Online Appendix

For: "The Cornered Mouse: Sanctioned Elites and Authoritarian Realignment in the Japanese Legislature, 1936-1942."

Makoto Fukumoto



Figure A1: Difference-in-differences graph for sanctioned sectors: (95%CI)

Online Appendix A: Event Study Graphs for Economic Sanction



Figure A2: Pro-army attitude in various sanction-hit sectors



Figure A3: Placebo: Pro-army attitude in various unaffected (non-tradable) sectors



Figure A4: Placebo: Pro-army attitude in various unaffected (not heavily traded) sectors



Figure A5: Sectors that are not categorized as ”Sanctioned” but show similar trends



Figure B1: Event Study Graph for Procured Firms

Online Appendix B: Event Study Graphs for Procurement



Figure B2: Event Study Graph for Legislators Tied to Procured Industrial Firms Compared to Industrial Firms without Procurement Contracts



Figure B3: Pro-Army Attitude in Procured Sectors



Figure B4: Pro-Army Attitude in Potentially Procured Sectors

Online Appendix C: Event Study Graphs for Robustness Checks



Figure C1: Pro-army Attitude with (Potentially) Ideological Factors

Online Appendix D: Robustness Checks; Subsample Difference-in-Differences Analysis

Table D1 presents subset analyses of the main difference-in-differences specification. The first column uses only parliamentary factions, and the second uses only legislative actions as outcome variables. Models employ different treatment periods. Results remain consistent and statistically significant, with magnitudes comparable to the main specification. Columns 3 and 4 incorporate the Ministry of Interior's Grading of Incumbent Legislators (January 16, 1942) and a record of parliamentary questions criticizing the army's actions in China (March 31, 1937). As these reflect either external evaluations or non-democratic criteria, they are excluded from the main models but included here. Results remain stable.

Table D1: Summary of DiD Results: Sanctions - Changing Dependent Variables

Dependent Variable	Model 1 Factions Only	Model 2 Legislation Only	Model 3	Model 4 Adding Two Extra Events
Treatment Period		post 1940.9		post 1941.7
Post-Sanction × Sanctioned	0.197**	0.111*	0.161***	0.130**
Legislator-clustered SE	(0.060)	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.040)
Dropped events in 1940.9-41.7				X
FE: Events	X	X	X	X
FE: Legislators	X	X	X	X
Num.Obs.	2113	2720	5739	5092
R2	0.587	0.507	0.479	0.473
R2 Adj.	0.331	0.363	0.391	0.371
Note:				*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table D2 reports additional subset analyses. The first two models exclude either socialist or socialist-leaning legislators, or those elected from Tokyo's seven districts. A third model excludes legislators with cabinet experience prior to 1936, while the last model restricts the sample to those holding business board memberships. Across all specifications, results remain positive and statistically significant.

Table D2: Summary of Subset DiD Results: Sanctions

Subset	Excluding Socialist Legislators	Excluding Tokyo Districts	Excluding Former Cabinet Members before 1936	Business Executive Only
Dependent Variable	Pro-Army, Anti-Democratic Actions			
Post-Sanction × Sanctioned	0.117**	0.131**	0.126**	0.122**
Legislator-clustered SE	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.041)
FE: Events	X	X	X	X
FE: Legislators	X	X	X	X
Num.Obs.	4424	4510	4005	3251
R2	0.525	0.488	0.484	0.516
R2 Adj.	0.424	0.382	0.370	0.412
Note:				*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Online Appendix E: Robustness Checks: Geographic Distribution of the Sanctioned, Procured Legislators, as well as pro-army legislators in 1937/42



Figure E1: Share of Sanctioned, Procured, and Pro-Army Legislators across Legislative Districts

Online Appendix F: Balance Tests

Figure F1 presents the balance test of 76th to 79th Diet sessions, showing that both the sanctioned and procured groups exhibited statistically significant inclinations to support or oppose legislator-tabled bills in only one out of ten instances when the legislation did not pertain to democracy or the military. Legislators from sanctioned sectors showed a slight inclination to support l2, the Farmland Nationalization Bill tabled on January 24, 1942. Similarly, legislators from procured sectors demonstrated higher support for l5, the Proposal to Enhance Apprentice Training, tabled on November 19, 1941. Given the context of these sectors'circumstances, it is understandable that procurement sectors would support training policies, while sanctioned sectors would favor nationalization.

These findings align with expectations and indicate that neither the sanctioned nor procured groups acted uniformly in the post-sanction era of Japan. This nuanced behavior underscores the lack of unified voting patterns among legislators connected to these sectors.

Figure F2 presents the density plot by age group. Neither the procured nor sanctioned sectors exhibit a skewed distribution of year of birth.



Figure F1: T-test for all the legislator-tabled legislation and proposals in 77th, 78th, and 79th Diet: Procured or Sanctioned



Figure F2: Density Plot: Year of Birth

Online Appendix G: Lack of Partisanship in Legislative Activities: 76th to 79th Diet Sessions (1940-42)

Political parties in prewar Japan, as discussed in the main text, were characterized by weak discipline and internal fragmentation. Pro-army attitudes in 1937 and 1942 also did not align with former party affiliations. However, one might hypothesize that the legacy of party socialization could have influenced legislative activities, as former party members might maintain connections even after the parties were dissolved.

Figures G1 and G2 present network analyses of legislators who co-sponsored or co-endorsed the same legislative proposals during the 76th, 77th, 78th, and 79th parliaments (1940–1942). Each node represents a legislator. Following the dissolution of political parties in 1940, the two former major parties appear to have had minimal influence on legislators' relationships in legislative activities.

These results confirm that partisanship did not significantly shape the actions of most legislators regarding their engagement with democratic backsliding.



Figure G1: Former Seiyūkai (Conservative) Legislators: Black



Figure G2: Former Minseitō (Liberal) Legislators: Black

Online Appendix H: Lasso Regression for 1942 Army Endorsements

One of the primary challenges of this research stems from the dataset's characteristics, which include a large number of variables (over 400) relative to the limited number of units per period (fewer than 1,100). This imbalance could increase the risk that some variables may appear statistically significant purely by random chance.

While the use of difference-in-differences with two-way fixed effects as the main specification significantly mitigates concerns about random significance, issues of overfitting and multicollinearity among variables remain. To address these concerns, Lasso regression is an appropriate and effective method. Lasso regression results can be used to assess the relative importance of different variables in predicting outcomes. This section highlights the most significant variables influencing pro-army attitudes in 1937 and 1942, providing a basis for further discussion and analysis about the importance of the main results.

