The Architecture of National Boundary Regimes

Mapping Immigration and Citizenship Policies in 23 Democracies 1980-2010

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Supplementary material

I Construction of CITRIX and validity tests

Measurement and aggregation

As mentioned in the article, the conceptualisation of CITRIX focuses on *four essential components* of citizenship regimes as they relate to the acquisition of nationality by immigrants and their children: (1) the strength of *jus soli*; (2) the residence duration requirement for ordinary naturalisation; (3) the toleration of dual citizenship in naturalisation; and (4) further naturalisation requirements, namely language and citizenship tests as well as economic and criminal record conditions. The less restrictive these policies, the higher the level of *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI) – and the higher the score on the *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness Index* (CITRIX).

Rather than reinventing the wheel, CITRIX develops an existing set of indicators. It conceptually builds on and temporally expands selected indicators measuring the *Access to Nationality* that feature in

the *Migration and Integration Policy Index* (MIPEX; Huddleston and Niessen, 2011). In the following, I specify the measurement and aggregation, showing whether, how, and why CITIRX differs from MIPEX.

The first policy component of CITRIX measures the *strength of jus soli*, regarding second generation immigrants and third generation immigrants, respectively (see Tables A1 and A2). The law regarding second generation immigrants uses an adapted 4-point scale that allows for a differentiation of unconditional and conditional forms of *jus soli*. This distinction is important because the switch from unconditional to conditional *jus soli* is not only relevant theoretically but has happened in various instances empirically.

Table A1 The strength of *jus soli* for second generation immigrants

MIPEX		**CITRIX**	
Birthright citizenship for second generation Can citizenship be acquired by children born on the territory to non-national parents?		**Indicator name: jussoli2**	
100	Automatic at birth (may be conditional upon parents' status)	100	Automatic at birth – unconditional
50	Upon simple application or declaration after birth	67	Attached to conditions related to the parents' residence and/or status
0	Naturalisation procedure (facilitated or not)	33	Upon simple application or declaration after birth
		0	Naturalisation procedure (facilitated or not)

The law regarding third generation immigrations is scored on the original 3-point MIPEX scale (Table A2). It captures what is called *double jus soli*, as it requires birth in the territory for both parents and children. A further distinction between unconditional and conditional regimes, while it may appear relevant in theory, is obsolete in the practice of most states.

Table A2 The strength of *jus soli* for third generation immigrants

CITRIX scale is identical to MIPEX indicator "birthright for third generation"

Indicator name: jussoli3

Can citizenship be acquired by children born on the territory to non-national parents at least one of whom was already born on the territory?

100	Automatic at birth (may be conditional upon parents' status)
50	Upon simple application or declaration after birth
0	Naturalisation procedure (facilitated or not)

The two sub-components measuring provisions for second and third generations are aggregated using a weighted arithmetic mean. I allot a double weight for the second-generation indicator, while the third-generation indicator receives a single weight. This is because granting automatic birthright citizenship to the second generation is more liberal than allowing it only for third generation immigrants. Indeed, in cases where a country allows second generation immigrants to acquire citizenship unconditionally at birth, the third-generation indicator is set to the maximum because the former implies the latter.

To measure the second policy component of CITRIX – the *residence duration requirement for ordinary naturalisation* – the number of years is not divided into the ordinal 3-point scale that underlies the MIPEX coding (see Table A3). Instead, aided by the data from Fitzgerald et al. (2014). I recorded the exact number of years and then normalize the data by linearly re-scaling the range of empirical variation

to an interval from 0 to 100 (see Table A3). 0 indicates the most exclusive provision. that is. the empirical maximum of years required 100 (e.g. 15 years in Germany in 1987-1999). 100 indicates the most inclusive provision, that is, the empirical minimum of years required (e.g. 2 years in Australia 1984-2010). This allows for a more fine-grained measurement.

