11.202 (1.678)***
Challenger Historical Sovereignty	0.360 (0.181)*	0.148 (0.521)	-0.023 (0.333)
Strategic Value	-0.033 (0.217)	1.391 (0.567)*	-0.089 (0.389)
Economic Value	-0.326 (0.188)†	0.479 (0.658)	-0.636 (0.355)†
Entire Territory Claim	0.018 (0.453)	-1.535 (0.954)	0.520 (0.930)
Shared Dominant Religion	-0.022 (0.209)	-0.113 (0.559)	0.539 (0.403)
Challenger Polyarchy Score	0.534 (0.404)	4.284 (0.920)***	1.824 (0.812)*
Challenger CINC Share	0.323 (0.275)	1.173 (0.656)†	-0.459 (0.620)
Alliance Portfolio Similarity	0.564 (0.435)	2.375 (0.760)**	2.509 (1.442)†
Mutual Trade	0.000 (0.000)*	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Pacific Settlement Commitments	-0.141 (0.059)*	-0.259 (0.192)	0.046 (0.116)
Territorial Integrity Commitments	0.112 (0.100)	0.356 (0.254)	0.147 (0.226)
Years since last MID	0.012 (0.022)	-0.092 (0.050)†	-0.002 (0.053)
Claim Duration	0.037 (0.019)†	0.160 (0.059)**	0.120 (0.059)*
t (years since last relevant settlement proposal)	-1.802 (0.220)***	-3.476 (0.670)***	-1.637 (0.247)***
t^2	0.234 (0.054)***	0.573 (0.149)***	0.137 (0.030)***
t^3	-0.009 (0.003)**	-0.027 (0.009)**	-0.003 (0.001)***
Constant	0.649 (0.433)	-5.027 (1.223)***	-3.084 (0.925)***
Number of Observations		1,532	
Log-Likelihood		-757.603	
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by dispute dyad.			
† = p ≤ 0.10, * = p ≤ 0.05, ** = p ≤ 0.01, *** = p ≤ 0.001			

Table A14. Religious Salience & Challenger Dispute Resolution Proposals (Model R8), Polity2 Democracy Measure Substitution

	Bilateral Negotiations	Third Party Non-Binding	Third Party Legally Binding
1. Challenger Moderately Religious	0.231 (0.255)	-1.229 (0.780)	-0.103 (0.646)
2. Challenger Highly Religious	-0.131 (0.276)	0.525 (0.673)	1.098 (0.429)*
Contested Sacred Sites	-0.988 (0.568)†	-0.131 (1.280)	0.500 (1.088)
Challenger Coreligionists	0.141 (0.298)	0.466 (0.624)	-0.401 (0.627)
Challenger Non-Contested Sacred Sites	0.303 (0.348)	1.567 (1.133)	-0.702 (1.129)
Mod. Religious*Contested Sacred	-15.366 (0.744)***	-0.846 (1.384)	-2.063 (0.907)*
High. Religious*Contested Sacred	2.237 (0.744)**	-13.234 (1.674)***	-15.285 (1.732)***
Mod. Religious*Coreligionists	-0.246 (0.507)	1.242 (1.041)	-13.559 (0.949)***
High. Religious*Coreligionists	-0.229 (0.478)	0.375 (1.014)	-1.359 (1.052)
Mod. Religious*Non-Contested Sacred	0.860 (0.798)	2.371 (1.355)†	-12.016 (1.418)***
High. Religious*Non-Contested Sacred	1.441 (0.477)**	-0.170 (1.456)	-12.201 (1.660)***
Challenger Historical Sovereignty	0.359 (0.179)*	0.336 (0.525)	-0.043 (0.344)
Strategic Value	-0.041 (0.188)	1.291 (0.524)*	0.024 (0.365)
Economic Value	-0.360 (0.191)†	0.290 (0.641)	-0.567 (0.360)
Entire Territory Claim	-0.326 (0.341)	-1.770 (0.866)*	-0.036 (0.966)
Shared Dominant Religion	-0.014 (0.210)	-0.119 (0.571)	0.546 (0.428)
Challenger Polity2 Score	0.021 (0.014)	0.122 (0.035)***	0.050 (0.031)
Challenger CINC Share	0.298 (0.264)	1.267 (0.657)†	-0.586 (0.610)
Alliance Portfolio Similarity	0.650 (0.393)†	2.634 (0.759)***	2.961 (1.460)*
Mutual Trade	0.000 (0.000)*	0.000 (0.000)†	0.000 (0.000)
Pacific Settlement Commitments	-0.150 (0.059)**	-0.249 (0.191)	-0.020 (0.122)
Territorial Integrity Commitments	0.119 (0.098)	0.229 (0.277)	0.142 (0.222)
Years since last MID	0.015 (0.022)	-0.059 (0.048)	-0.003 (0.056)
Claim Duration	0.034 (0.019)†	0.142 (0.050)**	0.141 (0.064)*
t (years since last relevant settlement proposal)	-1.800 (0.216)***	-3.482 (0.667)***	-1.601 (0.235)***
t^2	0.234 (0.053)***	0.575 (0.149)***	0.132 (0.029)***
t^3	-0.009 (0.003)**	-0.027 (0.009)**	-0.003 (0.001)***
Constant	0.866 (0.394)*	-2.861 (1.136)*	-2.302 (0.920)*
Number of Observations		1,499	
Log-Likelihood		-757.391	
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by dispute dyad.			
† = p ≤ 0.10, * = p ≤ 0.05, ** = p ≤ 0.01, *** = p ≤ 0.001			

