Online Appendix (A)

Does sportswashing work? First insights from the 2022 World Cup in Qatar

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A.1 Case selection and political context

This section provides more detailed information on the selected dyad of Qatar and Germany. Based on the country characteristics and the international political environment around the 2022 FIFA World Cup, we situate both countries in the universe of autocratic host and democratic spectator nations. In addition, we critically discuss whether and to what extent the selection of cases might increase or decrease the likelihood of finding empirical support for our theoretical hypotheses.

A.1.1 Qatar as the host nation of the 2022 FIFA World Cup

In December 2010, Qatar was selected to host the 2022 Football World Cup by the FIFA Executive Committee, beating the favored United States, as well as Australia, Japan, and South Korea. On the same day, Russia was awarded the 2018 edition of the World Cup, beating its democratic competitors from England and the joint bids of Belgium/Netherlands and Portugal/Spain (Longman 2010). While the decision in favor of Qatar marked a historic milestone as the World Cup was the first major tournament to be held in the Middle East, it also generated significant controversies and legal investigations related to the bidding process. In 2015, investigations by the US Department of Justice led to the indictment and conviction of several FIFA officials on charges of corruption, bribery, and money laundering associated with the awarding of the tournaments and their marketing rights (Gibson and Gayle 2015). In the following, we detail why Qatar is not an exceptional case with regards to its motivation of hosting sports mega-events and its sports-based image management strategy.

1) **Situating Qatar's motivation among other autocratic host regimes.** A common expectation is that authoritarian regimes host a major international sporting events because of economic benefits. However, ample research has shown that such mega-events are only profitable for the sports federations owning the marketing rights to the tournaments (Andreff 2012; Preuss, Solberg and Alm 2014). By contrast, for host countries, the organization of the Olympic Games or the FIFA World Cup is a balanced affair at best and a financial catastrophe at worst (Billings and Holladay 2012; Lin and Lu 2018; Zimbalist 2020). This is especially true for a host country like Qatar, which had to build all the stadiums and infrastructure from scratch but has no use for the oversized structures in the post-tournament period. Although the exact costs for the 2022 World Cup are unknown, Qatar's expenses have reportedly been higher than those of any other host before them (Craig 2022). Given that Qatar, in terms of per capita income, has become one of the richest countries in the world in just a few decades thanks to its vast oil and gas reserves, these costs at least do not present an impediment. But it seems fair to say that, like the autocratic host countries in the past, the Emir did not host the World Cup for economic reasons.

   Rather than hoping for big financial gains, authoritarian regimes primarily seek to profit from the unparalleled media attention around sports mega-events in terms of domestic legitimacy and international status (e.g., Bowersox 2018; Brancati and Wohlforth 2021; Scharpf, Gläßel and Edwards 2023). Domestically, studies have shown that sporting achievements and the hosting of sports events instills feelings of national pride and belonging, boosting public support for the regime in power (Bertoli 2017; Busby, Druckman and Fredendall 2017; Depetris-Chauvin, Durante and Campante

2020; Rosenzweig and Zhou 2021). Although all autocracies depend to some degree on domestic public support, the sources of legitimacy and the minimum levels required for political stability vary widely across the different subtypes of authoritarian regimes (Gerschewski 2013; Von Soest and Grauvogel 2017). For the Emir of Qatar, as a hereditary monarch with almost unlimited financial resources, popularity with the people might be less of a concern, especially since past Qatari rulers have not lost power through revolutions, but rather through palace coups by rival members of the royal family. Thus, domestic legitimacy was arguably only a secondary reason for the Qatari regime to host the World Cup.

This leaves us with the unique opportunity for Qatar—provided by the globally most important sports tournament—to take center stage, make a name for itself in the international arena, and boost its reputation as a capable and friendly host (Bowersox 2018; Brancati and Wohlforth 2021). Here, too, Qatar is not the exception but the rule. The last century is full of autocratic hosts who sought to use international sporting events to improve their image abroad. Authoritarian host nations of all stripes have strategically leveraged major international sports events to create a facade of being a friendly and welcoming host (Scharpf, Gläßel and Edwards 2023). The 1936 Berlin Olympics, hosted by Nazi Germany, aimed to present an illusion of tolerance and inclusivity. To put up this facade, the German leadership ordered the suspension of the persecution of the LGBT community and the hanging of anti-Semitic posters in the streets of Berlin. The goal was to mislead international observers into believing that foreign criticism was merely anti-German agitation and that concerns about the Nazis were unfounded. Two years before, the 1934 World Cup in Italy with its ultramodern stadiums served Mussolini as a propaganda tool that signaled the regime's progressiveness. More recently, the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics in Russia and the Beijing Olympics in 2008 sought to project a modern and progressive image while diverting attention from human rights concerns and political repression. These examples highlight how autocrats strategically utilize major sporting events to construct a favorable narrative, bolster their international reputation, and sow doubts about critics abroad.

The case of Qatar and its grand strategy fit this picture. The Al Thani royal family of Qatar has used much of its oil rents to expand geopolitical influence through both political and sports diplomacy (Steinberg 2023). Qatar's goal is to gain international recognition and soft power, for example, by way of placing Qataris in central positions of international sports associations and clubs. In 2011, the Emir acquired Paris Saint-Germain Football Club through state-run shareholding organization Qatar Sports Investments (QSI), only to invest another 1.5 billion euros in transfers of high-profile signings such as Neymar or Lionel Messi (Reuters 2023). In 2012, the Qatari state founded beIN Sports and transformed it into a globally operating network of sports channels and holder of prestigious broadcasting rights. Hosting the World Cup as the first country in the Middle East has been at the heart of these efforts. According to Qatar's National Vision 2030, the tournament was vital to the national interest and instrumental in cementing Qatar's status as a soft-power heavyweight.

Observers argue that the reason for Qatar's heavy investment in European football and the World Cup lies in its troubled and sometimes openly confrontational relationship with regional hegemons Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (Nereim 2022).

With a population of less than three million, of which only about 12 percent are Qatari citizens, and despite heavy investment in modern military equipment, Qatar could not contain a potential attack by its neighbors. According to country experts, the Qatari regime has drawn its lessons from Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, recognizing the importance of building significant soft power and fostering strong relations with Western powers as a means to deter potential aggression from Saudi Arabia and other powerful regional actors (Steinberg 2023). By actively cultivating alliances and investing in the areas of sports and international diplomacy, the Emir aims to establish Qatar as a formidable player on the global stage and ensure its security against potential threats.

2) **Situating Qatar's image management strategy among other autocratic host regimes.** To shape the narrative around its behavior and its role as the host of the World Cup the Qatari government went to great lengths. Most importantly, officials launched a comprehensive global secret intelligence operation called "Project Merciless." According to Swiss investigative journalists, the operation was targeted against critical individuals in world football and beyond (Eiholzer and Schmid 2022). To this end, the Qatari regime reportedly hired the American firm Global Risk Advisors, whose staff largely consisted of ex-CIA agents. The documents released by journalists not only demonstrate that Operation Merciless cost hundreds of millions of dollars but also what services Qatar received and the goals it pursued. To achieve "worldwide penetration" and "total control," the documents envisaged building an extensive espionage network, infiltrating international organizations such as the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), intercepting private communications via hacking attacks, and conducting so-called black ops to silence critics. The Emir saw such measures as a proper response to what he perceived as an "unprecedented campaign" against his regime by foreign actors, fought with ferocious "fabrications and double standards" (Eiholzer and Schmid 2022).

   Qatar's recourse to Western consulting firms with questionable expertise is typical of autocratic host states dealing with criticism from democracies. Autocracies most likely assume that these companies have intimate knowledge of their target group and operating environment, i.e. how to navigate liberal media messaging, what narratives and spins to construct, and how to sow doubt on adversaries' credibility. For example, the military junta of Argentina followed this playbook when hosting the 1978 FIFA World Cup (Scharpf, Gläßel and Edwards 2023). Similar to the Qatari government in 2022, the Argentine generals were facing significant criticism from Western media and boycott calls for their systematic violation of human rights (Jiménez Botta 2016; Relano 1978). In response to this criticism, the junta contracted the US public-relations agency Burson-Marsteller to undermine media reporting abroad, bribe foreign journalists, and discredit boycott movements that had been especially active in France (Pears 2006). Again, as with the case of Qatar, the Argentine government went to great lengths in order to make the tournament a global PR boon by discrediting its critics (Duke and Crolley 2014).

   In addition, and similar to what one might expect from big host countries like China and Russia, Qatar actively aimed to influence foreign public opinions through social media. It directly targeted fan leaders and influencers from all participating nations in the hope of turning them into unofficial tournament ambassadors and creating the impression of an authentic football atmosphere. The New York Times reported that in

2020, Qatar initiated a program offering fans free pre-World Cup visits to Qatar and trips to the tournament itself, providing them with first-class tickets, accommodation, and pocket money (Panja 2022). Yet, according to the investigations, the generous offer was subject to important conditions. Fans who accepted the offer were required to abide by strict contracts governing their behavior. They were expected to "like" and "share" Qatar-friendly content online, sing specific chants, refrain from criticizing Qatar, vet co-supporters, and report critical social media posts by other fans. The Guardian described the program as "Fan by day, Stasi by night" (Rushden 2022).

Taken together, the case of Qatar shares important similarities with other authoritarian host nations of past tournaments in terms of its foreign policy goals and its approach toward international criticism. Remarkably, Qatar exhibits significant overlaps with the high-powered and much more prominent host countries like Russia and China, despite its distinct characteristics such as a small population, a monarchical government, and the multipolar geopolitical situation on the Arab Peninsula.

A.1.2 Germany as a spectator nation of the 2022 FIFA World Cup

We focus on Germany because it is one of several plausible and important democratic target nations for Qatar's image campaign, but also one of the countries with the most critical media coverage of Qatar's role as tournament host. We regard this combination of host-spectator nations as a crucial and hard case in that, given the critical reporting, we are less likely to find support for our main hypothesis of a status and image upgrade for Qatar as a result of the World Cup.

1) **Germany as a plausible and crucial target state.** We consider Germany a crucial, plausible target state for Qatar's image management strategy around the football World Cup for at least three reasons. First, Germany is a football-loving country where the sport has a strong place in civil society and the wider population. With more than seven million members of the affiliated clubs, the German Football Association (DFB) is the largest national sports association in the world. From the perspective of Qatar, the Germans' football frenzy should thus present the ideal platform to capture people's attention and effectively communicate its messages. Second, Germany boasts the largest economy in Europe. Economic strength typically translates into influence and decision-making power in international affairs. For Qatar, this makes Germany a country whose international support is valuable and desirable.

   Third, Germany is also recognized as a diplomatic heavyweight due to its active participation in global politics. It plays a significant role in international relations, acting as a mediator, broker, and advocate for various causes. This diplomatic influence gives Germany a prominent voice in shaping public opinion and policy decisions in Europe and beyond. In sum, Qatar's image campaign surrounding the hosting of the FIFA World Cup seems to be an ideal fit for Germany, allowing the monarchy to capitalize on the nation's fervor for football, robust economy, and diplomatic clout.

   These reasons notwithstanding, Germany presents just one of many countries that might be relatively susceptible to Qatar's image campaign around the World Cup. Football holds immense popularity across diverse cultures, making it a universal language that resonates with people in various corners of the world, including in South

America, Europe, Africa, and Asia. Footballers and other athletes are iconic figures and possess influential voices. Their achievements, charisma, and impact on society make them powerful testimonials for promoting messages worldwide. Recognizing the global admiration for athletes and football, Qatar's sporting PR may thus boost its image in multiple nations, similar to its potential impact in Germany.

2) **German media stance toward Qatar in international comparison.** Qatar's role as host of the 2022 World Cup has drawn substantial criticism from a wide range of foreign media, officials, and international nongovernmental organizations (Amnesty International 2022; Tharoor 2022; Worden 2022). The criticism concerned both the precarious human rights situation and the overall feasibility of a tournament of this magnitude in the country (Ward 2022). Journalists drew particular attention to the tournament's poor sustainability record in relation to climate change and wasted resources. Due to the climatic conditions even during winter, the organizers decided to artificially cool all the stadiums. At the same time, critics complained that the country could not build on a pre-existing infrastructure and that there were neither needs nor plans for subsequent use for the many large arenas in the small desert state (Cabot 2022; Dufrasne 2022; Mills 2022).

Yet, the bulk of Western media criticism centered on Qatar's poor respect for the fundamental rights of migrant workers, LGBT communities, and women. In particular, an analysis by The Guardian in February 2021 fueled the media discourse about Qatar's maltreatment of migrant workers, inadequate safety measures, and exploitative labor practices surrounding the tournament preparations (The Guardian 2021).[1] According to the report, at least 6,500 migrant workers from Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka alone died in Qatar in the decade since the World Cup was awarded.[2] In response to international pressure, the Qatar government initiated several labor law reforms. But these reforms, too, aroused criticism for being inadequate or de facto not enforced (Amnesty International 2021; Human Rights Watch 2020). Similarly, many media outlets vocally questioned Qatar's hosting eligibility with reference to the country punishing men for being gay and treating women as second-class citizens under a broad set of "male guardianship rules" (Human Rights Watch 2021).

Public and media criticism of Qatar was not equally strong around the world. In Europe, outrage about the World Cup in Qatar and boycott efforts were most far-reaching, including from politicians, officials, and even the national teams (Le Monde 2022). For example, many major cities in France and Spain decided to block fan zones and public viewing events in protest (Euronews 2022). The Danish football federation announced wearing all-black shirts during the tournament honoring migrant workers who had died at the World Cup construction sites (The Guardian 2022). Other nations, including England, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and Wales, had to relinquish their plans to wear rainbow armbands as symbols of

[1]The systematic violation of labor rights and the poor working and living conditions for migrant workers inside the Kafala system had been known for decades (Montague 2013). The Kafala system is a sponsorship-based labor system prevalent in various Gulf countries, where migrant workers' legal status and working conditions are substantially tied to their domestic employer or sponsor, often leading to exploitation, limited freedom of movement, and abuse (Human Rights Watch 2014).

[2]The Qatari government countered the analysis by The Guardian in that the figure did not equate to the number of deaths on World Cup construction sites but represented the total number of deaths including those from natural causes (BBC 2022).

inclusiveness after FIFA threatened the teams with sporting sanctions (Syed 2022).

German media coverage of Qatar mirrored media coverage in other democratic spectator nations. Thematically, the German media focused on the same controversial issues as many of their colleagues in Western Europe and North America. In particular, disregard for the rights of migrant workers, women, and the LGBT community in Qatar has been particularly harshly criticized (e.g., Deutschlandfunk 2021). This criticism extended not only to media reports. There have also been repeated protests and calls for a boycott within the German fan community since 2020, including critical banners in the stadiums at Bundesliga games (Schulze-Marmeling 2022; Theis 2022). In the meantime, the discourse partly overlapped with the controversial sponsorship deal between Bayern Munich and Qatar Airways and the winter training camps that the club regularly spends in the Emirate (Lange 2022).

