Codebook:
Partisan Distribution of Ministerial Portfolios in Asian-Pacific Democracies

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Data file: data_stata_pp.dta

Variable list:

- **countryname**: The name of country.
- **countrycode**: The unique code for country.
- **cabinetcode**: The unique code for cabinet.
- **year**: The year wherein the party entered the government.
- **presidential**: A dummy variable equal to one if the country had a presidential system (i.e., absence of no-confidence vote), zero otherwise.
- **party**: The name of party.
- **formateur**: A dummy variable equal to one if the party had a status as the formateur, zero otherwise.
- **party_portfolios**: The number of ministerial portfolios directly controlled by each party.
- **gov_part_portfolios**: The number of ministerial portfolios directly controlled by all the parties participating in the government.
- **gov_ind_portfolio**: The number of ministerial portfolios assigned to independents.
- **gov_portfolio**: The total number of ministerial portfolios in government.
- **party_port2**: The number of ministerial portfolios under the control of each party.[1]
- **gov_portfolio2**: The total number of ministerial portfolios in government.
- **party_seats**: The number of legislative seats controlled by each party

[1] Non-partisan ministers in presidential cabinets are classified as members associated with the party of the president (i.e., the formateur party). In presidential systems, presidents tend to hold nearly exclusive power to assign or dismiss cabinet members by executive prerogative, especially in East Asia (Lee, 2018a,b; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Hahm, Jung and Lee, 2013; Kang, 2015; Croissant, 2002). In this situation, presidents tend to fill high-policy cabinet posts with independent members who are in the president's inner circle which is formed based on mutual biographical, educational, or familial backgrounds (Lee, 2018a,b). These non-partisan members serve as loyalists who are less likely to deviate from the presidents' policy agenda (Lee, 2018a,b; Blondel, 1991; Camp, 2010).

- **gov_seats**: The total number of legislative seats controlled by the government
- **leg_pow3**: Level of Legislature's institutional power. This variable was extracted from the V-dem dataset [Version 10] (Coppedge et al. 2020). It measures the degree to which the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is necessary for the passage of legislation. Higher values represent higher levels of the legislature's authority. The values range from -0.967 (Timor-Leste) to 2.799 (Japan).
- **party_inst**: Level of party system institutionalization. This variable was drawn from the V-dem dataset [Version 10] (Coppedge et al. 2020). It is an aggregated score for various features of political parties that help establish a more institutionalized party system, such as connections to civil society, the foundation of party activists, level and depth of organization, coherence of party platforms and ideologies, and party-line voting among legislators within the legislature. The traits of all parties are considered with an emphasis on larger parties that may dominate and define the party system. Higher values indicate higher levels of party system institutionalization. The values range from 0.169 (Solomon Islands) to 0.959 (Australia).
- **h_polcon3_vdem**: Level of political constraints generated by veto players. This variable was collected from the Political Constraint Index (POLCON) dataset (Henisz 2022). It is an aggregated score for the feasibility of policy change calculated by 1) the number of independent branches of government with veto power over policy change, 2) the extent of policy alignment across branches of government, 3) the extent of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch. Higher values represent higher levels of political constraints generated by veto players. The values range from 0 (Thailand, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Myanmar) to 0.88 (India).
- **h_polcon5_vdem**: Level of political constraints generated by veto players. This variable was gathered from the Political Constraint Index (POLCON) dataset (Henisz 2022). In addition to the three components that h_polcon3_vdem includes, it contains information on independent judiciary and independent sub-federal entities. Higher values represent higher levels of political constraints generated by veto players. The values range from 0 (Thailand, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Myanmar) to 0.88 (India).
- **region**: The name of the region in which each country belongs to. The classification scheme extracted from the United Nations (UN) [https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/#geo-regions].
- **legpower**: Level of Legislature's institutional power. This variable was formulated based on leg_pow3. It was re-scaled from 0 to 1.

References

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