Table A15. Religious Salience & Challenger Dispute Resolution Proposals (Model R9), Dichotomous Democracy Interaction Substitution

	Bilateral Negotiations	Third Party Non-Binding	Third Party Legally Binding
1. Challenger Moderately Religious	0.253 (0.237)	-0.688 (0.539)	-0.209 (0.649)
2. Challenger Highly Religious	0.057 (0.250)	0.203 (0.553)	0.895 (0.371)*
Challenger Democratic[1]	0.471 (0.280)†	0.842 (0.755)	0.559 (0.627)
Contested Sacred Sites	-0.449 (0.786)	1.349 (0.778)†	-13.401 (1.025)***
Challenger Coreligionists	0.002 (0.244)	0.474 (0.502)	-1.574 (0.624)*
Challenger Non-Contested Sacred Sites	0.502 (0.465)	0.999 (0.766)	-12.817 (0.749)***
Chal Democratic*Contested Sacred	-0.678 (0.767)	-16.336 (1.587)***	26.255 (1.662)***
Chal Democratic*Coreligionists	-0.049 (0.537)	1.283 (1.102)	1.935 (1.346)
Chal Democratic*Non-Contested Sacred	0.048 (0.537)	0.820 (1.363)	-0.338 (1.003)
Challenger Historical Sovereignty	0.263 (0.181)	-0.142 (0.418)	-0.282 (0.355)
Strategic Value	0.046 (0.183)	1.151 (0.486)*	0.092 (0.388)
Economic Value	-0.327 (0.176)†	0.064 (0.573)	-0.481 (0.369)
Entire Territory Claim	-0.379 (0.346)	-1.341 (0.634)*	0.971 (0.840)
Shared Dominant Religion	0.005 (0.216)	-0.191 (0.467)	0.687 (0.391)†
Challenger CINC Share	0.225 (0.261)	0.647 (0.561)	-0.830 (0.618)
Alliance Portfolio Similarity	0.611 (0.390)	3.088 (0.878)***	2.913 (1.423)*
Mutual Trade	0.000 (0.000)*	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Pacific Settlement Commitments	-0.097 (0.061)	-0.112 (0.182)	0.040 (0.103)
Territorial Integrity Commitments	0.101 (0.104)	0.039 (0.217)	0.085 (0.204)
Years since last MID	0.005 (0.022)	-0.070 (0.043)	-0.021 (0.054)
Claim Duration	0.041 (0.018)*	0.164 (0.044)***	0.167 (0.063)**
t (years since last relevant settlement proposal)	-1.812 (0.215)***	-3.440 (0.612)***	-1.584 (0.237)***
t^2	0.232 (0.052)***	0.560 (0.137)***	0.129 (0.029)***
t^3	-0.009 (0.003)**	-0.026 (0.008)***	-0.003 (0.001)***
Constant	0.723 (0.381)†	-2.326 (1.034)*	-2.205 (0.827)**
Number of Observations		1,532	
Log-Likelihood		-769.710	

Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by dispute dyad.