3) **Democratic media criticism toward autocratic hosts in historical perspective.** Widespread criticism from international media, naming-and-shaming campaigns, and even boycott movements targeting autocratic host regimes of international sports events are nothing new (Bowersox 2016; Cha 2009). Throughout history, numerous dictatorships came under intense pressure following the awarding of a major tournament. Examples include:

- Berlin Summer Olympics, 1936: After the Nazis came to power in Germany, several international initiatives (unsuccessfully) sought to prevent the 1936 Berlin Olympics and even planned to hold alternative Olympics in Barcelona, which had to be canceled due to the beginning of the Spanish civil war. By drawing attention to the Nazis' discriminatory policies, foreign diplomats, newspapers, and German opposition groups in exile tried to deny Hitler's PR success (Frommer 2021).
- FIFA World Cup in Argentina, 1978: In the run-up to the tournament, international newspapers and human rights organizations voiced widespread opposition against the hosting military junta (Jiménez Botta 2016). Amnesty International launched a campaign to shed light on the Argentine state terror and exert pressure on the regime, while public protests took place in various cities across Western Europe (Rein 2014). In France, the resistance was fiercest, with journalists and Argentine exiles joining forces to establish the Committee for the Boycott of the World Cup under the slogan "No football amidst concentration camps" (Relano 1978).
- Moscow Summer Olympics, 1980: After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the United States advocated a comprehensive boycott of the upcoming 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. With reference to the human rights situation in the Soviet Union, Western human rights activists and non-governmental organizations had been campaigning for a boycott for years (Tulli 2016). Eventually, 65 countries decided to abstain from the Games, while the Soviet Union retaliated four years later by boycotting the Games in Los Angeles together with the other Eastern Bloc states.
- Seoul Summer Olympics, 1988: While initially planned by General Chun Doo-hwan to serve as a lifeline for his military rule, the Olympics drew significant international media scrutiny, raising awareness of the regime's disrespect of human rights and civil liberties. Eventually, foreign media attention assisted

the South Korean pro-democracy movement and catalyzed the ousting of Chun Doo-hwan (Black and Bezanson 2004; Cha 2009).

In recent decades, it has become even more common for democratic media and, of course, human rights organizations to take a critical and in-depth look at autocratic host countries. In many cases, there are also national or transnational protest movements that at least draw attention to political grievances or call for a boycott. Both the 2008 Summer and the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, for example, drew widespread media attention to China's human rights and civil liberties record as well as the regime's treatment of ethnic and religious minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang (e.g., Boykoff 2022; Human Rights Watch 2008). Naming-and-shaming campaigns and international criticism placed pressure on the Chinese government to grant its citizens more freedom of expression and association, yet with unforeseen consequences, including increased surveillance and arrests (Radio Free Asia 2008).

Likewise, the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia faced major controversy due to Putin's anti-LGBT laws, the attacks against opposition figures, its annexation of Crimea, and its role in the Ukrainian Donbas region, leading to mainly Western scrutiny, protests, and discussions about potential boycotts (Meier et al. 2021; Rosenberg 2018; Walker 2018; Worden 2018). Unfortunately, it is unclear whether these critical voices led to increased skepticism towards Putin or the messengers of criticism in their own countries. An England supporter's take during a BBC interview at the 2018 World Cup in Moscow suggests the latter: "Everything the British government has said about Russia is a lie. It's propaganda. Fair play to Putin. He's done a brilliant job with the World Cup" (Rosenberg 2018).

International naming-and-shaming campaigns are also not limited to the FIFA World Cups and the Olympics. Just months before the 2021 Ice Hockey World Championships, the International Ice Hockey Federation decided to remove Belarus as a co-host in response to mounting international criticism of the regime's repression of political unrest. What may have accelerated the IIHF's decision is the reported threat made by multiple corporations to withdraw their tournament sponsoring otherwise (Walker 2021).

While autocratic host regimes have historically come under intense media scrutiny, some observers claim that criticism of Qatar has been particularly fierce, bigoted, or even showing racist neo-colonial undertones (e.g., al Hroub 2022; Herden 2022; Mohyeldin 2022). The media self-reflection also had an impact on the German public media, which questioned whether it was right to broadcast the World Cup and whether the critical approach was counterproductive in the end (Ramadan 2023; Schaer and Hassan 2022). Our short article provides a first social-scientific basis for discussing such questions, well beyond the case of Germany as a spectator and Qatar as a host nation.

A.2 Survey design

To test the effect of the 2022 FIFA World Cup on foreign public opinion, we conducted a representative online survey (N=2,008) in Germany with two waves–one before and one directly after the start of the World Cup. Any systematic hypothesis test of the impact of an autocracy-hosted international sporting event on the opinions of foreign spectators faces substantial methodological challenges. This section provides detailed information about the survey design along with a discussion of the trade-offs associated with each design choice. Finally, we provide the results of a covariate balance test.

1) **Time between survey waves.** We analyze changes in public opinion over a short period of time around the start of the World Cup on 20 November 2022. As shown in Figure 4, respondents of the first wave completed the survey between 14 and 16 November and those in the second wave between 21 and 23 November. The study thus captures the short-term effects of the start of an international sports event. There are several caveats associated with this approach: i) the hypothesized effect might take more time to manifest than the period between Wave 1 and 2, ii) the treatment needs to accumulate over time, or iii) the respondents might react to the treatment due to pre-treatment influences. In each of the three scenarios, we are less likely to find empirical evidence for our hypotheses and we are more likely to underestimate a treatment effect if there is any. That is, we pursue a highly conservative approach in that we trade the identification of long-term image effects for a clean set-up to isolate the influence of the World Cup start.

   We consider this conservative approach preferable, as the short time window between both waves reduces the risk that we mistakenly attribute effects to the start of the World Cup rather than to a multitude of potentially causally relevant other-regarding factors unaccounted for in our analyses. For example, German attitudes about the tournament and the host Qatar probably depend strongly on the performance of the German national team. Similarly, idiosyncratic events, such as the police investigation into Qatari bribes for members of the European Parliament, are highly likely to affect people's evaluations. By placing the second wave right between the opening ceremony and the first match of the German national team, we can rule out that the results are influenced by team performance or political scandals. If we had postponed the second wave by just one week, for example, it would have been impossible for us to disentangle the effect of the World Cup from the effect of the opening defeat against Japan, which was very disappointing for many German football fans.

   If we had carried out the second survey wave another week later, the evaluation and attribution of causal effects would have been even more problematic. On 29 November, Qatar's state-owned commodities group surprisingly announced an agreement with the American commodities group Conoco Phillips, according to which up to two million tons of liquefied natural gas should be delivered to Germany every year starting in 2026. While this quantity was "just a drop in the ocean" (Bauchmüller 2022) given Germany's energy consumption and the capacity of the Nord Stream I pipeline from Russia, this breaking news could have had the potential to influence second-wave responses. The Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, Robert Habeck, had traveled to Qatar for exploratory talks regarding possible gas deliveries from the Emirate to Germany in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This visit had been criticized by German media. Despite the long time between Habeck's

visit to Qatar and our survey, it could still be the case that German public opinion towards Qatar experienced a certain structural shift up or down. With the narrow time window between the two survey rounds, however, we can rule out distorted effects from the announcement of the gas deal, because it was only concluded after the second wave. In retrospect, we are therefore all the more convinced that it was the right decision to pursue the conservative approach with just one week in between the two survey waves.

To give a more comprehensive overview of the most debated topics in the two weeks before and during our survey period, Table A.2.1 shows the daily contents of the Deutschlandfunk press reviews. Deutschlandfunk is a public-broadcasting radio station with a strong focus on news and current affairs. The press review on Deutschlandfunk offers a daily overview and excerpts from German newspaper commentaries. For this purpose, the news department monitors all regional and national daily newspapers and compares the perspectives presented in them on the topics of the day. Table A.2.1 is based on the broadcast manuscripts of the press reviews between 10 and 23 November 2022 (Deutschlandfunk 2022). The issues discussed in the newspapers do not suggest that our results are affected by other scandals or political discourse. Among other topics, the listed news items cover relatively uncontentious debates in the German Parliament, several criminal and administrative court decisions in Germany, gradually waning Covid regulations, the G20 summit in Indonesia, the US Congressional elections, Donald Trump's readmission to Twitter, and the situation in Ukraine eleven months into the war. Only on 16 November did commentators discuss the completion of the first German floating liquefied petroleum gas terminal in Wilhelmshaven, which was thematically related to possible future Qatari gas supplies. However, it was not until 21 December 2022 that the first liquid gas was unloaded at the terminal, which came from the US and triggered protests because it had been produced with the help of fracking (Norddeutscher Rundfunk 2023). At the beginning of the tournament on 21 and 22 November then, the World Cup was the dominant topic in the comment columns of the German media. Our results are therefore unlikely affected by other news developments between the two survey waves.

2) **Survey mode, sample design, and representativeness.** Our survey could only be completed online. Extant literature deals with the advantages and disadvantages of different survey modes. We are convinced that an online survey was the only viable option for our study. Most importantly, online surveys have the advantage that a large number of respondents can complete the questionnaire in parallel without inflation in terms of costs. This is particularly important when—as in our case—the survey periods must be short and closely follow each other (see above).

At the same time, we aimed to address known challenges associated with the design and analysis of web-based surveys through the following well-established strategies. First, with the target population being the adult population of Germany, for each wave, we ensured a nationally representative sample in terms of gender, age, and education through pre-selected quotas. Second, our questionnaire was designed to maximize the reliability of the responses, addressing common complications associated with online surveys. For example, to prevent straight-lining patterns and unintended priming, we inverted half of the statements in every questionnaire block, where respondents were asked to state their level of agreement or disagreement. Third, the order of

nominal answer options was randomized in order to forestall primacy and recency biases. Finally, the use of mobile survey optimization and the option to pause and resume the survey likely reduced the risk of systematic dropouts due to problems with connectivity or end devices.

To recruit a nationally representative sample of respondents, we contracted Bilendi (formerly Respondi), a leading European market research company for social-scientific surveys. We chose Bilendi because it hosts its surveys in secure data centers, offers a high-quality access panel with over 300,000 panelists in Germany, and allows for the definition of fine-grained respondent quotas, based on the distribution of gender, age, and level of education among the German adult population. Using quota/screen-out questions, every respondent was asked to self-report about these three criteria at the beginning of their survey. Meanwhile, the system would monitor the number of participants who successfully completed the survey and update the rates for each quota accordingly. If a respondent fell into a category that had reached its quota limit, the participant would be notified and the interview automatically close. In this way, both respondent samples are representative of the distribution of the adult population in terms of gender, age, and level of education.

Figure A.2.1 and Figure A.2.2 show that respondent age and gender were representative in our sample. Education levels, depicted in Figure A.2.3, were normally distributed with most respondents having a secondary school degree, which matches the distribution in the German population. In addition, the sample also reflects the geographic distribution of the population well. Figure A.2.4 shows the number of respondents in our sample by postal code area, which in Germany has been defined such that each has approximately the same population.

To program the online survey, we used Qualtrics. The software allows for an intuitive and respondent-friendly survey interface. Using mobile optimization respondents were able to complete the survey both on their computers and mobile devices. Qualtrics further provides an artificial intelligence-based review feature diagnosing the accessibility, reading comprehensibility, and logical coherence of each survey question to avoid design-induced bad-quality survey data. Finally, it provides valuable meta-information about individuals' survey completion behavior, most importantly, how long individuals took to go through the entire survey. This allows us to exclude respondents with extreme response time values from the analyses, based on the assumption that they may not have taken the survey seriously or may have been distracted. Excluding respondents who took an exceptionally long or short time to answer the questions does not influence our findings, as demonstrated by Robustness Check 5 in Section A.6. As can be seen in Figure A.2.5, most respondents answered the survey questionnaire in the afternoon and the early evening. It took most respondents around 5 minutes to complete the survey with completion times being very similar across both survey waves, as shown by Figure A.2.6.

3) **Balance tests.** To check whether respondents in Wave 1 and 2 are systematically different, we conduct a covariate balance test. If the groups of respondents in both waves significantly differ from each other, these differences have to be accounted for in the main analysis to ensure that the results are not confounded. To detect potential differences, we regress variables that capture respondents' past football interest, political preferences, and biographic information, among others, on the dichotomous variable *World Cup start*, which groups respondents by their respective sampling wave.

Figure A.2.7 shows the results from these balance tests. To increase comparability between coefficients, continuous variables are standardized. As can be seen, there are no systematic differences between respondents that were sampled before and after the start of the World Cup. Unsurprisingly, only the variable *Critical reports*, which measures the number of critical reports about Qatar consumed, is systematically different before and after the start of the tournament. We include the variable as a control in the statistical analysis.

Table A.2.1. Daily top three news items according to Deutschlandfunk Press Review, November 10-23, 2023 (Dates of survey in bold)

Date		News item no. 1	News item no. 2	News item no. 3
Nov 10	Th	US Congressional elections	Russian retreat from Kherson	Child benefit raise
Nov 11	Fr	Russian war in Ukraine	EU Commission proposal of new emission standard	Bundestag vote on citizen's benefit
Nov 12	Sa	Decision of four federal states to lift the corona isolation obligation	Bundestag vote on prolongation of nuclear power plants	
Nov 13	Su	–	–	–
Nov 14	Mo	US Senate Election election results	Upcoming G20 summit in Bali	Disagreement about citizen's benefit
Nov 15	Tu	Bundesrat vote on citizen's benefit	Chinese-US heads of state meeting in Bali	Government of Schleswig-Holstein's plan to abolish the obligation to wear masks in public transport
Nov 16	We	G20 summit in Bali	Opening of LNG terminal in Wilhelmshaven	Beijing's position in the Ukraine war
Nov 17	Th	Rocket mishap in Poland	Intended presidential candidacy of Donald Trump	Rerun elections to the Berlin House of Representatives
Nov 18	Fr	Guilty verdict in the trial for threatening letters to politicians	Rocket mishap in Poland	Guilty verdict in the MH17 downing trial
Nov 19	Sa	Upcoming FIFA World Cup in Qatar	Trade agreement in the metal and electrical industry in Baden-Württemberg	United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP27) in Egypt
Nov 20	Su	–	–	–
Nov 21	Mo	Start of the FIFA World Cup in Qatar	United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP27) in Egypt	Readmission of Donald Trump on Twitter
Nov 22	Tu	FIFA World Cup in Qatar	Disagreement between FIFA and several European national football associations over "OneLove" captain's armband	Disagreement between Defense Minister Lambrecht and the Bundestag over disclosure of Bundeswehr equipment
Nov 23	We	Agreement of Christian Democrats and government parties on citizen's benefit	Decision of the federal government on a gas-price brake regulation	Decision of the Federal Administrative Court on the 2020 Covid19 curfew in Bavaria

Figure A.2.1. Age distribution of respondents



Note: The graphic shows the age of survey respondents. The survey was aimed at the adult population in Germany, i.e. at respondents aged 18 and over.

Figure A.2.2. Gender distribution of respondents



Note: Graph shows gender of survey respondents.

Figure A.2.3. Education attainments of respondents



Note: The graphic shows the highest general educational qualification or the highest vocational training of survey respondents. The value 1 identifies respondents without a general education qualification, the value 6 identifies respondents with a university degree. A detailed description of the *Education* variable is provided in Table A.3.4.

Figure A.2.4. Geographic distribution of respondents

(a) Postal codes (first digit)

(b) Respondent numbers



Note: Graph shows the geographic distribution of survey respondents. Panel (a) depicts areas covered by the first digit of the German postal code system. Panel (b) shows the number of respondents sampled from the respective postal code areas. Map stems from https://www.plz-suche.org.

Figure A.2.5. Time of survey engagement



Note: The graph shows the time of day respondents took the survey, using each respondent's start time.

Figure A.2.6. Survey completion time



Note: Graph shows box plots on the distribution of time that it took respondents to complete the survey in each wave. Dots give medians, boxes indicate interquartile range (first to third quartile), and lines corresponding 1.5* interquartile range whiskers.

Figure A.2.7. Balance test



Note: Graph shows results of the covariate balance test. Each dot-line element gives the coefficient estimate and 95% confidence interval of one bivariate regression where the variable depicted on the y-axis is the dependent variable and independent variable is *World Cup start*. To increase comparability between coefficients, continuous variables are standardized.

