The Political Consequences of Green Policies: Evidence from Italy Online Appendix

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Abstract

For many governments, enacting green policies is a priority, but such policies often impose on citizens substantial and uneven costs. How does the introduction of green policies affect voting? We study this question in the context of a major ban on polluting cars introduced in Milan, which was strongly opposed by the populist right party Lega. Using several inferential strategies, we show that owners of banned vehicles—who incurred a median loss of €3,750—were significantly more likely to vote for Lega in the subsequent elections. Our analysis indicates that this electoral change did not stem from a broader shift against environmentalism, but rather from disaffection with the policy's uneven pocketbook implications. In line with this pattern, recipients of compensation from the local government were not more likely to switch to Lega. The findings highlight the central importance of distributive consequences in shaping the political ramifications of green policies.

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A Details on Principles for Human Subjects Research

Our survey was administered by YouGov to their panel participants who reside in the city of Milan, within Area B and outside of Area C.

Concerning the Principles for Human Subjects Research, we clarify the following:

- All survey participants provided informed and voluntary consent when included in the YouGov panel, as per the YouGov policy on informed consent and privacy protection. When taking the survey used for this study, respondents were informed that their answers would be used to provide information to YouGov clients for a study regarding mobility within the city of Milan.
- When taking a survey, panel participants receive a number of YouGov points on their YouGov account. Such points can be accumulated over time and redeemed for cash and other rewards. Participants in the survey used for this study received YouGov points as compensation. YouGov reports on its website that participants receive up to 400 points for completing a 10-15 minute survey. 5000 points correspond to a $50 payout. More information can be obtained at this link: https://my.yougov.com/en-my/account/faq/
- The survey does not entail any deception.
- The survey does not ask participants to engage with any material that could impose psychological distress or harm.
- The survey was administered by YouGov, in line with YouGov policy on privacy, which can be accessed here: https://account.yougov.com/us-en/account/privacy-policy
- The survey had no impact on the political process.
- The research protocol received IRB approval before its implementation.
- In terms of relevant laws/regulations awareness, the survey has been taken in compliance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the European Union, that is legally binding in Italy.
- Given all the above information, we do not claim any exception to the Principles for Human Subjects Research.

B Additional Figures and Tables

Figure (SI-1) The Area B Policy



Notes: The map represents the city of Milan and is sourced from the municipality website. It is publicly available and can be found at the following link: https://tinyurl.com/w2c3cyv7. The large area with red borders is Area B, our focus of interest. The other outlined area in the very center of the city is Area C, excluded from our analysis.

Figure (SI-2) Electoral Flows from Regional 2018



Notes: The figure reports electoral flows from the regional elections of 2018 (left side) to the EU elections of 2019 (right side).

Figure (SI-3) Electoral Flows from Municipal 2016



Notes: The figure reports electoral flows from the municipal elections of 2016 (left side) to the EU elections of 2019 (right side).

Table (SI-1) Controlling for All Previous Votes

Dep. var:	(1) Vote for Lega	(2) Vote for Dem	(3) Vote for Forza Italia	(4) Vote for Five Star
Diesel X Euro 4	0.100*	0.017	0.018	0.023
	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.029)	(0.034)
Diesel	0.005	-0.035	-0.041	0.015
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Euro 4	0.032	0.025	-0.013	-0.043
	(0.032)	(0.047)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Age	0.003**	0.003*	0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.174**	-0.007	-0.023	0.007
	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.016)
Vote Lega 2018	0.501**			
	(0.095)			
Vote Lega Regional	0.428**			
	(0.109)			
Vote Lega Municipal	-0.023			
	(0.102)			
Vote Dem 2018		0.377**		
		(0.090)		
Vote Dem Regional		0.222*		
		(0.090)		
Vote Dem Municipal		0.273**		
		(0.088)		
Vote Forza Italia 2018			0.611**	
			(0.099)	
Vote Forza Italia Regional			0.034	
			(0.088)	
Vote Forza Italia Municipal			0.266**	
			(0.088)	
Vote Five Star 2018				0.328**
				(0.094)
Vote Five Star Regional				0.329**
				(0.118)
Vote Five Star Municipal				0.272*
				(0.120)
Education F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	515	515	515	515
R^2	0.653	0.794	0.846	0.772

Notes: Columns 1-4 report estimates from regression models that include controls for age and gender, as well as fixed effects for education levels and income brackets. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01.

