Appendix to "Cassandra's Reward: The Electoral Benefits of Early Opposition to an Unpopular War"

1. Analysis of two-party vote shares

The dependent variable used in the main body of the chapter was the incumbent's share of all non-spoiled ballots, including those cast for third-party candidates and those where the voter did not select a candidate in the Congressional race. Votes withheld or cast for third-party candidates are important because a substantial number of incumbents ran unopposed, or at least faced no major party opponent. Opposition to the war was also especially strong among those on the left and right ideological fringes of American politics. These voters might have preferred to express their approval or disapproval of the incumbent's position through some means other than supporting the other major party candidate, who might be quite ideologically distant from them. Nevertheless, these votes are arguably also a source of heterogeneity in election returns that might disguise electoral rewards. To guard against this possibility, this section replicates the main analysis in the chapter using the incumbent's share of the two-party vote as a dependent variable.

Table A1.1 replicates the results in Table 1 of the main text using this alternative dependent variable. Two features of these results deserve comment. First, the baseline control variables for vote shares in previous elections and whether the incumbent had no major party opponent have larger effects, and the model fit, as indicated by the R-squared statistics, is much tighter. This makes sense because these variables should have more consistent effects on the two-party vote than they do on the share of the total vote. There is no theoretical reason to expect them to predict third-party or blank votes.

Table A1.1
Democratic House Incumbent Vote Share in the 2002 Elections

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Vote against final passage of war authorization resolution		0.01 (0.01)		
Proportion of votes against war in 2002 authorization debate			0.01 (0.01)	
Antiwar speeches prior to the 2002 election (log)				0.02* (0.01)
Prowar speeches prior to the 2002 election (log)				0.0004 (0.01)
Democratic share of 2000 Presidential vote in district	0.48* (0.04)	0.46* (0.04)	0.47* (0.04)	0.44* (0.04)
Incumbent vote share in 2000 election	0.04* (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)
No Republican opponent	0.30* (0.01)	0.30* (0.01)	0.30* (0.01)	0.30* (0.01)
Constant	0.37* (0.02)	0.37* (0.02)	0.37* (0.02)	0.37* (0.02)
Observations	188	187	188	188
R-squared	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84
Adjusted R-squared	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83

Note: The dependent variable is the proportion of the two-party vote the incumbent received. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$.

Second and more importantly, compared to the primary results, these offer less evidence of electoral rewards in 2002 for opposing the war. The coefficient on the vote against the final war resolution in model 2 is less than half the magnitude of the same coefficient in the original results, and is not statistically significant. Similarly, although the logged number of antiwar speeches remains statistically significant in this analysis, as it was in the original, the estimated effect is smaller.

These differences in the results suggest that the electoral rewards for Democratic opposition to the war apparent for the 2002 election worked through third-party and blank votes. Table A1.2 checks this possibility through several similar models of the share of votes cast for third parties or left blank in elections where a Democratic incumbent was seeking re-election. There is some

evidence that this is indeed what happened. Voters cast fewer ballots of this sort when they could support a Democratic incumbent who had voted against the war resolution. The proportion of all antiwar roll-call votes that the incumbent had cast also narrowly misses the threshold for statistical significance. Third-party and blank votes thus appear to have served as a means of rewarding or punishing incumbents for their positions on the war, though not one that was very likely to affect the outcome of the election.

Table A1.2
Share of Third-Party or Blank Votes in the Elections Involving Democratic Incumbents, 2002

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Vote against final passage of war authorization resolution		-0.03* (0.01)		
Proportion of votes against war in 2002 authorization debate			-0.04 (0.02)	
Antiwar speeches prior to the 2002 election (log)				-0.01 (0.01)
Prowar speeches prior to the 2002 election (log)				0.02 (0.02)
Democratic share of 2000 Presidential vote in district	0.36* (0.05)	0.41* (0.05)	0.41* (0.06)	0.39* (0.05)
Incumbent vote share in 2000 election	-0.24* (0.05)	-0.23* (0.05)	-0.23* (0.05)	-0.23* (0.05)
Constant	0.004 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Observations	188	187	188	188
R-squared	0.21	0.24	0.23	0.23
Adjusted R-squared	0.21	0.23	0.21	0.21

Note: The dependent variable is the share of the vote left blank or cast for a third-party or write-in candidate. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$.

The case of Edward Markey illustrates the role of third party and blank votes. Markey represented the reliably Democratic 7th district of Massachusetts during the period considered here, running unopposed for reelection in both 2000 and 2002. He voted to support the war resolution, a choice he later claimed to regret and blamed on the lies told by the Bush administration. His

constituents had no alternative candidate to support but a slightly larger share of them chose to skip his line on their ballot or write in another name after he supported the war. Markey received 75.6% of the vote in 2000 and 71.7% in 2002. This was hardly a decisive rebuke: Markey was elected to the Senate 2012 and remains there today.

Tables A1.3 and A1.4 present the results for the 2004 and 2006 election, respectively. There was no evidence of electoral rewards for early opposition to the war in these elections in the primary analysis, and there is none here, either. Evidence of reward for speaking out after the war had begun apparent in the original analysis is also absent here. Model 3 of Table A1.4 suggest that members who voted against the war in 2002 were *punished* rather than rewarded in 2006. It is probably best not to rest any sweeping conclusions on this single, isolated result, though.