A.3 Survey items

This section provides the exact wording of each survey item in the questionnaire. All statements and answer options are translated from German into English. For reasons of clarity and comprehensibility, the order of the survey items in the tables below replicates the order in which they appear in the article. In the original questionnaire, the specific questions about Qatar appeared at the end of the survey, so that respondents would not be primed on the World Cup early on.

1) **Host items.** Table A.3.1 shows the survey items on the host state Qatar, i.e. the respective variable names and the statements based on which we coded each variable. Respondents were asked to give their level of agreement/disagreement with each of the statements on a 5-point Likert scale. The items' order of appearance within the questionnaire was randomized.

2) **Region items.** Table A.3.2 shows the survey items, where respondents were asked to rate their affinity towards the Arab world and each placebo region/country. The items' order of appearance within the questionnaire was randomized.

3) **Spectator items.** Table A.3.3 shows the survey items on the spectator nation Germany. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of (dis)agreement with each of the statements separately (5-point Likert scale). Again, the items' order of appearance within the questionnaire was randomized.

4) **Control variable items.** Table A.3.4 shows the survey items used to code the covariates. Due to the distinct wording of the questions and the structure of the answer options, the table gives the variable names together with the corresponding question and answer options.

Table A.3.1. Survey items on the host state Qatar (dependent variables in Figure 4). Question: "To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?"

Variable name	Statement	Answer options
Internationally influential	"Qatar is very influential at the international level"	1=Strongly disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=Undecided; 4=Agree; 5=Strongly agree
Aggressive country	"Qatar is an aggressive country"	
Technologically leading	"Qatar is a world leader in many technologies"	
Well organized	"Qatar is a well-organized country"	
Attractive travel destination	"Qatar is an attractive travel destination"	
Bad country for migrant workers	"The situation of migrant workers in Qatar is exceptionally bad"	
Treating women as second-class citizens	"Women are second-class citizens in Qatar"	
Dangerous country for gays and lesbians	"Qatar is a dangerous country for gays and lesbians"	

Table A.3.2. Survey items on the regions (dependent variables in Figure 5). Question: "People associate very different feelings with certain regions of the world. Please tell us how positive or negative you feel about each of the following regions or countries."

Variable name	Regions / countries	Answer options
Affinity: Arab world	"Arab world"	1=Very negative; 2=Rather negative; 3=Rather positive; 4=Very positive
Affinity: Asia	"Asia"	
Affinity: Western Europe	"Western Europe"	
Affinity: USA	"USA"	
Affinity: Russia	"Russia"	

Table A.3.3. Survey items on the spectator state Germany (dependent variables in Figures 6 and 7). Question: "To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?"

Variable name	Statement	Answer options
Freedom of expression similar to Qatar	"Germany is not much better than Qatar when it comes to freedom of expression."	1=Strongly disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=Undecided; 4=Agree; 5=Strongly agree
Too much criticism by media	"Qatar is too much criticized in German media"	
Imposition of opinion by media	"German media often force their opinions on people"	
Boycott of tournaments by politicians	"German politicians should not attend tournaments in non-democracies"	
Professional disadvantages for women	"In Germany, women are severely disadvantaged in professional life"	
Calls for prayer from mosques	"Mosques should be allowed to call for Islamic prayer"	
Exaggerated demands from homosexuals	"Compared to other countries, homosexuals in Germany sometimes exaggerate their demands for equality"	
Security threats through immigration	"The immigration of people from other cultures endangers social peace and security in Germany"	

Table A.3.4. Survey items on control variables

Variable name	Question	Answer options
Opening ceremony ([plan to] watch)	"[Do you intend to watch] / [Have you watched] the opening ceremony or the opening match of the soccer World Cup in Qatar?"	1=Neither nor; 2=Only the ceremony; 3=Only the match; 4=Both
German team (plan to watch)	"Do you intend to watch the matches of the German national team at the World Cup?"	1=Certainly not; 2=Probably not; 3=Probably yes; 4=Certainly yes
Football interest	"Please tell us if and how much football you watch on TV."	1=Not at all; 2=World and European Cups only; 3=Sometimes summaries or even an entire game on free TV; 4=If possible, every game of my team live; 5=If possible, every game live, football is football
Critical reports	"Approximately how many critical articles have you seen or heard in newspapers, on TV and on the radio about Qatar in the last month?"	1=None; 2=About 1 to 5; 3=About 5 to 20; 4=More than 20
Born in GDR	"Where are you born?"	[Country options + 'Other' category with free text field]
Migration background	1) "Where are you born?" / 2) "Is your mother born in the same country as you?" 3) "Is your mother born in the same country as you?"	[Country options + 'Other' category with free text field]
Male	"What gender do you identify yourself as?"	1=Male; 2=Female; 3=Diverse
Age	"In which year were you born?"	[List of years to choose from]
Education	"What is your highest general education qualification or vocational training?"	1 = General school not completed (yet); 2 = Hauptschule completed w/o vocational training; 3 = Hauptschule completed with completed vocational training; 4 = Secondary school w/o Abitur or equivalent degree; 5 = Abitur or equivalent degree w/o studying; 6 = University degree
Political Interest	"Generally speaking, how much interested are you in politics?"	1=Not at all; 2=Not that much; 3=Quite; 4=Very much
Conservatism	"When talking about politics, we often use the terms 'left' and 'right'. We would like to know whether you classify yourself more on the left or more on the right. Imagine a thermometer ranging from 1 (far left) to 11 (far right). With the values in between you can state your opinion in a graduated way. Where would you place yourself?"	[Integer values between 1 and 11 to choose from]

A.4 Summary statistics

1) **Summary statistics.** Table A.4.1 shows summary statistics for all variables used in the main analyses and the robustness checks. The top part of the table lists dependent variables, the middle part lists the independent variable, and the bottom part lists control variables. The dependent variables are grouped (*Qatar*, *Affinity*, and *Germany*) and sorted as employed in the respective models of the main analysis.

2) **Discussion of potential ceiling effects.** The summary statistics show that the measured survey items are unlikely to suffer from potential ceiling effects. The dependent variables display well-distributed responses across the 5-point Likert scale, with most mean values concentrated around the middle categories. This indicates that the survey items do not suffer from excessive clustering at either extreme of the scale.

Table A.4.1. Summary statistics

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Qatar: Internationally influential	Ordinal	1999	3.064	1.043	1.000	5.000
Qatar: Aggressive country	Ordinal	1999	3.312	1.073	1.000	5.000
Qatar: Technologically leading	Ordinal	1999	2.637	1.004	1.000	5.000
Qatar: Well organized	Ordinal	2003	2.880	1.061	1.000	5.000
Qatar: Attractive travel destination	Ordinal	2000	2.353	1.140	1.000	5.000
Qatar: Bad country for migrant workers	Ordinal	1992	4.060	1.028	1.000	5.000
Qatar: Treating women as second-class citizens	Ordinal	1997	4.057	1.008	1.000	5.000
Qatar: Dangerous country for gays and lesbians	Ordinal	1993	4.326	0.980	1.000	5.000
Affinity: Arab world	Ordinal	1997	2.011	0.755	1.000	4.000
Affinity: Asia	Ordinal	1995	2.590	0.718	1.000	4.000
Affinity: Western Europe	Ordinal	1990	3.046	0.695	1.000	4.000
Affinity: United States	Ordinal	1997	2.626	0.773	1.000	4.000
Affinity: Russia	Ordinal	1999	1.874	0.870	1.000	4.000
Germany: Freedom of expression similar to Qatar	Ordinal	1993	2.277	1.201	1.000	5.000
Germany: Too much criticism by media	Ordinal	1992	2.435	1.208	1.000	5.000
Germany: Imposition of opinion by media	Ordinal	1999	3.223	1.121	1.000	5.000
Germany: Boycott of tournaments by politicians	Ordinal	2008	3.611	1.216	1.000	5.000
Germany: Professional disadvantages for women	Ordinal	1999	3.223	1.065	1.000	5.000
Germany: Calls for prayer from mosques	Ordinal	1989	2.484	1.279	1.000	5.000
Germany: Exaggerated demands from homosexuals	Ordinal	2001	2.790	1.341	1.000	5.000
Germany: Security threats through immigration	Ordinal	1992	3.158	1.272	1.000	5.000
World Cup start	Binary	2008	0.499	0.500	0.000	1.000
Opening ceremony ([plan to] watch)	Ordinal	2004	1.410	0.700	1.000	3.000
German team (plan to watch)	Ordinal	2003	2.201	1.082	1.000	4.000
Football interest	Ordinal	2002	2.410	1.242	1.000	5.000
Critical reports	Ordinal	2006	2.435	0.907	1.000	4.000
Born in GDR	Binary	2004	0.175	0.380	0.000	1.000
Migration background	Binary	1944	0.133	0.340	0.000	1.000
Male	Binary	2008	0.508	0.500	0.000	1.000
Age	Interval	2008	44.826	14.367	18.000	70.000
Education	Ordinal	2008	2.120	0.809	1.000	3.000
Political interest	Ordinal	2006	2.653	0.878	1.000	4.000
Conservatism	Interval	2003	5.509	1.916	1.000	11.000
Mondays	Binary	2008	0.625	0.484	0.000	1.000
Tuesdays	Binary	2008	0.341	0.474	0.000	1.000
Wednesdays	Binary	2008	0.034	0.182	0.000	1.000
Hours: 0:00-6:00	Binary	2008	0.004	0.063	0.000	1.000
Hours: 6:00-12:00	Binary	2008	0.161	0.367	0.000	1.000
Hours: 12:00-18:00	Binary	2008	0.585	0.493	0.000	1.000
Hours: 18:00-24:00	Binary	2008	0.250	0.433	0.000	1.000

A.5 Main results

This section offers the regression tables of the main analysis. Formally, we estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with robust as well as clustered standard errors in the main analysis:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 World\,Cup\,start_i + \gamma \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_i,$$

where y is the opinion of respondent i on a specific topic, based on the dependent variables listed in the top part of Table A.4.1. α is the intercept, the coefficient β_1 gives the estimated effect of the start of World Cup in Qatar. γ_i is a vector of coefficients for the control variables *Football interest*, *Critical reports*, *Born in GDR*, *Migration background*, *Male*, *Age*, *Education*, *Political interest*, *Conservatism*, *Russia affinity*, listed in the bottom part of Table A.4.1. Unobserved determinants of individual opinions are captured by the error term ϵ_i.

1) **Watching the World Cup start.** Before undertaking the main analysis, we assess how many and which respondents planned to watch the opening ceremony and/or the opening match (Qatar vs. Ecuador, 20 November, 2022). Figure A.5.1 shows that 31% of the respondents in our survey planned to watch the opening ceremony and match (Wave 1), while 26% eventually did (Wave 2). This makes our research design even more conservative as not every respondent was directly exposed to the live images of the Cup's grand opening show. OLS regression results are shown in Table A.5.1 and visualized in Figure A.5.2. The dependent variable is *Opening ceremony*, which is 1=Neither watch(ed) opening ceremony nor opening match, 2=Either watch(ed) opening ceremony or match, 3=Watched(ed) both. Results show that respondents with high football and political interests were the most likely to watch the World Cup start, while the exposure to critical reports on the World Cup and a range of biographic variables such as gender or age have no discernible effect. We show in A.6 that our results hold when controlling for self-reported viewing of the World Cup start.

2) **Opinions on host.** Table A.5.2 shows OLS regression results for opinions on Qatar. The coefficient estimate of *World Cup start* is negatively and statistically significantly correlated in Model 7 (women are second-class citizens in Qatar). In Models 1-6 and 8, the coefficient estimates fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

3) **Opinions on region.** Table A.5.3 shows OLS regression results for sympathises about different world regions and countries. The coefficient estimate of *World Cup start* is positively and statistically significantly correlated with affinity for the Arab world (Model 1). For all other regions and countries, which serve as placebo tests, the coefficient estimates do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance (Model 2-4).

4) **Opinions on German media and political boycott.** Table A.5.4 shows OLS regression results for opinions on German media and the political boycott by politicians. The coefficient estimate of *World Cup start* is positively and statistically significantly correlated in Model 1 (Germany is not much better than Qatar when it comes to freedom of expression), Model 2 (Qatar is too much criticized in the media), and Model 3 (German media often force their opinions on people). The coefficient estimate

of *World Cup start* is negatively and statistically significantly correlated in Model 4 (support for the political boycott by politicians).

5) **Further political opinions.** Table A.5.5 shows OLS regression results for opinions on inclusion and equality in Germany. The coefficient estimate of *World Cup start* fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significant in Model 1 (professional disadvantages for women) and Model 2 (mosques should be allowed to call for Islamic prayer). The coefficient estimates of *World Cup start* are positively and statistically significantly correlated in Model 3 (homosexuals in Germany sometimes exaggerate their demands for equality) and Model 4 (immigration from other cultures endangers social peace and security in Germany).

Table A.5.1. Watching the start of the World Cup

	(1) Plan to watch (Wave 1)	(2) Reportedly watched (Wave 2)
Football interest	0.254***	0.198***
	(0.019)	(0.018)
Critical reports	−0.036	−0.036†
	(0.026)	(0.021)
Born in GDR	0.113*	0.091†
	(0.057)	(0.053)
Migration background	0.211**	0.092
	(0.070)	(0.057)
Male	−0.061	0.032
	(0.045)	(0.038)
Age	−0.007***	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	−0.086**	0.038
	(0.029)	(0.024)
Political interest	0.100***	0.082***
	(0.026)	(0.024)
Conservatism	0.017	−0.016
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Russia affinity	0.036	0.074**
	(0.027)	(0.024)
Constant	0.966***	0.607***
	(0.143)	(0.122)
AIC	1931.28	1678.75
R^2	0.23	0.21
Observations	963	963

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.2. World Cup start and change of opinions about Qatar

	(1) Internationally influential	(2) Aggressive country	(3) Technologically leading	(4) Well organized	(5) Attractive travel destination	(6) Badcountry for workers	(7) Treating women as second-class citizens	(8) Dangerous for homosexuals
World Cup start	−0.040	−0.066	−0.072	0.010	−0.055	−0.011	−0.113**	−0.051
	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Football interest	0.037†	−0.060**	0.057**	−0.001	0.114***	−0.056**	−0.080***	−0.055**
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)
Critical reports	0.101***	0.133***	−0.012	0.013	−0.118***	0.226***	0.177***	0.213***
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Born in GDR	0.109†	−0.114†	0.210***	0.138*	0.199**	−0.170**	−0.120†	−0.170**
	(0.062)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.067)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.059)
Migration background	0.106	−0.007	0.036	0.067	0.120	−0.011	−0.010	0.016
	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.079)	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.063)
Male	−0.008	−0.165**	−0.213***	0.190***	0.108*	−0.010	−0.124**	−0.118**
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Age	0.002	−0.002	−0.001	0.008***	0.001	0.011***	0.011***	0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	0.041	−0.054†	−0.022	0.115***	−0.055†	0.078**	0.021	0.072*
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Political interest	0.113***	−0.004	0.086**	0.182***	0.064†	0.099***	0.008	0.026
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.028)
Conservatism	−0.008	−0.014	−0.011	0.014	−0.001	−0.070***	−0.039**	−0.030*
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Russia affinity	0.118***	−0.115***	0.179***	0.202***	0.257***	−0.223***	−0.218***	−0.190***
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Constant	2.065***	3.773***	2.211***	1.185***	1.723***	3.580***	4.048***	3.803***
	(0.167)	(0.177)	(0.161)	(0.165)	(0.178)	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.163)
AIC	5549.32	5665.26	5372.30	5516.01	5797.35	5208.37	5231.20	5065.78
R^2	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.10	0.08	0.16	0.12	0.13
Observations	1923	1923	1922	1926	1923	1918	1920	1918

