APPENDIX

Unconditional Loyalty: The Survival of Minority Autocracies

A1. Data Sources and Variables Description 2

A2. Coding Procedures 3

A3. Cases of Minority regimes with excluded majority 5

A4. Robustness Tests 8

A5. Interviews Protocol and Ethical Considerations 13

A6. List of Interviewees 14

A1. DATA SOURCES AND VARIABLES DESCRIPTION

(a) "minorityreg" and "dat" Data

Country	Country Name. (Casey et al. 2020).
Year	Year of observation. (Casey et al. 2020).
ccode	COW country code. (Casey et al. 2020).
cus_caseid	Autocratic regime case name. (Casey et al. 2020).
cus_fail	Regime breakdown (binary). (Casey et al. 2020).
cus_t_surv	Total duration of regime. (Casey et al. 2020).
cus_t	Regime age. (Casey et al. 2020).
allminority	All minority regimes (binary). Author coded.
minority	Minority regime that excludes a majority (binary). Author coded.
frac_minority	Minority regime that excludes other minorities (binary). Author coded.
partB	Regime has a party component (binary). (Casey et al. 2020).
persB	Regime has a personalist component (binary). (Casey et al. 2020).
mon	Regime is a monarchy (binary). (Casey et al. 2020).
mil	Regime is a military (binary). (Casey et al. 2020).
prev_partB	Previous regime was party-based (binary). (Casey et al. 2020).
prev_persB	Previous regime was personalist (binary). (Casey et al. 2020).
prev_mon	Previous regime was a monarchy (binary). (Casey et al. 2020).
prev_mil	Previous regime was military regime (binary). (Casey et al. 2020)
log_e_gdppc	Natural log of country GDP per capita. V-Dem.v12 (Coppedge et al. 2022).
gdp_growth	Annual economic growth. Author created using the V-dem dataset.
log_oil_income_pc	Natural log of oil production per capita. V-Dem.v12 (Coppedge et al. 2022).
log_e_pop	Natural log of country population. V-Dem.v12 (Coppedge et al. 2022).
v2caautmob_osp	Mobilization for autocracy. V-Dem.v12 (Coppedge et al. 2022).
v2exl_legitideolcr_1	Socialist or communist ideology. V-Dem.v12 (Coppedge et al. 2022).
v2exl_legitideolcr_4	Religious ideology. V-Dem.v12 (Coppedge et al. 2022).
v2x_clphy	Physical violence index. V-Dem.v12 (Coppedge et al. 2022).
v2regimpgroup	Regime most important support group. V-Dem.v12 (Coppedge et al. 2022).
foreignsupport	Regime supported by a foreign/colonial power, V-dem (*v2regimpgroup*=13).
any_spons	Whether the regime received foreign sponsorship (Binary). (Casey 2020).
e_civil_war	Civil War (Binary). V-Dem.v12 (Coppedge et al. 2022).
decolonize	Independence through decolonization (binary). (Hensel and Mitchell 2007).

(b) NAVCO 2.1 Data

camp_name	Campaign name. NAVCO 2.1, (Chenoweth and Shay 2022).
id	Unique campaign ID.
loc_cow	Location country Correlates of War code
location	Campaign Location. NAVCO 2.1, Chenoweth and Shay (2022)
year	Calendar year

success	Campaign was successful (binary). NAVCO 2.1, Chenoweth and Shay (2022)
minority	Campaign against minority regime with excluded majority (Binary). Author coded.
state_defect	Defection of state elites (Binary). NAVCO 2.1, Chenoweth and Shay (2022)
v2caautmob	Mobilization for autocracy. V-Dem.v12. (Coppedge et al. 2022).
log_e_gdppc	Natural log of country GDP per capita. V-Dem.v12. (Coppedge et al. 2022)
log_e_pop	Natural log of country population. V-Dem.v12. (Coppedge et al. 2022)
camp_size_cat	Estimated campaign size. NAVCO 2.1, Chenoweth and Shay (2022).
regime_support	Regime is supported from other states (Binary). Chenoweth and Shay (2022).
camp_support	Campaign is supported from other states (Binary). Chenoweth and Shay (2022).
camp_confl_intensity	Degree of unity amongst opposition. Chenoweth and Shay (2022).
prim_meth	Non-violence is the primary type of resistance. Chenoweth and Shay (2022).
start_date	First date on which campaign activity is observed. Chenoweth and Shay (2022).
end_date	Last date on which campaign activity is observed. Chenoweth and Shay (2022).
log_duration_days	Natural log of campaign duration in days. Author created using NAVCO 2.1, Chenoweth and Shay (2022)

A2. CODING PROCEDURES

I operationalize minority regimes using binary variables. To identify cases of minority autocracies, I first compiled a list of all authoritarian regimes between 1900 and 2015 by drawing on the extended version of Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz's *Autocratic Breakdown and Regimes Transitions* dataset (GWF)[1]. This data includes 355 authoritarian regimes in total. Then, I narrowed the cases to regimes that 1) practice ethnic recruitment in the military and security forces and 2) led by dominant minority ethnic groups.