Table A3 The residence duration requirement for ordinary naturalisation

MIPEX		**CITRIX**	
Residence period			
How many years of residence are required for ordinary naturalisation?		**Indicator name: residur**	
100	After ≤ 5 years of total residence	X	Exact number of years
50	After > 5 < 10 years of total residence		
0	After ≥ 10 years of total residence	Normalisation	= ((X-max)/(min-max))*100

The third policy component of CITRIX is the *toleration of dual citizenship in naturalisation* and captures whether first generation immigrants are required to renounce another citizenship when naturalising. It is coded a 3-point scale that combines and recategorises two 3-point MIPEX scales by discriminating major from minor exceptions of all kind (see Table A5). One problem with the two MIPEX scales is that they are not mutually exclusive (see Table A4). A country that only exempts persons from renouncing because it is impossible to do so will have a score of 50 on both indicators because of that exemption. This is what the MIPEX wording implies, I contend that it is more useful to build the exemptions into a single scale. The resulting coding scheme goes into much detail, but the logic is straightforward: The impossibility to renounce citizenship and the cost to do so are matters that are not in the power of destination countries. Hence, these two aspects should constitute minor

exemptions that almost any democratic country would seem to be inclined to make (most indeed do). Refugeehood as well as holding a citizenship of a certain countries should count as other minor exceptions. However, if the latter are combined, we can speak of major exceptions. Finally, statelessness is not covered the CITRIX wording because stateless persons have no citizenship to renounce.

Table A4 The toleration of multiple citizenship in MIPEX

MIPEX			
a. Renunciation requirement Is there a requirement to renounce foreign nationality before naturalisation?		**b. Renunciation exemptions**	
100	No requirement	100	Both (A) refugees and/or stateless persons and (B) on grounds of accessibility (cost. distance. impossibility)
50	Requirement exists before naturalisation. but with exceptions (when country of origin does not allow renunciation of citizenship or sets unreasonably high fees for renunciation)	50	Only (A) or (B)
0	Requirement exists	0	Neither (A) or (B). though other minor exemptions may exist

Table A5 The toleration of multiple citizenship in CITRIX

Indicator name: dualcit	
Is there a requirement to renounce foreign nationality before naturalisation for first generation immigrants?	
100	No requirement for anyone
50	Yes. but with exemptions for multiple categories of migrants regarding their status and origin (this typically involves both of the following migrants: refugees as well as migrants with citizenship from more than one specific countries)
0	Yes. with or without minor exceptions (all minor exceptions are: (1) either refugeehood OR citizenship of specific countries. and (2) cases in which the country of origin does not allow renunciation of citizenship (impossibility) AND/OR cases in which the country of origin sets unreasonably high fees for renunciation (costs))

The fourth policy component of CITRIX measures *further naturalisation conditions*, namely language tests. Citizenship tests, and economic as well as criminal record requirements (see Tables A6, A7, A8, and A9). These four sub-components are each coded on the original MIPEX 3-point scales. They all appear well-suited to capture relevant variation. The only addition I make, regarding language tests, is to code as 100 cases that potentially involve a discretionary language assessment as part of an interview. Such a discretionary practice seems highly exclusive, but the coding is justified from a pragmatic perspective: Especially in the past, authorities have exercised discretion in language assessments, but it is very difficult to ascertain when exactly this was the case. Hence, the indicator measuring language tests is more about the explicit adoption of this aspect in a standardised way. Finally. the aggregation of these four policy sub-components uses an arithmetic mean applying equal weights – no single item is more important than the others.

Table A6 Language tests

CITRIX scale is identical to MIPEX indicator "language level"

Indicator name: langtest

Is there a test. interview or a course that requires or leads to a certain level of language skills?

100	Yes. level A1 or less set as standard OR no assessment OR interview with no explicit standard
50	Yes. A2 set as standard
0	Yes. B1 or higher set as standard

Table A7 Citizenship tests

CITRIX scale is identical to MIPEX indicator "integration form"

Indicator name: cittest

Is there a test. interview or a course of that requires a certain level of integration?

100	No requirement OR voluntary provision of information
50	Requirement to complete a course without a test
0	Requirement to pass an integration test

Table A8 Economic requirements

CITRIX scale is identical to MIPEX indicator "economic resources"

Indicator name: ecoreq

Is there an economic resources requirement?

100	No requirement
50	Minimum income (e.g. acknowledged level of poverty threshold)
0	Additional requirements (e.g. employment. stable and sufficient resources. higher levels of income)

Table A9 Criminal record conditions

CITRIX scale is identical to MIPEX indicator "criminal record"

Indicator name: crimreq

Is there a criminal record requirement?