† = p ≤ 0.10, * = p ≤ 0.05, ** = p ≤ 0.01, *** = p ≤ 0.001

[1] Dichotomous democracy measure based on 0.8 threshold on V-Dem Polyarchy score, comparable to score of 6 or greater on PolityIV scale.

Table A16. Religious Salience and Challenger Dispute Resolution Proposals (Model R10), Proximity Control Included

	Bilateral Negotiations	Third Party Non-Binding	Third Party Legally Binding
1. Challenger Moderately Religious	0.250 (0.252)	-1.203 (0.765)	0.086 (0.657)
2. Challenger Highly Religious	-0.063 (0.308)	1.138 (0.598)†	1.514 (0.470)***
Contested Sacred Sites	-0.429 (0.632)	0.608 (1.222)	0.972 (1.161)
Challenger Coreligionists	0.183 (0.313)	0.371 (0.756)	0.174 (0.649)
Challenger Non-Contested Sacred Sites	-0.324 (0.476)	1.200 (1.032)	-2.729 (1.384)*
Mod. Religious*Contested Sacred	-15.264 (0.806)***	-1.044 (1.265)	-1.905 (1.111)†
High. Religious*Contested Sacred	1.717 (0.784)*	-13.291 (1.658)***	-15.642 (1.744)***
Mod. Religious*Coreligionists	-0.312 (0.520)	1.097 (1.123)	-13.958 (1.046)***
High. Religious*Coreligionists	-0.419 (0.538)	0.119 (1.137)	-2.642 (1.202)*
Mod. Religious*Non-Contested Sacred	1.439 (0.873)†	2.671 (1.395)†	-11.086 (1.489)***
High. Religious*Non-Contested Sacred	2.191 (0.595)***	0.720 (1.540)	-10.211 (1.754)***
Challenger Historical Sovereignty	0.339 (0.179)†	-0.015 (0.539)	0.248 (0.346)
Strategic Value	-0.020 (0.198)	1.554 (0.581)**	-0.036 (0.329)
Economic Value	-0.308 (0.190)	0.331 (0.619)	-0.400 (0.338)
Entire Territory Claim	-0.054 (0.456)	-1.663 (0.968)†	0.181 (0.928)
Shared Dominant Religion	-0.010 (0.232)	0.306 (0.554)	-0.138 (0.416)
Challenger Polyarchy Score	0.567 (0.392)	3.632 (0.903)***	2.256 (0.885)*
Challenger CINC Share	0.331 (0.272)	1.258 (0.670)†	-0.852 (0.676)
Alliance Portfolio Similarity	0.576 (0.429)	3.435 (1.218)**	1.693 (1.334)
Mutual Trade	0.000 (0.000)*	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)†
Pacific Settlement Commitments	-0.145 (0.062)*	-0.334 (0.207)	0.085 (0.105)
Territorial Integrity Commitments	0.105 (0.106)	0.276 (0.301)	0.086 (0.227)
Years since last MID	0.013 (0.022)	-0.093 (0.048)†	-0.014 (0.055)
Claim Duration	0.035 (0.019)†	0.160 (0.057)**	0.128 (0.064)*
Proximity (ln(km))	-0.007 (0.109)	0.240 (0.333)	-0.659 (0.205)***
t (years since last relevant settlement proposal)	-1.789 (0.228)***	-3.444 (0.667)***	-1.584 (0.247)***
t^2	0.233 (0.057)***	0.568 (0.147)***	0.128 (0.029)***
t^3	-0.009 (0.003)**	-0.027 (0.009)**	-0.003 (0.001)***
Constant	0.712 (1.014)	-6.678 (3.468)†	2.163 (1.658)
Number of Observations		1,519	
Log-Likelihood		-750.580	
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by dispute dyad.			
† = p ≤ 0.10, * = p ≤ 0.05, ** = p ≤ 0.01, *** = p ≤ 0.001			