Table (SI-2) Switching to Lega in EU Elections of 2019

	Dep. var.: Switching to Lega in 2019 from earlier elections								
	Legislative Elections 2018			Regional Elections 2018			Municipal Elections 2016		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Diesel X Euro 4	0.116*	0.151**	0.144**	0.115*	0.151**	0.153**	0.142*	0.186**	0.184**
	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.067)	(0.064)
Diesel	−0.017	−0.044	−0.047	0.026	−0.010	−0.019	−0.002	−0.033	−0.039
	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.048)
Euro 4	−0.002	−0.003	−0.009	0.005	0.002	−0.014	−0.031	−0.039	−0.050
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.047)
Age		0.002	0.002		0.004**	0.004**		0.003*	0.003*
		(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)
Female		0.161**	0.148**		0.216**	0.204**		0.198**	0.187**
		(0.029)	(0.028)		(0.031)	(0.030)		(0.036)	(0.035)
Education F.E.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Income F.E.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	483	483	511	450	450	478	452	452	479
R^2	0.030	0.224	0.213	0.049	0.308	0.293	0.031	0.218	0.214

Notes: Columns 2-3, 5-6, and 8-9 report estimates from regression models that include controls for age and gender, as well as fixed effects for education levels and income brackets. Columns 3, 6, and 9 include respondents that did not report their car's fuel and/or emission category. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01.

Table (SI-3) Switching to Lega Before Area B

	Dep. var.: Switching to Lega from municipal elections 2016 to					
	Legislative Elections 2018			Regional Elections 2018		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Diesel X Euro 4	-0.029	0.017	0.022	-0.002	0.036	0.041
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.055)
Diesel	0.036	0.025	0.018	0.010	0.029	0.021
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.039)
Euro 4	-0.009	-0.035	-0.037	-0.024	-0.057	-0.056
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Age		0.000	0.000		-0.002*	-0.002
		(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)
Female		0.042	0.042		0.020	0.019
		(0.025)	(0.024)		(0.025)	(0.024)
Education F.E.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Income F.E.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	454	454	480	448	448	474
R^2	0.005	0.066	0.067	0.003	0.073	0.069

Notes: Columns 2-3 and 5-6 report estimates from regression models that include controls for age and gender, as well as fixed effects for education levels and income brackets. Columns 3 and 6 include respondents that did not report their car's fuel and/or emission category. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01.

Table (SI-4) Environment-friendly behavior and attitudes

Dep. var:	(1) Recycled	(2) Showers	(3) Eco Mode	(4) Bottles	(5) Policy	(6) Impact
Diesel X Euro 4	0.011	0.160	-0.242	-0.027	-0.009	0.035
	(0.129)	(0.150)	(0.147)	(0.185)	(0.049)	(0.054)
Diesel	0.089	-0.072	0.142	-0.041	-0.042	-0.087*
	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.106)	(0.147)	(0.036)	(0.041)
Euro 4	0.121	0.002	0.080	0.202	0.007	-0.002
	(0.094)	(0.113)	(0.108)	(0.142)	(0.035)	(0.038)
Age	-0.008*	0.004	-0.002	-0.031**	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	-0.013	0.005	-0.070	-0.007	-0.021	-0.049
	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.087)	(0.023)	(0.026)
Education F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	705	705	705	705	705	705
R^2	0.146	0.097	0.081	0.157	0.040	0.082

Notes: The dependent variables in the first four columns reflect, respectively, respondents' report of how frequently—on a five-point scale ranging from 'never' to 'always'—they carry out each of the following: (1) buy products made using recycled materials and/or packaged without plastic; (2) take short showers; (3) use home appliances in Eco mode; and (4) use reusable bottles for water. In column 5, the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent partially or fully agrees with the statement that government and local institutions should adopt emission-reducing initiatives aimed at achieving climate neutrality in Italy by 2050. In column 6, we consider agreement with the statement that adoption of green policies against pollution and climate change will have a very positive impact on citizens. All columns report estimates from regression models that include controls for age and gender, as well as fixed effects for education levels and income brackets. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01.