Lasso can perform variable selection by shrinking some coefficients to exactly zero, effectively removing irrelevant features from the model. It enhances prediction accuracy by preventing overfitting, especially in models with a large number of predictors such as this case. It can handle multicollinearity by selecting among correlated variables, retaining the most important ones.

Lasso (Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator) regression is a linear regression technique that introduces a penalty term to the objective function to enforce sparsity in the model. The objective function for Lasso is:

$$\hat{\beta}^{\text{lasso}} = \arg\min_{\beta} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(y_i - \beta_0 - \sum_{j=1}^{p} \beta_j x_{ij} \right)^2 + \lambda \sum_{j=1}^{p} |\beta_j| \right)$$

where:

- y_i is the response variable,
- x_{ij} are the predictor variables,
- β_j are the coefficients,
- $\lambda \geq 0$ is the tuning parameter controlling the strength of the penalty.

The L_1 penalty $\lambda \sum_{j=1}^{p} |\beta_j|$ forces some coefficients to be exactly zero, leading to a sparse model that performs variable selection.

I applied Lasso regression to the dataset concerning the 1942 army endorsements. Out of 549 predictors, Lasso regression preserved 26 key predictors that were associated with more than 1% of legislators. Notably, the "economic sanction" variable as well as some procured or sanctioned sectors were retained through the penalization process. Table H1 suggests that these factors are indeed critical, rather than incidental, in predicting pro- or anti-army stances during this period. Table H2 presents the results of the same analysis applied to the 1937 election, retaining only six variables. As the industrial union served as a catch-all interest group encompassing various businesses, none of the sector-specific variables appear to strongly influence pro-army attitudes in 1937.

predictor	Lasso coefficient
Petrochemical Business	0.209112171
Studied in China	0.189925752
Worked at Ministry of Industry	0.167743668
Chief Reporter	0.156198965
Welfare Institution	0.151067902
Coal Mining	0.139757851
Welfare Interest Group	0.135848906
Construction League (Real estate)	0.134083787
Retail	0.131904018
Sanctioned	0.116420344
Career in Manchuria	0.116367857
Credit Union	0.082674104
Governor	0.075610722
Plank	0.07530458
Steel	0.073098367
Lieutenant	0.06197516
Imperial University Graduate	0.049498457
Agricultural Union	0.045508601
General in Military	0.044056351
Keio University Graduate	0.034124217
Bank	0.024270089
Cadet School Graduate	0.0218861
Secretary to Politicians	0.020530973
Elite Bureaucrat	0.015724306
Non-steel Metal Industry	-0.002570235
Kwansei Gakuin University Graduate	-0.002620796
Nihon University Graduate	-0.009868266
Judge	-0.015733836
Literature Degree	-0.016082949
Pharmaceutical	-0.080212524
Land Cultivation Union	-0.083378639
Doctor	-0.15438007
Automobile	-0.2464697
Public Sector Job	-0.248889943
Prosecutor	-0.249994056
Peasant Union	-0.38985596
Labor Union	-0.772036389

Table H1: 37 out of 549 predictors chosen by Lasso Regression for Army Endorsements in 1942

predictor	Lasso coefficient
Editor	0.07193548
Colonial Business	0.03389578
Kyoto University Graduate	0.02505424
Worked at Tokyo Asahi Newspaper	0.02183653
From Miyazaki Prefecture	0.01539855
Industrial Union	-0.02130418

Table H2: 6 out of 549 predictors chosen by Lasso Regression for Pro-Army Factions in 1937

Online Appendix I: Photocopy of Archival Materials (Sample)



Figure I2: *Details of Jinji Koshinroku 14th Edition (1943)*.



Figure I3: A page from *Kabushiki Nenkan* (1942)



Figure I4: *A page from Army Designated Factories and Plants List (1942)*.



Figure I5: A page from Endorsement List of Parliamentary Motions, Proposals, and Questions (1937)



Figure I1: *A page from Jinji Koshinroku 14th Edition (1943)*.



Figure I6: *A page from Parliamentary Minutes: Roll Call (1938)*.

Online Appendix J: Graphs for: Profile of Legislators





Figure J1: Background of the Legislators 1936-42 (%)



Figure J2: *Business Board Membership of the Legislators (>30 Legislators; %)*



Figure J3: *Business Board Membership of the Legislators. (10-30 Legislators; %)*

Online Appendix K: Detailed Accounts of the 10 Events Analyzed in the Paper

1937.3.22 Resolution 70-11/-12 to Exterminate Human Rights Violations following 2-26 Coup

After the failed coup by army officers in February 1936, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) faced widespread criticism from legislators. In response, the IJA intensified its anti-democratic rhetoric, framing itself as the protector of national integrity against a purportedly corrupt political system. The newly formed Hirota cabinet, led by diplomat Hirota Kōki, yielded to military pressure. Consequently, the army secured veto power over cabinet formation, enacted new censorship laws, and implemented martial law, granting the army influence over police actions.

In October 1936, a leaked army reform plan proposed restricting suffrage, abolishing impeachment mechanisms, and weakening parliamentary oversight, directly threatening democracy. Legislators countered by blocking key military-backed bills, including those on military secrecy and electricity nationalization, while independently passing several of their own.[23]

Resolutions 70-11 and 70-12, both addressing human rights violations, were submitted by two separate parliamentary groups and later merged into a single resolution during the legislative process, receiving overwhelming support. Resolution 70-11 condemned the use of violence by police and prosecutors and criticized the army's implementation of martial law. Resolution 70-12 explicitly warned that political freedom was under threat, with a particular focus on the suppression of social groups and government interference in freedom of thought.

1937 Resolutions	Endorsed either (0)	Not endorsed (1)
Attended	443	36

By the time the resolutions were passed, the Hirota Cabinet had already fallen, but the succeeding Hayashi Cabinet continued to implement Hirota's policies.

[23] Teikoku Gikaishi, vol.26, 457.

1937.4.30. The 1937 General Election and Anti-Army Majority

The fall of the Hirota Cabinet in February 1937 was driven by escalating tensions between the army and the Diet. Despite parliamentary demands for a moderate figure, General Ugaki, to form a cabinet, the army blocked his appointment by refusing to provide an army minister, as required by the stipulation that the position must be held by an active-duty officer. By leveraging this veto power, revived under Hirota, the army ensured that no officer could serve in a cabinet without its approval.[24]

In response, the Army General Staff selected General Senjuro Hayashi as Prime Minister and proposed sweeping reforms to centralize state power and diminish parliamentary authority. The cabinet completely excluded parliamentarians and was supported by army staff, including Colonel Kanji Ishiwara. These reforms included the creation of the Ministry of General Affairs and the National Planning Agency, granting the army significant control over the economy and social policy while severely limiting parliamentary oversight.[25]

Major political parties opposed these reforms, refusing to bring the proposal to the parliamentary floor. While pro-army factions within the major parties and smaller fascist groups supported the reforms, they were in the minority. In retaliation, General Hayashi dissolved the Diet, citing the need to punish obstructionist members. The prewar Diet frequently preferred legislative sabotage over direct confrontation when faced with anti-democratic initiatives from the government. Pro-Hayashi legislators from major parties split off to join far-right parties or ran as independents.