Table A17. Religious Salience and Challenger Dispute Resolution Proposals (Model R11), Coup Risk Control Included

	Bilateral Negotiations	Third Party Non-Binding	Third Party Legally Binding
1. Challenger Moderately Religious	0.374 (0.249)	-1.031 (0.781)	0.115 (0.681)
2. Challenger Highly Religious	-0.048 (0.320)	1.099 (0.617)†	1.128 (0.452)*
Contested Sacred Sites	-0.353 (0.627)	0.443 (1.273)	1.117 (1.107)
Challenger Coreligionists	0.224 (0.298)	0.750 (0.661)	-0.343 (0.608)
Challenger Non-Contested Sacred Sites	-0.528 (0.464)	0.681 (1.143)	-1.701 (1.114)
Mod. Religious*Contested Sacred	-16.177 (0.772)***	-0.792 (1.327)	-2.390 (0.949)*
High. Religious*Contested Sacred	1.623 (0.756)*	-13.948 (1.668)***	-16.149 (1.702)***
Mod. Religious*Coreligionists	-0.368 (0.516)	0.737 (1.048)	-14.211 (0.977)***
High. Religious*Coreligionists	-0.448 (0.517)	-0.195 (1.064)	-1.626 (1.092)
Mod. Religious*Non-Contested Sacred	1.342 (0.870)	2.383 (1.327)†	-12.078 (1.417)***
High. Religious*Non-Contested Sacred	2.675 (0.637)***	0.851 (1.641)	-11.016 (1.664)***
Challenger Historical Sovereignty	0.306 (0.170)†	0.092 (0.493)	-0.087 (0.343)
Strategic Value	-0.050 (0.192)	1.528 (0.550)**	-0.025 (0.383)
Economic Value	-0.332 (0.182)†	0.404 (0.624)	-0.593 (0.354)†
Entire Territory Claim	0.242 (0.414)	-1.679 (0.925)†	0.584 (0.938)
Shared Dominant Religion	0.010 (0.204)	-0.068 (0.569)	0.504 (0.404)
Challenger Polyarchy Score	0.475 (0.383)	3.808 (0.895)***	1.155 (0.781)
Chal Max Coup Risk	-42.205 (18.559)*	-42.348 (57.873)	-69.839 (35.962)†
Challenger CINC Share	0.221 (0.262)	1.079 (0.660)	-0.649 (0.610)
Alliance Portfolio Similarity	0.569 (0.398)	2.518 (0.711)***	2.857 (1.384)*
Mutual Trade	0.000 (0.000)**	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Pacific Settlement Commitments	-0.152 (0.057)**	-0.268 (0.187)	0.015 (0.114)
Territorial Integrity Commitments	0.120 (0.096)	0.297 (0.261)	0.112 (0.214)
Years since last MID	0.012 (0.022)	-0.096 (0.048)*	-0.005 (0.054)
Claim Duration	0.026 (0.020)	0.155 (0.059)**	0.120 (0.065)†
t (years since last relevant settlement proposal)	-1.784 (0.215)***	-3.429 (0.660)***	-1.642 (0.237)***
t^2	0.231 (0.053)***	0.564 (0.146)***	0.136 (0.029)***
t^3	-0.009 (0.003)**	-0.026 (0.008)**	-0.003 (0.001)***
Constant	0.991 (0.435)*	-4.322 (1.297)***	-2.136 (1.013)*
Number of Observations		1,532	
Log-Likelihood		-755.727	

Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by dispute dyad.

† = p ≤ 0.10, * = p ≤ 0.05, ** = p ≤ 0.01, *** = p ≤ 0.001

Table A18. Listing of Sacred Sites by Dispute Dyad

Note: Table only includes claims in which either a sacred site was identified or in which a zero coding required clarification.