Table (SI-5) Global Level (ZeroCO2)

Dep. var:	(1) Website	(2) Video	(3) Social	(4) Podcast	(5) Tree
Diesel X Euro 4	-0.040	-0.045	0.141	0.220**	0.373**
	(0.046)	(0.076)	(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.078)
Diesel	0.056	-0.036	0.019	-0.021	-0.065
	(0.036)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.056)
Euro 4	0.013	-0.072	0.039	-0.017	-0.070
	(0.031)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.058)
Age	-0.001	0.001	-0.012**	-0.007**	-0.006**
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	-0.009	0.104**	-0.107**	-0.120**	-0.026
	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.035)
Education F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	705	705	705	705	705
R^2	0.047	0.157	0.184	0.187	0.297

Notes: The dependent variables are indicators equal to one in case the respondent: (1) clicks on ZeroCO2 website; (2) watches a short video about the company; (3) expresses interest in following the company's page on social media; (4) expresses interest in listening to the company's podcast on environmental sustainability; and (5) expresses interest in planting a tree. All columns report estimates from regression models that include controls for age and gender, as well as fixed effects for education levels and income brackets. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01.

Table (SI-6) Local Level (Genitori Antismog)

Dep. var:	(1) Website	(2) Newsletter	(3) Donation
Diesel X Euro 4	0.016	0.281**	0.434**
	(0.027)	(0.079)	(0.067)
Diesel	-0.029	-0.066	-0.027
	(0.023)	(0.056)	(0.049)
Euro 4	-0.034	0.001	-0.055
	(0.020)	(0.061)	(0.048)
Age	-0.001	-0.004*	-0.004**
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Female	-0.011	-0.022	-0.050
	(0.013)	(0.036)	(0.031)
Education F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	705	705	705
R^2	0.067	0.246	0.453

Notes: The dependent variables are indicators equal to one in case the respondent: (1) clicks on Genitori Antismog website; (2) expresses interest in subscribing to the association's newsletter; and (3) expresses interest in donating money to the association. All columns report estimates from regression models that include controls for age and gender, as well as fixed effects for education levels and income brackets. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01.

Table (SI-7) Responsibility, Taxes and Prices

Dep. var:	(1) Responsibility	(2) Higher Taxes	(3) Higher Prices
Diesel X Euro 4	0.362**	0.112	0.132
	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.078)
Diesel	-0.158**	0.035	-0.052
	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Euro 4	-0.056	0.079	0.042
	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.059)
Age	0.003	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	-0.013	-0.106**	0.003
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Education F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	705	705	705
R^2	0.110	0.249	0.166

Notes: The dependent variable in column 1 is an indicator equal to one in case the respondent partially or fully agrees with the statement that preserving the environment is the "responsibility of governments and big firms more than of citizens". In column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the respondent is "somewhat" or "very" willing to pay higher taxes in order to finance public initiatives aimed at preserving the environment. In column 3, the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the respondent is "somewhat" or "very" willing to pay higher prices for environment-friendly goods and services. All columns report estimates from regression models that include controls for age and gender, as well as fixed effects for education levels and income brackets. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01.