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.3. World Cup start and change of opinions about world regions and countries

	(1) Arab world	(2) Asia	(3) Western Europe	(4) United States
World Cup start	0.082**	−0.032	−0.005	−0.042
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.032)
Football interest	0.060***	−0.028*	−0.010	0.046**
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Critical reports	−0.058**	0.010	0.091***	−0.051**
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Born in GDR	0.047	0.066†	−0.117**	−0.117*
	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.047)
Migration background	−0.065	0.085†	0.025	−0.165**
	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.051)
Male	−0.017	0.087**	−0.025	−0.038
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.034)
Age	0.000	−0.002†	0.004***	−0.002†
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.083***	0.022	0.139***	−0.073***
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Political interest	−0.029	0.035†	0.091***	−0.016
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Conservatism	−0.038***	−0.017*	−0.000	0.020*
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Russia affinity	0.244***	0.179***	−0.068***	−0.084***
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.024)
Arab world affinity		0.253***	−0.033	0.139***
		(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.029)
Asia affinity	0.285***		0.174***	0.178***
	(0.026)		(0.025)	(0.030)
Western Europe affinity	−0.038	0.179***		0.366***
	(0.028)	(0.025)		(0.029)
United States affinity	0.123***	0.140***	0.280***	
	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.023)	
Constant	0.678***	0.853***	1.155***	1.204***
	(0.129)	(0.118)	(0.122)	(0.135)
AIC	3769.86	3546.02	3496.06	4002.89
R^2	0.26	0.27	0.24	0.20
Observations	1906	1906	1906	1906

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.4. World Cup start and change of opinions about German media and boycott

	(1) Freedom of expression similar to Qatar	(2) Too much criticism by media	(3) Imposition of opinion by media	(4) Boycott by politicians
World Cup start	0.123*	0.114*	0.105*	−0.134*
	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.053)
Football interest	0.057*	0.097***	0.017	−0.130***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Critical reports	−0.186***	−0.198***	0.019	0.243***
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.033)
Born in GDR	0.196**	0.217**	0.132*	−0.165*
	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.065)	(0.072)
Migration background	0.115	0.066	0.127†	−0.208*
	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.071)	(0.084)
Male	−0.090†	−0.058	−0.008	0.006
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.056)
Age	−0.005**	−0.004†	−0.001	0.006**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	−0.162***	−0.070†	−0.032	0.051
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.036)
Political interest	0.040	0.013	0.016	0.029
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.036)
Conservatism	0.090***	0.047**	0.087***	−0.058***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Russia affinity	0.397***	0.294***	0.295***	−0.215***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.035)
Constant	1.778***	2.086***	2.089***	3.718***
	(0.183)	(0.192)	(0.167)	(0.197)
AIC	5825.74	5982.92	5728.75	6037.48
R^2	0.17	0.10	0.09	0.10
Observations	1918	1918	1921	1928

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.5. World Cup start and change of political opinions

	(1) Professional disadvantages for women	(2) Calls for prayer from mosques	(3) Exaggerated demands from homosexuals	(4) Security threats through immigration
World Cup start	0.002	−0.022	0.145*	0.122*
	(0.047)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.054)
Football interest	−0.003	0.076**	0.065*	0.011
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Critical reports	0.016	−0.040	−0.114**	−0.031
	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Born in GDR	−0.091	−0.147*	0.091	0.122†
	(0.064)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.072)
Migration background	0.055	0.033	0.251**	−0.078
	(0.072)	(0.087)	(0.084)	(0.077)
Male	−0.393***	0.046	0.260***	−0.070
	(0.051)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.058)
Age	0.005**	−0.009***	−0.001	0.004†
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	−0.064*	0.200***	−0.150***	−0.251***
	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.036)
Political interest	−0.020	−0.001	0.096*	0.065†
	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Conservatism	−0.103***	−0.171***	0.176***	0.194***
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Russia affinity	−0.029	0.126***	0.257***	0.117***
	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Constant	3.995***	3.122***	1.340***	2.080***
	(0.167)	(0.198)	(0.199)	(0.194)
AIC	5548.85	6146.23	6295.23	6086.68
R^2	0.08	0.12	0.15	0.14
Observations	1923	1912	1924	1915

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure A.5.1. Respondents who planned to watch / reportedly watched World Cup opener



Note: Graph shows share of respondents who planned to watch (Wave 1) and reportedly watched the start of the World Cup on 20 November, 2022.

Figure A.5.2. Marginal effects of factors influencing people's decision to watch the World Cup opener



Note: Graph shows marginal effects of the respective independent variable depicted on the y-axis, based on Table A.5.1.

A.6 Robustness tests

This section offers checks that probe the robustness of the main statistical results.

1) **Plan to watch German team play.** This robustness test checks whether respondents in Wave 1 and Wave 2 were systematically different in their preference for watching matches of the German national team. Results are shown in Table A.6.1. Unsurprisingly and as indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate for *Football interest*, in both waves more football-passionate respondents reported that they were more likely to watch the German team play. Moreover, coefficient estimates for *Political interest* show that before the tournament start individuals with a larger interest in political topics were also more likely to watch matches of the German team, while this effect vanished after the Cup had started.

2) **Controlling for opening ceremony.** This robustness test checks whether our results hold when controlling for direct exposure to the World Cup start. To this end, we replicate our main analysis and include the tripartite variable *Opening ceremony* in the regression models. The variable captures whether respondents planned to watch or reportedly watched the Cup's opening ceremony and/or match. Results in Tables A.6.1, A.6.2, A.6.3, A.6.4, and A.6.5 remain unchanged. This suggests that the start of the World Cup changed respondents' opinions independent of whether they directly viewed the opening ceremony and/or the opening match between Qatar and Ecuador. One possible interpretation is that the media frenzy on the first three days of the tournament, which came with a steep increase in reporting and advertisement in print, radio, and television, even reached respondents that had not watched the Cup's opening. Such far-reaching, pervasive dissemination of information is characteristic of successful soft power campaigns (Nye 2004), and seems also to apply to the attention generated by international sports events.

3) **Ordered logistic regressions.** This robustness test assesses model dependence. That is, we check whether our results replicate when we employ ordered logistic regressions instead of OLS models. Results in Tables A.6.6, A.6.7, A.6.8, A.6.9, and A.6.10 show that this is the case. All coefficient estimates for *World Cup start* remain substantively unchanged.

4) **Clustered standard errors.** This robustness test checks whether the results hold when accounting for potential correlation between respondents. Individuals who live in geographic proximity might be exposed to distinct cultural norms and thus share certain opinions. To account for such clustering, we rely on the first number of the German postal code system using the information on respondents' location of residence. As shown in Figure A.2.4, this allows us to locate respondents in ten geographic regions across Germany. We replicate our analysis by clustering standard errors on these regions. Results in Tables A.6.11, A.6.12, A.6.13, A.6.14, and A.6.15 remain unchanged. The only exception is Model 1 in Table A.6.12, where the coefficient estimate for *World Cup start* drops from the 5% to the 10% level of statistical significance.

5) **Reduced samples.** This robustness test checks whether the results hold when we exclude i) respondents who were particularly quick or slow in completing the survey, and ii) respondents who only finished the survey while the first match of the German national team was already ongoing. The former includes individuals who completed

the survey in less than 2 minutes (fastest 5%) or took longer than 20 minutes (slowest 5%). These people may not have given the survey due diligence or may have been distracted. There were also 19 respondents (1.9% of Wave 2) that finished the survey after the kickoff of the match between Germany and Japan (23 November 2022, 14:00). Germany's unexpectedly poor performance might have altered the opinions of these 19 respondents. However, the results in Tables A.6.16, A.6.17, A.6.18, A.6.19, A.6.20, and A.6.21 remain unchanged when excluding the respective respondents from the analysis.

6) **Controlling for time of survey participation.** This robustness test checks whether the results hold when we control i) for the weekdays (Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays) and ii) the exact time of day during which respondents participated in the survey. In the first test, we include the variables *Mondays* and *Tuesday*, which identify respondents that participated in the respective weekday. *Wednesdays* serve as the reference category and are therefore not included in the models. Results in Tables A.6.22, A.6.23, A.6.24, A.6.25, and A.6.26 remain unchanged. In the second test, we control for the time of day during which respondents participated in the survey. We divide the day into four equal time spans of six hours. The hourly time spans are measured by the binary variables *Hours: 0:00-6:00*, *Hours: 6:00-12:00*, *Hours: 12:00-18:00*, with *Hours: 18:00-24:00* serving as the reference category. Results, shown in Tables A.6.27, A.6.28, A.6.29, A.6.30, and A.6.31 remain again unchanged.

Table A.6.1. Watching the German team play

	(1) Plan to watch (Wave 1)	(2) Plan to watch (Wave 2)
Football interest	0.530***	0.500***
	(0.024)	(0.024)
Critical reports	−0.038	0.004
	(0.037)	(0.032)
Born in GDR	0.126†	0.026
	(0.065)	(0.076)
Migration background	0.125	0.074
	(0.096)	(0.081)
Male	−0.102†	0.054
	(0.057)	(0.059)
Age	−0.002	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	−0.065†	0.020
	(0.038)	(0.037)
Political interest	0.086*	0.016
	(0.036)	(0.038)
Conservatism	0.017	0.028†
	(0.015)	(0.017)
Russia affinity	−0.010	0.063†
	(0.035)	(0.034)
Constant	0.958***	0.454*
	(0.197)	(0.198)
AIC	2446.22	2472.16
R^2	0.38	0.36
Observations	964	963

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.2. World Cup start and change of opinions about Qatar with control for opening ceremony

	(1) Internationally influential	(2) Aggressive country	(3) Technologically leading	(4) Well organized	(5) Attractive travel destination	(6) Badcountry for workers	(7) Treating women as second-class citizens	(8) Dangerous for homosexuals
World Cup start	−0.031	−0.085†	−0.046	0.029	−0.006	−0.037	−0.135**	−0.076†
	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.041)
Opening ceremony	0.094*	−0.167***	0.295***	0.190***	0.485***	−0.234***	−0.240***	−0.245***
	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Football interest	0.015	−0.022	−0.010	−0.043†	0.004	−0.003	−0.026	0.001
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Critical reports	0.104***	0.127***	−0.003	0.020	−0.102***	0.219***	0.170***	0.205***
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Born in GDR	0.099	−0.096	0.178**	0.117*	0.146*	−0.145*	−0.094	−0.144*
	(0.062)	(0.066)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.059)
Migration background	0.089	0.014	−0.014	0.044	0.050	0.021	0.031	0.051
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.063)
Male	−0.006	−0.166**	−0.204***	0.193***	0.117*	−0.013	−0.130**	−0.122**
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Age	0.003	−0.002	0.000	0.008***	0.003	0.010***	0.010***	0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	0.044	−0.059†	−0.015	0.121***	−0.042	0.071*	0.015	0.065*
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Political interest	0.104**	0.010	0.056†	0.163***	0.018	0.119***	0.031	0.049†
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.028)
Conservatism	−0.009	−0.015	−0.012	0.013	−0.002	−0.070***	−0.038**	−0.030*
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Russia affinity	0.113***	−0.106***	0.162***	0.191***	0.229***	−0.210***	−0.205***	−0.177***
	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Constant	1.988***	3.914***	1.973***	1.032***	1.329***	3.774***	4.243***	4.006***
	(0.169)	(0.179)	(0.161)	(0.166)	(0.174)	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.162)
AIC	5540.69	5642.21	5298.27	5482.08	5640.46	5159.64	5179.76	5008.77
R^2	0.05	0.05	0.09	0.11	0.15	0.18	0.14	0.16
Observations	1921	1921	1920	1924	1921	1916	1918	1916

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.3. World Cup start and change of opinions about world regions and countries with control for opening ceremony

	(1) Arab world	(2) Asia	(3) Western Europe	(4) United States
World Cup start	0.095**	−0.031	−0.011	−0.039
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.032)
Opening ceremony	0.139***	0.000	−0.055*	0.038
	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.026)
Football interest	0.029*	−0.029*	0.002	0.038*
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Critical reports	−0.054**	0.010	0.090***	−0.050*
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Born in GDR	0.032	0.067†	−0.111**	−0.120*
	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.047)
Migration background	−0.086†	0.085†	0.036	−0.174***
	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.051)
Male	−0.014	0.085**	−0.026	−0.036
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.034)
Age	0.000	−0.002†	0.004***	−0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.086***	0.022	0.137***	−0.072***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Political interest	−0.044*	0.037†	0.096***	−0.021
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Conservatism	−0.038***	−0.016*	−0.000	0.019*
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Russia affinity	0.236***	0.179***	−0.067***	−0.084***
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.024)
Arab world affinity		0.254***	−0.026	0.133***
		(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.029)
Asia affinity	0.281***		0.174***	0.179***
	(0.026)		(0.025)	(0.030)
Western Europe affinity	−0.030	0.179***		0.367***
	(0.028)	(0.025)		(0.029)
United States affinity	0.116***	0.141***	0.281***	
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	
Constant	0.576***	0.847***	1.187***	1.180***
	(0.128)	(0.119)	(0.122)	(0.137)
AIC	3734.28	3543.77	3490.11	3999.12
R^2	0.27	0.27	0.25	0.21
Observations	1904	1904	1904	1904

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.4. World Cup start and change of opinions about German media and boycott with control for opening ceremony

	(1) Freedom of expression similar to Qatar	(2) Too much criticism by media	(3) Imposition of opinion by media	(4) Boycott by politicians
World Cup start	0.136**	0.150**	0.106*	−0.180***
	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.051)
Opening ceremony	0.143***	0.381***	−0.012	−0.469***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.043)
Football interest	0.025	0.011	0.019	−0.024
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Critical reports	−0.182***	−0.186***	0.017	0.228***
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Born in GDR	0.180*	0.175**	0.134*	−0.115
	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.070)
Migration background	0.091	0.006	0.128†	−0.135
	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.083)
Male	−0.087	−0.049	−0.011	−0.005
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.054)
Age	−0.005**	−0.002	−0.001	0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	−0.158***	−0.060†	−0.034	0.039
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.035)
Political interest	0.026	−0.023	0.021	0.073*
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.035)
Conservatism	0.090***	0.046**	0.088***	−0.057***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Russia affinity	0.389***	0.272***	0.297***	−0.188***
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.034)
Constant	1.662***	1.775***	2.090***	4.100***
	(0.187)	(0.191)	(0.171)	(0.196)
AIC	5810.79	5896.97	5721.51	5908.64
R^2	0.17	0.14	0.09	0.16
Observations	1916	1916	1919	1926

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.5. World Cup start and change of political opinions with control for opening ceremony

	(1) Professional disadvantages for women	(2) Calls for prayer from mosques	(3) Exaggerated demands from homosexuals	(4) Security threats through immigration
World Cup start	−0.003	−0.000	0.172**	0.128*
	(0.047)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.054)
Opening ceremony	−0.013	0.230***	0.234***	0.023
	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Football interest	0.000	0.024	0.011	0.005
	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Critical reports	0.016	−0.032	−0.108**	−0.031
	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Born in GDR	−0.091	−0.172*	0.068	0.121†
	(0.064)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.072)
Migration background	0.053	−0.004	0.216**	−0.077
	(0.072)	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.077)
Male	−0.388***	0.054	0.260***	−0.075
	(0.050)	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.058)
Age	0.005**	−0.009***	−0.001	0.004†
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	−0.064*	0.207***	−0.145***	−0.251***
	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.036)
Political interest	−0.023	−0.026	0.080*	0.068†
	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Conservatism	−0.104***	−0.172***	0.176***	0.195***
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Russia affinity	−0.029	0.112**	0.245***	0.116***
	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Constant	4.016***	2.940***	1.137***	2.050***
	(0.171)	(0.202)	(0.200)	(0.197)
AIC	5540.87	6114.58	6259.99	6078.46
R^2	0.09	0.13	0.17	0.14
Observations	1921	1910	1922	1913