ICOW Claim #	Claim Name	Challenger Sacred Sites		Target Sacred Site		Contested Sacred Site	
		Code	Sites	Code	Sites	Code	Sites
5802	San Andres y Providencia	0		1	Multiple Catholic Missions, esp. Fort Warwick/Fuerte Libertad as indicative of cooptation of Raizal sacred sites	0	
6602	Belize	0	Significant Catholic Churches but distinctly tied to local Belize culture	2	Belizean Catholic Holy Redeemer Cathedral esp	0	
7801	Gulf of Fonseca Islands	1	Tiger Island restored Catholic church, other colonial-era ruined churches	1	Tiger Island restored Catholic church, other colonial-era ruined churches	0	
12003	Corentyn/New River Triangle	0		0	Churches, Temples, Mosques, etc exist but none are particularly salient	0	
15402	Antofagasta	0		1	Historic Catholic cathedrals, churches, esp in Antofagasta	0	
16601	Palena/Continental Glaciers	1	Christ the Redeemer of the Andes statue, symbol of peace b/w	1	Christ the Redeemer of the Andes statue, symbol of peace b/w	0	

			Chile and Argentina (1904)		Chile and Argentina (1904)		
17001	Falkland (Malvinas) Is. & Dependencies	0		1	Christ Church Cathedral, southernmost Anglican cathedral in world	0	
20001	Northern Ireland	2	Armagh, many	2	St. Anne's Cathedral-Belfast(Church of Ireland), St Columb's Cathedral-Derry, others	0	
20601	Gibraltar	1	Saint Mary the Crowned Cathedral of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Gibraltar; Shrine of Our Lady of Europe	1	Cathedral of the Holy Trinity(the cathedral of the Anglican Bishop of Gibraltar in Europe)	0	
30003	Petseri & Narva	2	St. Peter's Evangelical Lutheran church in Petseri	2	Holy Dormition Pskov-Caves Monastery in Pechory; Puhtitsa Convent near Narva, Resurrection of Christ Cathedral, Narva	1	Narva as site of historical contention b/w Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox interests
30203	Abrene (Abrena) & Pytalovo (Pitalovo)	0		1	Wooden St. Nicholas Church	0	
30803	Adutiskis - Druskininkai - Ignalina	0	Multiple Orthodox churches of no particular significance	0	Multiple Catholic churches of no particular significance	0	
33001	Sidonia & U Sabotu	0		0	Catholic church in U	0	

					Sabotu from 1590, not particularly relevant to dispute in any way		
34601	Prevlaka Peninsula	2	Monastery Sv. Arhandjel Mihailo (St. Archangel Michael) – very proximate	0		0	
34801	Bihac & Martinbrod	2	St. Antun of Padua	2	Fethija mosque	0	
35001	Danube coast	2	The Church of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul; Church of the Birth of St. John the Baptist	2	Aljmas Catholic Shrine; St. John of Capistrano Church in Ilok	0	
35201	Dragonja River-Secovlje-Sneznik	0	Churches in area of no particular significance	0	Churches in area of no particular significance	0	
36808	Northern Cyprus	2	Antifonitis Monastery, Church of Ayios Themonianos, Apostolis Andrea, Bellapais Monastery; over 500 churches/monasteries destroyed by Turkish Cypriot forces	2	Arab Ahmet Mosque, Hala Sultan mosque	2	The Church of Ayios Procopios - Desecrated by Turkish forces; Selimiye Mosque (St Sophia Cathedral) - former Roman Catholic cathedral converted to mosque
53401	Migingo Island	0	Church and Mosque on Island, not particularly salient	0	Church and Mosque on Island, not particularly salient	0	
56205	Ogaden	0	Mosques and Churches in Jigjiga (regional	0	Mosques and Churches in Jigjiga (regional	0	

			capital) but not esp salient		capital) but not esp salient		
56405	Sultanate of Raheita	0		0	Local mosque in town of Rahayta, no evidence this is significant	0	
57401	Chagos Archipelago	1	Chagossian tombs (Catholic), associated with ancestor worship, demand to return part of pro-Mauritius claims	0		0	
63801	Conquered Territories	1	Saint Augustine Priory (Anglican but assoc. With indigenous traditions), also Motouleng Caves, Mautse valley, Nkokomohi, Lehaha la Bataung cave	1	Saint Augustine Priory (Anglican but assoc. With indigenous traditions), also Motouleng Caves, Mautse valley, Nkokomohi, Lehaha la Bataung cave	0	
64001	KaNgwane-Ngwavuma-Nsikazi	1	Seat of the (Catholic) Apostolic Vicariate of Ingwavuma	0		0	
64601	Mayotte	0	Mosques on island but none of significance	0		0	
67004	Ceuta-Melilla-Chafarinas Islands	0	Mosques on Ceuta and Melilla but none of significance beyond island	1	Church of San Ildefonso; Church of the Purísima Concepción	1	Ceuta Cathedral (previously Grand Mosque of Ceuta)
72603	Kuwait	0		2	Grand Mosque of	0	