First, to identify regimes that practice ethnic recruitment, I use the *Ethnic Stacking in Africa* dataset (Harkness 2021), which provides the first comprehensive data on the ethnic stacking practices of all African countries, from independence to 2018. I use the *Ethnic Stacking* variable which is a binary indicator for whether the leader practiced ethnic stacking. For non-African regimes, I use the "*milethnic*" variable in Geddes et al. (2018), which code whether officers come from more than one ethnic, religious, or regional group.

Second, dominant minority ethnic groups are identified using the Ethnic Power Relation Dataset (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). These are ethnic groups of a size less than 45% of the ethnically relevant population and coded as Senior, Dominant, or Monopoly in EPR. I chose 45% as a cut point to identify groups that are clearly numerical minorities and to avoid including groups that are very close in size to a numerical majority. See Table A1 for a list of all minority regimes.

And finally, for authoritarian regimes formed before 1945 or after 2010 (n=81) and thus included only in Lachapelle et al. 2020 and not in the GWF or the EPR, I examine whether any of these cases meet

[1] The dataset is sourced from Lachapelle et al. 2020. I added the regime in Bahrain (1971-), a minority regime that excludes a majority group, to obtain a comprehensive list of this rare regime type which is the core subject of my study. However, the results remain the same even when this regime is excluded (See Appendix, Table A6).

the outlined criteria: a regime with ethnic stacking and led by a minority ethnic group with a size of less than 45%. I consulted numerous sources, including, Minorities at Risk, Minority Rights Group International, Political Handbook of the World, CIA World Factbook, and a large number of secondary sources related to each regime. My research turned up no minority regime during this period.
This leads to identifying all minority autocracies between 1900 and 2015 (n=71). Then, from this list, I identify cases of minority autocracies that exclude a relatively homogeneous, not fractionalized majority ethnic group. I consulted the Ethnic Power Relation Dataset, the cases' narrative in the Ethnic Stacking in Africa Dataset, a large number of secondary sources, both academic and journalistic as well as the sources mentioned above. This allows me to ensure that there are no measurement errors in coding these cases of minority regimes with excluded majority. This leads to identifying 17 minority regimes with excluded majority, listed in Table A2.

Table A1: All Minority Regimes (1900-2015)

Benin 1960-1963	Benin 1965-1967	Niger 1960-1974
Niger 1974-1991	Guinea 1984-2008	Guinea 2008-2010
Sierra Leone 1967-1968	Sierra Leone 1968-1992	Togo 1963-
Nigeria 1966-1979	Nigeria 1983-1993	Nigeria 1993-1999
CAR 1981-1993	CAR 2003-2013	CAR 2013-2014
Congo Republic 1968-1991	Congo Republic 1997-	Uganda 1966-1971
Uganda 1971-1979	Uganda 1980-1985	Uganda 1986-
Burundi 1966-1987	Burundi 1996-2003	
South Africa 1910-1994	South Sudan 2011-	Syria 1963-
Jordan 1946-	Bahrain 1971-	Nepal 1951-1991
Nepal 2002-2006	Yugoslavia 1945-1990	Guinea-Bissau 1974-1999
Guinea-Bissau 2002-2003	Mauritania 1960-1978	Mauritania 1978-2005
Mauritania 2005-2007	Mauritania 2008-	Ivory Coast 2000-2011
Liberia 1944-1980	Liberia 1980-1990	Ghana 1960-1966
Ghana 1966-1969	Ghana 1972-1979	Ghana 1981-2000
Cameroon 1960-1983	Cameroon 1983-	Gabon 1960-
Chad 1960-1975	Chad 1975-1979	Chad 1982-1990
Chad 1990-	Dem. Rep. Congo 1960-1997	Kenya 1963-2002
Rwanda 1994-	Angola 1975-	Malawi 1964-1994
Sudan 1958-1964	Sudan 1969-1985	Sudan 1985-1986
Sudan 1989-	Iraq 1932-1958	Iraq 1958-1963
Iraq 1963-1968	Iraq 1968-1979	Iraq 1979-2003
Yemen 1918-1962	Yemen 1962-1967	Yemen 1967-1974
Yemen 1974-1978	Yemen 1978-	Taiwan 1949-2000

Table A2: Minority regimes with excluded majority (1900-2015)

Niger 1960-1974
Niger 1974-1991
Liberia 1944-1980
Togo 1963-NA
Burundi 1966-1987
Burundi 1996-2003
Rwanda 1994-NA
South Africa 1910-1994
Iraq 1932-1958
Iraq 1963-1968
Iraq 1968-1979
Iraq 1979-2003
Syria 1963-NA
Jordan 1946-NA
Bahrain 1971-NA
Yemen 1918-1962
Taiwan 1949-2000