The 1937 general election proved disastrous for Hayashi's allies, who secured only 40 out of 466 seats. In contrast, anti-Hayashi politicians dominated the parliament, winning 354 seats. Consequently, General Hayashi resigned just 123 days after taking office.

1937 Election	Pro-Army (1)	Anti-Army (0)
Elected	40	426
Incumbent Lost	33	82

[24] Teikoku Gikaishi, vol.26, 460.
[25] Teikoku Gikaishi, vol.27, 335.

1938.2.21-3.4. Legislation 73-19/-20 Prosecutor Office Bill; Court Composition Bill

Prince Fumimaro Konoe assumed office following General Hayashi and established a new cabinet, appointing ministers from the Diet. At this stage, the political parties exhibited limited discipline, but Konoe effectively gained the support of the Diet by accommodating influential parliamentarians through cabinet appointments.

On July 7, 1937, the Japanese army in China initiated a unilateral military campaign against the Republic of China without prior approval from Tokyo. While initially hesitant, Prime Minister Konoe retroactively endorsed the army's actions after their initial success.

In this 73rd parliament, Konoe advocated for the "one nation, one party" principle. While the failure of this fascist initiative led to his resignation in early 1938, it also heightened concerns among many legislators about military overreach, comparable to executive aggrandizement.[26]

Legislation 73-19, the Prosecutor Office Bill, and Legislation 73-20, the Court Composition Bill, were introduced by legislators not aligned with Konoe during the same month that the General Mobilization Bill was being debated.

Legislation 73-19 sought to limit the influence of the Ministry of Justice over the Prosecutors' Office and to curtail the power of the Prosecutors' Office over regional courts. Legislation 73-20 strengthened the Supreme Court's authority to oversee regional courts, thereby reinforcing judicial independence against executive interference. Both pieces of legislation reflected a strong condemnation of the executive's encroachment on the judiciary and the erosion of checks and balances. Both passed the house with a comfortable majority with bipartisan support.

1938 Legislations	Endorsed either (0)	Not endorsed (1)
Attended	291	171

1939.3.11. Legislation 74-28/-29/-30/-31 Amendments to Code of Criminal Procedure

After Prince Konoe's resignation following his failed attempt to unify all political parties, former Prosecutor General Kiichiro Hiranuma became prime minister. Concerns about the suppression of dissent expressed in Resolution 70-11/-12 in 1937 resurfaced, as Hiranuma, though opposed

[26] Teikoku Gikaishi, vol.32, 167.

to war with the United States, was known for his hawkish stance against criticism of the government, socialism, or liberalism (Masumi 1985).

Legislation 74-28, 74-29, 74-30, and 74-31 were introduced to prohibit unwarranted detention of citizens by police and prosecutors. These bills were unprecedented and notable, as four separate groups of legislators submitted identical amendments, each with the same preamble, demonstrating a united front against executive overreach.

The preamble of these bills emphasized the importance of upholding Article 23 of the Imperial Japanese Constitution and referenced widespread public anger against arbitrary detention. As detentions were frequently used against anti-government social groups and critical intellectuals, these amendments represented a clear pro-democratic stance. While the army was not explicitly mentioned, its growing influence over the police and prosecution following the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War increasingly jeopardized the rule of law.

1939 Legislations	Endorsed either (0)	Not endorsed (1)
Attended	293	166

1939.5.30. Split of Major Parties in 1939

Following disagreements over the General Mobilization Bill and Konoe's proposal to unify all political parties, the major parties fractured into pro-army and anti-army factions, ceasing to function as unified entities. Compared to the more nuanced positions on general mobilization, attitudes toward the army were more clearly divided.

Both the Nakajima faction within Seiyukai and the Yanai faction within Minseito allied with the army, adopting a stance critical of party politics and parliamentary democracy. Additionally, a small national socialist wing of the Socialist People's Party shifted toward a pro-army stance after the passage of the General Mobilization Bill (cf. Tsurumi 2010). While the formation of these groups was relatively gradual following earlier events in 1938 and personal connections played a significant role, the growing factionalism within parties began to take on clear pro- or anti-democratic connotations as party discipline broke down. This period also witnessed significant political realignment.

The coding is based on May 30, 1939, and cross-referenced with the Ministry of Interior's

grading of incumbent legislators.

1939 Parliamentary Factions	Pro-Army (1)	Anti-Army or Neutral (0)
Membership	191	260

1940.2.3: Motion 75-1 to refer Rep. Takao Saitō to the disciplinary committee.

Anti-communist Hiranuma resigned after the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact undermined the Anti-Comintern Pact, and Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai succeeded him as Prime Minister. Yonai adopted a pro-parliament stance, reinstating parliamentary undersecretaries to increase the Diet's representation in the Cabinet. He opposed war with the United States and the United Kingdom, but his cabinet significantly increased taxes to fund the ongoing war in China, which had become a quagmire by this point (Berger 1977).

In March 1940, Takao Saito, a seasoned parliamentarian who had previously voiced his opposition to the General Mobilization Bill in 1938, delivered a vehement parliamentary speech that sharply criticized the rationale behind the war in China. The army strongly condemned his speech and demanded Saito's expulsion from the Diet. Despite Saito's refusal to voluntarily resign, a vote was held to decide his expulsion from the Diet, with pro-army politicians taking the lead as Prime Minister Admiral Yonai refrained from intervening.[27]

The expulsion motion garnered a majority of votes in favor, with only seven votes against Saito's expulsion. Notably, however, a significant minority of parliamentarians abstained from the vote, expressing their opposition to the very idea of expulsion. Saito would later make a return to the Diet after winning a seat in the 1942 election.

The exact list of those who voted for the motion or abstained is unknown, but the motion to refer Saito to the disciplinary committee already had a substantial number of endorsements that signals the passage of the motion, and the list of the endorsers is used for coding.

Motion to Expel Takao Saito	Endorsed (1)	Not Endorsed (0)
Attended	183	264

[27] Teikoku Gikaishi, vol.38, 176.

1940.10.11: Formation of Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA) and Dokokai / Koua Domei

The Yonai Cabinet was toppled by the army, which refused to appoint a Minister of Army, leading to its replacement by the second and third Konoe Cabinets. Konoe's government subsequently signed the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Konoe renewed his push for a unified government under the justification of a national emergency.