					Kuwait		
74403	Golan Heights & Syria-Israel DMZ	0		1	Biblical Bashan, Gamla, ancient synagogues	0	
74802	West Bank & East Jerusalem	2	MANY	2	MANY	2	Jerusalem Old City, Temple Mount, Tomb of Patriarchs, Rachel's Tomb, etc
75602	Najran-Asir-Jizan	1	Asir Province Mosques: Sadreid (Al-Namas); Al-Mudfat (Abha); Al-Sarou (Asir); Aaqisa (Asir); Al-Nusb (Abha); Najran Mosques: Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq; Jizan Province: Al Jizan Grand Mosque (2019)	1	Asir Province Mosques: Sadreid (Al-Namas); Al-Mudfat (Abha); Al-Sarou (Asir); Aaqisa (Asir); Al-Nusb (Abha); Najran Mosques: Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq; Jizan Province: Al Jizan Grand Mosque (2019)	0	
75603	Najran-Asir-Jizan	1	Asir Province Mosques: Sadreid (Al-Namas); Al-Mudfat (Abha); Al-Sarou (Asir); Aaqisa (Asir); Al-Nusb (Abha); Najran Mosques: Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq; Jizan Province: Al Jizan Grand Mosque (2019)	1	Asir Province Mosques: Sadreid (Al-Namas); Al-Mudfat (Abha); Al-Sarou (Asir); Aaqisa (Asir); Al-Nusb (Abha); Najran Mosques: Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq; Jizan Province: Al Jizan Grand Mosque (2019)	0	
76802	Abu Musa & Tunb Islands	1	UAE/Sunni mosques on Island intentionally neglected by Iranian authorities	0	Shia mosques present but not particularly salient	0	

77003	Eastern Buraimi	0	Mosques but none particularly salient to Saudi Arabia	1	Sultan Qaboos Grand Mosque	0	
77604	Kamaran Island	2	Great Mosque of Kamaran; Mosque And Shrine Of The Iraqi	2	Great Mosque of Kamaran; Mosque And Shrine Of The Iraqi	0	
78003	Hanish Islands	1	Yemeni Venerated Tombs	0		0	
78201	Dhofar	1	Nabi Umran tomb, also Nabi Ayoob (Job), Nabi Houd, and Nabi Salih tombs	1	Nabi Umran tomb, also Nabi Ayoob (Job), Nabi Houd, and Nabi Salih tombs	0	
78202	Dhofar	1	Nabi Umran tomb, also Nabi Ayoob (Job), Nabi Houd, and Nabi Salih tombs	1	Nabi Umran tomb, also Nabi Ayoob (Job), Nabi Houd, and Nabi Salih tombs	0	
79001	Hawar Islands & Zubarah	0		1	Zubarah is on UNESCO World Heritage Site tentative list since 2008	0	
79201	Ras al-Khaimah	0	None of mosques are particularly salient for challenger	1	Al Badiyah Mosque	0	
80006	Amur & Ussuri River Islands	0		1	Orthodox chapel of St. Victor (built 1999)	0	
81403	Hong Kong	1	Tin Hau Temple; Man Mo Temple; Chi Lin Nunnery	1	St. Stephen's Anglican Church	0	
81603	Macao	1	A-Ma Temple; Temple	1	St. Pauls College and	0	