A3. CASES OF MINORITY WITH EXCLUDED MAJORITY

Niger

From 1960 to 1974, Niger was governed by the Diori regime, which was dominated by the Djerma-Songhai ethnic group, comprising approximately 22% of the population, while the majority Hausa group, making up about 56%, was largely excluded from political power (Higgott and Fuglestad 1975; Vogt et al. 2015). The Djerma-Songhai group held all key positions in the politburo of the ruling party throughout this period, and more than 70% of the officer corps was composed of Djerma individuals (Ibrahim 1994). This pattern of ethnic dominance persisted under the subsequent Kountché regime from 1974 to 1990, which continued to favor the Djerma-Songhai while maintaining marginalization of the Hausa majority (Ibrahim 1994).

Liberia

The GWF dataset includes the regime during the period of 1944-1980 only. But Liberia was ruled by the True Whig Party (TWP) from 1878 to 1980, which represented the Americo-Liberian minority, constituting only about 2% of the population, while dominating the indigenous African majority. Initially, the Americo-Liberian settlers, who had arrived in Liberia starting in 1825 with support from the American Colonization Society, governed the settlement and declared independence in 1847 (Dearborn 2005; Dolo 1996). They viewed themselves as superior to the indigenous African population and excluded them from state institutions (Abrokwaa and McNair 2010; Seyon 1998; Nass 2000).

Burundi

1966-1987: A military coup in 1966 by Tutsi military officers established the regime of Michel Micombero. The regime was marked by the dominance of the Tutsi minority, constituting about 14% of the population, while the Hutu majority, making up approximately 85%, was systematically purged and excluded from power (Daley 2006; Lemarchand 1989).

1996-2003: The fragile new balance of power established by Pierre Buyoya's reforms in 1987, which allowed the Hutu-led Front for Democracy (FRODEBU) to be legalized and win the 1993 elections, was abruptly disrupted when Tutsi army officers orchestrated a coup on October 21, 1993. This coup led to the assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye and other FRODEBU leaders, resulting in the establishment of a new Tutsi-dominated minority rule (Lemarchand 1994).

Rwanda

Following the 1994 genocide, which saw the mass slaughter of Tutsis, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), predominantly Tutsi, seized control. Rwanda has been since governed by a minority Tutsi-led regime under President Paul Kagame that excludes the majority Hutus (84%). Although the new regime officially rejected ethnic discrimination, its actual practise reserved access to power, wealth, and knowledge to Tutsi elites in a process of "tutsization"(Reyntjens 2004). By 1996, the majority of MPs, four of the six Supreme Court judges, 80 percent of mayors, most permanent secretaries and university teachers, and almost the entire army command structure and the intelligence services were Tutsi (Reyntjens 2013, 20).

South Africa

The Union of South Africa was established in 1910, bringing together four colonies under a framework that entrenched racial segregation and minority rule. From 1910 to 1994, the country was dominated by a white minority, which constituted less than 20% of the population, while the majority black African population was systematically marginalized (Giliomee 1995). During this period, the military was exclusively composed of white personnel, with blacks entirely excluded from military service, and black police officers were prohibited from carrying firearms (Horrell 1970). It wasn't until 1973 that the regime began to incorporate non-whites into the police and military, but only at the rank-and-file level, leaving the higher echelons of power and decision-making firmly in white hands (Nothling and Steyn 1986).

Togo

In 1963, General Gnassingbé Eyadéma, a member of the Kabyè ethnic group from the north, seized power. Despite representing only about 10% of the Togolese population, the Kabyè have secured most of the country's high-ranking positions and have maintained their dominance since (Domefaa Atimasso 2013). Under the rule of Eyadéma and his successor, his son Faure Gnassingbé, the northern Kabyè ethnic group has maintained a significant hold on the country's political and military institutions, effectively excluding the southern Ewe majority from key roles, particularly in the army and security forces (Manley 2003; Heilbrunn 1993).

Iraq

The Iraqi monarchical regime (1932-1958) excluded the Shi'a (63%) and stacked both the executive and the military with the Sunni minority group (19%). For example, among 23 Prime Ministers between 1921 and 1958, only four were from Shi'a background.

The Baathist era, spanning from 1963 to 2003, perpetuated a similar pattern of Sunni dominance. The Baath Party, which came to power initially in 1963 and then solidified its control in 1968, established a regime dominated by the Sunni minority. This trend continued under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, who assumed power in 1979. During the Baathist period, the Sunni minority maintained a tight grip on political and military positions, marginalizing the Shi'a majority and other ethnic groups. (Bishara 2018; Saghieh 2004; Sassoon 2012).