In 1940, the third Konoe Cabinet dissolved all political parties in Japan, deeming them obstacles to effective wartime governance. Supported by both the army and the Ministry of Interior, this move marked a decisive shift toward centralized political control. There was little resistance, as every parliamentary group included members who aligned with Konoe's vision.[28]

To replace the disbanded parties, the government established the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA), effectively creating a single-party system aimed at fostering national unity and strengthening cooperation between the government, army, and society. The IRAA absorbed or disbanded all existing political parties, taking over their roles within this new framework. It was managed by a council of government-appointed advisors and operated through a network of regional and local branches across Japan (Ōyama 1999).

In response to the army's growing influence, a faction called *Dōkōkai* emerged, directly opposing the army. Another group, the *Kōa Dōmei* (Pan Asia Parliamentary Group), criticized the conduct of the war and government overreach without opposing the war itself. With political parties banned, these parliamentary groups functioned as informal coalitions of like-minded individuals. While some were formed in 1941, most of their members had not participated in the formation of the IRAA in 1940. Despite restrictions, both groups continued to challenge government policies in the months that followed.

The coding is based on October 11, 1940, and cross-referenced with the Ministry of Interior's grading of incumbent legislators.

Parliamentary Group after 1941	Pro-IRAA (1)	Anti-IRAA (0)
Membership	322	112

[28] Teikoku Gikaishi, vol.41, 35.

1941.2.15-2.28. Questions 76-5/-14, Motions 76-1/-2 about IRAA

The formation of the IRAA created a situation where the executive branch supported specific political parties, a practice deemed unconstitutional by the judiciary. During the third Konoe Cabinet, the IRAA underwent several reorganizations and subtle renaming efforts.

In the 76th Diet, the 1941 supplementary budget became a highly contentious issue. A sum of 8 million yen, accounting for approximately 1 percent of the wartime supplementary budget, was allocated to support the activities of the IRAA. Non-IRAA legislators delivered lengthy speeches criticizing this allocation as blatant electoral interference by the army and the Ministry of Interior, with several motions and questions tabled in protest.

Ultimately, while the IRAA secured funding, it was prohibited from fielding candidates in the election due to constitutional concerns. In response, the army devised another organizational shell for the IRAA, allowing it to issue endorsements in the 1942 election.

It is important to note that not all 112 non-IRAA legislators endorsed the questions and motions opposing these measures, even though they addressed critical components of democratic practices.

Questions and Motions February 1941	Endorsed either (0)	Not endorsed (1)
Attended	74	366

1941.11.18 Motion 77-1 to conclude questioning of the State Ministers of Tojo Cabinet

The Konoe Cabinet fell amid failed negotiations with the United States, leading to the appointment of the hawkish General Hideki Tojo as Prime Minister. Tojo continued diplomatic negotiations until November while simultaneously preparing for war. Tense negotiations with the United States were a major concern for legislators, and there was widespread interest in the newly formed Tojo Cabinet's stance on war and peace.

The debate was initiated by a mild question from Goutarou Ogawa, a senior IRAA member and former Minister of Railroads under the previous Konoe Cabinet. However, pro-army legislator Yuki Takechi promptly tabled a motion to end the debate after just one question. This action reflects the army's aversion to parliamentary discussion and debate, which it viewed as indecisive and counterproductive.

With very little information disclosed to legislators, some voiced their disapproval. Despite this, the motion passed with an overwhelming majority, effectively ending the debate. This motion is among the last roll calls recorded in the Imperial Japanese Diet's minutes. While only 77 legislators opposed the motion, the opposition notably included some IRAA members.

Three weeks after the motion was introduced, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and Malaya, marking the beginning of the Pacific War.

Motions in November 1941	Support (1)	Oppose (0)
Attended	356	77

The 1942 General Election and Pro-Army Majority

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor and the initial military successes in Southeast Asia, Prime Minister General Tojo orchestrated the 1942 general election.

Under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA) devised a categorization system to evaluate the level of cooperation between incumbent politicians and the army. The top two classifications received the army's endorsement, while new candidates were fielded by the IRAA in constituencies where incumbents did not receive endorsement. A total of 466 endorsed candidates contested the election, ultimately securing 381 seats.[29]

Among the incumbents, 235 received the army's endorsement, while 131 chose to run without endorsement. Sixty-two incumbents did not contest the election at all, though many of them had initially sought to run and subsequently withdrew.

The electoral process cannot be characterized as entirely free and fair, and the army supported IRAA candidates with funding and manpower (Furukawa 2001); however, it is worth noting that anti-army candidates, including the previously expelled Takao Saito, were able to participate and secure seats. Approximately one-third of the votes and 18% of the seats were won by non-endorsed candidates. Importantly, this group of non-endorsed candidates encompassed some right-wing politicians who opposed army-led resource mobilization, referring to such efforts as communist measures.

[29] Teikoku Gikaishi, vol.43, 545.

After the election, the IRAA majority passed most of the legislation tabled or requested by the army with minimal deliberation. Even after 1942, clashes persisted between the army and some legislators, particularly over issues like freedom of speech and local governance. However, absenteeism rose sharply after the election, making it difficult to identify pro- and anti-army legislators in each instance. This marks the final event analyzed in this study.

1942 Election	Army-Endorsed	Non-Endorsed
Elected	381	85
Running Incumbent	235	131
Retiring Incumbent	0	62

Online Appendix L: Network Analysis for the Legislators and 1942 Election Endorsement



Figure L1: 1942 army endorsement –Network Analysis using Career, Background, and Birthplace



Figure L2: 1942 army endorsement –Network Analysis using Business and Interest Group Affiliations (line denotes the same sectors)

Online Appendix M: Timeline of American and Allied Embargoes on Japan and Government Reactions in Market

Table M1: Timeline of American and Allied Embargoes on Japan and Government Reactions in Market

Date	Event
1937.7.7	*Marco Polo Bridge incident (the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War)*
1938.9.30	League of Nations authorized its members to impose economic sanctions on Japan
1939.7.26	Termination of the US-Japan Trade Agreement
1939.8.23	British export restrictions on war materials (petroleum, iron etc)
1939.8.31	*Germany's invasion of Poland and Japan's declaration of neutrality*
1940.6.14	*Fall of Paris; Armistice on June 22*
1940.6–8	US announces a series of export restrictions (steel, iron, lead, and gasoline)
1940.9.23	***Imperial Japanese Army enters Northern French Indochina***
1940.9.26	**US imposes a full embargo on iron and petroleum exports to Japan**
1940.10.4	Japanese government bans short-selling in financial markets
	Japanese government increases deposit requirements
1941.2.8	Dutch export restrictions on war materials (petroleum, iron etc)
1941.7.21	***Imperial Japanese Army enters Southern French Indochina***
1941.7.26	**US and UK freeze Japanese assets, ceasing all trade**
1941.7.28	Japanese government asks major banks to stabilize the stock market
1941.12.7	*Attack on Pearl Harbor*