Table (SI-8) Control Group Restricted to Diesel Euro5

Dep. var:	*Vote for Lega EU 2019*					*Switching to Lega in 2019 from:*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	Legislative 2018 (6)	Regional 2018 (7)	Municipal 2016 (8)
Diesel X Euro 4	0.072	0.158**	0.130**	0.146**	0.143**	0.158**	0.193**	0.182**
	(0.047)	(0.056)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.051)
Age		0.003	0.003	0.005**	0.005*	0.005*	0.008**	0.006*
		(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female		0.233**	0.253**	0.273**	0.288**	0.268**	0.338**	0.318**
		(0.058)	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.053)
Vote Lega 2018			0.795**					
			(0.048)					
Vote Lega Regional				0.757**				
				(0.066)				
Vote Lega Municipal					0.760**			
					(0.068)			
Education F.E.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income F.E.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	376	376	370	357	349	316	309	313
R^2	0.005	0.196	0.578	0.525	0.475	0.318	0.407	0.328

Notes: Columns 2-9 report estimates from regression models that include controls for age and gender, as well as fixed effects for education levels and income brackets. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01.

Table (SI-9) Controlling for Car Use: KMs per Year

Dep. var.:	*Vote for Lega EU 2019*		*Switching to Lega in 2019 from:*	
			Legislative 2018	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Diesel X Euro 4	0.157*	0.193*	0.107*	0.148**
	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Diesel	−0.096	−0.099	−0.050	−0.045
	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.038)	(0.041)
Euro 4	−0.066	−0.054	−0.021	−0.000
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.040)	(0.038)
KMs per year: less than 1k	-0.020		-0.216*	
	(0.141)		(0.098)	
KMs per year: 1k to 5k	-0.028		-0.157	
	(0.109)		(0.099)	
KMs per year: 5k to 10k	-0.092		-0.135	
	(0.103)		(0.095)	
KMs per year: 10k to 20k	-0.135		-0.154	
	(0.103)		(0.097)	
KMs per year: 20k to 30k	0.043		0.068	
	(0.109)		(0.107)	
KMs per year: more than 30k	-0.254*		-0.294**	
	(0.123)		(0.113)	
KMs per year: at least 10k		-0.052		0.010
		(0.041)		(0.030)
Education F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age and Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	602	602	483	483
R^2	0.163	0.133	0.326	0.224

Notes: All columns report estimates from regression models that include controls for age and gender, as well as fixed effects for education levels and income brackets. The control variables "KMs per year" are indicators for how many kilometers the respondent drives with their personal car, on average, per year. In columns 1 and 3, the excluded category is "don't know". Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01.

Table (SI-10) Controlling for Car Use: Frequency

Dep. var.:	*Vote for Lega EU 2019*				*Switching to Lega in 2019 from:*			
					Legislative 2018			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Diesel X Euro 4	0.228**	0.190*	0.204*	0.212**	0.201**	0.160**	0.186**	0.176**
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.059)
Diesel	−0.091	−0.102	−0.090	−0.107	−0.023	−0.040	−0.034	−0.045
	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Euro 4	−0.085	−0.050	−0.065	−0.062	−0.047	−0.004	−0.038	−0.016
	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.040)
Car use: daily	0.171*				−0.081			
	(0.077)				(0.078)			
Car use: weekly	0.394**				0.129			
	(0.075)				(0.075)			
Car use: monthly	0.352**				0.128			
	(0.091)				(0.086)			
Car use: yearly	0.438				0.019			
	(0.227)				(0.090)			
Car use: at least weekly		−0.062				−0.088		
		(0.063)				(0.047)		
Car use for work: daily			−0.120*				−0.100**	
			(0.058)				(0.036)	
Car use for work: weekly			0.093				0.145**	
			(0.062)				(0.041)	
Car use for work: monthly			0.093				0.108	
			(0.080)				(0.079)	
Car use for work: yearly			0.030				0.059	
			(0.115)				(0.095)	
Car use for work: at least weekly				−0.075				−0.051
				(0.046)				(0.034)
Education F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age and Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	602	602	602	602	483	483	483	483
R^2	0.183	0.132	0.170	0.135	0.316	0.230	0.323	0.227

Notes: All columns report estimates from regression models that include controls for age and gender, as well as fixed effects for education levels and income brackets. The control variables "car use" are indicators for how frequently the respondent uses their personal car, in general and specifically for work. In columns 1 and 5, the excluded category is "never". In columns 3 and 7, the excluded category is "don't work". Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01.