Syria
Since 1963, Syria has been ruled by a regime dominated by the Alawite minority, which constitutes only about 12% of the population, while the Sunni majority makes up around 70%. Hafez al-Assad's rise to power in 1970 entrenched this minority control, a trend that continued under his son Bashar al-Assad from 2000 onwards. The Assad regime has maintained its dominance through a tightly controlled political structure, with key positions in the military, and security services held predominantly by Alawites (van Dam 2011; Bou Nassif 2015; Goldsmith 2018).

Jordan
The politics of Jordan under the Hashemite family (1946-present) has been dominated by East Jordanians, who make up around 42% of the population, while Palestinians constitute about 52%. The Hashemite monarchy and its allied East Jordanian tribal elites have maintained almost exclusive control over state institutions and its coercive apparatuses, including the military and security forces (Tell 2004; Ryan 2011; Girardin et al. 2015).

Bahrain
Since gaining independence in 1971, the Sunni royal family has dominated Bahrain's state institutions. Despite constituting only about 30% of the population, Sunnis hold key positions, particularly at the upper echelons of power. In contrast, the Shiite majority, comprising approximately 70% of the population, is systematically excluded from senior government roles and critical coercive apparatuses, including the police, military, and intelligence services, all of which are exclusively Sunni (*International Crisis Group* 2005; Abdo 2011; Shehabi and Jones 2015).

Yemen
From 1918 to 1962, Yemen was ruled by the Zaydi imamate, a minority regime led by the Zaidi branch of Shia Islam. Zaydis constituted only about 29% of the population, while Sunni Shafi'i Muslims made up around 69%. Under the rule of Imam Yaḥyā, the Zaydi regime relied heavily on the support of Zaydi tribesmen from the highlands, ensuring that both the military and tribal forces were predominantly recruited from the Zaydi population of northern Yemen (Brown 1963; Vom Bruck 2005; Girardin et al. 2015).

Taiwan
From 1949 to 2000, Taiwan was governed by the Kuomintang (KMT) under an authoritarian regime established following the party's defeat after the Chinese Civil War. The KMT relied heavily on the Mainland Chinese minority who migrated to Taiwan after the defeat and made up approximately 14% of the population, excluding the locals who are often referred to in the literature as "Taiwanese", "Local Taiwanese" (Dickson 2016; Laliberte 2013; Hood 2020; Slater and Wong 2022) and "Benshengren" (Shih 2021). While both Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese are ethnically grouped as "Han," the KMT's preferential treatment of Mainland Chinese fostered deep ethnic and political divisions. This tension reflected more a divide between Taiwan-centric and China-centric affiliations than a matter of heritage or ethnicity (Girardin et al. 2015). In the mid-1980s, the KMT initiated efforts to integrate members of the majority Taiwanese group into government roles, a process that accelerated after Lee Teng-hui

assumed the presidency in 1988 (Laliberte 2013). However, senior positions remained dominated by Mainland Chinese elites until the early 2000s (see EPR codebook, Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, 2010).

EXCLUDED CASE

Pakistan (1958-1971): The separation of East Bengal from India to join Pakistan in 1947 and then the constant migration and displacement of Bengalis from Pakistan until their separation to establish Bangladesh in 1971 significantly blurred ethnic configurations in Pakistan during that period as EPR and other sources note (e.g., see Heitzman and Worden [1988, 57]). In addition, Pakistan 1947-1958 witnessed a transitional period with elected councils and functioned under the rules of the colonial administration, as noted in the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) codebook. Pakistan during that period is also coded as a democracy in the Autocracies of the World Dataset (Magaloni, Chu, and Min 2013).

A4. ROBUSTNESS TESTS

Table A3: Table 2 with alternative measure for foreign sponsorship from Casey(2021)-1945-2010

	Dependent Variable: Regime Breakdown		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
All minority regime	−1.163**		
	(0.563)		
Minority excluding majority		−2.299***	
		(0.679)	
Minority excluding minorities			−0.393
			(0.525)
Log GDP	1.160***	1.119**	1.146**
	(0.437)	(0.447)	(0.454)
GDP growth	−0.077***	−0.082***	−0.079***
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Log population	−0.006	−0.013	−0.018
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.057)
Log oil wealth	−4.010***	−3.861***	−4.171***
	(1.476)	(1.390)	(1.492)
Party	−0.611	−0.280	−0.737
	(0.478)	(0.479)	(0.495)
Monarchy	0.333	1.479*	0.461
	(0.845)	(0.766)	(0.807)
Personalist	−0.600	−0.403	−0.595
	(0.416)	(0.410)	(0.428)
Military	0.523	0.603	0.549
	(0.475)	(0.491)	(0.465)
Foreign sponsorship Casey(2021)	0.022	0.102	−0.100
	(0.519)	(0.534)	(0.563)
Constant	23.409**	21.501**	24.356**
	(9.434)	(8.860)	(9.562)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered by country