			of Shi Gandang; Ma Kok Miu temple; many others		Church; St Joseph's Seminary and Church; many others		
82604	North Korea	2	Paektu Mountain	2	Paektu Mountain	0	
82804	Kuril Islands & South Sakhalin	1	Ancestral shrines, Shinto temples	1	Russian Orthodox Churches but none of particular salience	0	
84001	Georgia-Russia Border	1	Tiri monastery; Lomissa Church and Monastery; many more	1	Tiri monastery; Lomissa Church and Monastery; many more	2	Although not site specific, splits between Russian Orthodox and Georgian Orthodox churches, and schismatic claims by Alania diocese (S. Ossetia) and Abkhazian Orthodox Church
84401	Russia/Kazakhstan Border	0	Mosques and Churches in area but none particularly salient	0	Mosques and Churches in area but none particularly salient	0	
84801	Nagorno-Karabakh	2	Amaras Monastery; Gandzasar and Dadivank monasteries; Ancient City of Tigranakert; Cathedral of the Holy Savior; Kanach Zham; many others	2	Shushi – Gevgharaga (Yukhari Govhar Agha) Mosque, Ashaghi Govhar Agha Mosque	2	Ghazanchetsots Cathedral (Gazanchy by Azerbaijan)
87401	Batken-Isfara	1	Sulaiman Sacred Mountain; Mausoleum	1	Sulaiman Sacred Mountain; Mausoleum	0	

			of Hazrati Shoh		of Hazrati Shoh		
87705	Sarykol Range	0		1	Bakpur-Ata shrine	0	
88001	Sokh Enclave Corridor	1	minor shrines surrounding Sokh, pilgrimage sites	1	minor shrines surrounding Sokh, pilgrimage sites	0	
90802	Pashtunistan (Durand Line)	1	Kandahar - Mosque of the Sacred Cloak; Mosque of the Hair of the Prophet; Peshawar – Ziyarat-i-Sakhi (Shrine of the Generous One)	1	Kandahar - Mosque of the Sacred Cloak; Mosque of the Hair of the Prophet; Peshawar – Ziyarat-i-Sakhi (Shrine of the Generous One)	0	
91402	Doklam-Sinchulumpa-Gieu	0		2	Tibetan Buddhist - Chumbi valley monasteries, Chomo-lhari mountain, Pemaling lake, Trashigang district temple with footprint of Guru Rinpoche or a khandroma (angel)	0	
92201	Jammu & Kashmir	2	TJamia Masjid, Sheikh Noor-ud-Din Wali shrine, Ziarat Dastgir Sahib pilgrimage site, Dargah Hazratbal shrine	2	Temple of Jyeshteshwara, Sharika Devi Temple, Martand Sun Temple, TVaishno Devi Mandir, Shivkhori cave shrine, Amarnath Cave	0	
93003	Muhurir Char &	1	Muhurichar - Cremation	1	Muhurichar - Cremation	0	

	Bengali Enclaves		and burial grounds for Hindus, Muslims and Nath		and burial grounds for Hindus, Muslims and Nath		
93401	Kalapani	1	Kali temple at Kalapani; Vyasa cave; Lipulekh Pass path to Kailash–Manasarovar pilgrimage site	1	Kali temple at Kalapani; Vyasa cave; Lipulekh Pass path to Kailash–Manasarovar pilgrimage site	0	
94201	Sino District Tract	0		2	Over 600 Buddhist temples and pagodas scattered around the area; Wat Ou-Tai Temple, the Wat Luang Ou-Neua Temple and the That Phou Xay Stupa	0	
94404	China-Vietnam Border Regions	0		1	Father God Temple and the Mother Goddess Temple; Kỳ Sầm Temple	0	
95203	Three Pagodas Pass	1	Three Pagodas complex, Wat Suwankhiri Buddhist temple and monastery	1	Three Pagodas complex, Wat Suwankhiri Buddhist temple and monastery	0	
95605	Ko Kut Island	0	Some temples and shrines but none of particular significance	0	Some temples and shrines but none of particular significance	0	
95606	Preah Vihear, cont	0		0		2	Preah Vihear, Ta Moan temple complex

97405	East Timor	2	Mount Ramelau — Blessed Virgin statue; Our Lady of Aitara in Manatuto pilgrimage sites	0		0	
97801	Matthew & Hunter Islands	2	Matthew Island considered “House of the Gods” by Ni-Vanuatu tradition, site of regular rituals	0		0	