100	No requirement OR only crimes with sentences of imprisonment for more than or equal to five years OR use of qualifying period instead of refusal
50	Crimes with sentences of imprisonment for less than five years
0	For other offences (e.g. misdemeanors. minor offenses. pending criminal procedure)

The policy components are aggregated with an arithmetic mean applying equal weights (Table A10). This is because no component is substantively more important than the others.

Table A10 CITRIX aggregation formula

```
CITRIX =
        (((2*jussoli2+1*jussoli3)/3) +
           residur +
           dualcit +
          (langtest+cittest+ecoreq+crimreq)/4) / 4
```

Data collection

To collect the data. I took the coding of Stadlmair (2017) as a starting point.[1] Stadlmair covers all MIPEX indicators on the access to nationality for nine EU member states from 1995 to 2014. After reducing and refining the indicators to the selection introduced below, I checked the data by validating them against the policy changes documented in the DEMIG database (de Haas et al., 2015). Having validated the data of Stadlmair, I used DEMIG to identify policy changes in these countries before 1995. To ascertain the nature of changes, in addition to DEMIG, I drew on the resources by the Global Citizenship Observatory (GLOBALCIT[2]) as well as the information provided in Howard (2009). For the residence duration requirement, I mainly relied on the indicators by Fitzgerald and colleagues (2014), which cover 21 of the 23 countries in the CITRIX sample. In fact, as one can see below, given the existence of this data on residence. I decided to record the exact residence duration requirement rather than an ordinal reduction of it. as is done in MIPEX. This information enabled me to code all indicators for the nine EU countries covered by Stadlmair (2017) back in time to 1980. Hence, the strategy of triangulating these different data sources – DEMIG for changes and substance, and GLOBALCIT, Howard (2009) and Fitzgerald et al. (2014) for substance – proved successful. On this basis, taking the MIPEX 2007-2014 data as a starting point, I applied the same strategy to the other countries in the sample.

[1] I am grateful to Jeremias Stadlmair, who has kindly shared his data. The creation of CITRIX would have been much more resource-intensive without his support.

[2] www.globalcit.eu

Convergent validity

Using all possible overlapping cases. CITRIX is highly correlated with several alternative indices (Table A11).[3] All correlation coefficients (Spearman's rho because the data are ordinal) also have very low p-values. The sub-components measuring integration testing (language and citizenship tests) are also highly correlated with the civic integration index (CIVIX) as reported in Goodman (2014, p. 55). The correlations with BNI (Janoski, 2010) and CIVIX are negative because they are oriented towards measuring higher levels of restrictions rather than inclusiveness. These tests demonstrate the convergent validity of CITRIX.

Table A11 Correlations of CITRIX with other indices

Index	N of overlapping cases	Spearman's rho	p-value
MIPEX Access to Nationality	162	0.75	0.000
Fitzgerald et al. aggregated	620	0.83	0.000
Citizenship Policy Index (CPI)	30	0.84	0.000
Barrier to Nationality Index (BNI)	55	-0.73	0.000
CIVIX	30	-0.73	0.000

Descriptive statistics

Table A12 displays the summary statistics. and Figure A1 shows a histogram of CITRIX scores. The data show that there is very significant variation across cases in all policy components as well as on the aggregate CITRIX. However. almost 15 percent of the observations cluster at the upper end of the spectrum. around the value of 80. This is. at least in part. a result of the overall liberalizing tendency in citizenship policies over time.

[3] The complete BNI, and the details of its measurement, are not publicly available. I used the available data as indicated in Janoski (2010, p. 40), which leads to 55 overlapping observations.