Table A4: Regime Breakdown using the original GWF dataset (1946-2010)

	Dependent Variable: Regime Breakdown					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All Minority Regime	−0.198	−1.183**				
	(0.199)	(0.595)				
Minority excluding majority			−0.727*	−2.400***		
			(0.372)	(0.698)		
Minority excluding Minorities					0.081	−0.465
					(0.183)	(0.558)
Log GDP		1.141***		1.094**		1.145**
		(0.439)		(0.435)		(0.461)
GDP Growth		−0.076***		−0.082***		−0.078***
		(0.025)		(0.025)		(0.025)
Log Oil Wealth		−3.767***		−3.655***		−3.834***
		(1.409)		(1.338)		(1.387)
Log Population		−0.463		−0.133		−0.631
		(0.464)		(0.428)		(0.515)
Party		0.540		1.757**		0.625
		(0.878)		(0.721)		(0.850)
Monarchy		−0.547		−0.350		−0.574
		(0.435)		(0.427)		(0.472)
Personalist		−0.698		−0.701		−0.673
		(0.934)		(0.966)		(0.929)
Military		−0.007		−0.015		−0.019
		(0.056)		(0.057)		(0.058)
Foreign Support		0.605		0.683		0.596
		(0.474)		(0.479)		(0.487)
Constant	−2.936***	21.200**	−2.930***	19.461**	−3.000***	21.542**
	(0.123)	(9.061)	(0.105)	(8.554)	(0.115)	(8.942)
Country and Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered by country

Table A5: Using Autocracies of the World Dataset (Magaloni, Chu, Min; 2013)

	Dependent Variable: Regime Breakdown	
	(1)	(2)
Minority excluding Majority	−0.976**	−1.929***
	(0.380)	(0.582)
Log GDP		−0.152
		(0.312)
GDP Growth		0.0002
		(0.0002)
Log Oil Wealth		−0.095***
		(0.037)
Log Population		−0.843
		(1.137)
Party		−0.476
		(0.310)
Monarchy		−0.159
		(0.693)
Personalist		−0.936***
		(0.256)
Foreign support		−0.261
		(0.460)
Constant	−2.855***	1.440
	(0.089)	(7.422)
Observations	4,490	4,490
Country and Year FE	NO	Yes
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Standard errors clustered by country

Figure A.1: Covariate Balance



Table A6: Regime Breakdown, Bahrain Removed

	Dependent Variable: Regime Breakdown					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All Minority Regime	−0.348**	−1.023*				
	(0.153)	(0.565)				
Minority excluding majority			−1.019***	−2.281***		
			(0.298)	(0.838)		
Minority excluding Minorities					−0.012	−0.353
					(0.169)	(0.618)
Log GDP		0.938**		0.922**		0.944**
		(0.409)		(0.419)		(0.417)
GDP Growth		−0.077***		−0.081***		−0.078***
		(0.026)		(0.026)		(0.026)
Log Oil Wealth		−1.246		−1.313*		−1.368*
		(0.815)		(0.739)		(0.794)
Log Population		−0.995**		−0.754*		−1.091***
		(0.405)		(0.426)		(0.405)
Party		−0.099		0.952		0.041
		(0.872)		(0.886)		(0.855)
Monarchy		−0.326		−0.207		−0.323
		(0.366)		(0.374)		(0.371)
Personalist		−0.015		−0.017		−0.024
		(0.043)		(0.042)		(0.043)
Military		0.490		0.524		0.516
		(0.446)		(0.450)		(0.445)
Foreign Support	−2.829***	5.395	−2.834***	4.963	−2.901***	5.905
	(0.066)	(5.439)	(0.061)	(5.132)	(0.064)	(5.325)
Country and Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered by country

Table A7: Minority regimes and Challenge Success: Using Beissinger's Revolutionary Episodes Dataset

	Dependent Variable: Revolution Success		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Minority over Majority	−1.529**	−1.844**	−1.701**
	(0.765)	(0.778)	(0.836)
Log GDP		−0.073	−0.483**
		(0.164)	(0.209)
Log population		−0.082	−0.290**
		(0.091)	(0.119)
Number of participants (log)			0.432***
			(0.117)
Coalitional Leadership			0.789*
			(0.405)
Armed campaign			0.167
			(0.451)
Campaign duration (log)			0.016
			(0.078)
Post-cold war			0.276
			(0.382)
Constant	−0.417***	0.508	−2.769**
	(0.121)	(0.673)	(1.256)
Observations	303	236	215
Log Likelihood	−198.854	−157.416	−130.733
Akaike Inf. Crit.	401.707	322.833	279.466
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Design Analysis