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.6. Ordered logistic regressions: Watching the start of the World Cup

	(1) Plan to watch (Wave 1)	(2) Reportedly watched (Wave 2)
Football interest	0.850***	0.790***
	(0.066)	(0.071)
Critical reports	−0.155	−0.129
	(0.101)	(0.094)
Born in GDR	0.472*	0.375†
	(0.192)	(0.212)
Migration background	0.802***	0.372
	(0.215)	(0.232)
Male	−0.245	0.154
	(0.163)	(0.176)
Age	−0.024***	−0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Education	−0.352**	0.207†
	(0.110)	(0.112)
Political interest	0.402***	0.361**
	(0.097)	(0.112)
Conservatism	0.034	−0.069
	(0.040)	(0.047)
Russia affinity	0.141	0.313***
	(0.089)	(0.094)
AIC	1377.00	1207.51
Pseudo R^2	0.16	0.16
Observations	963	963

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Cutoffs omitted.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.7. Ordered logistic regressions: World Cup start and change of opinions about Qatar

	(1) Internationally influential	(2) Aggressive country	(3) Technologically leading	(4) Well organized	(5) Attractive travel destination	(6) Badcountry for workers	(7) Treating women as second-class citizens	(8) Dangerous for homosexuals
World Cup start	−0.061	−0.114	−0.154†	0.028	−0.079	−0.020	−0.188*	−0.073
	(0.085)	(0.083)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.095)
Football interest	0.077†	−0.109**	0.099*	−0.003	0.176***	−0.102*	−0.167***	−0.128**
	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.043)
Critical reports	0.177***	0.228***	−0.015	0.035	−0.208***	0.499***	0.382***	0.514***
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.063)
Born in GDR	0.197†	−0.185†	0.365**	0.264*	0.316**	−0.313**	−0.184	−0.379**
	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.111)	(0.109)	(0.114)	(0.118)	(0.118)
Migration background	0.163	−0.020	0.033	0.128	0.148	0.008	0.010	0.089
	(0.132)	(0.127)	(0.134)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.136)	(0.134)	(0.148)
Male	−0.026	−0.280**	−0.401***	0.354***	0.182*	−0.024	−0.251**	−0.208*
	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.101)
Age	0.004	−0.004	−0.002	0.014***	0.002	0.022***	0.018***	0.024***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Education	0.082	−0.113*	−0.056	0.226***	−0.090†	0.138*	−0.000	0.059
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.067)
Political interest	0.202***	0.007	0.143*	0.338***	0.090	0.222***	0.043	0.111†
	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.062)
Conservatism	−0.007	−0.025	−0.018	0.030	0.003	−0.154***	−0.086**	−0.075**
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Russia affinity	0.203***	−0.229***	0.333***	0.355***	0.446***	−0.488***	−0.464***	−0.464***
	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
AIC	5469.53	5544.23	5271.81	5363.04	5440.82	4507.78	4682.33	3950.26
Pseudo R^2	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.05	0.07
Observations	1923	1923	1922	1926	1923	1918	1920	1918

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Cutoffs omitted.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.8. Ordered logistic regressions: World Cup start and change of opinions about world regions and countries

	(1) Arab world	(2) Asia	(3) Western Europe	(4) United States
World Cup start	0.270**	−0.113	−0.039	−0.106
	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.091)
Football interest	0.164***	−0.091*	−0.032	0.121**
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.042)
Critical reports	−0.166**	0.026	0.277***	−0.150**
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.057)
Born in GDR	0.084	0.214	−0.407***	−0.265*
	(0.129)	(0.132)	(0.121)	(0.131)
Migration background	−0.175	0.264†	0.122	−0.477***
	(0.149)	(0.150)	(0.147)	(0.143)
Male	−0.061	0.289**	−0.055	−0.059
	(0.098)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.097)
Age	0.002	−0.006†	0.014***	−0.007*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education	0.268***	0.073	0.454***	−0.236***
	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.062)
Political interest	−0.098	0.113†	0.347***	−0.043
	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.061)
Conservatism	−0.129***	−0.065*	0.006	0.062*
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Russia affinity	0.784***	0.631***	−0.235***	−0.234***
	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.070)
Arab world affinity		0.873***	−0.159†	0.472***
		(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.087)
Asia affinity	0.921***		0.606***	0.513***
	(0.087)		(0.088)	(0.088)
Western Europe affinity	−0.134	0.635***		1.112***
	(0.090)	(0.087)		(0.094)
United States affinity	0.413***	0.493***	0.983***	
	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.087)	
AIC	3668.41	3486.50	3373.30	3885.23
Pseudo R^2	0.14	0.15	0.13	0.10
Observations	1906	1906	1906	1906

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Cutoffs omitted.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.9. Ordered logistic regressions: World Cup start and change of opinions about German media and boycott

	(1) Freedom of expression similar to Qatar	(2) Too much criticism by media	(3) Imposition of opinion by media	(4) Boycott by politicians
World Cup start	0.187*	0.174*	0.163*	−0.210*
	(0.084)	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Football interest	0.092*	0.181***	0.025	−0.218***
	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Critical reports	−0.331***	−0.365***	0.030	0.431***
	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.054)
Born in GDR	0.325**	0.387***	0.210†	−0.255*
	(0.112)	(0.103)	(0.110)	(0.111)
Migration background	0.180	0.166	0.207†	−0.290*
	(0.122)	(0.120)	(0.122)	(0.133)
Male	−0.196*	−0.088	0.001	0.032
	(0.091)	(0.087)	(0.090)	(0.087)
Age	−0.009**	−0.006*	−0.002	0.009**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education	−0.263***	−0.107†	−0.055	0.067
	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Political interest	0.025	0.002	0.030	0.058
	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.059)
Conservatism	0.158***	0.087***	0.156***	−0.086***
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Russia affinity	0.650***	0.516***	0.523***	−0.329***
	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.056)
AIC	5260.62	5547.47	5540.34	5521.69
Pseudo R^2	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.04
Observations	1918	1918	1921	1928

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Cutoffs omitted.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.10. Ordered logistic regressions: World Cup start and change of political opinions

	(1) Professional disadvantages for women	(2) Calls for prayer from mosques	(3) Exaggerated demands from homosexuals	(4) Security threats through immigration
World Cup start	0.005	−0.010	0.221**	0.167*
	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.082)
Football interest	−0.019	0.122**	0.098**	0.017
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Critical reports	0.039	−0.081	−0.176***	−0.034
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.054)
Born in GDR	−0.161	−0.235*	0.160	0.189†
	(0.117)	(0.110)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Migration background	0.111	0.008	0.370**	−0.108
	(0.127)	(0.132)	(0.121)	(0.117)
Male	−0.698***	0.067	0.374***	−0.110
	(0.092)	(0.087)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Age	0.007*	−0.013***	−0.002	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education	−0.129*	0.311***	−0.220***	−0.388***
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Political interest	−0.019	−0.026	0.125*	0.102†
	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.058)
Conservatism	−0.187***	−0.293***	0.273***	0.329***
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.028)
Russia affinity	−0.058	0.188***	0.392***	0.179**
	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.054)
AIC	5435.34	5608.11	5785.52	5715.91
Pseudo R^2	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.05
Observations	1923	1912	1924	1915

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Cutoffs omitted.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.11. Clustered standard errors: Watching the start of the World Cup

	(1) Plan to watch (Wave 1)	(2) Reportedly watched (Wave 2)
Football interest	0.254***	0.198***
	(0.024)	(0.018)
Critical reports	−0.036*	−0.036
	(0.015)	(0.023)
Born in GDR	0.113†	0.091*
	(0.051)	(0.037)
Migration background	0.211**	0.092*
	(0.057)	(0.033)
Male	−0.061†	0.032
	(0.032)	(0.028)
Age	−0.007***	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	−0.086*	0.038†
	(0.032)	(0.017)
Political interest	0.100**	0.082**
	(0.029)	(0.023)
Conservatism	0.017	−0.016†
	(0.010)	(0.009)
Russia affinity	0.036	0.074**
	(0.025)	(0.019)
Constant	0.965***	0.607***
	(0.114)	(0.081)
AIC	1926.28	1674.75
R^2	0.23	0.21
Clusters	10	10
Observations	962	963

Note: Coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.12. Clustered standard errors: World Cup start and change of opinions about Qatar with control for opening ceremony

	(1) Internationally influential	(2) Aggressive country	(3) Technologically leading	(4) Well organized	(5) Attractive travel destination	(6) Badcountry for workers	(7) Treating women as second-class citizens	(8) Dangerous for homosexuals
World Cup start	−0.039	−0.065	−0.073	0.011	−0.056	−0.011	−0.113*	−0.050
	(0.069)	(0.059)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.070)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.040)
Football interest	0.037	−0.059*	0.056**	−0.000	0.114***	−0.056**	−0.080**	−0.054**
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Critical reports	0.101*	0.133***	−0.012	0.013	−0.118**	0.226***	0.177***	0.213***
	(0.041)	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.021)
Born in GDR	0.110	−0.113*	0.210***	0.139†	0.198**	−0.170*	−0.120	−0.169†
	(0.064)	(0.046)	(0.033)	(0.067)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.067)	(0.077)
Migration background	0.107	−0.006	0.036	0.067	0.119	−0.011	−0.009	0.017
	(0.079)	(0.046)	(0.080)	(0.077)	(0.098)	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.048)
Male	−0.009	−0.166*	−0.212***	0.189**	0.108*	−0.010	−0.124†	−0.119†
	(0.034)	(0.071)	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.055)
Age	0.002	−0.002	−0.001	0.008**	0.001	0.011***	0.010***	0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	0.041	−0.055	−0.022	0.115*	−0.055	0.078**	0.021	0.072
	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.057)	(0.017)	(0.037)	(0.042)
Political interest	0.113*	−0.004	0.086*	0.182**	0.064	0.099***	0.008	0.026†
	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.014)
Conservatism	−0.009	−0.015	−0.010	0.014	−0.001	−0.070***	−0.039*	−0.030†
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Russia affinity	0.118**	−0.116*	0.179***	0.201***	0.257***	−0.223***	−0.218**	−0.191**
	(0.030)	(0.045)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.049)	(0.041)
Constant	2.068***	3.776***	2.209***	1.187***	1.721***	3.581***	4.048***	3.805***
	(0.177)	(0.140)	(0.136)	(0.152)	(0.192)	(0.117)	(0.169)	(0.153)
AIC	5540.72	5656.62	5364.07	5507.74	5789.05	5200.64	5223.48	5057.35
R^2	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.10	0.08	0.16	0.12	0.13
Clusters	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Observations	1922	1922	1921	1925	1922	1917	1919	1917

Note: Coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.13. Clustered standard errors: World Cup start and change of opinions about world regions and countries with control for opening ceremony

	(1) Arab world	(2) Asia	(3) Western Europe	(4) United States
World Cup start	0.081†	−0.031	−0.006	−0.042
	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Football interest	0.060**	−0.028†	−0.010	0.046**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.010)
Critical reports	−0.058**	0.010	0.091**	−0.051**
	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.016)
Born in GDR	0.045	0.067	−0.118†	−0.117†
	(0.034)	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.056)
Migration background	−0.066	0.086†	0.024	−0.165**
	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.026)	(0.035)
Male	−0.016	0.086***	−0.024	−0.038
	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.040)	(0.046)
Age	0.000	−0.002†	0.004**	−0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.084**	0.022	0.139***	−0.073*
	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.023)
Political interest	−0.029	0.035†	0.091***	−0.015
	(0.028)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.019)
Conservatism	−0.038**	−0.017	−0.000	0.020†
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Russia affinity	0.245***	0.179***	−0.067***	−0.084**
	(0.038)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.019)
Arab world affinity		0.254***	−0.035	0.139**
		(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.039)
Asia affinity	0.286***		0.175***	0.179***
	(0.029)		(0.030)	(0.024)
Western Europe affinity	−0.040	0.180***		0.365***
	(0.026)	(0.032)		(0.031)
United States affinity	0.123**	0.140***	0.280***	
	(0.033)	(0.019)	(0.025)	
Constant	0.677***	0.852***	1.154***	1.204***
	(0.137)	(0.150)	(0.106)	(0.139)
AIC	3753.78	3531.74	3480.69	3989.78
R^2	0.26	0.27	0.25	0.20
Clusters	10	10	10	10
Observations	1905	1905	1905	1905

Note: Coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.14. Clustered standard errors: World Cup start and change of opinions about German media and boycott with control for opening ceremony

	(1) Freedom of expression similar to Qatar	(2) Too much criticism by media	(3) Imposition of opinion by media	(4) Boycott by politicians
World Cup start	0.123**	0.113*	0.106†	−0.133*
	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.053)	(0.044)
Football interest	0.057*	0.096***	0.018	−0.129**
	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.027)
Critical reports	−0.186**	−0.198***	0.020	0.243***
	(0.046)	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.026)
Born in GDR	0.197†	0.216**	0.133**	−0.164**
	(0.090)	(0.058)	(0.031)	(0.050)
Migration background	0.115†	0.066	0.128	−0.207**
	(0.054)	(0.043)	(0.074)	(0.064)
Male	−0.091	−0.057	−0.010	0.005
	(0.056)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.048)
Age	−0.005**	−0.004	−0.001	0.006*
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Education	−0.162**	−0.070*	−0.033	0.051
	(0.042)	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Political interest	0.040	0.013	0.016	0.029
	(0.042)	(0.028)	(0.049)	(0.036)
Conservatism	0.090***	0.047*	0.087***	−0.058**
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Russia affinity	0.397***	0.294***	0.294***	−0.215***
	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Constant	1.779***	2.084***	2.093***	3.720***
	(0.238)	(0.188)	(0.134)	(0.174)
AIC	5817.67	5974.47	5719.14	6029.19
R^2	0.17	0.10	0.09	0.10
Clusters	10	10	10	10
Observations	1917	1917	1920	1927

Note: Coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.15. Clustered standard errors: World Cup start and change of political opinions with control for opening ceremony

	(1) Professional disadvantages for women	(2) Calls for prayer from mosques	(3) Exaggerated demands from homosexuals	(4) Security threats through immigration
World Cup start	0.003	−0.023	0.146*	0.123*
	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.062)	(0.049)
Football interest	−0.003	0.075*	0.065†	0.012
	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.028)
Critical reports	0.016	−0.040	−0.113*	−0.031
	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.044)
Born in GDR	−0.091	−0.148*	0.092	0.123*
	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.063)	(0.048)
Migration background	0.055	0.032	0.251*	−0.077
	(0.082)	(0.103)	(0.084)	(0.090)
Male	−0.393***	0.047	0.260*	−0.072
	(0.071)	(0.055)	(0.086)	(0.058)
Age	0.005†	−0.009*	−0.002	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education	−0.064*	0.201*	−0.150***	−0.251***
	(0.028)	(0.064)	(0.024)	(0.032)
Political interest	−0.020	−0.001	0.095*	0.065
	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.039)
Conservatism	−0.103***	−0.170***	0.175***	0.193***
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.027)
Russia affinity	−0.029	0.126**	0.256***	0.116**
	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.029)
Constant	3.996***	3.119***	1.341***	2.084***
	(0.167)	(0.207)	(0.127)	(0.219)
AIC	5540.94	6137.32	6286.81	6077.41
R^2	0.08	0.12	0.15	0.14
Clusters	10	10	10	10
Observations	1922	1911	1923	1914