Table A12 Summary statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min-Max
Strength of jus soli	805	46.36	36.74	0-100
Residence duration	805	64.01	22.19	0-100
Dual citizenship	805	65.03	40.64	0-100
Further requirements	805	58.56	31.89	0-100
CITRIX	805	58.49	21.39	5.78-98.08

Figure A1 Histogram of CITRIX scores with Kernel density estimate



II The intricacies of measuring immigration regimes

The conceptualisation and operationalisation of immigration regimes used in this article serves to identify general tendencies in the openness of borders using a country-year approach. It is important to note that this approach cannot be used to trace more differentiated conceptions that are based on the assumption that across most receiving countries (culturally similar) high-skilled labour migrants are preferred, while for (culturally dissimilar) low-skilled ones as well as wide circles of family migrants and asylum seekers higher barriers are erected (Hollifield 2004, p. 902; Shachar and Hirschl 2014, p. 236). This has to do with the nature of labour immigration policies: they do not only vary cross-nationally but also intra-nationally, and the architecture of the intra-national variation is not fully congruent across countries and years (see e.g. Ruhs, 2013; Beine et al., 2016). Not all countries target specific categories of labour immigrants in the same way; some countries at some points in time may have specific policies on low-skilled labour immigrants while not having specific ones on high-skilled immigrants, whereas others may have the opposite configuration and still others only have unspecific ones or any combination of the above (Ruhs, 2013). It is therefore practically impossible to disaggregate labour immigration policies the same way for every country-year.

Alternative quantitative approaches either require shifting the unit of analysis or focusing specifically on a single sub-group of immigrants. The former is advocated by Beine and colleagues (2016), who focus on separate "entry tracks" – for instance, a track for high-skilled migrants entering for work purposes. If another country does not offer this track, this would not be a problem but a relevant substantive finding. Ruhs (2013) shifts the unit of analysis to separate labour immigration programs that can be (but need not be) specific to some labour immigration category. This allows him to map important differences across labour immigration programs rather than countries. Finally, the DEMIG database takes the isolated "policy change" (de Haas et al., 2015) as its unit of analysis, without

tracking the absolute level of restrictiveness. Using this approach, one can also isolate policy changes targeted only at one group of immigrants.

Peters (2017) resolves the problem by focusing only on "low-skilled immigration." However, as states do not have policies that are specifically and only targeted at low-skill immigrants in a uniform way across country-years, Peters assumes that policy-makers use a multitude of restrictions to control the number of low-skill immigrants. These are, for instance, based on nationality, universality of skill level, or then come in the form of recruitment measures and quotas. In addition, Peters considers family reunification and asylum and refugee policies (as well as access to citizenship. immigrant rights. and enforcement) as further instruments that are used to regulate low-skill immigration. To measure the concept of *Immigration Policy Openness*, Peters estimates a latent variable by extracting the first component of an unrotated solution of a standard principal component analysis (PCA). This variable is meant to capture how hard it is for low-skilled immigrants to enter a country in a given year.

The more general approach used in this article accommodates the variegated architectures of immigration regimes by enveloping intra-national and cross-national variation through an averaging strategy. Hence, I conceptualise labour immigration policies as targeting any kind of skill level across different entry tracks as well as unspecific entry tracks with conditions for entry and stay that apply to all – whatever the configuration of some country in some year may be. For this reason, this article cannot challenge – and indeed does not have the purpose to challenge – the view that the openness towards high-skilled migrants is negatively correlated with the openness towards low-skilled migrants and refugees.

III Further CATPCA tests

As indicated in the main text. further CATPCA tests support the validity of the two-dimensional solution. Below these additional tests are reported but not further discussed, I start with five dimensions because one can theorise that (1) labour migration policies, (2) family reunification policies, and (3) asylum policies, (4) further naturalisation requirements and the (5) other components of citizenship policies each form a distinct dimension.

The tests show that when extracting solutions with more than two dimensions, the unrotated solution shows the same pattern for the two first dimensions: they describe consistent and independent dimensions of IRO and CRI. This indicates that the two-dimensional model reflects the most natural and parsimonious description of the data. Furthermore, a one-dimensional model only accounts for about 33 percent of the variance and shows some low and one reverse loading. This indicates both an unacceptable level of statistical reduction as well as a partial inconsistency with the composite underlying concept of the *porousness* rather than *restrictiveness* of national boundary regimes.