Online Appendix N: Percentage of Different Sectors in the 1942 Procurement List

Table N1: Top 10 export and import products of Japan in 1938 (in 1000 yen; from the Japanese Customs: customs.go.jp)

Export		Import	
Cotton textile	121,413	Raw cotton	292,476
Raw silk	84,991	Pulp	28,100
Nylon textile	56,957	Rubber	22,811
Silk textile	24,346	Linen	15,622
Wool textile	21,640	Beans	14,723
Cotton shirt	15,167	Soya	14,046
Liquor	10,637	Leather	9,541
Flour	10,337	Raw wool	8,676
Canned food	9,571	Coal	6,688
Cotton socks	7,109	Sulfate	5,398
Total	774,038	Total	968,220

Table N2: Top 10 export and import products of Japan in 1942 (in 1000 yen; from the Japanese Customs: customs.go.jp)

Export		Import	
Linen sack	17,486	Raw cotton	172,478
Cotton textile	15,062	Rice	45,433
Silk textile	13,506	Rubber	42,102
Nylon textile	12,804	Soybeans	25,539
Wool textile	10,154	Coal	24,557
Locomotive	9,269	Raw wool	21,627
Pottery	5,730	Bean powder	21,530
Electronics	5,681	Leather	16,996
Fiber	5,628	Linen	15,725
Dried fish	5,350	Iron	15,231
Total	362,672	Total	578,185



Figure O1: Stock Index: Solid vertical lines: US sanctions; Dashed lines: War-related Events

Online Appendix O: Stock Market Performance of Relevant Sectors around Economic Sanction

The descriptions and related discussions are provided in the main manuscript.



Figure O2: Stock Market Performance of Sanctions-Affected Sectors (Dashed lines indicate U.S. sanction timing)



Figure O3: Stock Market Performance of Potentially Sanctions-Affected Sectors (Dashed lines indicate U.S. sanction timing)



Figure O4: Stock Market Performance of Procured Sectors

Online Appendix P: Percentage of Different Sectors in the 1942 Procurement List

Table P1: Percentage of Different Sectors in the 1942 Procurement List

Weapons, Machinery, Tank, Ship, Munitions	63.3%
Airplane parts and related goods	13.1%
Food	6.6%
Clothing (Leather/Linen/Wool)	4.6%
Sanitation / Medicine	3.1%
Transport Machinery	1.8%
Textile (Cotton/Silk/Synthetic)	1.1%



Figure Q1: Pro-Army Attitude of the Sectors Affected by the Occupation of Northern and Southern French Indochina (Dashed Line)

Online Appendix Q: Graphs for: Discussion on Mechanism 1: Parallel Analysis with Annexation of French Indochina

Online Appendix R: Graphs for: Discussion on Mechanism 2: Imperial Rule Assistance Association Funding



Figure R1: T-Test Results for IRAA Membership



Figure R2: T-Test Results for Seat Retention in the 1942 Election

Online Appendix S: Excerpts from The Speech by Etsujiro Uehara in the Imperial Diet, House of Representatives, 76th Session, Plenary Meeting No. 19, February 27, 1941

The following is an excerpt from a speech by Etsujiro Uemura, who introduced a motion to deny the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA) access to funding from the second reserve fund. In his remarks, Uemura openly criticized the military and defended democratic principles. Although the motion was defeated by a vote of 54 to 192, it led to an unprecedented 196 abstentions on a budget-related motion, remarkable in 1941. The English translation follows the original Japanese text.

私ハ委員長ノ報告ニ對シ昭和十五年度第二豫備金支出中、大政翼贊會補助金九十三万圓ノ部分ハ承諾スベキモノニアラズトノ動議ヲ提出スル者デアリマス(拍手)御承知ノ通リ第一豫備金ハ豫算款項目ヲ有スル費目中、不足ヲ生ジタ場合ニ支出スル規定デアリマス、第二豫備金ハ、天變地異若シクハ不可抗力、其ノ他政府ノ豫期セザリシ事項ガ發生致シマシテ、必要ナル費用ノアツタ場合ニハ之ヲ支出スル規定ニナツテ居ルノデアリマス、然ルニ大政翼贊會ハ何等ノ法律上ノ根據ヲ持ツテ居ルモノデナイノミナラズ、政府ノ豫期セザリシモノデモナイノデアリマス(「ヒヤ〓〓」)大政翼贊會ガ過去、現在ノ狀態ニ於テハ憲法ニ背反シ、立憲政治ヲ紊ルモノデアリマスルコトニ付テハ、一點ノ疑問ガナイノデアリマス(拍手)

I hereby submit a motion to disapprove the portion of the committee chairman's report concerning the 930,000-yen subsidy to the Imperial Rule Assistance Association from the Second Reserve Fund for fiscal year 1940.

As you are aware, the First Reserve Fund is designated for shortfalls in budgeted items, while the Second Reserve Fund is to be used in the event of natural disasters, acts of God, or other unforeseen circumstances requiring urgent expenditure.

Yet the Imperial Rule Assistance Association not only lacks any legal foundation—it was not even an unforeseen occurrence for the government. ("Hear, hear!")

There is no doubt whatsoever that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, in both its past and present forms, violates the Constitution and disrupts constitutional governance. (Applause.)

然ルニ大政翼贊會ナルモノハ近衞公ヲ總裁トシ、各地方長官ノ肝煎ニテ、各町村各部落マデ細胞的組織ニ編成セラレ

ツツアル、實ニ大掛リノ大組織デアリマス、若シ此ノ厖大ナル國民組織ガ完成セラレ、政府主張ノ如ク高度ノ政治性ヲ有シ、所謂上意下達、下情上達ノ機關タルモノトスレバ、私ハ近キ將來我ガ國ニ於テ實ニ好マシカラザル事態ノ發生ヲ懸念スル者デアリマス

”The so-called Imperial Rule Assistance Association, with Prince Konoe as its president, is being constructed as a vast organization, systematically organized down to every town, village, and hamlet under the initiative of local governors. If this massive national structure is completed and, as the government claims, comes to possess a high degree of political function—serving as a mechanism for top-down command and bottom-up feedback—then I must express my grave concern that such a development may bring about a most undesirable state of affairs in our country in the near future.”