Note: Coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.16. Reduced sample: Watching the start of the World Cup

	W/o slowest & fastest respondents		W/o German match respondents	
	(1) Plan to watch (Wave 1)	(2) Reportedly watched (Wave 2)	(3) Plan to watch (Wave 1)	(4) Reportedly watched (Wave 2)
Football interest	0.249***	0.192***	0.254***	0.198***
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Critical reports	−0.035	−0.031	−0.036	−0.032
	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.021)
Born in GDR	0.117†	0.069	0.113*	0.082
	(0.060)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.054)
Migration background	0.249***	0.137*	0.211**	0.076
	(0.074)	(0.060)	(0.070)	(0.056)
Male	−0.071	0.057	−0.061	0.034
	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.039)
Age	−0.006***	0.001	−0.007***	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	−0.096**	0.036	−0.086**	0.037
	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.024)
Political interest	0.109***	0.074**	0.100***	0.082***
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Conservatism	0.017	−0.018	0.017	−0.017
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Russia affinity	0.038	0.064*	0.036	0.076**
	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.024)
Constant	0.905***	0.558***	0.966***	0.599***
	(0.150)	(0.130)	(0.143)	(0.123)
AIC	1765.91	1514.00	1931.28	1642.71
R^2	0.23	0.20	0.23	0.21
Observations	884	874	963	944

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.17. Reduced sample: World Cup start and change of opinions about Qatar

	W/o slowest & fastest respondents							
	(1) Internationally influential	(2) Aggressive country	(3) Technologically leading	(4) Well organized	(5) Attractive travel destination	(6) Badcountry for workers	(7) Treating women as second-class citizens	(8) Dangerous for homosexuals
World Cup start	−0.041	−0.071	−0.073	0.026	−0.060	−0.011	−0.101*	−0.044
	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.042)
Football interest	0.037	−0.073**	0.055*	−0.002	0.109***	−0.061**	−0.085***	−0.052**
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Critical reports	0.094**	0.135***	−0.021	0.003	−0.117***	0.215***	0.170***	0.196***
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Born in GDR	0.114†	−0.113	0.202**	0.165**	0.196**	−0.157*	−0.112†	−0.172**
	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.061)
Migration background	0.101	−0.009	0.040	0.049	0.135†	−0.036	−0.051	−0.029
	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.082)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.063)
Male	0.001	−0.152**	−0.189***	0.218***	0.136*	−0.001	−0.112*	−0.101*
	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Age	0.001	−0.002	−0.001	0.007***	0.003	0.009***	0.008***	0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	0.035	−0.056	−0.027	0.113***	−0.053	0.075*	0.005	0.068*
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Political interest	0.132***	−0.013	0.090**	0.187***	0.060†	0.104***	0.015	0.028
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Conservatism	−0.006	−0.013	−0.016	0.009	−0.006	−0.065***	−0.038**	−0.024†
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Russia affinity	0.102***	−0.123***	0.154***	0.190***	0.237***	−0.233***	−0.223***	−0.199***
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Constant	2.106***	3.841***	2.301***	1.266***	1.685***	3.728***	4.256***	4.018***
	(0.176)	(0.187)	(0.168)	(0.173)	(0.187)	(0.167)	(0.168)	(0.166)
AIC	5066.40	5193.16	4899.03	5058.29	5304.54	4675.68	4704.53	4487.55
R^2	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.10	0.08	0.16	0.11	0.12
Observations	1756	1756	1754	1758	1756	1752	1753	1750

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.18. Reduced sample: World Cup start and change of opinions about Qatar

	W/o German match respondents							
	(1) Internationally influential	(2) Aggressive country	(3) Technologically leading	(4) Well organized	(5) Attractive travel destination	(6) Badcountry for workers	(7) Treating women as second-class citizens	(8) Dangerous for homosexuals
World Cup start	−0.046	−0.064	−0.081†	−0.002	−0.062	−0.008	−0.117**	−0.055
	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.042)
Football interest	0.036†	−0.059**	0.056**	−0.000	0.111***	−0.053**	−0.078***	−0.053**
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)
Critical reports	0.104***	0.134***	−0.010	0.012	−0.115***	0.225***	0.177***	0.212***
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Born in GDR	0.103†	−0.119†	0.190**	0.141*	0.195**	−0.171**	−0.125*	−0.173**
	(0.061)	(0.067)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.068)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.060)
Migration background	0.108	−0.008	0.040	0.066	0.119	−0.004	−0.006	0.023
	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.079)	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.063)
Male	−0.005	−0.164**	−0.200***	0.199***	0.113*	−0.012	−0.119**	−0.112*
	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Age	0.002	−0.002	−0.001	0.007***	0.001	0.011***	0.011***	0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	0.040	−0.053	−0.024	0.114***	−0.056†	0.076**	0.022	0.072*
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Political interest	0.115***	−0.005	0.086**	0.183***	0.061†	0.100***	0.008	0.028
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Conservatism	−0.005	−0.016	−0.012	0.014	−0.000	−0.071***	−0.040**	−0.031*
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Russia affinity	0.117***	−0.112***	0.181***	0.198***	0.257***	−0.223***	−0.215***	−0.190***
	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Constant	2.055***	3.754***	2.221***	1.205***	1.732***	3.586***	4.029***	3.797***
	(0.167)	(0.178)	(0.161)	(0.165)	(0.178)	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.164)
AIC	5484.36	5611.68	5302.85	5450.38	5739.15	5159.16	5186.31	5022.15
R^2	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.10	0.08	0.16	0.12	0.13
Observations	1904	1904	1903	1907	1904	1899	1901	1899

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.19. Reduced sample: World Cup start and change of opinions about world regions and countries

	W/o slowest & fastest respondents				W/o German match respondents			
	(1) Arab world	(2) Asia	(3) Western Europe	(4) United States	(5) Arab world	(6) Asia	(7) Western Europe	(8) United States
World Cup start	0.083**	−0.046	0.004	−0.048	0.084**	−0.037	−0.005	−0.038
	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.032)
Football interest	0.055***	−0.029*	−0.010	0.048**	0.060***	−0.029*	−0.009	0.047**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Critical reports	−0.055**	0.015	0.087***	−0.057**	−0.060**	0.013	0.088***	−0.052**
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Born in GDR	0.035	0.084*	−0.119**	−0.124*	0.052	0.060	−0.107**	−0.122**
	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.047)
Migration background	−0.056	0.082†	0.001	−0.156**	−0.062	0.081†	0.026	−0.160**
	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.051)
Male	−0.012	0.080*	−0.026	−0.034	−0.019	0.090**	−0.023	−0.040
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.034)
Age	−0.000	−0.002*	0.004***	−0.002†	−0.000	−0.002	0.004***	−0.002†
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.079***	0.023	0.139***	−0.082***	0.082***	0.023	0.139***	−0.075***
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Political interest	−0.032	0.040*	0.084***	−0.014	−0.028	0.034†	0.096***	−0.019
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Conservatism	−0.035***	−0.017*	0.005	0.022*	−0.039***	−0.016*	−0.001	0.019†
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Russia affinity	0.232***	0.180***	−0.076***	−0.090***	0.242***	0.181***	−0.072***	−0.080***
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.024)
Arab world affinity		0.259***	−0.028	0.125***		0.255***	−0.034	0.137***
		(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.030)		(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.029)
Asia affinity	0.290***		0.166***	0.167***	0.287***		0.175***	0.181***
	(0.027)		(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.026)		(0.025)	(0.030)
Western Europe affinity	−0.032	0.172***		0.365***	−0.039	0.180***		0.367***
	(0.030)	(0.027)		(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.025)		(0.029)
United States affinity	0.111***	0.131***	0.277***		0.122***	0.143***	0.282***	
	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.024)		(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.023)	
Constant	0.706***	0.895***	1.221***	1.292***	0.701***	0.822***	1.150***	1.211***
	(0.138)	(0.126)	(0.129)	(0.144)	(0.129)	(0.118)	(0.123)	(0.136)
AIC	3437.10	3237.54	3168.71	3651.65	3732.66	3512.06	3460.02	3957.10
R^2	0.25	0.27	0.23	0.20	0.26	0.28	0.25	0.21
Observations	1743	1743	1743	1743	1887	1887	1887	1887

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.20. Reduced sample: World Cup start and change of opinions about German media and boycott

	W/o slowest & fastest respondents				W/o German match respondents			
	(1) Freedom of expression similar to Qatar	(2) Too much criticism by media	(3) Imposition of opinion by media	(4) Boycott by politicians	(5) Freedom of expression similar to Qatar	(6) Too much criticism by media	(7) Imposition of opinion by media	(8) Boycott by politicians
World Cup start	0.119*	0.106†	0.101*	−0.117*	0.108*	0.111*	0.100*	−0.124*
	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.053)
Football interest	0.057*	0.093***	0.014	−0.132***	0.058*	0.095***	0.019	−0.128***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Critical reports	−0.203***	−0.208***	0.025	0.239***	−0.185***	−0.192***	0.020	0.238***
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.033)
Born in GDR	0.198**	0.199**	0.145*	−0.184*	0.190**	0.220**	0.132*	−0.174*
	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.065)	(0.072)
Migration background	0.132†	0.087	0.132†	−0.214*	0.118	0.068	0.133†	−0.202*
	(0.077)	(0.081)	(0.073)	(0.088)	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.071)	(0.084)
Male	−0.072	−0.053	−0.010	−0.003	−0.080	−0.058	−0.009	0.002
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.055)
Age	−0.005**	−0.003	−0.001	0.005*	−0.005**	−0.004†	−0.001	0.006**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	−0.170***	−0.083*	−0.027	0.040	−0.160***	−0.071*	−0.031	0.051
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.036)
Political interest	0.048	0.014	0.008	0.022	0.037	0.013	0.013	0.030
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.036)
Conservatism	0.089***	0.054***	0.093***	−0.061***	0.092***	0.050**	0.090***	−0.062***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Russia affinity	0.378***	0.265***	0.308***	−0.230***	0.398***	0.291***	0.291***	−0.210***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.034)
Constant	1.823***	2.089***	2.060***	3.905***	1.756***	2.072***	2.081***	3.728***
	(0.192)	(0.201)	(0.177)	(0.208)	(0.183)	(0.192)	(0.168)	(0.198)
AIC	5319.68	5461.18	5236.75	5529.45	5763.06	5924.38	5671.99	5963.15
R^2	0.17	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.17	0.10	0.09	0.10
Observations	1751	1752	1754	1760	1899	1899	1902	1909

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.21. Reduced sample: World Cup start and change of political opinions

	W/o slowest & fastest respondents				W/o German match respondents			
	(1) Professional disadvantages for women	(2) Calls for prayer from mosques	(3) Exaggerated demands from homosexuals	(4) Security threats through immigration	(5) Professional disadvantages for women	(6) Calls for prayer from mosques	(7) Exaggerated demands from homosexuals	(8) Security threats through immigration
World Cup start	0.010	−0.005	0.138*	0.118*	−0.001	−0.016	0.139*	0.117*
	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.047)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.054)
Football interest	0.005	0.078**	0.048†	0.003	−0.005	0.076**	0.065*	0.013
	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Critical reports	0.007	−0.022	−0.116**	−0.049	0.019	−0.036	−0.112**	−0.028
	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Born in GDR	−0.124†	−0.181*	0.097	0.114	−0.101	−0.146*	0.089	0.118
	(0.068)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.065)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.072)
Migration background	0.076	0.044	0.262**	−0.033	0.055	0.032	0.253**	−0.078
	(0.075)	(0.089)	(0.087)	(0.080)	(0.072)	(0.087)	(0.084)	(0.077)
Male	−0.394***	0.035	0.310***	−0.072	−0.391***	0.035	0.268***	−0.064
	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.051)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.058)
Age	0.005**	−0.007**	−0.001	0.003	0.005**	−0.009***	−0.002	0.004†
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	−0.070*	0.217***	−0.171***	−0.259***	−0.063*	0.200***	−0.152***	−0.249***
	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.036)
Political interest	−0.026	−0.015	0.107**	0.071†	−0.022	−0.003	0.099**	0.064†
	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Conservatism	−0.107***	−0.183***	0.179***	0.205***	−0.103***	−0.169***	0.177***	0.194***
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Russia affinity	−0.061†	0.121**	0.261***	0.096**	−0.025	0.129***	0.256***	0.117***
	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.034)
Constant	4.076***	3.018***	1.340***	2.149***	3.981***	3.107***	1.326***	2.052***
	(0.176)	(0.209)	(0.211)	(0.205)	(0.167)	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.194)
AIC	5071.17	5611.79	5768.01	5582.94	5493.85	6080.93	6223.17	6029.26
R^2	0.09	0.12	0.16	0.15	0.08	0.12	0.16	0.14
Observations	1756	1745	1756	1749	1904	1893	1905	1896

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.22. Watching the start of the World Cup with controls for week days (Reference category: Wednesdays)

	(1) Plan to watch (Wave 1)	(2) Reportedly watched (Wave 2)
Football interest	0.254***	0.196***
	(0.019)	(0.018)
Critical reports	−0.036	−0.035
	(0.026)	(0.021)
Born in GDR	0.119*	0.090†
	(0.057)	(0.053)
Migration background	0.212**	0.094†
	(0.070)	(0.057)
Male	−0.061	0.050
	(0.045)	(0.039)
Age	−0.006***	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.001)
Education	−0.076*	0.062*
	(0.032)	(0.028)
Political interest	0.100***	0.082***
	(0.026)	(0.024)
Conservatism	0.017	−0.015
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Russia affinity	0.035	0.073**
	(0.027)	(0.024)
Mondays	−0.011	−0.056
	(0.158)	(0.096)
Tuesdays	−0.054	−0.146
	(0.158)	(0.100)
Constant	0.947***	0.577***
	(0.227)	(0.167)
AIC	1934.46	1678.05
R^2	0.23	0.21
Observations	963	963

Note: Coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.23. World Cup start and change of opinions about Qatar with controls for week days (Reference category: Wednesdays)