Table A13 CATPCA – Five-dimensional unrotated solution

Variables	Dim IRO	Dim CRI	Dim 3	Dim 4	Dim 5
Labor entry	**.781**	-.192	-.002	.578	-.132
Labor stay	**.782**	-.186	-.005	.579	-.129
Family entry	**.806**	.063	.365	-.253	.379
Family stay	**.815**	.098	.354	-.239	.369
Asylum entry	**.613**	.185	-.497	-.293	-.448
Asylum stay	**.679**	.305	-.372	-.431	-.224
Strength of *jus soli*	-.183	**.870**	-.187	.242	.074
Residence duration requirement (reversed)	-.015	**.811**	.374	.093	-.087
Multiple citizenship toleration	.054	**.553**	**-.561**	.250	.457
Further naturalisation requirements	-.029	**.508**	**.649**	.040	-.420
Eigenvalue	3.410	2.172	1.555	1.194	.963
Cronbach's alpha	.785	.600	.397	.180	-.043

The following applies to all CATPCAs reported here: N=713 country-years; principal component analysis for categorical data (CATPCA) using selected policy components measuring the openness of immigration regimes according to IMPIC (Helbling et al., 2017) and the policy components of CITRIX (original dataset based on temporal expansion of selected items from MIPEX and based on the data by Stadlmair (2017) and Fitzgerald et al. (2014) and DEMIG and GLOBALCIT) measuring the inclusiveness of citizenship regimes; variable principal normalisation; solution with VARIMAX rotation and Kaiser normalisation; entries are component loadings and model parameters; component loadings > 0.5 bold

Table A14 CATPCA – Four-dimensional unrotated solution

Variables	Dim IRO	Dim CRI	Dim 3	Dim 4
Labor entry	**.761**	-.227	-.080	**.582**
Labor stay	**.772**	-.205	-.026	**.582**
Family entry	**.824**	.087	-.325	-.254
Family stay	**.829**	.106	-.321	-.249
Asylum entry	**.647**	.151	**.502**	-.282
Asylum stay	**.670**	.305	.393	-.404
Strength of *jus soli*	-.165	**.863**	.209	.256
Residence duration requirement (reversed)	-.003	**.816**	-.362	.086
Multiple citizenship toleration	.063	**.539**	**.571**	.319
Further naturalisation requirements	-.038	**.542**	**-.646**	.007
Eigenvalue	3.442	2.225	1.540	1.222
Cronbach's alpha	.788	.612	.390	.202

Table A15 CATPCA – Three-dimensional unrotated solution

Variables	Dim IRO	Dim CRI	Dim 3
Labor entry	**.811**	-.182	-.062
Labor stay	**.814**	-.172	-.075
Family entry	**.788**	.102	.408
Family stay	**.793**	.131	.403
Asylum entry	**.714**	.064	-.363
Asylum stay	**.726**	.262	-.336
Strength of *jus soli*	-.147	**.869**	-.311
Residence duration requirement (reversed)	-.015	**.829**	.317
Multiple citizenship toleration	.062	**.540**	**-.620**
Further naturalisation requirements	-.048	**.549**	**.610**
Eigenvalue	3.635	2.198	1.535
Cronbach's alpha	.805	.605	.387

Table A16 CATPCA – One-dimensional solution

Variables	Single Dimension
Labor entry	**.576**
Labor stay	-.454
Family entry	-.223
Family stay	**-.569**
Asylum entry	-.416
Asylum stay	**-.686**
Strength of *jus soli*	**-.785**
Residence duration requirement (reversed)	**-.683**
Multiple citizenship toleration	**-.586**
Further naturalisation requirements	-.495
Eigenvalue	3.226
Cronbach's alpha	.767
Explained variance	32.255

IV Constructing an Immigration Regime Openness Index

In the following, I justify the decision that to measure IRO it is best to use the cubed version of the arithmetic mean of the IMPIC scores on labour immigration, family reunification, and asylum seeker and refugee policies regarding entry and stay. The first reason is that the object scores retrieved from the CATPCA show very low variance (Figure A2). In addition, as is the case with any multi-dimensional solution of any kind of PCA, the dimension measuring IRO is "contaminated" with the lower component loadings of the other dimensions. The greater these loadings, the greater the "contamination". Hence, this measure of IRO also features small parts of citizenship policies, which is not what we want to capture when trying to measure IRO.