何ト言ウテモ翼贊會組織ハ「ソ」聯ノ「ボリシェヴイーキ」又ハ「ドイツ」ノ「ナチ」ニ酷似シテ居ルモノデアリマス、而モ此ノ組織內ニハ奇矯過激ナル言論ヲ敢テスル者ガ多數存在シテ居リマス

“No matter how one looks at it, the organizational structure of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association closely resembles the Bolshevik model of the Soviet Union or the Nazi model of Germany. Moreover, within this organization, there are a great many individuals who openly espouse bizarre and extremist rhetoric.”

政府ハ大政翼贊會ハ高度ノ政治性ヲ有シ、上意下達、下意上達ノ政治行爲ヲ行フモ、政事結社ニアラズト强辯シ、公事結社ナリト主張シテ居ル、然ラバ公事結社トハ如何ナルモノカ、實例ヲ擧ゲテ之ヲ說明セヨトノ議員ノ要求ニ對シ、治安警察法ノ委員會ニ於テ、司法省刑事局長ハ、公事結社トハ政治以外ノ公共ノ利益ニ關スル結社ヲ謂フ例ヘバ衞生組合ノ如シト答ヘテ居ル、天下何人ト雖モ大政翼贊會ノ實體、性格、其ノ活動狀態ヲ以テ、衞生組合ト同列ニ看做ス者アランヤデアリマス (拍手) 政府ノ答辯斯ノ如クデアル

”The government insists that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, despite possessing a high degree of political character and engaging in political activity—such as top-down instruction and bottom-up feedback—is not a political association but rather a public association. In response to a Diet member’s request to explain what exactly constitutes a ‘public association,’ citing concrete examples, the Director of the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice, speaking before the Peace Preservation Law Committee, stated that a public association refers to an organization concerned with public welfare outside the realm of politics—such as a hygiene association.

But who in this country could seriously consider the Imperial Rule Assistance Association equivalent to a hygiene association? (Applause.) That is the nature of the government's explanation."

尙ホ事實ニ徵シテ大政翼贊會ナルモノノ實體ヲ檢討スルニ、翼贊會ハ總理大臣之ヲ統率ストアリ、議會局ハ其ノ下ニアリテ立法府ヲ左右スル態勢ヲ有シテ居ル、翼贊會ノ役員ニハ現役軍人アリ、檢事アリ、多數ノ官吏モアルサウシテ總理大臣ノ命令一下、高度ノ政治性ヲ持ツテ政治的活動ヲ行フコトヲ標榜シテ居ル、是デ立法府ノ權威ガ保持出來ルカ、司法權ノ確立ガ出來ルカ (拍手) 大政翼贊會ノ實質ハ、何ト辯解シテモ、獨伊流ノ一國一黨ト揆ヲ一ニスルモノデアル、究極スル所幕府的存在ヲ意味スルコトハ、多言ヲ費ス必要ハアリマセヌ

"Looking further at the facts to examine the actual nature of the Association, we see that it is commanded by the Prime Minister himself, with the Parliamentary Affairs Bureau subordinate to it, creating a structure capable of dominating the legislature. Its leadership includes active-duty military officers, prosecutors, and numerous bureaucrats. The Association claims to carry out political activities of the highest order under the directives of the Prime Minister.

Under such conditions, how can the authority of the legislature be maintained? How can judicial independence be preserved? (Applause.)

No matter how the government may try to explain it away, the true nature of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is essentially that of a one-party state modeled after Germany and Italy. Ultimately, it signifies a bakufu-like regime—and that, I believe, requires no further elaboration."

憲法ニ依ツテ保障サレタ議會ノ論壇ニ於テサヘ八方手ヲ盡シテ議員ノ言論ヲ抑壓スル方途ガ、白晝公然構行シテ居ルト言ハレル、今日ノ日本デ言論ノ自由ヲ認メラレテ居ルノハ、翼贊會ノ役員ノミダト言ハレテ居リマス

"It is said that even within the Diet's forum—whose deliberations are guaranteed under the Constitution—every effort is being made to suppress the speech of its members through various means carried out openly in broad daylight. In today's Japan, it is said that the only people who still enjoy freedom of speech are the officials of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association."

批判ナキ所ニ公明ナル政治ハアリマセヌ、批判ト反省ナキ所ニ國民ノ健全ナル發達ヲ望ムコトハ出來ナイノデアリマス (拍手) 立憲政治ノ圓滑ナル運用ハ健全ナル政黨ニ依ル外途ハゴザイマセヌ、政府モ愈、翼贊會ノ行キ過ギト其ノ缺陷ヲ了解シ、其ノ政治的行爲ヲ抑制シ、人事ノ一新、機構ノ改造ヲ斷行スルコトヲ公約シ、其ノ結果追加豫算ヲモ改訂シテ實行豫算ヲ編成スルコトヲ聲明サレテ居リマス、是ニ出ツテ之ヲ觀テモ過去及ビ現在ニ於ケル翼贊會ノ組織ハ勿論、其ノ行動ニ付テモ正當ナラザルコトハ明カデアリマス (拍手) 而シテ之ニ向ツテ政府ガ此ノ畦局柄ヲモ顧ミズ、九十三万圓ノ

豫備金支出ヲ敢テセルコトハ何ト言ウテテ不常デアルト斷言シナケレバナラナイノデアリマス (拍手)

”There can be no transparent politics without criticism. Without criticism and reflection, it is impossible to hope for the healthy development of the nation. (Applause.) The proper functioning of constitutional government is only possible through the existence of healthy political parties. The government has finally acknowledged the excesses and shortcomings of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, promising to restrain its political activities, to reform its personnel and structure, and to revise the supplementary budget accordingly in order to implement a new operating budget.

From this alone, it is already clear that the organization and actions of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, both past and present, have not been legitimate. (Applause.) That the government nonetheless disregarded this critical juncture and allocated 930,000 yen from the second reserve fund is, in my view, plainly inappropriate and indefensible. (Applause.)”