	(1) Internationally influential	(2) Aggressive country	(3) Technologically leading	(4) Well organized	(5) Attractive travel destination	(6) Badcountry for workers	(7) Treating women as second-class citizens	(8) Dangerous for homosexuals
World Cup start	−0.041	−0.065	−0.080†	0.001	−0.063	−0.009	−0.111*	−0.054
	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Football interest	0.037†	−0.060**	0.056**	−0.001	0.114***	−0.056**	−0.080***	−0.054**
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)
Critical reports	0.098***	0.135***	−0.013	0.008	−0.119***	0.226***	0.175***	0.209***
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Born in GDR	0.101	−0.107	0.210***	0.126*	0.198**	−0.172**	−0.126*	−0.182**
	(0.062)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.068)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.059)
Migration background	0.105	−0.005	0.038	0.067	0.121	−0.012	−0.011	0.015
	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.079)	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.063)
Male	−0.009	−0.164**	−0.201***	0.201***	0.121*	−0.015	−0.129**	−0.118**
	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Age	0.001	−0.001	−0.000	0.007***	0.001	0.011***	0.010***	0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	0.020	−0.036	−0.011	0.096**	−0.044	0.068*	−0.001	0.041
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Political interest	0.113***	−0.003	0.086**	0.182***	0.064†	0.099***	0.008	0.026
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.028)
Conservatism	−0.009	−0.014	−0.010	0.013	−0.001	−0.070***	−0.040**	−0.031*
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Russia affinity	0.120***	−0.117***	0.178***	0.203***	0.256***	−0.223***	−0.216***	−0.188***
	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Mondays	−0.105	0.080	−0.177	−0.340**	−0.190	0.045	−0.033	−0.195*
	(0.142)	(0.127)	(0.136)	(0.130)	(0.144)	(0.114)	(0.105)	(0.087)
Tuesdays	−0.021	0.008	−0.220	−0.263*	−0.234	0.083	0.054	−0.071
	(0.145)	(0.131)	(0.139)	(0.133)	(0.147)	(0.116)	(0.107)	(0.088)
Constant	2.241***	3.633***	2.358***	1.596***	1.883***	3.565***	4.151***	4.102***
	(0.229)	(0.232)	(0.222)	(0.221)	(0.243)	(0.207)	(0.202)	(0.198)
AIC	5550.76	5667.58	5373.19	5512.11	5798.51	5211.59	5232.43	5062.04
R^2	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.10	0.08	0.16	0.12	0.14
Observations	1923	1923	1922	1926	1923	1918	1920	1918

Note: Coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.24. World Cup start and change of opinions about world regions and countries with controls for week days (Reference category: Wednesdays)

	(1) Arab world	(2) Asia	(3) Western Europe	(4) United States
World Cup start	0.084**	−0.035	−0.005	−0.038
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.032)
Football interest	0.060***	−0.029*	−0.010	0.047**
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Critical reports	−0.056**	0.008	0.091***	−0.050*
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Born in GDR	0.051	0.061	−0.116**	−0.114*
	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.047)
Migration background	−0.064	0.085†	0.025	−0.166**
	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.051)
Male	−0.020	0.090**	−0.025	−0.044
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.034)
Age	0.001	−0.002*	0.005***	−0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.092***	0.012	0.141***	−0.072**
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.025)
Political interest	−0.029	0.035†	0.091***	−0.016
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Conservatism	−0.038***	−0.017*	−0.000	0.020*
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Russia affinity	0.243***	0.180***	−0.068***	−0.084***
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.024)
Arab world affinity		0.254***	−0.033	0.138***
		(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.029)
Asia affinity	0.286***		0.175***	0.180***
	(0.026)		(0.025)	(0.030)
Western Europe affinity	−0.039	0.179***		0.365***
	(0.028)	(0.025)		(0.029)
United States affinity	0.122***	0.141***	0.280***	
	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.023)	
Mondays	0.093	−0.127†	0.024	0.128
	(0.074)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.086)
Tuesdays	0.057	−0.086	0.017	0.123
	(0.076)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.087)
Constant	0.553***	1.013***	1.125***	1.068***
	(0.161)	(0.142)	(0.145)	(0.165)
AIC	3771.91	3546.46	3499.93	4004.73
R^2	0.26	0.28	0.25	0.20
Observations	1906	1906	1906	1906

Note: Coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.25. World Cup start and change of opinions about German media and boycott with controls for week days (Reference category: Wednesdays)

	(1) Freedom of expression similar to Qatar	(2) Too much criticism by media	(3) Imposition of opinion by media	(4) Boycott by politicians
World Cup start	0.107*	0.112*	0.101*	−0.133*
	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.053)
Football interest	0.057*	0.097***	0.017	−0.130***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Critical reports	−0.192***	−0.198***	0.016	0.242***
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.033)
Born in GDR	0.183**	0.217**	0.121†	−0.166*
	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.065)	(0.072)
Migration background	0.116	0.067	0.126†	−0.208*
	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.071)	(0.084)
Male	−0.068	−0.055	−0.006	0.004
	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.056)
Age	−0.007**	−0.004†	−0.002	0.006**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	−0.175***	−0.067†	−0.057	0.046
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.040)
Political interest	0.040	0.013	0.016	0.029
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.036)
Conservatism	0.089***	0.047**	0.086***	−0.058***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Russia affinity	0.398***	0.294***	0.297***	−0.214***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.035)
Mondays	−0.516***	−0.034	−0.191	0.013
	(0.137)	(0.153)	(0.132)	(0.158)
Tuesdays	−0.465***	−0.044	−0.093	0.033
	(0.139)	(0.155)	(0.135)	(0.161)
Constant	2.352***	2.113***	2.365***	3.721***
	(0.243)	(0.262)	(0.227)	(0.268)
AIC	5816.06	5986.83	5728.73	6041.36
R^2	0.18	0.10	0.10	0.10
Observations	1918	1918	1921	1928

Note: Coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.26. Clustered standard errors: World Cup start and change of political opinions with controls for week days (Reference category: Wednesdays)

	(1) Professional disadvantages for women	(2) Calls for prayer from mosques	(3) Exaggerated demands from homosexuals	(4) Security threats through immigration
World Cup start	0.004	−0.016	0.138*	0.117*
	(0.047)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.055)
Football interest	−0.003	0.075**	0.065*	0.011
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Critical reports	0.016	−0.033	−0.115**	−0.035
	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Born in GDR	−0.090	−0.128†	0.089	0.112
	(0.064)	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.072)
Migration background	0.055	0.035	0.251**	−0.079
	(0.072)	(0.087)	(0.084)	(0.077)
Male	−0.394***	0.044	0.270***	−0.065
	(0.051)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.059)
Age	0.005**	−0.007**	−0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	−0.063†	0.245***	−0.147***	−0.272***
	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.041)
Political interest	−0.020	−0.001	0.096*	0.065†
	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Conservatism	−0.103***	−0.169***	0.175***	0.193***
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Russia affinity	−0.029	0.122***	0.257***	0.118***
	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.034)
Mondays	0.041	0.311*	−0.184	−0.219
	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.173)	(0.141)
Tuesdays	0.036	0.136	−0.197	−0.137
	(0.148)	(0.149)	(0.175)	(0.144)
Constant	3.949***	2.663***	1.518***	2.371***
	(0.232)	(0.262)	(0.281)	(0.254)
AIC	5552.74	6140.79	6297.73	6087.51
R^2	0.08	0.13	0.15	0.14
Observations	1923	1912	1924	1915

Note: Coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.27. Watching the start of the World Cup with controls for daytime (Reference category: Hours 18:00-24:00)

	(1) Plan to watch (Wave 1)	(2) Reportedly watched (Wave 2)
Football interest	0.253***	0.197***
	(0.019)	(0.018)
Critical reports	−0.037	−0.037†
	(0.026)	(0.021)
Born in GDR	0.115*	0.096†
	(0.057)	(0.053)
Migration background	0.212**	0.093
	(0.070)	(0.057)
Male	−0.063	0.027
	(0.045)	(0.039)
Age	−0.007***	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)
Education	−0.081**	0.031
	(0.030)	(0.025)
Political interest	0.100***	0.082***
	(0.026)	(0.024)
Conservatism	0.017	−0.017
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Russia affinity	0.034	0.074**
	(0.027)	(0.024)
Hours: 0:00-6:00	−0.021	0.762†
	(0.160)	(0.448)
Hours: 6:00-12:00	0.031	0.076
	(0.074)	(0.059)
Hours: 12:00-18:00	0.051	0.033
	(0.052)	(0.045)
Constant	0.935***	0.619***
	(0.147)	(0.126)
AIC	1936.23	1678.31
R^2	0.23	0.21
Observations	963	963

Note: Coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.28. World Cup start and change of opinions about Qatar with controls for daytime (Reference category: Hours 18:00-24:00)

	(1) Internationally influential	(2) Aggressive country	(3) Technologically leading	(4) Well organized	(5) Attractive travel destination	(6) Badcountry for workers	(7) Treating women as second-class citizens	(8) Dangerous for homosexuals
World Cup start	−0.039	−0.065	−0.073	0.005	−0.056	−0.011	−0.111*	−0.050
	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Football interest	0.036†	−0.059**	0.056**	−0.001	0.114***	−0.056**	−0.080***	−0.055**
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)
Critical reports	0.102***	0.132***	−0.012	0.012	−0.118***	0.226***	0.177***	0.213***
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Born in GDR	0.108†	−0.115†	0.211***	0.141*	0.199**	−0.168**	−0.121†	−0.168**
	(0.062)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.068)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.059)
Migration background	0.103	−0.003	0.034	0.066	0.120	−0.009	−0.009	0.017
	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.079)	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.063)
Male	−0.009	−0.162**	−0.215***	0.185***	0.107*	−0.011	−0.123**	−0.120**
	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Age	0.002	−0.002	−0.001	0.007***	0.001	0.011***	0.011***	0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	0.045	−0.060†	−0.019	0.117***	−0.055	0.079**	0.020	0.074*
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Political interest	0.114***	−0.005	0.087**	0.183***	0.064†	0.099***	0.008	0.026
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.028)
Conservatism	−0.008	−0.015	−0.010	0.014	−0.001	−0.070***	−0.039**	−0.030*
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Russia affinity	0.120***	−0.116***	0.179***	0.200***	0.256***	−0.225***	−0.218***	−0.192***
	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Hours: 0:00-6:00	−0.648*	0.692***	−0.408	0.072	0.138	0.414***	0.014	0.293*
	(0.329)	(0.202)	(0.362)	(0.416)	(0.386)	(0.101)	(0.157)	(0.131)
Hours: 6:00-12:00	−0.012	−0.026	0.023	0.115	0.013	0.014	−0.031	0.017
	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.080)	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.067)
Hours: 12:00-18:00	0.023	−0.063	0.043	0.089	0.010	0.023	−0.027	0.032
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.052)
Constant	2.033***	3.829***	2.175***	1.141***	1.720***	3.574***	4.063***	3.788***
	(0.170)	(0.179)	(0.167)	(0.170)	(0.183)	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.167)
AIC	5552.07	5666.58	5376.24	5518.78	5803.22	5212.92	5236.88	5070.73
R^2	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.10	0.08	0.16	0.12	0.13
Observations	1923	1923	1922	1926	1923	1918	1920	1918

Note: Coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.29. World Cup start and change of opinions about world regions and countries with controls for daytime (Reference category: Hours 18:00-24:00)

	(1) Arab world	(2) Asia	(3) Western Europe	(4) United States
World Cup start	0.085**	−0.036	−0.002	−0.040
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.032)
Football interest	0.060***	−0.028*	−0.010	0.047**
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Critical reports	−0.058**	0.010	0.092***	−0.052**
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Born in GDR	0.046	0.066†	−0.118**	−0.116*
	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.047)
Migration background	−0.064	0.085†	0.025	−0.163**
	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.051)
Male	−0.017	0.086**	−0.024	−0.037
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.034)
Age	0.000	−0.002†	0.005***	−0.002†
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.085***	0.019	0.142***	−0.074***
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Political interest	−0.029	0.035†	0.091***	−0.016
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Conservatism	−0.038***	−0.017*	−0.000	0.020*
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Russia affinity	0.244***	0.180***	−0.067***	−0.084***
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.024)
Arab world affinity		0.254***	−0.034	0.139***
		(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.029)
Asia affinity	0.285***		0.175***	0.178***
	(0.026)		(0.025)	(0.030)
Western Europe affinity	−0.039	0.179***		0.366***
	(0.028)	(0.025)		(0.029)
United States affinity	0.123***	0.140***	0.280***	
	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.023)	
Hours: 0:00-6:00	−0.020	−0.010	−0.295	0.392
	(0.306)	(0.197)	(0.220)	(0.260)
Hours: 6:00-12:00	−0.040	0.042	−0.047	−0.017
	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.052)
Hours: 12:00-18:00	−0.008	−0.006	−0.005	−0.008
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.039)
Constant	0.676***	0.863***	1.143***	1.215***
	(0.130)	(0.120)	(0.125)	(0.139)
AIC	3775.12	3550.51	3499.18	4006.40
R^2	0.26	0.27	0.25	0.20
Observations	1906	1906	1906	1906

Note: Coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.30. World Cup start and change of opinions about German media and boycott with controls for daytime (Reference category: Hours 18:00-24:00)

	(1) Freedom of expression similar to Qatar	(2) Too much criticism by media	(3) Imposition of opinion by media	(4) Boycott by politicians
World Cup start	0.122*	0.111*	0.098*	−0.137**
	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.053)
Football interest	0.057*	0.096***	0.017	−0.129***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Critical reports	−0.187***	−0.198***	0.019	0.242***
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.033)
Born in GDR	0.197**	0.218**	0.131*	−0.164*
	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.065)	(0.072)
Migration background	0.116	0.065	0.129†	−0.206*
	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.071)	(0.084)
Male	−0.091†	−0.061	−0.006	0.006
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.056)
Age	−0.006**	−0.004*	−0.001	0.006**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	−0.163***	−0.067†	−0.043	0.046
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.036)
Political interest	0.039	0.014	0.016	0.028
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.036)
Conservatism	0.090***	0.047**	0.087***	−0.058***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Russia affinity	0.396***	0.293***	0.295***	−0.215***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.035)
Hours: 0:00-6:00	0.244	−0.129	0.456*	0.459
	(0.293)	(0.259)	(0.180)	(0.426)
Hours: 6:00-12:00	0.028	0.063	0.051	0.042
	(0.079)	(0.085)	(0.078)	(0.086)
Hours: 12:00-18:00	0.017	0.058	−0.074	−0.020
	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.065)
Constant	1.776***	2.052***	2.162***	3.750***
	(0.187)	(0.195)	(0.172)	(0.200)
AIC	5831.31	5987.83	5729.37	6041.66
R^2	0.17	0.10	0.10	0.10
Observations	1918	1918	1921	1928

Note: Coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6.31. Clustered standard errors: World Cup start and change of political opinions with controls for daytime (Reference category: Hours 18:00-24:00)

	(1) Professional disadvantages for women	(2) Calls for prayer from mosques	(3) Exaggerated demands from homosexuals	(4) Security threats through immigration
World Cup start	0.013	−0.019	0.132*	0.122*
	(0.047)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.054)
Football interest	−0.003	0.075**	0.065*	0.012
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Critical reports	0.015	−0.041	−0.113**	−0.031
	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Born in GDR	−0.089	−0.142†	0.092	0.118
	(0.064)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.072)
Migration background	0.059	0.035	0.247**	−0.076
	(0.072)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.077)
Male	−0.392***	0.041	0.257***	−0.065
	(0.051)	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.058)
Age	0.005**	−0.010***	−0.002	0.004†
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	−0.056†	0.210***	−0.159***	−0.259***
	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.037)
Political interest	−0.021	−0.002	0.096*	0.065†
	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Conservatism	−0.103***	−0.171***	0.175***	0.194***
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Russia affinity	−0.031	0.122***	0.257***	0.118***
	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Hours: 0:00-6:00	0.722***	0.552	−0.199	0.166
	(0.164)	(0.639)	(0.404)	(0.364)
Hours: 6:00-12:00	−0.111	0.030	0.172†	−0.054
	(0.075)	(0.088)	(0.093)	(0.087)
Hours: 12:00-18:00	0.026	0.120†	0.007	−0.117†
	(0.058)	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.065)
Constant	3.970***	3.050***	1.361***	2.159***
	(0.170)	(0.203)	(0.204)	(0.198)
AIC	5547.04	6147.37	6296.37	6089.00
R^2	0.09	0.12	0.16	0.14
Observations	1923	1912	1924	1915

Note: Coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

A.7 Plausibility checks

This section offers results from three tests that provide in-depth evidence on how the start of the World Cup increased people's criticisms of German media.