I perform a design analysis following Gelman and Carlin (2014) to estimate the probability of an estimate being in the wrong direction (Type S error) and the magnitude being overestimated (Type M error). As recommended by Gelman and Carlin (2014, p. 642), the chosen effect size is determined from the literature on variation in authoritarian regime longevity. Previous studies have found effect sizes between 4 to 5 percentage points. For instance, the effect size of different regime types on annual breakdown is reported as 5.1 percentage points for rebel regimes (Meng and Paine 2022), 4.5 percentage points for party regimes (Miller 2020), 4.5 percentage points for revolutionary regimes (Lachapelle et al. 2020), and 4.6 percentage points for Soviet client regimes (Casey 2020). Therefore, I consider effect sizes of 3 percentage points to be plausible for my analysis. Using the retrodesign() function from Gelman and Carlin with a true effect size of 0.03 and a standard error of 0.0097, the results show a power of 0.87, a Type S error probability of 0.000000263577, and an exaggeration factor of 1.079. This indicates a high power with an 87% chance of correctly identifying the effect. The extremely low Type S error probability means there's a negligible chance of incorrectly determining the effect's direction. The exaggeration factor suggests that a statistically significant effect will be exaggerated by about 7.9%, indicating the results are fairly accurate in magnitude.

A5. INTERVIEWS PROTOCOL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This project was conducted with the approval of the Research Ethics Board (REB) at the University of Toronto (Protocol #:42993). In this section, I discuss the details of my fieldwork and certain ethical considerations given the sensitivity of the topic and the potential risks to research participants.

Between October and December 2022, I conducted in-person, semi-structured interviews with 25 respondents during my visits to Bahrain as well as in Lebanon and London (UK), where I met Bahraini participants living in exile. All interviews were conducted in the participants' native language (Arabic) and ranged in duration from 1 to 4 hours.

All interviews were conducted in confidentiality and in private settings, with respondents offered full anonymity. Due to the sensitivity of the topic and the potential risks involved, I did not collect personally identifiable information, such as audio recordings, from participants in Bahrain and those in exile who preferred not to be recorded or identified. I assured all participants that their interview content would remain confidential and that their names would not appear in any publications or research findings. For these reasons, I omit all personally identifying information from the evidence presented in this article. Quotations in this article are sourced from interviews where permission to record was given, or verbatim transcripts taken during the interviews. Given the potential for emotional distress and to maintain the voluntary nature of participation, I refrained from offering financial compensation or incentives for participants.

Interview participants included actors with knowledge on the political landscape and events in Bahrain, and specifically the uprising of 2011. This included members of political parties, activists, journalists, public intellectuals, and NGOs staff in Bahrain. Participants also included opposition members and human rights activists in diaspora (Lebanon and UK). The inclusion criteria were based on evaluating whether the potential participants 1) possessed knowledge and experiences related to Bahrain and 2) capable of making informed consent and 3) contributed to the diversity of my interviewee sample, thereby upholding the principles of fairness and equity.

I began my research with open-ended interviews and informal conversations with contacts that I had developed over years of working as a journalist in the Middle East. Snowballing method was used after this stage. I asked the first interviewees to suggest other participants to be interviewed. However, to maintain the right to privacy, which might be violated in a snowball recruitment process, I asked my interviewees to seek consent from possible new participants before giving me their contact information.

From the names provided following each interview, I selected those that helped ensure that my participants represent the diversity of the target population under study. Therefore, participants were recruited while taking into consideration criteria such as sect, age, gender, socio-economic status, party affiliation, and political views.

A6. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Interview Code	Description	Approximate Date of Interview	Duration of Interview
P.1	Independent liberal writer	Oct 2023	2 hours
P.2	Civil society activist.	Oct 2023	3 hours
P.3	Independent journalist.	Oct 2023	2.5 hours
P.4	Opposition leader in a leftist Party.	Oct 2023	2.5 hours
P.5	Shiite Islamist figure.	Oct 2023	3 hours
P.6	Researcher in a Bahrani human rights organization.	Oct 2023	3.5 hours
P.7	Member in a Bahrani human rights organization.	Oct 2023	1 hour
P.8	Leader in the *Progressive Democratic Tribune*.	Oct 2023	2 hours
P.9	Opposition leader in a leftist party.	Oct 2023	2.15 hours
P.10	Member in a Sunni Islamist party.	Nov 2023	1 hour
P.11	Leader in the *February 14 Youth Coalition*.	Nov 2023	2 hours
P.12	Independent leftist opposition and writer.	Nov2023	4 hours (over two meetings)
P.13	Former leader in Bahrain's Labor Union	Nov 2023	2.15 hours
P.14	Leader in *Bahrain Forum for Human Rights*.	Nov 2023	2 hours
P.15	Independent Bahraini journalist and writer.	Dec 2023	1.5 hours
P.16	Leader in the *Bahrain Freedom Movement*.	Dec 2023	2 hours
P.17	Bahraini researcher and writer.	Dec 2023	4 hours (over two meetings)
P.18	Bahraini activist and former political prisoner.	Dec 2023	2.15 hours
P.19	Former MB member and a member of *Al Wefaq* opposition party.	Dec 2023	1.5 hours
P.20	Bahraini activist and former political prisoner.	Dec 2023	2.5 hours
P.21	Leader in the *Islamic Action Society*.	Dec 2023	2 hours
P.22	Bahraini liberal activist, blogger, and former political prisoner.	Dec 2023	1.5 hours
P.23	Former MB member and a member of *Al Wefaq* opposition party.	Dec 2023	1.5 hour
P.24	Bahraini civil society activist.	Dec 2023	1 hours
P.25	Bahraini researcher and writer.	Sep 2023	1.5 hours