Table (SI-11) Switching to Lega in EU Elections of 2019 - Robustness

	Dep. var.: Switching to Lega in 2019 from earlier elections								
	Legislative Elections 2018			Regional Elections 2018			Municipal Elections 2016		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Diesel X Euro 4	0.125**	0.166**	0.157**	0.118*	0.159**	0.132*	0.143*	0.184**	0.164**
	(0.048)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Diesel	−0.027	−0.055	−0.057	0.024	−0.014	−0.000	−0.007	−0.036	−0.029
	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.048)
Euro 4	−0.012	−0.015	−0.022	−0.007	−0.014	−0.022	−0.054	−0.065	−0.069
	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Age		0.002	0.002		0.003**	0.003**		0.001	0.001
		(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)
Female		0.156**	0.143**		0.192**	0.172**		0.163**	0.145**
		(0.030)	(0.028)		(0.030)	(0.030)		(0.034)	(0.033)
Education F.E.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Income F.E.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	486	486	514	475	475	504	492	492	522
R^2	0.028	0.214	0.204	0.044	0.270	0.239	0.024	0.190	0.174

Notes: Columns 2-3, 5-6, and 8-9 report estimates from regression models that include controls for age and gender, as well as fixed effects for education levels and income brackets. Columns 3, 6, and 9 include respondents that did not report their car's fuel and/or emission category. Compared to the baseline switching regressions, this table also includes respondents who voted in 2019 but did not vote in earlier elections, potentially switching from "non vote" to "vote for Lega". Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01.

Table (SI-12) Other Political Parties

Party Name	**Orientation**	**Vote Share**
Panel A: Legislative Elections 2018		
Italia Europa Insieme	Centre-left	0.45%
Civica Popolare Lorenzin	Centre-left	0.81%
Potere al Popolo	Extreme-left	1.33%
CasaPound Italia	Extreme-right	0.71%
Il Popolo della Famiglia	Centre-right	0.30%
10 Volte Meglio	Centre	0.33%
Italia agli Italiani	Extreme-right	0.39%
Per una Sinistra Rivoluzionaria	Extreme-left	0.24%
Partito Repubblicano Italiano - ALA	Centre	0.10%
Panel B: Regional Elections 2018		
Italia Europa Insieme	Centre-left	1.34%
Civica Popolare Lorenzin	Centre-left	0.30%
CasaPound Italia	Extreme-right	0.77%
Grande Nord	Centre-right	0.14%
Partito Pensionati	Centre-right	0.27%
Panel C: Municipal Elections 2016		
Radicali, Federalisti, Laici, Ecologisti	Centre-left	1.88%
Italia dei Valori	Centre-left	0.69%
Io Corro per Milano	Civic	3.02%
Partito Pensionati	Centre-right	0.43%
Noi x Milano	Civic	1.12%
Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori	Extreme-left	0.41%
Alternativa Municipale	Civic	0.28%
Fuxia People	Civic	0.21%

Notes: Vote shares are obtained from official government sources and refer to the city of Milan. Data can be found at this link: https://tinyurl.com/mr29uy38.

Table (SI-13) Comparison of the Sample with the Census

	Full Sample	**Census**
Age		
18-24	2.7	7.7
25-34	10.8	13.2
35-44	34.7	16.2
45-54	31.3	19.8
55+	20.5	43.1
Gender		
Male	52.2	48.2
Female	47.8	51.8
Education		
High school diploma	33.7	55.2
Bachelor	27.2	8.3
MA or higher	38.5	36.5
Unknown	0.6	-
Income		
Less than 15,000€ per year	6.9	35.5
From 15,000€ to 29,999€ per year	20.3	23.3
From 30,000€ to 44,999€ per year	21.7	27.6
From 45,000€ to 69,999€ per year	14.9	5.4
Above 70,000€ per year	26.8	8.2
No Answer / DK	9.3	-