1) **Search terms on Google.** The aim of this check is twofold: i) to assess whether people in Germany were aware of the World Cup, the host nation Qatar, and the opening ceremony, ii) to provide further suggestive evidence that the start of the World Cup triggered negative sentiments about German media. To this end, the plausibility check exploits the popularity of search terms on Google to scrutinize which topics were on the minds of German inhabitants around the World Cup. The idea is that the opening ceremony and game of the World Cup and the accompanying backlash against German media should be reflected in what words Germans used when googling.

   We draw on Google Trends, which offers daily information on the popularity of top search queries in Google Search, ranging from 0 to 100. Higher values indicate higher popularity. In line with our research design and the main analysis, we limit the analysis to Germany and the time period from 14 November 2022, which marks the start day of survey Wave 1, to 23 November 2022, which denotes the end of survey Wave 2. We conduct the analysis for two types of search terms. First, we track the popularity of search terms that are closely associated with the World Cup but are neutral in sentiment. Terms include *Football World Cup* ("fussball-weltmeisterschaft"), *Qatar* ("katar"), and *Opening ceremony + ZDF* ("eröffnungsfeier zdf"). The last search term includes ZDF ("Second German Television"), the German public-service television broadcaster which covered the opening ceremony and game on the first World Cup day. Second, we track the popularity of search terms that may indicate critical sentiments toward German media. Terms include *Hypocrisy* ("heuchelei"), *One-sided reporting* ("einseitige berichterstattung"), and *Lying press* ("lügenpresse"). The last search term is particularly pejorative and disparaging. Used by Joseph Goebbels during the Nazi dictatorship, the term is used to accuse German mainstream media of heavy political bias, manipulation, propaganda, and the spreading of fake news.

   Figure A.7.1 shows the results of the first plausibility check. As expected, *Football World Cup* (Panel a, top panel) steadily gained popularity after the World Cup had started on 20 November. A similar pattern is visible for *Qatar* (Panel a, middle panel). Popularity spiked on the first Cup day and remained high. As expected this is different for *Opening ceremony + ZDF*, which people searched for on the day of the World Cup start only. Together, the results suggest that people in Germany engaged with the World Cup and the opening ceremony.

   Figure A.7.1 also demonstrates how the start of the World Cup triggered strong skepticism toward German media. The search terms *Hypocrisy* and *One-sided reporting* noticeably spiked on the day of the World Cup start and right after it. This is also the case for the particularly disparaging search term *Lying press*. In line with the findings of the survey analysis, the results suggest that the World Cup start generated strong skepticism towards and rejection of German mass media.

2) **Media criticism on Twitter.** The aim of this check is to provide further evidence on how the coverage of the World Cup start by German media triggered strong criticism among viewers. To capture such criticism, we rely on Twitter as a data source that allows timely access to immediate public sentiments about the media

coverage of the World Cup start. The idea is that people, upset by the gloomy German media coverage of the World Cup in contrast to the shiny pictures of the first day of the tournament, take their criticism directly to the media outlets perceived to be biased and unfair. To this end, we identified the two Twitter accounts of the sports shows ("Sportschau" and "Sportstudio") of the two German public-service television broadcasters ARD ("Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland") and ZDF ("Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen"). We then checked all replies to Tweets by the shows' social media teams on the first and second day (20 and 21 November) of the World Cup.

Table A.7.1 shows the results of the systematic search of Twitter replies. As can be seen from the selection of translated replies, many viewers expressed strong negative sentiments and heavy politicized criticism of how German media covered the World Cup opening. Among other things, individuals labeled the coverage of the opening ceremony "a joke" or "one-sided." Others claim that the journalists engaged in "propaganda" or "fake news." Some users seem to generalize their impressions of the reporting to the German public broadcasters as such. One Twitter user concludes: "I now believe that the media are manipulating us." Another one advocates to "boycott the public broadcasters because of the wc [World Cup]." As we suggest in the main text, the reason for such outbursts seems to be the perceived mismatch between the glamorous images and the harsh criticism by the commentators on live television, as one person put it: "What a cool opening event and what a stupid over-moralizing babble."

Many Twitter users express their criticism by implicitly or explicitly putting the coverage in perspective to their perceptions of domestic politics. While some call the reporting "hypocritical" or "self-righteous," others are more concrete either by accusing the broadcaster of applying "double standards" or by demanding to focus on own domestic problems and (social) injustices first, before attacking other countries. For example, one user argues that "we have hundreds of thousands of homeless people here, we need food banks so that people don't starve, so much for human rights, you don't have to discuss #Qatar." Another one pleads that "as long as there isn't a single active gay footballer in our own country" who dares to come out, "we shouldn't be so presumptuous as to point fingers at other countries."

A group of commentators even goes full circle by directly connecting the reporting to political actors and government policies. For example, one person shares his seemingly confirmed skepticism about liberal immigration policies: "ZDF complains about an Islamic country, but has been propagating unchecked immigration of exactly this backward image of society to our country for years. Or do you think immigrants throw away homophobia as they throw away their passports?" Another user reports feeling "like in a left-green agitation seminar," referring to the colors associated with the coalition parties in government. Finally, one person even feels reminded of the conditions under the former East German socialist dictatorship: "I could only throw up at so much self-righteousness. But, I remember, this attitude was also suggested to me many years ago: 'My place of work - my place to fight for peace'. That was before 89 in the GDR."

3) **Dynamic of media backlash on Twitter.** The third and final check complements the previous analysis of selected critical replies on Twitter. It zooms in on the media backlash dynamic by taking a closer look at the temporal development of different

sentiments on the opening day of the tournament. To this end, we analyze all replies (N=54) to one specific Tweet posted by ZDF Sportstudio (see the top of Table A.7.1). Note that the ZDF exclusively broadcasted the opening ceremony and the opening match on German public TV. We focus on the responses to this tweet for two reasons. First, Sportstudio posted the Tweet on the morning of the first tournament day (9:30 am, 20 November 2022), while the broadcast of the opening ceremony itself started at 3:30 pm that day. This allows us to compare the distribution of sentiments in the replies before and after the broadcast started. Second, the content of the Tweet is neutral in tone, simply announcing the upcoming broadcasting in the afternoon. Consequently, the tweet gives little cause for criticism. The actual show in the afternoon featured a moderator, two former soccer players, and the head of Human Rights Watch Germany.

To compare the sentiments before and after the broadcast of the opening ceremony started, we use the timestamp of the replies. We then manually code the contents of each of the replies into one of the three exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories: "uncritical," "critical of the tournament," or "critical of critical reporting." Manual coding is necessary since some Tweets contain pictures or emojis. For a user's reply to be coded "uncritical," the content of the message must not exhibit any political undertone or criticism. Typically, replies in this category express users' thrill of anticipation of the World Cup start and the upcoming matches, or their support for a national team. Replies categorized as "critical of the tournament" must feature explicit criticism of the tournament, FIFA as the sports federation in charge, or Qatar's role as a host, including its lack of human rights or civil liberties. Finally, for replies to be coded as "critical of critical reporting," users need to voice their disapproval of the media's critical coverage of either the tournament or the political situation in Qatar.

As shown in Figure A.7.2, the pattern in the sentiments expressed in the replies markedly changed once the broadcast of the opening ceremony began. Before the broadcast, the vast majority of responses criticized the allegedly corrupt FIFA, Qatar's human rights abuses, or called for a general boycott of the World Cup (often using the hashtag #BoycottQatar). In contrast, these voices went almost entirely silent during and after the opening ceremony. Instead, almost all of the responding users (over 80%) complained about the critical reporting, which they felt was hypocritical and misplaced. Together, the critical replies by Twitter users indicate how the opening World Cup might have changed opinions and perceptions in the German population, triggering doubts about the integrity of the country's democratic media rather than the autocratic host regime.

Overall, the three plausibility checks suggest that the World Cup start reduced trust in German public broadcasters among parts of the audience and triggered some individuals to update their beliefs about German domestic politics. These results offer tentative support for the plausibility of our findings. In Germany, the critical reporting about the political conditions in Qatar—the autocratic host nation of the 2022 FIFA World Cup—might have heightened public skepticism about the reliability of domestic media and politics.

Figure A.7.1. Patterns in google search terms



Note: Graph shows popularity of words used in Google searchers in Germany between 14 and 23 November 2022. Data stem from Google Trends (https://trends.google.de/trends/).

Table A.7.1. Twitter replies (Emojis omitted, highlighting added by the authors)

Original tweet	Reply	Link
@sportstudio (Nov 20, 9:30 am): *The time has come: Today the World Cup begins in Qatar. From 17:00 the hosts will meet Ecuador in the opening game. We show the game live on ZDF and in the stream*	Just tell #belarethy to **concentrate on the opening ceremony and not all this nonsense of #HumanRights**. It is now time for football.	https://twitter.com/beeoohbee111/status/1594345177225007107
	"**Your coverage of the opening ceremony is really a joke.** It's all about the human rights debate - it's now World Cup! If you, the media, were really serious about criticizing it, then you shouldn't be broadcasting it at all. But you take the advertising revenue with you."	https://twitter.com/docco_de/status/1594352225391984640
	"Seriously...I'm sitting here with my son and nothing has come up about football...then let it be...everything is only being politicized by you guys...**we'd better see what's queer going on in our country**...have now switched it off with you and watch now with the streaming service!"	https://twitter.com/OliverWeg/status/1594351613304602625
	"Is there also a transmission without **all this whining?** Want to see football and not hear all the things you don't like."	https://twitter.com/thedisc2014/status/1594351258453905415
	"**ZDF complains about an Islamic country, but has been propagating unchecked immigration of exactly this backward image of society to our country for years.** Or do you think immigrants throw away homophobia as they throw away their passports?"	https://twitter.com/Captain_Gerri/status/1594350951028113410
	"**What a cool opening event and what a stupid over-moralizing babble**, what's a human whatever bloke doing in a football show, will I now have to endure this in the Bundesliga too? Picture and sound will be turned back on again only when the game starts!"	https://twitter.com/ReichardtUlrich/status/1594353174332297225?s=20
	"Finally the ball is rolling, so stop with your political shit. **You make the World Cup a political stage.**"	https://twitter.com/ESinanagic/status/1594348713593667584
	"We have **hundreds of thousands of homeless people here**, we need **food banks** so that people don't starve, so much for human rights, **you don't have to discuss #Qatar. That's enough. #hypocrite** #WM #Quatar2022"	https://twitter.com/um72de/status/1594351733492547585?s=20
	"Feels like I'm in a **left-green agitation seminar**"	https://twitter.com/fallbeil5/status/1594352128826347520?s=20
	"I want to watch football, not a human rights talk show. Please process the topic with Lanz or in the Heutejournal. The show is called #SPORTstudio Talk about the sport, or give the rights to someone else if you don't want them. **It sucks.** #zdf #wm2022"	https://twitter.com/magnus_magnetus/status/1594352730814185472

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Table A.7.1 – *Continued from previous page*

Original tweet	Reply	Link
@sportschau (Nov 20, 8:39 pm): *Losing interest quickly: Many Qatari fans left the stadium minutes before the final whistle in the opening game against Ecuador. Empty ranks instead of World Cup mood?*	"Do you actually have your own content team—which works for **permanent host bashing?** Anyway it works"	https://twitter.com/bertel_de/status/1594404456577179650
	"I love the **one-sided reporting** that was more important than analyzing the game itself first"	https://twitter.com/AliDresslein/status/1594415264602656773
	"In Hoffenheim, Wolfsburg or Leipzig that doesn't bother you either. Reputable journalists would at least mention the minutes of play. It already looks like **propaganda**"	https://twitter.com/fseiter214/status/1594409235261145089
@sportschau (Nov 20, 10:46 pm): *"Signs against the World Cup in Qatar: people in Herne (NRW) have put up around 20,000 grave candles in the stadium at Strünkede Castle to commemorate the guest workers who died during the construction of the World Cup stadiums."*	"The mortality rate in Germany is currently 11.8 people per 10,000 inhabitants. In 2021 alone there were 1,023,723 deaths. But science teaches us to always look for the reason. 20k deaths? Where did you get that number from? stop with your **#Qatarphobia**"	https://twitter.com/dalo_joe/status/1594784958945832960
	"When Russia organized the 2018 World Cup, it was simultaneously bombing Syrian cities, killing thousands, and we didn't hear your criticism at the time... **Damn this hypocrisy!**"	https://twitter.com/milad_Alemam/status/1594664855528685570
	"This is so Germany! One should **put the own house in order first** #Moral"	https://twitter.com/RiSe03881337/status/1594776187221716992?s=20
	"'Uncovering grievances in the country' - where do you get the chutzpah to huff and puff about everything that doesn't correspond to your woke zeitgeist elsewhere. You really stand **in the tradition of 'the world should improve from the German essence'** + 'Today GER is ours, tomorrow the whole world'."	https://twitter.com/USchuergers/status/1594813328995516416
	"You're **annoying** with the **Qatar bashing**."	https://twitter.com/General_Alicio/status/1594603479728889856?s=20
	"Clown country. No country in the world has a more **hypocritical double standard** than the Rainbowland. Anything can happen here with the workers, taxpayers and locals, it doesn't matter... you accept everything. But on the other side of the world, you can point your finger at it!"	https://twitter.com/K_Low91/status/1594792791913144335?s=20
	"**Boycott the public broadcasters** because of the wc"	https://twitter.com/KlausHettrich1/status/1594568949383008258?s=20
	"When I quote someone who is telling a lie, I am inevitably spreading the lie and contributing to **fake news**. That's exactly what you do with the 20k deaths/candles!"	https://twitter.com/dalo_joe/status/1594789371789582340?s=20

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Table A.7.1 – *Continued from previous page*

Original tweet	Reply	Link
	"Sportschau? How many guest workers or slaves died in Germany and Europe? **Foul colonialist countries!** Stick to SPORT"	https://twitter.com/IPorzo/status/1594464800754597888?s=20
@sportstudio (Nov 21, 10:32 am): *The #FIFA has banned the wearing of the "One Love" captain's armband. At the USA vs Wales game, ZDF commentator Claudia #Neumann wore a t-shirt and an armband in rainbow colors.*	"We're just so embarrassing. self-promoter! At some point things don't get any better. **I now believe that the media are manipulating us.** Other subjects straight into oblivion. We are also to blame for the QUATAR issue. ARD AND ZDF as well, the main thing is that the ratings are great."	https://twitter.com/ALEKS75844441/status/1594808930844155935
	"Not Qatar, you are the reason why I don't follow the World Cup with the Germans !! We know about Qatar, and **hypocritical Germany** too!"	https://twitter.com/ZolRano/status/1594837717115981824?s=20
	"**I could only throw up at so much self-righteousness. But, I remember, this attitude was also suggested to me many years ago: "My place of work - my place to fight for peace". That was before 89 in the GDR.**"	https://twitter.com/FritzKummer2/status/1594944884762451968?s=20
	"**As long as there isn't a single active gay footballer in our own country, we shouldn't be so presumptuous as to point fingers at other countries.** Why don't we put our own house in order first?!"	https://twitter.com/Su52481999/status/1594812818364465152?s=20
	"Ever since the World Cup was awarded, the public broadcasters knew about the grievances, and **for 12 years they had time to report and condemn it!**"	https://twitter.com/IngoRehme/status/1594886948828635139?s=20

Figure A.7.2. Twitter replies in response to broadcast announcement by German TV (ZDF) on day of World Cup start



Note: Graph shows sentiments in replies before as compared to during and after the broadcast of the opening ceremony on the day of the World Cup start. The broadcast by the ZDF started at 3:30 pm, on 20 November 2022.

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