References

Abdo, Genieve. 2011. "Shia in Bahrain: Repression and Regression." *Al Jazeera English*, May 1, 2011.

Abrokwaa, Dr CK, and H. B. McNair. 2010. "Ethnicity, Politics and Social Conflict: The Quest for Peace in Liberia." Pennsylvania State University.

Bishara, Azmi. 2018. *الطائفة، الطائفية، الطوائف المتخيلة [Sect, Sectarianism, Imagined Sects]*. Beirut: al-Markaz al-ʿArabi lil-Abhath wa-Dirasat al-Siyasat,.

Bou Nassif, Hicham. 2015. "'Second-Class': The Grievances of Sunni Officers in the Syrian Armed Forces." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 38 (5): 626–49.

Brown, William R. 1963. "The Yemeni Dilemma." *Middle East Journal* 17 (4): 349–67.

Casey, Adam E. 2020. "The Durability of Client Regimes: Foreign Sponsorship and Military Loyalty, 1946–2010." *World Politics* 72 (3): 411–47.

Casey, Adam E., Jean Lachapelle, Steven Levitsky, and Lucan A. Way. 2020. "Replication Data for: Social Revolution and Authoritarian Durability." Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/OMDQI9.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min. 2010. "Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis." *World Politics* 62 (1): 87–119. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887109990219.

Chenoweth, Erica, and Christopher Wiley Shay. 2022. "Updating Nonviolent Campaigns: Introducing NAVCO 2.1." *Journal of Peace Research* 59 (6): 876–89.

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, and Jan Teorell. 2022. "V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset." Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds23.

Daley, Patricia. 2006. "Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa: The Challenge to the Burundi State." *Political Geography* 25 (6): 657–79.

Dam, Nikolaos van. 2011. *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Asad and the Ba'th Party*. London: I. B. Tauris.

Dearborn, Fitzroy. 2005. "Encyclopedia of African History." *Ed. Kevin Shillington. New York*. http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~tcrndfu/articles/EnclyAfrica%201Crops.pdf.

Dickson, Bruce J. 2016. "The Kuomintang before Democratization: Organizational Change and the Role of Elections." In *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*, 42–78. Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315285818-3/kuomintang-democratization-organizational-change-role-elections-bruce-dickson.

Dolo, Emmanuel. 1996. "Democracy versus Dictatorship: The Quest for Freedom and Justice in Africa's Oldest Republic–Liberia." *(No Title)*. https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1130282272638896896.

Domefaa Atimasso, Mawusse. 2013. "Togo: A Country of Strangers?" *Open Democracy*, 2013. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/togo-country-of-strangers/.

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2014. "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set." *Perspectives on Politics* 12 (2): 313–31. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714000851.

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph George Wright, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2018. *How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse*. Cambridge University Press.

Gelman, Andrew, and John Carlin. 2014. "Beyond Power Calculations: Assessing Type S (Sign) and Type M (Magnitude) Errors." *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 9 (6): 641–51. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691614551642.

Giliomee, Hermann. 1995. "Democratization in South Africa." *Political Science Quarterly* 110 (1): 83–104.

Girardin, Luc, Philipp Hunziker, Lars-Erik Cederman, Nils-Christian Bormann, and Manuel Vogt. 2015. "GROWup - Geographical Research On War, Unified Platform." ETH Zurich. http://growup.ethz.ch/.

Goldsmith, Leon T. 2018. "The Alawites of Syria: The Costs of Minority Rule." In *Routledge Handbook of Minorities in the Middle East*, 185–96. Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315626031-14/alawites-syria-leon-goldsmith.