Notes: Column 1 reports descriptive statistics on the full sample, as in column 1 of Table 1. Column 2 reports official figures about the city of Milan. Data on age, gender, and education are from the 2020 Census and can be found on the Italian Statistical Institute (ISTAT) website at this link: https://tinyurl.com/4zptw2j9. Data on income are provided by the Ministry of Economics and Finance; they refer to the year 2020 and are available at this link: https://tinyurl.com/4uwby46y. The income brackets in the official data are slightly different than those employed in the survey. In particular, they are as follows: "Less than 15,000€"; "From 15,000€ to 25.999€"; "From 26,000€ to 54.999€"; "From 55,000€ to 74,999€"; and "above 75,000€".

Table (SI-14) Model including only controls

	Dep. var.: Vote for Lega EU 2019
	(1)
Age	0.001
	(0.002)
Female	0.068
	(0.048)
Education - 2	−0.138*
	(0.064)
Education - 3	−0.166*
	(0.071)
Education - 4	0.294**
	(0.067)
Income - 2	−0.035
	(0.138)
Income - 3	0.008
	(0.139)
Income - 4	0.173
	(0.147)
Income - 5	0.089
	(0.112)
Income - 6	0.138
	(0.113)
Income - 7	0.147
	(0.122)
Income - 8	0.142
	(0.128)
Income - 9	−0.024
	(0.119)
Income - 10	0.167
	(0.132)
Income - 11	0.243
	(0.141)
Income - 12	0.080
	(0.131)
Income - 13	0.083
	(0.138)
Income - 14	0.065
	(0.109)
Income - 15	0.139
	(0.187)
Income - 16	0.226
	(0.119)
Observations	324
R^2	0.071

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The first category of education and income is omitted. *p<0.05; **p<0.01.

C Subjects Potentially Misreporting the Effect of the Policy

As mentioned in footnote 19 in the main text, one might be worried that our results could be driven by some subjects who may have misreported–either by mistake or deliberately–the effect of the traffic ban on their car. In particular, one could be concerned that Lega voters might have been more inclined to do so. Yet, for several reasons we believe this is highly unlikely.

First, it is important to recall that there were six categories of cars banned by Area B: Petrol-Euro0, and all the Diesel-Euro0-to-4. In our analysis, we only focus on Diesel-Euro4 car owners. That is, subjects are assigned to the treatment group only if: (1) they report that they were affected by the ban; and (2) they indicate that, at the time when Area B was announced, they owned a Diesel-Euro4 car. All subjects who owned other types of cars affected by the traffic ban are not part of our sample. It is possibile, at least in theory, that Lega voters might have been inclined to report incorrectly that they owned a car affected by the ban. However, this would have not been enough for these subjects to be assigned to the treatment group. For this to happen, the subjects would have had to correctly guess and declare the specific car category (Diesel-Euro4) that would have granted them assignment to treatment in our study. This is something they had no reason to know or even suspect. With six categories of banned cars, they had only a one-out-of-six chance of being included in the treatment group. It is hard to think that our treatment group has enough of these "lucky guessers" to drive our results.

Moreover, we also present evidence that the introduction of Area B has a significant effect on switches in voting behavior. That is, focusing on subjects who had not voted for Lega in previous elections, we find that treated subjects are more likely than controls to switch to Lega in the 2019 European elections. It seems hard to envision a scenario where our result on switches to Lega is driven by subjects who: (1) misreport whether their car was affected by the ban; (2) among six affected car types indicate the only one that would grant them assignment to treatment; and (3) had not voted for Lega in the previous elections, but did so in 2019.

In general, one could be worried about the fact that asking subjects some questions about their voting behavior or ideological leanings might have influenced their answers on questions about whether they owned a car affected by the ban, especially for Lega voters. Yet we can exclude this possibility as the questions on cars were placed early in the survey, and preceded

the questions on voting behavior and political views. Taken together, we believe the points above should reassure the reader about the possibility that any misreporting of the effect of the policy by some subjects could have a meaningful impact on the results we report.