政府ハ此ノ九十三万圓ノ使途ニ付テモ一々明細ニ議會ニ其ノ動字ヲ示スコトヲ避ケテ居ラレマス (拍手) 斯様ナ事實ニ徴シマシテ、私共ハ何トシテモ此ノ九十三万圓ノ第二豫備金支出ニ對シテ承認ヲ與ヘルコトハ出來ナイノデアリマス、若シ之ヲナスヤウナコトガアレバ、翼贊會ノ過去及ビ現在ニ於ケル行動ヲ是認シタコトニモナルノデアリマス、又之ヲ承認スレバ一此處ニ於テ委員長ハ色々ノ實例ヲ擧ゲラレマシタ、例ヘバ輸出入奬勵金ダトカ、或ハ食糧ノ增產計畫ニ支出シタモノハ第二豫備金ノ支出ニ依ルトカ、實例ヲ擧ゲテ申サレマシタガ、ソレト是トハ全ク根本的ニ其ノ性質ヲ異ニスルモノガアリマス (拍手) 私共ハ斯様テ惡例ガ議會政治ノ上ニ殘ルコトヲ斷ジテ許サヌ者デアリマス (拍手) 是ガ議會ニ對スル吾々ノ聯權ヲ全ウスル所以ナリト確信シテ疑ハザル者デアリマス

”The government has also avoided presenting the specific uses of this 930,000 yen in detail to the Diet. (Applause.) In light of these facts, we cannot, under any circumstances, approve the use of the second reserve fund for this purpose. To do so would be to retroactively endorse the Association’s past and present conduct.

The committee chair has cited various precedents, such as subsidies for export promotion or food production planning, which were funded through the second reserve. But this case is fundamentally different in nature. (Applause.) We cannot allow such a harmful precedent to remain in parliamentary politics. (Applause.)

In rejecting this, we affirm our constitutional responsibility as representatives of the people, and we do so with unwavering conviction. (Applause.)”

Online Appendix T: Excerpts from The Proposals on the Establishment of Imperial National Morality (皇國道義確立二關スル建議) in the Imperial Diet, House of Representatives, 85th Session, Proposal No. 6, September 9, 1944

The following are excerpts from The Proposals on the Establishment of Imperial National Morality, used to assess the ideological orientation of sanctioned legislators in the discussion of alternative mechanisms.

皇國道義確立二關スル建議一、神國斷ジテ守ルベシ道ノ國大日本ハ侵スベカラズ大東亞ヲ解放シ全人類ヲシテ覇道邪想ヨリ永遠救ハザルベカラズ此ノ道義ニ基ク世界新秩序ノ建設戰ヲ完遂スル爲ニハ先ヅ國内ニ於ケル政治上、行政上、生産上指導者責任ヲ明確ニシリテ皇國傳統/道義ヲ昂揚シテコソ初メテ全國民ノ總力ヲ遺憾ナク必勝ノ一點ニ凝集スルコトヲ得ベシ一、而シテ戰局/現狀一億/民ヲシテ憤然滅敵/忠誠心ヲ燃ヘ上ラシムル秋其ノ總力ヲ十百倍化シテ一死殉忠忱ヲ遂ゲシムルノ途萬遺漏ナキ企畫ト適正強力ナル指導ニ俟ツノ外ナキナリ

(Omitted middle part)

政府此關シ速ニ切腹遠島閉門謹慎等ノ日本的道義的制裁立法其他信賞必罰ノ上緊急適切具體的措置出デ國ヲ擧ゲテ大イニ皇國道義ノ昂揚ヲ圖リ、必勝態勢ヲ強化セラレムコトヲ望ム

1. Japan is a divine nation (shinkoku), the land of the Way (michi no kuni), which must by no means be violated. It must resolutely defend this Way and liberate Greater East Asia, and it must save all humanity once and for all from hegemonic violence and wicked ideologies. In order to complete the war for the construction of a new world order based on this morality, it is necessary, first and foremost, to clearly define the responsibilities of leaders in politics, administration, and production within the country, and to elevate the imperial nation's traditions and moral spirit. Only by doing so can the total power of the entire people be gathered together, without reservation, and concentrated fully toward certain victory.

2. At this point in the war situation and current conditions, it is the time to inflame in the one hundred million people righteous indignation to destroy the enemy and devotion to the emperor. The path to multiplying this national strength ten- or hundredfold, and to enabling everyone to die a loyal death and fulfill their sincere duty, depends entirely on meticulous planning and

strong, proper leadership.

(Omitted passages)

The government must, with regard to this matter, swiftly enact specifically Japanese-style moral sanctions such as seppuku (ritual suicide), exile to remote islands, house confinement, or voluntary self-restraint. It must also implement a system of clear rewards and punishments (shinshō hibatsu), and urgently take appropriate and concrete measures to promote imperial morality across the entire nation and strengthen the posture for certain victory.

Online Appendix U: Case Study of Rep. Torakichi Nakano

No biography of Torakichi Nakano (1879-1962) survives today, but two local encyclopedias provide relatively detailed accounts of his life[30] [31]. Hailing from the Aizu region, known for its strong local identity, this regional pride likely contributes to the relatively detailed accounts of his life preserved in local sources.

Nakano, born into the Kobayashi family in modest circumstances in Aizu, worked his way through Tokyo Professional School (now Waseda University) while employed. He began his career as a clerical secretary at *Otaru Daily Newspaper* in Hokkaido before becoming a police officer. His police service spanned the Hokkaido Prefectural Government, the Governorates General of Taiwan and Korea, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, and the former German colonies in the Pacific during World War I.

At 35, Nakano was adopted by business tycoon and Tokyo prefectural legislator Torajiro Nakano, taking the name Torakichi Nakano. After his adoptive father served one legislative term in 1917, Torakichi ran for office in Aizu in 1920, serving intermittently until 1949. Despite campaign finance scandals in 1936 and 1948, he was in office during the critical period of 1936–1942, which this study examines. He served as the chair of the Petition Committee but did not hold any cabinet positions.

Nakano also managed businesses while in office, serving as executive director of Tokyo Electric Ceramics and director of Toyo Paint. Notably, Toyo Paint appears in both the 1940 and 1942 *Army Designated Factories and Plants List*. Tokyo Electric Ceramics, though absent from the list, likely supplied parts to the airplane industry.

He was one of the few allies of General Hayashi to survive the 1937 election and took far-right positions on numerous occasions. During the Provisional Committee on the Bill for Restrictions on the Movement of Horses in September 1937, he controversially advocated for sending Koreans and prisoners to support the Second Sino-Japanese War effort. He also called for penal measures to address juvenile delinquency.

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[30] Aizuwaka Dictionary Compilation Committee, ed. Aizu Daijiten [Aizu Encyclopedia]. Tokyo: Kokushokankokai, distributed by Buneido Shoten, December 1985.

[31] Fukushima Prefecture, ed. Fukushima Kenshi, Vol. 22: 8 (Jinbutsu) [Fukushima Prefectural History, Vol. 22: -8 (Biographies)]. Fukushima: Fukushima Prefecture, February 1972.

As a proponent of the aircraft industry, he introduced the Bill on the Issuance of Patriotic Aviation Bonds to the floor in March 1938. Earlier, in 1934, he had been a vocal advocate for the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to record nonstop cross-Pacific flights.