Figure A2 CATPCA object scores of the IRO dimension



The next option is the equally weighted artithmetic mean of the six policy components. It assumes that the policies can compensate each other in their openness. However, also the arithmetic mean shows relatively low variance and is highly skewed; the observations cluster at the upper end (Figure A3).

Figure A3 IRO measurement via non-transformed arithmetic mean



I now turn to the IMPIC coding logic to further justify the scale construction. 50 is an important threshold because it indicates the presence of a legal provision on the IMPIC scale (Figure A4). The original scale is from 0 indicating no legal provision or maximum openness to 0.5 a liberal legal provision to 1 indicating no policy or maximum restrictiveness. The example of residence requirements for family reunification shows how this works. If there is an explicit family reunification policy but it

lacks any residence requirements the score is 0. 0.5 is assigned to a liberal policy option. and the other scores indicate greater restrictiveness up until the point where there is no explicit family reunification policy, which is a score of 1 and implies that there are no legal openings beyond those which are administered in a discretionary way for this category of immigrants.

Figure A4 Example for IMPIC coding: Residence requirement for family reunification

Values	Label
0	No
0.5	Yes, less or equal 12 months; Yes, unspecified
0.6	Yes, 13-24 months
0.7	Yes, 25-48 months
0.8	Yes, 49-60 months
0.9	Yes, more than 60 months or permanent residence
1	No family reunification policy

Source: Bjerre et al. (2017: 52), indicator [S_a01]

This means that an aggregate score above 50 on the reversed and transformed scale that I use – where 100 is maximum openness – indicates that numerous variables comprised by the six policy components have a score of 100 rather than 50 or below. It is essential to capture this feature of the data. Even more. it must be captured in much greater detail – we need to discriminate more clearly the cases that have no legal provision for entry and stay conditions across all indicators. One way to do this is to square the measure for IRO (Figure A5).

Figure A5 IRO measurement via squared arithmetic mean



With this scale construction, we come closer to discriminating more clearly the important variation at the upper end of the scale, while not ignoring the variation that exists beyond the threshold of the presence of a legal provision. However. a cubed transformation does an even better job (Figure A6). Now there are two clusters. The firsts tends toward 0 and thus declares comparable the levels of IRO in states that have a discretionary policy without an official law and those that have very restrictive laws. Yet, there still is variation among this cluster that the index can capture. The second cluster captures in detail the most significant variation caused by very liberal policies on varying numbers of indicators. In addition, a statistical test shows that a cubed version is not significantly skewed anymore (not shown). This is why I choose to operationalise IRO with the arithmetic mean of the six policy components that is then cubed (and rescaled using a division of 10000). In the analyses, I rescaled this

measure again so that 0 is the minimum openness and 100 the maximum openness observed in the data.

Figure A6 IRO measurement via cubed arithmetic mean



V Correlation matrix of variable quantifications

	Labor entry	Labor stay	Family entry	Family stay	Asylum eligibility	Asylum stay	Strength of *jus soli*	Residence duration	Multiple citizenship	Further conditions
Labor entry	1.000	.995	.432	.448	.442	.398	-.235	-.101	-.030	-.096
Labor stay	.995	1.000	.437	.459	.455	.415	-.203	-.084	.002	-.086
Family entry	.432	.437	1.000	.962	.373	.469	-.168	.109	-.009	.084
Family stay	.448	.459	.962	1.000	.375	.494	-.082	.173	.080	.087
Asylum entry	.442	.455	.373	.375	1.000	.806	-.099	-.078	.023	-.099
Asylum stay	.398	.415	.469	.494	.806	1.000	-.011	.094	.113	-.051
Residence duration	-.235	-.203	-.168	-.082	-.099	-.011	1.000	.599	.539	.356
Multiple citizenship	-.101	-.084	.109	.173	-.078	.094	.599	1.000	.252	.532
Strength of *jus soli*	-.030	.002	-.009	.080	.023	.113	.539	.252	1.000	.053
Further conditions	-.096	-.086	.084	.087	-.099	-.051	.356	.532	.053	1.000

N=731 country-years; entries are Pearson correlation coefficients of transformed variable quantifications retrieved by the CATPCA shown in the article.

VI Evolution of IRO and CRI by country



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