Table A1.3.
Democratic House Incumbent Vote Share in the 2004 Elections

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Vote against final passage of war authorization resolution		0.02 (0.02)				
Proportion of votes against war in 2002 authorization debate			0.04 (0.03)			
Antiwar speeches before war (log)				-0.01 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.02)
Prowar speeches before war (log)				-0.03 (0.02)		-0.03 (0.02)
Antiwar speeches after war began (log)					0.004 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Democratic share of 2000 Presidential vote in district	0.46* (0.08)	0.46* (0.09)	0.44* (0.10)	0.44* (0.09)	0.45* (0.08)	0.44* (0.09)
Incumbent vote share in 2002 election	0.11 (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)	0.8 (0.08)	0.11 (0.07)	0.11 (0.07)	0.12 (0.07)
No Republican Opponent	0.25* (0.03)	0.25* (0.03)	0.25* (0.03)	0.25* (0.03)	0.25* (0.03)	0.24* (0.03)
Constant	0.35* (0.05)	0.37* (0.06)	0.37* (0.06)	0.37* (0.05)	0.35* (0.05)	0.37* (0.06)
Observations	190	172	190	190	190	190
R-squared	0.51	0.49	0.50	0.51	0.51	0.51
Adjusted R-squared	0.50	0.48	0.48	0.50	0.50	0.50

Note: The dependent variable is the proportion of the two-party vote the incumbent received. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$.

Table A1.4.
Democratic House Incumbent Vote Share in the 2006 Elections

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Vote against final passage of war authorization resolution		-0.01 (0.01)				
Proportion of votes against war in 2002 authorization debate			-0.03* (0.01)			
Antiwar speeches before war (log)				0.003 (0.01)		-0.002 (0.01)
Prowar speeches before war (log)				0.02 (0.01)		0.02 (0.01)
Antiwar speeches in 109th Congress (log)					0.003 (0.004)	0.01 (0.01)
Democratic share of 2004 Presidential vote in district	0.29* (0.05)	0.30* (0.05)	0.34* (0.06)	0.32* (0.05)	0.29* (0.05)	0.32* (0.05)
Incumbent vote share in 2004 election	0.16* (0.05)	0.17* (0.05)	0.16* (0.05)	0.16* (0.05)	0.15* (0.05)	0.15* (0.05)
No Republican Opponent	0.25* (0.01)	0.25* (0.01)	0.25* (0.01)	0.25* (0.01)	0.25* (0.01)	0.25* (0.01)
Constant	0.43* (0.03)	0.42* (0.03)	0.41* (0.03)	0.41* (0.03)	0.43* (0.03)	0.41* (0.03)
Observations	191	191	191	191	191	191
R-squared	0.82	0.82	0.83	0.82	0.82	0.83
Adjusted R-squared	0.81	0.82	0.82	0.81	0.81	0.82

Note: The dependent variable is the proportion of the two-party vote the incumbent received. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$.

2. Incumbent Vote Shares in Close Districts

The main text of the chapter reported results for districts that had relatively close results in the preceding election for the 2002 election. The rewards that Democrats who had voted against the war enjoyed in this election were indeed larger than those in all districts, perhaps because they had more room to improve their performance. This pattern did not hold for the 2004 and 2006 elections, however. Tables A2.1 and A2.2 report these results. None of the variables indicating opposition to the war in 2002 is statistically significant. It is worth noting that the sample sizes are quite small. Close elections are not common.

Table A2.1
Democratic House Incumbent Vote Share in Close Districts, 2004 Election

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Vote against final passage of war authorization resolution		0.03 (0.02)				
Proportion of votes against war in 2002 authorization debate			0.01 (0.03)			
Antiwar speeches before war (log)				0.002 (0.02)		-0.001 (0.02)
Prowar speeches before war (log)				-0.04 (0.03)		-0.04 (0.03)
Antiwar speeches after war began (log)					0.01 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)
Democratic share of 2000 Presidential vote in district	0.31* (0.08)	0.28* (0.09)	0.30* (0.09)	0.28* (0.09)	0.30* (0.09)	0.28* (0.09)
Incumbent vote share in 2002 election	0.25* (0.08)	0.23* (0.08)	0.24* (0.08)	0.21* (0.08)	0.25* (0.08)	0.22* (0.09)
No Republican Opponent	0.40* (0.03)	0.40* (0.03)	0.40* (0.03)	0.40* (0.03)	0.40* (0.04)	0.39* (0.04)
Constant	0.28* (0.06)	0.29* (0.07)	0.28* (0.07)	0.33* (0.07)	0.27* (0.07)	0.32* (0.07)
Observations	44	44	44	44	44	44
R-squared	0.81	0.82	0.81	0.82	0.81	0.82
Adjusted R-squared	0.79	0.80	0.79	0.80	0.79	0.79

Note: The dependent variable is the proportion of the total vote the incumbent received. Close districts are those where the incumbent had received less than 60% of the vote in 2002. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$.

Table A2.2
Democratic House Incumbent Vote Share in Close Districts, 2006 Election

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Vote against final passage of war authorization resolution		0.01 (0.01)				
Proportion of votes against war in 2002 authorization debate			0.01 (0.02)			
Antiwar speeches before war (log)				0.01 (0.02)		0.01 (0.02)
Prowar speeches before war (log)				0.01 (0.02)		0.01 (0.02)
Antiwar speeches in 109th Congress (log)					0.002 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.01)
Democratic share of 2004 Presidential vote in district	0.09 (0.07)	0.08 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)
Incumbent vote share in 2004 election	0.54* (0.07)	0.54* (0.07)	0.54* (0.07)	0.54* (0.07)	0.54* (0.08)	0.55* (0.08)
No Republican Opponent	0.06* (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)
Constant	0.26* (0.05)	0.26* (0.05)	0.26* (0.05)	0.25* (0.06)	0.26* (0.06)	0.24* (0.07)
Observations	38	38	38	38	38	38
R-squared	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73
Adjusted R-squared	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.69	0.70	0.68

Note: The dependent variable is the proportion of the total vote the incumbent received. Close districts are those where the incumbent had received less than 60% of the vote in 2004. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$.