In 1938, however, during debates on the Electricity Nationalization Bill, he delivered a starkly anti-government speech, criticizing the timing, inadequacy of compensation, and coercive nature of the planned nationalization. His criticism of government economic policies persisted. During the Committee on the Issuance of Public Bonds to Cover General Account Expenditures for Fiscal Year 1941, he lambasted the bloated budget and even demanded salary cuts for army officers and generals.

Interestingly, his shift toward economic liberalism coincided with a pro-democratic turn. By 1939, he had left his far-right faction to join the centrist Kanemitsu faction. In 1940, he refused to join the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA) and strongly criticized the National Eugenics Bill in a speech. In 1941, he endorsed criticism of government suppression of anti-army candidates in March and demanded that the Tojo government address critical questions in November. Running without the army's endorsement, he lost his seat in the April 1942 election but later returned to Diet under American occupation in 1946. In this study's dataset, he is coded as (1) until May 1939 and (0) thereafter.

Nakano's business undoubtedly prospered under army contracts, yet he consistently opposed the army's political agenda. His motivations remain unclear but appear to align with this paper's central finding that economic independence enabled anti-army political stances.

Online Appendix V: Graphs for: Discussion on Alternative Mechanisms 1: Nationalism and Rally-Around-the-Flag Effect



Figure V1: T-Test: "Proposal on the Establishment of Imperial National Morality" 1944.2



Figure V2: T-Test: "Proposal on the Total Armament of the Population" 1944.2



A B

Figure W1: Stock Market Performance and Partial Nationalization Attempt (dashed line)



Figure W2: Pro-Army Attitude with Partially Nationalized Sectors

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Online Appendix W: Graphs for: Discussion on Alternative Mechanisms 2: Business Consolidation and National Control



Figure X1: Stock Prices and Pro-Army Attitudes of the Sectors Affected by the Battle of Khalkhin Gol (Dashed Line)

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Online Appendix X: Graphs for: Discussion on Alternative Mechanisms 3: Conflict in Manchuria

Online Appendix Y: Coding Details for 10 occasions studied in this paper

10 occasions studied in this paper: Original in Japanese

Date	Event description and coding
1937.3.22	Resolution 70-11/-12 to Exterminate Human Rights Violations
第７０回帝国議会決議第１１号「人権蹂躙根絶二關スル決議案」又は第１２号「人権蹂躙二關スル決議案」賛成：0	
1937.4.30	20th General Election (PM Gen. Hayashi)
第２０回衆議院議員総選挙（林内閣）：　昭和会・国民同盟・国家社会主義派無所属：1	
1938.2.21-3.4	Legislation 73-19/-20 Prosecutor Office Bill; Court Composition Bill
第７３回帝国議会議員提出法案１９号・２０号「検察廳法案」　賛成：0	
1939.3.11	Legislation 74-28/-29/-30/-31 Amendments to Code of Criminal Procedure
第７４回帝国議会議員提出法案２８号・２９号・３０号・３１号「刑事訴訟法中改正法律案」　賛成：0	
1939.5.30	Split of Two Major Political Parties
立憲政友会中島派（革新派）・立憲民政党柳井派（分党派）・社会大衆党国家社会主義派＊：1	
1940.2.3	Motion 75-4 to refer Rep. Takao Saitō to the disciplinary committee.
第７５回帝国議会動議４号「議員齋藤隆夫君ヲ懲罰委員二付スルノ動議」　賛成：1	
1940.10.11	Formation of Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA)
大政翼賛会　発足時所属：1	
1941.2.15	Question 76-5 on the Current Situation and Governmental Leadership
第７６回帝国議会質問主意書第５号「時局の變遷と政府の指導に關する質問」（尾崎行雄）　賛成：0　又は	
1941.2.27	Question 76-14 on the National Polity and IRAA
第７６回帝国議会質問主意書第１４号「國體擁護ト大政贊贊會ニ關スル質問」（小山谷蔵）　賛成：0　又は	
1941.2.28	Motion 76-1/-2 on the Use of the second reserve budget to support IRAA
第７６回帝国議会本会議動議第１号・第２号「昭和十五年度歳入最出總豫算追加案二對スル修正動議」　賛成：0	
1941.11.18	Motion 77-1 to conclude questioning of the State Ministers of Tojo Cabinet
第７７回帝国議会本会議動議第１号「國務大臣ノ演説二對スル質疑終局ノ動議」（武知勇記）　賛成：1	
1942.4.4	The 20th General Election: Endorsement by IRAA
第２１回衆議院議員総選挙（東條内閣）　翼賛政治体制協議会推薦：1	

Table Y1: 10 occasions studied in this paper

Date	Event description and coding
1937.3.22	Resolution 70-11/-12 to Exterminate Human Rights Violations
Criticized suppression of dissent by police/army. Endorsers coded 0, non-endorsers 1	
1937.4.30	20th General Election (PM Gen. Hayashi)
Anti-democratic factions split from major parties. Pro-Hayashi:1, Anti-Hayashi:0.	
1938.2.21-3.4	Legislation 73-19/-20 Prosecutor Office Bill; Court Composition Bill
Promoted judicial independence and criticized interference. Endorse:0, otherwise:1	
1939.3.11	Legislation 74-28/-29/-30/-31 Amendments to Code of Criminal Procedure
Aimed to prevent unwarranted detention of dissent by police. Endorse:0, otherwise:1	
1939.5.30	Split of Two Major Political Parties
Seiyukai fully split into pro-Army and neutral factions, while Minseito gradually followed suit. Nakajima, Yanai, or other pro-Army factions are coded as 1, and all others as 0.	
1940.2.3	Motion 75-4 to refer Rep. Takao Saitō to the disciplinary committee.
Army pressured legislators to expel him after his anti-army speech. Endorse:1, otherwise:0	
1940.10.11	Formation of Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA)
Pro-government legislators consolidated power to suppress dissent and support the war effort. IRAA members: 1, others (eventual Dokokai, Koua-domei, or independent): 0	
1941.2.15 1941.2.27 1941.2.28	Question 76-5 on the Current Situation and Governmental Leadership Question 76-14 on the National Polity and IRAA Motion 76-1/-2 on the Use of the second reserve budget to support IRAA
Criticism of government suppressing parties other than IRAA. Endorse any:0, otherwise:1.	
1941.11.18	Motion 77-1 to conclude questioning of the State Ministers of Tojo Cabinet
Attempt to suppress critical questioning against PM Tojo. Opposed:0, Supported:1	
1942.4.4	The 20th General Election: Endorsement by IRAA
Army backed endorsed candidates, obstructed others. Endorsed:1, non-endorsed:0	