Harkness, Kristen A. 2021. "The Ethnic Stacking in Africa Dataset: When Leaders Use Ascriptive Identity to Build Military Loyalty." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 07388942211044999.
Heilbrunn, John R. 1993. "Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 31 (2): 277–99.
Heitzman, James, and Robert Worden. 1988. "Area Handbook Series: Bangladesh, A Country Study." In *Library Of Congress Washington DC Federal Research Div*.
Hensel, Paul R., and Sara M. Mitchell. 2007. "The Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project Supplementary Data Set: Colonial History Data Set." *Harvard Dataverse* 2.
Higgott, Richard, and Finn Fuglestad. 1975. "The 1974 Coup d'État in Niger: Towards an Explanation." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 13 (3): 383–98.
Hood, Steven J. 2020. *The Kuomintang and the Democratization of Taiwan*. Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780429312168/kuomintang-democratization-taiwan-steven-hood.
Horrell, Muriel. 1970. *A Survey of Race Relations*. South African Institute of Race Relations Johannesburg. https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/SAIRR%20Survey%201969.pdf.
Ibrahim, Jibrin. 1994. "Political Exclusion, Democratization and Dynamics of Ethnicity in Niger." *Africa Today* 41 (3): 15–39.
International Crisis Group. 2005. "Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge," May 6, 2005. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/bahrain/bahrains-sectarian-challenge.
Lachapelle, Jean, Steven Levitsky, Lucan Way, and Adam Casey. 2020. "Social Revolution and Authoritarian Durability." *World Politics* 72 (4): 557–600. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887120000106.
Laliberte, Andre. 2013. "Democratization and Recognition of Difference in a Chinese Society: The Taiwanese Experience." In *Democratization and Ethnic Minorities*, 130–45. Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315882642-7/democratization-recognition-difference-chinese-society-andr%C3%A9-lalibert%C3%A9.
Lemarchand, René. 1989. "Burundi: The Killing Fields Revisited." *African Issues* 18 (1): 22–28.
———. 1994. "Managing Transition Anarchies: Rwanda, Burundi, and South Africa in Comparative Perspective." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 32 (4): 581–604.
Magaloni, Beatriz, Jonathan Chu, and Eric Min. 2013. "Autocracies of the World, 1950-2012." *Version 1.0. Dataset, Stanford University*.
Manley, Andrew. 2003. "Togo: After Eyadéma." *WriteNet. Paper*, no. 14. https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1309511/470_1165925697_3e4cb8084.pdf.
Meng, Anne, and Jack Paine. 2022. "Power Sharing and Authoritarian Stability: How Rebel Regimes Solve the Guardianship Dilemma." *American Political Science Review* 116 (4): 1208–25.
Miller, Michael K. 2020. "The Autocratic Ruling Parties Dataset: Origins, Durability, and Death." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 64 (4): 756–82. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002719876000.
Nass, I. S. 2000. "A Study in Internal Conflicts: The Liberian Crisis and the West African Peace Initiative." *(No Title)*. https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1130282268952484736.
Nothling, C. J., and L. Steyn. 1986. "The Role of Non-Whites in the South African Defence Force." *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 16 (2): 47–54.
Reyntjens, Filip. 2004. "Rwanda, Ten Years on: From Genocide to Dictatorship." *African Affairs* 103 (411): 177–210.
———. 2013. *Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda*. Cambridge University Press. https://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=HtZGAgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=political+governance+in+post+genocide+rwanda&ots=eXlD_QRbfv&sig=eJ_WEgQlJew2ZOCfvzGwsa4CUZ4.
Ryan, Curtis R. 2011. "Identity Politics, Reform, and Protest in J Ordan." *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 11 (3): 564–78.
Saghieh, Hazem. 2004. *بعث العراق: سلطة صدام قياماً وحطاماً [SIraq's Resurrection: The Ascendance and Decline of Saddam's Power]*. Beirut : Dar al-Saqi.

Sassoon, Joseph. 2012. *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime*. Cambridge University Press. https://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=sNSeusarZQMC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=Saddam+Hussein%E2%80%99s+Ba%E2%80%80th+Party+sasson&ots=GpcAsmioh7&sig=vhsjeUUre4VWcLsD_K3HLBQBzXo.

Seyon, Patrick LN. 1998. *Quick-Fixing the State in Africa: The Liberian Case*. Vol. 217. African Studies Center, Boston University.

Shehabi, Ala'a, and Marc Owen Jones. 2015. *Bahrain's Uprising: Resistance and Repression in the Gulf*. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Shih, Fang-long. 2021. "Taiwan's Culture Wars from 'Re-China-Ization' 1 to 'Taiwan-Ization' and beyond: President Tsai Ing-Wen's Cultural Policy in Long-Term Perspective." In *Taiwan in the Era of Tsai Ing-Wen*, 284–311. Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429356469-11/taiwan-culture-wars-re-china-ization-1-taiwan-ization-beyond-fang-long-shih.

Slater, Dan, and Joseph Wong. 2022. *From Development to Democracy: The Transformations of Modern Asia*. Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691231075.

Tell, Nawaf. 2004. "Jordanian Security Sector Governance: Between Theory and Practice." In *Conference Paper*.

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin. 2015. "Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59 (7): 1327–42.

Vom Bruck, Gabriele. 2005. "The Zaydi Elite during the Twentieth-Century Imamate." In *Islam, Memory, and Morality in Yemen*, by Gabriele Vom Bruck, 44–63. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-11742-7_3.